Full Text Papers
Deciding What Has To Be Done: General William E. Depuy and the 1976
Edition of FM 100-5, Operations,(Leavenworth Paper #16). MAJ
Paul H. Herbert.
Even though General DePuy and the other authors of FM 100-5 intended
to write a manual that would prepare the Army for its next war, not
its last, they could not possibly escape the Army's historical
experience. General DePuy's most fundamental ideas about tactics,
combined arms, combat leadership, the American Soldier, and the U.S.
Army came directly from the campaign to liberate Europe from Nazism.
He never forgot them and he wrote them into FM 100-5.
Eisenhower, Strategic Operator and Leader.
LTC John W. Hall.
Dwight David Eisenhower entered onto the world stage In early 1942
during the very darkest hours of World War II and exited in 1961
after leading the nation as our President for eight peaceful and
productive years. The study examines his ability to lead at the
highest levels of strategic military and political power. It argues
that he is in fact one of our nation's few truly great leaders of
vision and moral courage. The paper uses several of Eisenhower's key
decisions during important events at critical points of his career
to demonstrate his ability to make major visionary decisions while
enduring extreme national and international political pressure and
personal criticism. Lastly, the end results and implications of his
decisions are discussed.
Forging the Instrument: George C. Marshall as a
Strategic Leader, 1939- 1941. LTC
John T. Nelsen II.
General George C. Marshall assumed the duties of Chief of Staff,
U.S. Army, in July 1939. During the subsequent two and a half years,
he played a central leadership role in preparing the United States
for the possibility of war. In fact, largely through his efforts,
America entered the war with a running start. By that time, it had
developed a large, well trained Army of over 1.4 million men. This
was a far cry from the paltry forces which had existed in 1939. This
paper focuses on Marshall's strategic leadership during the
relatively unglamorous prewar years. During this period, Marshall
went from a generally unknown Washington personage to become one of
the more recognized and respected national figures. In the process,
he laid the foundation for exercising enormous influence at the
highest levels of government throughout the war. Major aspects of
his strategic leadership analyzed include the following: his
strategic vision, the step-by-step process of implementing that
vision, his relations with Congress, his efforts to institutionalize
selected values across the Army in consonance with his vision, his
success in structuring and restructuring the Army in pursuit of his
vision and institutional values, his own interpersonal skills, and
his role in strategy formulation.
General George C.
Marshall and the Army Staff: A Study in Effective Staff Leadership.
LTC Paul G. Munch.
Few dispute George Marshall's role in winning World War II. He is
universally recognized as one of its most important leaders. But
General Marshall was not a commander in the field. Unlike Generals
Eisenhower, MacArthur, Bradley, and Patton, Marshall was the Army's
Chief of Staff -- a position normally relegated to historical
obscurity. In fact, Roosevelt once asked, Who remembers who the
Chiefs of Staff were during the Civil War or World War I? Despite
his position as a staff officer, Marshall emerged as the war's most
respected general. He and his staff directed military operations
around the world. In addition, he was Roosevelt's most trusted
military advisor, a strategist on global terms, and a champion of
alliance warfare. He was one of the war's most effective leaders. As
with most talented men, one can learn a great deal from George
Marshall. His ability to successfully direct the Army Staff during
the crucial 3-month period from December 1941 through March 1942 is
particularly instructive. It provides some very good insights on how
to lead and direct a large staff faced with multiple problems.
During this period, Marshall and his staff successfully tackled a
wide range of critical problems that would affect the outcome of the
war. This article looks at Marshall's preparation to become Chief of
Staff, his ability to build an effective team, the character of the
staff, and Marshall's interaction with these very talented men.
Following this background information, the author investigates how
Marshall handled two critical issues: the support to the beleaguered
forces in the Philippines, and the reorganization of the Army Staff.
Lastly, he offers some insights into why Marshall was so successful
as a staff leader.
George C. Marshall: The Essential Strategic
Leader. LTC Jeffrey S. Tipton.
The complexity of the 21st century operational environment, the
Global War on Terrorism, and on-going Army transformation require
more of Army leaders at all levels. One can apply lessons learned
from General George C. Marshall's career when developing today's
leadership programs. George Marshall had unique foreign, domestic,
and wartime experiences from his commissioning to his final military
assignment as Army Chief of Staff. General Marshall displayed
certain talents and abilities that allowed him to function with, be
accepted by, and finally be chosen by national civilian authority
for service as Secretary of State. These attributes, elements of
character, and calculated uses of the strategic art enabled the
creation or expansion of skills that facilitated strategic
leadership at an unprecedented scale. This paper examines Marshall's
character, education, experiences, and decisions, and then
coordinates these characteristics with selected Pentathlete skills
and metacompetencies to form strategic leader essentials. Cultural
adjustment, institutional change, professional education, and
self-awareness recommendations are suggested to improve leadership
development for contemporary officer leaders in the Army.
George Washington, America's First Strategic
Leader. LTC Sheila C. Toner.
American military officers are educated via a formal professional
military development program, for more than twenty years in pursuit
of mastery of the strategic art. Much of that developmental program
emphasizes the concepts of war and military genius advocated by Carl
Von Clausewitz in his nineteenth century classic, On War. This study
examines the strategic thought and actions of General George
Washington in the American Revolution, which preceded Clausewitz's
work by more than thirty years. It shows that, despite the lack of
any formal military professional education, Washington made skillful
use of the ways and means available to him to construct a strategy
capable of achieving the desired ends. The author concludes that,
whether judged against Clausewitz's concepts or modern definitions
of the strategic art, Washington deserves to be recognized as a
master of the strategic art and America's first strategic leader.
Great Service
Secretaries - Lessons Learned. Van B. Cunningham.
This paper is designed to help a new Service Secretary during the
difficult transition period. It is based on the lives of two great
men, Secretary of War Elihu Root and Secretary of the Army Frank
Pace, Jr., who made extraordinary contributions to the Army. Twelve
lessons learned are drawn from each man's experience. Because of the
similarity of issues surrounding the role of the Service Secretary
and the role of the corporate director, twelve lessons are drawn
from business corporate governance. Three guiding principles for
governance of the military are offered. Several contemporary issues:
civilian control of the military, evolution of the Secretary's role,
and several detractors are discussed. Exclusion of the Service
Secretary from operational matters is challenged. Secretary of
Defense Robert McNamara's amazing fast start is explained.
Major General Leonard Wood: A Study of
Leadership in an Army in Transition.
LTC Robert J. Sperberg.
Leonard Wood rose from obscure civilian contract doctor in the
American southwest of 1885 to Chief of Staff of the United States
Army as the Army itself changed from frontier constabulary to global
fighting force. Besides his service as Chief of Staff, Wood was a
Medal of Honor winner in the campaign to capture Geronimo; commander
of the Rough Riders in Spanish American War; Governor of Cuba and
later the Philippines; a prolific writer; and candidate for
President of the United States. He was the Prophet of Preparedness
and dedicated his career to initiating training and readiness
improvements in the Army in the years of transition before World War
I. But Leonard Wood was foremost a political general, shrewd,
ruthless, and often insubordinate. Capable and ambitious, he used
friends and position to further his power, prestige, and his
singular vision of America. Eventually his conflict with influential
political leaders, fellow generals, and presidents led to his
banishment to Kansas while the Army he had spent years in promoting
marched to World War I without him. Even now, he remains an enigma
to the Army's officer corps. This study reviews Leonard Wood's
service as the Army's foremost strategic leader in a period of
unprecedented transition to examine his leader competencies and the
political military relationship lessons learned that may be apropos
to today's Army leaders.
Prepare the Army
for War. A Historical Overview of the Army Training and Doctrine
Command, 1973 - 1993. John L. Romjue, Susan Canedy, and Anne W.
Chapman.
This is an excellent short history of TARDOC written by the TRADOC
Historians.
Selected Papers
of General William E. Depuy. Compiled by COL Richard M. Swain.
Soldier, Statesman,
Scholar: A Study of Strategic Generalship. MAJ Maurice L. Todd.
Contrary to Army promotion policies and practices today, all types
of generalship are not the same. Instead there are different types
of generalship required for different levels of command and
specialized function Unfortunately, the Army's focus on promoting
officers to general rank based almost exclusively on tactical unit
assignments does not address the differences in the requirements for
the different types of generalship, particularly at the strategic
level. The key characteristics of the strategic level that make it
different from lower levels are the importance of joint, combined,
and unified command? the constant international scope; and the
interaction in the national political system. Examining the lives
and careers of three American general who performed unquestionably
well at the strategic level, Douglas MacArthur, George C. Marshall,
and Dwight D. Eisenhower, reveal indicators of their success in
terms of organizational characteristics, education experience, and
selection. The organizational characteristics of the US Army were
similar for MacArthur, Marshall, and Eisenhower.
Something Old,
Something New: Army Leader Development in a Dynamic Environment.
RAND Arroyo Center.
Over the past two decades many aspects of military operations have
changed profoundly, with the potential for equally profound effects
on the things that Army leaders must know and do. The tangible
threat of the Soviet Union has been replaced by amorphous, changing,
and ill-defined threats and challenges. Simultaneously, the focus
has shifted toward stability operations, support operations, and
military operations other than war. As a result, considerations that
once were peripheral now often take center stage. These changes have
created a dynamic situation-volatile, unpredictable, and novel in
many respects-making the conduct of military operations more complex
and varied than in the past.
Strategic
Leadership Competency Development: A Comparison of Generals Zinni
and Powell. COL Peter M. Warker.
The intent of this paper is to compare and contrast the
developmental experiences of two military leaders who have
successfully performed at the strategic level in the United States
military and government. I will subjectively compare their careers
to assess experience similarities that could suggest assignment
paths that contribute to successful strategic leadership competency
development. For the purpose of this assessment I will compare and
contrast the careers of General Anthony Zinni, United States Marine
Corps, and General Colin Powell of the United States Army. I believe
that the assessment will demonstrate that exposure to combat, or
challenging decision-making in a VUCA environment, opportunities to
command increasingly complex organizations, assignments within the
Joint and Interagency environment, and opportunities to personally
grow through civilian and military education are critical to the
competency development for future strategic leaders of the military.
The Army War College classifies the strategic leadership
competencies as conceptual, technical, or interpersonal. I will
utilize a specific competency within each of the three competency
classifications to assess Generals Zinni s and Powell s careers for
common developmental experiences. The experiences of each General in
combat, adult education, leadership and command positions, joint
assignments, and multinational or interagency environments will be
compared to assess developmental experiences that contributed to
gaining competency in frame of reference development, Joint,
Interagency, Multinational, and Intra-agency relationships, and
consensus building skills.
The Strategic Vision of Admiral Arleigh Burke.
CDR Craig D. Lesher.
The transition from tactical expert to senior leader involves
widening one's scope and becoming comfortable at the strategic
level. Strategic vision is one of the competencies required of the
leader functioning at that level. This report develops a list of
questions by which one can evaluate the senior leader's strategic
vision and then applies the list to a study of the strategic vision
of Admiral Arleigh Burke, United States Navy. The final
determination of the evaluation of Burke's actions as Chief of Naval
Operations revealed that he possessed strategic vision.
Transformational
Leadership in the Era of Change. MAJ Thomas D. Huse.
The U.S. Army is currently in the midst of unprecedented
transformation. Weapons, vehicles, technology, and most important,
people, are the focus of the Army's future change. Understanding the
relationship between people (Soldiers) and change is a definite
leadership challenge. By combining emerging technologies with people
and change, future leadership challenges increase immeasurably.
Transformational leadership is about leading an organization through
change. In its purest form, it is the ability to guide and direct
those within a given organization, focusing on one clear, directed
vision through the application of the components of transformational
leadership. As the U. S. Army continues to change and progress
through the twenty-first century, we will without doubt need
transformational leaders to spearhead this change, leaders that can
effectively guide and direct their subordinates through this
transformation, and to serve as agents of change. The purpose of
this monograph is to determine the applicability of transformational
leadership within the U. S. Army through an analysis and comparison
of transformational leadership styles and techniques based upon
selected evaluation criteria. Moreover, the base question to be
answered is should transformational leadership be adopted at all
leadership levels within the Army, or at specific levels only? The
case studies are an analysis and historic significance of
transformational leadership, centering on two renowned
transformational leaders of our Army, General George C. Marshall,
and General William E. DePuy. Both of these leaders possessed
exceptional transformational leadership ability through periods of
true change and transformation within the U. S. Army. Furthermore,
the case studies apply the principles of transformational leadership
to these leaders abilities, decision-making, and overall.
The Ulysses S. Grant: A Strategic Leader.
LTC Henry W. Suchting III.
With the increased emphasis that is currently being placed upon
strategic thinking, it is appropriate to reexamine past U.S. leaders
to determine their proficiency in this skill. This study focuses on
the strategic thinking of General Ulysses S. Grant as a military
leader. Specifically addressed are his national strategic vision,
his operational (battlefield) vision, and his personal leadership
style. This study argues that Grant was 'state of the art' in each
of these arenas. Diverse sources provide a view of his possession
and mastery of the several layers of what we would dub strategy. The
section on national strategic thinking furnishes a glimpse of his
ability to see, well beyond most of his contemporaries, the
connectivity between battlefield results and national destiny. The
segment covering operational vision demonstrates Grant's key role in
the advancement of operational art. The final portion, concentrating
on his leadership style, displays a more personal view of Grant.
U.S. Army Training
and Doctrine Command, 1973-1982: A Case Study in Successful
Peacetime Military Reform. MAJ Suzanne C. Nielsen.
In the 1970s, the newly formed Training and Doctrine Command
(TRADOC) played a key role in instituting and integrating peacetime
military reforms. TRADOC updated doctrine, revised training
practices, and ensured that these and other aspects of the combat
developments process were mutually supportive. TRADOC changed the
manner in which the U.S. Army prepared for war. That TRADOC played
such a central role is important because a common expectation is
that military organizations will be unable to reform themselves.
This perspective is deficient in that it fails to predict the
changes that Generals William DePuy, Donn Starry, and Paul Gorman
spearheaded in the 1970s and early 1980s. The Army faced external
pressures--changing national security policy, budget stringency, and
the political decision to move to an all-volunteer force--but these
challenges and constraints did not provide Army leaders with a
detailed plan of action. The shape and extent of reforms within the
U.S. Army in the 1970s were primarily determined by leaders from
within the organization. This thesis explains the role of TRADOC in
the Army's reforms in the 1970s and draws implications relevant to
today's Army Transformation.
William J. Donovan: Visionary, Strategic
Leader, an Historical Perspective.
COL Anthony F. Caruana.
This paper presents the concepts of vision and strategic leadership
at senior levels as enumerated by several respected civilian and
military leaders. The major focus of the paper, from a historical
perspective, will be an analysis of the life experiences which
included family background, education, character and personality,
career path, accumulative knowledge, and the network of contacts
that lead William J. 'Wild Bill' Donovan to become a visionary and
strategic leader. It chronicles his life in four stages
demonstrating his efforts towards realizing his visions, especially
the development of a central intelligence agency for the United
States. It attempts to prove that Major General William J. Donovan
was a citizen soldier worthy of study by U.S. Army War College
students and other senior leaders.
Government Reports / After Actions
Eisenhower Report
on Torch. GEN Dwight D. Eisenhower.
A narrative report produced by General Dwight Eisenhower on the
invasion of North Africa by the Allied Forces in 1942. Areas covered
in the report are the creation of the Allied Force; the planning
considerations; the invasion; the race for Tunisia; and operations
against Field Marshal Rommel and Africa Korps.
Hard Lessons: The
Iraq Reconstruction Experience. Office of the Inspector General,
Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction.
Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience appears virtually
upon the five-year anniversary of my appointment as Inspector
General in Iraq. Shortly after that appointment, I met with
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, to whom I reported, to discuss
the mission. His first words were: Why did you take this job? It is
an impossible task. I began to understand why he offered so
startling a welcome during the following week, when I made my first
trip to Iraq to begin setting up oversight of the Coalition
Provisional Authority (CPA), then in charge of Iraq's
reconstruction. My office in the Republican Palace, which housed the
CPA and would later house the U.S. Embassy was adjacent to the CPA
Comptroller's. What I saw was troubling: large amounts of cash
moving quickly out the door. Later that same day, walking the halls
of the palace, I overheard someone say: We can't do that anymore.
There is a new inspector general here. These red flags were the
first signs of how challenging executing oversight in Iraq would be.
But it has not been impossible, chiefly because of the professional,
productive, and courageous conduct of the many auditors, inspectors,
and investigators who have worked diligently to fulfill the mission
of the Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq
Reconstruction (SIGIR). SIGIR's oversight jurisdiction covers about
$50 billion in U.S. funds appropriated by the Congress for Iraq the
largest relief and reconstruction effort for one country in U.S.
history. This sea of taxpayer dollars flowed to a wide spectrum of
initiatives, ranging from training Iraq's army and police to
building large electrical, oil, and water projects; from supporting
democracy-building efforts to strengthening budget execution by
provincial councils; and from funding rule-of-law reforms to
ensuring that the Iraqi government sustains what the U.S. program
provided.
Articles/Speeches
Articles with an Asterisk (*) are
only available to Fort Leavenworth Users through our proxy server /
ip recognition.
* Bennis, Warren G. "The
Seven Ages of the Leader." Harvard Business Review 82,
no. 1 (January 2004): 46-53. Business Source Complete, EBSCOhost (accessed June 5, 2009).
Caldwell IV, William B. "Leadership
in a Time of Crisis." Lincoln Lecture Series at the University
of Saint Mary, 12 February 2009.
* Fryer, Bronwyn. "Timeless
Leadership." Harvard Business Review 86, no. 3 (March 2008):
45-49. Business Source Complete, EBSCOhost (accessed June 5, 2009).
* Ibarra, Herminia, and Mark Hunter. "How
Leaders Create and Use Networks." Harvard Business Review 85, no. 1 (January 2007): 40-47. Business Source Complete,
EBSCOhost (accessed June 5, 2009).
* Kotter, John P., and Leonard A. Schlesinger. "Choosing
Strategies for Change." Harvard Business Review 86, no. 7/8 (July 2008): 130-139. Business Source Complete, EBSCO host (accessed June 5, 2009).
Links
Officer Education History (Army)
Patton on the Next War
