

terminals. Terminal fires, even though they may not involve the waterfront areas, can rapidly engulf the port facilities. Insufficient firefighting capabilities may permit extensive damage to other properties, marine craft and other transportation vehicles loaded with hazardous materials, and the environment. An effective terminal firefighting capability should include a sufficient number of trained personnel and adequate methods to constrain products capable of intensifying an existing fire.

All large oil transfer facilities are required to maintain an operations manual which must contain emergency procedures. The manual is reviewed by the Coast Guard Captain of the Port who may require that changes be made by the terminal management. A critical review by fire prevention professionals might disclose shortcomings in the firefighting procedures. Any deficiency noted could be made known to terminal management who would then make desired changes to improve the efficiency of the firefighting operations.

Log M-44 Not 1532

PROBABLE CAUSE

M-75-9-11 WRO

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of the casualty was the ignition, by an unidentified source, of gasoline which spilled from the overflowing cargo tanks on the OCEAN 80.

Contributing to the casualty was the failure of the barge tankerman and the terminal dockman to adhere to prescribed cargo transfer procedures.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The National Transportation Safety Board recommends that the U. S. Coast Guard:

1. Issue regulations to require adequate vessel and terminal management supervision of safety assurance procedures during cargo transfer operations. (Recommendation M-75-9)
2. With the assistance of local fire departments, evaluate the effectiveness of terminal firefighting capabilities and require such changes as necessary to reduce hazards to other properties, marine craft, and the environment. (Recommendation M-75-10)
3. For at least 1 year, thoroughly investigate all oil pollution incidents involving cargo transfer spills to evaluate the adequacy of 33 CFR 154 through 156. (Recommendation M-75-11)


MAR-75-3

BY THE NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD:


Adopted this 2nd day of May 1975:




John H. Reed, Chairman



Francis H. McAdams, Member



Louis M. Thayer, Member



Isabel A. Burgess, Member



William R. Haley, Member