

BAS-6

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD
WASHINGTON, D.C.

FOR RELEASE: 6:30 A.M., E.D.S.T., AUGUST 13, 1975

ISSUED: August 13, 1975

Forwarded to:

Honorable James E. Dow
Acting Administrator
Federal Aviation Administration
Washington, D. C. 20591

SAFETY RECOMMENDATION(S)

A-75-63

The National Transportation Safety Board's investigation of an accident involving a Beechcraft Model 99, N851SA, at Spokane International Airport, Spokane, Washington, on April 6, 1975, indicates that additional corrective action is necessary to prevent similar accidents from occurring.

A pilot for Cascade Airways, an air taxi operator operating Flight 723 into Spokane International Airport, was unable to lower the landing gear by utilizing either the electrical or the manual extension systems. A wheels-up landing was made with no personnel injury; however, the aircraft sustained extensive damage.

Examination revealed that the landing gear had overtravelled in the "up" position. Further examination disclosed that the landing gear motor controller relay (P/N MC-815-AS-1) breaker points were welded together, and a screw that connects the bus strap to the gear-up terminal had come loose and shorted the bus to the case. This condition caused the landing gear motor to drive the landing gear beyond the up-limit cut-off point until a main landing gear strut contacted the main wing spar and the gear jammed.

The controller relay had never been removed from the aircraft, and it had accumulated a total of 11,564 flight hours. The aircraft manufacturer's maintenance manual indicates that the controller should be changed only "On Condition;" that is, there is no mandatory time limit for replacement or inspection of the unit. The controller must malfunction or fail before it is removed for inspection.

Beech has issued an "Airliner Communique" No. 57, dated April 22, 1975, to all owners and operators, which has as one of its items a report of the landing gear motor controller malfunction, and has recommended a visual inspection to be conducted at intervals not to exceed 1,000 landing cycles.

A survey of your Maintenance Analysis Center records indicated that 11 units have been removed for various reasons. Because of the number of malfunctions which have occurred, and because of the possible consequences of such malfunctions, we believe that a periodic internal inspection of the landing gear motor controller should be made mandatory.

Therefore, the National Transportation Safety Board recommends that the Federal Aviation Administration:

Issue an Airworthiness Directive (AD) to establish a requirement for the removal and internal inspection of the Beechcraft Model 99 landing gear motor controller, P/N MC-815-AS-1. (Class II)

REED, Chairman, McADAMS, THAYER, BURGESS, and HALEY, Members, concurred in the above recommendation.

J. H. Reed
BY: John H. Reed
Chairman

THIS RECOMMENDATION WILL BE RELEASED TO THE PUBLIC ON THE ISSUE DATE SHOWN ABOVE. NO PUBLIC DISSEMINATION OF THE CONTENTS OF THIS DOCUMENT SHOULD BE MADE PRIOR TO THAT DATE.