AgroterrorismWhy Were Not Ready: A Look at the Role of Law Enforcement
by Glenn R. Schmitt
About the Author
Mr. Schmitt is the director of the Office of Research and Data
at the U.S. Sentencing Commission and the former acting director
of the National Institute of Justice.
This article first appeared in the May/June 2006 issue of Sheriff
magazine, a bimonthly publication of the National Sheriffs
Association (www.sheriffs.org).
It is reprinted here with permission.
Terrorists trying to damage the U.S.
economy need look no further than
the countrys heartland for soft
targets. Farms, ranches, and feedlots are
open and generally unprotected. The majority
of State and local law enforcement agencies
are financially and strategically unprepared
to respond to agroterrorism.
Public health officials may seem like the
logical leaders for responding to an attack
on the food supplies. However, the laws of
many States require that agroterrorism be
handled as a crime investigation, giving law
enforcement primary responsibility.
State and local law enforcement officials
should be asking:
- Are the farms, fields, and feedlots in
my jurisdiction protected?
- Do I have a strategy to prevent agroterrorism?
- Do I have a partnership with ranchers,
farmers, meatpackers, truckers,
veterinarians, and public health officials?
- Is my agency prepared for agroterrorists?
Agroterrorism experts are especially
concerned about the introduction of foot-and-mouth
disease into the food supply.
Twenty times more infectious than smallpox,
the disease causes painful blisters on the
tongues, hooves, and teats of cloven-hoofed
animalscattle, hogs, sheep, goats,
deerrendering them unable to walk, give
milk, eat, and drink. Although people generally
cannot contract the disease, they can carry
the virus in their lungs up to 48 hours and
transmit it to animals. The animal-to-animal
airborne transmission range is 50 miles.
With millions of farms, open fields, and
feedlots in the United States, the introduction
of foot-and-mouth disease would require the mass
slaughter and disposal of infected animals. An outbreak
could halt the domestic and international sale of
meat and meat products for years. Foot-and-mouth
disease in 2001 in the United Kingdom affected 9,000
farms and required the destruction of more than 4,000,000
cows. Researchers believe that a similar outbreak in
the United States would cost taxpayers up to $60
billion.[1]
The National Institute of Justice (NIJ) recently funded
research into how an agroterrorist attack with foot-and-mouth
disease in Kansas would affect the State and the
country.[2]
The Kansas Bureau of Investigation, the
Ford County Sheriffs Department in Kansas,
and the National Agriculture Biosecurity
Center at Kansas State University conducted
the 21-month study. Findings were based
on simulated exercises, field surveys, and
interviews with law enforcement, livestock
producers, meat packers, truckers, feedlot
managers, researchers, politicians, and animal
health officials.
Of course, agroterrorism is not meant
to be an act of violence against livestock
but an attack on the economic stability
of the United States. The study funded
by NIJ identified five groups that could
pose threats to our agricultural industry:
- International terrorists. (Although many
animal diseases have been eradicated in
this country, they flourish overseas. The
foot-and-mouth virus is easily accessed,
transported, and transmitted.)
- Domestic terrorists, including anarchist
or antigovernment groups.
- Militant animal rights groups.
- Economic opportunists seeking financial
gain as a result of a change in market
prices.
- Disgruntled employees seeking revenge.
Law Enforcements Role Post-Attack
How would law enforcement be expected
to respond to agroterrorism? How would
jurisdictional issues be overcome as local,
State, and Federal authorities collaborate?
Research by NIJ suggests some preliminary
best practices.
The first priority of a law enforcement
agency would be to establish and enforce
a strict quarantine around the affected area.
In the case of foot-and-mouth disease, the
quarantine would cover a 6-mile radius,
113 square miles, from the point of virus
introduction. Experts say that the quarantine
would have to be enforced for at least
30 days.
The second priority likely would be State-wide
roadblocks to help contain the disease.
Local law enforcement, working with the
State highway patrol, would stop vehicles
at every roadblock. Vehicles that have had
contact with livestock would be sent back
to their point of origin, and that site would
have to be tested for the virus. Other
vehicles would be diverted for testing on
the spot. Some semitrailers may be allowed
to detach the trailerwhich would be held
for testingwhile the cab is decontaminated.
Passenger cars would be stopped
and the drivers interviewed to determine
whether they have traveled through a
contaminated area. If they have, the car and
the passengers would have to be decontaminated
to minimize the risk of transmission.
Law enforcement also would be responsible
for primary crime-scene investigation,
including collection of tissue from infected
animals and an attempt to identify suspects.
If not established before the incident, the
roles of local, State, and Federal officials
would have to be quickly agreed upon.
All cloven-hoofed animalsdomestic and
wildwithin the affected area would have
to be destroyed and disposed of.
Preventing an Attack
Every level of the food chain is vulnerable:
farms, feedlots, chemical storage facilities,
meatpacking plants, and distribution
operations. Because terrorists rely on
a lack of preparedness, law enforcement
agencies should develop a plan to prevent
agroterrorism and to minimize the results
of an attack.
Special FBI Agent David Cudmore says,
Identifying threats of agroterrorism and
stopping them before they happen are
obviously vital roles for law enforcement.
Cudmore, a weapons of mass destruction
coordinator, adds, But protecting
the Nations agricultural industry will
take combined efforts of the agriculture
industry, government, law enforcement,
and academic and scientific communities
working together to minimize both the
likelihood of an attack and the severity
of its impact.
Local law enforcement should gather
intelligence, for example, by working with
livestock producers to identify vulnerable
farms and feedlots. Partnershipsthe
best way to prevent an occurrence of
agroterrorism and the only way to contain
onemust be created among the local
sheriff and farmers, ranchers, meatpackers,
truckers, feedlot owners, and other critical
members of the food-supply chain in the
jurisdiction. Meetings with local chapters
of livestock associations and other industry
groups can encourage the exchange of
ideas. Also, local law enforcement must
establish a working relationship with
veterinarians and animal and plant
health inspectors.
Ron Snyder, program director of AgTerror
Emergency Responder Training, in Cedar
Rapids, Iowa, says, Because law enforcement
officials perform critical functions
in an agriculture emergency, it is vitally
important that they become knowledgeable
in all aspects of this unique type of emergency
response. State and local officers
are responsible for the establishment and
oversight of quarantine areas to control
the further spread of disease and maintain
order as the response efforts unfold.
In our post-9/11 world, the sharing of
information among law enforcement
agencies is more important than ever.
State and Federal intelligence-gathering
groups must collaborate to provide local
law enforcement with the information it
needs to deal with suspected terrorists.
When it learns of a potential threat, for
example, the FBI contacts the sheriff in
that area. The FBI is also in the process
of training expertsa rapid response team
with criminologists and epidemiologists.
However, local officials should also keep
up-to-date on threats of bioterrorism.
The World Organization for Animal Health,
for example, coordinates information on
animal diseases.
Resources
NIJ does not exercise control over external Web sites. Read our Exit Notice.
Cudmore says, Seeing, hearing, and
reporting are critical steps to gathering the
intelligence that would hopefully prevent an
attack. There are five countermeasures that
are recommended to prevent this type
of threat to our economic infrastructure:
intelligence, surveillance, rapid diagnosis
capabilities, rapid incident response, and
training.
The U.S. Department of Homeland Security
maintains information on potential terrorist
threats. The FBI runs the Terrorism Threat
Investigation Center, where names and
license information can be checked. Local
law enforcement agencies have access to
both databases. The U.S. Department of
Agriculture has a number of programs that
concentrate on identifying foreign animal
diseases. Nationally recognized experts
can also help local law enforcement
agencies create a prevention and response
plan. Undersheriff James Lane, of the
Ford County Sheriffs Department in
Kansas, often visits local law enforcement
agencies to work with their
response teams.
Several colleges around the country offer
training to improve law enforcements ability
to respond to agroterrorism. Resources
are available from the federal
governmentespecially the U.S. Department
of Justice and the U.S. Department of Homeland
Securityto help local agencies with
training. For example, Homeland Security,
working with Iowas Kirkwood Community
College, has developed the first accredited
course for law enforcement officers and
other first responders to prepare them for
agroterrorism. The course is available at
https://www.agpreparedness.org.
Kirkwood also offers a train-the-trainer
program on foreign animal diseases.
The FBI hosts an international gathering
of law enforcement officials, scientists,
academics, and agricultural professionals
to discuss intelligence sharing and agroterrorism.
The National Institute of Justice sponsored
the Terrorism Research Symposium on June
12-13, 2006, which covered a wide range of
research on antiterrorism.
The paradigm for protecting the Nation
changed after 9/11, focusing attention
on all aspects of infrastructure that require
greater security. Preventing an agroterrorism
attack will require a concerted,
coordinated effort by all levels of law
enforcement. The National Institute of
Justice is committed to helping sheriffs and
other local law enforcement first responders
develop a prevention plan and a response
plan to mitigate the impact of agroterrorism.
NCJ 218265
Notes
[1] |
USDA, Economic
Impact of a Foreign Animal Disease (FAD) Outbreak Across
the United States, U.S. Department of Agriculture,
Washington, DC: 2004. |
[2] |
Knowles, T., J.
Lane, G. Bayens, N. Speer, J. Jaax, D. Carter, and
A. Bannister, Defining Law Enforcements Role in
Protecting American Agriculture from Agroterrorism,
final report submitted to the National Institute
of Justice, Washington, DC: 2005 (NCJ 212280),
available at www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/212280.pdf. |