## '69 MAY 27 AM 11:04

BY LDX

## SECRET

FOR COLONEL ROBERT PURSLEY
(OFFICE OF SECRETARY OF DEFENSE)

FROM:

Colonel Al Haig



SUBJECT: Assessment of Soviet MRV Tests

Attached per our conversation is a copy of the Central Intelligence Agency's memorandum on the above subject.

Request your comments, if any, by 0800 hours tomorrow morning.

Attachment

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E.O. 12958, as amended, Sect 3.5

NLN 98-60/27 PER 6.2(a) HR. 11/18/2009

By WALH NARA, Date 6/8/2010

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
MEMORANDUM FOR: Dr. Henry Kissinger

SUBJECT

: Significance and Implications of Soviet Multiple Reentry Vehicle Testing

1. The following information and assessment is forwarded in accordance with your request. I have included in the final paragraph a statement of opposing views which do not represent any significant differences in interpretation of the Soviet test data but do represent differences in what this test data means.

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PER 1.2 (a) 1th. 11/13/2009



3. The CIA believes that the system has been tested only in a simple multiple reentry vehicle (MRV) mode. We recognize that the separation system we observe in the telemetry could be

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The system in this case would have the capability to attack closely spaced targets such as Minuteman silos. We have conducted studies to determine how the system would have to work to perform the MIRV mission and have concluded that the capability has not been demonstrated in flight tests to date. We

4. The opposing view in some parts of the intelligence community is that a MRV of this type does not give the Soviets any advantage over a single reentry vehicle. They believe, therefore, that the system being tested is a MIRV intended for use against Minuteman silos. They further believe that the necessary capability of the system need not be demonstrated before making such a judgment. We cannot agree with this view since the Soviets have always tended to conduct very complete weapon systems tests. It would be a radical departure from normal practice if they were to deploy a weapon with the potential importance of MIRVs without complete testing.

RICHARD HELMS

Director

Central Intelligence Agency

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[NUD 98-60/27:3]