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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 3, 1994

PRESIDENTIAL DECISION DIRECTIVE/NSC-25

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES TO
THE UNITED NATIONS
CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL
SECURITY AFFAIRS
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: U.S. POLICY ON REFORMING MULTILATERAL PEACE
OPERATIONS (U)

Serious threats to the security of the United States persist in the post-Cold War era. History suggests that new threats will surface. The United States remains committed to meeting such threats through either unilateral or multilateral action, as our interests dictate. (U)

Circumstances have arisen and will arise in the future in which it will be in our interest to proceed in partnership with others to preserve, maintain or restore the peace. The United Nations (UN) can be an important instrument of such partnerships. (U)

Participation in UN peace operations can never substitute for the necessity of fighting and winning our own wars, nor can we allow it to reduce our capability to meet that imperative. It can, however, serve, in effect, as a "force multiplier" in our efforts to promote peace and stability. (U)

During the Cold War, the United Nations could resort to multilateral peace operations only under the rare circumstances in which the interests of the Soviet Union and the West did not conflict. Such operations can now serve as a cost-effective tool in many cases to advance such American interests as the maintenance of peace in key regions and the relief of suffering abroad. (U)

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Since it is in our interest to support or participate in UN peace operations on such occasions, it is also in our interest to seek to strengthen our own and the United Nations' peace operations capabilities. That is the object of the attached "Policy Guidance: U.S. Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations," which elaborates this Presidential Decision Directive, and which I approve today. (U)

The Role of Peace Operations in U.S. Foreign Policy

Territorial disputes, armed ethnic conflicts, civil wars (many of which spill across international borders), and the total collapse of governmental authority in some states are now among the threats to world peace. The UN has sought to play a constructive role in such situations by mediating disputes and obtaining agreement to cease-fires and political settlements. Where agreements to that effect have been reached, the interposition of neutral forces under UN auspices can help facilitate lasting peace. (U)

Having considered the factors in Annex I, the United States will vote in the UN Security Council for multilateral peace operations, or, where appropriate, take the lead in calling for them, when member states are prepared to support the effort with forces and funds; when the U.S. decides that the operation's political and military objectives are clear and feasible; and when UN involvement represents the best means to advance U.S. interests. The U.S. will not support in the Security Council proposals for UN involvement in situations where such involvement is not viable or when it would interfere with U.S. interests.
(C)

UN and other multilateral peace operations will at times offer the best way to prevent, contain, or resolve conflicts that could otherwise be far more costly and deadly. In such cases, the U.S. benefits from having to bear only a share of the burden. We also benefit by being able to invoke the voice of the community of nations on behalf of a cause we support. Thus, peacekeeping, peace enforcement and the establishment of a capability to conduct multilateral peace operations will become part of our National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy. (U)

Peace operations can be valuable tools in certain circumstances to advance our national interest. They cannot and will not substitute for unilateral or coalition action when that is what our national interest requires. Thus, in building our capacity for peace operations, we will not discard or weaken other tools for achieving U.S. objectives. The U.S. will maintain the capability to act unilaterally or in coalitions when our interests and those of our friends and allies are at stake. Multilateral peace operations must, therefore, be placed in proper perspective among the instruments of U.S. foreign policy.
(C)

U.S. Support for Multilateral Peace Operations

The United States will strengthen its support for United Nations and appropriate regional peace operations politically, militarily and financially. In doing so, we will support when warranted the full range of activities from preventive diplomacy through traditional peacekeeping and peace enforcement. (C)

As President, I retain and will not relinquish command authority over U.S. forces. On a case-by-case basis, I will consider placing appropriate U.S. forces and personnel under the operational control of a competent UN commander for specific UN operations authorized by the Security Council. In making this decision, I will take into account such factors as the nature of U.S. interests, the size of the proposed U.S. force, the risk to U.S. personnel, the proposed duration of the mission and rules of engagement and the nature and mandate of the operation (including whether it is Chapter VI or Chapter VII). Such action will be undertaken consistent with the U.S. Constitution, U.S. federal law and the Uniform Code of Military Justice. The greater the U.S. military role, the less likely it will be that I will agree to have a UN commander exercise overall operational control over U.S. forces. Any large-scale participation of U.S. forces in a major peace enforcement operation that is likely to involve combat should ordinarily be conducted under U.S. command and operational control or through competent regional organizations such as NATO or ad hoc coalitions. (C)

It is important to build public and Congressional support for UN peace operations, particularly those in which U.S. forces participate. Accordingly, we will take the steps outlined in Annex VIII to ensure Congress is regularly and fully briefed on such operations, and, wherever possible, consulted about the participation of U.S. armed forces in them. (U)

The United States will take a leadership role in obtaining international agreement to enhance the headquarters capabilities of the UN to conduct peace operations effectively, to achieve economies of scale and reap the benefits of past experience. The United States will contribute personnel, technical assistance, equipment, facilities and funding for that enhancement. (U)

While we work with the UN to make its operations more efficient and effective, to reduce UN costs and to ensure our financial assessment is more equitable, the United States will aggressively seek Congressional support to meet its financial obligations for UN peace operations. (U)

Within the U.S. Government, agencies will improve their capabilities to contribute to and coordinate with UN peace operations through significant organizational changes. The Secretaries of State and Defense will be jointly responsible for obtaining adequate peace operations funds and for managing day-to-day U.S. support for international peace operations. Decision-making and support for UN peace operations will be a shared responsibility as elaborated in the Policy Guidelines. In

all cases, the conduct of diplomacy and instructions to embassies and our UN Mission in New York will remain a State Department responsibility. (C)

Implementation

An interagency Peacekeeping Core Group chaired by the NSC and reporting to the Deputies Committee shall monitor implementation of this PDD, make recommendations on U.S. support for and participation in peace operations, oversee interagency management of support for peace operations in the form of goods, services and personnel and consider future U.S. policy on peace operations. Decisions on new peacekeeping operations will be made by an interagency group, at least at the Deputies Committee level, taking into account available analysis by the Peacekeeping Core Group. (C)

The Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense shall submit to me through the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs a joint report on the status of implementation of this directive and the state of peace operations every six months. (C)

William J. Clinton

SUBJECT: POLICY GUIDANCE: U.S. POLICY ON REFORMING MULTILATERAL
PEACE OPERATIONS (C)

Presidential Decision Directive 25 established U.S. policy on reforming multilateral peace operations. In signing that document, the President approved the following policy guidance, which elaborates on the Directive. (C)

Deciding When Peace Operations¹ are Appropriate

1. The factors in Annex I will be considered when deciding whether to support in the Security Council a proposed UN peace operation or to support a regionally-sponsored peace operation. The factors will be an aid in decision-making, not alone a prescriptive device. Decisions will be based on the cumulative weight of the factors, with no single factor necessarily being an absolute determinant. The U.S. will share a version of Annex I with the UN and regional organizations as appropriate. (S)
2. In addition, each UN peace operation should have a clear mandate and specified timeframe tied to intermediate or final objectives as well as an accompanying sunset provision, an integrated political/military strategy well-coordinated with humanitarian assistance efforts, specified troop levels and a firm budget estimate. Once adequate funding arrangements are in place, the U.S. will identify funding sources to pay its assessed and/or voluntary share(s) of a peace operation before the U.S. votes to approve a mandate. (S)
3. The Administration will consider the factors in Annex II when assessing whether to recommend to the President that U.S. personnel participate in a given UN or regional operation. The recommendation will be based on the cumulative weight of the factors, with no single factor necessarily being an absolute determinant. (S)

¹For simplicity, the term peace operations is used in this document to mean the entire spectrum of activities from traditional peacekeeping to peace enforcement aimed at defusing and resolving international conflicts. Annex VII provides definitions useful in the implementation of this guidance. (U)



4. As a matter of principle, the U.S. will support peace operations as a tool to provide finite windows of opportunity to allow combatants to resolve their differences and failed societies to begin to reconstitute themselves. Peace operations should not be open-ended commitments but instead linked to concrete political solutions; otherwise, they normally should not be undertaken. The U.S. will urge the UN Secretariat and Security Council members to engage in rigorous, standard evaluations of all proposed new peace operations, with special attention paid to the aforementioned principles. (U)
5. Applying the factors in Annex I, the U.S. will closely scrutinize all existing peace operations when they come up for regular renewal by the Security Council to assess the value of continuing them. In addition, in appropriate cases, the U.S. will seek voluntary contributions by beneficiary nations or enhanced host nation support to reduce or cover, at least partially, the costs of certain UN operations. Finally, the U.S. will consider voting against renewal of certain longstanding peace operations that are failing to meet established objectives in order to free military and financial resources for more pressing UN missions. (U)
6. Due to our current resource constraints, any proposed new large UN operations must be scrutinized carefully to ensure that adequate resources can be made available. (C)

The Role of Regional Organizations

7. In some cases, the appropriate way to perform peace operations will be to involve regional organizations. In considering their role, our policy will be: (U)
 - The U.S. will continue to emphasize the UN as the international body with primary authority to conduct peace operations. At the same time, the U.S. will support efforts to improve regional organizations' peace operations capabilities. (U)
 - When regional organizations seek to conduct peacekeeping with UN Security Council (UNSC) blessing, U.S. support for UNSC endorsement will be conditioned on the adherence of the regional activity to the principles of the UN Charter, the criteria established by the UNSC and the factors discussed in Paragraph 1 above. (S)
 - In Europe, the U.S. will look also to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and other regional organizations to deal with problems that could be resolved through low-intensity peacekeeping. On a case-by-case basis, the U.S. will support efforts to ensure that CSCE receives political and material support in its conflict resolution efforts. (S)

-- NATO has confirmed its preparedness to support peace operations under the authority of the UNSC and/or CSCE on a case-by-case basis and in accordance with its own procedures. The U.S. will work to ensure that NATO preserves the integrity of its military command structure when operating for the UN or CSCE and will encourage non-members (including both former European neutrals and former Warsaw Pact states) to associate with the Alliance for peace operations. The U.S. will take the lead in accelerating cooperation on peace operations within the NACC. (S)

8. U.S. policy on regional peacekeeping in the Former Soviet Union is outlined in Annex IX. (S)

Strengthening the UN

9. The UN needs to improve significantly its capability to manage peace operations effectively as an integrated whole. At present, each operation is created and managed separately by an understaffed UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). As a result, support to the field may suffer, economies of scale are lost and work is duplicated. Structural changes at UN Headquarters, some of which are already underway, would make a positive difference. (U)

The U.S. will share with the Security Council permanent members, the Secretariat and the UN General Assembly Committee of 34 and the Contact Group of major peacekeeping contributors as soon as possible proposals to strengthen UN peace operations. In making these proposals, we will stress our willingness to make specific commitments and provide goods and services. In general, we will seek either direct reimbursement for U.S. provision of goods and services or credit against our assessments. In rare instances, we may contribute goods, services and funds on a voluntary basis. Included in the package of U.S. proposals will be: (U)

A. Expanded Staff: The UN should improve and expand the staff of DPKO with the addition of at least 100 skilled civilian and military personnel. State, DOD and other U.S. agencies will offer to detail on a voluntary basis approximately 20 percent of the total personnel required. Additionally, the U.S. will actively support in the Fifth Committee of the General Assembly proposals to redeploy resources within the UN to enable the effective augmentation of DPKO along the lines outlined below. (C)

B. Turn-Key Operation: The U.S. will offer to provide a study of facility requirements for DPKO and based on that study, if a new DPKO facility is needed, the U.S. will propose that concerned nations make a facility available to the UN on a turn-key basis for the DPKO. This facility could house all the elements of DPKO. (S)

C. Organization: The U.S. will urge the UN to include in DPKO the following divisions: (C)

- Plans Division: To address the larger planning problems facing UN peace operations, the U.S. will support the creation of a professional peace operations headquarters staff for planning. Multinational peace operations planning should be linked with regional organizations. The U.S. will provide military expertise to the UN to strengthen its planning for peace operations. (U)
- Information and Research Division: The DPKO staff should include an Information and Research Division (IRD) that is linked to field operations in order to obtain and provide current information. The IRD staff could offer a range of useful support, including publishing a daily report for principals in the UN, DPKO and field operations. It should also manage a 24-hour cell to monitor open source material and information submissions from governments. The Director of Central Intelligence will establish a single point of contact with DPKO/IRD and will provide as much informational support as possible while ensuring full protection of sources and methods. (S)
- Operations Division: The UN's command and control capabilities, particularly in complex operations, need substantial improvement. As a helpful step, DPKO should include a modern command, control and communications (C3) facility and architecture that are based on commercial systems. The U.S. will offer to design a C3 systems architecture for such a C3 facility and solicit members to donate specified components or funds for the facility. At the same time, the U.S. will continue to work with the UN and other member states to streamline command and control procedures and maximize effective coordination on the ground. (C)
- Logistics Division: Peace operations should have their own military logistics system. The U.S. enthusiastically supports the transfer of the Field Operations Division (FOD) from the Department of Administration and Management to DPKO. To minimize costs by achieving economies of scale, much of the UN's logistical requirements should be contracted on a competitive basis to a small number of commercial contractors. These contracts should be re-bid on the basis of price and performance on a regular basis. (U)
- Civilian Police Cell: The U.S. will urge the UN to accelerate plans to improve its capacity to support UN civilian police operations and related efforts to build police and judicial institutions as part of UN peace operations. The UN should form a small staff to manage current police operations, compile lessons learned in El Salvador, Somalia, Cambodia and elsewhere, conduct

planning and develop standard procedures, doctrine and training for police support operations. (U)

- Public Affairs Division: The UN should greatly enhance its peace operations public affairs capability by hiring highly qualified, experienced, multinational specialists to serve in New York and, particularly, in the field. The U.S. will offer to detail public affairs specialists to perform key public affairs functions within DPKO and help train other countries' nationals. (U)

D. Logistics Support and Start-Up Capability: To avoid the need for costly regional stockpiles, the U.S., with other member states, will offer to assist the UN DPKO to establish an improved, cost-effective logistics system to support UN peace operations, including a computer network to link the UN DPKO with a single logistics office in each participating nation. Using that computer network, the UN could request price and availability data and order materiel from participating states. A U.S. decision to respond to a UN request for price and availability data using this system would be contingent upon an interagency policy decision that the U.S. would be willing to provide the supplies or equipment, acceptable arrangements for reimbursement and upon satisfaction of all legal requirements for the transfer of technical equipment. Continued U.S. participation in this system will be reviewed in light of the level of participation by other member states. ~~(S)~~

- The UN should consider establishing, by contract, a ready or standing airlift capability. The U.S. will develop a plan for such a capability and share it with the UN. Possible solutions could include contracting with commercial firms or with member states such as Russia for a small number of heavy lift cargo aircraft that could operate channel flights to support peace operations and would be available for emergency deployments. ~~(C)~~
- To eliminate lengthy and potentially disastrous delays in deployment after the UN Security Council has authorized the dispatch of a mission, DPKO should have a rapidly deployable headquarters team, a composite initial logistics support unit, and open, pre-negotiated commercial contracts for logistics support in new missions. The U.S. will notify the UN of forces or capabilities it would consider offering on short notice for the composite initial logistics support unit. UNSC approval would be required to deploy the logistics unit. ~~(C)~~
- The UN should develop a data base of specific, potentially available forces or capabilities that could be made available for the full range of peace and humanitarian operations. The U.S. will provide input to such a database by notifying the UN of the specific U.S. forces or capabilities that could be made available for

the full spectrum of peace or humanitarian operations. U.S. notification in no way implies a commitment to provide those forces, if requested. The U.S. will help to design this data base of military forces of member states that the UN might request be contributed to a given UN peace or humanitarian operation. (C)

- Nearly as difficult as rapidly identifying and deploying appropriate military forces is finding qualified civilian personnel to serve in UN peace operations. To reduce the UN's costly reliance on the dispatch of UN Headquarters employees to field missions, the U.S. will urge the UN Secretariat to establish a trained civilian reserve corps as a ready, external talent pool to assist in the administration, management and execution of UN peace operations. (U)

E. Training: The UN should establish a professional Peace Operations Training Program for commanders and other military and civilian personnel. The U.S. will offer to help create and establish this program, as well as promote multilateral peace operations training, exercises, simulations and leadership development. The U.S. will also urge the creation of correspondence courses, along the lines successfully employed within the U.S. military, in order to make peace operations instruction widely available at low cost. The U.S. will offer to participate in peace operations training efforts and offer the use of U.S. facilities. (C)

F. Protection of UN Peacekeepers and UN Peace Enforcers: The U.S. remains concerned that, in some cases, captured UN peacekeepers and UN peace enforcers may not have adequate protection under international law. The U.S. believes that individuals captured while performing UN peacekeeping or UN peace enforcement activities, whether as members of a UN force or a U.S. force executing a UN Security Council mandate, should, as a matter of policy, be immediately released to UN officials; until released, at a minimum they should be accorded protections identical to those afforded prisoners of war under the 1949 Geneva Convention III (GPW). The U.S. will generally seek to incorporate appropriate language into UN Security Council resolutions that establish or extend peace operations in order to provide adequate legal protection to captured UN peacekeepers. In appropriate cases, the U.S. would seek assurances that U.S. forces assisting the UN are treated as experts on mission for the United Nations and thus are entitled to appropriate privileges and immunities and are subject to immediate release when captured. Moreover, the Administration is actively involved in negotiating a draft international convention at the United Nations to provide a special international status for individuals serving in peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations under a UN mandate. Finally, the Administration will take appropriate steps to ensure that any U.S. military personnel captured while serving as part of a multinational peacekeeping force or peace enforcement effort are immediately released to UN authorities. (U)

G. Reducing UN Costs: The U.S. remains concerned that the UN has not satisfactorily rectified management inefficiencies that result in excessive costs and, on occasion, fraud and abuse. As a matter of priority, the U.S. will continue to work for dramatic administrative and management improvements in the UN system. As a first step, the U.S. welcomes the creation of an Inspections and Investigations Unit. However, the U.S. remains wholly committed to the immediate establishment of a fully independent Inspector General with oversight responsibility that includes peacekeeping. (U)

The U.S. will press for a reduction in the U.S. peacekeeping assessment to 25 percent by January 1996 and inform the UN of the Congress' possible refusal to fund U.S. peacekeeping assessments at a rate higher than 25% after January 1996. The U.S. will also urge early consideration by the Contact Group and early implementation by the Secretary-General of the package of UN peacekeeping financing and budget management reforms listed in Annex III. (U)

The U.S. will use its voice and vote in the Fifth Committee of the General Assembly of the United Nations to contain costs of UN peacekeeping operations once they are authorized and underway. In addition, in establishing or renewing UN peace operations, the U.S. will require that cost control measures be among those items reported on in the Secretary General's periodic reports. The U.S. will insist on rigorous reviews of peace operations with a view to terminating those that are not successful or have insufficient prospect of meeting their objectives. (C)

H. Emergency Humanitarian Assistance: Often humanitarian relief must take place in a peacekeeping context. Indeed, at times, humanitarian assistance may be among the primary reasons for deploying a peace operation. The U.S. will urge the UN to implement rapidly the proposals in Annex IV to improve coordination among the UN's peacekeeping and humanitarian relief organs. The U.S. will detail experienced military and civilian personnel to the UN as appropriate to enhance the expertise of UN humanitarian agencies and to provide surge capacity in times of humanitarian crisis. (C)

I. Peace Negotiations: As the complexity and number of peace operations has increased, the lack of adequate coordination between UN negotiators and those in UN Headquarters (UNHQ) who will implement eventual peace settlements has become especially problematic. To improve advance coordination, the U.S. will urge the UN to establish clear terms of reference for UN negotiators that outline operational constraints and limit the negotiator's ability to commit the UN in the context of peace negotiations without the explicit consent of the UNSC. When conducting negotiations that may result in possible peace operations, UN negotiators should have on-hand UN military advice. (C)

Strengthening U.S. Support for Multilateral Peace Operations

10. The U.S. Government must enhance its capability to manage and support UN and other peacekeeping organizations effectively and must ensure that it is able to fund our peace operations obligations adequately. Towards this end, the USG will do the following: ~~(S)~~

A. Organizational Changes: The Secretaries of State and Defense will be jointly responsible for obtaining adequate peace operations funds and for managing day-to-day U.S. support for international peace operations. Decision-making authority and support for UN peace operations will be a shared responsibility as laid out below and in the Chart in Annex V. In all cases, the agency with lead responsibility for a given operation will be responsible for assessments associated with that operation. In all cases, the conduct of diplomacy and instructions to embassies and our UN Mission in New York will remain a State Department responsibility. ~~(S)~~

Unless the President determines otherwise, at the request of one of the principals: (U)

- The State Department will have lead responsibility for the oversight and management of those Chapter VI peace operations in which U.S. combat units are not participating. The Administration will seek to fund the assessments for these operations through the existing State Contributions for International Peace Activities (CIPA) account, and; (U)
- The Defense Department will have lead responsibility for the oversight and management of those Chapter VI operations in which there are U.S. combat units and for all Chapter VII peace operations. The Administration will seek to fund the assessments for these operations through the establishment of a new CIPA account within DOD. Once a DOD CIPA account is established, DOD may receive direct reimbursement from the UN for contributions of goods, services and troops to UN peace operations. (U)

Since peace operations are neither wholly military nor wholly political in nature, consisting instead of military, political, humanitarian and developmental elements in varying degrees, no one agency alone can manage all facets of an operation effectively. Therefore, the designated lead agencies will engage in full and regular interagency consultation as they manage U.S. support for peace operations. In addition, each agency will be responsible for ensuring that all appropriate functional bureaus within their departments (such as the State refugee bureau or the DOD humanitarian bureau) are fully involved in decision-making relevant to their areas of competence. ~~(S)~~

The National Security Council will continue to chair the interagency Peacekeeping Core Group (PCG). The PCG shall make recommendations to the Deputies Committee on U.S. policy on peace operations and U.S. support for and participation in new and on-going UN operations. In addition, the PCG will oversee interagency management of U.S. support for peace operations. When meeting to consider U.S. support for new and continuing operations, the PCG will invite representatives of the regional offices of the various departments to attend, and the regional Interagency Working Group (IWG) leader will serve as deputy chair of the meeting. When lead agencies have been designated for specific peace operations, those agencies may continue to chair individual IWGs. (S)

B. Reimbursements from the UN: The Departments of State and Defense shall credit UN reimbursements to the 050 and 150 budget functions according to the procedures in Annex VI. (S)

C. U.S. Funding of UN Peacekeeping: In the short term, the Administration will seek Congressional support for funding the USG's projected UN peacekeeping arrears. Over the long run, we view the shared responsibility approach outlined above as the best means of ensuring improved management and adequate funding of UN peace operations. (U)

The Administration will make every effort to budget adequately for known peacekeeping assessments and to seek Congressional support to fund, in the annual appropriation, assessments for clearly anticipated contingencies. (U)

D. Legislative Changes: The Administration will begin immediate consultations with Congress to seek to move the State CIPA account from the Commerce, Justice, State (CJS) Appropriations Subcommittees to the Foreign Operations Appropriations Subcommittees. In addition, at some future appropriate time, the Administration will seek the following legislative changes: (S)

- Amending Section 7 of the UN Participation Act first to remove the limitations on detailing personnel to the UN in Chapter VI operations and then, to the extent that it is politically feasible, to delete the prohibition against using that section as authority to support Chapter VII operations and combatant missions. (S)
- Amending DOD's authority to provide cross-servicing to peace operations (10 U.S.C 2341 et seq.) to simplify the current procedures (FAA Sec. 607 AECA). (S)
- Obtaining permanent extraordinary transfer authority to allow the President to transfer up to \$250 million of current year or unexpended past year funds internally within the 050 function or internally within the 150 function to support urgent international peacekeeping activities. (S)

E. U.S. Forces: The President retains and will not relinquish command authority over U.S. forces. On a case-by-case basis, the President will consider placing appropriate U.S. forces and personnel under the operational control of a competent UN commander for specific UN operations authorized by the Security Council. In making this decision, the President will take into account such factors as the nature of U.S. interests, the size of the proposed U.S. force, the risk to U.S. personnel, the proposed duration of the mission and rules of engagement and the nature and mandate of the operation (including whether it is Chapter VI or Chapter VII). Such action will be undertaken consistent with the U.S. Constitution, U.S. federal law and the Uniform Code of Military Justice. The greater the U.S. military role, the less likely it will be that the U.S. will agree to have a UN commander exercise overall operational control over U.S. forces. Any large-scale participation of U.S. forces in a major peace enforcement operation that is likely to involve combat should ordinarily be conducted under U.S. command and operational control or through competent regional organizations such as NATO or ad hoc coalitions. (C)

Even when the President determines that U.S. forces will be placed temporarily under the operational control of a UN commander, the fundamental elements of U.S. command will apply, including: (C)

- The sole source of legitimacy for U.S. commanders flows from the Constitution of the United States, U.S. federal law and the Uniform Code of Military Justice. (C)
- The chain of command from the President to the lowest U.S. commander in the field must remain inviolate. (C)
- U.S. commanders will maintain the capability to report separately to higher U.S. military authorities, as well as to the UN commander. (C)
- Commanders of U.S. military units participating in UN peace operations will refer to higher U.S. authorities orders that are illegal under U.S. or international law or are outside the mandate of the mission to which the United States agreed with the UN, if they are unable to resolve the matter with the UN commander. (C)
- The U.S. reserves the right to terminate the participation of U.S. personnel in the peace operation at any time and to take whatever actions it deems necessary to protect them if they are endangered. (C)
- U.S. units will at all times remain under U.S. administrative control for purposes such as discipline and evaluation. (C)

It is important to build public and Congressional support for UN peace operations, particularly those in which U.S. forces participate. Accordingly, we will take steps to ensure Congress is regularly and fully briefed on such operations, and, wherever possible, consulted about the participation of U.S. Armed Forces in them. (U)

F. Article 43 Stand-by Agreements: The U.S. will not pursue any Article 43 agreements with the UN at this time. The recommendations contained in this document are a workable, preferable alternative to Article 43 agreements at this time.

~~(S)~~

G. U.S. Participation in UN Field Assessments: To the extent possible, U.S. personnel should accompany UN assessment teams dispatched to the field to verify the feasibility and cost effectiveness of proposed plans for UN peace operations.

~~(S)~~

H. U.S. Training: The Armed Forces will include appropriate peace operations/emergency humanitarian assistance training in appropriate DOD training programs as needed to ensure the U.S. has adequate military forces and capabilities available to conduct or participate in the full spectrum of peacekeeping and humanitarian operations. Individual services will continue to conduct appropriate peace operations and humanitarian assistance training pursuant to Title X, U.S. Code responsibilities. Training U.S. forces to fight and decisively win wars will, however, continue to be the highest training priority.

~~(S)~~

Implementation

11. To implement the recommendations contained herein, agencies will do the following: ~~(S)~~

A. Within 60 days, OMB, with JCS, OSD and State, will produce an estimate of the cost of the proposed U.S. reform package and the budgetary implications of the U.S. contributions of goods, services and personnel. ~~(S)~~

B. As soon as possible thereafter, USUN will present or reaffirm U.S. proposals for UN peacekeeping reform initially to the Permanent Members of the Security Council and then to the Secretary General. These proposals will constitute the USG's considered response to the Secretary General's 1992 Agenda for Peace initiative, building upon the suggestions that the U.S. made to the P-4 in January 1993. USUN should continue its efforts to ensure that a Ministerial Session of the UNSC is held at an appropriate time to adopt a package of peace operations proposals. ~~(S)~~

C. USUN will urge the UN to coordinate a multinational pledging activity, focusing on Japan and Germany, to expand the DPKO as described above. ~~(S)~~

D. Within 90 days, OMB, JCS, OSD and State will complete a study of whether or not it is practical for the U.S. to contribute a greater New York area USG facility to house the expanded DPKO. (S)

E. Within 90 days, OMB/State/OSD will complete a study of the viability of a number of additional proposals to improve UN peacekeeping financing and budget management. (S)

F. As specified in Annex IV, within 90 days, an interagency group chaired by AID will make specific recommendations for enhancing the humanitarian assistance capabilities of the UN and the USG in the context of peace operations. Recommendations will be presented to the interagency Peacekeeping Core Group. (S)

G. The OSD and JCS will immediately review their organizational structures that currently support peace operations and augment them as necessary by reassignments to ensure that there are adequate personnel to support DOD's new responsibilities for managing and funding peace operations as outlined above. (S)

H. The Peacekeeping Core Group will review the separate question of rapid reaction capabilities once the relevant U.S. recommendations have been presented to the UN and, to the extent feasible, implemented and evaluated. (S)

12. The interagency Peacekeeping Core Group shall monitor implementation of this PDD. The Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the President through the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs a joint, semi-annual report, beginning six months from today, on the status of implementation of this directive and on the state of peace operations. (S)
13. All decisions to approve a vote in the UN Security Council in favor of a new UN peace operation will be made by an interagency group, at least at the Deputies Committee level, taking into account available analysis by the Peacekeeping Core Group. (S)

ANNEX I

Factors to be Considered in Voting on
UN Peace Operations Resolutions

- A. UN involvement advances U.S. interests, and there is an international community of interest for dealing with the problem on a multilateral basis.
- B. There is a threat to or breach of international peace and security, often of a regional character, defined as one or a combination of the following:
 - international aggression;
 - a humanitarian disaster requiring urgent action, coupled with violence;
 - sudden and unexpected interruption of established democracy or gross violation of human rights, coupled with violence or the threat thereof.
- C. There are clear objectives, including an understanding of where the mission fits on the spectrum between traditional peacekeeping and peace enforcement.
- D. For peace operations that are not explicitly authorized under Chapter VII, a cease-fire should be in place and the consent of the parties to the conflict obtained before the UN Security Council authorizes deployment of the peacekeeping operation.
- E. For peace enforcement operations, authorized under Chapter VII, the threat to international or regional peace and security is significant.
- F. The means to accomplish the mission are available, including forces, financing and a mandate (regional or UN) appropriate to the mission.
- G. The political, economic and humanitarian consequences of inaction by the international community have been weighed and are considered unacceptable.
- H. The operation's anticipated duration is tied to clear objectives and realistic criteria for ending the operation.

ANNEX II

Factors to be Considered for U.S. Troop Participation
in Peace Operations under Chapter VI or Chapter VII

- A. Participation advances U.S. interests and both the unique and general risks to American personnel have been weighed and are considered acceptable. (U)
- B. Funds, personnel and other resources are available for U.S. participation. (U)
- C. U.S. participation is necessary for the success of the mission or to persuade other nations or organizations to participate. (C)
- D. The role of U.S. forces is tied to clear objectives and an end point for U.S. participation can be identified. (U)
- E. There is domestic political and Congressional support for U.S. participation, or such support can be marshalled. (U)
- F. Command and control arrangements governing the participation of American and foreign forces are acceptable to the U.S. (U)

Additional Factors to be Considered for Significant
U.S. Involvement in Chapter VII Peace Enforcement Operations

Any large-scale participation of U.S. forces in a major peace enforcement operation that is likely to involve combat should ordinarily be conducted under U.S. command and operational control, through competent regional organizations such as NATO or ad hoc coalitions. In some rare instances, however, the situation might dictate the significant use of U.S. force in an international peace enforcement coalition acting under the aegis of the United Nations Security Council pursuant to Chapter VII. In such instances, the following additional conditions would apply. (S)

- G. We are able to commit sufficient forces to achieve our clearly defined political and military objectives. (C)
- H. We participate with the clear intention of decisively achieving these objectives. (C)
- I. The relationship among the size, composition, and disposition of forces we have committed and our objectives is continually reassessed and, if necessary, adjusted. (C)

Finance and Budget Management Reforms

Financing Reforms

- Enable countries to reduce their assessed peacekeeping costs by receiving credit for in-kind contributions of goods and services over and above those associated with troops they have provided to a particular operation. The amount of in-kind contributions each member state can credit should be limited to 30 percent of its assessed payment for the peace operation. (C)
- Consider revising the special peacekeeping scale of assessments to base it on a three-year average of national income instead of the current 10-year average. (U)
- Rationalize or eliminate Group C (middle-income countries) so that all or some of these member states pay their regular budget rate. Retain the special rate for Group D, least developed countries. The membership of Group D should be rationalized to reflect current national income levels. These changes are necessary to take account of current relative national incomes. (U)
- Urge member states with high GNPs (e.g., Japan, Germany) and countries directly benefitting from peace operations (including host states and states located within the region) to make significant voluntary cash and in-kind contributions to reduce the cost of peace operations. (C)
- As the President has stated, the U.S. is committed to reducing its assessment for peacekeeping operations to 25%. The U.S. will continue to reiterate that position within the UN, as Congress has directed. (U)

Budget Management Reform

- If by December 1994, FOD has not sufficiently improved its budget management capabilities, the SYG should set up a new, independent budget preparation/execution office in the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations. The USG should offer to detail highly qualified staff on a non-reimbursable basis to UN HQ for this purpose. (C)
- Create special budgeting techniques tailored to peace operations including: use of standardized cost "modules" (based on actual market pricing) for common elements of

peace operations; flexibility to construct budgets in two parts -- an in-kind requirements budget and cash requirements budget; and use of standardized "valuation" factors, which would be updated periodically to enable countries to estimate fairly the value of their in-kind contributions. (U)

- Establish a standing cadre of budget experts from member states, particularly top contributing countries, to assist the UN in developing credible budgets and financial plans. This would enable the major contributions to take an active role in ensuring cost-effective operations. It would also provide member states with early, detailed knowledge of mission costs and help build credibility for the estimates within member governments. (U)
- Enlarge and expand the current revolving Peacekeeping Reserve Fund (PRF) to \$500 million with voluntary contributions to help finance the start-up costs of UN peace operations pending receipt of assessed contributions. (U)
- Revise the UN's procedures to allow \$10 million or 20 percent, whichever is greater, of the initial estimated cost of a peace operation to be obligated, with the concurrence of the Advisory Committee on Administration and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ), once it is approved by the Security Council. This would enable the UN to cover quickly the typically high start-up costs of operations and contract for longer lead-time items. Current procedures allow only \$10 million to be obligated without specific approval of the General Assembly. (U)
- Require the UN to have a status of forces agreement that provides preferential host nation support to a peace operation with the exception of countries where there is no central government (e.g., Somalia). The agreement should ensure that the host country provides necessary local facilities on the most favorable terms (e.g., accommodations, supplies and local transport at no charge when possible) and offers the UN the most favorable legal exchange rate. (C)
- Prohibit the UN from "borrowing" from peacekeeping funds to finance cash shortfalls in regular UN administrative operations. Peacekeeping assessments should be maintained in separate accounts and should not be used -- even temporarily -- for regular UN activities. (U)
- Urge the UN to consider establishing an unified peace operations budget in conjunction with a contingency reserve fund, financed by a single annual peacekeeping assessment. A unified budget should be accompanied by more regular and timely cost accounting procedures to track expenditures and ensure effective budget management. (U)

Emergency Humanitarian Assistance

The UN Secretary-General should take a number of early steps to improve coordination between its peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance efforts: (U)

1. Establish clear lines of authority in the field between a Special Representative of the Secretary-General and the humanitarian, peacekeeping and political components of an operation. Within the humanitarian component, designate a Humanitarian Coordinator for a given crisis or country and establish his/her role and authority with respect to UN agencies and their implementing partners, other international organizations and non-governmental organizations. (U)
2. Consider the creation of a Donors' Oversight Committee to improve monitoring of humanitarian programs. (U)
3. Implement a system to be designed by U.S. experts that enables the UN to quantify and track needs as they arise in the field as well as international responses to those needs (from the emergency site, donor capitals and UN HQ). USAID has already financed the initiation of this activity for use by the UN relief agencies. (U)
4. Request as needed the dispatch of full-time U.S. and other member states' military or civilian experts to the Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA) and other UN humanitarian agencies and the rapid ad hoc detailing of experienced personnel for surge capacity/task force membership in times of crisis. (C)
5. Utilize a data bank to be designed by the U.S. of American personnel and technical resources, including government and private individuals or organizations with expertise in various facets of humanitarian assistance. Request other member states to augment this database. (C)
6. Improve coordination among the Humanitarian Affairs, Peacekeeping and Political Departments at UN Headquarters. (U)


In addition, AID, with representatives from State, Defense and Agriculture should formulate detailed proposals for enhancing the humanitarian assistance capabilities of the USG and UN in the context of peacekeeping operations. Recommendations should be made to the Peacekeeping Core Group within 90 days. In particular, the humanitarian working group should recommend improvements in USG capacity to contribute to the design and

implementation of humanitarian interventions; examine means to enhance monitoring and respect for human rights and humanitarian law in the context of peace operations; examine the implications of consolidating the UN's humanitarian relief activities in either New York or Geneva; consider ways to improve information exchange and operational coordination; consider ways to augment the Plans Directorate to provide more responsive, specialized support to DHA and other UN humanitarian agencies, determine whether DHA needs its own contingency planning capacity; and propose a process for future evaluation of progress made by DHA in fulfilling its mandate. Ultimately, the U.S. will present the UN SYG with a non-paper recommending ways to enhance UN and DHA's management and operational effectiveness. (C)

KEY ASPECTS OF THE SHARED RESPONSIBILITY MODEL

Champion	State + DOD
Peacekeeping Core Group Chair	NSC
Start/Terminate an Operation	Deputies Committee
-- Political Assessment	State
-- Military Assessment	DOD
-- Final Recommendation	State + DOD
Day-to-Day Conduct of Operations	Lead Agency
Conduct of Diplomatic Efforts	State
Identifying Funding Sources	Lead Agency
Source of Funds	
-- UN Assessments	State + DOD
-- Voluntary Peacekeeping	State + DOD
-- DOD O&M (which is reimbursed by UN)	DOD
Authorizing Committees	HFAC/HASC SFRC/SASC
Appropriating Subcommittees	Foreign Operations or CJS* Armed Services

*Eliminate role of CJS, if possible



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ANNEX VI

Reimbursement Policy for U.S. Contributions
to UN Peace Operations

There is interagency agreement that the U.S. should be reimbursed by the United Nations (UN) when DOD contributes troops, supplies or services to assessed UN peace operations. As a matter of policy, until the legislation providing the DOD CIPA account is enacted, the implementing Executive Order and other relevant authorities are in place, and DOD has received CIPA appropriations, State and DOD have agreed to the following procedures: (C)

In the short term, State and DOD will continue to consider each assessed UN peacekeeping operation on a case-by-case basis. (C)

a. DOD Troop Contributions: When DOD details forces to assessed UN peace operations under either Chapter VI or Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the U.S. shall seek the normal reimbursement to which all troop contributors are entitled (currently \$988/troop/month; or \$1279/troop/month for specialists, plus other related individual allowances, e.g., clothing and ammunition allowances). (U)

Such reimbursement, in excess of DOD component incremental troop costs, could be used, to the extent provided under existing statutes, to offset the USG's peacekeeping assessment -- paid from the State peacekeeping account. (C)

b. DOD Goods and Services: When DOD provides goods or services (e.g., lift, logistics support, medical or technical services) to assessed UN peacekeeping operations, DOD shall seek direct reimbursement from the UN. (U)

DOD and State will consult in exceptional situations which may require waiver of reimbursement. In such exceptional circumstances, when DOD and State agree, DOD would waive reimbursement. As a matter of policy, when reimbursement is waived, the USG will not seek to credit the value of DOD contributions of troops, goods and services against the USG UN assessment. State and Defense agree that we should continue to resolve these issues on a case-by-case basis. (C)

In the long term, the Administration will handle reimbursements for contributions of U.S. troops, goods and services in accordance with existing legislation and such new legislation as may be enacted. Reimbursement for contributions of U.S. troops in excess of incremental costs will ordinarily be credited to the CIPA account of the agency which has lead responsibility for a

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given operation. DOD will receive direct reimbursement for contributions of other goods and services. (U)

In pursuing the above reimbursement policy, the Administration will actively oppose any efforts by the Congress to authorize and direct the transfer of DOD funds to State to pay for peacekeeping assessments; or for any efforts to transfer State funding to DOD to pay for DOD participation in peacekeeping activities. (U)

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Definitions

This annex provides definitions useful for implementing the "Policy Guidance: U.S. Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations."

Multilateral Peace Operations

Actions taken by the United Nations under the authority of Chapter VI or Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, by regional arrangements pursuant to Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, or by ad hoc coalitions pursuant to a UN Security Council resolution under the authority of Chapter VI or VII of the UN Charter or consistent with Chapter VI of the UN Charter, in order to preserve, maintain or restore the peace.

Preventive Diplomacy

Diplomatic actions taken to resolve disputes before violence breaks out.

Peacekeeping (Chapter VI Peace Operations)

Deployment of neutral military and/or civilian personnel with the consent of the state or states involved and, more recently, of all significant parties to the dispute in order to assist in preserving or maintaining the peace. These are traditionally non-combat operations (except for the purpose of self-defense) and are normally undertaken to monitor and facilitate implementation of an existing truce agreement and in support of diplomatic efforts to achieve a lasting political settlement of the dispute.

Peace Enforcement (Chapter VII Peace Operations)

Actions involving the use of force or the threat of the use of force, authorized by the United Nations Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, to preserve, maintain or restore international peace and security or address breaches of the peace or acts of aggression. Such operations do not require the consent of the state(s) involved or of other parties to the conflict.

ANNEX VIII

Enhancing Congressional Involvement
in Matters Related to UN Peace Operations

1. The Administration will expand its consultations with the bipartisan leaders and senior leadership of the relevant committees of both Houses of Congress, as was begun last year, to ascertain Congressional views when it is giving serious consideration to deployment of U.S. military units in a UN peace operation. Such consultations will normally cover the anticipated UN command and control arrangements, the U.S. military role, the nature of the mission, its expected duration and how such deployment serves U.S. national interests. As reasons of national security dictate, the Administration may use other appropriate methods to communicate and consult with Congress on these matters.

2. State and Defense Department officials, with other Administration representatives, will hold monthly briefings for the combined majority and minority staffs of the foreign affairs, armed services and appropriations committees and bipartisan leadership of each House of Congress. These briefings will include:

- o significant developments in on-going peace operations and projected actions to be taken by the UN Security Council (UNSC) related to current or new operations;

- o for new operations, to the extent possible, the estimated total cost of the mission, the estimated U.S. share of the costs, the UN mandate, UN objectives, the expected duration of the mission and, if U.S. military units may be involved, UN command and control arrangements;

- o any reimbursable assistance to the UN for peace operations anticipated in the coming month, the value of which exceeds \$20 million. In extraordinary circumstances, where advance notification is not possible, the Administration will inform Congress no later than three working days after such assistance is provided.

3. In the event a situation arises that was not included in the monthly briefing and requires a UNSC vote, the Administration will endeavor to inform the appropriate committees prior to the vote. If this is not possible, the Administration will inform appropriate committees within three working days of the vote. These briefings will include the information specified in paragraph 2 above.

4. UN Documents: State will provide copies of all final UNSC peacekeeping resolutions and reports distributed to the Security Council and member states to appropriate committees within three working days of their receipt.

5. The Administration realizes that peace operations and war powers issues can overlap. The Administration would support legislation along the lines of that introduced by Senators Mitchell, Nunn, Byrd and Warner to amend the War Powers Resolution to introduce a consultative mechanism and to eliminate the 60-day withdrawal provisions.

6. Annual Comprehensive Report to Congress on Peace Operations: The President will provide to Congress with the submission of the budget a comprehensive annual report on peace operations activities conducted during the previous fiscal year, starting with the FY 1996 budget submission. The report will, to the extent possible, satisfy existing legal requirements for all related such reports and will include:

a) the number and nature of ongoing United Nations peacekeeping activities;

b) an assessment of the effectiveness of each on-going UN peace operation, its relationship to U.S. interests, and the efforts by the United Nations to resolve the relevant armed conflicts;

c) the total costs of each UN peace operation, both on-going and recently concluded, for the prior fiscal year;

d) the amount of U.S. assessed and voluntary contributions to each such activity for the prior fiscal year;

e) the nature and value of in-kind assistance and other support made available by the United States from any agency for United Nations peace operations, on both a reimbursable and non-reimbursable basis, for the prior fiscal year;

f) the estimated incremental costs to DOD of UN peace operations activities conducted during the previous fiscal year;

g) an assessment of the United Nations management and support for United Nations peace operations activities, including recommendations for improvement made by the United States, whether the UN has accepted them, and action by the UN to implement any such recommendations.

7. It is the Administration's policy to make non-reimbursable contributions of goods and services to the UN per a letter of assist only in unusual circumstances. However, when such contributions for peace operations are made, the value of which exceeds \$10 million, the Administration will inform Congress 72 hours in advance. In extraordinary circumstances where an advance report is not possible, the Administration will inform Congress no less than 72 hours after such contribution is made. All such non-reimbursable contributions of lesser value will be reported to Congress annually as provided above.

ANNEX IX

Peacekeeping in the Former Soviet Union

- Requests for "traditional" UN blue-helmetted peacekeeping operations on the territory of the former Soviet Union will be considered on the same basis as any other, using the factors outlined in Annex I. (U)

- As appropriate, on a case-by-case basis and subject to the factors in Paragraph 1 of the Policy Guidance, the U.S. will be prepared to support specific Russian proposals to seek UN Security Council endorsement to organize peacekeeping operations on the territory of the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union. U.S. support will be conditioned on these operations adhering to the principles of the UN Charter and meeting established UNSC criteria, including neutrality, consent of the conflicting parties, formal UNSC oversight and finite, renewable mandates. While the CSCE may play an important role in overseeing Russian peacekeeping efforts, ultimate authority for authorizing and legitimizing such operations should reside at the UN. In addition, the U.S. will not agree to accord the Commonwealth of Independent States in its current form the status of a regional organization or arrangement under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. (S)

- The U.S. will support, on a case-by-case basis, Russian proposals to establish a voluntary fund for regional peacekeeping operations in the former Soviet Union and endeavor to contribute to this Fund, resources permitting. (S)

- In its discussions with Moscow, the U.S. should make clear to Russia that UN oversight of any operation must be real and ongoing and could result in U.S.-Russian policy differences over the mandate, scope and even the advisability of such operations. At the same time, we will engage in on-going dialogue with other newly independent states to ensure that they understand the objectives of U.S. policy and to ensure that policy and UN oversight of operations reflect the legitimate interests and concerns of the newly independent states. The U.S. will encourage Russia to begin multilateral consultations on these issues as well. (S)

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