

(ORDER LIST: 566 U.S.)

TUESDAY, MAY 29, 2012

CERTIORARI -- SUMMARY DISPOSITIONS

11-99 HOLDER, ATT'Y GEN. V. MOJICA, LISBETH D.
11-103 HOLDER, ATT'Y GEN. V. CAMACHO, LUIS A.
11-104 HOLDER, ATT'Y GEN. V. BECERRA, HUMBERTO
11-831 HOLDER, ATT'Y GEN. V. PIMENTEL-ORNELAS, KARINA

The petitions for writs of certiorari are granted. The judgments are vacated, and the cases are remanded to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit for further consideration in light of *Holder v. Martinez Gutierrez*, 566 U.S. ____ (2012).

ORDERS IN PENDING CASES

11M92 JOHN MEZZALINGUA ASSOC., INC. V. INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION

The renewed motion for leave to file a petition for a writ of certiorari under seal with redacted copies for the public record is granted.

11-218 TIBBALS, WARDEN V. CARTER, SEAN

The motion of respondent for appointment of counsel is granted. Scott Michelman, Esquire, of Washington, D.C., is appointed to serve as counsel for the respondent in this case.

11-8556 BOOK, ETHAN V. MORTGAGE ELEC. REG., ET AL.

11-8636 LOYOLA, EDGARDO V. DONAHOE, POSTMASTER GEN.

The motions of petitioners for reconsideration of orders denying leave to proceed *in forma pauperis* are denied.

11-9692 RANA, GENE S. V. DEPT. OF ARMY
11-9833 THOMAS, MELVIN K. V. RITZ CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION

The motions of petitioners for leave to proceed *in forma pauperis* are denied. Petitioners are allowed until June 19, 2012, within which to pay the docketing fees required by Rule 38(a) and to submit petitions in compliance with Rule 33.1 of the Rules of this Court.

CERTIORARI GRANTED

11-1175 MARX, OLIVEA V. GENERAL REVENUE CORP.

The petition for a writ of certiorari is granted limited to Question 1 presented by the petition.

CERTIORARI DENIED

11-301 SAINT-GOBAIN CERAMICS V. SIEMENS MEDICAL SOLUTIONS
11-730 ROEDER, DAVID M., ET AL. V. IRAN, ET AL.
11-789 JENNINGS, DAVID B. V. OWENS, RISSIE, ET AL.
11-824 SCHAFER, JANICE V. ASTRUE, COMM'R, SOCIAL SEC.
11-890 BRIGHT, IKE R. V. HOLDER, ATT'Y GEN.
11-895 BUSH, LYMAN F. V. UNITED STATES
11-1032) AGARANO, DARREN, ET AL. V. MATTOS, TROY, ET UX.
)
11-1045) BROOKS, MALAIKA V. DAMAN, STEVEN L., ET AL.
)
11-1165) MATTOS, TROY, ET UX. V. AGARANO, DARREN, ET AL.
11-1074 JACOBS ENGINEERING GROUP, INC. V. MINNESOTA
11-1159 FLINT, EDWARD H. V. METLIFE INSURANCE CO., ET AL.
11-1172 UPSHAW, SOLOMON V. ANDRADE, MATTHEW, ET AL.
11-1181 SCOFBP, LLC, ET AL. V. CENTRAL STATES, ET AL.
11-1183 SATTARI, MICHAEL V. WASHINGTON MUTUAL
11-1196 HERSHEY, BARBARA J. V. NEW YORK
11-1205 BUSH, GERALD D., ET UX. V. SLAGH, BRADLEY, ET AL.

11-1220 FREEDMAN, STEVEN F., ET AL. V. STATE BAR OF GA
11-1232 COLLINS, CLIFTON L. V. VIRGINIA
11-1244 GRUNDSTEIN, ROBERT V. COURT OF APPEALS OF OH, ET AL.
11-1265 INTERNATIONAL STRATEGIC PARTNERS V. CIR
11-1282 WILLIAMS, ALLEN D. V. VIRGINIA
11-1293 MILLER, DANQUELL V. UNITED STATES
11-1300 CHOI, DANIEL V. UNITED STATES
11-8135 RANDOLPH, MARK L. V. UNITED STATES
11-8356 TRAN, TRUNG V. V. SWARTHOUT, WARDEN
11-8432 WEARING, RASHADI A. V. UNITED STATES
11-8632 NICHOLS, DARRYL V. UNITED STATES
11-8635 MARTIN, TA-THASIO V. UNITED STATES
11-8915 HOLAND, MARQUEZ A. V. LOUISIANA
11-9104 PELLETIER, MICHAEL V. UNITED STATES
11-9228 HARRIS, KENNETH S. V. UNITED STATES
11-9325 CHAFFO, JOHN L. V. UNITED STATES
11-9426 SALAZAR, ROLAND V. THALER, DIR., TX DCJ
11-9431 RICHARDSON, RASSAN V. PENNSYLVANIA
11-9437 THOMPSON, MATTHEW V. PREMO, SUPT., OR
11-9448 CORPORAL, JEFFREY V. MORGAN, WARDEN, ET AL.
11-9449 GARRETT, WILLIAM R. V. RUNNELS, WARDEN
11-9451 HILL, JEWEL V. MUWWAKKIL, NISAA N.
11-9458 HAYNES, ROBERT L. V. R.W. SELBY CO., ET AL.
11-9461 TRICOME, DOMENIC V. GOOGLE, INC.
11-9471 HOFELICH, HOWARD V. HAWAII, ET AL.
11-9472 GEMAS, JAMES D. V. HENEKS, JACK R., ET AL.
11-9473 FERNANDEZ, JOAQUIN L. V. HARTLEY, WARDEN
11-9477 SATTERFIELD, PAUL V. JOHNSON, PHILIP L., ET AL.

11-9478 SALERNO, DENNIS M. V. MICHIGAN
11-9479 STRICKLAND, ROBERT V. SMALL, WARDEN
11-9480 GRIFFIN, RONALD A. V. JESSON, LUCINDA E.
11-9481 FOYE, DARRELL V. WARREN, ADM'R, NJ, ET AL.
11-9482 HENRY, BOBBY D. V. HOBBS, DIR., AR DOC
11-9483 GARCIA, DAVID V. CALIFORNIA
11-9485 FLOWERS, WILLIE T. V. THALER, DIR., TX DCJ
11-9491 DIXON, BENNIE V. LOPEZ, ACTING WARDEN, ET AL.
11-9493 LOMAX, MATTIE V. MIAMI POLICE DEPT., ET AL.
11-9495 GOLDEN, RASHAAN V. THALER, DIR., TX DCJ
11-9497 HASSAN, ALIM V. WARREN, ADM'R, NJ, ET AL.
11-9506 BUCKMAN, ANTONIO L. V. FLORIDA
11-9508 KENDRICK, KARIN M. V. UNION BAPTIST CHURCH, ET AL.
11-9520 LANCASTER, KEITH E. V. FLORIDA
11-9521 KING, CURTIS L. V. STEVENSON, WARDEN
11-9522 PRIMAS, MANUEL V. CALIFORNIA
11-9531 PEREZ, FRANCISCO V. STAINER, WARDEN
11-9533 MCHENRY, ROYAL V. CALIFORNIA
11-9534 NOLL, SCOTT A. V. PENNSYLVANIA
11-9541 CRUZ, REYNALDO V. ILLINOIS
11-9544 WRIGHT, TROY A. V. BUTTS, SUPT., PENDLETON
11-9545 BURNS, AARON S. V. FLORIDA
11-9546 ARNOLD, RONALD M. V. VIRGINIA
11-9548 BURNELL, JOE B. V. JUNIOUS, WARDEN
11-9549 TRICOME, DOMENIC V. AUTOMATTIC, INC., ET AL.
11-9551 LEE, JEROME H. V. THALER, DIR., TX DCJ
11-9568 SYKES, MARRICCO V. ELLIOT, MR., ET AL.
11-9573 HALL, TOMMY D. V. HOBBS, DIR., AR DOC

11-9588 DA COSTA, GEORGE A. V. UNITED STATES, ET AL.
11-9591 LISTER, JANIS V. ASTRUE, COMM'R, SOCIAL SEC.
11-9597 MOHSEN, AMR V. MORGAN STANLEY DEAN WITTER
11-9615 MENDOZA, RONALD B. V. CALIFORNIA
11-9629 SYRUS, CHARLES A. V. BENNETT, CLAY, ET AL.
11-9659 HELLER, EARL R. V. OPM
11-9679 HASAN, HASAN H. V. HOLDER, ATT'Y GEN.
11-9687 WHITE, FRANK W. V. KILGORE, TOM
11-9690 SMARTT, LOYCE V. DEPT. OF EDUCATION
11-9694 ESQUIVEL, CESAR S. V. HALL, WARDEN, ET AL.
11-9712 BRAVO, JUAN V. LOPEZ, WARDEN
11-9723 BROOM, MARK E. V. DENNEY, WARDEN
11-9727 DYER, CHARLES P. V. MASSACHUSETTS
11-9738 DAX, JOSEPH F. V. WYOMING, ET AL.
11-9757 COLLINS, JAMES Y. V. LEMPKE, SUPT., FIVE POINTS
11-9762 DEERE, LLOYD R. V. PALMER, WARDEN, ET AL.
11-9799 BURRELL, COREY V. TENNIS, SUPT., ROCKVIEW, ET AL.
11-9813 PARVIN, JOHN A. V. CATE, SEC., CA DOC
11-9824 WADE, FREDERICK D. V. OPM
11-9825 GREEN, JAMAL V. WALSH, SUPT., SULLIVAN
11-9834 GILBERT, MICHAEL V. FLORIDA
11-9837 MATHIS, SHANDA V. OHIO REHAB. AND CORR., ET AL.
11-9854 MICOLO, MARCUS V. NEW YORK
11-9941 SHANKS, ELIZABETH H. V. UNITED STATES
11-9942 STALLWORTH, DOUGLAS L. V. UNITED STATES
11-9944 STRILEY, EDWARD K. V. UNITED STATES
11-9958 BOWMAN, JOHN J. V. KOVSLEK, ANYA, ET AL.
11-9967 CERVANTES-AGUILAR, HECTOR V. UNITED STATES

11-9970 LIGHTFOOT, XAVIER V. UNITED STATES
11-9972 LENNARD, SHAWN M. V. UNITED STATES
11-9975 TUCKER, TERRANCE G. V. UNITED STATES
11-9983 ADAMS, DEONTRAYVIA V. UNITED STATES
11-9984 EWING, SAMUEL J. V. UNITED STATES
11-9986 PINION, ARMON L. V. UNITED STATES
11-9987 NDUBUISI, EZUMAH C. V. UNITED STATES
11-9988 MUNEZ, RICKY V. UNITED STATES
11-9990 McCULLERS, BILLY R. V. UNITED STATES
11-9992 BANSAL, AKHIL V. UNITED STATES
11-9997 MOSLEY, ROY V. UNITED STATES
11-10000 ROBINSON, GILBERT V. UNITED STATES
11-10004 GREEN, MARK A. V. UNITED STATES
11-10005 HUDSON, SANCHEZ V. UNITED STATES
11-10007 GONZALEZ, MONICA G. V. UNITED STATES
11-10008 HERNANDEZ-BELTRAN, EVERARDO V. UNITED STATES
11-10010 GALLOWAY, DARIUS L. V. UNITED STATES
11-10016 RIOJAS, ROBERTO V. UNITED STATES
11-10018 ISAAC, PRINCE V. UNITED STATES
11-10019 HEWITT, TONY R. V. UNITED STATES
11-10025 JOHNSON, JOHN M. V. UNITED STATES
11-10027 FULTON, KENDRICK J. V. UNITED STATES
11-10028 SCANLAN, ERIC S. V. UNITED STATES
11-10030 GLOVER, MAURIEL V. UNITED STATES
11-10033 GOODWIN, MICHAEL V. LOCKETT, WARDEN, ET AL.
11-10035 GORBATOVA, VALENTINA P. V. GAETA, CHARLES, ET AL.
11-10038 FOSTER, NAPOLEON V. UNITED STATES
11-10043 HAWKINS, DON N. V. UNITED STATES

11-10048 GLENN, BERNARD V. UNITED STATES
11-10056 MORILLO-HIDALGO, RAFAEL V. UNITED STATES
11-10059 MARTINEZ ESCOBEDO, MANUEL V. UNITED STATES
11-10062 TADIO, DENNIS V. UNITED STATES
11-10065 ARTEAGA-TAPIA, CARLOS A. V. UNITED STATES
11-10067 GILYARD, BOBBY M. V. UNITED STATES
11-10073 HACKLEY, JAMES R. V. UNITED STATES
11-10075 HA, THUAN H. V. UNITED STATES
11-10076 DAVIS, MICHAEL R. V. UNITED STATES
11-10077 PICKAR, GREGG A. V. UNITED STATES
11-10078 NIGG, STEVEN J. V. UNITED STATES
11-10080 TUCKER, SONYA D. V. UNITED STATES
11-10084 MARK, GELEAN V. UNITED STATES
11-10087 CEBALLOS, OSCAR V. UNITED STATES
11-10090 MESA-LOPEZ, ALVIERO V. UNITED STATES
11-10092 LOPEZ-SANCHEZ, CESAR V. TAMEZ, WARDEN
11-10095 CRISP, ROBERT J. V. UNITED STATES
11-10097 ASLAM, SHAHZAD V. UNITED STATES

The petitions for writs of certiorari are denied.

11-667 BEELER, PATTI V. ASTRUE, COMM'R, SOCIAL SEC.

The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied. Justice Kagan took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.

11-898 DAMAN, STEVEN L., ET AL. V. BROOKS, MALAIKA

The motion of Los Angeles County Police Chiefs' Association, et al. for leave to file a brief as *amici curiae* is granted. The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied.

11-903 TESSERA, INC. V. ITC, ET AL.

The motion of ANP Respondents for leave to file a brief in opposition under seal with redacted copies for the public record is granted. The motion of petitioner for leave to file a reply brief under seal with redacted copies for the public record is granted. The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied.

11-8948 CRIM, JOHN M. V. UNITED STATES

The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied. Justice Kagan took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.

11-9459 OPONG-MENSAH, KOFI V. WORKERS' COMP. APP. BD., ET AL.

The motion of petitioner for leave to proceed *in forma pauperis* is denied, and the petition for a writ of certiorari is dismissed. See Rule 39.8.

11-9515 JONES, DONALD G. V. LA STATE BAR ASSN., ET AL.

11-9691 SMITH, WESLEY E. V. DYBING, ROBERT A., ET AL.

The motions of petitioners for leave to proceed *in forma pauperis* are denied, and the petitions for writs of certiorari are dismissed. See Rule 39.8. As the petitioners have repeatedly abused this Court's process, the Clerk is directed not to accept any further petitions in noncriminal matters from petitioners unless the docketing fees required by Rule 38(a) are paid and the petitions are submitted in compliance with Rule 33.1. See *Martin v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals*, 506 U.S. 1 (1992) (*per curiam*).

11-9974 JOHNSON, HARVEY R. V. UNITED STATES

The motion of petitioner for leave to proceed *in forma*

pauperis is denied, and the petition for a writ of certiorari is dismissed. See Rule 39.8. Justice Kagan took no part in the consideration or decision of this motion and this petition.

11-9982 NOWELL, FREDERICK B. V. UNITED STATES

11-10046 FLECK, DANNY L. V. UNITED STATES

The petitions for writs of certiorari are denied. Justice Kagan took no part in the consideration or decision of these petitions.

11-10063 JEAN-PIERRE, STEVEN V. UNITED STATES

The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied. Justice Sotomayor took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.

11-10081 WILSON, ANTHONY K. V. UNITED STATES

The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied. Justice Kagan took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.

HABEAS CORPUS DENIED

11-9994 IN RE GARY T. CARRILLO

11-10052 IN RE SAAD NOAH

The petitions for writs of habeas corpus are denied.

MANDAMUS DENIED

11-9507 IN RE ORAL SEKENDUR

The petition for a writ of mandamus is denied.

REHEARINGS DENIED

11-7610 BROWN, DUANE K. V. COLLINS, TERRY J., ET AL.

11-7648 STEVENSON, JAMES V. NY DOC

11-8207 WALTON, ANDRE V. ALSTON, CORR. OFFICER, ET AL.

11-8323 CONLEY, ANTHONY V. KEYS, MARCIA, ET AL.

11-8492 BENSON, JAMES V. TIBBALS, WARDEN
11-8599 WESTON, TRAVIS V. ILLINOIS
11-8603 D'ANTUONO, FRANK V. BRADT, SUPT., ATTICA
11-8611 SHABAZZ, KAMAU A. V. UNITED STATES
11-8897 TIBURCIO, SEIDY M. V. OBAMA, PRESIDENT OF U.S.
11-9099 VASQUEZ, ORLANDO R. V. UNITED STATES

The petitions for rehearing are denied.

08-7229 COOK, DANIEL W. V. SCHRIRO, DIR., AZ DOC

The motion for leave to file a petition for rehearing is denied.

ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE

D-2624 IN THE MATTER OF DISBARMENT OF PERCY SQUIRE

Percy Squire, of Columbus, Ohio, having been suspended from the practice of law in this Court by order of March 19, 2012; and a rule having been issued and served upon him requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred; and a response having been filed;

It is ordered that Percy Squire is disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.

D-2632 IN THE MATTER OF DISBARMENT OF CHARLES RUFFIN POOLE

Charles Ruffin Poole, of Raleigh, North Carolina, having been suspended from the practice of law in this Court by order of April 2, 2012; and a rule having been issued and served upon him requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred; and a response having been filed;

It is ordered that Charles Ruffin Poole is disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.

D-2653

IN THE MATTER OF DISBARMENT OF CHRISTOPHER M. UHL

Christopher M. Uhl, of Southborough, Massachusetts, having been suspended from the practice of law in this Court by order of April 16, 2012; and a rule having been issued and served upon him requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred; and a response having been filed;

It is ordered that Christopher M. Uhl is disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.

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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

BRIAN COLEMAN, SUPERINTENDENT, STATE COR-
RECTIONAL INSTITUTION AT FAYETTE, ET AL.
v. LORENZO JOHNSON

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 11–1053. Decided May 29, 2012

PER CURIAM.

Respondent Lorenzo Johnson was convicted as an accomplice and co-conspirator in the murder of Taraja Williams, who was killed by a shotgun blast to the chest in the early morning hours of December 15, 1995, in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. After his conviction was affirmed in state court, Johnson exhausted his state remedies and sought a writ of habeas corpus in Federal District Court pursuant to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), 28 U. S. C. §2254. The District Court denied habeas relief but the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed, holding that the evidence at trial was insufficient to support Johnson’s conviction under the standard set forth in *Jackson v. Virginia*, 443 U. S. 307 (1979).

We have made clear that *Jackson* claims face a high bar in federal habeas proceedings because they are subject to two layers of judicial deference. First, on direct appeal, “it is the responsibility of the jury—not the court—to decide what conclusions should be drawn from evidence admitted at trial. A reviewing court may set aside the jury’s verdict on the ground of insufficient evidence only if no rational trier of fact could have agreed with the jury.” *Cavazos v. Smith*, 565 U. S. 1, ____ (2011) (*per curiam*) (slip op., at 1). And second, on habeas review, “a federal court may not overturn a state court decision rejecting a sufficiency of the evidence challenge simply because the federal court

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disagrees with the state court. The federal court instead may do so only if the state court decision was ‘objectively unreasonable.’” *Ibid.* (quoting *Renico v. Lett*, 559 U. S. ___, ___ (2010) (slip op., at 5)).

Because the Court of Appeals failed to afford due respect to the role of the jury and the state courts of Pennsylvania, we now grant certiorari and reverse the judgment below.

* * *

The parties agree that Williams was shot and killed by Corey Walker, who was subsequently convicted of first-degree murder. Johnson was with Walker on the night of the crime, and the two were tried jointly. Johnson was charged as an accomplice and co-conspirator. See 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. §2502 (2008) (defining first-degree murder as “willful, deliberate and premeditated” killing); §306(c) (imposing accomplice liability for anyone who, “with the intent of promoting or facilitating the commission of the offense . . . aids or agrees or attempts to aid such other person in planning or committing it”); *Commonwealth v. Montalvo*, 598 Pa. 263, 274, 956 A.2d 926, 932 (2008) (criminal conspiracy liability for anyone who takes an overt act in furtherance of a crime he has agreed to abet or commit).

At trial, the Commonwealth called Victoria Doubs, who testified that she, Johnson, and Walker were “close friends” who “ran the streets together.” Tr. 213. On the morning of December 14, the three of them awoke at the same residence, bought marijuana, and then went to a Kentucky Fried Chicken restaurant, where they encountered Williams. Walker announced that he was going to “holler at” Williams about a debt Williams owed. *Id.*, at 217. According to Doubs, Walker and Williams “were talking about the money that [Williams] had owed us,” with Walker “asking [Williams], confronting him, about his money and what’s up with the money and why is it

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taking you so long to give us the money.” *Id.*, at 217–218. Williams was “cussing [Walker] out, telling him he’d give it to him when he felt like it and he ain’t scared of [Walker].” *Id.*, at 218. A fight ensued, which ended when Williams beat Walker with a broomstick in front of the crowd of people that had gathered.

After the fight, Doubs testified, Walker “was mad, because he got beat by a crackhead. . . . He was saying, yo, that crackhead beat me. I’m going to kill that crackhead. I’m going to kill that kid. . . . He was hot. He was heated.” *Id.*, at 220–221. Johnson was present when Walker made these statements. Later that afternoon, Doubs recounted the beating to others, who laughed at Walker. Walker “repeated it for a while that I’m going to kill that kid. That kid must think I’m some type of joke. I’m going to kill that kid. Who he think he is[?]” *Id.*, at 222. Once again, Johnson was present for these statements.

Another witness was Carla Brown, a friend of the victim, who testified that she was at the Midnight Special Bar on the night of December 14–15, where she saw Walker, Johnson, and Williams engaged in a heated argument. Although she could not hear what they were saying, she could tell they were arguing because they were making “a lot of arm movements.” *Id.*, at 104. The bouncer soon told them to leave, and Brown followed them into the street because she “wanted to know what was going on.” *Ibid.* Brown observed the three men walking in a single-file line, with Walker in front, Williams in the middle, and Johnson in the back. Walker was wearing a long leather coat, walking as if he had something concealed underneath it. Brown followed the three men to an alleyway, at which point Williams recognized Brown and told her to “go ahead” and pass. *Id.*, at 107. Walker then entered the alleyway, followed by Williams, while Johnson remained standing at the entrance. As Brown walked past the alley, she heard a loud “boom,” causing her to run away. *Id.*, at

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143. On cross-examination, Brown stated: “They walked [Williams] in that alley. He stood inside the alley. He walked him in the alley. I heard a boom.” *Ibid.*

The Commonwealth also called Aaron Dews, who testified that he was in a building bordering the alleyway at 12:45 a.m. on the morning of December 15. He heard a loud boom that caused him to look out into the alley from his second-story window, where he saw two silhouettes fleeing.

After Dews the Commonwealth called Brian Ramsey, who had been selling cocaine on a nearby street corner at the time of the murder. He testified that he saw Williams walking toward an alleyway with two males and a female, and he heard a loud boom shortly after Williams entered the alley. When pressed on cross-examination, he stated: “I would say that [Williams] was forced in that alley.” *Id.*, at 189.

The jury also heard testimony from police who searched the alley shortly after the murder and found a shotgun with the barrel missing. A medical examiner who examined Williams’ body testified that the cause of death was a shotgun wound to the chest.

After the jury convicted Johnson, he filed a post-trial motion arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. The court denied his motion, and the Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed the conviction on direct appeal. See *Commonwealth v. Johnson*, 726 A. 2d 1079 (1998). After the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied his petition for review, Johnson unsuccessfully sought state postconviction relief. He then filed a habeas petition in Federal District Court, which denied his claims. See *Johnson v. Mechling*, 541 F. Supp. 2d 651 (MD Pa. 2008). Finally, Johnson appealed to the Third Circuit, which reversed the District Court and ordered his conviction overturned.

Under *Jackson*, evidence is sufficient to support a con-

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viction if, “after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, *any* rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” 443 U. S., at 319.

In light of the testimony at Johnson’s trial, the Court of Appeals acknowledged that “[a] trier of fact could reasonably infer . . . that Johnson and Walker shared a common intent to confront, threaten or harass Williams.” *Johnson v. Mechling*, 446 Fed. Appx. 531, 540 (CA3 2011). As for the notion that “Johnson shared Walker’s intent to kill Williams,” however, the court concluded that was “mere speculation” that no rational factfinder could accept as true. *Ibid.* The court stated that “a reasonable inference is one where the fact inferred is ‘more likely than not to flow from the proved fact on which it is made to depend.’” *Id.*, at 539–540 (quoting *Commonwealth v. McFarland*, 452 Pa. 435, 439, 308 A. 2d 592, 594 (1973)). In order for a jury’s inferences to be permissible, the court reasoned, they must “flow from facts and circumstances proven in the record” that are “of such volume and quality as to overcome the presumption of innocence.” 446 Fed. Appx., at 539 (quoting *Commonwealth v. Bostick*, 958 A. 2d 543, 560 (Pa. Super. 2008)).

At the outset, we note that it was error for the Court of Appeals to look to Pennsylvania law in determining what distinguishes a reasoned inference from “mere speculation.” Under *Jackson*, federal courts must look to state law for “the substantive elements of the criminal offense,” 443 U. S., at 324, n. 16, but the minimum amount of evidence that the Due Process Clause requires to prove the offense is purely a matter of federal law.

Under the deferential federal standard, the approach taken by the Court of Appeals was flawed because it unduly impinged on the jury’s role as factfinder. *Jackson* leaves juries broad discretion in deciding what inferences to draw from the evidence presented at trial, requiring

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only that jurors “draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.” *Id.*, at 319. This deferential standard does not permit the type of fine-grained factual parsing in which the Court of Appeals engaged. For example, in addressing Brown and Ramsey’s testimony that Williams was “walked” and “forced” into the alleyway, the court objected that the witnesses did not describe any “physical action” supporting the conclusion that force was used. 446 Fed. Appx., at 541. Absent some specific testimony that “Johnson actively pushed, shoved, ordered or otherwise forced the victim into the alley, or prevented him from leaving it,” *ibid.*, the court could see no reasonable basis for the jury’s conclusion that Johnson had a specific intent to help kill Williams.

That analysis is flawed for two reasons. First, the coercive nature of Johnson and Walker’s behavior could be inferred from other circumstances not involving the direct use of force: Walker was noticeably concealing a weapon, and he had been heatedly threatening to kill Williams after a violent confrontation earlier in the day. Johnson and Walker kept Williams between them in a single-file line on the way to the alley, where Johnson stood at the entrance while the other two entered, suggesting that Johnson may have been prepared to prevent Williams from fleeing. And second, even if Williams was not coerced into the alley, the jury still could have concluded that Johnson helped lead or lure him there to facilitate the murder.

Taken in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the trial testimony revealed that Johnson and Walker “ran the streets together,” and had attempted to collect a debt from Williams earlier on the day of the murder. Williams resisted the collection, managing to humiliate Walker in the process by giving him a public thrashing with a broomstick. This enraged Walker to the point that he repeatedly declared over the course of the day in Johnson’s

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presence that he intended to kill Williams. Then, while Walker was noticeably concealing a bulky object under his trenchcoat, Johnson helped escort Williams into an alley, where Johnson stood at the entryway while Walker pulled out a shotgun and shot Williams in the chest.

On the basis of these facts, a rational jury could infer that Johnson knew that Walker was armed with a shotgun; knew that he intended to kill Williams; and helped usher Williams into the alleyway to meet his fate. The jury in this case was convinced, and the only question under *Jackson* is whether that finding was so insupportable as to fall below the threshold of bare rationality. The state court of last review did not think so, and that determination in turn is entitled to considerable deference under AEDPA, 28 U. S. C. §2254(d).

Affording due respect to the role of the jury and the state courts, we conclude that the evidence at Johnson's trial was not nearly sparse enough to sustain a due process challenge under *Jackson*. The evidence was sufficient to convict Johnson as an accomplice and a co-conspirator in the murder of Taraja Williams. The Commonwealth's petition for certiorari and the motion to proceed *in forma pauperis* are granted, the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.