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HISTORY OF THE
JOINT STRATEGIC TARGET PLANNING STAFF

SIOP - 4 L/M, JULY 1972 - JUNE 1973

(Unclassified Title)

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FOREWORD

This is the eleventh history of the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff (JSTPS) since its establishment on 16 August 1960. It covers the period of July 1972 through June 1973, the term of Revisions L and M of SIOP-4. It has been prepared in accordance with Joint Administrative Instruction 210-1, 10 May 1972.

The classification of Top Secret/~~Restricted Data~~ and the exemption from the General Declassification Schedule are established to conform with the classification of the source documents.

This history was prepared for the JSTPS by Mr. (b)(6) of the Strategic Air Command historical staff.

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- I Roster of Key Personnel, JSTPS, July 1972 - June 1973, and JTD (or requirements) for 1973 - Spaces by Category, by Service, by Grade

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Introduction

(U) The Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff (JSTPS) was established in August 1960 by Secretary of Defense Thomas S. Gates, Jr. It served as a military planning agency under the control of and responsible to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). Secretary Gates directed that the Commander in Chief, Strategic Air Command (SAC) would be the Director of Strategic Target Planning (DSTP). He also specified that a flag or general officer from another service be the Deputy Director. The Deputy has invariably been a U.S. Navy vice admiral. Staff personnel, specialists in intelligence and operational matters, represented all services and were assigned directly to the JSTPS. Further, many Headquarters SAC personnel were assigned to dual-duty positions -- SAC and the JSTPS. Secretary Gates also assigned the JSTPS to Offutt AFB, Nebraska, near Omaha, to be collocated with Headquarters SAC. One reason determined the selection: SAC possessed the most experience both in strategic target planning and in computer support.¹

(U) Throughout FY 73, General John C. Meyer, the Commander in Chief, Strategic Air Command, continued to serve as Director of Strategic Target Planning and Vice Admiral Kent L. Lee served as the Deputy Director.²

Mission

(U) The mission of the JSTPS was to assure unity of strategic effort in national general war planning. This had become necessary because the employment of advancing nuclear weapon technology had resulted in overlap of missions and duplication of effort. The Secretary of Defense had directed the JSTPS to provide centrally-controlled operational planning, to identify targets, and to specify strikes to destroy or neutralize them in case of general war.³

(U) The strikes would be delivered by the systems of the unified and specified commands. These, the major combatant commands of the United States Department of Defense, were assigned broad and continuing missions. Of the eight unified and specified commands, only four

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
were involved directly in the strategic offensive mission. They were: Strategic Air Command (SAC), U.S. Atlantic Command (LANTCOM), U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM), and U.S. European Command (EUCOM). These military organizations comprised the strategic offensive nuclear forces and were strictly controlled as a matter of national policy.⁴

(U) The nuclear forces consisted of SAC's manned bombers, SAC's intercontinental ballistic missiles, and the Navy's submarine-launched ballistic missiles, augmented by tactical weapon delivery systems from theater forces. Included with these U.S. forces were North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces in Supreme Allied Command, Europe (SACEUR) and Supreme Allied Command, Atlantic (SACLANT).⁵

(U) To assure unity of strategic effort, the JSTPS was responsible for the preparation and maintenance of the National Strategic Target List (NSTL) of targets selected for attack in a general nuclear war and "a Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) for attacks against some of those targets." Related to these was a requirement to prepare and maintain a National Strategic Reconnaissance List (NSRL) and a Coordinated Reconnaissance Plan (CRP). The objective of these was to coordinate plans of the unified and specified commands during nuclear war. Furthermore, allied nations with nuclear weapons received the assistance of the JSTPS in preparation of general strike plans.⁶

(U) Because the mission was dual, the JSTPS was organized with two main divisions: a SIOP Division and an NSTL Division. They were responsible for the two principal products -- the SIOP and the NSTL.

Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP)



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Preparation and Maintenance of the SIOP

(U) Original procedures had required preparation of an annual SIOP, based on the fiscal year, e.g., SIOP-64. By FY 1967, an annual SIOP was no longer satisfactory. The composition and posture of United States and Allied strategic offensive forces and the targets they were directed against were continually changing. New weapon delivery systems were becoming operational and old ones were phased out. Furthermore, committed forces changed operational status because of modification programs, maintenance necessities, crew shortages, and so forth. Rapidly changing target priorities also brought about the need for revising the SIOP more frequently. Consequently, beginning with FY 1967, the SIOP was revised on a semiannual basis. The basic plan in effect at that time was SIOP-4, the fourth SIOP published since inception of JSTPS. The JSTPS maintained the plan in current status with a major revision every six months, specified with alphabetical suffix indicators in sequence. In addition, minor interim and mid-period changes were incorporated as dictated by events.⁹

(U) On 1 July 1972, the first major revision of FY 1973 -- Revision "L" (LIMA) went into effect. Revision "M" (MIKE) followed on 1 January 1973 and remained in effect through 30 June 1973.


Communist Threats

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SIOP-Committed Forces

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


System

Rev LIMA

Rev MIKE

- Minuteman I
- Minuteman III
- Polaris
- Poseidon
- SRAM
- Conversion Net
- Change



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
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CINCS	Alert			Non-Alert			Total		
	KILO	LIMA	MIKE	KILO	LIMA	MIKE	KILO	LIMA	MIKE
CINCEUR	(b)(1)								
CINCSAC									
CINCLANT									
CINCPAC									
SACEUR*									
SACLANT*									
Total									

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CINCS	Alert			Non-Alert			Total		
	KILO	LIMA	MIKE	KILO	LIMA	MIKE	KILO	LIMA	MIKE
CINCEUR	(b)(1),(b)(3):42 USC § 2168 (a) (1) (C)								
CINCSAC									
CINCLANT									
CINCPAC									
SACEUR*									
SACLANT*									
Total									

DE
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* (U) Not commanders of unified commands.

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(b)(1)



(TS) JSTPS planning factors were used to prepare each SIOP revision. For Revision LIMA (1 July-31 December 72) and Revision MIKE (1 January-30 June 73), factors for several weapons delivery systems changed as a result of larger sampling of tests and accumulation of data. Most significant of these was the improved accuracy (CEP) in the missile forces, specifically the Minuteman and Polaris.



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Rev LIMA

Rev MIKE

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This CEP improvement was the product of data accumulated from operational tests. During launches, the data was recorded delineating overall increases in internal systems reliability which ended in improved CEPs.

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~~(TS)~~ Weapon system reliability decreases also resulted from a larger sampling of tests. The decrease in the B-52 WSR for Revision MIKE from (b)(1)

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~~(S)~~ Force Application.

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~~(TS-NO FOREIGN DISSEM)~~ Many factors had to be considered in force application. Physical limitations such as range of a weapon system, its payload, and its ability to penetrate were always present. Another limiting factor was JCS policy restraints

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


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


~~(TS)~~ Weapon Employment Priorities. Weapon employment priorities were based upon the principles of warfare. Logic dictated first-priority efforts against



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
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National Strategic Target List (NSTL)

~~(S)~~ Target planning was one of several end products of national military intelligence structure. Long before the current revisions to SIOP-4 went into effect, JSIPS had received target planning information from many intelligence sources.



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


National Strategic DGZ List (NSDL)

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


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
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
~~(TS-NO FOREIGN DISSEM)~~ Task ALPHA. In the case of Task ALPHA

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~~(TS)~~ Task CHARLIE. More refined data also improved Task

CHARLIE



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
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~~(TS)~~ Task BRAVO targeting studies produced some expansions of the NSDL.




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Consequences of Execution


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~~(TS)~~ For both Revisions LIMA and MIKE, the scenarios were constant.




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
~~(S)~~ In the comparison of all scenarios for Revision LIMA and Revision MIKE, only minor differences appeared.



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Games and Analysis

~~(S)~~ An important evaluation of SIOP effectiveness was testing the revisions



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
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~~(TS)~~ Annually, JSTPS reported the results of gaming one of the revisions. For 1973, the JSTPS reported to the JCS on the results between



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National Strategic Targeting and Attack Policy (NSTAP)

~~(S)~~ The National Strategic Targeting and Attack Policy (NSTAP) was the cornerstone for the development of targeting principles and provided the assumptions concerning the posture of SIOP forces.

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~~(S)~~ In February 1972, the JCS issued a proposed revision to the NSTAP that would respond to some new strategic concepts. The main thrust of the proposals was to extend the scope of the NSTAP to include plans other than the SIOP: "To express . . . policy . . . and to provide guidance for the preparation of strategic capabilities plans . . ." Such an extension was in direct contrast with the existing NSTAP which dealt with only the one plan: SIOP. The objective of the extension was to deter attacks at any level in the

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The proposal called for even greater flexibility within the framework of the plans.

~~(S)~~ After preliminary review, JSTPS noted that planning the

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feasible.

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The various CINCs, the JCS and the Office of the Secretary of Defense were still considering the proposed changes at the end of FY 73.

COORDINATED RECONNAISSANCE PLAN (CRP-4)

~~(S)~~ Damage assessment of target areas required reconnaissance efforts in Trans- and Post-SIOP periods. Such effort would provide necessary information for the National Command Authority and the individual CINCs. The CINCs had responsibility for planning. JSTPS coordinated the products. Since these plans would be executed in a wartime situation, the NSTL Division of the JSTPS prepared

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Organization

(U) The JSIPPS's dual mission was reflected in its organizational structure. Of the two divisions, one prepared the NSTL and the other prepared the SIOP. The Director and the Deputy Director supervised these efforts and the Deputy Director conducted the day-to-day work. The Director's office included four senior officers (colonel or equivalent) from each of the four services. They were an integral part of the staff. The JSIPPS also had a staff secretary for administration.

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The unified and specified and NATO commands involved in strategic nuclear planning also had liaison officers detailed for duty. There was a specific CINCSAC representative, usually the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans, as well as groups representing the CINCPAC, CINCLANT, and CINCEUR.¹²⁴

Key Personnel

(U) Key personnel changes were relatively few for this period. The NSTL Division chief changed when Brigadier General Robert L. Cardenas, USAF, left the position on 15 June 1973 and was replaced by Rear Admiral Joseph W. Russel, USN, on 30 June. Among the Senior Service Members, the Army member, Colonel Charles R. Supplee was replaced by Colonel William P. Schneider on 7 August 1972. The Air Force member, Colonel Sherwin G. Desens, was replaced by Colonel Gerald W. Adams on 31 May 1973. There was more stability among the command representatives in that the only change occurred in the position representing CINCPAC. Although Captain Lester B. Lampman, USN, had vacated the position on 19 May 1972, his replacement, Captain Albert E. Knutson, did take over the job on 21 September 1972. Of the NATO national representatives, only Colonel (b)(6)

(b)(6) remained through the year. The others were replaced as follows:

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Manpower

(U) The JSTPS manpower authorization for FY 1973 was reduced by six spaces from FY 1972. The authorizations were as follows:

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<u>Service</u>	<u>FY 72</u>	<u>FY 73</u>	<u>Change</u>
Air Force	242	226	-16
(Single			
Status	[85]	[85]	
SAC	157	141	
Army	22	23	+1
Navy	58	58	0
Marine Corps	4	4	0
Service, Not specified			
	6	15	+9
Officers	225	221	-4
Enlisted	81	80	-1
Civilian	26	25	-1

(U) In March 1972, a JCS Manpower Survey Team made several recommendations and proposals that still remained under discussion at the end of June 1972. Among these were recommendations to abolish the senior service member positions, the Integral Analysis Branch, and the Reconnaissance Branch, as well as to reorganize the resources of the two branches into sections.¹²⁵

(U) These proposals were to be incorporated in the Joint Manpower Program, JTD-13, when published on 1 July 1972. They had generated controversy and JSTPS disagreed with several of the proposals. As a result, JTD-13 did not receive final approval until 27 September 1972.¹²⁶

(U) In the case of the recommendation of the survey team to abolish the positions of the senior service members, the JCS could not obtain concurrence from the services. As a consequence, General Meyer formed an Ad Hoc Committee composed of the senior officers from the JSTPS. The final decision, as briefed to the JCS, was that if the services desired to retain their senior service representatives as an integral part of the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff, they should be allowed to retain them. In addition to that, the number of nominative positions were increased from six to 15. The prime purpose of this change was to create a more realistic balance of service representation in positions which significantly influenced policy and decisions. In the SIOP division, the chiefs and deputy

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chiefs of the functional branches were those that became nominated positions. In the Tactics and Combat Plans Branches, the nominations were limited to Navy and SAC dual-status positions. In the NSTL Division, the two section chiefs were changed from Air Force-specified to Navy-specified. Two sections chiefs in the SIOP Division were changed from SAC dual-status to nominative between SAC dual-status and Navy. The Chief of the new Studies and Analysis Staff was another of the nominative positions. The increase in nominative positions provided an excellent opportunity for officers of any service to progress to a position of greater responsibility within the JSTPS.¹²⁷

(U) The recommendation for elimination of the Integral Analysis Branch was modified. All studies and analysis functions of this Branch were transferred to a new Studies and Analysis Staff, which was made part of the Director's staff. Justification for this action was that the JSTPS needed the capability to conduct in-depth, independent and forward-looking studies and analysis of the SIOP. This capability existed partially in the Integral Analysis Branch, and in the Simulation and Analysis Branch although it was in two different divisions. Rather than cut across lines of responsibility to conduct the type of studies needed, the establishment of the independent analysis group would provide the Director with the independent analytical view of the output of the staff without any parochial bias.¹²⁸

(U) Although the JCS Manpower Survey had recommended disestablishment of the Reconnaissance Branch, JSTPS disagreed and counter-proposed changing it from a branch to a section and retaining it within the Combat Plans Branch.¹²⁹

(U) Another organizational readjustment was the reorganization of the Tactics Branch, SIOP Division. The rationale for this was that there was no single point of contact for aircraft or missile functions alone. Both sections -- Tactics and Penetrations -- worked on missiles, aircraft and ECM matters.¹³⁰

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(U) Final approval for the disputed and controversial matters came from the JCS and the JTD-13 went into effect on 27 September 1972.¹³¹

Summary

~~(TS)~~ In summary, several features were readily apparent. Developments recorded in previous histories had noted the steady and continued growth

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Planners


also achieved more effective use of weapons because of data-base quality improvements and overall refinement of data.

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
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~~(18)~~ This increase in SIOP effectiveness in Revisions L and M resulted in a general increase in damage expectancies.



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
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APPENDIX "I"

JTD (or requirements) for 1973
 Spaces by Category, by Service, by Grade

	<u>Grade</u>	<u>A</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>AF</u>	<u>MC</u>	<u>NP</u>	<u>SAC</u>	<u>Total</u>
<u>Officers:</u>	O-10						1	1
	O-9		1					1
	O-8						1	1
	O-7					1		1
	O-6	2	2	2	1	13	3	23
	O-5	6	14	11	1	1	25	58
	O-4	13	24	25	2		54	118
	O-3		5	5			8	18
	O-2							
	WO							
<u>Officer Totals:</u>		21	46	43	4	15	92	221
<u>Enlisted:</u>	E-9			1			3	4
	E-8		2				2	4
	E-7	1	4	5			11	21
	E-6	1	5	5			10	21
	E-5		1	13			12	26
	E-4			1			3	4
<u>Enlisted Totals:</u>		2	12	25	--	--	41	80
<u>Military Totals:</u>		23	58	68	4	15	133	301
<u>Civilians:</u> US				17			8	25
<u>Civilian Totals:</u>		--	--	17	--	--	8	25
<u>Grand Totals:</u>		23	58	85	4	15	141	326

UNCLASSIFIED



IFRD

(b)(6)

THIS IS REALLY PAGE 68
(PROGRAM PREVENTED MOVING
UP)