

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JAMES D. STARLING, USA
DEPUTY COMMANDER IN CHIEF
UNITED STATES TRANSPORTATION COMMAND
(June 1991 to August 1993)

AN ORAL HISTORY

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Organizational Issues

Vander Schaaf Report

Dr. Matthews: A few years back, Vander Schaaf [Derek J.], the Deputy DOD IG [Department of Defense Inspector General], recommended that we do away with the components and meld them and us into one huge unified transportation command. Do you think that is a good idea? Pros and cons please.

Gen Starling: I think the idea has some merit. The components perform two major functions. One is traffic management and the other is mode operations. When I look at Air Mobility Command [AMC], I see a mode operator. They operate aircraft. I look at the Military Sealift Command [MSC] and see a mode operator. They operate ships. I look at the Military Traffic Management Command [MTMC] though, and I don't see a mode operator. However, they are responsible for operating the ports around the world. I think those three components need to continue to perform those operational functions. You could build a case for consolidating all the traffic management functions into one headquarters. Whether [US]TRANSCOM [United States Transportation Command] or MTMC does the majority of those functions could be debated.

If I were king for a day, I would put TRANSCOM in Washington [D.C.] because that's where most of the true traffic manager organizations, customers, and leadership of industry are located. In Washington it could deal with a wide variety of government agencies on the spot so that they

don't always have to come out here to visit us. So, in a nutshell, yes, I think Vander Schaaf was on to something; had some good ideas. There are some political reasons why you can't get there from here. The services don't want to see the demise of their own organizations. They perform vital and unique functions.

Dr. Matthews: How about merging the two surface components, MSC and MTMC? DOD had considered that off and on over the last decade.

Gen Starling: I don't support it. I see MSC as being a mode operator who operates ships. In fact, it does relatively little traffic management, per se. I would see some of the traffic management functions that it performs migrating to MTMC along with some of the traffic management functions performed in AMC. MTMC has the wherewithal and the structure to be the traffic manager for our command.

Direct Reporting Units

Dr. Matthews: In the last few months, we've been taking on some new responsibilities, like ASMRO [Armed Services Medical Regulating Office], the aeromedical regulating mission, and maybe soon the Defense Courier Service, both perhaps as Direct Reporting Units. Are there other cats and dogs that we should absorb?

Gen Starling: There are none that I am aware of. I hear people propose that organizations ought to be transferred to TRANSCOM. The question I always ask when somebody makes a suggestion like that is "is the function you want to transfer to TRANSCOM a common-user transportation function?"

And if it doesn't meet that simple test, then I say "no, it shouldn't be transferred." You can look at ASMRO and say yes, that's a common-user transportation function. That's managing movement of patients around the world, and it passes the test. I don't see any others out there on the horizon.

Deputy Commander in Chief and Chief of Staff

Dr. Matthews: You're the DCINC [Deputy Commander in Chief] for a dual-hatted CINC [Commander in Chief]. That puts you in a unique situation where you appear to us, the troops out in the command, to be the guy who is operating the command on a day-to-day basis. At least we see your face more than the CINC's. Do you see yourself primarily as the manager of the command? Give us a feel for your position.

Gen Starling: I am, as the title denotes, Deputy. I am not the commander. Even though the CINC is away or sitting over in his AMC office, we talk several times a day. So the policies and issues that surface here in the command that you might think I am handling alone, believe me, I have coordinated with the CINC and I know his position. When I promulgate some policy or provide some direction, it's in keeping with the broad guidelines that I have from the CINC. When he's away on TDY [temporary duty] and operational issues come up, I make the decision at the moment, but I do it within a framework he's given me to make those decisions. And I always inform him of what I've done. When I talk to all the other DCINCs I know all around the world, I feel that I am extremely fortunate that I work for a guy who's dual-hatted

because it has given me a lot of latitude to make decisions and do things on a day-to-day basis. I've loved this job.

Dr. Matthews: The CINC has empowered you?

Gen Starling: Yes, yet I understand what the strings are and what the limits are of what I can and can't do. I fully understand the bounds of my authority. I know when I need to go check with the boss and keep him informed of what's going on.

Dr. Matthews: Your predecessor chose to combine the offices of the DCINC and Chief of Staff, and, in essence, eliminating the latter. You reinstated it. In hindsight, do you think that was the right decision? Do we need a Chief of Staff?

Gen Starling: Tricky question. Back in 1989, in the review of all the unified commands, a decision was made to do away with positions of Chiefs of Staff in unified commands. So you'll find today in most unified commands there is no Chief of Staff. You have a DCINC/Chief of Staff. About the time I came to TRANSCOM, General Johnson [Air Force General Hansford T., Commander in Chief, USTRANSCOM, 22 September 1989-25 August 1992] decided that we ought to go back to the old arrangement, a DCINC and a Chief of Staff. Bill Begert [Air Force Brigadier General William J., Chief of Staff, USTRANSCOM, 29 July 1991-December 1992] was coming into the CS [Chief of Staff] position and he was going to be a brigadier general. So it was very convenient. We had the luxury of putting a brigadier general into a position that on our authorization document really is only a colonel's position. Even to this day, there is no true position of Chief of Staff here. Internally we have created

one. In the eyes of the Washington community we're not authorized a Chief of Staff. We can no longer afford a Chief of Staff billet as the armed forces draw down. As the Air Force, Army, and Navy shrink, so do the number of general and flag officers. So there is pressure not to fill positions like Chief of Staff with brigadier generals. We will never again, I think, have the luxury of a brigadier general in our CS position. In my view, the colonel's position should become the Deputy Chief of Staff and serve as the right arm of the guy who has the title of DCINC/Chief of Staff. General Wykle [Army Lieutenant General Kenneth R.], my replacement, and I have discussed this. What he decides to do about it remains to be seen. But my recommendation to him is to recognize the reality of the situation: a colonel sitting in a position called Chief of Staff trying to exercise staffing authority over three flag officers. It puts the colonel in an untenable position. I'm not talking about the personalities now. Colonel Lowe [Air Force Colonel Robert A., first Chief of Staff, then Deputy Chief of Staff] is a great guy. But you just can't expect three general officer directors to respond to a colonel Chief of Staff.

Dr. Matthews: Would the Deputy Chief of Staff or Assistant Chief of Staff, whichever we call him, be an O-6 [colonel]?

Gen Starling: Yes.

Dr. Matthews: Would we do away with the old O-5 billet [lieutenant colonel]?

Gen Starling: Probably not. Administratively, to keep the things flowing around the command, I think that you'll still need that billet.

Directorates and Special Staff

Dr. Matthews: Could you make any other recommendations on how to reorganize the command?

Gen Starling: Yes, I have a number of them. I've discussed them with the CINC and he's prepared a paper for General Wykle. It asks General Wykle to do a "bottom-up" review of the command's organization. Obviously we have taken on an incredible number of new functions, missions, and responsibilities, but there has been no major restructuring of our organization. Consequently, there are some disconnects in the way we are organized. That doesn't mean we weren't organized properly in the beginning. We were organized properly in the beginning for the situation that existed at that time. Things have changed and evolved over the intervening five or six years. So I think it's time for us to see if we shouldn't realign some of our functions.

I have some ideas. We've talked about the Chief of Staff function. I think reality is that we can't maintain a separate Chief of Staff position because we can't fill it with a flag officer. And it doesn't work as a colonel. I look in the J3/J4 [Operations and Logistics Directorate] organization and I don't, in my view, think that we need a J4. We are not a logistics command. A J4 is responsible for the logistics support of the organization and its components. Our J4 is not really responsible for the logistical support of our components. So we don't perform a true logistics function in our J4. It is very heavily involved in logistics doctrine, in traffic management policy, and those kind of things.

And now that leads me to J5 [Plans and Policy Directorate]. The J5 is responsible for policy and doctrine and planning, so I think there are functions within the J4 that need to migrate over to our J5 so that, in fact, he becomes the guy who is in charge of setting policy and doctrine as far as TRANSCOM is concerned. There are some day-to-day operational functions that occur within our J4 that I think need to be in the J3. But don't call it a J4 function. They are operational issues and therefore they are J3 kinds of functions. Now when I look at J5, I see the J5 doing some things that I consider to be operational issues. Almost every month we host a conference for a CINC and we call it a planning conference. It's not a planning conference. It's an effort to straighten out the regional CINCs' TPFDDs [Time Phased Force Deployment Data]. That is an operations function, a J3 function. It's operators who come here to do that stuff. And so I think that function, developing those TPFDDs and deciding operationally how we are going to apply and manage resources against those CINCs' requirements, ought to be conducted and managed by the J3.

Over a period of time, what are traditionally thought of as communications, command, and control kinds of functions have migrated out of our J6 [Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems (C4S) Directorate]. And I've tasked the new J6 to come back to me soon and let me know in his view what things he needs back in J6. There are a number of functions that have left for one reason or another and migrated into the other directorates. Now, I'm the cause of one of those migrations.

Dr. Matthews: GTN [Global Transportation Network]?

Gen Starling: I directed GTN be pulled out of J6 because, quite frankly, J6 wasn't doing anything with it. It was just sitting there. The bureaucracy was not interested in producing a Global Transportation Network. Today I'm proud of the fact that I pulled it out of J6. I established for us a [GTN] Program Director. We now have a prototype on the street and people around the world are talking about it and saying, "Boy isn't that great. TRANSCOM is doing great things." And I'm convinced that if I had not pulled it out of J6, it wouldn't be where it is today. So now it has matured to the point that somebody will come along and say maybe it's time to put it back in J6. I'm not saying that, but someone after me might. I think Tom Lutterbie [Air Force Colonel Thomas P., Chief, GTN Program Management Office] and the team he put together has done an incredible job. They've done what I've asked them to do, and I'm proud of our work in that area.

Dr. Matthews: Talking about expanding our mission and our responsibilities, certainly we've moved big time into the budget arena.

Gen Starling: Oh yes, that is another issue for discussion. I established the J8 [Program Analysis and Financial Management Directorate] at TRANSCOM and I'm proud of that, also. As you know, in our new manpower authorizations, we're authorized an SES [Senior Executive Service] for that position. And hopefully, before too much longer, we'll see it filled. We're taking over the DBOF-T [Defense Business Operations Fund-Transportation] business for the Department of Defense. It is a very important aspect of what this command does day in and day out, and it's going to grow. I'm pleased to see that our J8 has recruited quality

people for the command. The J8 has filled almost all of his new billets, ones the command received based on our peacetime, single manager charter. The other directorates are lagging behind for one reason or another. They have just not pushed it as hard as our J8. He's done a great job putting that all together. And it is working.

Dr. Matthews: Do you foresee us moving more into the acquisition field in any way? National Defense Sealift Fund and all that?

Gen Starling: There are those who would have us do that. I don't think commanders in chief should be in the organizing, training, and equipping business which public law assigns to the service secretaries. So if you establish yourself as an acquisition guy, you take on trappings that go with being a service secretary. And it creates an incredible requirement for another bureaucracy out here to serve our CINC because he now has acquisition authority. I personally would hate to see that happen. I realize that with the establishment of the Sealift Fund and the Airlift Fund, which is now being touted as a new Mobility Fund, that there are those in Congress who are saying "give it to [US]CINCTRANS [Commander in Chief, USTRANSCOM]," not only the management of this fund, but acquisition authority as well. I just see it as a major expansion of our mission. If we were to take that on, it would require a quantum leap in the size of our staff in terms of lawyers, contracting people, and acquisition officers. I'd be willing to bet you that we'd have to double the size of our staff to manage acquisition. It's a very complex business.

Dr. Matthews: When we get the SES in J8, would that be the time to separate J5 and J8?

Gen Starling: Yes, it would. Bob Osterhoudt [Navy Captain Robert R., Deputy Director, Program Analysis and Financial Management Directorate] does a bang-up job and has put J8 on the map, so to speak. There are times when you need general officer or SES coverage for an issue in Washington. That's the only reason it's not separated today. I still say to the J5, "if I need a flag officer or somebody to run to town to represent us, you're going to be it." So until we get the SES my recommendation is, don't split it up. In fact, Bob operates as an independent director within TRANSCOM.

Dr. Matthews: Do you recommend any changes in the Special Staff?

Gen Starling: Perhaps the Protocol and Public Affairs offices should not be dual-hatted. But dual-hatting works well for the surgeon. If we were to make it two separate offices, a USTRANSCOM/SG [Surgeon General] and an AMC/SG, we could never justify a general officer in TRANSCOM. So it works to our advantage having a dual-hat there. Same situation with the Judge Advocate. We could never justify a general officer JAG [Judge Advocate General] here in TRANSCOM. So it works to our advantage to have general officers dual-hatted in the surgeon's office as well as the JAG.

Dr. Matthews: SP [Security Police]?

Gen Starling: There's just not enough business there for us to establish an independent office in my view. The Special Staff, for the most part, works well. It works to TRANSCOM's advantage

to have them dual-hatted, so if we are ever in a crunch and need more than the one or two people who are devoted to TRANSCOM business, we can always call on AMC to back us up. And that is, in fact, what happens.

Dr. Matthews: Let's look at our relationships with the Joint Staff. If we got rid of our J4, would we continue to work with the JS/J4 [Joint Staff, Logistics Directorate] as we have in the past? Or would we be more oriented to the J3 [Operations Directorate] at the Joint Staff?

Gen Starling: No. Even our J3 operates more with the JS/J4 than it does with the JS/J3. Our J5 operates primarily with the JS/J4, not the JS/J5 [Joint Staff, Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate]. So, I don't see our relationship with the Joint Staff changing. We are a logistics organization. Every one of our staff sections deals with the JS/J4.

Liaison Officers

Dr. Matthews: How about our liaison relationships, our liaisons out at the other unified commands and also the liaisons here who are assigned to our command--the CIA [Central Intelligence Agency], NSA [National Security Agency], DIA [Defense Intelligence Agency], and DMA [Defense Mapping Agency]? Are there improvements there that you could recommend? Additions? Should we have one from State Department, for instance?

Gen Starling: Yes, we should have a State Department liaison. We floated a trial balloon about eight months ago to try and get the State Department to put a political advisor here. And last fall I thought I had that set up and well greased. I had been

talking with a guy in the State Department who was ready to approve it, and then the administration changed and they were not interested. Maybe I shouldn't say they weren't interested, it's just that I haven't been able to capture their attention. They are so wrapped up in other issues. But I think CINCTrans should have a political advisor on his staff, because we deal with organizations worldwide on a daily basis. The Coast Guard helps us a great deal in our worldwide port operations. The DIA, CIA, DMA people, of course, work primarily with our J2 [Intelligence Directorate] and, believe me, we are really getting a lot of good input from them. Our J2 and JTIC [Joint Transportation Intelligence Center] products are based on information that comes to us from those liaison officers and the information they are able to tap into.

Now the ones outside our command, those we have out with the other CINCs, since we moved them out of AMC and gave them the title of TRANSCOM liaison officers, their prestige has improved. It has helped them and the image of TRANSCOM. They walk into their assigned CINCDom and can say "I'm representing TRANSCOM," as opposed to saying "I'm representing AMC." Those people are now charged with the responsibility for answering all the mail for TRANSCOM surface as well as airlift questions and issues. What I would like to see is a better mix of services in those liaison offices. Unfortunately, the other services aren't ready to step up and pay those bills. The Air Force has been generous to TRANSCOM. I would tell you that as we went through our charter deliberation, trying to justify those new billets, I ran into most of my problems with the Navy and the

Marine Corps. The Army was the next most difficult, but the Air Force was supportive all along. So I have to take my hat off to the Air Force. They've been helpful as we've tried to create new spaces, new billets here. The Army's finally on board, but not without a lot of hassles. I have never won over the Navy.

Dr. Matthews: For a while there we were considering getting a MARAD [Maritime Administration] liaison. What happened to that initiative?

Gen Starling: There was a MARAD liaison officer to the Department of Defense that we succeeded in moving out of the Navy to the JS/J4. That was sort of the compromise position rather than put somebody out here full time.

Dr. Matthews: Since we did not move the whole command to D.C., should we augment our office there instead? Does our Joint Staff liaison officer have the manpower we need in Washington?

Gen Starling: We have a new GS-9 executive assistant authorized for the office. So the office will soon have someone to help the liaison represent us at meetings. That will probably suffice in the meantime. We spend an awful lot of money going TDY just because we don't have a bigger presence in the town. Colonel Barnaby [Army Colonel Richard J., USTRANSCOM Liaison Officer to the Pentagon] spends most of his time going to meetings representing us. And he's doing a great job for us, but I was authorized an Army O-6 out here that I gave up in order to put an Army colonel in the Pentagon so we'd have a bit of a service mix in our liaison structure. Not just Air Force everywhere.

Dr. Matthews: Is there any other government agency where we should have TRANSCOM representation and a liaison relationship?

Gen Starling: We should have one in the UN [United Nations]. AMC has somebody TDY at the UN, but I think there needs to be a permanent liaison officer there from TRANSCOM. What we are up against is DOD manpower authorization limitations for the United Nations. It's undergoing review right now, but there are a very limited number of spaces. Everybody wants to play in that arena. We have asked that one of those spaces be allocated to us. It will probably be September or October before we know the results. TRANSCOM should have somebody at the United Nations.

***USTRANSCOM's Peacetime,
Single Manager Charter***

Dr. Matthews: You mentioned that the Air Force had been a strong supporter of us throughout the drafting of our charter and the Navy and the Army less so. One thing that struck me is how small the charter ended up, how vague it tended to be compared to what we had recommended, a very detailed charter. Why is it that smaller memo was signed and not the more detailed, TRANSCOM-drafted charter?

Gen Starling: Anything I say to you is speculation on my part. I believe that the Navy is the reason we don't have that more detailed charter. That's my personal opinion. I thought that we pretty well had our draft approved. We had worked that issue all up and down the chain. Sean [C.] O'Keefe, the Acting Secretary of the Navy, and I had a real bloody session one day in Washington over some of the issues that were in the TRANSCOM charter, and it was shortly after

that that I learned it was not going to be in the format that we expected. I have no direct knowledge that Sean O'Keefe played a role in that, but I have my suspicions that he did. Also the legal council to the Secretary of Defense, who was handling that action for us, chose to avoid a lot of Navy-related contentious issues. So they shortened it up to avoid controversy. I think that all the major issues have been resolved between the Army and TRANSCOM, and between the Air Force and TRANSCOM. We continue to be on opposite sides of the fence on several issues when it comes to the Navy.

Dr. Matthews: For example?

Gen Starling: Who has the authority to activate the Ready Reserve Force and manage the Sealift Fund are big issues.

Dr. Matthews: Are there other ways we are handicapped by not having a more detailed charter?

Gen Starling: I haven't allowed myself to think that a shorter version of our charter is a handicap. I've taken the approach that it's given us some opportunities. Because it is vague in many areas, it's allowed us just to assume we have the right to act or the right to publish whatever we need--a doctrine or issue or policy paper--until somebody challenges us. So it has worked both ways. I was disappointed that it didn't come out with more specificity, but now, after having to live with it for seven or eight months, I'm beginning to realize that it's okay. It's a working document. And over time, as the personalities change, I think that it will have worked to our

advantage. So, yes, I was disappointed at first, but I've gotten over it and looked at the positive side of it.

Component Commands

Dr. Matthews: How have our relationships with the component commands changed during your tenure as DCINC?

Gen Starling: I'd like to think they've improved, but I don't know that they have with all three. Walt Kross* and I are such good friends. We developed a good friendship during the Gulf War. I was on the telephone with him every day from Riyadh [Saudi Arabia] talking to him back here at Scott [Air Force Base, Illinois] when he was the TRANSCOM J3/J4. So, from my perspective, our relationship with AMC has always been really good. Now, down at the action officer level, sure there are probably some times people don't agree on things, but I never found a situation that Walt Kross and I couldn't talk about and get settled, because we've had a good personal relationship.

Since the end of the Gulf War, that is, since the time I have been at TRANSCOM, our relationship with MSC has improved steadily. Michael Kalleres [Navy Vice Admiral Michael P., Commander, Military Sealift Command] and I talk to each other every day sharing views on issues. We have healthy, open-minded, fruitful discussions. I now find that the whole MSC staff is supportive of our command.

*Air Force Major General Walter, Director, USTRANSCOM Operations and Logistics Directorate, 1 June 1990-21 July 1991; AMC Provisional Commander, 15 January 1992-31 May 1992; Special Assistant to the Commander, AMC, 1 June 1992-1 July 1992; Vice Commander, AMC, 2 July 1992-6 August 1993.

That's not to say that we always agree. We don't. But I think the relationships are getting better.

Looking at MTMC, I used to think that relationship was great. It has eroded over the past several months. I'm not sure why. We need to do some fence mending there. I accept responsibility when relationships aren't good, because I see my role to be an ambassador for the command, with a job to ease and resolve conflict between our organizations, to break through the bureaucracy and try and make things go right. So when it doesn't happen, then I look at it as a failure on my part, that somehow there is something that I haven't done or considered the component commands' responsibilities or their sensitivities on some particular issue.

Dr. Matthews: Is there something specific that sticks out in your mind where we've stumbled with MTMC?

Gen Starling: Some of the issues that we deal with are tough and many faceted. And there are very convoluted relationships that exist between our components and the industry, and between our components and their customers. We, TRANSCOM, have tried to move in and assert our authorities over those areas. People who have in the past felt they were in charge of something, like airlift policy for example, find it hard to accept that there's a new guy in town who's going to play on the team. Honest men have honest differences of opinion about how things ought to be done. And that occurs between us and our components quite often. There has always been a bone of contention between MTMC and MSC over who should be the DOD Single Manager for Containers. MTMC

believes they ought to take over the sustainment agreements from MSC, what we called SMESA [Special Middle East Sealift Agreement] during the Gulf War. They don't really mean "single manager for containers." They mean the SMESA agreement. Well, as we dug into that, we found that maybe it's not the right thing to do. What we have done is sort of developed a conceptual model. What we want is a single face with industry when it comes to SMESA-like agreements, container agreements, and that's MSC because it's our mode operator. And we should also move towards a single face with our customers, and in that case, that's our traffic manager, MTMC.

Now you try and take that model and transfer it to the airlift business. It hasn't worked as well. We would like to say that the Air Mobility Command, as a single manager for airlift, should be the single point of contact with the industry since they're the mode operator. And MTMC ought to be our single point of contact with the customer. But historically, relationships have developed between those two organizations and industry and customers which have been so fragmented that is very difficult to pull all that together and make it work in our model without stepping on a lot of toes, getting into a lot of turf issues. We have formed a Process Action Team that is trying to address some of these issues. And I think MTMC has been disappointed, particularly in the airlift business. They see some of their authorities and power eroding. That's one of the reasons why I think maybe it isn't going too well between us. It's not to say that I don't have a healthy respect for what they

do. Day in and day out they do incredible work for the command.

Dr. Matthews: Is there anything more we could do to improve the relationship?

Gen Starling: Well, nothing more than just trying to communicate. The Process Action Teams we put together with MTMC, MSC, and ourselves, while very difficult to get started, produced some tremendous results and improved our relationships with MSC and with MTMC, too.

Mobility Requirements Study

Dr. Matthews: I'd like to move on to plans and policy now. Do you believe the MRS [Mobility Requirements Study] is in trouble?

Gen Starling: Yes, because the administration feels that maybe we can't afford it. It continues to be touted as the road map to the future when it comes to mobility, and Secretary of Defense Aspin [Les A.] has said that he supports the MRS solution, but the administration is finding it increasingly difficult to afford it, in terms of buying surge sealift ships, afloat prepo[sitioning] ships, and the C-17. So, yes, I think it is in trouble, but in trouble not because it isn't a good document or because it wasn't well thought out and it's vision wasn't correct. It's in trouble because of budget realities.

Dr. Matthews: As the document was written, what do you see as its greatest weaknesses and greatest strengths?

Gen Starling: We participated in it, in the decisions that went into it, so I'm hard pressed to answer that question. We recommended

an expensive solution. That might be one of its weaknesses, because I think that's how it's going to be attacked. Some are taking it to task by saying some of the scenarios it's based on are unrealistic. During the bottom-up review, there was great debate about whether we should plan on two nearly simultaneous wars. I don't think we've heard the last of that. So I would say that probably those two things, the two-war scenario and the expense of the MRS are perhaps weaknesses, a place to attack the MRS.

Dr. Matthews: USTRANSCOM, especially J5 and J2, for the past couple of years has produced numerous studies. In your opinion, which are the most important and why?

Gen Starling: The J5 worked the MRS and produced a lot of its annexes, the supporting rationale for its recommendations. The MRS is probably the most important study we have done, in the time I have been here. What the J2 does for us is a totally different thing. They are producing intelligence studies for us and the regional CINCs on transportation networks around the world. Comparing T-Stars to MRS is like comparing apples and oranges.

USTRANSCOM as Advocate for the DTS

Dr. Matthews: What should TRANSCOM's role be in strategic transportation analysis? Are we on the right track?

Gen Starling: Yes, I think we are. If I understand your question, you are asking me if we should be the watchdogs ensuring that infrastructure in the United States and overseas is in fact being maintained to reintroduce US forces in war. Are we the watchdogs? I would say yes. We have blown the whistle

on [US]EUCOM [United States European Command] several times as they have tried to draw down the bases.

Dr. Matthews: Has the Department of Transportation [DOT] included us in their transportation analysis to the degree that is best for the DOD?

Gen Starling: The Maritime Administration within has. We have an incredibly close and good working relationship with them.

Robust Merchant Marine

Dr. Matthews: In your opinion, can we live without a merchant marine?

Gen Starling: No. If we go totally foreign flag and all the commercial shipping leaves the United States and is flagged somewhere else, we'll have an RRF [Ready Reserve Force], a hundred-some ship fleet, and no one to man them. The only place we can go to get the manning for those ships is the US Merchant Marine. And if the ship is under registry in some other country, the country may not support the United States and its national policy, our objectives in some part of the world. If you go to them for ships, they can say, "Sorry, but we're not going to put a dog in this fight and we're not going to help you." Not only there go the ships, but also there goes the manpower for the RRF.

Dr. Matthews: It seems so simple, yet we can't seem to convince the powers that be that that's the equation. What more can we do to convince them of the urgency of the situation?

Gen Starling: I don't know that we haven't convinced the powers that be. It's more complicated. What we have here is a history of

100 years of tax laws, public laws that effect the maritime industry of the United States. They have catered to all of the special interests over time and created an economic environment in which it is extremely difficult for that industry in the United States to operate at a profit. So the issue is not whether we do or do not want a merchant marine. The issue is how do we get rid of this bureaucracy that prevents and precludes the US flag liner companies from operating at a profit. My feeling is we need maritime reform in this country. And with maritime reform you'll get a robust maritime industry and get away from special interest laws and taxes that have been created to protect the labor force. And then industry can operate at a profit. Then instead of US shipping lines wanting to go foreign flag, you're going to have foreign flags wanting to come and register here.

Dr. Matthews: What role does the NDTA [National Defense Transportation Association] need to play in that issue and others?

Gen Starling: NDTA serves and should continue to serve as a forum in which we can discuss these issues with the various parts of the Defense Transportation System [DTS]. So for us, we can take these issues to them and have, say, a Process Action Team put together with representatives from Sea-Land Corporation, Navy, TRANSCOM, and MSC--all the interested parties--to talk about better business practices and not be subjected to anti-trust laws. For the industry, that's a great advantage. And you look the same way from the airline industry viewpoint. The CINC can host a meeting of all those CEOs [Chief Executive Officers] and discuss issues and policies, trying to bring consensus out of that group for

the betterment of the Department of Defense and industry alike without fear of being slapped with an anti-trust suit. That to me is a great advantage of NDTA. It offers the entire DTS a forum to discuss issues and seek solutions that are objective and best for business and the nation.

Dr. Matthews: I remember one staff meeting where you related to us that the command had been accused of, or you felt like we were being fingered for, being too cozy with industry because of our advocacy for it and support of the NDTA. Do you think we ever crossed the line? Were we guilty of going out of the DOD chain?

Gen Starling: There are those in OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense] who say that. But they were in the last administration. Diane Morales [Diane K., Deputy Assistant Secretary for Logistics, OSD] is the one who used to accuse me of that.

Dr. Matthews: Could you offer us some guidelines so that we don't cross that line?

Gen Starling: No, because I think we ought to continue to move in the direction of even closer ties with industry. My reason for saying that is, and you know this better than I, if you look at the statistics coming out of Desert Shield and Desert Storm, TRANSCOM is dependent on commercial industry to perform its mission. They are in fact the majority of our force structure. So we must be an advocate for industry. If we don't have them, we are not going to deploy forces. So I advocate pushing for a stronger TRANSCOM/industry relationship.

Dr. Matthews: Are there other ways that we can push, other than through NDTA? What more can we do to help revitalize the merchant marine, for instance.

Gen Starling: That's what the CINC does. The CINC is really great at that. He goes out, as you know, to Washington, and touches base with everybody. He goes into the OSD level and deals with the undersecretaries and makes appointments, and he goes over and sees the Secretary of Transportation, and he touches base with congressmen and senators who serve on committees that have oversight on transportation business. Not that H. T. Johnson didn't. It's just that General Fogleman [Air Force General Ronald R., USCINCTRANS] does it more, and it has really helped the command. It has helped us smooth the way into our peacetime mission and helped us educate people on what we are trying to do. He convinces people that it is in the nation's best interest for us to execute our charter. I know he spends a lot of time in Washington, but I'd urge him to spend more.

Dr. Matthews: Certainly one of the main arguments for setting up TRANSCOM was to establish an advocate for the Defense Transportation System.

Gen Starling: And we are.

Dr. Matthews: Explain to me, from your viewpoint, the adversarial relationship between MSC and the commercial shipping lines. What can we do, TRANSCOM that is, to help bring these parties together?

Gen Starling: We've done a lot. We have, in fact, put together working groups with NDTA's help that look at better business

practices on both their parts. The industry has criticized us for imposing requirements on them that drive up costs. On the other hand, we have found industry price gouging us from time to time. Now we're putting the issues on the table for all to see and discuss and resolve. I think the relationship in the past was one of mistrust. MSC's objective was the cheapest price. Always the cheapest price, regardless of service. We have begun to advocate a concept of best value. We would move something for \$1,000 in a container, but if we were getting lousy service and the container was rotten, and it transferred to three ships and it took five months to get there or it got lost, that's not value. But if we pay \$1,500 for the same service and it gets there in half the time, we've got value. The idea of best value, as opposed to cheapest price, that we have begun to preach not only to the industry but also to our components is beginning to take hold. That should be the norm for doing business, one of our criteria for evaluating the contracts we let. That relationship still is adversarial in many ways, but getting better, I think. Even Sea-Land Corporation occasionally recognizes that we are making some progress. NDTA is the forum to bring us all together.

Civil Reserve Air Fleet and Sealift Readiness Program

Dr. Matthews: Do you have concerns about the airline industry going the same way as the maritime industry?

Gen Starling: Yes, I do.

Dr. Matthews: What are we doing to ensure that we have commercial aircraft for surge?

Gen Starling: We're sure beating the bushes, but we're not making much progress. You probably know the latest CRAF [Civil Reserve Air Fleet] solicitation failed to meet our Stage III objectives, and it failed to meet our medevac [medical evacuation] requirements. We have certainly raised the consciousness level of those within the Office of the Secretary of Defense as well as the Department of Transportation on the relationship between the health of the airline industry and national security. As the airline industry becomes more competitive, some companies are having difficulty keeping their heads above water. Of course, they can't all continue to survive. I see in time that we're going to be down to four, maybe five, carriers in the United States. The fact is if we ever have another true national emergency like Desert Shield/Desert Storm, I don't think we will lack aircraft to move us to the war. When you get into such a situation, world traffic dries up. So the airlines won't have any business except DOD business and they are going to come to us, and ask us to "please charter my airplane." So that doesn't bother me. Now if they start going foreign flag, that will be something else. If they went foreign flag, like the surface carriers are threatening, we may have some foreign countries saying, "No you can't use the airplanes from the company that I now control," in the Netherlands, or France, or wherever it happens to be, "to ferry troops to a war that my country doesn't believe in."

Dr. Matthews: After Desert Shield/Desert Storm CEOs of the various airlines were giving us such dire warnings. There's a blue

ribbon commission looking at the airline industry. Where is that going?

Gen Starling: They are looking at the national airlift policy. They're also looking at some of the business disincentives that exist as a result of the various public laws and tax laws. They are looking at possible legislative reform proposals. We need that kind of committee for sealift, too.

Dr. Matthews: We had one, a group of elders that looked at national security sealift policy. It was under the Federal Emergency Management Agency at one time. They don't meet anymore?

Gen Starling: No. Right now there is an issue between the Department of Defense and the Department of Transportation over who would pay a subsidy to the Maritime Industry to keep them from going foreign flag. The Department of Defense has taken the position that it will not pay the subsidy. The current administration has decided on no maritime reform now. They've got too many things on their plate. They just haven't taken up the issue. Eventually we can bring it back to the table and then DOD will be asked to pay. DOD wants somebody else, like DOT, to pay the bill, anyone but the Department of Defense. I don't have a solution to that problem as to who pays the bill, but TRANSCOM certainly has stood up and said what we think the requirement is.

Dr. Matthews: We've looked off and on over the last three or four years at making the SRP [Sealift Readiness Program] more CRAF-like. What's the latest?

Gen Starling: I just read an interim report on the issue last week. We still have meetings on it to put together a costing mechanism. The maritime industry has had a very difficult time stepping up to that idea. With the help of the Volpe Center and Price-Waterhouse, we've come up with a convoluted way to protect the costing data, and now the major maritime companies--Sea-Land, APL [American President Lines], and some of the other big liner companies--have provided cost data to this one independent evaluation group. The data is all in. I don't know the results yet. It is not moving as fast as I would like, but it is moving. It needs more visibility.

Dr. Matthews: Everything moves so slowly.

Gen Starling: Yes it does. We're trying to overcome practices that have existed for the past fifty years.

C-17

Dr. Matthews: The world situation has given us a push. We've got to change the way we do business. We have to be more efficient. If Congress kills the C-17 program or cuts it drastically, what can TRANSCOM do to recoup.

Gen Starling: AMC has a number of alternatives, like buying commercial aircraft to augment the military fleet, in fact, to make them part of the organic fleet of the Air Mobility Command. Those analyses are going on now as we speak. Eventually they will be presented to the Joint Staff and OSD for consideration if in fact Congress cuts the C-17. At the end of August there will be a big review on the C-17 headed by Mr. Deutch [John M., Under Secretary for Acquisition]. The

CINC is fully involved in that and we will know the outcome soon.

Dr. Matthews: There is a big parking lot in the middle of the Mojave Desert where he may get some real deals. Have you seen it?

Gen Starling: I have seen it. You're right, a lot of people think "just go out there and buy some of those airplanes. You'll get a good deal." But those are not what we are looking for. The money it would take to make them militarily useful is prohibitive. So if you could buy a new 747-400 and as it comes through the production line build into the cockpit the military communications systems, friend or foe identification systems, and those kinds of things, it is cheaper to buy new, when you look at the life cycle, than it is to buy those used aircraft. And those are some of the alternatives being looked at, buying new 747-400s and 757s as cargo craft.

Dr. Matthews: They are not going to do everything a C-17 can do?

Gen Starling: Oh no. They will never have the capability of the C-17. Honestly, I think the C-17 has turned the corner. McDonnell Douglas has their act together in terms of management. The production problems have been overcome. We may not get the buy at the rate we wanted. It will be stretched out, but I don't think they will kill the C-17. I'm optimistic.

Overland Transportation and the Ready Mobility Force

Dr. Matthews: We've talked at length about sealift and airlift. What are your biggest concerns in regard to overland transportation?

Gen Starling: Rail access to and from CONUS [continental United States] air and army bases, and adequate rail loading platforms and docks. The ISTEA [Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act] legislation, which gives incredible amounts of money to regional planning commissions, will wind up funding pork barrel projects in my view. They are not going to help meet defense-related needs, access to ports and those kinds of things. It will serve the local politicians who influence and serve on the board of directors of those regional transportation agencies. I'm concerned that we are not going to get our fair share of the money.

Dr. Matthews: Anything in particular in port operations that concern you?

Gen Starling: Because we are becoming a CONUS-based force, there is greater emphasis on capability to deploy to port, quickly load the ships, and get out of town. MTMC is responsible for operating and loading the ships. MTMC doesn't have anyone to do that except in the Reserve structure, and so initially you have to rely upon volunteers just as AMC has to rely on reservists to fly airplanes in a crisis. But Congress decided recently not to act upon legislation we proposed to have the early call-up. I was told by Deutch's Deputy, Ms. Deborah Lee, [Assistant Secretary Designate for Reserve Affairs] that the Ready Mobility Force is a dead issue and the administration is not going to fight for it even though the Senate approved it.

Dr. Matthews: Why?

Gen Starling: Well, frankly, Mr. Dellums [Ronald V., Democrat-California, Chairman, House Armed Services Committee]

feels it gives too much power to the Secretary of Defense. That's what he's said. Mr. Dellums is opposed to the War Powers Act, so now if he doesn't approve of the President having authority to call up 200,000, he's not going to support giving the Secretary of Defense the authority to call up 25,000. That goes contrary to his view of the world. So back to your question of what am I concerned about. It is our ability to get people into the ports to be able to load the ships to deploy quickly. We have to be able to deploy to get to the war on time.

Dr. Matthews: Are we going to raise this Ready Mobility Force issue again when Congress comes back?

Gen Starling: OSD told us not this year. Maybe next year.

Deliberate Planning

Dr. Matthews: What has the command accomplished since you have been here in regards to deliberate planning and TPFDD refinement?

Gen Starling: We have had TPFDD refinement conferences with all the war fighting CINCs and have produced realistic, transportation-feasible op [operation] plans as a result of them. The commands come in here and want us to move mountains for them in very short periods of time. We have shown them in many cases that their plans were not feasible and they have gone back, explained the situation to their CINCs, and refined the plans. For the most part, they are now feasible from a transportation point of view. That is great progress. When I was in [US]CENTCOM [United States Central Command] we assumed that everything we

asked for would be moved. We didn't think in terms of constraints. We have done a great job of educating the CINCs in the deliberate planning process. One of the things we have failed to do though is come up with a replacement for JOPES [Joint Operation Planning and Execution System]. This is still, in my view, an albatross around our neck. When they canceled the program a year ago, they said within 18 months we would have a replacement, and we are not even close to a replacement. We don't even have a gleam in our eye as to what it is going to look like. It is not TRANSCOM's responsibility in total, but certainly we have a vested interest in the outcome. I just don't see a lot of progress.

Dr. Matthews: With this new world order, we're looking at all the hot spots, the humanitarian lift, the peacekeeping missions. We certainly can't have plans, TPFDDs, for all that, can we?

Gen Starling: Every one of them, yes. We're going through a review process now. We have gone through the big ones and now we're coming back into some of the less urgent ones. It is an ongoing process, one that will continue on until we get them all. A lot of work.

Program Analysis, Financial Management, and Rapport with Congress

Dr. Matthews: I want to talk a little about program analysis and financial management. You've been deeply involved in that from day one and have guided us through some major changes with the establishment of J8, and major shifts and changes in the way we do our headquarters budget. Let's start off with a

question about Congress. What have we done right in your opinion in establishing a rapport with Congress and the same question for the new administration?

Gen Starling: On the positive side, our congressional office in J8 constantly stays in touch with the various house and senate committees that work transportation-related issues. They interact almost on a daily basis with the various staffers who support those committees. Also, we created, in essence, a TRANSCOM Day in Washington. We invite staffers to come over from the Hill for an orientation on TRANSCOM. The CINC shows up, talks with them, has lunch with them. We put them on a C-141 or C-5 and give them an orientation on the Air Mobility Command. We fly them down to Norfolk, Virginia, and put them aboard an FSS [Fast Sealift Ship] and give them some MSC and MTMC briefings. So we have raised the level of consciousness in Congress about the roles and mission of our command. They know we are proactively involved in the events of the day, and that we are a vital part of the Department of Defense. General Fogleman has done a super job of educating key senators and representatives on our command and, as you know, he testifies before various committees about TRANSCOM activities and initiatives. With the new administration the CINC has also been very proactively involved. He put together a detailed briefing on the new administration's priorities and how TRANSCOM can support those priorities. He has taken that briefing over to Mr. Peña [Frederico F., Secretary of Transportation], for example. He took it to the Secretary of Defense and all the key assistant secretaries in Defense. He gave them the presentation so that they would

have a better understanding of how we fit into the big picture.

Dr. Matthews: What are some of the most difficult problems for TRANSCOM in the industrial fund arena?

Gen Starling: We've just begun operating under DBOF this year. Developing a new system that builds upon the old industrial funds of the three services, trying to pull those together, and have them work as a single fund is a tough job. There are difficulties in training people and getting everybody to understand a new way of doing business. So the most difficult area for us is to get people attuned to a new way of doing business, a new way of handling financial management. Our three components, because they have in the past gone to their service for guidance and leadership on the industrial fund side of their operations, are having a difficult time weaning themselves away from their services and recognizing that they now must submit everything through TRANSCOM and that we, TRANSCOM, have taken over budget authority that used to reside with the service secretaries. It has been difficult to get everyone attuned to this new way of doing business. It is an education process and they are coming around. It's TRANSCOM's responsibility to build a large enough J8 staff with the right credentials that can, in fact, exercise our new authority. It is a growing, evolving process. I am very positive about it. We have made great strides. There is still a ways to go.

Another difficulty we face is the lack of a true financial management system, fully automated, with cost reports. We are still tied to the various service ways of doing business

because we don't have our own financial reporting system that meets the peculiar needs of the Defense Business Operations Fund.

Dr. Matthews: You've had oversight of the headquarters budget from early on. You made that one of your high priorities. What do you think you did right as far as reorganizing our headquarters budget process?

Gen Starling: Creating a financial management forum for everybody that forces the directors to sit down and prioritize all their requirements was a positive step. Before it was just willy-nilly. Anyone with a nickel-and-dime project could lobby the DCINC to approve their funding. They got what they wanted. We now expose everybody's requirements in the context of the total requirement. That priority system has been very positive change in peacetime.

Dr. Matthews: It seems to me that in this new era, the post-cold war period, we are being pushed all the time to put a price tag on everything, even national security. Does that worry you?

Gen Starling: National security has always had a price tag. When you look at the President's budget and the priorities this administration places on defense, recently fully debated in Congress, we all recognize what share of the new President's budget will be devoted to defense. The services have an allocation. TRANSCOM itself has an allocation. We all have to sign up to the realities of life and figure out how best to manage our programs given budget constraints. Yes, there is a price tag on national defense and the President determines what that is and what the American economy can

afford. I don't have any problem with that. I think that is the way things work in the United States. I think it is a good way to allocate resources. Full public debate, decisions are made, and we follow them.

Corporate Information Management- Transportation

Dr. Matthews: Like a lot of people around here, I'm wrestling with the meaning of CIM-T [Corporate Information Management-Transportation]. Do you see it as something that will help us perform our mission?

Gen Starling: I support CIM-T a hundred percent, but I don't support creating it out-of-hide. We have pulled enough things out-of-hide in this command and we just can't afford any more ad hoc organizations that have not been fully recognized by the Joint Staff and supported and resourced by the services with manpower. CIM-T is one of those things that needs to be done. However, it also has to be resourced outside this organization. So, my position has always been that we will not stand up a CIM-T organization until it has been resourced by the Department of Defense and to date that has not happened.

Dr. Matthews: You put it under the J6. Why?

Gen Starling: CIM-T is really just a name for a way to go about analyzing your business practices. It relies on a formal modeling technique that lets you analyze all the things you are involved in and tells you in a structured way whether you're doing good or doing bad business. It lets you investigate alternate ways of doing business. Because it uses a lot of software, the J6 was asked to take on this project and we have an officer designated within J6, Bud Bell [Air Force Colonel Anthony W., Chief, C4S Plans Division], to head this organization once we stand it up. Could it fit

somewhere else in our organization? Sure. You could put it in J5; you could put in J3/J4; you could put in J8. It was put in J6 at the time because the J6 wanted it. He had some background in the CIM process, and after considering the entire workload in the command, it looked like a good place to assign it.

Operations, Logistics, and Readiness

Dr. Matthews: Sir, I would like you to speak a little now about operations, logistics, and some more about systems. How did your background as a key TRANSCOM customer during Desert Shield/Desert Storm influence your operational decisions here at TRANSCOM?

Gen Starling: Obviously, as a result of Desert Shield and Desert Storm, I had a great appreciation for the capabilities of TRANSCOM, what it could do, and how it could help a supported CINC deploy his forces. Sitting as the J4 [Logistics Directorate] in [US] Central Command, I looked to TRANSCOM to be the integrator, the coordinator, and the operator of all the mobility forces needed to deploy Central Command assets over to the theater. As a result of that experience, I came out of Desert Storm with a great appreciation for the role that TRANSCOM could play in future deployments. This gave me the ability as TRANSCOM DCINC to go to the Services and out to the other CINCs and sell them on the idea that TRANSCOM has a tremendous service to offer and that they need to take advantage of it. I was able to overcome the nay-sayers on the Army, Navy, and Air Force staffs. Those insights I had into how the command operated and the kinds of things it was capable of doing, what it did in

fact do during Desert Storm, gave me credibility in the Washington community to sell our peacetime charter and win support for our new responsibilities.

Dr. Matthews: Two of the biggest operations, probably the two biggest since you've been here, were Somalia [Restore Hope] in Somalia and Hurricane Andrew in Florida. What things could TRANSCOM have done better in those two operations?

Gen Starling: Restore Hope first. TRANSCOM did a remarkable job in leaning forward to support Central Command in its deployment to Somalia. In hindsight, you can always find things you could have done better. We probably could have done a better job educating the Army on how to put its force list together and prepare to deploy. We had FSSs sitting at the port three days before the Army was ready to load them. We had airplanes sitting on the ground waiting for loads and leaving with less than full loads. One of our responsibilities in TRANSCOM is to educate our customers on how they can better utilize our services. We would have been better off had we quickly put some people out at Forces Command and up at Fort Drum [New York] to help them better understand our capabilities, and then in turn be able to take advantage of the resources we had to offer. The Army itself has recognized that they did not do a terrific job in getting themselves ready to go to Somalia. It has been mutually beneficial lessons learned.

The same sort of thing for Hurricane Andrew. I think with the DIRMOBFOR [Director of Mobility Forces] concept we now have, where we deploy somebody to help manage the

flow of strategic airlift into a theater of operations, would have helped during Andrew. We should have done that quicker and faster in Florida. We were slow to recognize that we needed a focal point down there. We were allowing FEMA [Federal Emergency Management Agency] and all the other agencies that needed support to call in directly to our components rather than forcing them to come in to us as a central location, as a clearing house for all the support requests.

Dr. Matthews: Have we made progress getting the services to containerize their unit equipment and ammunition?

Gen Starling: Not much. We went over to Korea in exercise Team Spirit and demonstrated that we could put a unit in containers. It helped to allay some of the fears that war fighters have about letting their equipment go into containers and disappear into the hull of the ship. However, there are still a lot of commanders in the Army and Air Force who are very leery of letting their equipment move by containers. What they see is a loss of control over what goes into a container. We have a lot of educating to do before the services and war fighters accept containers. We've got to continue to push for container use in JCS [Joint Chiefs of Staff] exercises. Most war fighters look at what happened in Saudi Arabia and say containers were a disaster because you--the Army, or TRANSCOM, or whomever they choose to blame--didn't control the flow of containers so we never knew where anything was. They are absolutely right. We didn't. And we have not yet solved that problem of intransit visibility. We were successful in Team Spirit because it was an isolated event, with a lot of management attention. What we proved

in that exercise is that the concept is feasible, that, in fact, it can be done. We don't yet have the DOD-wide intransit visibility system in place that will allow us to fully utilize the capabilities offered by containers.

Now your question also had to do with ammunition. The Army is today procuring thousands of containers because they are the ammunition managers, in most cases, for all the common-user ammunition. They have bought into it and are ready to containerize ammo because they realize it is an effective way to move ammunition. That battle, I think we have won, but again the intransit visibility question is one we haven't solved. The Global Transportation Network, once we get that in place, will accelerate containerization. We have the air module working now. Putting the surface module in place in another year will go a long way in converting people to containerization. Until we provide intransit visibility, we're going to have people who are suspicious of our ability to move cargo and equipment through the system in containers.

Dr. Matthews: Do you think we are getting our money's worth out of exercises?

Gen Starling: Yes, I sure do. Everybody needs to go off and train and understand how to conduct coalition warfare. That is a constant reeducation process, but we in the military do a lousy job of retaining our institutional memory. I have learned an incredible amount in this job as DCINC. When I walk out the door that all goes with me. The new guy will have to learn the same things all over again.

Dr. Matthews: In spite of his historian?

Gen Starling: Yes, you're right, in spite of his historian. That's typical of how the military operates. Someone finally learns the job, gets proficient in it, and we move him and his institutional knowledge out the door. We do not do a good job of capitalizing on lessons learned. We all have the attitude, "It happened on someone else's watch, I'm the new guy, and there is now a new way of doing business. I'm going to reinvent the wheel."

Dr. Matthews: Tell me about TRANSCOM's expanding role in measuring readiness. What have we done in the last year or two and where are we headed?

Gen Starling: We are, in fact, not doing very much. We have tried on a couple of occasions to get our three components to participate with us in an effort to start identifying the readiness issues that affect the command. All three of them have resisted the idea that TRANSCOM would be involved in readiness assessment. We have not been forceful enough in getting the components to respond to us, so now what you have is a major readiness crisis in the Air Mobility Command: grounding of the C-141 fleet. We at TRANSCOM are just sort of sitting here, not leading, not even following. We're just observing what is going on. Readiness assessment is an area that my successor should certainly press on with and he could probably produce some positive results fairly quickly. We at TRANSCOM are woefully ill prepared to discuss readiness issues in regard to our three components. It is going to take the CINC cracking

the whip over the components to get us in the mode to do something about it or influence the action.

Intelligence Support

Dr. Matthews: I've seen a tremendous improvement in J2 since we started this command, and on your watch, especially. Our last J2 was really the first joint J2 we've had. He spent as much time or even more time over here than he did at the component. None of the others did that. What has a "purple" J2 meant to TRANSCOM and what else can the J2 do to help us perform our mission?

Gen Starling: As you know we are forming a Joint Transportation Intelligence Center [JTIC] here that is, in fact, already recognized by the Defense Intelligence Agency, the CIA, and the unified commands as the central source of intelligence on transportation systems around the world. The products we produce, the T-Stars and other documents that come out of this J2 office in TRANSCOM, are now being recognized by our three components, as well as the other unified commands, as products they can count on to use as they do their own planning. Obviously the utility of having TRANSCOM be a proactive player in the intelligence community is that we can quickly provide our components with intelligence information on ports, airfields, road networks, and infrastructure that they need in their planning. Early on, TRANSCOM probably had a great deal of that information within the Air Mobility Command because it had a large robust intelligence staff. MSC had to depend upon the Navy and MTMC had to depend upon the Army, but in those services transportation intelligence is near the bottom

of the barrel in terms of priority, so our service components couldn't get timely, accurate intelligence. The JTIC is making it much easier for them to plan for and participate in exercises and contingencies. For the unified commands, JTIC airfield and port surveys are very helpful to their planning. Transportation intelligence is a growth industry within TRANSCOM and the whole DOD.

Joint Doctrine

Dr. Matthews: Drawing from both your experiences here and as the CENTCOM/J4, where do you think TRANSCOM's role should end in theater?

Gen Starling: I'm of the opinion it should end at the port. We should be responsible for operating the ports. MTMC has that mission. It is in their mission statement. It is in our charter that we will operate the ports worldwide. MTMC does that in most every case except in contingency operations because they do not have any forces that allow them to deploy into a contingency area, an undeveloped area. It just doesn't exist. Their only port operators in the continental United States are within the Reserve structure. Nevertheless, it is my view that we--TRANSCOM and our components--have the responsibility within the Defense Transportation System to pick materiel up at the fort and move it to port, whether that is an aerial port or seaport, put it on the mode of transportation--sealift, airlift, whatever it happens to be--and move it to the theater. Once it arrives in the theater, we should unload it at the aerial port or the seaport. There our responsibility should end. The unified commander organizations within that theater that are responsible for

picking it up at the point where we drop it off and distributing it within the theater.

Dr. Matthews: Are you saying that we would like to have the 7th Trans [Transportation Group] as part of MTMC?

Gen Starling: Be reassigned to US Transportation Command.

Dr. Matthews: Directly to us?

Gen Starling: Yes. The Forces For document should state that we have COCOM [combatant command] over the 7th [Transportation] Group. We would then delegate OPCON [operational control] to MTMC during deployment, but it would belong to TRANSCOM as a command element.

Dr. Matthews: This is in the works, a proposal?

Gen Starling: Yes.

Dr. Matthews: What does FORSCOM [Forces Command] think about this?

Gen Starling: They have not turned it down yet.

Dr. Matthews: How about our responsibilities to ports as far as security goes? Should our security police be involved more in theater?

Gen Starling: Since we don't have a security police force, our role is one of advising and planning for and asking for those security forces to protect our operations.

Dr. Matthews: On a related issue, do you feel TRANSCOM should be more involved in joint logistics training? Should we be involved in joint mobility doctrine development?

Gen Starling: Yes. We are, in fact, proactively involved in these areas. We are writing joint doctrine as part of an ongoing Joint Staff program. It will be 18 months to two years before we get all those publications rewritten to reflect TRANSCOM's peacetime mission and single manager responsibilities. Now, joint training is another issue. In the Unified Command Plan this October we will stand down the old USLANTCOM [United States Atlantic Command] and we will stand up the new USACOM [United States Atlantic Command], which will have as one of its primary responsibilities training forces and deploying forces for joint exercises and joint operations. We in TRANSCOM will play a role there at least on the mobility side. It will be a very proactive role for us. We, in fact, are members of the steering committees that are forming the new command, writing its implementation plan. We have an active role.

Dr. Matthews: What are some of the hardest nuts to crack as far as our relationship with USACOM?

Gen Starling: As a new organization, they do not understand the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System, JOPES, how to use it, and how they should incorporate it into their planning, pull it in as part of their thinking process. The old [US]CINCLANT [Commander in Chief, US Atlantic Command] did not have to worry about that. We need to educate them on how we can help them in the joint planning arena. Then there is the C-130 issue. As you know the Air Force made a decision to transfer most of the C-130s to the Air Combat Command, and the Air Combat Command is now a component of the new USACOM. The C-130 issue will continue to be a source of confusion for a while.

Dr. Matthews: Are there possible overlapping responsibilities as far as land transportation and port operations?

Gen Starling: Yes, there is that potential. The working committees are addressing those now. But nothing with USACOM will be as difficult as dealing with the Navy on our single manager charter.

Dr. Matthews: Do you envision USCINCTRANS's role as a supported CINC as increasing and why?

Gen Starling: Yes, absolutely. Again, it is because we are now recognized throughout the Department of Defense as a going concern with a great contribution to make. We are important to their success. They can't get there without us, so to speak, and they need us. That can only increase our role. All those CINCs, even when I was in CENTCOM, would say "TRANSCOM? Who are they? What are they doing"?

Dr. Matthews: Are we prepared to be the supported CINC?

Gen Starling: Yes, and we have been. You know we were in Steel Box.

Dr. Matthews: And Cambodia.

Gen Starling: Yes, and we will continue to have those opportunities.

Total Force

Dr. Matthews: I would like to move into some manpower, personnel, and Total Force questions. First, let's talk about our JTRU [Joint Transportation Reserve Unit]. Do you feel it is the right size and has the right service mix?

Gen Starling: The right mix because we are now balanced among the Army, Navy, and Air Force. We have also managed to integrate some Marines and Coast Guard. The right size is a difficult question to answer. We sized it based upon our experiences in Desert Shield and Desert Storm. We thought about a hundred or so people was about what we needed. So if you get into an operation with a greater scope than Desert Shield or Desert Storm, you probably will need more people. If you wind up with a lesser contingency operation, then obviously you don't need a hundred. You need something less. Is the JTRU the right size? Yes, it is, based upon our past experiences, but only the future will tell whether or not, in fact, it is the right size. It is our best estimate of what we think we would need in a Desert Storm-type of operation.

Dr. Matthews: Does it have it any weaknesses we need to key in on?

Gen Starling: Training. You constantly need to train. It is difficult enough for us on active duty to maintain our proficiency when we work at our jobs 365 days a year. Now you take somebody who only comes in to train with you two or three days a month. You can't expect them to have been trained up to the same level of proficiency as the person who does the job day in and day out. So we need to constantly train our reservists.

Dr. Matthews: Looking way down the road, do you see the role of JTRU evolving and changing to something different than it is today?

Gen Starling: At the moment, no. Its purpose is to augment our staff, primarily our operations center, during times of crisis

because in peacetime we are not staffed to do 24-hour-a-day operations.

Dr. Matthews: Do you have any problems with the intelligence reservists not being part of the JTRU and getting broader joint transportation perspective and training?

Gen Starling: I'm not sensitive to any issues or problems there. I know we have IMAs [Individual Mobilization Augmentees] who come in and work in J2, and they would also come in and augment J2 during wartime. Again our JTRU's primary focus is to augment our operations center.

Dr. Matthews: Let's talk about your O-8 [major general] mobilization assistant billet. Is it properly assigned to the DCINC or should it be assigned to the CINC?

Gen Starling: After the war, as we began to look at how to structure the JTRU, we had to develop some rationale for why we wanted a two-star level commander of the JTRU. You couldn't justify it based upon saying he is going to organize, train, and equip a one hundred-man detachment composed of three services. Nobody would buy into that. We wrote up that job description saying that during mobilization he, in fact, becomes the Chief of Staff of TRANSCOM as a major general. We sold it that way. I think it is at the right place reporting to the DCINC because, in fact, the Chief of Staff reports to the DCINC. Over time it may evolve into something else, but since I helped create the situation and the position as it today, obviously I think it is great.

Dr. Matthews: What do you think about the way the Services train and promote transporters and logisticians?

Gen Starling: The Army does it well. The Chief of Staff of the Army, when you look at the logistics group of general officers for example, there are more transportation corps generals than there are other logisticians. The Army Chief of Staff fully recognizes the importance of mobility and the Army is only as viable as its ability to get to the battle. So the Army has a good track record for promoting and training transportation officers.

In the Navy, they are treated almost as lepers. It just amazes me as to how they are looked down upon as second-class citizens. To be successful in the Navy in the logistics arena you have to, first and foremost, be an operator. Navy people on our staff are operators who have learned logistics, and are very good at it. But they are successful within the Navy because they are line officers who understand line operations and have then gained skills as logisticians. They are not successful because they are pure logisticians and transporters.

In the Air Force, you have a mix. When you say somebody is a transporter in the Air Force, that is a different definition from what a transporter is in the Army. You can be a C-141 pilot, a C-5 pilot, or whatever in the Air Force, and you are not classified as a transporter. You are classified as an airlifter, an operator. A pure transporter within the Air Force is somebody who deals in moving household goods, who understands how to move passengers around. It is a very narrow field within the Air Force. You have only one general officer within the Air Force who is a transporter. Only the Army, of all the services, trains pure transporters.

Dr. Matthews: Here is one of those trick questions. How can we more wisely use our manpower at TRANSCOM?

Gen Starling: Jim, I don't know how to react to that. "How to more wisely use" implies that we are not using it wisely.

Dr. Matthews: That's right. If we are not, why didn't you fix it?

Gen Starling: I leave it to the directors to manage their resources to produce whatever it is we need and whatever is asked for.

Dr. Matthews: How does the quality of the people in TRANSCOM compare with past assignments.

Gen Starling: It is better here than where I have been in the past. For example, the quality of people we have here is better than the quality of people I saw in Central Command when I first arrived there. You have to understand that until Desert Storm, Central Command was perceived to be sort of a backwater kind of outfit, too. Few seriously envisioned that we would go to war in that area of the world. Schwarzkopf [Army General H. Norman, Commander in Chief, United States Central Command] breathed new life into the command and began to bring in higher quality people. I have been more successful here in getting quality people assigned than I was in Central Command in the Logistics Directorate. Before that I was in Military Traffic Management Command, one of the area commands, and within the Army those area commands do not receive very high priority in terms of quality people, so I honestly think the quality here at TRANSCOM is better, superior to any other place I have been assigned.

I take a great deal of pride in the command's maturation over the last two years. We now have a sense of purpose and direction that didn't exist when I came here. We still have a long way to go. General Wykle will come in and continue moving us forward. It has been very rewarding to be part of that process. We have a new group of people in now who are a little more motivated than some of the folks I found when I arrived here. Some of the people who were here when I arrived were of the attitude that they had been put out to pasture in the corn fields of Illinois. To be assigned to TRANSCOM was a dead-end assignment. At least on the Army side I have managed to weed out those people and get some fresh blood in here. So we now have people in here who are getting promoted or not getting SERBed [Selective Early Retirement Board]. When I got here we had eleven lieutenant colonels SERBed, being released from the Army for whatever reason. That was devastating. It told me that the Army wasn't sending us its highest quality people. That has turned around. We have had no one SERBed this last time around. This year we now have higher promotion rates, far above the rest of the Army. The same thing applies to the Air Force. Our promotion rates within the Air Force are higher than the Air Force average.

When I got here it was worse for the Navy than it was for the Army. I have been told that one of my predecessors used to tell the Navy people who came to TRANSCOM that they were in a career-ending job. He used to tell them that! That's no way to motivate people. It has been difficult to turn that perception around for the Navy folks. But we did it. The Navy people we're getting in now are really quality

people. I take credit for that to some degree because I personally contacted the service personnel offices about assigning quality people to us and refusing to accept from them people who do not meet the quality cut. We have made great strides in that regard. People are coming to realize that USTRANSCOM is a going organization, one that has ambition and is on the move up and has a contribution to make. I get phone calls all the time from people wanting to be assigned here. No more do I hear “poor me, I’ve been assigned to TRANSCOM.” It has totally turned around.

Dr. Matthews: What do we do to help our troops think jointness?

Gen Starling: We now send all of our officers to Norfolk to the Armed Forces Staff College, which gives them a tutorial on joint operations, a flavor for joint operations before they get here. But we don’t want them to be “totally” joint. One reason we bring together people from all the services is because we want and need the view of that service as we address a particular issue. What we ask all our officers to do is step back and ask themselves the question, “What’s the best thing for our country? What’s the best thing for the Department of Defense as opposed to what’s best for the Army, or for the Navy, or the Air Force?” Officers sometimes find themselves in conflict. What is best for the Army, the Navy, or the Air Force is not always in the best interest of the Department of Defense. We ask them to have the intellectual honesty to admit that. They can go ahead and express their service view, but they have to also step back and ask themselves “is this the best thing for the country?” We have some officers who have a hard time doing it, but there are enough checks and balances, I think, within our

command that we ultimately produce what's best for the Department of Defense.

Total Quality Management

Dr. Matthews: When we were down at Tyndall [Air Force Base, Florida], we set down our goals and objectives in our strategic planning session. That was back in January and February. What have we done since to reach those goals?

Gen Starling: Not much, to tell you the truth, other than establish the CINC's Initiatives Team, which, you recall, grew out of that planning session. The purpose of the Team is to do exactly that, get in motion a long-range strategic plan for this command and lay out how we are going to achieve those goals and objectives. In fact, the Team has a charter and is out talking to people in the command as well as the components. We're moving in the right direction, but we're not there yet.

Dr. Matthews: Where do you think we're at in our quality journey? Give some examples on how we have become more quality conscious.

Gen Starling: I begin to see now, within the directorates, people coming forward and suggesting better ways of doing business. When we first began this quality journey, I heard some supervisors say "I don't want to hear it." They truly resisted change. Now that we have gone through the awareness training and have a large percentage of our command exposed to the tenets of quality, there is less resistance to change so that those people who do have bright ideas are a little less intimidated in surfacing them and talking about better ways

of doing business. I now have people tell me that because of their exposure to TQM [Total Quality Management] they have changed their attitudes, but I also realize that people sometimes tell me what they think I want to hear as opposed to what I need to hear. I would ask you the same question. You can probably judge that better than I can.

Dr. Matthews: There are a lot of troops who say they have more important things to do, or that it will never work in the military. You still hear that, but hear it less, and you hear more people talking quality and using the terminology.

Gen Starling: When you get down into the enlisted force, those kids are concerned about getting done whatever they are tasked today. I don't know that we have penetrated that part of our organization yet with the ideas of quality. One cornerstone of TQM is that quality is a never ending journey. You will always find areas to improve on. We just started the journey about a year or so ago.

Dr. Matthews: A lot of people think TQM is the answer. They are proselytizers, but that in itself may be a shortcoming because I don't believe anyone or any one philosophy can solve all the problems. What do you think are some of TQM's shortcomings?

Gen Starling: It produces unrealistic expectations within an organization. When you first start talking about quality and what you hope to accomplish with quality, people tend to think that the organization is going to change overnight. It doesn't and it won't. It is a long process complicated by influxes of new people. You are constantly having to retrain leaders and

facilitators and get people thinking along the lines of quality. Again, a never ending journey. Quality hasn't come to grips with managing expectations. People get turned off and say "well, I told you so" when it doesn't happen overnight.

Dr. Matthews: Unfortunately the military moves you around so much many troops will not see the fruits of their hard work in the quality arena. But maybe, hopefully, it will catch up with them and benefit them at their next assignment because they've moved to a quality conscious organization. How should we measure our customers' satisfaction?

Gen Starling: I don't have an answer. We talk about it. We say we need to measure customer satisfaction. When you say "customer" to me, I automatically begin to think about the external customers of the command, the unified commanders. There are a lot of informal measures in terms of the kinds of kudos you get. The actual metrics of how you go out and measure, we haven't come to grips with that yet. Then there are customers internal to this organization. I'm the staff's customer because they are trying to produce things for me. In my own mind, I measure the quality of the product that comes before me every day. So I have a measure. How do you measure whether or not our admin [administration] shop is serving the customer? I just don't have an answer. How does J3 measure whether or not it is serving the needs of the members of the J3/J4 organization? They are customers, in a sense. We don't have such metrics in our organization.

Dr. Matthews: If you're not getting complaints, common sense says you're doing good.

Gen Starling: But if you don't get anything back, does that mean you're okay or does that mean you're not getting feedback because customers don't feel it is worthwhile?

Dr. Matthews: You're someplace in that big gap in between. You're not doing real great and you're not doing real bad, but that doesn't help tell you how to do better. You don't want to be just okay. You want to be the best. Who's equipped to tell us how to measure quality in our command?

Gen Starling: Our Quality Council and the CINC's Initiatives Team will be the ones to come to grips with that issue. As we move down the quality path, we have to have some sessions to come to grips with that question. We haven't done it yet. It's one of those things that has to be on our "to do" list.

Dr. Matthews: The Initiatives Team is looking at our long term strategy, our goals and objectives, how to move us along in that direction, and how to measure how we're getting there and satisfying the customers. Are there other roles you envision for that group?

Gen Starling: The CINC plans to use them as a think tank to throw "what if?" questions at. When he throws those kinds of things out to the staff, its responses are bound by its history. We can't go beyond the bounds of our own experiences, within the J5, for example, the constraints of the planning world, to give him an answer. He's looking for free thinking, off-the-wall kinds of responses for those "what if?" questions. He doesn't want the approved solution from the Initiatives Team.

Dr. Matthews: A brainstorming group and think tank. A rare opportunity in any job to be able to have the time to think and respond with total freedom and honesty. On a lighter, a more personal note, why did you take such an interest in making our headquarters so sharp? Your predecessors, except for maybe Cassidy [Air Force General Duane H., Retired, USTRANSCOM Commander in Chief, 1 July 1987-22 September 1989], as far as the flag officers anyway, really didn't take a personal interest in the decor of the building. You did. Why?

Gen Starling: When someone comes to visit us the first impression is formed when he walks in the door. When we project an image of caring about ourselves and caring about the image we project to visitors, then they can only think better of us. When you walk into a place and it looks shabby, you think what a shabby operation this is, or if it looks ill-cared for or ill-maintained, you think "well if they don't care about where they live and work, they sure don't care about my problems or needs." It is public relations.

Dr. Matthews: And it's quality?

Gen Starling: You're right, it's quality.

Summary

Dr. Matthews: What most frustrated you here at TRANSCOM?

Gen Starling: I became frustrated with trying to get the Navy to recognize they no longer have the responsibilities they formerly did in their old single manager charter for surface transportation. I have run into the same kinds of frustration to a lesser degree

with the Air Force and Army. All bureaucracies are frustrating to deal with. Ours is no different here at TRANSCOM. When I communicate to my Exec [executive officer] or the Chief of Staff what I want from the Directors, by the time my question gets down to the action officer and then back up the chain to me, many times what I get has absolutely no resemblance to what I asked for. I recognize that is a function of the way bureaucracies work because everybody, going all the way down to that action officer, has his own interpretation of what it is that I said or what it is that I asked for, and the same thing when it comes back up to process out. I've been an action officer so I understand, but it frustrates me when I can't deal directly with the action officer. So what I do many times is pick up the phone and call them directly. The Directors get a little uptight about that. It would be true in any bureaucracy.

Dr. Matthews: Where is TRANSCOM going to be in the year 2010? What are we going to look like organizationally?

Gen Starling: We are going to move more and more into consolidating and pulling into the headquarters some of the functions that are performed by our components. We are going to take over more and more the role of setting the policy, setting the direction for our components. Over time we are going to move toward consolidating the traffic management functions in our three components into one, MTMC. As we continue to draw down our armed forces, we are not going to be able to afford both a MSC and a MTMC. I think eventually we will be forced into combining those two components.

Dr. Matthews: You've already stated how rewarding it was for you to help shape TRANSCOM into a command that people wanted to come to, getting quality people to this command. Are there other accomplishments that you are particularly proud of?

Gen Starling: I'm proud of our command's increased status and role, and I'm proud of having helped set it in the right direction. I leave here with a sense of accomplishment and contribution. It is fun to be part of a dynamic organization that is moving forward and in a direction it wants to go in, and has the guts to go out and do it. Let me tell you what I'm not proud of. I'm not proud of the fact that I was unsuccessful in getting the Office of the Secretary of Defense to issue that more definitive charter that we all worked so hard on. I regret that did not turn out better.

Dr. Matthews: If you had more time, or more money, or more people, what one more thing would you want to accomplish before your departure?

Gen Starling: I would have liked to move us over to the AFCC [Air Force Communications Command] building. It is a wonderful facility. It would give us a chance to expand and get all of us into one building. The poor J6 guys think they are second-class citizens because they have to operate over there in Building 1961, but it is physically impossible to get us all in this building [Building 1900]. I'd urge the CINC to give TRANSCOM the whole AFCC building, let us all move over there.

Dr. Matthews: That would be great. We have been split since the very beginning. What do you feel is TRANSCOM's value added?

Gen Starling: For our primary customers, the unified commanders, what we bring to the table is the wherewithal to manage the mobility assets of the Department of Defense in a way that best serves their needs. We can integrate the flow of materiel, resources, and people so that it all arrives at the right place at the right time for that commander to employ his forces. Before, he had to go to AMC to arrange his airplanes, MTMC to arrange his trucks, and MSC to make sure the ship was there on time. It was difficult and did not work well. We make it work in a neat orderly fashion, bringing to bear all the reserve forces, active duty forces that we can call upon. That's our mission and that's what we do better than anyone else and better than it's ever been done before.

Dr. Matthews: What above all else worries you about the future of this nation, our national security?

Gen Starling: We are now at a point in our history where very few in Congress have had experience serving in our armed forces. Therefore, they don't understand the role of the armed forces, the contribution it makes to the foreign policy of the United States, the strategic interests of the nation. We've seen legislators coming into positions of responsibility now who were the people demonstrating against us in the '60s. The programs we need in order to perform our rightful role in our society are not important to them. As a result we will continue to see the decline of the armed forces, not only in size, but also as they are perceived in our society. We have been very fortunate the past several years, particularly since Vietnam. The military has grown in stature within the

United States. I think now the pendulum is going to start swinging in the other direction.

Dr. Matthews: Is there anything else you would like to get on record about your duty here at TRANSCOM?

Gen Starling: No, just that I have had a great time. Hate to leave it. But there comes a point in time when you need to go. My wife, who works in the theater, always tells me you want to exit stage right and always leave them wanting more. So that's the way I feel. I'm leaving you in good shape. Headed in the right direction. Time to turn it over to someone else.

Biography

Lieutenant General Starling was born in Goose Creek, Texas, on January 20, 1936. He was commissioned a second lieutenant and awarded a bachelor of science degree in military science from the United States Military Academy in 1960. He also holds a master of business administration from Michigan State University. His military training and education include Ranger School and Airborne School, Field Artillery Officer Basic Course, Transportation Officer Advanced Course, United States Army (USA) Command and General Staff College, and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces.

General Starling has completed a wide variety of significant command and staff assignments including Battery Commander, "A" Battery, 320th Field Artillery, 82d Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, North Carolina; Commander, 21st Transportation Company, Korea; Division Transportation Officer, 82d Airborne Division; S-3, 7th Transportation Battalion, Vietnam; Chief, Transportation Services, Headquarters 5th USA, Fort Sheridan, Illinois; Transportation Analyst, Headquarters USA, Vietnam; Operations Research Analyst, Headquarters Training and Doctrine Command, Fort Monroe, Virginia; Commander, 7th Transportation Battalion, Fort Bragg; Operations Officer, XVIII Airborne Corps G-4, Fort Bragg; Staff Officer, Requirements Directorate, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, USA, Washington DC; Assistant Chief of Staff for Security, Plans and Operations, 4th Transportation Command, USA Europe; Commander, 507th Transportation Group, Fort Bragg; Commander, 1st Corps Support Command, XVIII Airborne Corps, Fort Bragg; and Commander, Military Traffic Management Command, Eastern Area. During Operation Desert Storm, he served as Director, Logistics and Security Assistance, J4/7, United States Central Command. On 17 June 1991 he became Deputy Commander in Chief, United States Transportation Command, when he assumed the rank of lieutenant general. General Starling retired from active duty effective 1 October 1993 with a retirement ceremony on 31 August 1993.

General Starling's decorations include the Defense Distinguished Service Medal, Defense Superior Service Medal with Oak Leaf Cluster, Legion of Merit, Bronze Star Medal with Oak Leaf Cluster, Defense Meritorious Service Medal, Meritorious Service Medal with Oak Leaf Cluster, and Army Commendation Medal.

He is married to the former Mary Kress of West Point, New York. They have four children: J. D., Leigh Anne, Jeff and Grant.

Glossary

AFCC	Air Force Communications Command
AMC	Air Mobility Command
APL	American President Lines
ASMRO	Armed Services Medical Regulating Office
CEO	Chief Executive Officer
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CIM-T	Corporate Information Management-Transportation
CINC	Commander in Chief
CONUS	Continental United States
CRAF	Civil Reserve Air Fleet
CS	Chief of Staff
DBOF-T	Defense Business Operating Fund-Transportation
DCINC	Deputy Commander in Chief
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
DIRMOBFOR	Director of Mobility Forces
DMA	Defense Mapping Agency
DOD	Department of Defense
DOT	Department of Transportation
DTS	Defense Transportation System
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
FORSCOM	Forces Command
FSS	Fast Sealift Ship
GTN	Global Transportation Network
IMA	Individual Mobilization Augmentee
ISTEA	Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act
JAG	Judge Advocate General
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JOPES	Joint Operation Planning and Execution System
JS/J3	Joint Staff, Operations Directorate
JS/J4	Joint Staff, Logistics Directorate
JS/J5	Joint Staff, Strategic, Plans, and Policy Directorate
JTIC	Joint Transportation Intelligence Center
JTRU	Joint Transportation Reserve Unit
MARAD	Maritime Administration
MRS	Mobility Requirements Study
MTMC	Military Traffic Management Command

NDTA	National Defense Transportation Association
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
RRF	Ready Reserve Force
SERB	Selective Early Retirement Board
SES	Senior Executive Service
SG	Surgeon General
SMESA	Special Middle East Sealift Agreement
SRP	Sealift Readiness Program
TCJ2	Intelligence Directorate, USTRANSCOM
TCJ3/J4	Operations and Logistics Directorate, USTRANSCOM
TCJ5	Plans and Policy Directorate, USTRANSCOM
TCJ6	Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems Directorate, USTRANSCOM
TCJ8	Program Analysis and Financial Management Directorate, USTRANSCOM
TDY	Temporary Duty
TPFDD	Time Phased Force Deployment Data
TQM	Total Quality Management
UN	United Nations
USACOM	United States Atlantic Command
USCENTCOM	United States Central Command
USCINCLANT	Commander in Chief, United States Atlantic Command
USCINCTRANS	Commander in Chief, United States Transportation Command
USEUCOM	United States European Command
USTRANSCOM	United States Transportation Command

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