

Lieutenant General Hubert G. Smith, USA
Deputy Commander in Chief
United States Transportation Command
(September 1995 to August 1997)

AN ORAL HISTORY

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Introduction

Arrival at USTRANSCOM as Dual-Hatted DCINC/Chief of Staff

Dr. Matthews: What was your perception of the command prior to your arrival here as DCINC [Deputy Commander in Chief]? Where was your perception on the mark and where not?

Gen Smith: I had a pretty good appreciation for the command because I'd had a couple of recent assignments where I'd been a big user of [US]TRANSCOM [United States Transportation Command] resources, at the theater level in Europe prior to joining TRANSCOM in 1995, and of course, the Desert Shield/Desert Storm deployment. I felt the command was up to the task. If we had a major regional contingency or major theater war, the command could certainly deal with it. There were lots of synchronization-type issues that we would face if we went to war, but we would work through them. Remember, some people tend to discount the need for deliberate plans, or their attitude is "we'll do the deliberate plan but we'll execute something else." However, once I got here, my biggest surprise was the amount of work or maturing activity yet remaining for the command. Maybe that should not have been a surprise, given the fact the command really isn't that old, that mature.

Dr. Matthews: How did you prepare for this assignment when you found out it was yours?

Gen Smith: I was honored that General Rutherford [Air Force General Robert L., Retired, Commander in Chief (CINC), USTRANSCOM, 1994-1996] selected me for this assignment, but quite frankly I had not

given it a lot of thought until I literally changed command, giving up the 21st TAACOM [Theater Army Area Command] in Europe about the 4th of August 1995 and reporting in here around the 15th. But I'll add that if I had not known a lot about the command, I would have done a lot more prying, digging, and questioning.

Dr. Matthews: We're putting together orientation packages for your replacement, General Thompson [Army Lieutenant General Roger G., Jr.], similar to those we compiled for you. Do you recall anything in those materials that was of special help to you?

Gen Smith: The books that were prepared, the read-aheads provided by each of the directorates, were really helpful. They enabled me to focus on what had been worked through, what was currently being worked on, and they helped me develop some ideas for the future.

Dr. Matthews: One thing that really caught my attention, comparing your tour of duty here with your predecessors, was how you were able to "get out of Dodge" more often than the others. Generals Wykle [Army Lieutenant General Kenneth R., Retired, DCINC, USTRANSCOM, 1993-1995] and Starling [Army Lieutenant General James D. "Dane," Retired, DCINC, USTRANSCOM, 1991-1993], said that they felt tied to their desk. It was just the nature of business here, where the CINC tended to be out on the road, working with the unified commands and with Congress, doing the Washington [D. C.] scene, while the DCINC was here doing the day-to-day work. It appears to me you found a balance the others weren't able to find, where you were able to go out and be more directly involved in operations and planning. How were you able to do that and how do you account for that change?

Gen Smith: My ability to travel was not without pain. I kept Generals Rutherford and Kross [Air Force General Walter Kross, CINC, USTRANSCOM, 1996-Present] very much aware of what I was thinking, where I needed to go, and I was very much attuned, of course, to their priorities. I was able to work my travel into the daily agenda. I could work in parallel with what the CINC was doing in his travels.

The dual-hatting of the DCINC here, as the chief of staff, demands a tremendous amount of time. Every day a very large volume of correspondence passes through the headquarters, both inbound and outbound. This correspondence requires attention. I've tended to compensate for that workload by working, I believe, longer days than my predecessors. I've tried to work as smart as possible, not spending too much time on the correspondence, giving it a quick assessment, asking myself is this something that requires a lot of study or is this something I can deal with quickly. I think there is a very important balance that the Deputy Commander in Chief must make and that is reinforcing the needs of the command while complementing the CINC where appropriate. And those meetings I attended in Washington were very important vehicles for working CINC agenda items, so the DCINC does need to do some traveling.

Attendance at QDR and Breakfast Club Meetings

Dr. Matthews: One major area where you were involved was the Quadrennial Defense Review [QDR]. What was it that you were doing in those QDR meetings?

Gen Smith: Most importantly, I worked very closely with our J5 [Plans and Policy Directorate] because the J5 and his action officers, strategic

planners, really carried the bulk of our mail, if you will, to the QDR. The J5 is very good about keeping the DCINC up to speed on everything that's going on. I, in turn, was able to keep the CINC apprised of what was going on.

Toward the end of the QDR proceedings, we had the DCINC war game, where the DCINCs were participants. I was in a very good position to listen to and evaluate the scenarios and the different intervals between them. In addition to using current and projected forces in major regional contingencies, we looked at operations other than war, peacekeeping, humanitarian, and disaster relief activities.

I learned that the other unified commands, at least the representatives of those unified commands, assumed we had lift resources for two nearly simultaneous major regional contingencies. They did not appear to be sensitized to the fact we are building only a single major regional contingency lift capability, to be achieved by the year 2001. And they did not understand that to disengage from a major peacekeeping operation to posture for a major regional contingency is a major maneuver. It can be done, but not as easily as some assumed. It was important that I was on hand to help them, particularly the geographic DCINCs, think through the process and gain appreciation for strategic lift limitations and capabilities.

Dr. Matthews: It's a historical burden for the transporter and logistician. It's a constant matter of educating the operators.

Gen Smith: It's important to note, too, that even though TRANSCOM stood up in 1987, it didn't become a fully operational command until 1992 when we received our peacetime mission. A lot of people still

don't recognize or appreciate that we are heavily engaged in peacetime support and that we will face a challenge when required to transition to war.

Dr. Matthews: You were also involved in the Breakfast Club meetings. How were they organized, and who were the participants.

Gen Smith: The Breakfast Club was chaired by Mr. Phillips [Air Force Major General John F., Retired], the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Logistics. Representatives included the [Joint Staff] J4 [Directorate of Logistics], the senior logisticians from each of the Service staffs, and some of the OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense] staff. I wasn't initially included as a participant, but after visiting once or twice I determined it was very important to have TRANSCOM represented there to listen to and participate in what all was going on. They got into things like ACTDs [Advanced Concept Technologies Demonstrations], logistics policy, etc., much of which impacted TRANSCOM.

Dr. Matthews: Was there any issue in particular that stood out that you were glad you had been there during the discussion?

Gen Smith: Oh yes. There was considerable discussion about the Strategic Mobility Panel's activity as part of the Defense Science Board. I was able to elaborate a bit on what was done in that important study. There was also considerable discussion about the status of Joint Total Asset Visibility [JTAV] and the intheater piece of Total Asset Visibility. We compete for ACTD funding, and several ACTD-type ventures were discussed that we were able to talk to. Additionally, there was also great interest in our Global Transportation Network [GTN]. We were able to clarify what we

were doing with GTN, educate senior Service representatives, and tout its successes.

Dr. Matthews: These meetings are ongoing?

Gen Smith: They're ongoing, typically one per month. It's a forum that I will recommend to General Thompson that he continue to participate in regularly. It is time consuming; it requires a trip to Washington and back, but I could usually work in some other meeting up there in conjunction with it, so I could cover more than just that single base.

Exercise Observation and Conference Participation

Dr. Matthews: You also got out to observe some exercises. Did you get to observe the TURBO CADS* ammo loadings on the west coast?

Gen Smith: No, I did not get to see the TURBO CADS loading. I'm very much aware of the importance of that program though. We simply must improve our ability to containerize and rapidly move ammunition in response to future contingencies.

The exercises that I've observed included JLOTS [Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore] off the east coast. These exercises are very important because the CINC has oversight for the JLOTS program. The JLOTS program has required a large commitment on the part of the Army, a little less commitment on the part of the Navy and Marine Corps, but it's a joint initiative that needs focus and commitment of resources. We will not always have a fixed port into which we will move. And even if we were to go into fixed

*TURBO CADS is a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff exercise designed to stress the Department of Defense (DOD) Containerized Ammunition Distribution System (CADS) from origin to destination using commercial/DOD intermodal container systems.

facilities, JLOTS has the potential to help expand the flexibility afforded with that type of contingency operation. Those exercises provided me some feedback in terms of the health of the JLOTS program, and then I was able to give the CINC my appraisal. The CINC, in turn, could influence the program by getting the Service Chiefs to raise it on their priority lists, if appropriate.

Dr. Matthews: Did you give any guidance to the troops who were operating the exercises while you were out there, considering your background and knowledge?

Gen Smith: No guidance, per se. I made several observations. I think, by virtue of my experience and grade, people tend to listen when and if I offer observations on how things are progressing or what needs to be addressed next.

Dr. Matthews: You've also been to several professional conferences and given speeches to various organizations. What were the benefits to the command for those trips?

Gen Smith: USTRANSCOM needs the support of the American people, particularly from the commercial sector. We need the support of the Department of Defense. We need the support of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It's important for us to tell our story, how successful we've been. I find that with the turnover in military organizations that you can't talk too much about what TRANSCOM does because so many people are coming and going that it's just very hard to keep all key people apprised of what we do. We are a very important part of the defense structure and we're not always well understood. By being able to get out and attend these different conferences, we've been able to tell our story.

We've also been able to tout the great partnership that exists between us and the commercial industry. We've been able to explain the contributions the commercial industry brings to the Department of Defense. The CRAF [Civil Reserve Air Fleet] program is a good example. The VISA [Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement] program we're developing is another good example. We've been able to talk about the benefit of industry visits where we're doing benchmarking with industry. We've been able to pick up some really good business practices. I want to emphasize we don't consider ourselves a commercial business enterprise, but we must look at what businesses are doing from a "work smarter" perspective and a use of technology perspective. We've not only been able to provide information about what the command does, but we've been able to receive a lot of useful information. We just can't communicate too much, whether it be within the command, to our components, or with the rest of the transportation community, which resides in the commercial sector.

Paperwork Flow and TDY Philosophy

Dr. Matthews: General Wykle made significant progress in facilitating the flow of paper, but the amount of paper that comes through the command section continues to increase. What have you done to cut down on the paper flow and move us to that paperless office that we talk about so much?

Gen Smith: I haven't been as successful on cutting back on the paper flow as I would have liked to have been. I contribute a lot to the problem. I ask a lot of questions about correspondence coming across my desk. Every day I read messages and memos that beg questions. I tend to write marginal notes on them such as "What's the status here?" If we have a very important conference coming up, I'll

tend to ask the J3/J4 [Director, Operations and Logistics Directorate], as an example, “Who’s going to attend this? We need to make sure we have all the bases covered” or “I’d like to see your presentation before you take it up.” By virtue of the amount of activity occurring within the Department of Defense as a whole, the volume of correspondence coming in here from outside of the command is considerably higher than it was last year. I just recently looked at the STACS [Suspense Tracking Application for the Command Staff] taskers list. We have about twice the number of taskers outstanding as we had this time last year.

The current CINC also travels a lot. He has a very active mind. He is a very smart fella, and he thinks through a lot of transportation-related issues, which begs questions. We both tend to generate a lot of paper and we’ve both tried to emphasize the better use of email to facilitate responses. It’s really a burden on the people who have to answer a lot of questions, but we do need a lot of questions answered. I don’t think we’re making needless work for anyone; I think what we’re doing is essential.

We are partnering with the Air Mobility Command [AMC] next door to look at a system whereby we can do most everything electronically without generating paper. I don’t know that we’ll ever get away from paper because it’s very difficult when traveling to use only email. It’s easier, quite frankly, on the plane to run off all your email on paper and then read it while you’re flying when you can’t be actively receiving and sending email. You get the paper copies, you put your notes on the paper copies, and then they tend to go back down the chain in the paper form. A lot of those paper copies will drive responses which gives you more paper copies. We have to learn how to answer questions without sending

a big folder along with several reference-type items. Instead, we need to do a succinct summary of references on the email and answer the bottom line. The hardest thing for anyone to do is to boil down the essential bits of information and write short, succinct papers. It'll be a challenge for people here for years to come.

Dr. Matthews: We keep taking on more responsibilities, our activities continue to expand. I wouldn't be surprised if we'd see a doubling in the number of documents a year from now. Is there anything other than increased use of email and succinct responses that you would recommend General Thompson pursue to cut down on paperwork?

Gen Smith: Make maximum use of the DCINC roundtables and CINC- and DCINC-hosted staff meetings.

Dr. Matthews: General Kross encourages his staff to send him emails direct. Did you ever feel like you got left out of the loop with that policy?

Gen Smith: No. This staff has been a pleasure to work with. I've encouraged the staff to communicate with the CINC. The staff is smart enough to keep me informed about what's important. I recall only one action being prepared for the CINC that went directly to him that I would have liked to have seen first. Other than that single action, which really in itself wasn't very significant, I've been very pleased with the staff communicating directly with the CINC.

Dr. Matthews: It seemed to me at the time extraordinary to have the chain of command work like that. I was really reluctant when you told me to go directly to the CINC--of course, I sent you a courtesy copy--but I felt very uneasy, and I think a lot of the rest of the staff did, too.

Gen Smith: The staff really works for the CINC. I use his staff. If he were not here, we would not have a staff. So, I feel very comfortable with the arrangement.

Dr. Matthews: You require trip reports from your staff following TDYs [temporary duties]. How did that pay off for you?

Gen Smith: Trip reports require the action officer or the director who's been somewhere to sit down and reduce to writing what really occurred. Much of what goes on out in the field where we attend conferences may not affect us directly, but it affects us indirectly. It's very important to take that succinct report of what occurred, pull from it the issues we need to be sensitized to, and then deal with them as appropriate.

Dr. Matthews: And you watch the TDYs across the command more closely than your predecessors. What was your philosophy on travel?

Gen Smith: Go where you must when you must. Don't travel if you don't need to travel. Make sure you have sufficient depth left back here at the headquarters to keep up the momentum. Represent the command well.

***Dual-Hatted USCINCTRANS and JTRU
Commander as Chief of Staff***

- Dr. Matthews: What are your thoughts on the CINC being dual-hatted?
- Gen Smith: I've given that a lot of thought. My personal feeling is the dual-hatting works, but I would like very much to see a Service other than the Air Force provide the commander in chief for at least one rotation. I realize Air Mobility Command would need to put a four-star officer in that billet based on size and nature of the business that takes place across the street. I think it would be very interesting to see if there was any value added with a one-time appointment of another Service as the [US]CINCTRANS [Commander in Chief, USTRANSCOM]. It's probably more of a curiosity of mine than a true need.
- Dr. Matthews: It seems to me the Army would be the logical one since it's our largest customer.
- Gen Smith: I believe that the Army leadership has felt very comfortable with the job both CINCs have done since I've been here. Otherwise, since it's a nominative position, you would have seen the Army or the Navy clamoring for the job. Maybe even the Marine Corps, had they been uncomfortable with the leadership or the amount of attention that CINCTRANS has shown them. The Chairman [of the Joint Chiefs of Staff] obviously is very comfortable with the dual-hatting role and the amount of time the CINC has been able to put on CINC duties.
- Dr. Matthews: Admiral McKinley [Naval Reserve Rear Admiral John H. Jr., Commander, Joint Transportation Reserve Unit (JTRU), USTRANSCOM] has spent more time up here in the command section doing his wartime mission as chief of staff than any of his

predecessors. How has that been a benefit to the command and how were you able to make it happen?

Gen Smith:

In Admiral McKinney, the JTRU commander, I've had a very capable chief of staff for mobilization. He is a very professional guy who's led a very professional organization, one that gives this command a tremendous amount of depth and staying power.

Admiral McKinley and I have worked closely together so that he knew my schedule and I knew his schedule to make the best use of his limited training time. I've made it a point, as I've gone on leave or taken extended trips, to arrange to have him fill in for me because there's nothing like hands-on experience. His sitting in that chief of staff's position, whether I'm here or not, has given him some great insight in the way the command functions. I feel confident that if we were mobilized due to a crisis and he were brought in to be the chief of staff, that he would begin on the run or at least trotting as opposed to crawling, where he might otherwise have started if he didn't have the hands-on experience. He's been keenly interested in what's going on in the command, and that's been very good for the command.

Dr. Matthews:

He brings a very strong business background to his position here as our JTRU commander and our chief of staff in his wartime position. What things did he help you with in his business mode?

Gen Smith:

Benchmarking, customer surveys, customer interface, and metrics. He's really been good at sharing such information from the business perspective. He's been able to reinforce and validate much of what we've done in these areas.

Reengineering

Clean Sheet/Optimum Organization

Dr. Matthews: I'd like to move on to some organizational issues, TRANSCOM and our relationships with the TCCs [Transportation Component Commands]. I remember very well the first day we met. You came down for an orientation. I had about 45 minutes blocked with you. I got about five minutes into my spiel and you decided you were going to tell me what your highest priority was. After you, in essence, briefed me, I proceeded to try to help you as best I could by doing research for you and the CINC's Initiatives Team, and later the JTCC [Joint Transportation Corporate Information Management (CIM) Center], on what you originally termed the "Clean Sheet." The study, renamed the Optimum Organization, was never released. Why?

Gen Smith: When I came here it was apparent that we were, what I would call, under siege by a lot of uninformed or misinformed, however well-intentioned, people. We had the Vander Schaaf^{*} study, what he as the Deputy DOD IG [Inspector General] thought the command should or should not be. There were several GAO [General Accounting Office] reports commenting on a perceived lack of efficiency associated with the command. We had congressional staffers scrutinizing what we were doing and why we were doing it. We were under threats of arbitrary transportation budget cuts as a result of our reported inefficiencies. We were being criticized for having duplicative-type headquarters by those who did not understand the Services' contributions through their Title 10 side of the house.

^{*}Published in February 1988, the Vander Schaaf review recommended the elimination of the TCCs and the creation in their place of a massive joint operational transportation command.

As a result of all of that, I commissioned early on a “Clean Sheet,” just to have a product that we could offer if we should be forced into combining everything under the unified command headquarters. In other words, a plan to execute if we were directed to eliminate the components. Although I never released that study, it gave me a very good idea of where to start if we had to divest ourselves of our components, which would be a terrible mistake. The components bring so much with them in the way of Title 10 contributions from the Services that we would otherwise have difficulty dealing with. Also, I should add, the Clean Sheet never showed a significant savings of manpower because much of what would have been eliminated in the components would migrate to the headquarters to maintain the expertise found in its component commands.

Dr. Matthews: Would you recommend that General Thompson take a look at the study?

Gen Smith: Yes, because the question of why we need our components will inevitably come up while he’s here.

Dr. Matthews: The study concluded that the best arrangement would be to maintain the three component commands. Do you feel the JTCC was given full reign to come up with any recommendation: one component, two components, three components, no components?

Gen Smith: Absolutely. My guidance to them on the Clean Sheet was “now that we’ve been in existence about nine years, how would we organize the command if we had to do it over again. With hindsight, take a clean sheet and develop, design, and lay out a new organization.” Interestingly, the answer wasn’t significantly different from what we have today.

DOD Deputy IG and the GAO

Dr. Matthews: You said, when you came on board, we were under the microscope by the DOD IG, GAO, and certain members of Congress who had a whole list of things they were looking at about our organizational structure. We worked the last two years to try to convince the GAO and the others how we've improved our processes, reengineered the DTS [Defense Transportation System], and brought savings both in manpower and in money. We've also detailed how our strategic plan will continue to bring efficiencies into the next century, yet it seems to me that they still don't understand. They are still skeptical and are still prodding us to do even more faster. Why have we not been successful in turning that around?

Gen Smith: I will be perfectly candid. I think some people developed agendas before they began looking at what they purported to be the problem. It's been very hard for them to fall off those agendas. Some people have put in writing recommendations in which they have so much pride in authorship that they now have trouble being objective. We are still not well understood in terms of what we do. We're a warfighting command designed to support the warfighter. We must maintain a significant level of readiness. We have assigned more resources on a day-to-day basis than we employ on a day-to-day basis. In other words, we carry some excess capacity for surge requirements. We're compared frequently and somewhat unfairly to the business sector, which is "right-sized," with only those resources needed on a day-to-day basis. We continue to be looked at from a "why can't you be more like a business" perspective without, in my words, significant appreciation for what

we must and must not be in order to support the warfighting commanders around the world.

Dr. Matthews: What more can we do?

Gen Smith: Just continue to get out and educate people. It's a function of being able to show people what value we add to the Department of Defense and how we add it. As long as we continue to be an organization that spends along the line of four and a half billion dollars a year, we're going to continue to be looked at from a "how can you spend less" perspective. When you look at what I call the discretionary piece of our budget, it's very small. Once you take away the contracts we're committed to for day-in and day-out services, we have very few resources, in a bigger picture, that we can reduce. As a matter of fact, I don't see how we can be a whole lot more thrifty or wiser managers than we are today.

Dr. Matthews: Do you think part of the problem is our business is just so complicated? You see those process maps and they boggle the mind.

Gen Smith: It's a very involved business but we also operate very expensive resources. It takes resources--money, fuel, time, and people--to operate this Defense Transportation System. And the Defense Transportation System isn't really well understood. I can assure you that if this command ever faltered big time in a contingency, there would be a much greater interest than ever before in what we do, how we do it, and why we do it. However, I surely don't want to see the DTS falter or fail in a crisis in order to make our point.

Dr. Matthews: We do it so well. We make it look easy.

Gen Smith: That's part of the problem. So much goes on at TRANSCOM, the successful pulling of many levers at one time, that people tend to take what we do for granted and oversimplify it in terms of ease of execution.

Dr. Matthews: The Business Center, the JMCG [Joint Mobility Control Group], JTMO [Joint Transportation Movement Office], JTCC, GPMRC [Global Patient Movement Requirements Center], JOSAC [Joint Operational Support Airlift Center], and there are others. They jump out at you when you look at our organizational chart. Our organizational chart is quite different from the other unified commands. Do you think this is part of the problem we're having with the GAO? They look at our organizational chart and say "Why aren't they organized like their counterparts?"

Gen Smith: I don't think it's a problem. Granted, we're not the same as any of the other unified commands. There are five geographic or regionally-focused and four functional commands. The four functional commands are quite dissimilar. The five geographic commands are similar in the way they go about approaching their business. None of the five regional commands focus on the customer the way we do in peace and war. None of the other three functionals focus on the customer the way we do in peace and war. I think we are working towards the best possible organization.

Dr. Matthews: We are more like a business?

Gen Smith: We sell a service, in reality, where they, with a couple of exceptions, don't really sell services, they perform activities. The mere fact that we work so closely with industry, that we're so dependent and reliant upon industry--not only for day-to-day business execution but also for surge capability--means that we

have to think and operate more like business than any of the other unified commands.

Process Mapping

Dr. Matthews: What did those process maps teach you?

Gen Smith: They taught me that the Defense Transportation System is an extremely complex business and there are many facets to the business that TRANSCOM doesn't directly control. The Defense Transportation System is the system used to move materiel anywhere in the world, by any defense user. The number of processes and automation information systems associated with running the DTS is, as you stated, mind-boggling. Our JTCC has attacked the problem through transportation-related systems migration, which has been supported very well by the OSD staff, particularly Ms. McHugh [Ms. Mary Lou, Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Transportation Policy]. We're trying to reduce the number of systems from about 134 to about 24. We don't have a single entry point for all requirements. Different customers enter requirements at different levels. We must also interface with commercial industry. We move many of our customers and their goods day-in and day-out with commercial resources. The ability to monitor, to orchestrate, and regulate that movement is very critical to our success. I think the benefit of process mapping, in a nutshell, is we've been able to lay out those complex processes and, in many cases, simplify or streamline them.

Dr. Matthews: Have you made any major decisions based on these process maps?

Gen Smith: Major decisions, no. Significant decisions, many of them, some of which had immediate impact. Others focused us on the direction we'll be taking two or three years down the road.

Dr. Matthews: We've built up a tremendous bank of knowledge on these process maps and expertise. In fact, we developed the process of process mapping. Is this something we should share with the other unified commands?

Gen Smith: I think we have. We've used our Customer Day to tout what we're doing. We bring the customers, to include the Services and the unified commands, in here frequently to look at processes. Everything we do in the JTCC is coordinated with the Services and the unified command commanders. They've been participants with us in terms of doing the process mapping and they've also benefited from the mapping, the simplifications, and efficiencies in the DTS.

Requirements Process Reengineering

Dr. Matthews: One of the projects I got involved with during your tenure was the JTCC's look at the requirements process and how to reengineer it. That final report helped initiate the DPSAG [Deployment Process Special Action Group]. I'm wondering, is this DPSAG initiative and structure bearing fruit?

Gen Smith: It bore fruit for awhile. The group is not meeting as regularly now as it used to meet. Its early activity did help focus attention on deployment problems common to users of the DTS.

Dr. Matthews: It's ongoing?

Gen Smith: Yes. There's not as much visible activity right now as there used to be. One reason is because the Joint Staff J4 has established a

Deployment Division. Rather than having the DPSAG work getting done in the field, the new division is coordinating the effort.

Contracting and Outsourcing

Dr. Matthews: There appears to be an ever increasing number of O-5s [lieutenant colonels] and O-6s [colonels] retiring from the command and then reappearing in a matter of weeks as civilian contractors in the JTCC or one of the directorates. Satellite cities of TRANSCOM contractors are actually sprouting up in O'Fallon [Illinois] and Fairview Heights [Illinois]. Does this make you at all uncomfortable?

Gen Smith: I'm very comfortable with our contractual support. The reason is, we're having more and more put on our plate. The only way we're going to be able to accomplish more is through outsourcing, contractual support, the leveraging of the partnerships we've developed with industry. The folks I see coming back here are doing something meaningful. We really have not expanded the responsibility or size of the JTCC that much, and that's where you see most of that contractual effort.

We have to differentiate between what we'd like to see done as opposed to what must be done, the minimum essential activity. We tend to have a lot of "wants" that may not be "true needs." As we continue to focus on the true needs of the command, some of that activity may be accomplished through contractual support. We're very sensitive to the amount of money we spend. We're very sensitive to the bill passed back to the Services that pay our way. Thus far, I feel every dollar we've spent within the

command, every dollar we've spent on contractual support has been money well spent. We can show the value added.

Dr. Matthews: Has the JTCC bitten off more than it can chew?

Gen Smith: There might be a couple of activities that have been undertaken by the JTCC that some would say go beyond our charter. A good example is development of a deployment manual for US Army Europe. Another is an ongoing initiative we have with [US] European Command regarding asset visibility and distribution. But I think we've benefited from those initiatives as much as those two commands I just pointed out have benefited. We've learned much more about how those customers we support operate. We've been able to mutually simplify processes and activities, and save money along the way.

Dr. Matthews: Are there any functions we're performing now at TRANSCOM that we should contract out or outsource?

Gen Smith: There are a couple of areas that we might outsource. DISA [Defense Information Systems Agency] could take over some of the J6 [Command, Control, Communications and Computer Systems Directorate] work through the DISA Megacenters out here [St. Louis, Missouri]. We've already moved the LAN [local area network] to the wing. That's taken some manpower spaces off our books. Down the road a piece there's a potential for outsourcing some of the JOSAC. We probably won't want to do that until the JOSAC matures, we get the fleet right-sized, and the warfighting CINCs and Services feel comfortable with the way we are doing the OSA [Operational Support Airlift] business. There's a point in time, too, when you could outsource to such an extent that you

would not have enough in-house activity left to adequately maintain programs.

Dr. Matthews: What about the component commands? Anything there you'd recommend for outsourcing?

Gen Smith: Each component commander has to make his own call there. I'm comfortable with what they've done thus far.

Dr. Matthews: How would you judge our relationships with our components?

Gen Smith: We have a very healthy relationship with each of the components. I think the components also have healthy relationships with each other. A good example would be MTMC [Military Traffic Management Command] and Military Sealift Command as they work through the Joint Transportation Movement Office, the JTMO. Component commanders are encouraged to deal with the CINC. They share with me, where appropriate, what they told the CINC, and I'm very comfortable with that arrangement. I know of nothing that's not being accomplished that needs to be accomplished by our components.

Dr. Matthews: Anything you'd recommend that we do to make those ties stronger?

Gen Smith: I'd like to see us have what I call an interactive command center that could be tied in with the TCCs' command centers 24 hours a day, seven days a week, where we literally could watch their daily updates on the screen in our MCC [Mobility Control Center]. They, in turn, could watch our updates, and we'd have a series of real time information displays that would show the status of forces and movements. I think that's the thing that will help us most in the transition to war in the future, if we can really share on a real-

time basis with each other what we're doing. That step would take us a long way toward removing any seam we might face in transition from peace to a contingency.

Dr. Matthews: Do you believe the fact that General Thompson was a component commander will help him get up to speed here at this job?

Gen Smith: Yes, he's coming in very well prepared, and his new job will give him some insights that he didn't enjoy as the MTMC commander.

Costs, Rates, and Industry Visits

Dr. Matthews: Why is it that when we have been successful in lowering costs, rates go up? Is it really possible to lower rates?

Gen Smith: Rates have tended to go up even though we've reduced costs. This command has been very sensitive to assessing what the cost drivers are, what really drives our costs. Each of the components now do a monthly cost drivers briefing to the CINC. They're looking at cost from an operational perspective--since operations tend to drive costs--what they're doing, how they're doing it, and how that influences and impacts costs. And our financial management people are assessing the information exchanged at those cost drivers briefings, so we have a good handle now on what really drives our costs.

We want to do a better job controlling costs. External criticism demands we stay focused on reducing costs. As a result, we've been very successful in reducing costs. We've taken down structure and we've improved processes. But the very nature of the system tends to work against us. When we look at rates for next year, they're driven by what occurred or did not occur last year. For example, if the cost of fuel goes up--and we consume a

tremendous amount of fuel, particularly in the Air Mobility Command--DLA [Defense Logistics Agency] passes that on as an added cost, which then influences the rate. If we have assigned a cost per unit of business, if you will, and we have a shortfall in execution, the workload is less than what was envisioned last year, then we get the adjustment next year. Rates are a reaction to the past. We influence costs directly. We do not control rates, at least not totally. If we can lower costs, we can take our part of the rate [equation] down, but we can't control all of the external activities, like inflation, volume of activity, and imperfect forecasting. We also have contingencies that come and go. We can't plan for every contingency.

Dr. Matthews: What are the two or three most important lessons we've learned from our visits to industry?

Gen Smith: Industry has helped us really understand that we must focus on the customer, that we must maintain state-of-the-art technological capability, and that our automation systems must interface with industry systems. They have shown us the need to build architectures before we build systems. They've shown us that we must invest significantly in automation systems if we're going to manage information. We have come to understand from these transportation companies that we need to manage information, not manage products. They've taught us a great deal about metrics, how to measure and what to measure. And although we will never become a business like a Sears, Roebuck or a Roadway Express, we can certainly pick up many of the business-type principles to lower cost and increase effectiveness and efficiency.

Dr. Matthews: Were there any industry visits in particular that stand out?

Gen Smith: Each one of them gave the command something meaningful. I cannot indicate that any one was significantly better than the others because I only made one visit. I went out to Sears, and I was very impressed with their metrics. They don't allow any single carrier to do more than twenty percent of their business. They've made some tough decisions in terms of what to keep in-house and what to outsource. I also found very interesting the fact that they have brought some outsourced functions back in-house because they have learned to do them more efficiently as a result of their process improvements.

Dr. Matthews: Did you meet with General Pagonis [Army Lieutenant General William G., Retired] while you were there?

Gen Smith: General Pagonis was a very gracious host and we had a very good meeting. He was very forthcoming.

Dr. Matthews: And he's applying his military expertise to the corporation?

Gen Smith: His military knowledge and modus operandi were very evident in the organization.

Dr. Matthews: Did you get an end of tour report from General Salisbury [Air Force Brigadier General Gary, former director, JTCC]?

Gen Smith: I did. He was pleased with what he had accomplished in the JTCC. He was concerned that the JTCC maintain its momentum. He wants the JTCC to be a "going concern" for some time into the future. He was especially pleased with the JTCC's process mapping. I, too, appreciate the JTCC's contributions. However, I think we need to downsize its capability over time, unless OSD wants to underwrite more of its costs.

Manpower, Personnel, and Quality: the Total Force

Reserve Augmentation and the JTRU

Dr. Matthews: Do you feel the command is manned properly both in total numbers and distribution by directorate to perform its mission?

Gen Smith: Yes. Some directorates on a day-to-day basis are working harder than others. J3/J4 [Operations and Logistics Directorate], for example, must surge considerably when we get into a contingency. We have a mechanism in the headquarters where we bring in augmentees from the other directorates to help us get started. When we get into a mobilized, or a long, sustained operational environment, we'll obviously depend upon our reservists. The command, given its day-to-day mission, and what we know about future surge requirements, is manned about right.

Dr. Matthews: What are your concerns about our work force?

Gen Smith: The work force is the best I've ever worked with. We have a work ethic on the part of both our military and civilians that I've never seen matched anywhere. I just worry about people continuing to work long days, working a multiplicity of issues, and simply getting tired. However, if we should be spun up as a result of a contingency, I believe our people will put their shoulders to the grindstone and move out.

I am also concerned that we might get strung out in a major contingency without a commitment to mobilize. In a contingency, we must have the expertise and support we have built into the command through our joint reserve training. And I have the same concern for the components. If MTMC and AMC don't get

reserve units mobilized before combat forces start moving, we're in trouble.

Dr. Matthews: One of our top ten lessons learned from Desert Shield/Desert Storm was that we have to have the forces there to prime the transportation system. As a result, one of our initiatives after the war was to guarantee such a force--we called it the Ready Mobility Force--of about twenty thousand troops. We didn't get that through Congress. Do you think we should resurrect it?

Gen Smith: I think we should. I told Mrs. Lee [Deborah R.], the Assistant SECDEF [Secretary of Defense] for Reserve Affairs, about a year ago, that I have great confidence in the ability of the reservists to do their job. However, I'm not so confident that we will have units mobilized or units made available in time to prime the pump. I can reflect back on my MTMC Eastern Area experience during Desert Shield. I had some talented reserve IMAs [Individual Mobilization Augmentees] coming into the ports. However, I never had a single, total unit volunteer, so I used people with different skills from probably fifteen units to stand up five port operations, and we struggled to properly operate the ports. Now, we're spending billions of dollars to improve our lift resources--new airplanes, new ships, updated and expanded infrastructure, and reengineered processes--but I'm still concerned about our ability to get our units mobilized early on in a contingency so we can make maximum use of these resources. I'm talking about reserve units that are trained to deploy and fight as a unit. You'll never get all the skills you'll need among volunteers if you attempt to do more technically demanding tasks. If you should get, for some strange reason, all those skills, you won't have that "we've worked together so we know each other" bond.

So, at every opportunity we must express the need to have transportation reserve units available early on in the next large contingency. Since the Gulf War we've spent a tremendous amount of money on resources to get to the next war faster. The way to get there faster is to have the enablers up front. And the major enablers we need are strategic mobility reserve units.

Dr. Matthews: Do you feel the JTRU is fully integrated into the command's activities?

Gen Smith: I don't see how the JTRU could be better integrated. Again, the active and reserve forces have a very healthy interface, thanks much to Admiral McKinley. The J3/J4 relies very heavily day-to-day on reservists who do their training here. I call our command post on weekends, practically every Saturday and Sunday, to see what's up. I don't know if I'm talking to an active or reserve component officer or NCO [non-commissioned officer]. It really doesn't matter because I get the right answer. I suspect all of our reservists have jobs in the civilian sector, but they make themselves available when we need them. The JTRU also helps us manage the AT [active duty training] periods, so we have a good feed of reservists coming in and out of the command, particularly during exercises. As we have planned exercises, we also plan the reserve support for them.

Manpower Review Board and Service Mix

Dr. Matthews: Last year you approved establishment of the Manpower Review Board. Is that organization functioning as you envisioned it would?

Gen Smith: The feedback I'm getting indicates yes. It gets a healthy dialogue going in terms of what we can and can't do, should and should not

do. I know that everyone does not always agree with the outcome of the Board deliberations, but I think we get the consensus opinion. We're not getting additional resources, so the question is how do we use what we have more effectively. The Board helps us do that.

Dr. Matthews: Do you feel like the command has the right service mix now?

Gen Smith: Yes, I'm pleased with the command service mix. And it's not just the mix, it's the quality. The Services vary a little bit in terms of promotion rates and selection rates for schools, but the quality of our troops, both officer and enlisted, is extremely high.

Dr. Matthews: Are there any key billets you would recommend changing service?

Gen Smith: I'd like to see the Army provide, in addition to the DCINC, at least one of our directors at the brigadier general level. I've discussed the issue with the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, but the Army simply doesn't have enough flag officers to go around.

Dr. Matthews: When you look around the room and table at the staff meeting, sometimes you're the only senior Army officer in the room.

Gen Smith: We have some super colonels as deputies and branch chiefs in the organization. I'd really like to see an Army director sit at the table.

Dr. Matthews: Any directorate in particular?

Gen Smith: There are a couple of directorates that could be Army as easily as another service. I'll leave it at that.

***Quality Journey, Management Style,
and USTRANSCOM Personnel***

Dr. Matthews: Why did you put the Quality Office in J1 [Manpower, Personnel, Quality, and Information Management Directorate]?

Gen Smith: To flatten the organization a little bit and better align personnel numbers for the betterment of the command. I believe that we never end our pursuit of quality, but we've reached a point in time where a separate quality organization is no longer required, where the Quality Office could be aligned with a directorate.

Dr. Matthews: How would you assess our quality journey at this point? What have we accomplished and where do we need to go?

Gen Smith: We haven't eliminated quality. We have embedded quality in the organization as opposed to having it stand alone as a separate entity. The Quality Office helped us with our metrics and process improvements, and our quality experts, now in J1 and the Business Center, will continue to help us in those areas and others: customer interface and assessment of customer satisfaction. The quality journey never ends. The restructuring has enabled us to make better use of our limited resources.

Dr. Matthews: How would you define your style of management?

Gen Smith: My style of is one of participation. I'm not dictatorial. I trust the directors and staff. There have been a couple of directors in the past who were not so strong, but we don't have a weak director in the group now, as far as I'm concerned. They've shown me that they are capable of doing their jobs. I talk to almost every director at least once every day, in meetings or by phone or email.

My calendar is sometimes misleading. When you look at my calendar it may show that I have some very light days meeting-wise, but all of my days are filled with phone calls if not with

meetings. I think the directors are very comfortable with me. I'm very comfortable with them. We get more done that way.

Dr. Matthews: What in your professional and personal background--your education, your training, your experiences--has helped you define your management style?

Gen Smith: It's been the kind of assignments I've held. I've held some pretty responsible positions and I've tended to prove to my supervisors that I was able to plan ahead and execute well when the time came for action. I didn't get a lot of, what I would consider, "over supervision" and I've appreciated that. Empowerment has worked for me, so I've empowered the directors, who, I believe, have empowered their people.

Dr. Matthews: Were there any people in particular you'd like to mention who served as a mentor, someone you patterned your style after?

Gen Smith: No, I have not consciously made an attempt to pattern my style after anyone. I've really just tried to operate as someone I would enjoy working for. I did have one or two assignments early in my career where I felt I was in a very threatening environment. I decided back then, as a young field grade officer, that I would never ever make people as miserable as I was in those two different cases. People are our most important asset. I think people want to do a good job. They want to feel that they are in charge. A good manager needs to make his people feel that they are making a difference.

Dr. Matthews: How do you personally determine the state of your troops' morale?

Gen Smith: I think I'm a pretty good judge of people. I talk to the directors frequently enough to get a good feel for how they and their people

are faring. And I have frequent meetings attended by a good cross section of the command. Most importantly, our people do good work, one sure sign of good morale. Morale is high at TRANSCOM.

Dr. Matthews: You mentioned that you've never worked at a place that could equal the quality of the people here at TRANSCOM. Do you fear that force drawdowns might erode that quality in the future?

Gen Smith: At this point in time, absolutely not. I feel very confident that we can continue to attract people who have well-rounded backgrounds for the kinds of jobs we require. We just need to make sure we don't demoralize the work force with some arbitrary cuts. And we need to be very forthright and candid with our work force in keeping them apprised with what's going on in regard to cuts. We also need to tout our great organization and its critical mission. It's a very important job, it's exciting, and it pays well compared to alternatives in the civil sector. We can continue to attract young people and maintain their upward mobility. The fact that this command has a relatively young civilian work force is why it's so good. There's still a lot of energy left. There is still a lot of opportunity for upward mobility. Not everybody is going to be able to be promoted to GM [General Manager]-15 in this organization, but there are plenty of opportunities for our GS [General Service]-11s and GS-12s. There are opportunities for our younger military people, too. Serving here opens up whole new horizons for them. Some will see an opportunity in industry and they will leave us. Others will become retirement-eligible and will leave us, but as long as the job is exciting and, more importantly, the job is perceived as important by the people who do it, we'll be in good shape. We will maintain the quality of our people in the future.

*Climate Survey, Unit Self-Assessment,
and Customer Day*

Dr. Matthews: Late last year we had a climate survey. What did you learn from that?

Gen Smith: I learned that people felt good about themselves, and they felt good about the command. They felt they were being treated with dignity and respect. There was no area that we identified as a problem area.

However, the survey indicated that there was still some uncertainty about what constitutes sexual harassment. Even though the survey did not show we had any problems with sexual harassment--in fact, we scored about the norm in this area--I would have expected us to score higher.

Dr. Matthews: When do you think we should have another climate survey?

Gen Smith: Every 18 months to two years as a result of the personnel turnover. That will give the CINC and DCINC an opportunity to look at how they're perceived and how the organization is perceived.

Dr. Matthews: Were you satisfied with the way the questions were phrased and the survey was organized?

Gen Smith: Yes. We used a well-established survey provided to us by the Department of Defense. I was very appreciative of the number of responses received. I think the people felt that they could say what they wanted to say about the command. By and large, they said good things.

Dr. Matthews: Have we honestly assessed ourselves, our customer service?

Gen Smith: I think we have. We have gone to great lengths to determine how well we interface with our customers, those who use our services. The biggest enemy we have is time. I would like to have a team on the road full time just circulating among the customers to see what we can find out, but we simply can't enjoy that luxury. We use several mechanisms to evaluate our customer service. The CINC frequently goes out and visits customers. He receives feedback, which I am sure is objective. I get feedback. I talk to the other DCINCs frequently. We have lots of meetings where people are provided the opportunity to comment on what we're doing, how well we're doing it. We have a very healthy interface with the Services and unified commands. Unless we had a lot more resources to put a mobile team on the road, I can't imagine how we could do it better.

Dr. Matthews: Would you give me some examples to illustrate how Customer Day has paid off for us?

Gen Smith: I suggested to General Rutherford that we establish a "Customer Day" and he agreed with me. Executed with General Kross, it is now a resounding success. We've had the opportunity during Customer Day to present to those who use our services information on how we do our business. For example, you brought up earlier the issue of rates and costs. Costs go down, rates go up. We were able to explain to those who attended our Customer Day the reasons for that phenomenon. They left with a better appreciation than ever of what we can and can't control. And we showed them that we were genuinely concerned about rates, and we were working hard and smart to reduce costs.

We were able to share with the Services what we've done in the way of reengineering and streamlining. We've been able to

explain to them the way we're restructuring the organization. We've been able to show them that we have taken on additional workload without additional resources. And we're going to continue to do manpower trade-offs and push-arounds within the headquarters to add capability.

More importantly, Customer Day gives the unified commands, the Services, and agencies like DLA, AAFES [Army and Air Force Exchange Service], and DeCA [Defense Commissary Agency] a chance to give us feedback. DeCA, AAFES, and DLA are our major peacetime customers. They're the major users of the Defense Transportation System on a day-to-day basis keeping it warm so we're able to energize it in a wartime or contingency environment. They spoke their pieces, and, by and large, they gave us more positive than negative feedback. Taking the idea a step farther, we have established a Council of Colonels--which meets at a three-month interval between the semi-annual Customer Days--where we identify the hard issues and have determined future Customer Day agendas.

Customer Day is paying big dividends. It's an opportunity twice a year to have our customers come in and lay their concerns on the table. It helps us focus our processes. Customer Day helps us get all those issues up in front of everybody, and it helps answer a lot of questions that otherwise would never be answered.

Dr. Matthews: Do we have the right level of participation at Customer Day now?

Gen Smith: Participation has not been quite at the level I would have hoped. I'd hoped to have more flag officers attend, the principals like the DCSLOGs [Deputy Chiefs of Staff, Logistics] of the Services, the J4s [Director, Logistics] of the unified commands. But I think the

people who have attended have taken the information back to their bosses.

Dr. Matthews: What do we need to do in the near term and long term to become a truly world class quality organization?

Gen Smith: We need to continue right on with what we're doing. We've gone out to commercial transportation and other organizations to do benchmarking. We've listened to how they do their metrics. We've listened to how they do their customer interface programs. And what we have found out is that we're doing much of what many of those successful organizations are doing. As a matter of fact, we invited Mr. Fred Smith [Frederick W., Chairman of the Board, President, and Chief Executive Officer (CEO), Federal Express Corporation] to TRANSCOM and, after we briefed him on our programs, procedures, and processes, he gave us a very strong endorsement.

Operations and Logistics

Organization

Dr. Matthews: Once or twice over the last five or six years, we've looked at making the J3 [Operations] and J4 [Logistics] separate directorates. Do you foresee that as a possibility in the near future?

Gen Smith: I don't see that occurring any time soon, but it is an issue to be addressed by each new CINC. We get a lot of capability out of having one button for J3/J4, because they're really inseparable in our business. From an operational perspective, we often deal with the J3s at the unified commands and Joint Staff, but from a deployment and sustainment perspective we also deal with their J4s, so we find our J3/J4 having to deal with a separate J3 and separate J4. There's a great benefit in having one person in our command overseeing our relationships with the J3s and J4s of the world.

Dr. Matthews: In 1994 we went through the biggest reorganization of the headquarters since we were established. Arguably the most important change we made at that time was to move deliberate planning from J5 to J3/J4. Do you think that's working?

Gen Smith: It's working. That's one of things I wondered about when I got here. I looked at it and concluded it's not broken. So if it's not broken, why change it?

Dr. Matthews: Also at that time we moved GTN from J3 to J6. How is that working?

Gen Smith: That's working well. The reason it's working well is we have a very good GTN functional interface between J3/J4 and J6.

QDR and the Two Major Theater Wars Scenario

Dr. Matthews: We talked a little bit about the QDR and our one major regional contingency strategic mobility force. I'd like to pursue that a little bit more. What are the strategic mobility pitfalls in that swing force scenario?

Gen Smith: The QDR scenario was a series of possible future military-related activities to include disaster relief operations, humanitarian support, lesser regional contingencies, and a major theater war [MTW]. We looked at how quickly and effectively we could disengage from a lesser operation to deal with a new activity or problem. The way we would do that is basically flow against the first contingency, and then if a second one occurred, the Joint Chiefs would give us direction to shift resources. We looked at how much of a holding force we would get delivered to the first before ordered to move to the second. Do you get the holding force closed in the first before you start the second? The key issue is the time between two major theater wars. There's an assumption that a two MTW scenario would have some separation, a certain number of days between occurrences. I have some strong misgivings about relying on only a single major theater war strategic mobility force to deal with two simultaneous or nearly simultaneous major contingencies. We will need to leverage commercial resources to the greatest extent possible. We have the command and control capability in TRANSCOM to do two. It will be a challenge, but we can deal with it here. It's the allocation of lift resources, surface and air, that will be tough. That allocation of resources call will be made by the Joint Chiefs.

Dr. Matthews: You mentioned in a staff meeting that some QDR panel members were obviously smart business people, but they were not highly experienced in defense issues. As a consequence, they were bandying about some really unreasonable proposals.

Gen Smith: The QDR started with a look at “ways and means.” In the end we got down to a budget-driven environment. In other words, “What can you do with ten percent, twenty percent, thirty percent less.” We were not dealing in reality. Although it did not turn out as a budget-driven drill, the budget certainly came into play toward the end. I don’t think the QDR outcome will put us at risk, but it didn’t tell us much more than we already knew. It boiled down in the end to “what do you do with less money, which equates to less force structure. How much can you do with less?” It did not help us formulate strategy for the longer term.

AAFES and DeCA in the DTS

Dr. Matthews: One of the biggest issues that you dealt with on your watch here at TRANSCOM was keeping AAFES and DeCA in the DTS. Was this a life and death issue for the DTS?

Gen Smith: Yes, for the DTS as we know it. DeCA has been a billion-dollar a year business using appropriated funds, which means it gets a lot of attention from Congress. DeCA was also designated a private PBO [Performance-Based Organization] and the director of DeCA [R. E. Beale, Jr.], a retired major general, was given the latitude to put DeCA on a business-like footing. DeCA, if it were allowed to leave the DTS, could possibly acquire cheaper transportation. But such a move would do nothing to contribute to maintaining DTS wartime capability. It would do nothing toward leveraging commercial capability for wartime use. If DeCA and AAFES were

to leave the DTS, under the guise of getting cheaper transportation, the cost in the end would be far greater in terms of reduced wartime readiness.

Dr. Matthews: Was our strategy primarily geared to educating Congress about the ramifications?

Gen Smith: It was geared to two things. First, the CINC wanted to reduce costs to DeCA and AAFES. Second, he wanted to show Congress and the GAO that we were making the best possible effort to lower costs, and he articulated to all parties the importance of maintaining the day-to-day base and infrastructure we will need in wartime.

Dr. Matthews: You made a comment in staff meeting earlier in the year about a memo you were drafting, listing punitive charges for DOD agencies who ship goods outside the DTS. I never saw a copy of that memo. Did you actually send it out? Can you give me a little background on it?

Gen Smith: I did not send that memo out because the issue was championed by the folks in OSD, Ms. McHugh in Transportation Policy. Here is some background, some of which we discussed earlier. Mr. Pang [Mr. Frederick F. Y., Principal Under Secretary for Personnel and Readiness, and Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Management], one of the deputy assistant secretaries of the Department of Defense, was interested in letting AAFES and DeCA get outside the DTS because he perceived they could ship cheaper outside of it. In reality, they could, in a narrow sense, ship cheaper outside of it; however, those organizations are part of our big sustaining base necessary on a day-to-day basis to keep our commercial partners tied to us, those partnerships like VISA and

CRAF that we talked about earlier. The OSD memorandum basically says “you can go outside the DTS, but you have to prove the case for it.” No one has yet made such a case to OSD’s satisfaction.

Dr. Matthews: Do you think the issue is dead?

Gen Smith: No. The issue won’t go away because there will always be someone--DeCA, AAFES, DLA, and others--who says the cost of doing business for them needs to be lower, and the way to save additional money is to get them out of the DTS. Such a move would be short-sighted. It would put at risk the larger defense transportation system we need for contingencies.

JTAV and TPFDD Refinement Conferences

Dr. Matthews: Probably few issues seemed to frustrate you more than JTAV. Why?

Gen Smith: There are three segments to the pipeline: in-processing, in-storage, and in-transit. For whatever reason, the executive agent for JTAV, the Army, lost its focus on the overarching total asset visibility, global TAV, if you will, and began to focus almost exclusively on the intheater piece. There was an awful lot of money focused on solving the intheater piece. Eventually the intheater piece became viewed as a fourth segment of that pipeline, when in reality it was a subset of the larger: in-process, in-storage, and in-transit.

I was most frustrated over the fact that the JTAV office was attempting to develop JTAV without an architecture. Back about February we went on record here with a message saying “You have to deal with the architecture. We don’t know what we’re building,” which caused a lot of heartburn on the Joint Staff and

Army staff. We argued that we didn't have the same level of maturity in the in-process and in-storage segments as we did in the in-transit piece. Who's building the in-process and in-storage pieces? Look at Caterpillar. Caterpillar has been a very successful business. It came from the throes of death to become one of the best examples of a successful business enterprise today. Their number one lesson: "Listen to the customer." We can't build a product the customer doesn't like. The number two lesson: "Build your architecture before you start buying systems." And here we were chasing JTAV without any architecture. As a result, the pieces weren't fitting together well. I'm still concerned that we have too much focus on the intheater piece and not enough on the larger, over-arching piece.

Dr. Matthews: Which would accentuate that hand-off, that seam intheater, rather than smooth it?

Gen Smith: Worse than that, we could end up building a system in Europe, for example, that might not work in Korea. You would think that if we're going to put the money out there to build a system in Europe, that that system would be totally suited to the other four regional commands. But I don't know if that is so.

We're several months, potentially a couple of years, ahead of the rest of the JTAV community in terms of work we've done on intransit visibility vis-à-vis the work remaining on the in-process and in-storage pieces, primarily because GTN, our in-transit segment, is also the command and control system for the DTS and it is operational today.

Dr. Matthews: What did you do behind the scenes to get the Army back into the JTAV program?

Gen Smith: Basically I talked to the Army DCSLOG and the ADCSLOG [Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff, Logistics] and shared with them my thoughts, reiterated the TRANSCOM position, and touted what we've already done with GTN. The Army has a lot on its plate, but I think we've begun to stabilize the battlefield, if you will, in the area of JTAV. We're beginning to look at it collectively as a community.

Dr. Matthews: TRANSCOM has been hosting TPFDD [Time Phased Force Deployment Data] Refinement Conferences since the command was established. Do you think we should continue to serve as host?

Gen Smith: Absolutely. We do the transportation analysis for the unified CINCs' war plans and we also, for several reasons, have a much better appreciation of the TPFDD process, and how important it is, than anyone else. So it's appropriate that we host them.

Dr. Matthews: Have we made any progress in getting the unified command J3 folks to be part of the TPFDD refinement process so they will be prepared to run JOPES [Joint Operation Planning and Execution System] during war?

Gen Smith: We've made some progress. That's going to be a hard one to fix permanently because many people assume that no plan or TPFDD will ever be executed as planned.

Dr. Matthews: What impact would a change in the size of army divisions have on deliberate planning, the deployment process, and our current and planned strategic mobility air, land, and sea forces?

Gen Smith: I don't think the Army's FORCE XXI, the "Army After Next," is going to have a major impact on lift requirements. There's going

to be potentially fewer tanks and fewer Bradley Fighting Vehicles in a battalion, but I don't think we're going to find a large savings in lift as a result of the Army's initiative.

***Bosnia-Herzegovina Deployment* and
MTMC Port Operations Intheater***

Dr. Matthews: I would argue that the most important operation you've been involved in here was the IFOR [Implementation Force] deployment to Bosnia-Herzegovina about 18 months ago. A key lesson learned was that we needed to get ourselves into the planning early on. Of course, we knew that. It was not our lesson learned. Hopefully it was a [US]EUCOM [European Command] lesson learned. You took a personal role in attempting to break the logjam that kept us from being a full partner in the IFOR planning process. Would you please relate for us some of the conversations you had with your counterpart in EUCOM?

Gen Smith: During the initial part of that operation I talked often to the chief of staff at EUCOM. I also talked frequently to the commander of the 21st TAACOM who was actually executing the deployment. Having been the 21st TAACOM commander, I was very knowledgeable of what had to be done. The way it was being done was somewhat different than the concept that I had planned the year prior to coming out here to TRANSCOM as DCINC. They looked at their deployment and felt, by virtue of being able to take the land route through Hungary, the so-called "northern route" into Bosnia, that they would be able to deploy primarily via road and rail with some tactical airlift support. They planned it that way based on the contacts they had with the nations through which they

*UN peacekeeping operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which began in December 1995.

had to transit, the host nations. So, I believe EUCOM was so comfortable with their land deployment route plan, they simply failed to engage us in planning for employment of strategic airlift assets in a theater role.

They knew the weather would be challenging. As a matter of fact, I can recall when I was working for Admiral Boorda [Navy Admiral Jeremy M., Commander in Chief, Allied Forces Southern Europe] as the senior log[istics] planner in his headquarters in 1993, we recommended to General Shali [Army General John M. Shalikashvili], who was then the SACEUR [Supreme Allied Commander, Europe], that we not even attempt a deployment into the country between the months of October and March, because if there was any armed resistance, the weather would put us at a much greater risk in terms of successful deployment, force protection, and housing for our troops. But the folks over there at the time of the IFOR deployment apparently concluded they could successfully deploy almost entirely overland. They had planned to move the airborne battalion out of Italy into Tuzla [Bosnia-Herzegovina] with C-130s. If we had planned to use the C-17, we could have flown the battalion with one-third the number of sorties needed to deliver the outfit via C-130s. They knew the weather was going to be bad, which would decrease the windows of opportunity to take off and land in Bosnia-Herzegovina. I heard some concern expressed about the cost of airlift, too.

In addition to bad weather and the cost issue, there were some border problems in Hungary and a rail strike in France trapping about half of the “deep well cars,” which were needed to move outsized equipment, primarily command and control vans, down range. The problems on the ground forced EUCOM to focus on the use of airlift during execution.

Also, when deploying via land routes, US Army Europe planned to exercise command and control oversight through STACS, which is the Standard Theater Command and Control System. It's an Army standard, but it's really unique now to US Army Europe. [US]CINCEUR [Commander in Chief, EUCOM] did not have visibility over what was moving nor was his command able to validate the movement because the units were using STACS in lieu of a TPFDD in JOPES. The greatest single lesson EUCOM learned was the need to use JOPES and to develop a TPFDD. I believe that EUCOM simply froze USAREUR [United States Army Europe] in place because they did not have visibility over the deployment.

As a result, we lost the opportunity to fly several hundred missions from Rhein-Main [Air Base, Germany] where General Rutherford had mustered numerous strategic airlift aircraft because he knew EUCOM would need airlift. We had a lot of aircraft there but nothing to transport, even though there was equipment parked everywhere. The loads had not been validated so we were not permitted to put them aboard the aircraft. To the best of my recollection, over the first six weeks of that operation, there were about three hundred missions where crews reported to aircraft with no loads. So they went back to their quarters. This was a major failure in planning for a contingency requiring strategic lift in an intratheater role.

Dr. Matthews: Do you expect it will be a different situation if we do it again?

Gen Smith: It could be the same situation if we don't force the issue with the unified commands we are supporting.

Dr. Matthews: What else could we do that we didn't do this last time?

Gen Smith: We have to weigh in to make sure they understand that if they'll include us in planning, whether they intend to use us or not, we'll all benefit. They'll benefit by planning and if, in fact, we play a role, we'll obviously be much better prepared for that role.

Dr. Matthews: We have to be invited in, though. We sent [Navy Commander] Scott Breeding over there during the late planning stages, but he was kept on the periphery. We also had our liaison officer, and the two of them continued to state our case. Hindsight says that we should have had a team over there working JOPES, TPFDD, GTN and other strategic mobility issues.

Gen Smith: And we could have done that had there been more thought given to the potential need for strategic lift for use in an intratheater role.

Dr. Matthews: Is this STACS system going to be phased out?

Gen Smith: No, it's been accepted as a standard Army command and control system. As a result of it being a classified system, not everyone has access to it now.

Dr. Matthews: Will it be part of the GTN network?

Gen Smith: No. However, there could potentially be some interfaces to GTN built into it. Unified commands should continue to use JOPES and the TPFDD. STACS will never be a substitute for JOPES and the TPFDD.

Dr. Matthews: We've been into Africa several times since you've been here. Did we play our rightful role in Zaire?

Gen Smith: Oh, we overplayed our role. We prepositioned a lot of material that was never used. The National Command Authorities said "lean forward," and we did. We were prepared for the worst case--

thankfully the worst case did not evolve--so we over-resourced that operation. When we do that, we deprive other users of those assets.

Dr. Matthews: The worst case being if the rebels went into Kinsasha [Zaire], and there were mass killings, and we would have had to evacuate large numbers of Americans and other civilians.

Gen Smith: As it turned out, there was a relatively peaceful takeover and relatively orderly flow of people.

Dr. Matthews: Looking back over the last two years, are there any general lessons learned that cover all the different operations we had?

Gen Smith: We must continue to emphasize to the supported CINCs that they must bring us into the planning early on. There's no place for "trusted agent." There's no place for compartmented information when it has to do with employment of strategic lift forces. We need to help them plan exercises. For an exercise or actual operation we need to participate in their flag and general officer-level in-process reviews, and then we need to be there with a robust liaison capability during execution. We'll all be beneficiaries. And we'll save money and maybe lives in the end.

Dr. Matthews: Earlier I asked if it would be different if we went into Bosnia-Herzegovina again. I meant to follow up with a question. Will having General Begert [Air Force Lieutenant General William J., Vice Commander, United States Air Forces Europe (USAFE)] out there at USAFE now in the number two slot facilitate the use of strategic mobility forces in the European theater?

Gen Smith: He can help a great deal, but remember he's not the user. The user of the lift will be the ground forces, so if the folks on the ground

don't plan for the potential use of our assets, whether it be in the intratheater or intertheater role, then they aren't going to be effectively employed, at least early on. We lose so much time and potentially waste so much money if we're not engaged in the planning well in advance.

Dr. Matthews: I recall reading an article about third party logistics in Bosnia-Herzegovina. What is the lesson learned?

Gen Smith: TRANSCOM needs to know what's going on in the third party logistics intheater. In the case of Bosnia, the third party logisticians initially procured lift without coordinating with our folks, who were forward. We had assets competing for limited landing spots and slot times. The thing we learned quickly, and we eventually got our arms around this, was our Director of Mobility Forces [DIRMOBFOR] needs visibility over the contractors so he can coordinate slot times and control the MOG [maximum on ground].

Dr. Matthews: What are the ramifications of third party logistics for MSC [Military Sealift Command] and MTMC?

Gen Smith: In a large-scale humanitarian relief operation there's the potential for intensive competition for commercial lift resources. Someone needs to be aware of what ships are coming in to support the humanitarian organizations. In a port like Ploce [Croatia], you may have five or six berths but only a couple that are useable for larger ships. Someone needs to coordinate their arrival and departure so you don't end up getting port congestion.

Dr. Matthews: Should that be MTMC?

Gen Smith: MTMC should be, in my mind, our single port manager and if we, the United States, are the lead nation or executive agent for the operation, then obviously, yes, we ought to make the call when ships move in and when they move out.

Dr. Matthews: The CINC had an article published this year in *Joint Forces Quarterly** dealing with MTMC's role in current intheater port operations and future possibilities. Has there been any feedback on that article?

Gen Smith: Pretty much an acknowledgment that MTMC should be the port operator. There is some question as to how far beyond the waterline MTMC (or TRANSCOM) needs to be in control of activity. I'm of the opinion--and I have a pretty good background here, probably as good as anyone around now--that we need to be able to move the cargo off the ships into a staging area and, at that point in time, it should get turned over to the theater. We don't need to have a large number of movement control people in our command nor do we need a lot of ground assets. Movement control and ground assets need to be orchestrated by the commander we're supporting. Some would argue that's a seam. I would argue, if it's coordinated correctly, the seam's invisible.

***Exercises, Chemical/Biological Warfare
Training, and Force Protection***

*"Single Port Management," by General Walter Kross, *Joint Forces Quarterly*, Winter 96-97, pp. 53-57.

Dr. Matthews: Two recent exercises were TURBO Intermodal Surge^{*} and TURBO Challenge. What did we learn about strategic mobility from them?

Gen Smith: TURBO Intermodal Surge reinforced the fact that for successful deployment and sustainment we must have a good working relationship with the commercial industry, and we will rely heavily on commercial industry's assets. There's no doubt in my mind that we can oversee the execution of a deployment involving air, ground, and sea assets. However, we can't do it alone. We have to use our commercial partners. We have the mechanism to do it with CRAF on the air side; we have the mechanism to do it on the sea side with Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement. We still have a ways to go with VISA, but we have a good start. Our commercial partners are almost always surprised about the magnitude of the workload. Our surges are a massive challenge for the commercial industry.

TURBO Challenge was our big mobility exercise. It represented a tremendous challenge for the staff in terms of learning procedures, evaluating workload, and using all the tools necessary for a successful deployment and sustainment operation.

Dr. Matthews: Do we have the proper level of involvement in both those exercises?

Gen Smith: I think so. They're always manpower-intensive. Key to a successful exercise is planning far enough in advance so we can get all our reserve component personnel who would normally be a part of our team in an actual mobilization.

^{*}An exercise testing commercial industry door-to-door service via containerhips operating in liner service to deploy unit equipment.

Dr. Matthews: These exercises are manpower-intensive and takes a lot of the staff's time. The CINC said he'd like us to consider doing a couple of TURBO Challenge-like exercises a year. Do you think we can pull that off?

Gen Smith: I think we can. We need to plan them in conjunction with large exercises already scheduled by a unified command.

Dr. Matthews: There's been a lot in the press recently about CB [chemical/biological] warfare. In a recent exercise, Coral Breeze, we looked at the issue. What did we see?

Gen Smith: Coral Breeze enabled us to identify problems. What is the threat? Where will decontamination take place? To what standard do we decontaminate strategic mobility assets before they're permitted to come back in the CONUS [continental United States]? How do we minimize risk for our people, our equipment operators as well as the infrastructure personnel? We have problems on both the airlift side and the sealift side. In a coordinated effort ongoing with [US]PACOM [Pacific Command] and US Forces Korea, we are going to deal with the problems. It's going to be challenging because there's a lot of political sensitivities associated with it.

Dr. Matthews: Are we going to need a group of people, a standing organization here in this command, to continue to focus on this issue?

Gen Smith: I don't think we need a special group of folks for this issue. We do need a chemical, biological, and nuclear-trained officer on the staff.

Dr. Matthews: In the J3/J4, the Force Protection Office, maybe?

Gen Smith: Yes, probably force protection.

Dr. Matthews: When you were running the sealift off the east coast and in the Gulf of Mexico during Desert Shield/Desert Storm, what thought did you give to the possibility of chemical/biological warfare?

Gen Smith: We thought that through. As a matter of fact, every ship departing Savannah, Georgia, with 24th Infantry Division equipment had several people on board who actually trained crews en route. They took chemical suits and masks.

Dr. Matthews: We did this with the commercial ships, too?

Gen Smith: No, we did this initially with the FSSs [Fast Sealift Ships] allocated against the 24th, and then with a couple of RRF [Ready Reserve Force] ships. The 24th ended up using between nine and eleven ships, all of which had chemical, biological, and nuclear training teams on board.

Dr. Matthews: What is our responsibility for doing the same for our commercial partners, their ship and aircraft crews?

Gen Smith: They're going to need protection. They're going to need training. That's something we have to make a determination on, given the scenario. It really isn't that difficult to train people to operate in that environment. Of course, we want them to operate in that environment for a very short period, so hopefully we are talking about a non-persistent agent. We're going to do everything we can to minimize putting people in harm's way to begin with.

Dr. Matthews: They would need to feel confident that they are protected or they may not want to serve, even if they're Americans. There aren't too many things in this world scarier than CB weapons.

Gen Smith: You'll recall during the Gulf War some of the truck drivers--local nationals and third country nationals--abandoned their trucks and

refused to drive for a while because it was rumored that chemical agents had been used or would be used in SCUDs [surface-to-surface missiles]. A lot of disorder occurred quickly just over a rumor.

Dr. Matthews: Eligible Receiver 97 ended recently, another important exercise for the command. What was TRANSCOM's role and did we identify any comm[unications]-related weaknesses or any other weaknesses in the command's posture?

Gen Smith: We were very much involved in Eligible Receiver. None of our core systems were penetrated, but there were some other penetrations. Reflecting back on what was reported to me, we dealt very well with the threat, and the real reason for that is our J6 had enough foresight to put firewalls in our operational GTN. The exercise served as a good shot across the bow, emphasizing that we must put continuous, concentrated effort on protection of our information and our command and control systems because they are so critical to our ability to effectively execute our mission.

Dr. Matthews: How do we delineate our role from the supported CINC's role in regard to force protection?

Gen Smith: The responsibilities are pretty clear. We have a responsibility to ensure that our people know that when they're in a unified command's AOR [area of responsibility], if they've been chopped, that they are under the control of the supported CINC. Since we don't chop strategic airlift or sealift resources, we're then responsible for communicating with those crews. The supported CINC, whose area they'll operate in, will also be providing information to everybody in the AOR. Ideally, if the system works well, they'll be getting information from the supported CINC as

well as our own headquarters or our component commands. As a result, they should be pretty well armed with what they need in the way of information to operate effectively and safely.

Dr. Matthews: General Fogleman [Air Force General Ronald R., Retired, then Chief of Staff of the Air Force] stated that the Khobar Towers attack* was an act of war. Do you agree?

Gen Smith: I wouldn't argue the point. It appears to have been well-planned in advance. It was conceived to cause great harm and, in fact, it did cause great harm. It occurred on a sovereign nation's soil. The real issue is what is the sovereign nation's role in preventing something like this from happening again. What is their responsibility? How are they going to ultimately deal with it?

Dr. Matthews: Back at home, do you feel TRANSCOM's headquarters and its component commands' headquarters have the physical protection that's required?

Gen Smith: We don't have everything we would like to have, but I think we have everything we need today given the current threat. The problem is the threat can change quickly, and you then have to question our ability to respond to a stepped-up threat. Here at TRANSCOM, for example, we've coordinated with the 375th [Airlift] Wing, our host unit, and they have a contingency plan to deal with an increased threat. But we still don't have Mylar on windows, for example, which we'd like to have. That will hopefully occur next year, which would cut down on people being injured by flying glass. You can't give your people one hundred

*On 25 June 96, terrorists exploded a gasoline truck outside the Khobar Towers housing area on King Abdul Aziz Air Base, Saudi Arabia, killing 19 Air Force officers and airman and injuring 300.

percent protection. We're doing, have done, and will continue to do what's prudent, given what we know about the bad guys.

Dr. Matthews: Is our Force Protection Office now up to speed as far as its manpower and its knowledge base?

Gen Smith: I feel very comfortable with our current Force Protection Office. I do a weekly IPR [In-Process Review] on force protection matters, view all the message traffic, and we're very capably handling the current workload.

Dr. Matthews: Have MTMC and MSC put together their force protection offices?

Gen Smith: They've pulled together force protection elements and have force protection offices, so we have a disciplined approach to it.

Intelligence Support

Dr. Matthews: Has the J2/JICTRANS [Intelligence Directorate/Joint Intelligence Center-Transportation] met the command's needs?

Gen Smith: Absolutely. We have one of the finest J2 sections and JIC organizations in the DOD. They do a tremendous job. They're constantly looking at what is available in the way of transportation-related intelligence information. They are attuned to what's happening on a day-to-day basis, and have developed and nurtured a super relationship with the national intelligence agencies. In our weekly staff meeting with the CINC, we have present representatives of the Defense Mapping Agency, DIA [Defense Intelligence Agency], CIA [Central Intelligence Agency], and NSA [National Security Agency]--we have them all. Those people aren't timid. If they think there's something that the CINC

needs to know, they put it up on his screen. When we went to Bosnia, the supported and supporting CINCs quickly learned that we had some of the best intel[ligence] products around. We became a major provider of intel information. We have a very balanced approach to intel requirements. We're very much respected in the community in terms of what we do and how we do it.

Dr. Matthews: Colonel Peterson [Air Force Colonel Eric C., Director, J2] and Mr. Reynolds [Thomas C., Deputy Director, J2] and their troops asked me to ask you to challenge them to do better. How would you challenge them to do better?

Gen Smith: Hire a good mind-reader. Seriously, they do a superb job. I do a weekly force protection update where I have the J2 people present, and they're always on top of it all.

Dr. Matthews: What was your impression of their new video production facility?

Gen Smith: It has great capability. It's something we'll make great use of. We're just now beginning to appreciate its power.

Dr. Matthews: Anything new you'd like to see them do in the near future?

Gen Smith: They should continue to do infrastructure analyses and get that type of information disseminated to the field.

Business Center, JMCG, and JTMO

Dr. Matthews: Let's talk a few minutes about the Business Center. Where did the idea for the Business Center originate?

Gen Smith: The Business Center came about as a result of our close interface with industry. We've seen business centers operate in industry.

We've seen the benefit of business centers. We've been very focused on improving our support to our users, our customers. We've needed a single button for customer relations, to do customer surveys. We've needed the same single button, in my mind, to oversee our command metrics program. The Business Center will oversee our metrics. It should also be the center of our procurement activity. We've also moved our procurement personnel from the Judge Advocate [JA] over to J4 because that's really where they belong. It's really becoming a single point of contact for those we support as well as the commercial industry that we use to do the support.

Dr. Matthews: Why did we put the Business Center in J4 and not J8 [Program Analysis and Financial Management Directorate] or J5?

Gen Smith: J8 is focused on financial management. J5 is focused on plans and policy. J3/J4 is the operator, and this is really an operations function. We want our operators' perspective when interfacing with our customers, those we support.

Dr. Matthews: Why didn't we make the SES [Senior Executive Service] position the deputy J3/J4 rather than the deputy J4 only?

Gen Smith: There's enough work in the J4 to justify the SES in that single billet.

Dr. Matthews: It might look lopsided on the organization chart. We have the ops [operations] deputy, who is traditionally the more important of the two groups, being a colonel, and we have the logistics side being an SES.

Gen Smith: It may look lopsided, but we have that colonel who, by virtue of experience level when he gets here, is very well prepared to deal

with the operational issues. It's not a matter of what horsepower you need, it's a matter of how well he or she is trained.

Dr. Matthews: Did you look at other possible ways of aligning the Business Center in the command's structure?

Gen Smith: Never seriously considered anything else.

Dr. Matthews: Are you comfortable with the division of responsibilities between the Business Center and the other directorates?

Gen Smith: Yes, very much so. The Business Center is going to require a lot of what I would call matrix support, and with the close relationships we have between our directorates--in terms of the wiring diagram and based on personalities--we have a good lash up. Now, over time, we may see a need for change. Today, based on what we're doing and our strategic plan, the division of responsibilities is right.

Dr. Matthews: What's the Business Center's greatest potential?

Gen Smith: To help us refine and improve the way we provide support to our customers during peacetime, which then carries over and complements everything we do in wartime.

Dr. Matthews: And its greatest hurdles?

Gen Smith: Its greatest hurdle is probably going to be communications. It will need to be awfully busy in terms of communicating with the different parties necessary for keeping a big picture of what we're doing and how well we're doing it.

Dr. Matthews: What do you believe is the most effective and efficient division of responsibility between the JMCG and the JTMO? Should the JTMO be part of TRANSCOM?

Gen Smith: The jury is still out on that one. We knew we had to fix the intermodal gap that existed between MTMC and Military Sealift Command. I personally believe that by virtue of MTMC being a traffic manager, the JTMO should reside at MTMC. There's an issue, though, of the number of people required. We still don't have our arms around what we truly think the JMCG will look like at end state. We may never see end state for that matter. It may be a constantly evolving state. By virtue of pulling the JTMO together, we were able to achieve some efficiencies associated with intermodalism that we still would not have achieved if we would have waited longer for the JMCG to mature. So we still have work to do in terms of end state relationship between those two organizations, but it's workable now. And in the interim we're avoiding gross inefficiencies. It's not costing a lot. We're not wasting resources.

Dr. Matthews: What is the JMCG's greatest potential?

Gen Smith: The ability to see, to analyze, and to facilitate the meeting of all requirements given to the command.

Dr. Matthews: And its greatest hurdle?

Gen Smith: Identifying the right force structure.

Dr. Matthews: Force structure in the JMCG itself?

Gen Smith: Yes. In other words, how many people do we need to do the job. There's still a disagreement between us and our components over what requirements work we should see and delve into up here vis-à-vis what requirements ought to float directly down to the components for execution.

Dr. Matthews: You required end-of-tour reports from departing directors. What did General Begert tell you in his report?

Gen Smith: General Begert feels very good about what he contributed, very good about what J3/J4 is doing, very good about the relationship between TRANSCOM and the other unified commands, very good about the relationship between TRANSCOM and the Joint Staff, and the need to continue to nurture those relationships. General Begert believed strongly in our strategic plan. We need to maintain our vision as described in the strategic plan and we need to continue to have the JMCG involved.

Dr. Matthews: Did he make any recommendations as to something we might change that you're following up on?

Gen Smith: Nothing significant.

Cat B and Liaison Officer Structure

Dr. Matthews: Why is it important to fill Cat[egory] B seats and what are we doing now to fill those seats?

Gen Smith: Cat B routes are flown mostly by our smaller specialized air operators and, of course, we have these Cat B routes set up based on the needs of the unified commands and the Services. We've had a dropping off of ridership for a number of reasons as we've pared down the size of the overseas forces. We've had fewer passengers to transport. As a result of fewer passengers to transport, we've pared some of the flexibility from the system. In other words, we don't have all the gateways we once had. And as a result of the loss of flexibility, the Services perceived that we didn't move troops necessarily when and to where they needed them.

It's just a general combination of things that resulted in ridership dropping off. A drop in ridership resulted in less peacetime requirement for specialized carriers on whom we rely so heavily to do the initial surge in a contingency. We had ridership dropping, the number of airlines involved with the number of assets decreasing, and we saw the deteriorating of our base we need so badly for a contingency-type surge environment. So we're trying to rebalance the equation and I think we're on the right track. The Services are committed now to increased ridership. The Joint Staff is probably going to reduce the amount of commercial ticket seating money available for exercises and that's going to drive the people to plan better use of Cat B channels to and from exercises. We can also put more emphasis on the use of Cat B by TDY travelers. And AMC has done some pretty good work to improve the quality of the flights. The increased visibility of the issue will help us fix the system.

Dr. Matthews: Cat B was a big topic at the last Customer Day. Do you feel like that's one of the successes of Customer Day?

Gen Smith: That's the kind of thing we want to learn from Customer Day. We want to be able to lay out problems as we see them and we want our customers, the Services in this case, to respond. And if they see where an improvement needs to be made to help us get back to where we need to be, then they offer those improvements for our consideration.

Dr. Matthews: I'd like to spend a minute talking about our liaison structure, our TRANSCOM troops assigned to the unified commands and the liaisons who are here at headquarters. As far as our liaisons at the Pentagon and unified commands, does that structure need any tweaking?

Gen Smith: Our liaison structure is good. If we get into a contingency environment, we need to augment the liaison office at the unified command where the activities are occurring. We just developed a plan to deploy a more robust LNO [Liaison Officer] element so that we'll have a round-the-clock capability if required.

Dr. Matthews: We have added another Army troop or two to the structure since you've been here.

Gen Smith: We've actually used an Army colonel at [US]ACOM [Atlantic Command] in lieu of what was an Air Force colonel.

Dr. Matthews: Have you seen any need to look again at making that structure more purple, less blue?

Gen Smith: No, it works well the way it is.

Dr. Matthews: How about the liaison officer structure here? We've added a couple since you've come on board. Why did we put DLA in here?

Gen Smith: DLA is a critical customer for us, in war and peacetime. They have some needs that are different from those of the warfighter on whom we had been focusing the most. It's good to have someone here who will be able to pass information forward to DLA. Someone here to pass DLA's concerns to us is equally important. It's good to have that open communication. It's easier to communicate with an LNO than it is to communicate telephonically between headquarters. I see all our LNOs as great facilitators.

Dr. Matthews: There's a new Navy group here, too.

Gen Smith: Navy Supply Group. The Navy wanted to put their folks here to help us help them move Navy supplies. It's working well.

Dr. Matthews: Are there any other liaison offices we should consider? We've looked in the past at having a State Department person on the staff.

Gen Smith: We have a very healthy relationship with our on-site LNOs, the national intelligence agencies, Defense Mapping Agency, MARAD [Maritime Administration], etc. I don't see the need for any others.

Plans and Policy

USTRANSCOM Strategic Plan and USLOGCOM

Dr. Matthews: Is our strategic plan on track?

Gen Smith: The strategic plan is on track. It's a well thought out plan. The real issue is going to be affordability. What we need to do to achieve the strategic plan is going to require a continued investment and smarter and better ways of doing business. The pressure we're under for keeping the cost of using the DTS down--don't pass on the costs of the TWCF [Transportation Working Capital Fund] to the customer unless it's absolutely essential--is going to cause us to make some tough decisions. I'm hoping we don't end up having to change the strategic plan because of resource constraints.

Dr. Matthews: Do you think the concept of a USLOGCOM [United States Logistics Command] is a dead issue now?

Gen Smith: Logistics involves supply and maintenance, transportation, contracting, acquisition, and procurement. I don't think that a

single organization could be designed and built to pull all of that together and do it more effectively than it is done today. The organizational structure we have today--a CINCTRANS, DLA, and the Services' materiel commands--I don't think there's a better possible arrangement. The question should be "what would you gain if you rolled DLA and TRANSCOM together?" You probably couldn't reduce manpower. We have good synergism now. We have tie-ins with automation feeds. We have systems coming on board that will give us joint total asset visibility. So what do you gain by giving the DOD a super logistician? I just don't see it being practical. You'd have a span of control like no other in the world. What's better? What improves? We have about the right organization today.

Future of Strategic Mobility Force

Dr. Matthews: What above all else worries you about our nation's future mobility capability? Please comment on sealift, air mobility, railroad, and port operations.

Gen Smith: For airlift, the follow-on to the C-5 is important. We really have to do the C-5 modernization. That program will pay great dividends. We need that capability. It's a solid airframe, it's just that the engines and avionics ain't that great. That's going to be a potentially big dollar program, but we need to commit to it. I also believe that we need more than 120 C-17s. We're already seeing decreased flexibility as a result of having a much larger number of C-141s go out of the inventory than C-17s coming in to replace them. We also have the [US]SOCOM [Special Operations Command] requirement for C-17s above and beyond the 120. We think we know the number for that mission, but we don't have it in the program.

For sealift, the biggest concern is continued commitment, staying power if you will, with the LMSRs [Large Medium-Speed Roll-On/Roll-Off ships]. We need to get that program completed because it is a key part of our single MRC [major regional contingency] lift capability. Secondly, we need a continuing strong commitment to the Ready Reserve Force. Several of the RRF ships in the next ten years are going to exceed their life expectancy, their usefulness. We are going to need to recapitalize. And I think I would vote to build small, fast ships as opposed to more large ships. We need to increase flexibility to get into underdeveloped ports all around the world that are denied to us today because of the size of the RRF ships and, particularly, the LMSRs. As an adjunct, we need to continue to focus on the JLOTS program. That's very critical. Even in a developed area, JLOTS gives us an awful lot of flexibility for sea-based operations. Needless to say, if we go into a damaged or underdeveloped area, JLOTS could be the only way to get ashore. We need a ready over-the-shore capability that is compatible with the Navy pieces and the Army pieces. We don't enjoy that today.

On the surface side, we should stop taking the trucking industry and the rail industry for granted. We need to make sure that MTMC and the Transportation Engineering Agency stay focused on changes to the strategic transportation network in the continental US which is critical to our ability to move out of the posts, camps, stations, and bases to the ports of debarkation, whether they be air or sea.

Dr. Matthews: Why is it important for TRANSCOM to form partnerships with commercial seaports?

Gen Smith: It's critical we maintain such partnerships because we have no general purpose ports today that are owned by the Department of Defense, given that both Oakland [California] and Bayonne [New Jersey] were identified for closing during the last BRAC [Base Realignment and Closure] Commission. We don't need to operate general purpose military ports on a day-to-day basis, but we do need assured access to commercial ports for outloading of unit equipment when we enter a fray. Today--through MARAD, MTMC, and MSC--we're able to develop a plan for use of certain ports as contingency ports. We don't pay for their maintenance on a day-to-day basis, but they're there when we need them for a crisis.

Dr. Matthews: The command's senior leadership has been working to build a VISA program for about ten years. I recall, during TRANSCOM's first year, General Cassidy [Air Force General Duane H., Retired, USTRANSCOM's first CINC] and Vice Admiral Herberger [Navy Vice Admiral Albert J., Retired, USTRANSCOM's first DCINC] would discuss the need for a CRAF-like program for sealift. Why has it taken so long to get VISA on the board?

Gen Smith: It's been a function of focus, of finally getting to the point where we saw the necessity of dedicating and readying the resources needed to bring a VISA-type program into being. The good offices of the National Defense Transportation Association have been of great help, too.

Dr. Matthews: What were the toughest issues, the biggest hurdles?

Gen Smith: To develop the program with a manageable risk to the commercial sealift sector, and a rate guide to ensure a fair return to commercial carriers for the use of their resources. I'd say those, combined

with the sizing of the Stages I, II, and III, were the big pieces. Rates will be very hard to determine.

Dr. Matthews: What dangers do we face in reaching full implementation of VISA?

Gen Smith: There's *so* much going on here. We have *so* many number one priorities that we just need to maintain our focus. We lost some momentum this summer. We're probably 90 days behind where we ought to be right now because of personnel turnover, a shifting of responsibilities in internal headquarters, and some changes within the components. As a result, there's a little bit of cloudiness and confusion. For example, the role between MSC and MTMC, as affected by the JTMO, needs to be worked through in regard to VISA. We have to get beyond that gray area and get focused again, finish up the rate guide working group activity, make sure we're satisfied with the size of Stages I, II, and III, and then put the contracts in place so industry is happy with what we have.

Dr. Matthews: What role did MARAD play in VISA?

Gen Smith: MARAD's been a key partner in VISA, of course. They've been an equal in terms of chairing the work groups. As a spin-off of VISA, we have a joint planning group called JPAG [Joint Planning Advisory Group]. It gives us a tremendous interface with the sealift industry.

Dr. Matthews: Our CRAF peacetime initiatives and incentives seemed to have secured our wartime alliance with the airline industry. Do you foresee any future problems with that alliance?

Gen Smith: Not unless there's some significant changes in economic development patterns around the world. I think all of the CRAF carriers see the benefit of the CRAF program to them. We certainly see the benefit of the CRAF program from a DOD perspective. The carriers are going to continue to change their commitment based on market-driven conditions and we just have to be sensitive to that.

Dr. Matthews: The command has worked hard since Desert Shield/Desert Storm on CRAF and VISA, the air and the sea side. Is it time to reassess the land equivalent, the Contingency Response Program or CORE?

Gen Smith: Yes. General Montero [Army Major General Mario "Monty" F. Jr., Commander, MTMC] is doing that. He is asking "What does it bring to the table, what does it give us, how does it empower us, how does it improve our relationship with industry?" I'm a little concerned about the munitions carriers. They offer a specialized service that's not common among the other general cargo carriers throughout the United States. And we need to think of a CRAF-like program potentially for the ammunition carriers so we can retain that specialized capability for a wartime surge. We need to move munitions safely and expeditiously in peace and war.

Dr. Matthews: Is afloat prepositioning managed as effectively and efficiently as possible, and should TRANSCOM become more involved in that management?

Gen Smith: We have it about right on afloat prepositioning management. MSC operates the vessels, and the unified command in which the ships are located makes the call on where they go, with, of course, the Chairman's concurrence. The only thing I'd be concerned about is any growth in the prepositioning force at the expense of surge

sealift capability. We need to make sure we maintain that surge capability in the RRF, that we don't get too many of those resources tied up in an expanded afloat prepositioning program.

JDTC and JOPES Training

Dr. Matthews: What role did you play in moving the Joint Deployment Training Center [JDTC] off dead center?

Gen Smith: I don't take credit for a lot on the Joint Deployment Training Center. Collectively the command did very well with that. My focus was on working the Service DCSLOGs. I tried to show them the need for the JDTC by highlighting to the Services, particularly to the Army DCSOPS [Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations], that we had some major inefficiencies associated with deployment. Whether it was a single move or a multiple move, we generally had problems. We simply need to invest in deployment training just some fraction of the amount of money we're spending to buy new airplanes and ships so we can really take advantage of those new platforms when needed. We have about a forty-billion dollar program out on the screen now--buying ships, airplanes, Army Strategic Mobility Program, Mobility Enhancement Funds--and we've given training lip service, but not much more.

Dr. Matthews: What's your confidence level that the JDTC will be a used and influential institution?

Gen Smith: I'm very confident that over time the Joint Deployment Training Center will pay for itself many times over through improved training at the executive level, the mid-manager level, and also at the operator level down at the bottom of the totem pole.

Dr. Matthews: And what do you think its greatest potential contributions will be?

Gen Smith: A much better trained force, in terms of ability to understand JOPES and to build TPFDDs, and ability to move the forces faster and decrease risk to our troops.

Dr. Matthews: One of the top five lessons learned from Desert Shield/Desert Storm is continued education and training in the use of the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System. Over the years, before and since the war in the Persian Gulf, we've heard frequent complaints that the system was not user-friendly. Do you think JOPES has improved its user friendliness?

Gen Smith: There have been some slight improvements made in system friendliness. There's a mentality out in the field that JOPES is impossible. But JOPES is not impossible. JOPES is difficult; JOPES is challenging. Effective use of JOPES requires good training. And all too often, I believe, having been out there myself, we train too few people in JOPES and then when we need to use JOPES for real, we have too few trained people. The system users tend to relegate JOPES duties to a couple of people considered specialists and then when we need them, they may not always be there.

Dr. Matthews: It seems to me TRANSCOM has done everything it can to provide the training if the user wants it.

Gen Smith: We've gone well beyond the minimum essential level of activity to let people know that we have a training capability. We're willing to train. We do train. It's just a nurturing of the trained personnel in the field, I think, that needs more attention.

Dr. Matthews: And the plan is to align the JOPES Training Office with the JDTC?

Gen Smith: That is the plan.

NDTA, Future of OSA, and Worldwide Express

Dr. Matthews: What has our relationship with NDTA [National Defense Transportation Association] produced for the Defense Transportation System in the last couple of years?

Gen Smith: NDTA, from my perspective, offers us a capability that we cannot afford to buy. NDTA brings to the table a partnership with industry, all quadrants--airlift, sealift, surface, technology--and gives us a tremendous amount of synergism through that relationship. The Technology Committee is one example. It helps us stay abreast of technical advancements that affect transportation. The three modal committees--Airlift, Sealift, and Surface--promote a healthy relationship between our commercial partners and TRANSCOM. So I see the NDTA bringing a tremendous amount of talent, capability, and leveraging to the Department of Defense that would otherwise not be affordable in today's resource-constrained environment.

Dr. Matthews: Is its committee organization right? Are there any other committees they should add? They added the Passenger Services.

Gen Smith: There's always the potential to add more, but I think we have the big bases covered with the focus on transportation modes. The sub-committee approach might be the way to go if we decide we need to expand.

Dr. Matthews: What has the Transportation Advisory Board accomplished?

Gen Smith: It has helped the CINC look out into the future to identify what strategic changes are coming over the horizon that will enable him to make those slight adjustments in where we are going with the strategic plan. In other words, the Transportation Advisory Board has given the CINC its view of the future. They have more flexibility than we have in terms of what they pursue business-

wise. They have a better feel for the international commercial environment than we have, how it's going to impact the civil sector, and in turn how it might impact the DTS.

Dr. Matthews: Is it organized properly? Is the representation correct?

Gen Smith: I think so. There's been a tendency to rotate the representatives and to keep it a small body. Jeff [C.] Crowe [Chairman of NDTA and CEO, Landstar System, Inc.] has done a fine job of leading the group in terms of providing thoughts, ideas, what's really happening out there that CINCTRANS can benefit from. Oh, by the way, it gives CINCTRANS an opportunity to talk to that group about where he's headed. Given their view of the future, they can tell the CINC he's headed in the right direction, or tell him he's off on a tangent.

Dr. Matthews: There was a proposal referenced in a recent CINCTRANS Update to give CONUS OSA COCOM [combatant command] to a single CINC. Can you give me some background on that proposal?

Gen Smith: There's been a decision to downsize OSA, the operational support airlift required to support a major contingency. We've proven the merit of centralized scheduling. From a training perspective, the OSA fleet is now more efficient. Crews are going to fly to maintain efficiency and a single agency does a better job of scheduling those training missions against actual movement type missions, thus achieving the training mission yet saving money for some traveler who would otherwise spend it on commercial airfare. As we've gotten smarter about the joint training, single point scheduling, we've also recognized that there's merit in having a single manager from a COCOM perspective. Today there are several unified commands that have COCOM and we just think

greater efficiency can be achieved if there is a single manager. And it's not TRANSCOM's position that this should be TRANSCOM because it could easily be ACOM. It's just that we believe there should be a single manager from a COCOM perspective to take the OSA the last mile in maximizing efficiency on a day-to-day basis.

Dr. Matthews: So we could still have all three Services flying?

Gen Smith: Sure, it would still be a joint organization. The assets would belong to the Services, different aviators, different Services flying them. It would really be invisible to the users.

Dr. Matthews: Has TRANSCOM looked seriously about the possibility of moving OSA scheduling over to AMC?

Gen Smith: We've looked at that recently only because we're under pressure to reduce the number of joint billets. And there's the potential that if OSA moves over to AMC, if the Air Force would take it, that we could take those sixty people in JOSAC off the joint roll. That would be the only merit we would see in such a move. If the Joint Staff is interested in this, the Joint Staff ought to work it with the Services.

Dr. Matthews: In regard to Worldwide Express procurement strategy, AMC insists on only one carrier award per region. Why?

Gen Smith: One the one hand, AMC sees that the service they're looking for, the service they think the customer needs, would be adequate with a single carrier. On the other hand, DLA is very concerned with having all the eggs in one basket. In reality, given what just went on with the UPS [United Parcel Service] strike, we certainly ought to consider more than one carrier per region.

Dr. Matthews: Where's that issue right now?

Gen Smith: We're meeting with the Services and unified commands the 27th of this month [August], to cover with them the Worldwide Express solicitation as we envision it and to get their feedback. We'll see how concerned they really are about this single carrier per region idea.

Systems

J6 Organization

Dr. Matthews: A month or so ago you met with our J6, General Kelley [Air Force Brigadier General Stephen E.] to discuss the directorate's optimum size and structure. General Kelley also mentioned in staff meeting that he was sending up to you his J6 evolution plan. What did you decide about J6's future?

Gen Smith: J6 is here to stay in terms of a directorate. The number of people they require, given the functions they have, is questionable in light of possible outsourcing. We have a DISA Megacenter that's being stood up in this part of the country. There's the potential to take functions out of J6 and outsource them to DISA. We also looked at supervisor-to-supervised ratio. There are wants and there are needs. We need to make sure all the directorates have what they need, not necessarily what they want.

GCCS, GTN, and TRAC²ES

Dr. Matthews: What's your confidence level with GCCS [Global Command and Control System]?

Gen Smith: It offers an awful lot of promise. It's a significant improvement over WWMCCS [Worldwide Military Command and Control System]. Like most every other system, it's evolving. Although there's a road map, I don't think we'll ever finish the journey. GCCS will be a continuing journey with improved capability and enhancements.

Dr. Matthews: We have GTN operational capability now. What has its contribution been to operations?

Gen Smith: Global Transportation Network is our premier command and control system. It's given us a tremendous amount of capability in terms of maintaining visibility of what's moving, whether it be cargo or passengers, whether it's sealift or airlift. Of course, the output is only as good as that input. It offers a tremendous amount of promise as a command and control system.

Dr. Matthews: How did it improve the redeployment from Bosnia-Herzegovina?

Gen Smith: It accurately reflected passengers and cargo to be moved. Then we were able to actually watch the moves and make changes as appropriate. It gave us an accurate visibility over requirements. There's incredible power in GTN.

Dr. Matthews: Are the commercial partners coming on board to share their information with us?

Gen Smith: Yes. We're in a very enviable position now, where we can help the commercial partners shape their feed systems, the interfaces we need to build between their systems and what we need from a command and control perspective.

Dr. Matthews: At staff meeting last March, the CINC asked General Kelley how much money we had spent on GTN to date and how much can we

expect to spend on GTN in the future. When you saw those answers, were you surprised?

Gen Smith: No. Technology is expensive. We actually put a very small percentage of our annual expenditure into automation compared to what the major commercial transportation partners invest in their systems. For example, Fed Ex President Fred Smith stated that his corporation rolls between a half-billion and a billion dollars into automation and improvement annually. We don't put anywhere near that amount of money into our system, GTN. Some would argue that we need an even greater level of detail in terms of what is moving through the system than what Fed Ex needs. So he makes us question whether we're putting enough money into automation, if we're putting enough resources against it. We've given the issue a lot of thought. The real question is "are we putting our money where our mouth and minds are" and I'm not sure we're doing that. One reason we're not doing that is because an increase in expenditure passes an increased rate onto the customer. And we're very sensitive about increasing customers' rates.

Dr. Matthews: TRAC²ES [TRANSCOM Regulating And Command and Control Evacuation System] is a GTN module. The command's put a lot of energy into developing that system. Is there still strong support in the Department of Defense for TRAC²ES?

Gen Smith: Yes. TRAC²ES has very strong support because the medical community sees the need for the ability to regulate evacuation flow during a contingency. TRAC²ES will hopefully minimize losses to our most precious resources--our people. As a matter of fact, we've expanded TRAC²ES oversight. DOD Health Affairs has now taken the lead. They're not only supportive, they're

enthusiastic about the program and have taken on the funding responsibility. That works in our favor because they, in effect, underwrite the costs of the system that we need in peacetime and wartime.

Dr. Matthews: Did General Jernigan [Air Force Brigadier General John G., former Command Surgeon] give you an end of tour report?

Gen Smith: He did. Basically he felt very good about what he had contributed. He was especially pleased with the progress his people had made on TRAC²ES. The program has been firmed up considerably in the last year. I receive a monthly IPR on TRAC²ES. I had IPR Number 11 yesterday. It reflected a very healthy program. General Jernigan has every reason to be proud of TRAC²ES because he helped get the program where it is today. In his new job out in Texas [Commander, Human Systems Center, Brooks AFB, Texas], he will continue to have an impact on TRAC²ES. He will continue to promote it and make it an success.

Systems Migration and Future of the JTCC

Dr. Matthews: You have previously commented on the important contributions made by the JTCC. Let's discuss the systems migration, and then perhaps you can come up with some others that you consider primary contributions of the organization.

Gen Smith: JTCC exercises responsible oversight of transportation-related systems with the goal of reducing them to the smallest possible number required to do the job. JTCC reviewed well over 130 systems and has determined that about 23 or 24 will be retained. That's resulted in a tremendous amount of cost avoidance. For example, we've saved millions of dollars that would have been required to maintain those systems over time. We'll maintain the

required capability, but with far fewer automated systems. That system migration initiative is pretty much completed. It's now just housekeeping and oversight, keeping the systems on track, and meeting the timelines we envisioned to have everything ready as planned.

We've now focused the JTCC on process improvements. Their transportation functional process mapping has helped us determine the "as is" and the "to be." "To be's" have given us improved efficiency at a potentially lower cost. We're excited about the work that's been done. We're excited about the work that continues to be done. There'll be a place for that organization for a couple more years, and then we should look at moving JTCC functions over to our J3/J4, possibly aligning it with the Business Center.

Dr. Matthews: Will the CIM [Corporate Information Management] process allow it to exist that long?

Gen Smith: I think so. It's a function of getting some OSD funding support. Much of what the JTCC is doing is for OSD, and OSD is not funding that work. If they're going to exist for OSD, then OSD ought to pay their fair share for keeping it up.

Dr. Matthews: Do you have any idea whether the other CIM centers have had such great success?

Gen Smith: No, I don't. I would think that if they had, we would have heard about it. We haven't heard about it. Anyway, they're not communicating to others their successes. We tout every one of our successes.

Dr. Matthews: You commented at a JTCC IPR a few weeks back that you believe the Services would eventually give TRANSCOM all the transportation systems to manage. What makes you think this will happen?

Gen Smith: Over time DTS users and providers will find that as we develop fewer systems, the oversight of deployment systems should reside out here. We manage the DTS, so there's the potential that we could get oversight responsibility. I'm not advocating that we do. I just think we could do it better than anyone else.

Video Teleconferencing and Posture for the New Millenium

Dr. Matthews: Use of teleconferencing at TRANSCOM increased dramatically on your watch. Why?

Gen Smith: We've learned that we can do a lot more with teleconferencing than we can with trips. We have a lot of number one priorities. We have a lot of hot things working here. A trip to Washington typically costs you about a day and a half. If you have an early meeting in D.C., you have to leave the day before and you don't get back usually until the afternoon of the day of the meeting, whereas teleconferencing enables us to do the meeting in an hour or two hours, in some cases less time, and there's no travel involved. It's economical from a money perspective. It's certainly economical from a time management perspective.

Dr. Matthews: Is the system's capability equal to the task? Does it do what it needs to do?

Gen Smith: We have a technical glitch every now and again, but by and large we have about what we need.

Dr. Matthews: Would you like to see the capability expanded anywhere else in TRANSCOM or our partners in the DTS?

Gen Smith: No. Everyone we need to talk to has that capability. The challenge for the future will getting a screen that lets us see all the components at once. Now we're seeing only one component at a time.

Dr. Matthews: Is the DTS C4S [Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems] postured for the new millennium?

Gen Smith: I think so. We've spent considerable time preparing to operate beyond the year 2000. I feel pretty comfortable we've identified our requirements, that we know what the resource bill is, and that we're programming for that resource expenditure.

Budget

SES in J8 and USTRANSCOM Budget

Dr. Matthews: Did we decide we don't need an SES in J8?

Gen Smith: We haven't decided that yet. We saw a need to stand up the Business Center, and we needed an SES to do it. It was convenient to move Mr. Weber [Frank P., Deputy Director for Logistics and Business Operations] over there and he was interested in making a career change. He'd been in J5 [as Deputy Director, Plans and Policy Directorate] for quite awhile. So we moved him over. Then, in effect, we got the Air Force to recognize our dormant [J8] SES billet, put it in as the deputy J5, and proceeded to fill it. I do worry about the long term continuity in J8. We have some really good civilian personnel down there, but there's no guarantee they'll stay here forever. Personally I feel the need for continuity in J8 warrants a civilian director. And I also believe the level of responsibility of that director justifies an SES. I would like to see us put an SES resource against that.

Dr. Matthews: Is J1 working on getting that accomplished?

Gen Smith: That's the kind of thing the CINC will continue to evaluate. My personal thought is it would be appropriate to go ahead and get a position validated. We have a new fella who just came in to be the J8 [Navy Captain Michael T. Rader]. He's getting up to speed nicely, so I'm not saying bring an SES on board because we have a problem. We need to bring it on board to give us some long term continuity. It would be very healthy. Also, I see that when we're talking resource management matters with AMC, we're talking to a brigadier general. When we're dealing with MSC, we're talking

to an SES. When we're dealing with MTMC, we're talking to a senior colonel.

Dr. Matthews: What did Captain Rachor [Navy Captain Robert L. Rachor, Jr., former Director, Program Analysis and Financial Management Directorate] tell you in his end of tour report?

Gen Smith: Captain Rachor was most pleased with the impact that he and his people have had on streamlining in the DTS, the reduction of the costs. He felt very good about that, and he should have. He and his people did super work as part of the streamlining team. He expressed his pleasure at the very positive relationships his folks built and nurtured with the Department of Defense and the Joint Staff. It's critical to have good relationships with those people. He also felt that what the directors were doing here in terms of budget, their requirements, was about right. He felt good about the fact that we were using our resources wisely.

Dr. Matthews: How can we improve the way we budget for the headquarters?

Gen Smith: We have budgeting for the headquarters down pat. The headquarters is paid for via the costs that are passed onto components. So we're very sensitive about the size of the headquarters and any increasing cost. Annual inflation is around two percent as a minimum, so we're going to have some cost growth. I don't know if there's a better mechanism to pay for the headquarters or not. The thing we have to do is communicate how we're actually decreasing costs, even though we don't show a downward turn in rates necessarily. We aren't increasing costs, we're passing on a lesser bill to the Services than they would otherwise be receiving.

Rapport With Congress and TWCF

Dr. Matthews: What have we done right and what more should we do to improve our rapport with Congress?

Gen Smith: The biggest challenge is to keep up the dialogue. We need to keep discussing with Congress the needs of the Defense Transportation System, the capability within TRANSCOM, what we need versus what we have, and continue to show them we truly are a good shepherd of the taxpayers' money. It's the old dictum "communicate, communicate, communicate." Our communication with Congress is critical in part because so few in it have served in the military or understand the military.

Dr. Matthews: On your watch we've had a couple of TRANSCOM Days for congressional staffers. Do you consider them a success?

Gen Smith: Absolutely. Anytime you can get people in to talk about issues, particularly things that concern them, then you're going to "make money." We've "made money" in every case.

Dr. Matthews: We have these congressional staffers come in and ride on the C-17, walk around an FSS.

Gen Smith: Staffers benefit immensely and so do we. As a matter fact, today we had a permanent staffer and one intern staffer who's on loan from the Department of Defense in to visit. This young man and young lady learned an awful lot about the Defense Transportation System and about the positive stewardship of resources out here, information they otherwise would never have received. And they'll be able to go back and influence some very important actions for us.

Dr. Matthews: What have been our biggest problems with TWCF and how have we dealt with them?

Gen Smith: The biggest problem is the way it was set up. Workloads are forecasted based on givens. There's no flexibility built in for contingency costs.

Dr. Matthews: What can we do to improve the working relationships with our TCCs in regard to TWCF?

Gen Smith: Just make sure they understand what drives their costs and in turn influences their rates. The monthly cost drivers meetings with the components are being chaired by the CINC. Those get-togethers have taken us a long way toward learning what we need to know about what truly influences, impacts, and drives costs.

Dr. Matthews: Are our customers involved in those meetings on cost drivers?

Gen Smith: The customers are not involved in the cost drivers briefings. They are the beneficiaries of what we identify as improvements.

Dr. Matthews: Is there more that we could do to educate our customers and senior military and civilian DOD officials in the operation of the TWCF?

Gen Smith: We can certainly do more. We need to continue to use every forum to talk up the good things we have going on. But it's really a function of how much time we have to use all venues available.

Dr. Matthews: How can we make a seventy to ninety million dollar reduction in TCWF by 2003?

Gen Smith: By taking down manpower. Right now we're on a glide slope, a very deliberate glide slope, in terms of downsizing. Each of the components have made reductions. Some are making more, percentage-wise, than others. We can lower the cost of using the DTS as a result of process improvements. These are several things we can do and are doing.

Contract Review Board and Household Goods

Dr. Matthews: Several months ago you approved the establishment of the Contract Review Board. Why, and what has it accomplished?

Gen Smith: We needed the Contract Review Board to oversee the command's contracting initiatives. I was getting a monthly review of contracts and I was concerned that we were committing too much money to the first month of the contracts. In some cases we had made a total commitment against the contract in the first month of the new fiscal year. I wanted to make sure we weren't caught up in a "this is the way we've always done it" routine, or that our contracting officer representatives lacked the backbone to speak up and say "I don't need that amount of money" or "I don't need that amount of service in the future." So the Contract Review Board will help us get our money's worth from our contracting arrangements.

Dr. Matthews: One of the big issues we dealt with during your time here was the movement of household goods. Why is a warfighting CINC so deeply involved in what a few years back we thought were the nuts and bolts of a component command?

Gen Smith: It's a program intended to improve the service member's quality of life, so there's been a lot of congressional interest generated in the issue, particularly the MTMC pilot program. MTMC was not making significant progress on the program, because of industry's resistance over what they weren't sure about or what they didn't like about the program. It has taken a tremendous amount of MTMC's time, resources, and focus to keep the program on track. The CINC became engaged in order to put more leverage behind the program. There are significant improvements that can be achieved. We need to stay the course, and we will.

Direct Reporting Elements and Defense Courier Service

Dr. Matthews: We have the Facilities function under the First Sergeant. How does that arrangement work?

Gen Smith: It's worked reasonably well. We have three in-house employees who look out for our facility maintenance. We should seriously consider having the base take over facility management for us. We could pare that workforce down a person or two.

Dr. Matthews: Why did you realign IM [Office of Information Management]?

Gen Smith: By bringing that organization together with another one, we could save a space or two. In today's environment, every space we can conserve is critical. I've been pleased with the outcome on that.

Dr. Matthews: Why did you decide to move it to J1 rather than J6, which you also had looked at?

Gen Smith: The J6 wasn't overly enthusiastic about taking on IM, and I thought the synergism between IM and J1 would be greater. Additionally, we were looking at downsizing J6 through outsourcing.

Dr. Matthews: We are driving a major downsizing of the Defense Courier Service [DCS]. Why?

Gen Smith: The Defense Courier Service is a very important organization. It transports goods not just for the Department of Defense, but for the State Department and the national intelligence agencies. However, DCS had an infrastructure around the world that was simply too large. Recent DCS commanders have seen the opportunity to downsize and to eliminate unnecessary capacity. We've helped

them to that. The billets have gone back to the Services. The Services, in turn, have been very appreciative.

Dr. Matthews: Should DCS report someplace other than TRANSCOM?

Gen Smith: With today's pressure to downsize joint billets, I can see an advantage in putting it under one of our components. Up until about three years ago it belonged to Air Mobility Command. There's the potential for it to go back under Air Mobility Command and come off the joint rolls as a joint activity. There's also the potential to outsource some of the DCS mission. We're actively exploring that possibility, but I don't think we'll do away with DCS.

Conclusion

Dr. Matthews: Which of your accomplishments at TRANSCOM are you most proud of and why?

Gen Smith: Encouraging our people to give every tasking their best shot, and recognizing them for their initiative. We have an outstanding work force, military and civilian. I'm proud of everything they've accomplished, but process mapping and process flow improvement are standouts. I've seen a significant improvement in the quality of paperwork that moves through here and out of here. I've seen the DTS mature considerably in the last two years. We may never get to our destination, which is a perfect DTS, but we're certainly pursuing it, given our resources. I feel very good about folks who have left the command to go on to bigger and better things. We attract good people. We treat them with dignity and respect. They contribute and they leave here feeling good about themselves.

Dr. Matthews: While at TRANSCOM what was your toughest task and why?

Gen Smith: My toughest task was probably streamlining and reengineering because there's so much organizational resistance to change. We also had to make some significant reductions in MTMC. Having formerly been a commander of MTMC Eastern Area, that was tough. I have really taken pride in thinking and acting "purple," not looking out primarily for the interests of the Army, but for the best interests of the command and the joint community as a whole.

Dr. Matthews: If you had had more time, money, and people at TRANSCOM, what else would you have liked to have completed?

Gen Smith: The TRANSCOM warfighter program. I had envisioned pulling together a team made up of TRANSCOM representatives and our components who would go out and brief the Services and unified commands on what our capabilities consist of, how we use GTN, how we're going to get them to the next fight. I would have liked to have major customers meet the component commanders, our port managers, the likely Directors of Mobility Forces they'll work with in the next contingency. That would be a great marketing tool. It's just not getting off the ground.

Dr. Matthews: Who's the OPR [Office of Primary Responsibility] for that?

Gen Smith: J3/J4.

Dr. Matthews: A type of mobile, traveling education team?

Gen Smith: Yes, and ideally it would visit every Marine Corps and Army division once a year, and it would head off a lot of problems. Remember, as I mentioned before, every one of our deployments have been problem-ridden. If we do a better job training people, we'll minimize the number of problems we have in deployment, whether it's a small or large scale activity.

Dr. Matthews: What are TRANSCOM's greatest weaknesses and its greatest strengths?

Gen Smith: The greatest potential weakness is trying to take on too much given the small size of the staff. This is a very small headquarters. We're the smallest of the unified commands in terms of headquarters. We have a large number of important projects to accomplish in support of our strategic plan, so we really need to pace ourselves.

Its greatest strengths are its people--their ability to react quickly to the short notice-type activities--and the synergism, the partnership with commercial industry.

Dr. Matthews: Are you going to give your successor, Lieutenant General Thompson any special words of advice?

Gen Smith: I'm simply making him aware of what he's in for. Over the years I've changed command with people who went the extra mile to make sure I was as prepared as possible to take the reins. I intend to do the same for General Thompson. I want to enable him to take good care of the troops I'm leaving behind.

Dr. Matthews: What is your heartfelt assessment of this assignment?

Gen Smith: It is one of the most gratifying I've ever had. The people made it that way. There are a small number of people in this headquarters, but their work ethic--civilian and military--is the best I've seen anywhere. I'm proud to have been part of this organization. We truly make a difference. There's no doubt in my mind that TRANSCOM can deliver the forces when they're needed and where they're needed. It's just a function of the National Command Authorities making decisions early so we can get to our

reserve components. We're so dependent upon reserve partners, the Total Force, military and commercial.

Dr. Matthews: You wanted to make an addendum to the CINC dual-hat issue.

Gen Smith: I talked earlier about the dual-hatting. As I recall, my comment was I'd really like to see a Service other than the Air Force have the CINC's job just to see how well it would work. There is another point I would like to drive home. Commanding the Air Mobility Command is a full-time job, day-in and day-out. Air Mobility Command deserves full time leadership. I worked for two very able CINCs. I can't imagine anybody being able to do a better job in a dual-hat role than Generals Rutherford and Kross. Still, I believe it is unfair to the commander, AMC, to have him dual-hatted given the tremendous amount of responsibility that's on the Air Force side.

Dr. Matthews: Is there anything else you'd like to discuss for the record?

Gen Smith: Only to say that for me it's been a great ride. I really feel honored and blessed to be able to go out, after 35 years of service, as Deputy Commander in Chief, USTRANSCOM. TRANSCOM is a highly respected organization. Everyone knows, when it gets down to the bottom line, they can't get there without us. I just hope that over time there's a better appreciation developed among the unified commands on the need to bring us in early in the planning process.

Biography

Lieutenant General Hubert G. Smith was born in Cosby, Tennessee. He was commissioned as a second lieutenant in August 1962 after completing the Reserve Officers Training Course curriculum and his Industrial Arts studies at East Tennessee State University. He obtained his masters degree in Logistics Management from the Florida Institute of Technology. His military education includes the Armor Officer Basic Course, Transportation Officer Advanced Course, United States Army Command and General Staff College, Logistics Executive Development Course, and the Naval War College.

He has served in a variety of key command and staff positions, to include: Commanding General 21st Theater Army Area Command, United States Army Europe and Seventh Army; Director of Transportation, Energy and Troop Support, Headquarters Department of the Army; Commander, Military Traffic Management Command, Eastern Area, Bayonne, New Jersey; a joint assignment as Logistics Officer, US Mission to North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Brussels, Belgium; Commander, 101st Airborne Division Support Command; Commander, 29th Transportation Battalion and Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4 (Logistics), 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), Fort Campbell, Kentucky; Executive Officer, 181st Transportation Battalion, V Corps, US Army Europe; Chief, United States Army Maintenance Activity, US Army Thailand; Commander, D Company, 3d Aircraft Maintenance Battalion, Fort Steward, Georgia; and Commander, Service Platoon, 57th Assault Helicopter Company, US Army Vietnam.

General Smith's awards and decorations include: Defense Distinguished Service Medal, Army Distinguished Service Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster), Defense Superior Service Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster), Legion of Merit, Bronze Star Medal with "V" Device (with two Oak Leaf Clusters), Purple Heart (with Oak Leaf Cluster), Meritorious Service Medal (with three Oak Leaf Clusters), nine Air Medals, Army Commendation Medal, Army Aviator Badge, Air Assault Badge, and Gold Cross of Honor of the Federal Armed Forces of Germany. He is authorized to wear the Secretary of Defense Identification Badge and the Army Staff Identification Badge.

General Smith and his wife, Nancy, have two children: Todd and Laura, both officers in the Army Reserve.

Glossary

AAFES	Army and Air Force Exchange Service
ACTD	Advanced Concept Technologies Demonstration
AFB	Air Force Base
AMC	Air Mobility Command
AOR	area of responsibility
BRAC	Base Realignment and Closure
C4S	Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems
CADS	Containerized Ammunition Distribution System
CB	chemical/biological weapons
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CIM	Corporate Information Management
CINC	Commander in Chief
COCOM	combatant command
CONUS	continental United States
CORE	Contingency Response Program
CRAF	Civil Reserve Air Fleet
DCINC	Deputy Commander in Chief
DCS	Defense Courier Service
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
DIRMOBFOR	Director of Mobility Forces
DISA	Defense Information Systems Agency
DOD	Department of Defense
DPSAG	Deployment Planning Special Action Group
DCSLOG	Deputy Chief of Staff, Logistics (Army)
DCSOPS	Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations (Army)
DeCA	Defense Commissary Agency
DLA	Defense Logistics Agency
DTS	Defense Transportation System
FSS	Fast Sealift Ship
GAO	General Accounting Office
GCCS	Global Command and Control System
GPMRC	Global Patient Medical Regulating Center
GTN	Global Transportation Network

IFOR	Implementation Force
IG	Inspector General
IM	Office of Information Management
IMA	Individual Manpower Augmentee
IPR	In-Process Review
J1	Manpower, Personnel, Quality, and Information Management Directorate
J2	Intelligence Directorate
J3/J4	Operations and Logistics Directorate
J5	Plans and Policy Directorate
J6	Command, Control, Communications and Computer Systems Directorate
J8	Program Analysis and Financial Management Directorate
JA	Office of Chief Counsel
JDTC	Joint Deployment Training Center
JICTRANS	Joint Intelligence Center-Transportation
JLOTS	Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore
JMCG	Joint Mobility Control Group
JOPEs	Joint Operation Planning and Execution System
JOSAC	Joint Operational Support Airlift Center
JPAG	Joint Planning Advisory Group
JS/J4	Joint Staff Logistics Directorate
JTAV	Joint Total Asset Visibility
JTCC	Joint Transportation Corporate Information Management (CIM) Center
JTMO	Joint Transportation Movement Office
JTRU	Joint Transportation Reserve Unit
LAN	local area network
LMSR	Large Medium-Speed Roll-On/Roll-Off
LNO	Liaison Officer
MARAD	Maritime Administration
MCC	Mobility Control Center
MOG	maximum on ground
MRC	major regional contingency
MSC	Military Sealift Command
MTMC	Military Traffic Management Command
MTW	major theater war
NCO	non-commissioned officer
NDTA	National Defense Transportation Association
NSA	National Security Agency

OPCON	operational control
OPR	Office of Primary Responsibility
OSA	Operational Support Airlift
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
PBO	Performance-Based Organization
QDR	Quadrennial Defense Review
RRF	Ready Reserve Force
SACEUR	Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
SCUD	surface-to-surface missile
SECDEF	Secretary of Defense
SES	Senior Executive Service
STACS	Suspense Tracking Application for the Command Staff (USTRANSCOM)
STACS	Standard Theater Command and Control System (Army)
TAACOM	Theater Army Area Command
TCC	Transportation Component Command
TCWF	Transportation Capital Working Fund
TPFDD	Time Phased Force Deployment Data
TRAC ² ES	TRANSCOM Regulating and Command and Control Evacuation System
TDY	temporary duty
UPS	United Parcel Service
USACOM	United States Atlantic Command
USAFE	United States Air Forces Europe
USAREUR	United States Army Europe
USCINCEUR	Commander in Chief, USEUCOM
USCINCTRANS	Commander in Chief, USTRANSCOM
USEUCOM	United States European Command
USLOGCOM	United States Logistics Command
USPACOM	United States Pacific Command
USSOCOM	United States Special Operations Command
USTRANSCOM	United States Transportation Command
VISA	Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement
WWMCCS	Worldwide Military Command and Control System

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