

Lieutenant General Daniel G. Brown, USA
Deputy Commander in Chief
United States Transportation Command
(September 1999 to September 2002)

AN ORAL HISTORY

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Preface

Dr. James K. Matthews interviewed Lieutenant General Daniel G. Brown in four separate sessions from April to August 2002. This oral history covers a range of issues on the workings of this command, including the reasons behind the most comprehensive reorganization of the command since 1994, deployment for the war in Afghanistan (Operation Enduring Freedom), and partnering with the Defense Logistics Agency. General Brown's answers are candid, illuminating, and reveal his in-depth knowledge of the distribution and deployment issues facing the command. His oral history will be of great interest and use to government and business decision makers, in general, and to defense transportation operators and planners, in particular.

At the end of September 2003, Dr. Matthews retired after twenty-three and a half years of government service while this oral history was in the first stage of editing. Dr. Jay H. Smith, Dr. Matthews' successor, oversaw the editing, finishing touches, and publishing of this oral history. Margaret J. Nigra, staff historian, transcribed and edited the interview and prepared the footnotes, table of contents, biography, glossary, and index.



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Introduction

The Many Ways to Say “Logistics”

Dr. Matthews: You gave a briefing in the Seay Auditorium on how the Services use their particular terminology to describe logistics. I wish I had taped it. Would you give it to us one more time?

Gen Brown: I began by suggesting that our national strategies are intertwined, and while our nation does not have a single national strategy, we certainly have national priorities. The nation’s priorities help shape our national military strategy, which in turn drives military programs such as force structure, procurement, training, and logistics. For example, the trade-off between spending our nation’s resources on social programs, rebuilding infrastructure, or spending it on defense is a debate that occurs every four years during a presidential election. We voice our priorities by electing a President who then appoints a Secretary of Defense to implement the nation’s defense priorities. While obviously not that simple, the allocation of our nation’s resources and the political will to use the military have a lot to do with the type of military we build and sustain.

Just as we elect a President every four years, we also conduct a major review every four years of our national military strategy--we apply that strategy within the Quadrennial Defense Review [QDR]. There is a running debate whether the QDR strategy is based on actual threats to our nation or is more practically based on the fiscal realities of our ability to pay for a military that can respond to all of the threats. The answer is that both threat-based requirements and fiscal realities enter into the development of a new military strategy.

I was trying to lay a foundation for discussions that followed on defense transformation. From a practical perspective, I believe that by changing doctrine, force structure, training, and investing in technological enablers--in our case, things like ships, trains, planes and information technology [IT]--we gain the means to execute our portion of the new and emerging military strategy. I'll try to briefly walk you through the train of thought. First, we execute and institutionalize our military strategy by defining it in doctrine. Our doctrine is still evolving, but for several years we have been laying the ground work in a publication called "Joint Vision 2020." Joint Vision 2020 has four tenets that describe the type of military and capabilities we want to have in fifteen years.¹ Two of the four tenets are key to accomplishing the USTRANSCOM [United States Transportation Command] mission. The first tenet is called "dominant maneuver," and the second is called "focused logistics."

Each Service has its own version of dominant maneuver. The Army calls its version "strategic dominant maneuver." The Navy and the Marine Corps call their version "operational maneuver from the sea." The Air Force describes their version through the application of their "Air and Space Expeditionary Forces," or AEF. All Service versions require the delivery of forces significantly faster in the future to achieve the two primary missions of the national military strategy; that is, deterrence, or if deterrence fails, to win our nation's wars. In effect, there's a direct relationship between how fast our forces deploy in the future and their relevancy for the new millennium. The transformation implications for TRANSCOM are obvious since we play such a major role in deployment.

¹ The four tenets of Joint Vision 2020 are dominant maneuver, precision engagement, focused logistics, and full dimensional protection.

The second tenet of Joint Vision 2020, focused logistics, also has Service-unique terminology. In the end, all of the Service concepts are forms of “just-in-time” logistics, although use of those three words is not acceptable in the military. Apparently some think that phrase connotes high risk. We instead use the term focused logistics to describe the same thing. And the primary way we measure focused logistics is by measuring time-definite delivery; that is, we measure the time it takes a customer to receive an item after it is requested. The concept of focused logistics accounts for the fact that the mountains of supply no longer exist and, in fact, have decreased by over 50 percent in the last ten years. We’ve therefore transitioned from having large mountains of supplies to having a time-definite delivery system that attempts to deliver supplies within the time of prescribed need. The Army calls their version of focused logistics “velocity management” and the Navy calls their version “high yield logistics.” The Marine Corps uses the phrase “precision logistics” and the Air Force refers to “agile logistics.” They’re versions of the same time-definite delivery concept.

So, if you look at the concept of dominant maneuver, which is centered on combat units, and the concept of focused logistics, which supports combat units, you may ask what the common thread is. The answer is that they both have to deliver their primary commodities--forces for combat units and supplies for logistic units--faster. Combat units can no longer draw from mountains of supplies that are immediately to their rear as they have done in the past. They must now depend on a seamless distribution pipeline that goes from end-to-end or strategic-to-tactical levels, and they have to be able to integrate and use that supply chain to fight their war. Combat units must now be able to

deploy strategically, operationally throughput,² and tactically fight simultaneously rather than sequentially. That leads to the conclusion that there must be one single distribution pipeline that goes end-to-end, and that there are three things that move through that pipeline: military units, replacement personnel, and supplies. Now, when units move through the distribution pipeline, we call it force projection. And when supplies move through the pipeline, we call it sustainment.

Forces and supplies deploying through the pipeline use the same ships, planes, bandwidth, communications, host nation support, terrain management, force protection, and base cluster defense. In effect, they all compete for the same finite resources, and all of the resources need to be prioritized. Unfortunately, we don't build war plans and TPFDDs [Time-Phased Force Deployment Data] that force competition for resources to the same degree that exists during wartime. The understanding of this basic fact has shaped my thinking for the entire time I've been at TRANSCOM. I believe that you have to integrate wholesale supply and strategic transportation, because if the warfighter cannot draw on mountains of supply, then you must have an efficient and effective distribution system to execute our new military strategy. You have to substitute velocity--speed of delivery--for mountains of supply. These concepts and many others will support our new national military strategy.

Dr. Matthews: Shortly after you got here, you went to the UK [United Kingdom] to give a speech to NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] representatives on logistics. What was their reaction to your briefing?

² Throughput is the average quantity of cargo and passengers that can pass through a port on a daily basis from the time it arrives to the time it leaves the port.

Gen Brown: I reaffirmed what I already knew, that the US military is far ahead of other militaries in the development of our deployment systems, technologies, and distribution doctrine. Other militaries do not have our force projection capability. Concepts like strategic dominant maneuver are interesting, but are not as relevant to them. For other militaries, end-to-end distribution often means using their commercial transportation assets to deliver supplies to forces that are in a benign area and relatively close. They are generally in awe of our assets and force projection capabilities.

Dr. Matthews: About the time you got here, [Marine Corps Colonel] Mark [S.] McTague and I were invited to go to Wright-Patterson [Air Force Base (AFB), Ohio] to talk to a group of Israelis about Desert Shield/Desert Storm. They were at Wright-Patterson working at Air Force Materiel Command, and they were very curious about how TRANSCOM deployed. We briefed them and they just sat there stunned. They had no idea what was involved, and what kind of things we could do. Obviously, they don't deploy.

Gen Brown: We're probably a minimum of ten to fifteen years ahead of any adversary who might try to compete with us in the area of deploying sustainable combat power.

Dr. Matthews: What about China?

Gen Brown: As you know, they're spending a lot more money on their military and are even buying things like landing craft and an aircraft carrier. However, our logistics capability is truly a national treasure, and no country has a military logistics capability like the US.

Dr. Matthews: What about our logistic shortfalls?

Gen Brown: We're facing challenges today like we've always had to face after the drawdown of forces following every major war the US has

participated in. As mentioned earlier, we reduced supply stocks after Operation Desert Storm by approximately 50 percent from their pre-war levels. Supply stocks were reduced for lots of reasons, most of them fiscal. Today, no one believes we're going to build our supply stocks back up other than for specific commodities like "smart" munitions. In effect, we've opted to depend on time-definite delivery in lieu of having the mountains of supply. During Desert Storm, we deployed our supplies 8,000 miles from the US and built a sixty-day stockage level in Saudi Arabia. We even built some supply depots, if you can believe it, in front of some of our combat divisions. Not to the rear as we've done in past wars, but in front of them! In fact, we didn't start the counteroffensive until after 205 days of deployment and supply build-up.³ The rest is history.

It's unlikely that we will ever build up sixty days of supply stocks before we start a ground offensive again. As a result of political considerations, the knowledge of our adversaries about our strengths and weaknesses, changes in warfare, and reduced levels of supply stocks, we may choose to commence ground offensives with only a few days of supplies on hand--assuming that we have an effective distribution capability. We have some challenges though with a peacetime distribution system that moves approximately 10 percent of its supplies by direct vendor delivery. For example, when we deployed to Afghanistan we had no direct vendor delivery and no commercial freight forwarders. In order to overcome problems like this, we need to have a single chain-of-command with a single deployment and distribution process owner.

³ Operation Desert Storm commenced with the start of the air war on 17 January 1991 at 0239 local Saudi time. The ground war commenced on 24 February 1991 at 0400 local Saudi time.

Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF)⁴

The Deployment Process

Dr. Matthews: What kind of problems are we encountering with the deployment for Operation Enduring Freedom?

Gen Brown: We're doing well overall, but you have to remember that we haven't had a major deployment in two and a half years, so the military is experiencing a learning curve. For example, everyone is now rushing to train their people on JOPES [Joint Operation Planning and Execution System]. Prior to the war, we had just about stood down the JOPES school because people weren't sending students to the class. We've now had to send JOPES training teams to [United States] Joint Forces Command [USJFCOM], Air Combat Command, and [US]CENTCOM [United States Central Command] to help them build their TPFDDs. We've deployed 27 people to help so far. If I had to do it again, I would assume that during peacetime joint planning staffs will not be trained to the level that they can build executable TPFDDs. I'd stand down the JDTC [Joint Deployment Training Center], stand down about half of the JOPES school, and then send "9-1-1 Teams" on day one to assist the deploying units.

⁴ On 11 September 2001, terrorists hijacked airliners from Boston, Massachusetts' Logan Airport; Newark, New Jersey's International Airport; and Dulles International Airport in Northern Virginia and precipitated the worst domestic terrorist attack in United States history. Two hijacked passenger airliners flying from Boston crashed into both towers of the World Trade Center in New York City and a third passenger jet smashed into the Pentagon shortly after taking off from Dulles. The fourth passenger aircraft, en route from Newark to San Francisco, California, turned east and crashed outside Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. Osama bin Laden's terrorist network, Al Qaeda, claimed responsibility for the 11 September attacks that killed almost 2,500 and injured thousands more. In response to the attacks, the United States launched a military operation against the terrorist network of Osama bin Laden and the Taliban government of Afghanistan that shielded them. In Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), the United States and its coalition partners overthrew the Taliban government; captured, killed, or sent into hiding the Al Qaeda leadership; and helped the Afghans form a new government.

We're also struggling with the activation of large numbers of Reserve and Guard units. For example, AMC [Air Mobility Command] has one process and standard for activating Reserves and a different standard for the Air National Guard. AMC is trying to determine how many people they need by location but is hindered by different rules and regulations depending on the type of component used. There are a lot of systemic problems that can be resolved. At the beginning of OEF I tried to identify eight to ten problems that could be fixed before the next major deployment. To achieve quick fixes, I sent [Air Force Lieutenant Colonel] Cathy Clothier to visit all of the major supporting and supported commands and to document and resolve problems. We've been fairly successful.

Dr. Matthews: What about deployment times?

Gen Brown: During the first few months of planning for Enduring Freedom the senior leadership--the President [George W. Bush], General Franks [Army General Tommy R., Commander in Chief⁵ (CINC), USCENTCOM, July 2000 to July 2003], and others--were trying to decide what was required to achieve a military victory, and how long it would take to deploy the force. For example, we were asked to answer questions like, "When will the Air Force have the capability to drop bombs on targets?" Or "When can Special Forces commence operations?" The commencement of operations was delayed even after the President had been briefed that the force would be closed and capable of performing all of its missions by the 25th of September.

⁵ In a memo dated 24 October 2002, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld stated that "effective immediately, the title 'Commander in Chief' shall be used to connote or indicate the President of the United States of America. Further, this memorandum discontinues the use of the acronym 'CINC' (meaning 'Commander in Chief') for military officers."

There were reasons that portions of the deployment went more slowly than anticipated. For example, we couldn't get diplomatic clearances to over fly certain countries. Fortunately, we were able to keep the senior decision makers informed about our capabilities so that they could make the right decisions.

It was difficult for TRANSCOM to state when specific capabilities would be on station, in part because we couldn't capture the entire requirement, couldn't always obtain priorities for movement, and therefore couldn't build parent ULNs [unit line numbers] and an accurate TPFDD. Our component commands had requested over 70 ports of embarkation early on in the deployment. The first thing we should have said on day one was, "We will send you a person who will help you build your deployment packages. He or she will be there in 24 hours. A complete 'package' means that every deploying unit must have a parent ULN, and then all the subordinate ULNs for that function must be built--just as we teach in JOPES. If you don't have at least 100 passengers at an origin and destination, the Service should not validate a ULN, because we will not fly to a port of embarkation that has fewer than 100 passengers." That kind of guidance needs to be forthcoming in the first few hours of a deployment. Fortunately, the National Command Authority⁶ delayed the original deployment, thereby facilitating a more effective and efficient operation. The additional time enabled all of the forces to be deployed more effectively.

Dr. Matthews: In one of the operations briefings, you talked about the systemic issues and problems regarding Operation Enduring Freedom. Could you go over exactly what you meant about the systemic issues we need to focus on?

⁶ The term refers to the President of the United States and the Secretary of Defense.

Gen Brown:

I was referring to business rules and practices that are not as good as they should be and cause recurring problems. For example, we know that the supported command is given a menu of forces by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and they select from that menu to fit their needs. Forces are then put into a package and prioritized. The Services validate the force lists and send them to TRANSCOM. Philosophically, that's what happens. However, there are systemic problems with how these tasks are executed. For example, at the beginning of Enduring Freedom, there were no rules on how many people needed to be in a unit line number to make it executable and therefore valid. TRANSCOM wanted forces to be built as packages, but never said what the minimum size for a package could be and remain valid. I remember one day the Air Force had nine pages of ULNs deploying to Afghanistan, and there were only 540 people deploying in the entire force. In effect, each person had his own ULN. Why? Because the Air Force frequently activates people from a core of individual volunteers rather than as units. The individuals are often deployed to an AOR [area of responsibility] and then join up with a unit. The question is, shouldn't you consolidate all of those people at one location and then build a ULN to move them to the AOR? The answer is clearly yes, and these types of problems can be resolved by refining our business practices.

Another example is that you may have a command at Fort Campbell [Kentucky] that wants to track their deploying units and their ability to close at destinations not later than their required delivery date [RDD]. Presently, the deploying unit must download the ULNs onto a disk and then give the disk to the AMC TALCE [Tanker Airlift Control Element]. If they don't provide the disk, then there will be no intransit visibility of the unit. Automation can solve these types of problems.

There are also systemic problems that result from a basic lack of understanding of deployment doctrine, techniques and procedures. I'll give you an example by asking another question. Where do you learn that if you're flying into Kandahar [Afghanistan] and want to deploy your forces as rapidly as possible, that the limiting factor will be the throughput limitations at the port of debarkation [POD], not the number of available airplanes? Rapid deployment is frequently about turning airplanes faster at PODs, so that at the end of the day you've landed two or three more airplanes and therefore deployed more forces. If, for example, AMC closes an airfield for maintenance, TRANSCOM should be asking questions like, "What is the impact on the airflow and forces on the ground, are all parties ready to use another airfield, and do you have the diplomatic clearances for alternate routes, etc.?"

Deployment planners must be trained with a basic skill set that enables them to think days or weeks in advance. They must understand "critical decision windows," and know what the next most limiting factor to throughput will be. If the limiting factor to flying 24-hour ops [operations] is security, and AMC can only fly during daylight hours, then there are major implications for forces on the ground. AMC should then be defining for the ground component commander what conditions must be met so that 24-hour operations can be flown. Everyone needs to work together to ensure that the right conditions exist for maximizing throughput. When building a TPFDD, AMC planners should say, "If you want us to maximize throughput and the deployment of forces, then prioritize these types of units in the front end of your TPFDD, and you will get more combat power faster." Sometimes it's more important to deploy a unit like a cargo transfer unit than a combat unit if you want to rapidly build up sustainable combat power.

I've advocated for a long time that there should be a "Strategic Mobility 101" course to teach people basic deployment skills. We have courses that teach units how to load trains and planes, but not how to maximize the rapid deployment of sustainable combat power. We teach a short JOPES course, but we don't teach basic force projection. TRANSCOM can help through its collaborative planning. For example, we should say, "If you're trying to deploy these forces fast, then have you thought about what's necessary to operate the airfield around the clock and to reach full capacity as fast as you can? If not, here's what we recommend that you do." Unless the deployment involves a forced entry, the limiting factor will usually be throughput. We should always be trying to define the minimum force we need in place to provide the maximum throughput possible at the POD as quickly as possible. If we do this, we'll get more combat power in place faster. I'm confident that our school systems will respond.

Dr. Matthews: Could the JDTC do that tutorial at Fort Eustis [Virginia] for us on a regular basis?

Gen Brown: They're already playing a role. And we've been sending some of our key TRANSCOM people like Kathy Gainey [Army Colonel Kathleen M., Chief, Joint Mobility Operations Center (JMOC), July 2000 to July 2002] and [Air Force Colonel] Mark Henderson [Chief, JMOC, August 1999 to May 2000] to address some of the classes. Our challenge is that we don't have a lot of force projection experts, although that is changing as the number of deployments increase. Legitimate experts don't just come out of the classroom; you have to grow them. Remember how we used to build deliberate plans and not include RSOI [reception, staging, onward movement, and integration] into the plans? For most of my career we built deliberate deployment plans that went only as

far as the port of debarkation. We assumed unconstrained throughput at PODs and did not include RSOI in any of our deployment analyses. Shortly after arriving at TRANSCOM, I remember the TRANSCOM staff saying, “Sir, you don’t understand, that’s the supported CINC’s AOR, and they don’t let us do anything in their AOR.” Fortunately, we’ve changed that thinking, and TRANSCOM will need to be far more involved in supporting operations within the AOR in the future.

For years we’ve built deliberate OPLANs [operation plans] and said they were logistically feasible without even considering the throughput piece! Combat commanders were told that deployment was not a problem and they could focus on other concerns. Of course, during real deployments there are problems with weather, maintenance, enemy attrition, changing priorities, and a host of other concerns that make rapid deployment extremely difficult. Time after time, throughput is the limiting factor.

If you ask me how Enduring Freedom is going, I’d say it’s going well, but the perception of how well a deployment is going depends on where you sit and when you ask. This deployment is going great in comparison to others I’ve seen. During the deployment to Kosovo,⁷ we basically had no TPFDD. The supported CINC threw up his hands at the end of two days because he could not define his requirements or prioritize his movements. We eventually transferred twelve C-17s to Europe because things were backing up, and they could not prioritize flow into an area with a limited MOG [maximum on ground] and could not sequence their movements. We provided aircraft, and it was

⁷ Operation Allied Force was the US-led NATO air campaign against Yugoslavia. The campaign, 24 March-20 June 1999, followed the breakdown of negotiations between the members of NATO and the government of Yugoslavia over the Yugoslav oppression of the ethnic Albanian majority residing in the Serbian region of Kosovo.

essentially first-in-first-out of whatever was backed up at Ramstein [Air Base (AB), Germany]. If the APOE [aerial port of embarkation] thought something had a higher priority, they moved that next. That is not the way to maximize throughput or power projection.

Enduring Freedom has a functioning TPFDD. We're in the middle of a deployment and we're constantly working to make it better, but the fact is that we have a TPFDD. We're establishing priorities and coordinating them from a central location without having to chop strategic lift assets. That's a huge step forward. If we keep deploying forces at the rate we have in recent years, we're going to resolve many of these types of systemic problems.

Dr. Matthews: You see it every day in the way we tweak the daily briefing slides.

Gen Brown: It's already started resonating with the new CINC, General Handy [Air Force General John W., Commander in Chief, USTRANSCOM, and Commander, AMC, November 2001 to present⁸], and he, like his predecessor General Robertson [Air Force General Charles T., Jr., Retired, Commander in Chief, USTRANSCOM, and Commander, AMC, 3 August 1998 to 5 November 2001], is educating the deployment community about things they can do better to deploy faster. If we can get people to understand how important early collaborative planning is, then we will have a foot in the door.

Dr. Matthews: What is the future of the JDTC?

Gen Brown: I'm not sure. A lot will depend on how well it's resourced, and how TRANSCOM and the user community employ it. I try to remind people that the "T" in JDTC was not originally meant to

⁸ General Handy retired 7 September 2005.

mean “conduct training.” The JDTC’s original purpose was to identify training requirements, validate and prioritize those requirements, and then help shape doctrine. In fact, the JDTC concept did not originate at TRANSCOM, but with a white paper written by Colonel Charlie Fletcher⁹ and me around 1996. I had just arrived as the commanding general at Fort Eustis and decided to create a new organization around five military spaces that were assigned to Headquarters TRADOC [US Army Training and Doctrine Command, Fort Monroe, Virginia]. The officers were filling joint billets and had been assigned to TRADOC for the purpose of developing joint deployment doctrine. Unfortunately, little if any deployment doctrine up until then had been developed. I eventually got the five military slots and some civilian billets transferred to Fort Eustis, the home of the Army Transportation Corps, and they became the nucleus of the Deployment Process Modernization Office [DPMO].

When TRANSCOM adopted the concept of the JDTC, we added the training task, but that was not the original concept. There is presently some discussion about transferring the JDTC to JFCOM.¹⁰ Regardless of what command owns the JDTC, I believe it’s essential that it play a more active role in deployment training. One day I’d like to see the Joint Deployment Training Center be an organization that can teach “Strategic Mobility 101” course that I referred to earlier.

⁹ Army Colonel Charles W. Fletcher, Jr., served as the Assistant Deputy Director, Operations and Logistics Directorate, US Transportation Command, from August 1999 to July 2000. He was promoted to brigadier general 1 September 2000. Brigadier General Fletcher was assigned as Commanding General, (Military) Surface Deployment and Distribution Command, on 24 August 2004.

¹⁰ JDTC transferred to USJFCOM effective 1 October 2004.

Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration

Dr. Matthews: I've been told that you created and institutionalized the acronym, RSOI.

Gen Brown: I coined the acronym when I was the commander of the 19th Theater Support Command in Korea. While the deployment processes were not new, it was somewhat new to think of theater deployment in its totality, i.e., a total process from origin to the tactical assembly area [TAA]. At the time, there was little Service doctrine on the subject and no joint doctrine that explained how to maximize throughput of deploying forces and their follow-on sustainment. While force projection was key to the success of the Korea OPLAN, no sophisticated throughput analyses had been done. Like all OPLANs in those days, the challenges associated with throughputting forces had been assumed away. Having run most of the seaports, airports, staging areas, and highway transportation during Desert Storm, it was clear to me that forces could not be deployed to Korea anywhere near as fast as the advertised closure times. I also knew that while we needed major changes to the OPLAN, no changes could take place until we first educated our leaders on the challenges and tasks to be performed. It was clear that it would be difficult to convince the Korean military that we had major throughput problems when we had told their military leaders for decades that we could reinforce the peninsula in a timely fashion. To deal with these issues, I decided to conduct my own command training exercise and called it the RSOI Exercise. The exercise was extremely successful and after we ran it the first year, it was adopted by the CINC [Army General Gary E. Luck, Commander in Chief, United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command/Commander, United

States Forces Korea, May 1993 to July 1996] as a theater-level exercise. The RSOI exercise has continued ever since and today is one of the two main annual training events¹¹ for US forces in Korea.

RSOI functions are not unique to Korea. I merely gave them a name and then began training to the four primary ones--reception, staging, onward movement and integration. It was apparent that if the processes were to be institutionalized, then I would also have to embed them in Joint and Service doctrine.

Upon leaving Korea [June 1995], I was assigned to Fort Eustis as the Commanding General and Chief of the Army Transportation Corps. Fortunately, Army transportation doctrine was written at Fort Eustis, and therefore it was easy to leverage the staff to begin writing RSOI doctrine. I solicited my school commandant, Colonel Charlie Fletcher, as an RSOI advocate, and we began writing a series of field manuals called the FM [field manual] 100-7 series. These field manuals became the base doctrine for force projection, follow-on sustainment, distribution, and RSOI. The joint community then basically put a joint cover sheet over the FM 100-7 series and called it joint doctrine. We essentially formalized the RSOI processes and turned them into doctrine.

I mentioned earlier that as a colonel during Desert Storm, I commanded a unit [the 7th Transportation Group] that ran many of the RSOI facilities in theater; they just weren't called RSOI nodes. I learned that you can only throughput forces as fast as the weakest link in the RSOI process. For example, one of the first combat units to deploy to Saudi Arabia was the 1st Armored Division. Its soldiers quickly deployed to the theater and then sat on the ground

¹¹ The other major joint exercise in Korea is Ulchi-Focus Lens.

for days waiting for ships to arrive with their equipment. During Desert Storm, the average battalion would deploy by air and then spend approximately nine days waiting to marry up with their equipment that deployed via sea. I looked at our contingency plans and said, “Wait a minute, military OPLANs don’t even take into account theater staging bases, and no time is allocated to perform most RSOI functions.” The fact was that every major OPLAN in the military at that time assumed unconstrained throughput at ports of debarkation. Commanders were told that their forces could deploy within a certain time, but they were, in fact, being given unconstrained movement times only to the PODs. Unfortunately, PODs are not relevant locations for warfighters, and we should have been analyzing the time it took to deploy forces to their TAAs. For example, having an Army division of soldiers on the ground without their equipment is not closing the division. As you know, last year TRANSCOM requested and received authority to conduct RSOI analyses as a part of the deliberate planning process. We’re making progress. Anyway, that’s some of the genesis of RSOI.

Dr. Matthews: What was your solution to the problem of trying to change transportation doctrine and the way we do business?

Gen Brown: For a number of years I’ve professed that we need a four-part strategy to change organizations and the way they do business. Assuming you know what you want to achieve, you must first change doctrine. Second, you have to change the force structure of the military units that execute the new doctrine. Third, you have to procure the necessary technological enablers and give them to the forces that execute the new doctrine. I call technological enablers anything that facilitates force projection and throughput: airplanes, ships, intermodal handling devices, information management

systems or any technology that facilitates throughput. Fourth, you have to train the new force to apply the technological enablers in a way that is consistent with the new doctrine. Sounds simple, but it's tough since no single activity is responsible for making all four areas come together. We rarely approach deployment problems by addressing all four functional areas at the same time. For example, it's not enough to merely say that we need additional C-17s or high speed sealift. These are important technological enablers, but they don't achieve their full potential without trained forces that can maximize their use. They must be integrated with the other enablers, and then you have to adapt your training, force structure, and doctrine to better use the assets. Sometimes it's like the chicken and egg analogy as to which comes first, the technology enablers, doctrine, or force structure changes. It's clear, however, that forces and supplies must be deployed faster than ever before, and that all of the Services are redesigning, training and equipping their forces to better accomplish their emerging missions.

Dr. Matthews: It appears to me that TRANSCOM's culture has changed to incorporate these ideas in the latest TPFDD conference.¹²

Gen Brown: I've told General Handy privately and publicly that I could not be prouder of what our folks are doing. Historically, there have always been big learning curves during major deployments and we're at a peak right now. We're lucky that we truly have the "first team" running the Enduring Freedom deployment.

Unfortunately, there was no CONPLAN [concept plan¹³] on the shelf when we started Enduring Freedom. However, there were

¹² The TPFDD Conference held 8-19 July 2002 at USTRANSCOM was one of six focused on deploying a military force to Iraq in the event of war.

¹³ An operation plan in concept format.

several key factors we had to evaluate from a force projection perspective. We first considered the commander's required delivery dates and then how to mitigate anticipated risks. As you know, we had a very short time window to deploy the force to a site on the other side of the world, one that had a very austere infrastructure. Adding to the challenge was a lack of routine flexibility and redundancy since we only had one APOD [aerial ports of debarkation]. These and many other problems were overcome by the ingenuity of the joint deployment community and the deploying forces.

Dr. Mathews: What about security risks during deployment?

Gen. Brown: Security of the deploying force should be a major concern during deployments and RSOI. Forces are at great risk when they are static, for example at a theater staging base waiting for their equipment to arrive. They are generally not dispersed or in combat configurations. During Desert Shield/Desert Storm, we housed 13,000 soldiers in warehouses at the Ad Damman [Saudi Arabia] port waiting for their equipment. They lived within 100 meters of a large ammo storage facility and ammo ships that were being discharged. We were constantly being advised that the operation was too risky, but there was really no choice at the time. We also had approximately 5,000 soldiers living at Khobar Towers,¹⁴ which housed a large number of people vertically in high rise apartments rather than dispersed horizontally as desired. In addition we housed approximately 7,000 marines at Al Jubayl [Saudi Arabia] in a tent city. In effect, we had about 25,000 people at a time housed tightly together waiting for their equipment to arrive by

¹⁴ On 25 June 1996, terrorists exploded a gasoline truck outside the Khobar Towers housing area on King Abdul Aziz Air Base, Saudi Arabia, the residence for Air Force members supporting air operations over Iraq. 300 were injured and 19 killed in the blast.

sealift. I believe that our wartime configuration for combat units is so good, and our units are so lethal, that in many ways they are less in harm's way when those units are fighting than when they're packed together without their equipment. We had more people killed in Desert Shield/Desert Storm prior to the ground offensive than we did when the fighting occurred.

Barring the employment of unconventional weapons, I believe that the single place and event that puts forces at greatest risk is when they are condensed in large groups waiting for their equipment. That is one time when you can lose thousands of people in a single catastrophic event. You can mitigate the problem by not housing people at PODs. When that is not possible, then they should be housed at the port or airfield for as short a time as possible. You can't allow a battalion to spend nine days at a staging base waiting for their equipment. You have to coordinate the airlift and sealift modes better and then throughput forces quicker. For example, if you can move the battalion in only two days, then you have significantly mitigated your risk. So how do you do that? You maximize throughput. You train and equip forces accordingly and refine RSOI doctrine. You don't house soldiers vertically in high rise apartments like Khobar Towers, you disperse them horizontally over a large staging base. That's tough to do at places where you have a small port and large numbers of people in the open. Once again, it's all about throughput.

Another thing that you can do to mitigate risk is to minimize the potential for single points of conflict. I'm a big believer in building redundancy and flexibility into CONPLANs when selecting primary and alternate throughput nodes. At present, we have only one aerial port of debarkation for Enduring Freedom and it's congested. I tell my planners to think about what will happen

if a seaport is rendered inaccessible to ocean-going ships. What happens if CRAF I [Civil Reserve Air Fleet, Stage One]¹⁵ can't fly commercial airlift into the AOR? As you know, our contracts with the commercial carriers state that they only have to fly if we can provide a safe and secure port of debarkation. Unfortunately, that will not always be possible. Remember, we plan to deploy approximately 93 percent of all our people on CRAF aircraft. What happens if CRAF suddenly can't be used?

Dr. Matthews: And these risks are inextricably linked? They all affect each other?

Gen Brown: Absolutely. Understanding RSOI can provide solutions to some of the risks.

Dr. Matthews: Do you feel CENTCOM understands this?

Gen Brown: Certainly. I talk to CENTCOM frequently and have also shared my thoughts with General Abizaid,¹⁶ the Director of the Joint Staff. As you know, we are planning another major deployment at this time [Operation Iraqi Freedom] and these types of discussions are on all of our minds.

¹⁵ Instituted in 1952, the CRAF program allowed the Department of Defense to augment military airlift capability during contingencies with aircraft from the commercial airlines.

¹⁶ Then Army Lieutenant General John P. Abizaid served as Director, Joint Staff, from October 2001 to January 2003. He was promoted to general and replaced General Tommy Franks as Commander, USCENTCOM, on 7 July 2003.

Secretary Rumsfeld's Visit

Dr. Matthews: Secretary of Defense [Donald H.] Rumsfeld visited TRANSCOM [18 April, 2002] and spent a lot of time here. What was our agenda for him? What did we tell him, and what did we ask him for?

Gen Brown: We tried to focus on two things: one, the importance of collaborative planning both for deliberate planning and crisis action; and two, the importance of our application and use of information technology. I think we succeeded particularly well in the first one. We took the SECDEF [Secretary of Defense] through the MCC [Mobility Control Center] and gave him an overview of our operations. He got a feel for the east and west coast branches and how we address requirements, including medical evacuations. And we took him over to the CAT [crisis action team] area. We also emphasized that we rely heavily on the Reserve and National Guard, both at TRANSCOM and at our components.

Our focus was on collaborative planning. We showed him two charts, one that displayed the dollars that could be saved if we moved a notional force by sea versus air and the trade-off between closure times. He kept saying, "If I just make a decision six days sooner, I can save all that money?" The real issue was, if we could make decisions about *two months* sooner and use more sealift, we could save lots of money, and the force would still close at approximately the same time. The point was a follow-up on a discussion that we had with him earlier by VTC [video teleconferences], that we're reaching the point where, in the war against terrorism, we may not have the luxury of picking and choosing when we go to war and whom we fight. There may not

be one single event to trigger deployment, like someone crossing the DMZ [demilitarized zone] in Korea or Saddam Hussein going into Kuwait. Secretary Rumsfeld understood the issue and viewed it in terms of potential dollars that could be saved. TRANSCOM views the issue in terms of potential dollar savings and as a means for expediting force projection and sustainment. Either way, the point hit home.

One of the things that truly resonated with the SECDEF was a problem we're having getting approval for deployment orders [DEPORDs]. The SECDEF personally approves each deployment order, and to date, we've had over 124 deployment orders for Enduring Freedom. Unfortunately, 36 percent of the orders were not signed until after they missed their latest arrival date [LAD]! The SECDEF now understands that he is often signing deployment orders for forces that General Franks says he needs no later than a certain date, and that the date has already been missed. In addition, there is another 25 percent of the force that has had deployment orders signed within 96 hours of when they must be in country. The DEPORDs are taking an average of about three weeks to get from CENTCOM to the SECDEF. It struck him how foolish that is, although we've raised the issue several times in the last few months. He personally made some notes, and then later in the GO [general officer] session, he brought it up again. I also sent his executive assistant a paper on that particular issue with all the latest statistics. I hope that in the future when he signs deployment orders, he will begin to ask, "When do they require the force?" and "Am I signing this after the date they are required?"

Dr. Matthews: The connection between getting a DEPORD signed in time to putting something on a ship instead of an airplane is not just about timelines; there's a money issue also, correct?

Gen Brown:

Yes. For example, the cost of shipping HDRs [humanitarian daily rations] via air is \$7.24 a meal vice sixteen cents a meal for sea transport. The difference in cost is tremendous. The issue is, that when you wait until the last minute to make deployment decisions, the only way to get to your destination fast may be by high-cost airlift. The problem with airlift is you can't deploy very much very fast. You can only load so much on a plane, and everyone's competing for the same limited capacity. One thing is true: regardless of what you move, it will be extremely expensive by air. I don't think that most people fully appreciate how expensive airlift is. You're paying several thousand dollars an hour for an airplane, and that's not including the cost of the crew, training, the airplane, and all the other associated costs. In addition, you're flying 36-hour roundtrips and also have costs associated with air refueling. Deploying significantly less expensively is not the responsibility of a single Service; it is achieved through early collaborative planning and by making early deployment decisions, both military and political decisions.

I asked the SECDEF several questions in our GO session and tried to get a sense as to his thinking about the time available to make political decisions to deploy forces and the time required by the military to execute a deployment within desired timelines. I wanted to know, for example, if he thought he could give us 30 or 40 days before a deployment began to charter float-on/float-off ships and heavy lift ships, and to activate reservists to start moving certain things by sea before deploying troops. Not surprisingly, the answer was situational.

Dr. Matthews:

What else did you discuss with him?

Gen Brown:

The staff also discussed war planning in general. The Secretary was concerned over the length of time it takes to build and execute a war plan, and at least from his perspective, that we'll never execute a war plan as originally designed. I believe he is correct about the inordinately long time that deliberate planning takes and also that we will never execute an OPLAN exactly as planned. But there's also a fine line between wanting forces deployed rapidly and being able to deliver the right capability to the right place at the right time. It's not something that can be done without a lot of planning and coordination. The key is to find ways to do it fast.

We therefore talked about what TRANSCOM is doing to shorten the time required for deliberate planning; for example, reducing the time it takes to build an OPLAN from two years to one year. Our success in deploying forces rapidly has made it difficult for some to understand just how complex force projection can be. As a nation we may debate for months or years whether a particular action should be taken and then expect results to be achieved almost immediately after reaching a decision. This is not a new challenge, and I don't expect that it will ever change. Our job is to anticipate decisions as far in advance as possible and then be prepared to execute them quickly. While we will never have the luxury of executing a plan directly off the shelf, it's the months and years of work that go into the planning that help enable us to respond quickly. The complexity of deploying rapidly during wartime cannot be overstated, and there is no other nation that can come close to doing what we can. I expect that the time required to conduct deliberate planning will be reduced significantly within the next few years.

Dr. Matthews:

It's not just nations, but there aren't any large businesses that can do what we do.

Gen Brown: Businesses don't need to, but there are a lot of businesses that do parts of what we do better than we can. That's one reason for outsourcing--we can learn a lot from industry. It's not fair to compare the US military to companies like Wal-Mart or Caterpillar and say, for example, that we should be able to deliver repair parts anywhere in the world in 48 hours. The challenges are quite different. For now, we continue to be very successful at rapidly deploying and sustaining forces in relatively benign environments. The real challenge will come when we have to project forces to a non-benign environment against an adversary with significant combat capability.

Dr. Matthews: Did you discuss Joint Forces Command and the deployment process owner issue?

Gen Brown: Yes, the topic came up in the GO session. There's no question that TRANSCOM is more involved in planning and executing deployments than any other command in the military. Joint Forces Command has a major role to play as the "force provider," but a limited role once movement commences. The relationship between JFCOM and TRANSCOM will continue to evolve in the years ahead. I anticipate that TRANSCOM will increase its role in distribution and theater operations, and JFCOM will continue to refine its role as a force provider. In fact, the JFCOM responsibilities may change significantly with NORTHCOM¹⁷ standing up. I expect that Joint Forces Command will continue to define joint requirements, facilitate joint training, and test developing systems.

¹⁷ A unified combatant command, US Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) was activated 1 October 2002 at Peterson AFB, Colorado. Established as a result of the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001, NORTHCOM's mission is to plan, organize, and execute homeland defense and civil support missions.

Dr. Matthews: How about looking at the whole SECDEF visit? Is there anything in particular that stands out that we could have done better? And what did we do right?

Gen Brown: The visit was good. I liked the town hall meeting. I also liked the fact that we centered our participation on our military and civilian work force. We did not let the press take over the event. We let them field some questions at the end, but we kept the communal sessions focused on our employees. We also kept the flag officers out of the visible events, which was the right thing to do.

I wouldn't make any significant changes, although it would be nice if you could get briefers not to use acronyms. We dry-ran the visit *three times* and kept telling people, "Don't use acronyms!" Then they'd get nervous and start throwing out acronyms. We could probably clean that up a little, but the event was good for both the SECDEF and the command.

Dr. Matthews: How did you determine who was going to sit in the Seay Auditorium?

Gen Brown: Seay has seating for 250 people, so we gave 125 seats to AMC and the same number to TRANSCOM. All were volunteers. I gave the seats up front to employees who had won recent command awards--people like the Soldiers and Civilians of the Quarter. Interestingly, there was a good cross section from all the Services. After that, the only guidance I gave the chief [Major General Carlos D. "Butch" Pair, Chief of Staff, USTRANSCOM, June 2000 to present] was "No flag officers up front."

Dr. Matthews: Did we break through a wall with the SECDEF? Did we get the momentum going?

Gen Brown: I hope we made a small breakthrough on the signing of deployment orders.

Dr. Matthews: He looked like he enjoyed it. We sure did.

Gen Brown: The visit went well.

Briefing to the Defense Science Board

Dr. Matthews: Has anything come up in the last few months that really stands out in your mind about the global war on terrorism from a TRANSCOM perspective?

Gen Brown: I think that our present activities offer a glance into the future. Most of us have been taught to believe that there is an event that occurs and triggers us to go to war. We tend to think in the context of deploying large numbers of forces to defeat and impose our will over a nation state. As a matter of fact, we say that our mission is to deter aggression, and if deterrence fails, then to win our nation's wars. Little was ever said about deploying forces to places like Bosnia¹⁸ where deterrence had already failed and where we conducted combat operations without declaring war.

Similar dilemmas arise when fighting terrorists who reside in countries that may not even be our enemies. For example, we're presently fighting terrorists who reside in Pakistan, and yet Pakistan is one of our allies in the war on terrorism. We're at a moment in time when a terrorist event may occur without warning and cause us to deploy forces to a most unlikely place. Many of the places we'll go in the future are not going to be secure. The local populace may not want us to be in their country, and there will be little to no host nation support. In all likelihood, the type of

¹⁸ Peacekeeping operations began in Bosnia-Herzegovina in December 1995.

places we will go will have terrible transportation infrastructure, inadequate life support, and poor communications. All of these things will impact our thinking and our ability to rapidly deploy and sustain forces.

I just returned from briefing the Defense Science Board [DSB] on our Operation Enduring Freedom lessons learned. I talked to them for two hours, and the feedback I got was really good. With only two weeks left on active duty, I tried to be very frank.

You and I talked about deployment orders during an earlier session, but a few of the statistics that I shared with the DSB may interest you. At the time of the DSB briefing, we had 158 deployment orders that had been signed personally by the Secretary of Defense. Each deployment order had multiple lists of forces to deploy, and all of them had required delivery dates. Twelve percent of those 158 deployment orders had 100 percent of the units miss their required delivery dates *before* the SECDEF had signed the deployment order. Twenty-eight percent of the deployment orders had either all or some of the units in the deployment order that had already passed their delivery date before the SECDEF signed the DEPORD. The average deployment order took six days to get signed. If CENTCOM provides fifteen days from the time they identify a unit to the time they want it to arrive, then one-third of the deployment time is spent getting a signature on a piece of paper. A force projection military has to do better.

I also spent a lot of time talking about the mobilization process. TRANSCOM mobilized 15,000 Reserves, yet had to deactivate one-third of the force without using them. We're going to deactivate another third between now and October [2002]. Unfortunately, the mobilization process is broken. It doesn't

appear to be much better than it was in 1991 during Operation Desert Storm. It took *sixteen* signatures to get one Army officer activated at TRANSCOM. The war plans that we build on the second floor of this building are all predicated on the assumption that reservists will be available within 72 hours after the PSRC [Presidential Selected Reserve Call-up]. However, Reserves have never been mobilized that fast, and OEF has revalidated that the process needs fixing. The average Army soldier mobilized for TRANSCOM took ten days to arrive. Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps personnel took an average of five days to report. Even those activated to serve in St. Louis [Missouri] had to first qualify on their primary weapon. Wills, powers of attorney, and shots should be up to date prior to activation. In addition, two-thirds of all of the 15,000 reservists activated were individual volunteers, yet we have a deployment system that is predicated on activating units. We're routinely activating Reserve units with a readiness condition C4¹⁹ and then having to immediately augment them with filler personnel.

In one case, we needed 440 vehicle drivers to help provide convoy security for some of the 53,000 ammunition shipments we move annually in CONUS [continental United States]. We were advised that there was no way to call up individual drivers, but that we could activate Army transportation truck companies. Unfortunately, we were then told that Reserve Affairs could not tell us how many truck companies to request until after they saw how many volunteers came forward in each company. Next we were advised that we had to activate the units for either one or two years, despite the fact that we didn't need or want the drivers for

¹⁹ One of five possible readiness levels, C4 indicates the unit is not combat-ready due to major deficiencies.

more than a few months. Sounds like Catch-22.²⁰ There are lots of other deployment planning considerations associated with the call up of Reserves. For example, we need large numbers of Reserve soldiers to be at our seaports of embarkation and ready to load RRF²¹ [Ready Reserve Force] ships starting on day two of a deployment. If they can't be there on time, then the deployment is delayed.

You can see how inefficient the process is and how draining it will be on our National Guard and Reserve components if the war on terrorism continues for a long period of time. My expectation and hope is that these processes will improve significantly within the next few years.

Dr. Matthews: Were the members of the DSB all shaking their heads?

Gen Brown: No, it was a very positive conversation, and these are complex problems. I was fired up [Laughter], and I'll miss that type of interaction.

Dr. Matthews: Were you successful in getting your points across?

Gen Brown: Some. We also spent a lot of time talking about what I call the "critical decision windows" prior to C-Day, and what has to happen within the windows if you want to be efficient and effective at D-Day.²² We then talked about the need for better collaborative planning tools. The DSB also wanted to know who I

²⁰ From the Joseph Heller book by the same name, meaning a situation in which an individual must complete two actions, both of which require that the other one be done first.

²¹ US government-owned fleet of commercially designed deep-draft ships of various configurations and capabilities maintained by the Maritime Administration to respond within four, five, ten, or twenty days to national emergency sealift requirements, particularly the movement of military unit equipment.

²² C-Day is the day on which a deployment operation commences or is to commence. D-Day is the unnamed day on which a particular military operation begins or is to begin.

thought should be the deployment process owner. I suggested that the deployment process owner should be the joint command that affects the deployment processes the most in peacetime and war--TRANSCOM. Ask me that question again in five years, and I bet the debate will still be going on. The DSB was also interested in hearing about the Joint Staff and how they interface in the deployment process. I shared my belief that the JCS [Joint Chiefs of Staff] abrogated some of their responsibility for shaping the deployment process by eliminating their Strategic Mobility Directorate and by relying on Joint Forces Command to pick up the deployment process ownership.

I'll give you an example of the types of problems that occur when TRANSCOM is not empowered to shape the processes and procedures. Shortly before Operation Enduring Freedom, the Joint Staff asked the deployment community to help them select the optimal collaborative planning tool for deployment. TRANSCOM strongly recommended the use of IWS [Information Work Space] over the system recommended and used by JFCOM. JCS said that JFCOM was the process owner and therefore their recommended tool would be used. As soon as we went to war, the JFCOM collaborative planning tool was declared useless. It could only support one commander or OPLAN at a time. We had six supported commanders during Enduring Freedom! Overnight, TRANSCOM had to buy 63 IWS licenses for 21 commands and install them at 32 locations. We knew what was required but didn't have the authority to mandate the policy during peacetime. We're presently conducting real time collaborative planning meetings with all of the supporting and supported commands using IWS. Unfortunately, JFCOM was not able to participate in the collaborative planning until after IWS was installed at their location.

Dr. Matthews: That's a wonderful anecdote.

Gen Brown: The point is that TRANSCOM knows a great deal about strategic deployment and probably performs the major role in deploying forces once they have been selected by their component commands. Most of the joint deployment and distribution communities compete for the same limited transportation and facility resources. TRANSCOM's job is to develop and then execute processes and procedure that are efficient and effective, both in peacetime and war. In short, peacetime operators also need to be wartime process owners.

Dr. Matthews: Was there anything in particular that the DSB focused on or was most interested in or surprised about?

Gen Brown: The DSB visited TRANSCOM on 18 September [2002] to discuss Operation Enduring Freedom. At that time we talked to them about the need to develop something called dynamic TPFDDs. That was a new term for them, so I explained why we need to have exercise TPFDDs that enable us to simulate the real deployments. We need exercises that train people to build TPFDDs from scratch, i.e., during deployment execution. For thirty years I've heard the excuse that JOPES and the TPFDD planning process are broken. In reality, it's usually said by people who do not know how to build a TPFDD from scratch and have never had to undergo the stresses of planning a real deployment. At this time, all joint training exercises use "canned" TPFDDs and there is no cause and effect for decisions and events. Can you imagine deploying without impacts from weather, enemy attrition, maintenance, changing priorities, or a thousand other events? That's the situation today. We use canned TPFDDs and therefore do not adequately train our staffs. During OEF we deployed a "9-1-1"

team to help teach commands how to use JOPES and build TPFDDs. We fixed a lot of systemic problems, but it took nearly three months before the validation and prioritization processes worked well.

Another thing that commands need to learn how to do quickly is to build a TPFDD when there is no CONPLAN. If a staff is fortunate enough to already have a CONPLAN, then they must learn how to replace their notional data with actual movement data. This is particularly applicable for supply data since it is almost completely notional in CONPLANS. Commanders must also be responsible for what is in their TPFDD and how it's prioritized. If they want to deploy a unit earlier, then they must be responsible for reprioritizing the flow and identifying the "bill payer."

Is JOPES user friendly? No. Deployment is a complicated business that requires a high skill level from its practitioners. In reality, we have to grow experts who can quickly do the administrative side of building executable plans and also understand the warfighting implications of their decisions.

Dr. Matthews: What is the deployment process owner's role and does he play a major part in training people?

Gen Brown: The deployment process owner is supposed to be the Portfolio Manager. Unfortunately, JFCOM has not been successful in resolving long term systemic problems. In fact, they are not even involved in building TPFDDs and don't come to TPFDD planning conferences. Their primary role during deployment is as a force provider. As supported commands select the types of units they want--by selecting unit type codes [UTCs]--JFCOM works with the component commands to select the right individual units. Unfortunately, one reason people don't want to do force packaging

is because they are afraid that JFCOM or supported commanders will select individual units rather than leave the selection to the discretion of the component Service.

I believe that within a few years we will have unit readiness reports that are tied to readiness cycles, and that JFCOM will be significantly more involved in the readiness reporting system. For example, if a unit at Fort Hood [Texas] is supposed to deploy, and it isn't ready due to equipment or training problems, one should be able to look at an automated unit readiness report and say, "Oh don't take the second battalion, take the third battalion." OPLANS could be constantly updated using automated readiness reports. The sustainment package might be the same type supply package for all units with the same unit type code. As the Army develops interim brigade combat teams, the concept of force packaging will be used much more. In five years we'll have people advocating force packaging who don't appreciate the value of building packages today.

Dr. Matthews: Give us a benchmark on how we're doing on compressing the planning cycle.

Gen Brown: Well, we're presently transitioning from a two-year deliberate planning cycle to a one-year cycle. We're looking at new collaborative planning tools and we're also putting more money into JFAST [Joint Flow and Analysis System for Transportation], ELIST [Enhanced Logistics Intratheater Support Tool], and some other models. I have no doubt that we can reduce the planning cycle down from two years to one year. In fact, we need to reduce deliberate planning time from about one year to about sixty days, and then use the exact same analytical tools that we use in deliberate planning for deployment execution.

Defense Logistics Agency

USTRANSCOM/DLA Partnership

Dr. Matthews: Give me the status of the TRANSCOM/DLA [Defense Logistics Agency] partnership. When will we see the actual change in the chain of command?²³

Gen Brown: I don't know that there will ever be a change in the chain of command, but the real issue is how to better integrate TRANSCOM and DLA functions. TRANSCOM is still a minority in the supply community, and there isn't consensus on who even makes up the distribution community. The SECDEF gave the issue to Mr. Aldridge [E. C. "Pete," Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD AT&L), May 2001 to May 2003] and tasked him to determine the way ahead. Mr. Aldridge apparently then passed the task to his senior director of logistics, Ms. Morales [Diane K., Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Materiel Readiness, July 2001 to January 2004]. General Handy and Mr. Aldridge have talked, and we've offered to give him a white paper on how OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense] might approach the issue. Unfortunately, the OSD approach to date has been to create a working group and get all the players around the table. These are the same players we've had around the table for three years trying to work the Strategic Distribution Management Initiatives (SDMI). A good place to start would be for OSD to assign TRANSCOM to be the distribution process manager for DOD [Department of

²³ Shortly after assuming command in November 2001, General Handy proposed to the Secretary of Defense that DLA, whose commander reports to USD AT&L, be made a component of USTRANSCOM to integrate strategic transportation and wholesale supply functions under one combatant commander. After two years of study and political infighting, the SECDEF made USTRANSCOM the distribution process owner, but left DLA aligned under USD AT&L.

Defense]. As of now, the SECDEF and Mr. Aldridge haven't directed us to assume that mission. They also didn't put the task in the UCP [Unified Command Plan] this time. I'm encouraged, but we'll have to see how things proceed in the next year or two.

Dr. Matthews: General Handy is asking for single unity of command?

Gen Brown: Yes. We're suggesting that you need to have unity of effort to maximize distribution efficiency and effectiveness. One of the best ways to achieve unity of effort is through unity of command. We would, in effect, integrate wholesale supply and strategic transportation. In my opinion, you can't have unity of command if the key functional command for joint wholesale supply--DLA--answers to a non-military chain of command. The supply commands of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps all answer to their Service chiefs, and all of the strategic level transportation components report to TRANSCOM. However, DLA is the one command that reports to a political appointee and a policy-making organization, i.e., Diane Morales in OSD. In effect, we have a battlefield operating system, logistics, that is not directly responsible to a warfighter. We will never fully integrate end-to-end supply and transportation distribution if one segment of the supply chain answers directly to a policy-making organization in OSD.

Dr. Matthews: For the working group to make progress, wouldn't we have to be the chair or have the Joint Staff as a compromise be the chair to direct it?

Gen Brown: Well, Pete Aldridge has it. So the question is who will Pete Aldridge give it to?

Dr. Matthews: Is Admiral Holder [Navy Vice Admiral Gordon S., Director, Logistics Directorate, Joint Staff (JS-J4), September 2001 to August 2004] predisposed to see DLA be under TRANSCOM?

Gen Brown: I can't speak for Admiral Holder, but I think he would say that he wants an integrated logistics system that ties strategic transportation and wholesale supply closer together. It doesn't have to be done by changing command relationships, but that's one way. We'll see how it turns out, but I predict it will take many years to resolve.

Dr. Matthews: I came out of that meeting with General Handy thinking we've made some tremendous progress, that it was inevitable that we'd realign the commands, and it would happen within the next two years.

Gen Brown: We have made progress, but future changes are more likely to be evolutionary than revolutionary in nature. At this time, TRANSCOM is the only command really pushing for change. The Joint Logistics Board²⁴ [JLB] and Ms. Morales have been resisting my efforts to address the issue for nearly eighteen months. I believe that OSD should make overarching policy, and then let a supporting commander be in charge of deployment and distribution. OSD should not be in the operating chain of command for distribution.

So, how do I think this issue will end? Being a realist, I know that a lot of hurdles must be overcome. The good news is that we're having meaningful dialogue about distribution responsibilities. I suspect that the first step will be to create a distribution process

²⁴ The Joint Logistics Board was co-chaired by the deputy undersecretary of defense for logistics and material management and the Joint Staff J4, and composed of the most senior logisticians from the Services, Joint Staff, USTRANSCOM, and DLA to recommend improvements in DOD logistics and supply chain management.

owner [DPO].²⁵ In the end, we must have better unity of effort, and we'll need a four-star to be the spokesperson for the deployment and distribution communities. This does not mean that you have to have a CINCLOG [Commander in Chief, Logistics Command] in a big building that runs everything. A single command would be too big and cumbersome. TRANSCOM is a command of less than a thousand people, and yet our components are made up of nearly 90,000 people and they perform most of the operational tasks. TRANSCOM tries to merely integrate processes and allocate and prioritize resources. One model could be for DLA to remain a component command with its headquarters, flag, and chain of command unchanged except that the commander would report to a unified command. Eventually, redundancies between the two commands would be reduced, and business practices would be integrated to encourage efficiency. Information technology systems would also be better integrated to facilitate asset visibility. A lesser change would be to merely assign TRANSCOM with a broader mission, e.g., distribution process owner, and create joint program offices.

Dr. Matthews: Subordinate to TRANSCOM?

Gen Brown: Yes. DLA could be a component. The only thing that would change is when Keith Lippert [Navy Vice Admiral Keith W., DLA Director, July 2001 to present] gets up in the morning, he'd be getting a phone call from John Handy, not Diane Morales. For example, Ms. Morales doesn't call General Coolidge [Air Force Lieutenant General Charles H. Jr., Vice Commander, Air Force

²⁵ On 16 September 2003, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld designated the USTRANSCOM commander the distribution process owner for the DOD. DPO responsibilities included improving the "overall efficiency and interoperability of distribution related activities – deployment, sustainment and redeployment support during peace and war," and serving as "the single entity to direct and supervise execution of the Strategic Distribution system."

Materiel Command (AFMC), February 2000 to December 2003] at AFMC, who runs one of the five military distribution systems in the DOD. She doesn't call General Kern [Army General Paul J., Commanding General, Army Materiel Command, October 2001 to November 2004], who runs the Army's wholesale supply system. In fact, she only has direct responsibility over one of the five commanders who run wholesale supply for the military and no commanders who run transportation. Most important, she doesn't have authority over John Handy, who is the key functionary for time-definite delivery.

The next step depends on a number of political considerations and how important OSD believes it is to have unity of command. I'm not certain that everyone understands what we mean by having a single chain of command that is responsible to provide unity of effort to the warfighter. For example, if you are an Army division commander, you provide the unity of command that pulls together your brigades and companies. Most fighting is done at the brigade level, and divisions provide the unity of command to integrate all of the units. TRANSCOM does not want to command DLA. We have component commanders that command AMC, MSC [Military Sealift Command], and MTMC²⁶ [Military Traffic Management Command]. We provide the unity of command to coordinate their transportation functions. If you can also do that for wholesale, then you have integrated distribution and also maximized deployment and distribution for the warfighter. You don't have to initially change working capital funds, information management systems, or personnel systems. The DLA commander would merely get his phone calls from a different boss. In my opinion,

²⁶ Military Traffic Management Command was officially renamed the (Military) Surface Deployment and Distribution Command (SDDC) on 1 January 2004.

OSD should not determine how DLA is organized, equipped, and manned.

Dr. Matthews: Is there a link between integrating DLA and this manpower exercise we're going through?

Gen Brown: Not at all. In fact, I reminded everyone the other morning not to be distracted by the DLA issues because in 45 days we have to identify a 15 percent manpower cut in TRANSCOM. Issues associated with the authority and responsibility for deployment and distribution will likely stretch on for many years.

DLA and the Unified Command Plan

Dr. Matthews: The new Unified Command Plan²⁷ is out. TRANSCOM worked to change its section. What did we want in the publication that we got and what didn't we get?

Gen Brown: I thought that there might be guidance concerning the command and control relationships for distribution that I've discussed. Apparently there was a directive letter in one of the drafts that was later removed. The present guidance says, "Look at drawing DLA closer to TRANSCOM." [Laughter] It's not clear what that means, and I believe that an opportunity for transforming logistics was missed. At a minimum, I would have liked to see a directive requiring an independent analysis of ways to integrate TRANSCOM and DLA. Whether or not someone will initiate a study is questionable. However, Ms. Morales once advocated putting TRANSCOM under DLA, and that clearly will not happen.

²⁷ The Unified Command Plan is the document, approved by the President, that sets forth basic guidance to all unified combatant commanders; establishes their missions, responsibilities, and force structure; delineates the general geographical area of responsibility for geographic combatant commanders; and specifies functional responsibilities for functional combatant commanders. It is usually updated every two years. The UCP was last updated in 2006.

Dr. Matthews: Did we push to have a greater responsibility for deployment?

Gen Brown: No. I've heard that some think that TRANSCOM asked to be assigned the joint deployment process owner [JDPO] mission. It's not true, and there are no plans to ask for the JDPO mission to be reassigned. JFCOM is the JDPO. I do expect JFCOM to pass over their homeland defense responsibilities to NORTHCOM, expand their role in joint experimentation, and also assume the role of force provider.

DLA as a Command

Dr. Matthews: Is it a fact that DLA is trying to become a command?

Gen Brown: You need to ask DLA. Some in DOD don't like the term "Agency," but it really doesn't matter whether DLA is an agency or a command. The important thing is how well they provide wholesale supply support to the combatant commands. You already know my feelings about integrating DLA with the strategic level transportation commands.

Two weeks ago I argued vehemently against an OSD/DLA proposal that recommended that DLA be designated as the distribution process owner for DOD. It was Ms. Morales' intent to increase the DLA role from distribution manager to distribution owner. I non-concurred with the proposal because it demonstrated a lack of understanding of the problem and did not include an option for TRANSCOM to be designated as the distribution process owner. It's apparent that the OSD/DLA staff does not fully understand the total functionality of distribution. Their definition of distribution is focused totally on the supply function and excludes any reference to transportation. It is unfortunate and highly unlikely that any progress will be made concerning

distribution command relationships until Ms. Morales departs. I then expect that TRANSCOM will be designated as the distribution process owner.

OSD needs to look at the entire business model for distribution and not shape it the way they would like it to be, but, in fact, shape it the way it is. If you go to industry and say, “I want to talk to someone in the international distribution business,” then you go to companies that market themselves as international distribution managers. All of these types of companies are transportation-rooted, not warehouse or supply-rooted. For example, UPS [United Parcel Service], Federal Express, CSX, and APL [American President Lines, Limited] all sell themselves as end-to-end distribution companies. They provide intermodal transportation, intransit and asset visibility, a single billing system, and transport their commodities overseas from the US. That’s the mission they do. They do not say, “We store supplies in warehouses, we do acquisition, and we buy supplies.” They do distribution which includes both supply and transportation functions.

The question is do we create a command to coordinate distribution or continue with what we have now: multiple commands, lots of different working capital funds, many different information management and billing systems, and high costs? The answer should be to create a command to coordinate distribution. If you aren’t going to address it under the Unified Command Plan, then you must have an independent third party evaluate the pros and cons. I don’t believe that the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Logistics can be the co-chair of the study because that office already has a predisposition to the outcome. I believe that in the

end DOD will do the right thing and have TRANSCOM play a much greater and more formal role in distribution.

Dr. Matthews: Can you give me an example of something that can be done to improve distribution?

Gen Brown: Sure, we could link strategic deployment and RSOI so that we don't have to rebook supplies for onward movement to forward areas. The same goes for improving intermodal containerization. Another thing that must be done is to begin putting real versus notional supply data into our CONPLANS. You can't allocate lift and develop distribution plans unless you know what has to be moved to include origins and destinations. Most of the supply data in TPFDDs is presently notional. In addition, DLA could start participating in the deliberate planning process and begin providing detailed supply distribution information.

Dr. Matthews: Are there other ongoing discussions involving distribution responsibilities?

Gen Brown: There have been recent discussions that Joint Forces Command be designated the "single distribution spokesperson" for the Joint Staff. The analogy has been made that since JFCOM is the deployment process owner, then they should also be the distribution process spokesperson. I'm not sure what a spokesperson does, but designating JFCOM to be the spokesperson for the distribution community would be a mistake. I told the Joint Logistics Board that I would support the designation if anyone on the Board could name one officer in JFCOM who works "real world" distribution issues in peacetime. No one could name an officer, and the issue has been dropped for the time being. TRANSCOM needs to educate others more about distribution.

Customer Service

Dr. Matthews: How do our customers, in particular CENTCOM and the Army, perceive TRANSCOM's performance in Operation Enduring Freedom?

Gen Brown: It probably depends on where you sit when you ask the question, and whom you ask. And it's not just Operation Enduring Freedom; it's any major deployment. Generally speaking, the joint deployment community, the supported CINCs and the Joint Staff have always appreciated TRANSCOM and the mission we perform. Quite frankly, we pull the bacon out of the frying pan on a daily basis in peacetime, and we perform in spades during wartime. I shared with you in an earlier session how we deployed "9-1-1" teams, immediately helped CENTCOM build their TPFDD, and rapidly installed a collaborative planning tool--IWS--so that all could communicate with each other. They see and appreciate the job we are doing.

Customers understandably have a more narrow focus. They want to deploy fast and receive the highest priority, and then don't want problems. Today, TRANSCOM cancels approximately 20 percent of all flights because of maintenance. That's not good if you are a customer. Once scheduled, you expect to fly on time. You don't expect to go to a commercial airport and two times out of ten miss your airplane.

Many of the problems I see result from a lack of communication and unreasonable expectations between the supported and supporting commanders. Some of it is cultural. There are reasons why customers seek commercial transportation in lieu of using the

DTS [Defense Transportation System]. Cost of service and reliability are the two primary reasons.

During wartime, it's the same except customers can't walk away from the DTS and use commercial transportation. In the military, it's a given that good leaders take care of their soldiers. We teach that from day one. We don't say, "Good leaders take care of their customers." However, if you are a supporting command, your soldiers are not your customers, and sometimes there are conflicts between caring for both equally. The commercial sector says, "Good managers take care of their customers." That thought permeates everything they do.

I'll give you an example of how our desire to take care of our troops may affect the way a customer sees us. During OEF, the Air Mobility Command flew only nighttime operations into one airfield due to their concern for the safety of their aircraft, crew, and passengers. The customer on the ground had a different perspective and felt that he was at higher risk because his deployment and sustainment were being significantly delayed. The customer wanted 24-hour operations, and it was an issue for many weeks.

Our challenge is to meet our customers' needs and also help them understand that they can't always have everything they want. There are some priorities that aren't set by TRANSCOM, the supported CINC, or JCS.

We're in the business of rapidly projecting forces and their follow-on sustainment. For example, Kandahar is our biggest port of debarkation and our main entry point in Afghanistan. We should all be looking for ways to maximize throughput and MOG capability at Kandahar. We reached a point when the major

limiting factor to throughput was that we were only operating during the hours of darkness. The customer was saying, “We have a Marine Corps BG [brigadier general] who is on site and in charge of ground forces, and he says that it’s secure enough to run daylight operations.” The commander’s perspective was, “AMC won’t fly because they are overly concerned for their airmen and aircraft.” The TRANSCOM Threat Working Group (TWG) perspective was that it’s not safe because the ground component forces are not aware of all of the threat or the conditions that must exist before 24-hours-a-day operations can commence. You can see the differences between the two positions and how they shape perceptions.

Dr. Matthews: And the ground forces may be seeing Marine Corps aircraft or commercial aircraft from other countries flying during daylight.

Gen Brown: That was exactly what happened. Marine Corps C-130s and commercial aircraft from Russia and other nations were flying in to Kandahar around the clock. Our customer then said, “Why can’t we contract commercial aircraft to support us if our military aircraft can’t fly during the daylight hours?” It’s never as simple as it appears, and in this case, we were able to eventually resolve all of the issues. Problems like the one I described are common to all deployments. The thing that is significantly different this time is that we have multiple supported CINCs who all expect and want top priority.

Overall, I think we’re doing a super job, and I think that JCS and CENTCOM will echo the same sentiments. If you ask the Army, they would probably say we could do better, because they’re the guys in harm’s way.

The point is that these types of situations exist both in peacetime and war. We must communicate better to facilitate common understanding and improve expectations among all parties. It's as important to understand limitations as it is to understand capabilities. That's one reason I've been an advocate for improving our collaboration tools.

There are also some systemic problems that can be improved. We can do a better job of obtaining actionable intelligence on the enemy threat at key transportation nodes. For example, we have to know the situation at the LZ [landing zone] or APOD and share it with quick reaction forces, the AWACS [Airborne Warning and Control System], and base cluster defenses, then pass the information through a supported CINC like CENTCOM, and then have them transfer the information to us in real time. Then all the parties will have a common picture of what should or should not be done. I think the DIRMOBFOR [Director, Mobility Forces] could play a greater role because he or she has direct links to both AMC and the supported commander. The DIRMOBFOR can do much more than just coordinate intratheater airlift. He or she also has to be an intermediary, a spokesperson for the TACC [Tanker Airlift Control Center] and AMC on the ground to try to better explain what is going through our heads back in the US.

The Strategic Plan

Dr. Matthews: When you came on board, it appeared to me that you took a greater, more personal interest in our strategic planning process than your predecessors. What did you see in the strategic plan, and did you have a vision of where it would be when you left? How far along have we come in that vision?

Gen Brown:

I think we've made significant inroads and a lot of hard work has been done to improve the strategic plan. Unfortunately, the plan was fairly cumbersome, and some of the intermediate leadership was not as engaged as many of the action officers. Some would argue it's still pretty cumbersome, and it is. We had three documents that we were constantly updating: a business plan, a strategic plan, and a strategic overview. Responsibility for maintaining the plans was spread across two directorates! Depending on which document you went to, you frequently had different authors for the same initiatives. The strategic issues were blessed by the senior leadership, but there wasn't a routine process where the subordinate chain of command had to formally come before the senior leadership and explain what they had accomplished in the last "x" number of days, and what they planned to accomplish in the future.

The changes we made were fairly simple, albeit rather emotional for some at the time. We first reduced the three plans to two. The strategic overview is now a very brief document that lists our major issues and priorities. Responsibility for maintaining and publishing the plan belongs to the [TC]J5 [Plans and Policy Directorate, USTRANSCOM] instead of being shared between the [TC]J3/4 [Operations and Logistics Directorate, USTRANSCOM] and J5. We also cut the number of issues from 37 to 21 and then reformatted them with performance measures. Each performance measure now has assigned tasks with expected milestones.

Then we initiated a review process, a painful process for some, in which every 120 days each issue owner--a director and not an action officer--briefs me on the progress of all their performance measures and tasks. General Handy attends the reviews of the top seven issues. We're constantly updating both the issues and the

performance measures. We've also tried to install metrics for measuring and quantifying progress. The directors brief what they had planned to accomplish, whether they accomplished it, and what they plan to accomplish in the next 120 days. The issue owner has meetings with his action officers and division chiefs before he briefs me. In effect, we've tried to simplify our strategic plan while also improving accountability.

Dr. Matthews: Can you put your finger on any issues that you've seen come to fruition?

Gen Brown: Certainly. For example, TCJ2 [Intelligence Directorate, USTRANSCOM] has eleven major tasks to accomplish this year. One task has been completed, eight will be completed within the next sixty days, and two tasks will slip into the early part of next year. By the end of this year, we will have accomplished nine of the eleven things that we set out to do. The two delayed tasks can't be completed until we have a MOA [memorandum of agreement] with NIMA²⁸ [National Imaging and Mapping Agency] that deals with the mapping of APODs and inputs the data into a database. That should occur soon. It's amazing what you can accomplish when leadership personally takes interest in the issues and assigns measurable tasks to be completed.

I'm presently conducting my fourth cycle of reviews. The briefings to me are not the most important part of the process. It's the interaction between the chief, directors, and action officers that is important. By the time I receive my review, we have thoroughly vetted most issues and worked on their resolution. Dan McMillin [Daniel F., Senior Executive Service (SES), Deputy Director,

²⁸ Now the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, NGA.

TCJ5, August 1997 to August 2003] has two action officers who have done a really good job of refining our processes.

The strategic plan is still more cumbersome than desired. I've asked J5 to continue to streamline it where possible. CRIS [Corporate Resource Information System] is the information management system that we use. It's easy to use if you're familiar with it, but if you don't know the different codes, symbols, and formats, it's not user-friendly. It needs to be easier to use for action officers. It would be easy for the process to regress back to where it was. All it would take is for the senior leadership to say, "It's not worth my time to sit down with my directors every 120 days, roll up our sleeves, and talk about the details of this issue because there's a full inbox of other things that need to be done." Dan McMillin and I have had that discussion frequently. All it would take is to let the directors off the hook, and we would regress back to having action officers struggling to define and resolve the command's major issues.

Dr. Matthews: I look back at the history of the process, and there were certain major milestones. The kickoff with General Fogleman [Air Force General Ronald R., Commander in Chief, USTRANSCOM, and Commander, AMC, August 1992 to October 1994, Retired]. He had a strategic planning conference at Tyndall [AFB Florida]. That was just about the time he set up the Initiatives Team, the first Initiatives Team.²⁹ Their primary responsibility, right off the bat, was to get this process going. They produced a document called "The Ought-To-Be-DTS" that laid out where we wanted to go in the next century. They did the process mapping. After they set it

²⁹ General Fogelman established a permanent Initiatives Team effective 1 July 1993 to provide analysis and recommendations on a wide range of issues including future roles, organizational structure, and processes of USTRANSCOM and its components.

up, they handed it off to J5. Frank Weber [Frank P., SES, February 1992 to June 1997], as the deputy J5, was tasked to put the process in place. He grabbed his brightest people in J5 to help him and sequestered them in Building 1700. For three or four months he did nothing but strategic planning.

Gen Brown: That's a major commitment.

Dr. Matthews: The number one landmark was the kickoff with General Fogleman and his action group. Then Frank Weber took it over and put the process in motion. And the next major step I see is Dan McMillin bringing all of his budget and finance expertise into the J5 arena and linking our budget cycle with the strategic plan, which hasn't been done before.

Gen Brown: We still have a lot of work to do on that.

Dr. Matthews: That was my next question. How is that working?

Gen Brown: As we go through the CPRP [Chief Information Officer (CIO) Program Review Process], we want to allocate funds to resolve specific issues. We try to look as far out as the POM [Program Objective Memorandum]. As always, it's tough for action officers to project realistic completion milestones when the funding is incremental and not constant.

One of the reasons I want TFMS [Transportation Financial Management System] is that our budget reports are all based on historical or old data. We don't have real time information for making sound business decisions. In addition, everything that we input into CRIS has to be done manually rather than automatically. With the CRIS system, we are trying to automate functions so that, for example, we can input financial data directly into our briefing slides. We have a long way to go. All this is just evolutionary,

with peaks and valleys depending upon interests of various commanders. We must continue to improve our capability to set priorities, allocates resources, and measure progress.

Dr. Matthews: Has there been any change to the strategic plan or the process due to the war on terrorism?

Gen Brown: We postponed one of the scheduled reviews that was supposed to be in September [2001]. We just got so busy with events that I told the staff, “Just don’t brief this one.” The directors sent me the paper copies. We just stayed the course. We’re back now right on schedule doing what we were doing before.

Sealift

Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement

Dr. Matthews: Where do you think our relationship with our VISA³⁰ [Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement] partners is heading?

Gen Brown: The better question might be where is the commercial transportation industry in the United States headed? Even though our relations are excellent, the partnership is only as good as the health of the industry, and unfortunately the sealift industry is in trouble with many carriers going bankrupt. The health of the VISA members depends in large measure on the US economy and what happens with the MSP [Maritime Security Program], which is a subsidy of \$100 million that we spread among 47 ships. MSP subsidizes carriers to register their ships as US flag vessels, and we

³⁰ The Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement (VISA), developed through a partnership between DOD, the Department of Transportation, the Maritime Administration, and the US flag commercial sealift industry, establishes the order in which government-owned merchant ships and private sector maritime assets are called up in a war or national emergency. As of 2004, approximately 100 ships were enrolled in the program, 47 of which received a government subsidy under the Military Security Program (MSP).

in turn give the carriers preference cargo. The entire program, to include the subsidy, is under review since the MSP expires in 2005. I expect that Congress will renew the MSP to include the subsidy. That will enable us to maintain the very bare semblance of a US flag fleet. The truth is that every year the carriers need about \$3 million per ship to be a US flag carrier versus a foreign flag registered carrier. It's not a very efficient way to maintain a healthy US flag fleet of ships.

Dr. Matthews: Is it necessary to have US mariners crew these ships?

Gen Brown: It's extremely desirable because of force protection and security issues, and because we need to maintain the merchant fleet to crew our RRF ships. The RRF, not the commercial fleet, is the backbone of our force projection capability. Without merchant mariners, there are no crews we can mobilize in time of war. We need to keep our maritime industry strong, but the reality is that we are never going to be able to man all of our ships with US merchant seamen unless we have a major change in the economies of the market place.

Dr. Matthews: I would like to relate, as best I can, a conversation I overheard at a VTC with you and Admiral Holder when he was the MSC commander.³¹ We were waiting for the VTC to start, and he was telling you that it's so inefficient to put all that money into VISA, why not hire a bunch of merchant mariners and pay them full-time so that we know they'll be there when we need them to go to war to man our surge sealift ships? Your comment was something to the effect, "I've sat in a lot of VISA meetings and talked to a lot of the VISA members. I can tell you that as businessmen, their first allegiance must be to their companies and to remaining in

³¹ Admiral Holder commanded MSC from February 1999 to September 2001.

business--providing merchant mariners for surge sealift will always be a secondary issue.” Do you still believe that to be true?

Gen Brown: Of course. All businesses and contractors are in business to make money. If they don't make a profit, they quickly go out of business. That doesn't mean that our US carriers are not patriotic or interested in maintaining a healthy pool of merchant mariners. In fact, the sealift industry people I know are very patriotic. However, industry does not keep an excess capacity that is not billable in the hope that one day it may be used. The bigger the crew, and the more you pay crew members, the smaller the profits for the carrier. The carriers are not motivated to increase their costs without a subsidy. What businessman goes around and says, “My job is to increase costs”? You must subsidize the carriers if you want them to maintain extra capacity that can be used during wartime. Most of the carrier representatives don't talk about maintaining large numbers of US merchant seamen because they know there is not a good business case to do so. The truth is that they don't want bigger crews or more crews. If they could man a ship with three people, they'd do it, and I would as well.

Dr. Matthews: If our goal, though, is to have merchant mariners to man surge sealift, why don't we think about finding another way rather than putting the money into keeping the commercial ships?

Gen Brown: You need both merchant seamen and commercial ships. Keep in mind that Congress does not provide a sealift subsidy by fencing the money to the Department of Defense. The money is given directly to industry. The congressmen who support the MSP are primarily from the east, west, and gulf coasts, and have constituents they represent. We also need to have ships in addition to those in the RRF. Most of our discussions with the carriers are

about keeping their commercial ships available for use during wartime; there's very little discussion about the American merchant marine and the RRF.

High Speed Sealift

Dr. Matthews: Has there been any more talk about high speed sealift?

Gen Brown: Some. We're talking about emerging technologies, but there are differences of opinion. Each Service has the authority to purchase and procure theater-unique assets--that includes intratheater sealift. The Marine Corps, the Navy, and the Army can buy a theater-unique asset like an LST [landing ship, tank] or LSV [logistics support vessel] or LSD [landing ship dock]. They don't need our approval. They can also sublease that asset if they so choose. It's all legal. As far as I'm concerned, the III MEF [Marine Expeditionary Force] in the Pacific can have a high speed vessel, which is the same thing as a TSV [theater support vessel]. It's basically a tri-hull watercraft that can travel at approximately 45 knots and transport 900 people and a few hundred tons of cargo. It is ideal for intratheater transport of a few thousand miles or less. However, I believe that our TSVs/HSV's [high speed vessels] should be on the TRANSCOM IPL [Integrated Priority List]. The TRANSCOM IPL has not changed significantly for over a decade. We can't keep saying "deep-draft sealift and C-17s" forever.

One day soon the Services will have some of their own unique theater lift assets. TRANSCOM will have to decide how best to command and control the vessels. We will also have to decide where they fit into the war plans and how to address the legal issues if they compete with US commercial carriers. While these assets might reduce requirements for airlift, I think it highly

unlikely that anyone would reduce the present airlift acquisition programs. There are also questions as to who should lease watercraft, i.e., the Services, TRANSCOM, or someone else. There isn't even agreement on the definition of what constitutes the boundaries of a theater. For example, the Pacific Ocean stretches over two-thirds of the world's surface, so the [US]PACOM [United States Pacific Command] theater is a big place. From the perspective of the CINCs, you could be almost anywhere in the world and be authorized to purchase theater-unique lift assets. What happens if the III MEF in Okinawa subleases HSVs to the Army so that they can move an interim brigade from the East Coast to do a rotation in Kosovo? You have common-user lift since two Services are using the same vessels and common-user lift is supposed to be controlled by TRANSCOM within the DTS. There are also laws like the Jones Act³² and cargo preference legislation³³ that preclude the military from competing with US commercial flag carriers. It's not a black and white situation at all. I'm trying to find ways to help the Services buy the TSVs and not get tied up over competition issues with the carriers.

We don't want to be bureaucrats who stand in the way of emerging technologies or add additional costs that make their use untenable. However, we must also keep healthy US flag carriers since over 50 percent of all of our forces and supplies move on commercial lift.

³² The Jones Act is a popular term used to refer to the section of the Merchant Marine Act of 1920 that reserves the coastwise and intercoastal trade to US flag vessels built in the United States and owned by American citizens. (SOURCE: Rene De la Pedraja Tomain, *A Historical Dictionary of the US Merchant Marine and Shipping Industry*, Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1994).

³³ The Cargo Preference Act of 1904 directed that all supplies moving by sea for the US military had to be carried by US flag ships or ships owned by the US government except when rates charged by US ships were excessive or unreasonable. (SOURCE: Office of Chief Counsel, USTRANSCOM; *US Maritime Policy: History and Prospects*, by H. David Bess and Martin T. Farris, Praeger Publishers, 1981.)

We can't do that if you don't have merchant mariners and commercial sealift and airlift.

I think that TRANSCOM is best positioned to understand the issues associated with competing against the commercial carriers. There is a transformation and natural evolution underway, and TRANSCOM must help drive the transformation. Next year I would like to see us reconsider our traditional IPL and include more emerging technologies to include intratheater high speed sealift.

Information Technology

Dr. Matthews: When we talk about information technology and our goals in that arena, what is it exactly that we're looking for?

Gen Brown: Are you asking me what we're trying to do with AT21³⁴ [Agile Transportation for the 21st Century]?

Dr. Matthews: Yes, in a broader context, and if there are other major parts of information technology that we're hoping to get or pursue, please roll that into the discussion.

Gen Brown: Contractors frequently talk to us about their "as-is" systems. AT21 is supposed to give us technologies that will facilitate our "to-be" system. My concern is that we will focus on technologies that will only take our "as-is" systems and try to make them better. There is no question that we will make improvements, but the old comment about looking at the cow path and trying to make it better applies. For example, the MCC makes modal determinations only when we use TPFDDs, and at this time we only use TPFDDs when we have

³⁴ AT21 was undertaken to develop and field innovative automation tools for rapidly generating and adjusting transportation plans, assessing the feasibility of transportation support plans, and locating and monitoring items as they moved through the transportation pipeline.

major deployments during wartime. We don't make mode determination decisions in our day-to-day operations. We must obtain tools that enable us to determine modes of transportation, both in peacetime and war. We will not obtain that capability by merely improving the "as-is" system.

We're trying to maintain legacy systems and at the same time identify technologies that will enable us to achieve objective capabilities. Unfortunately, there will never be enough money to do it all sequentially or to have a single ERP [Enterprise Resource Planning] solution. There are also institutional roadblocks in addition to the technological roadblocks. DOD needs to have a single face to the customer that can make efficient and effective modal determination decisions that will reduce rates, improve routing, reduce delivery time, and provide asset visibility. This needs to be done during peace and war. Industry can provide some of these services today. If you call CSX and say, "I'd like to move my commodity from Point A to B," they'll say, "How soon do you need it?" Your answer in part determines whether your commodity goes by air, rail, highway, or ship. You decide how much you are willing to pay for regular or expedited delivery. You cannot do that in the Department of Defense. As a shipper, you don't even know your costs until months after they are incurred. That's neither the kind of service needed for time-definite deliveries nor to gain customer confidence.

I mentioned that we do some mode determinations during major deployments. In those instances, we often advise shippers that they should be moving by sealift instead of using airlift. Sometimes the customer agrees, but more often they choose airlift as the faster mode of delivery since they are not paying for the movement out of their unit funds. In either case, you get a

customer who first determines whether they want to fly or go by surface, and then the customer calls one of our components without first knowing the trade-off between cost and closure times.

To change this situation, TRANSCOM must first change the operational relationship with its components--MSC, AMC, and MTMC. Shippers presently determine the mode of transport they desire and then call the component that manages that mode of transport. The system would be much more efficient and effective if shippers could identify their movement requirement and then contact TRANSCOM, who would select the proper mode of transport. I believe that we will eventually have to consolidate booking services at TRANSCOM to achieve this capability. The components could continue doing scheduling, but only after TRANSCOM books the mode of transport. In the end, it must become transparent to customers whether they are talking to AMC, MTMC, or MSC.

I've also asked the staff to identify technologies that will help us do deliberate planning faster as we go from a two-year to a one-year planning cycle. I want to look at things that will streamline and speed up the existing processes--technologies that will allow a customer to call in and talk to someone who is a mode determiner, and technologies that will provide collaborative planning tools like IWS.

Dr. Matthews: IWS is the near-term and maybe the mid-term tool as we expand it?

Gen Brown: At present, IWS is just a collaborative planning tool used during deployment execution. Keep in mind that we need to develop tools for day-to-day business that are also used in wartime.

Dr. Matthews: Is there any technology in particular that has caught our interest and shows great potential?

Gen Brown: We have a contractor who's been with us for about four weeks and who's supposed to report back in another forty-five days on the realm of the possible. It's a very small contract, but I suspect we'll be searching for these technologies for many years. There is no question that we could buy some COTS [commercial off-the-shelf] technology today, but it changes so quickly that by the time you field the technology, it's obsolete. In addition, most of the technology cannot deal with multiple levels of security, facilitate joint integration and interoperability, overlay commercial and military networks, interface into web based portals, etc. At this stage, it's more important to determine the functions we want to perform and the business processes we want to use. We need technologies that can adapt to future changes, both in roles and missions and other technology.

As with all things transformational, it's hard to find people with "to-be" vision. For example, our MCC people are experts on what they do, but it's a major leap forward for them to be familiar with "cutting edge" technologies and have the vision to apply them to new roles and missions. We must be able to redesign our organization so that the MCC is better equipped to handle its expanding distribution mission. If you go to the MCC and say, "Tell me how the Army uses ICODES [Integrated Computerized Deployment System], ELIST, and all of their other operations systems," they don't know because they don't work with the systems on a routine basis. The objective system needs to be able to integrate all three components into an end-to-end transportation service that selects the right mode of transport, costs, routing, and then provides a single bill.

Dr. Matthews: What do you see as the major contributions of the two J6s [Directors, Command, Control, Communications and Computer Systems Directorate (TCJ6)] we've had on your watch, General Jones [Air Force Brigadier General Walter I., TCJ6, May 1998 to July 2000, Retired] and General Hawk [Air Force General Gilbert R., TCJ6, July 2000 to December 2002, Retired]?

Gen Brown: A lot of progress has been made in the last year and a half. Most important, General Hawk has provided us with an enterprise architecture that includes both an operational and technical architecture. He's a recognized functional expert in his field, and he's put discipline into what we're doing. There are changes that I didn't think the components would accept, but we've been able to centralize some functionality, procurement, and hardware acquisition. We're even sharing some of our LANs [local area networks] with AMC. We're also divesting ourselves of some functions and centralizing them at one location on the base. Most of these changes were driven by General Hawk's vision of the enterprise architecture. He's a great agent for change.

Dr. Matthews: General Jones set up a J6-type command center.

Gen Brown: Yes, the GCCC [Global Command, Control, Communications and Computer Systems (C4S) Coordination Center]. I call it the mole hole.

Dr. Matthews: Tell me what you think the mole hole has contributed.

Gen Brown: It provides us with a central location to manage our network information management system. It was initiated by General Jones, but General Hawk has developed its full potential. Basically the GCCC is a 24/7 command center that monitors all of our information management networks. We have about 28 major

systems and the GCCC monitors and tracks them all. If anyone tries to intrude into them, or they go down for any reason, then the GCCC is able to respond immediately and do all the things necessary to get the system back on line.

Dr. Matthews: Have you seen the CIO³⁵ as being a value-added?

Gen Brown: Absolutely. A good CIO is worth his or her weight in gold, and we're lucky to have a great one. It's hard to discern the difference between a good J6 and a good CIO because they both have many of the same functions. The differences are usually one of scope. The term used to describe the function is not important, but it's vital to have someone responsible for your information management systems, and who can champion resourcing and streamlining of the systems. It's also important to have someone who can determine when to cut off funds to legacy systems and redirect your dollars to objective systems. We have a guy [General Hawk] who is doing it right.

Dr. Matthews: When he first came on board, I asked him how he viewed himself in those two hats. He said, "In the simplest terms, as the J6 I'm a warfighter. And my peacetime role is as a CIO."

Gen Brown: That's a good analogy. At TRANSCOM, the peacetime systems are basically the same systems we use in wartime. The difference is, in wartime you aren't thinking about redesigning, developing, and resourcing systems. You are focused primarily on deploying and operating the systems. I can assure you that General Hawk has been far more occupied with ensuring that we improve our

³⁵ On 1 October 1998, General Robertson designated the USTRANSCOM Director of Command, Control, Communications and Computer Systems to be dual-hatted as the command's Chief Information Officer, making him the principal advisor to the Commander in Chief, USTRANSCOM, on Information Resource Management and Information Technology.

situational awareness and asset visibility than he ever was in peacetime.

GTN/ITV

Dr. Matthews: What feedback have you received on GTN [Global Transportation Network], both in peacetime and war?

Gen Brown: Interestingly enough, I don't get as much feedback as I would like. I wish I got more. GTN is so far down at the operator level that most senior leaders outside of TRANSCOM don't really know what it does. During OEF, I frequently had a three-star calling me who said that GTN was broken. We sent people to his staff twice to train them. They didn't know how to make queries in GTN, so they would incorrectly call up something and get frustrated when their answer was different from that they anticipated.

The biggest thing we've learned about GTN involves ITV [intransit visibility], or better said, the lack of ITV we have. Just prior to my reporting to TRANSCOM, the command awarded a ten million dollar contract to the incumbent contractor to build "the next GTN." About ninety days later I terminated the contract. The reason I took the action was because we were taking our existing system and merely trying to make it slightly better rather than take a quantum leap forward and build the system we need. We have four teams presently building prototypes, and they are all competing to build the "next GTN." It will be at least three years from now before we have the next projected GTN, but I hope that it will be significantly better than the nine-year old system that we were about to merely tweak. Can you believe that the present GTN doesn't even have a fully documented operational

architecture? I just hope that the next contract award, which occurs after I depart, will give us the type of system we need.

When I first came to TRANSCOM, I heard a lot of bad things about GTN. I began to ask how we quantify performance standards to determine what is working well and what needs improvement. For example, how do we know if we have accurate and complete data? How do we know that we only have 30 percent visibility of everything that should be in GTN versus 100 percent? How do we know if we have the commercial data? I asked these and many other questions, and unfortunately no one knew. We still struggle trying to figure out what we don't know. We still don't know enough about the quality or timeliness of the data. You can see why we need a better system.

We have to know more about intransit visibility because that's what our customer wants from GTN. The only reason our customers query GTN is to find out where something is. If you don't know where an item is within the distribution pipeline, then GTN has failed in the eyes of the customer. It's a pass or fail test. I believe that we have had systemic problems in ITV from its inception. And we never knew it. We just accepted incomplete data because we didn't know what we didn't know.

I'll give you a few examples. When we started OEF, I asked what the success rate was for ITV for both intratheater and intertheater movements. No one knew. Then we started compiling data. I still remember the AMC briefing that said they had 100 percent intertheater ITV. And I said, "Impossible. There is no way anyone can have 100 percent ITV." I then created a tiger team of five people to look at the issue and put General Hawk in charge of the team. I told him, "I want you to do whatever is necessary to

find out whether we have ITV. If you have to visit sites in the theater, then go visit the sites. Look at everything.” AMC had some heartache over the fact that we were questioning the validity of their data, and the accuracy of GATES [Global Air Transportation Execution System]. Within ten days the team had developed a means for measuring the accuracy of ITV. We started breaking the system down by node, location, origin, and destination. The original five-man team soon grew into about twenty-five people. We opened an ITV office and manned it 24/7. Unlike our commercial counterparts, we had never done quality assurance of our ITV data. We found that we only had about 30 percent ITV. We said, “Gosh, if we’re 30 percent ITV now, then we must have had about 30 percent ITV in Kosovo, Haiti, Somalia, Rwanda, and every other contingency because we’re operating GATES or RGATES [Remote GATES] the same way as in the past. AMC got on board, and we started briefing intertheater ITV every single day. Then we began to analyze intratheater ITV. All of the ITV percentages started getting better, but we wondered why our data had been so bad.

Dr. Matthews: What did you find out?

Gen Brown: There were several problems, but lack of training was one of the major causes. For example, we train airmen how to use GATES, but there’s a learning curve once deployed. Many units were deploying without the necessary training. They’d say, “We don’t have ITV at Karshi-Khanabad [Uzbekistan],” when in fact, they didn’t know how to use GTN or GATES. Before a unit deploys, it should ensure that it has trained personnel, because the unit will want and expect to have ITV the day they arrive. We also began to find hardware and software problems. Because of all the AUTODIN [Automatic Digital Network] message traffic, a lot of

CONUS installations established data transmit limits to reduce the amount of network congestion. Some of the data that was eliminated was ITV data, and we were also being restricted from updating some of our data bases. These types of problems had always existed; we just weren't aware of them.

Because of the tiger team's success during OEF, we now understand systemic problems associated with ITV much better. We now monitor all transportation nodes. We track whether the data gets into the database and how long it takes. If you look at our statistics for airlift cargo, we've had over 99 percent ITV for the last five days, which is the best we've done in the past seven or eight months. We're averaging about 93 percent ITV for intertheater and similar kinds of numbers for intratheater--quite an improvement from the 30 percent ITV we had.

It really is a case of "garbage in, gospel out." There have always been GTN problems that existed because of bad data or data not being inputted. We're just now beginning to invest people to look at the quality of other systems and of the data going into GTN 24 hours a day, seven days a week. In the past, if an ITV system went down on the weekend, the customer heard, "Well, when the guys come back in on Monday...." When an ITV system goes down now, it has to get back up as soon as possible. These changes have all occurred over the last six months. We've even been able to reduce the size of the team. We now use a few military and some contractors. These changes have begun to improve the GTN reputation. It was done by improving the human factor, not just by applying new technology. I don't want to leave an impression, however, that our GTN problems are resolved--they aren't. We still don't have ITV of static stocks in the supply chain and cannot provide answers to many of the questions our customers have.

This will improve only when we build a single distribution management system that integrates supply and transportation.

Dr. Matthews: We also, if I recall, put some troops on a plane and sent them to Bagram [Afghanistan] because we just couldn't get ITV at Bagram up and going.

Gen Brown: Yes. We did a lot of things to make GTN work. Making institutional change is tough. Most of us think we have more effect on institutional change than we really do. ITV is a perfect example. I think we have institutionalized change by dedicating a full-time group of people and investing resources to monitor ITV and force accountability. I believe that's been a significant improvement, but we could easily revert to our old ways if not careful.

I'm convinced that having real-time information to make command and control decisions is critical to our concepts of dominant maneuver and focused logistics. Integrating the supply side of asset visibility, the transportation side of ITV, and doing it all in real time, and in a way that provides actionable intelligence is critical. If that can't be done, then we can't be as efficient and effective as we need to be.

Dr. Matthews: The next issue is the intheater piece. If we continue to go into such isolated areas as Afghanistan, we will continue to have to do transloads. That's another ITV piece in the theater that we need to own.

Gen Brown: We're never going to eliminate transshipments, but you're touching on a major issue for the future. Does TRANSCOM have a role in providing intratheater ITV and distribution? The answer, in my opinion, is yes, but how that should be done is another issue.

Reorganization and Manpower Reduction

Dr. Matthews: The command contracted with LMI [Logistics Management Institute] to look at reorganizing TRANSCOM. We've done reorganization studies before. How is this study different from the previous ones?

Gen Brown: This is different from anything we've done in the past because this time we're going to have to implement major changes. I talked to General Robertson once about reorganization, and I talked to General Handy about the need for reorganization on his first day in command. In hindsight, it was way too soon. [Laughter] I talked to him again about two months ago, and he felt the time wasn't yet right. About two weeks ago, we talked about the issue again, and he has now blessed a look at reorganizing the command. I think that it's essential to do some reorganization, and that it be done on this commander's tour. General Handy has enough time to make the necessary reorganization decisions, and then live with the reorganization and refine it before he turns TRANSCOM over to the next commander. What I told General Handy was, "Once you've been on the job twelve months, you've missed the window. It will take six months to study the reorganization, six months to transition, and then another six months to just live with it and refine it." I was assuming that General Handy would follow suit with previous CINCs and command only two years. It now looks like he may be here longer.

Fifteen Percent Manpower Reduction

Dr. Matthews: Did the 15 percent manpower reduction precipitate the reorganization?

Gen Brown: Two things also helped precipitate reorganization at this time. First, the DPG [Defense Planning Group] is serious about cutting 15 percent of our manpower, which is anywhere between 88 and 92 people, depending on which base line you use. Second, the SECDEF said that there would be no new additional general officer authorizations or an increase in staff with the stand-up of NORTHCOM. Now, you can't create a new unified command and say there aren't going to be any more staff people in the Department of Defense unless there are cuts somewhere. So what are they doing? They're salami-slicing the unified commands as the bill payers. TRANSCOM's first bill is for 21 billets that we have to identify by the 15th of July [2002]. Those 21 spaces will go towards filling NORTHCOM's initial authorization of 200 billets. Three-quarters of those 200 billets are military billets. I suspect that NORTHCOM is going to use the first 200 people to better define needs, and then there will be a second bogey.

Dr. Matthews: Two hundred people is a pretty small number for a unified command. What's NORTHCOM's final manpower authorization?

Gen Brown: I have no idea how big they will want to be, but I have a feeling they'll want to be as big as we are, and 200 people is smaller than we are by two-thirds. Of course, contract people could be used to fill some voids. If we cut 21 people in the first bogey, that would mean we will have to cut an additional 42 people in the second bogey, or a total of 63 billets overall. Now, to reduce TRANSCOM by 15 percent, we'll have to cut an additional 29

billets. It's not clear how big future bogeys will be. And it's not absolutely clear that we will have to make up the difference between the second bogey to stand up NORTHCOM and the 15 percent cut. But one thing is clear; we're giving up 21 billets now, and we have 71 more that we're going to be tasked to cut in the near future. If you salami-slice the first cut just with vacancies-- jobs that haven't been filled yet, and predominantly military billets because there are only five civilian billets involved in that first cut--you can probably take those 21 billets out of hide. But in my opinion, when you start talking lots of billets, and you just salami-slice, you've done the wrong thing. You haven't created the optimal organization; you've just tried to do the same mission, the same way, but with fewer people. We have organizations where the workload is not equitably distributed to ensure that we get the most from our resources. We can do better.

General Handy has blessed my plan to get started with the reorganization study. I've talked to LMI twice and they will visit us next week. Within the next month we'll give General Handy a recommendation for cutting the first 21 billets. Then we'll take as long as we need to look at the additional cuts. I would like to do a reorganization that takes into account both workload and process flow. I'd also like to reorganize in a way that we can handle the third cut, if tasked, without reorganizing again. I see lots of opportunities for reorganization.

Dr. Matthews: Do you foresee us saying there will be missions that we are not going to do anymore?

Gen Brown: The basic mission won't change, but there may be some functions we'll do differently. We'll take a comprehensive look at the command. For example, should J3/4 be combined or should it be

separated into J3 [Operations] and J4 [Logistics]? Should deliberate planning be in J5 or J3? We've had it both ways, and I don't know which is best. I don't think it's a cut and dried decision, but I do know if we're going to go from a two-year planning cycle to a one-year planning cycle for deliberate planning; something has to change. You either have to have better and faster analytical tools or more people. Maybe you need to put more people in the deliberate planning process because you're now going to have to cut the planning cycle in half. That whole process deserves an honest look. If we're going to remain at a wartime OPTEMPO [operating tempo] for several more years, then we should allocate our resources accordingly.

Dr. Matthews: How are we going to cut 90 billets?

Gen Brown: If we were to look at a salami-slice approach, J3/4, for example, would probably have to cut 35 billets. If you don't do a salami-slice, then maybe J3/4 would lose 20 billets. J3/4 will definitely take some cuts because they represent such a large portion of the command. General Welser [Air Force Major General William, III, TCJ3/4, July 2001 to August 2003] understands this, and he'll be an active participant in the process. In the end, I expect that we'll probably combine the Business Center and the Strategic Distribution Management office, which have common roots.

Dr. Matthews: I'm thinking that once you get over 30 or 40 billets, it's tremendous pain.

Gen Brown: Yes, and that's the reason we instituted a hiring freeze. We didn't want a freeze, but if we don't mandate one, we will have people outside of TRANSCOM using their bumping rights to fill some of our billets. I want to ensure that we retain as many of our great

employees as possible. Some of them may use their skills in different ways or directorates, but we will still benefit from their presence. I do not want to let an administrative process have the unintended consequences of forcing out our best employees. Since we have a couple of years to effect cuts, one of the things we're looking at is "banding." The first cut of 21 billets isn't painful because the spaces are vacant. The next band gets more painful. And if we have to go all the way to 15 percent, I agree with you, it will be very painful. That's the reason I'm having LMI do the study in bands, so that we look at reorganization and the 15 percent reduction at the same time. If we get to band number two, and OSD or DOD says we owe them three bands, then we will have a plan in place.

Reorganization: The J Staff

Dr. Matthews: Has LMI given us any recommendations that we feel are meaty enough to pursue?

Gen Brown: They've given us lots of recommendations. It's my sense that it's now time to transition from a dependence on LMI giving us information to rolling up our sleeves and deciding what we need to do. Tomorrow [27 August 2002] we will brief General Handy on our progress. We have a fairly detailed analysis that's been briefed twice to what I call the Board of Directors or the Brain Trust.³⁶ General Handy will be given a macro-level presentation. I want to ensure that we're on the right track, that we get some proprietary ownership, and that in another month and a half we don't find out that the boss has a different vision as to what the organization should look like. There's not much time.

³⁶ General Brown formed a Brain Trust headed by the chief of staff and comprised of the directors to develop an optimal organization.

It's a good thing we got started when we did, or we'd really be in hot water. I wish we had gotten to the stage we're at six months or a year ago. It's going to go fast and furious now. I created the Brain Trust group, quite frankly, to get some proprietary ownership from the directors and get their insights and good ideas. Like all large organizations, every time we discuss reorganization, there are ownership issues. People care a lot about where they work and for whom. For example, I remember you had concerns when we created the chief of staff position about whether you would work for the commander, deputy commander, or chief. People aren't too concerned about working for the chief now because we brought in the right individual. General Pair has worked out great. The staff has not been bogged down in bureaucracy as some had feared. In many cases, the creation of a chief of staff has enabled the streamlining of functions.

I'm *absolutely* convinced that we can cut 15 percent out of this headquarters. I don't have any problem with that. But you have to have different ratios of supervisors to supervisees. You can't have all of these directorates, divisions, and branches. You have to have fewer directors and fewer deputies. We can't afford to duplicate functions. When we start cutting functions is when we'll have challenges. We have a basic mission, and that mission is predominantly done by the J3/4 and J5. Everyone else--you, me, Force Protection, [TC]J1 [Manpower and Personnel Directorate, USTRANSCOM], J2, J6, [TC]J8 [Program Analysis and Financial Management Directorate, USTRANSCOM], the CINC's Action Group, the Surgeon, Legal, and so on--support J3/4 and J5 missions.

Dr. Matthews: Let's look at this by directorate. What are your thoughts about J1?

Gen Brown: J1 deserves a close review. The Brain Trust came up with several ideas, and some of them are very original. One variation had J1 under J8. My gut feeling is probably not; they ought to remain as a J1. However, there appears to be some layering that we may be able to address.

Dr. Matthews: J2.

Gen Brown: My guess is that the “Intelligence Mafia” outside of TRANSCOM may have their way in the end because they view J2 positions as *commands* and *command opportunities*. Maintaining an intelligence capability is essential, but we should not have to man the J2 with additional personnel just because it is designated as a command. The J2 wants to answer directly to the CINC, but what we really need from them is actionable intelligence. Unfortunately, TRANSCOM rarely receives actionable intelligence, and most of our intelligence briefings are cut and paste documents from national intelligence organizations. I’m certain that we will retain the J2, but we ought to look at whether it should be embedded with our J3 current ops section.

J2 has 139 people in the JIC [Joint Intelligence Center-Transportation (JICTRANS)] and 25 people doing other things. When I ask for intelligence information, I don’t know if it comes from the JIC or the other staff. With over 160 people, that makes them the largest directorate in TRANSCOM. For that investment, we get some Threat Working Group information and some intelligence reports, but on a daily basis we don’t get an equitable return on our investment. Interestingly enough, the JIC is fenced from manpower cuts, so we’ll have to look at the rest of J2 for manpower savings.

As previously mentioned, the J2's primary purpose is to provide actionable intelligence that can be used to reduce risk. Everything else is primarily administrative in nature, e.g., briefings for the CINC and the DCINC [Deputy Commander in Chief]. I recently asked our J2 to identify the top five pieces of actionable intelligence that they've provided in the past three years. Unfortunately, they couldn't give me one example. Generally speaking, the J2 gathers information from national intelligence collection agencies. What we really need is operational level intelligence in support of J3/4 operations. J2 doesn't do anything for the J1, J8, or Surgeon. The question is, if J2 predominantly exists for the purpose of providing us information for operations, why don't they work for the operator? If Force Protection's primary purpose is to protect facilities and ongoing operations, why don't they work for the operator? Is the operator's span of control too much? I think it is, but I wanted to give you the flavor of our discussions.

Dr. Matthews: I'd like to discuss J3/4 and J5 together. In the past certain functions have gone from J5 to J3/4 and back again. How would you reorganize those two directorates?

Gen Brown: What I don't like is combining future ops and current ops. And the reason I don't like it is because I don't think anyone can do justice to both at the same time. Deliberate planning and the building of OPLANs are future ops. It takes two years to build a deliberate plan, and we rarely execute them. I believe that J5 should be responsible for future plans. That includes planning for major theater wars [MTWs], the Mobility Requirements Study, future infrastructure needs, distribution of CINC Initiatives Funds, etc.

By the way, I didn't share these thoughts with LMI, but they came to the same conclusion. I'm trying to get the staff to look at these ideas and say, "If we're going to reduce the number of directorates, then we ought to consider future ops and current ops first, and then consider everything else as support functions." Operation Enduring Freedom--it's current ops. Force rotations in Bosnia and Kosovo, and Northern and Southern Watch are all examples of current ops. Strategic Distribution functions could be assigned either way, but I'm inclined to think they fit best with a separate J4 or with J3.

Dr. Matthews: What about the JDTC? First it was in J3 and then in J5 and now it's in J3 again.

Gen Brown: The Joint Deployment Training Center is located on the other side of the United States, at Fort Eustis. Unfortunately, the J3 has probably only had time to visit the center once in the last year. It's too hard for him to provide the level of supervision required. He's too busy. He's trying to run the war on terrorism. I look at the JDTC issue through the context of future ops-current ops. We should try to put things under J3 that deal with current ops. And for future ops, broaden the scope of J5 a little bit and say, "There's a director with a very capable SES deputy, and we've divested so much from them that they aren't as busy as the other directors. They could afford to take on additional responsibility." In the end, this discussion may be irrelevant, because we may transfer the JDTC to USJFCOM.

Dr. Matthews: Are you then saying that we should look at moving deliberate plans back into J5?

Gen Brown: Yes, but one can make a case either way. At the end of the day we need to consider the J3's span of control during wartime. The J3 is

too busy to supervise deliberate planning for all OPLANs. In addition, planning responsibilities will increase if we go from a two-year to a one-year planning cycle. Something has to change. We aren't increasing the number of people who do deliberate planning, we're decreasing them. So they have to have more efficient and effective tools, and we need to be organized in a way that current ops are not adversely affected. J5 planners could chop to the J3 when the CAT is activated. The rest of the time they could be supervised under the span of control of the J5.

Dr. Matthews: Early on you said one of the things you wanted LMI to look at was the lash-up between the J4 Business Center, SD [Strategic Distribution], and acquisition. Did anything come out of the LMI look?

Gen Brown: We're still looking at the Acquisition Center and who that should belong to. It could work for anyone. Right now it's the J4. We're even looking at whether it should be under TCJA [Office of Chief Counsel, USTRANSCOM]. The staff didn't recommend cutting as much out of the Business Center as I thought they would. Unfortunately, we even had some people try to influence the statistics and the LMI analysis. I had to counsel one of the directors--emotions run high with reorganizations.

Dr. Matthews: Strategic Distribution?

Gen Brown; LMI didn't recommend deep cuts for the Business Center. We'll see how all that shakes out. You can't say, "I believe in streamlining as long as it doesn't affect my area of operations." You also can't retain deputies and secretaries for all organizations.

Dr. Matthews: How has the Business Center been a value added?

Gen Brown:

Interesting question. I'm slightly, with a small 'd,' disappointed that we haven't gotten more out of the Business Center over the years. During my inbrief here, I asked the Business Center to give me a list of ten things that they've done to change the way we do business within TRANSCOM. They couldn't do it. I was told about surveys, studies, reports, etc., but not a thing about changing business practices.

A week later I started the Strategic Distribution initiative with Frank Weber. Strategic Distribution has been an agent for more change than the Business Center ever was. I could give you a page full of business practices that have changed since we created SD. I'm not just talking about changing the way we do something in the MCC; I'm talking about the way our command does business with MTMC, AMC, and MSC, and the way we affect our customers. There have been quantifiable improvements in filling stocks, customer wait time, allocation of dollars, utilization rates of fill, delivery time, and many other measures. Many positive business practices have been put into effect. As we've worked SD, we would funnel out a little bit of the workload to the Business Center to provide us with statistics.

I believe that a large number of people in the Business Center can be used more effectively by having them work on distribution issues. One of the major things the Business Center does is to oversee the customer survey process. In previous years we've spent a lot of money for customer surveys. Last year I told the Business Center to stop doing annual surveys and to start doing them every other year. The surveys told us the same thing every year, and yet we were not changing business practices; we just spent money. Distribution is our future, and the reorganization should enable us to realign people to that mission.

Dr. Matthews: J6.

Gen Brown: One of the decisions General Handy will have to make is on outsourcing. We think we can save, on paper, sixty people by outsourcing.

Dr. Matthews: How about J8? At one time J8 was part of J5.

Gen Brown: Interesting, because LMI recommended that J8 come under J5, but I don't agree with the recommendation. Each person sees the organization from where he sits. If you'll notice, the Surgeon General has been very quiet since no one is seeking to reduce his assets. Force Protection didn't say a word through this whole process until all of a sudden last week they saw that we were thinking of putting them under J3. The truth is, when the J3 needs something quick and fast to make a decision on force protection or intelligence, he doesn't want to have to go through another directorate. He wants to task them and get a fast response.

Dr. Matthews: So J8 should stay as it is?

Gen Brown: Yes. I think J8, at least since I've been here, has been somewhat unique. We need an honest broker when it comes to the budget. The way the CPRP works, which is very J3/4-J6 oriented, is it has a lot of power and handles hundreds of millions of dollars. You need someone outside of that group who looks at the fiscal viability of what we do. We are very operations-focused and not focused enough on costs. If we were a business, we would never hide our CFO [chief financial officer] underneath another director. In the last three years the command has written off almost a half billion dollars. MARAD [Maritime Administration] came in last year with over \$130 million in bills that MSC hadn't paid for a decade. We got that resolved. Within the last six months we've

written off \$100 million of accounts receivable bills by MTMC. AMC has had their problems, too. Development of a good financial system should be one of our top priorities, although it will take years to achieve.

I've been pleased with how we've worked the budget process since I've been here. In the seven years prior to my arrival, the budget grew 15 to 20 percent per year for seven years in a row! I saw that, and said it's going to be zero growth. And we've had zero growth other than for inflation for three years running. I've intentionally been holding off approving \$10 million of J3 MILCON [military construction] projects to see how the reorganization goes. The other reason I've delayed the projects is because the funds are coming out of the TWCF [Transportation Working Capital Fund] and include a million dollar conference room. Okay, we need a new conference room, but who's really going to pay for it? It's going to be the Services who eventually pay for it in their higher rates. The command needs to develop a mind-set that everything costs money, and we must find ways to reduce our rates, or our customers will leave the TWCF when the war on terrorism ends. One of the weak links in strategic distribution is the inability to get relevant, timely, and accurate financial data. Obtaining a new financial system must be a priority, and the chain of command must get more involved in the setting of rates.

Dr. Matthews: How do we save billets by doing the moves that we just discussed? Start with moving deliberate planning back to J5. It's the same function and the same faces. They just don't sit in the same place.

Gen Brown: We won't just move faces because the billet cuts have to be real. We must become more efficient and effective. We need the right

collaborative planning tools and financial data like we just discussed. In addition, we need to decrease the J3/4 span of control so that he can focus his efforts on achieving efficient and effective operations. It's interesting. We historically assign officers with Type A personalities to be J3s, and we get just what we want: very aggressive, hard-charging leaders. General Becker [Air Force Major General John D., TCJ3/4, January 2000 to June 2001, Retired] was this way. General Coolidge was this way, and so is General Welser. All three of them are the kind of leaders who raise their hands and ask for more authority and responsibility. Interestingly enough, all three of them at various times offered proposals to me to increase their spans of control. They need to be focused on current ops and let others perform support functions.

I identified six areas for LMI where I thought there was low hanging fruit to cut. I told them to dig into those areas first and then find more places for potential cuts. The moment you're a bill payer, then everything changes. That's when people and organizations get defensive. I now have five people led by an SES working full-time on the reorganization. Dan McMillin is the perfect individual from within our staff to lead our analysis. He has the temperament, institutional knowledge, and my full trust to do the job. He looks at things non-parochially. I've seen him facilitate groups with a lot of different people, such as the EWG [Executive Working Group], and he's the perfect guy to lead this effort. The tough work is in the next few weeks.

Reorganization: The Direct Reporting Elements

Dr. Matthews: What about the support staff, the DREs [Direct Reporting Elements]?

Gen Brown: I'm generally okay with the DREs, but they need to be looked at as well. The Surgeon's Office is like J2--lots of people--some are fenced, and some are not. Public Affairs has only five billets. We get great work out of the PAO [public affairs officer], but I don't know that it takes five people except during surge periods. DREs could stay as separate activities answering directly to the CINC or be reassigned as the CINC desires. In effect, each CINC determines how much time he wants to spend with particular activities, and he does it regardless of what the chain of command is. The important thing is for DREs to be able to get to the right decision-makers in an expedient manner. I think the creation of the chief of staff position has filled that need for some DREs.

It's important that we have as functional an organization as possible, especially if we're going to be on a war footing for many years. In many cases we're calling up Reserves to serve on our staff and asking them to give up their jobs and leave their families. We need to use our resources wisely.

Reorganization: The Components

Dr. Matthews: As far as the reorganization goes, you said earlier you were looking at the components differently, perhaps reorganizing them along with the headquarters. Is LMI going to look at that as well?

Gen Brown: No, but during the next few years some additional reorganization seems likely. For example, we'll need to consider combining all sealift traffic management under one command. We've already

transferred the MSC container management functions to MTMC. We also need to look at whether it makes sense to have a single traffic manager to handle both the chartering of sealift vessels, which MSC does, and the management of liner vessels, which is MTMC's responsibility. We'll also need to consider whether we want a central operations center that determines mode selection. Until we do so, we'll never be as efficient and effective as required. It doesn't matter whether we're dealing with ships, planes, trucks, or rail; we need to do a better job with mode selection. We need more unity of command and effort to do that. And it needs to be totally transparent to the customer--single billing and single ITV. We do not have that in the Department of Defense today because we have three Service components, and they each have a stovepipe automation information system, separate acquisition authority, etc. We're chipping away at that, but our customers and OSD have not yet demanded a single distribution command. It will come.

Dr. Matthews: How would you go about achieving this single button for traffic management?

Gen Brown: One might begin by looking at the traffic management functions that remain in MSC. Maybe they should transfer over to MTMC. The running of most of the MSC fleet is a pure Navy function. That's one way to get traffic management under one headquarters for everything but airlift, and that will be difficult unless TRANSCOM creates a single operations center.

Inevitably, the command must consider whether MTMC should be a separate Service component or be integrated into TRANSCOM. MTMC is an Army Service component, but it's joint-staffed and has a joint mission. It's a difficult question, but I'm beginning to

believe that MTMC should be integrated into TRANSCOM. Why should it be a Service component when it's doing joint missions, e.g., household goods, multi-modal transportation, etc.? These are not unique Army requirements. The main advantage of having MTMC remain a component command is to ensure resources—funding and people. However, the Army has been using MTMC as a bill-payer for many years. Eventually, I believe we will have further consolidation of joint functions. If we were a business, we would just do it now. Should it be done? Probably. Is it the right time? No. It will probably take further consolidation of distribution functions and a full-time CINC who makes component reorganization a major priority. It would also require consensus from the Service Chiefs and the joint deployment community.

Service Alignment of Directors

Dr. Matthews: Would you recommend changing the Service of any of the key positions in the command? And if so, which ones and why?

Gen Brown: I don't think that the Service alignment makes a big difference as long as you get qualified people and have cross-fertilization of ideas and experience. I believe that having a cross-representation of Services is not only healthy but essential. If we're to achieve transformation, then we have to have new ideas and concepts. Each Service develops people who have unique expertise about their Service's thoughts and ideas. So if you want transformation, you have to have different Services occupy key positions in order to fully leverage new thoughts and ideas. We have historically, other than the deputy commander's job, kept people from the same Services in certain directors' chairs. I don't think that's good. I expect that the CINC position will eventually be rotated among the different Services.

All of the directorates should be rotated among the Services. The only one that's tough is J3, which in peacetime is very air-centric. The fact that we've historically brought in people from the TACC has made a positive difference. However, the downside is that some business practices are probably not questioned by the J3 as much as they should be. At this time, the J4 should probably not be Air Force, and I believe the J3 should not be dual-hatted as the J4. We've had a J4 SES who came from the Army. He's now leaving. I don't know what Service will backfill the position. I believe it should be an SES position, and that makes it kind of tough to rotate it frequently. J1--we're looking at another Service now. J2 has always been Air Force. There's no reason that J2 has to always be Air Force. Some of it depends on which Service is willing to give you a body. We're locked in for the Navy for another two to three years in J5. We've had a succession of quality J5s. The Navy has really done us proud, so it's not criticism; it's just that it is healthy to get a different Service perspective.

Dr. Matthews: Do you have any concern that when we get a Marine into the deputy commander position, and when General Pair leaves, we're not going to have an Army flag officer?

Gen Brown: General Pair will be around for another year or two. It would be bad for TRANSCOM if we don't have a senior Army flag, especially since the Army is our largest customer. Does he or she have to occupy a certain job? No. It might not be the deputy commander, but it may be the J3. The next chief of staff could be, but doesn't have to be, Army. We'll get Reserve nominations, and we ought to take the best qualified person, as long as we can ensure adequate Service representation. There's certainly not going to be an active duty flag officer for chief of staff because most of the Services are cutting back their flag positions, and they

have to fill new positions at NORTHCOM. It will be interesting when General Handy leaves to see if he's replaced by another Air Force four-star. His replacement could be Navy or he could be Army. His replacement might also become a full-time TRANSCOM commander rather than dual-hatted as commander, AMC. Enabling the CINC to be a full-time TRANSCOM commander would be a major step in the right direction.

There's verbiage in the Federal Registry right now that the CINC's position should rotate among the Services. We've had seven Air Force CINCs in a row who have been dual-hatted between TRANSCOM and their AMC responsibilities. It would be interesting if you had a commander who was able to commit himself full-time to TRANSCOM issues. The CINCs we've had have all been exceptional leaders, but both commands (AMC and TRANSCOM) need full-time commanders. One can't command AMC with its 140,000 people and say that's a part-time job. These are huge jobs.

My feeling is that the next big change in TRANSCOM, whether it's in distribution or reorganizing the components, will coincide with the assignment of a full-time four-star who is totally focused on these things. Transformation is a full-time job. The next commander has to come to the job and already understand enough about the organization and transformation trends to say, "Okay, these are the changes we are going to make," and then spend the rest of his tour making them happen. Integrating strategic transportation and wholesale supply will require the full-time commitment of a very talented commander.

Dr. Matthews: A full-time Army four-star?

Gen Brown: A full-time four-star--the Service is less important. The person should, however, ideally understand both transportation and supply. If the Army provides a commander, he will probably be a warfighter, not a log [logistics] guy. It will take a very talented leader. An Air Force four-star can certainly fill that role, but not if he has to split his time commanding AMC. General Robertson once told me that he was able to spend about 20 percent of his time on TRANSCOM and about 80 percent on airlift/AMC issues. Tell me in a year and a half from now when you do General Handy's oral history what he says when you ask him how he split his time. I'll bet you that he'll say he wasn't able to spend more than 60 percent of his time on pure TRANSCOM issues. That's more time than his predecessors, but less than will be required to effect full transformation. A commander who is able to commit himself full-time to TRANSCOM issues will be able to put in place many of the initiatives that commanders like Robertson and Handy started.

Dr. Matthews: The command has never had a Marine Corps flag officer in its history, and here we're going to have a three-star Marine Corps officer. What are some of the benefits that you see with having a Marine Corps three-star?

Gen Brown: Just what we talked about--diversity and additional points of view. This particular officer, Gary Hughey [Marine Corps Major General Gary H.³⁷], also has some DLA experience. I don't know his transportation/distribution experience, but he should certainly understand the wholesale logistics piece. I think that cross-fertilization among Services is essential in joint commands.

³⁷ General Hughey pinned on his third star on 29 August 2002 in a ceremony at USTRANSCOM. He assumed his duties as deputy commander on 3 September 2002.

Dr. Matthews: Is there a chance that Congress will extend the ten billets that the unified commands got and that we used as a chief of staff billet? Will we see our chief of staff billet extended?

Gen Brown: I believe so. When I arrived at TRANSCOM, I was dual-hatted as both the deputy and chief of staff. After about 18 months, we created the chief of staff position, and I selected BG Butch Pair to be our first chief.³⁸ General Pair grew with the position, and his role and responsibilities were significantly expanded as his experience increased. Over time, the CINC and I tried to funnel more and more to the chief. I believe that the chief's role will and should expand even more when I depart.

General Pair is an outstanding and talented general, and so much depends on the talents of his replacement. The average reservist may not have the background to do some of the tasks that General Pair does after two years on the job. The question is how long will it take his replacement to gain that experience? The good news is that the military is developing some very experienced Reserve generals as a result of the war on terrorism.

A chief of staff had been tried in the past using colonels, but the position was always discontinued for various reasons. Butch Pair was actually the fourth chief in the history of the command. The success of the position depends to a large extent on the personality of the chief and the authority granted. Initially, people were very concerned, including some of the directors, about having another chief of staff. We worked all through that, and it turned out great. Butch Pair has the perfect personality and skill set. The next chief needs to have a similar chemistry and experience, so that he hits the ground running.

³⁸ A slate of candidates was interviewed from all Services.

Dr. Matthews: Once General Pair got up to speed, you were able to be a full-time deputy commander rather than dual-hatted as the chief of staff. What do you feel like you've been able to do that you couldn't have done if you were still dual-hatted?

Gen Brown: I thought having a chief of staff was going to free me up to travel and work more on strategic issues. It hasn't achieved that as much as I thought it would, in part, because a lot of the paperwork and administration still flowed to me in the beginning. When General Robertson was here, he still wanted to see my initials on most things that came to him from the staff, so I didn't see a big reduction in my administrative workload. That has begun to evolve over the last six months and, I think, will continue to improve. General Handy is comfortable with my funneling more and more to the chief. There are more occasions where I'm saying, "I don't need to see these anymore," or "The chief ought to sign off on this kind of stuff." General Pair is very happy to do that. He likes responsibility, and therefore, the job will continue to grow.

Dr. Matthews: When we initially started looking at how the chief of staff would function, your O-6 [colonel/Navy captain equivalent] Working Group looked at three possible organizations: one where the chief of staff had virtually no one aligned under him, one where everyone was aligned under him, and one where just the special staff "cats and dogs" were aligned under him. The last option is the one we went to. Is that still the model? Should it be the model, or should we alter it somehow?

Gen Brown: I like the staff working for the chief of staff, not for the deputy commander. I like the deputy commander and commander being in the chain of command in the senior rating scheme of these

people, but I like the staff generally working for the chief. However, it gets a little complicated when you have a J3/4 who's senior to the chief. General Robertson wanted to be in the rating scheme of all the aforementioned people. General Handy is now questioning why he's in the rating scheme for some of these people. I think the chief of staff may eventually supervise all but the J3 and a few of the CINC's special staff, e.g., aides, executive officers, etc.

Conclusion

Dr. Matthews: What were your most difficult challenges while serving as DCINC?

Gen Brown: The job was challenging but fun, and so I never looked at it as being really tough. The hardest thing for any large organization is integration. In the TRANSCOM case, it's how do you integrate the three component commands so that you "speak with one voice" and all have the same priorities? How do you integrate nine different directorates so that they are complimentary and not duplicative? We struggle with that every single day. How do you make sure that what J5 is telling people about strategic requirements is the same thing that J3/4 is telling people? How do you take an information management system that J6 is building and make sure that it supports not only TRANSCOM but three different component commands that have CIOs of their own? It's always integration. The toughest thing for my successor will be integration, especially when DLA and the distribution community get added to the mix.

Dr. Matthews: What do you consider to be your biggest successes?

Gen Brown:

We successfully deployed our forces to Afghanistan. As an aside, we also got the command to start thinking about end-to-end deployment, sustainment, and analyses. I remember talking about end-to-end deployment at our first commander's conference, which was about the second week I was on the job. I had all kinds of stares like "What the heck is this guy talking about?" I was told that TRANSCOM is only interested in deploying to ports of debarkation. We don't have those kinds of comments anymore, and I'd like to think that I'm part of the reason. For example, we added RSOI to the end part of the deliberate planning process, which now means that we build war plans and TPFDDs from origin to tactical assembly areas, and that is significant. The command has learned that throughput is a major challenge, not just strategic deployment.

I'm also especially proud of the fact that we coaxed TRANSCOM into the strategic distribution business. There was never ever any dialogue that said we, TRANSCOM, were going to get into distribution. It was kind of like end-to-end deployment and RSOI; we had to first educate the command. I had flag officers tell me "You just don't understand. That's the AOR of the supported CINC, and we have no responsibility in that AOR. Therefore, we shouldn't be working on RSOI or distribution." I was told, "Supply chain management isn't what we do--we do transportation." It's been a real culture change to move the organization from thinking that all we do is strategic transportation, when, in fact, we do end-to-end force projection/distribution and are an integral and major part of supply chain management. The SD initiatives have resulted in unbelievable improvements in customer wait time, changes in business practices, and getting AMC to understand that they were on a death spiral with their business practices. We are slowly

getting AMC to change their business practices: bring back cargo market share, decrease the amount of dependence on commercial lift, and move more cargo with organic lift. These and many more initiatives are all part of our SD initiative. My fear is that the war on terrorism will increase funds in the TWCF, and therefore, people may relax their demands for business practice changes.

I'm also proud of the fact that we have had zero growth in the budget for the three years I've been here. The CINC and others are going to have to decide whether they want to break that glass ceiling. I'm not sure I'd break it except to handle inflation. I think we still have tremendous inefficiency. For example, we have a lot of contracts we either don't need or are not receiving full value from. I will talk to General Hughey during my transition because I think there is low hanging fruit for him to harvest. It's not that we can't get our hands on TWCF dollars. We can. But the moment that you let people grab TWCF dollars, it's not real money; it's Monopoly money.

We've also made some significant inroads in the J8 accounting section, and I'm particularly proud of the direction we are headed. Ultimately, we need a single finance accounting system for TRANSCOM and its components. Today, we do not have the financial tools for making good, timely, and accurate business decisions.

We have an initiative now to get research and development money for the first time. We'll see if the R&D [research and development] money evolves, because we may find that in the next year when we get R&D money that it could solve a lot of problems. It is unrealistic to have Title 10 funding all in the hands of the Services and not have funding to address joint problems.

We also have an initiative working now to grant us acquisition authority for the very first time. We've worked hard to get acquisition authority, and I believe we will finally get it within the next six months.

I'm proud that we got an ACTD³⁹ [Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration] approved for approximately \$40 million that will provide us with collaborative planning tools. I hope that the command uses the money wisely and that we can develop a mode optimization tool within the next year.

Dr. Matthews: What worries you most about the command and the DTS?

Gen Brown: I'm not worried about the command at all. I'll just offer a few observations. As long as I've been in the military, for 34 years, we've always had to address competing priorities and high OPTEMPO/high PERSTEMPO [personnel tempo]. We think that this is a unique time, but it isn't. Right now the buzz word is "transformation." Every Service is using the word "transformation." The Army is going to implement dominant maneuver and focused logistics. The Air Force is going to develop Air and Space Expeditionary Forces. TRANSCOM is also going to go through change. We are going to reorganize, and we're going to cut 15 percent of our staff. We are going to begin integrating wholesale supply and strategic transportation, and get into the distribution business. With all these changes, it might be easy to wring your hands and say, "Oh my goodness, nothing but priorities and competing requirements and needs. When is this train ever going to slow down?" My observation is that it has always been that way. In times like these it is important to

³⁹ The ATCD program is managed by OSD and funds accelerated development and evaluation of proven advanced technology to meet operational needs.

remember that times have always been like this. It was certainly that way after Vietnam.

I don't have any concerns about change because change is the normal course of events. We ought to embrace it. We ought to be pleased that we are in an occupation where there is constant change. The reason I don't worry about TRANSCOM is that I have a lot of confidence in our people. I'm convinced that we have attracted the right kinds of people into this command to solve almost any problem, if given enough resources. Our people will wrestle through the priorities and sort out the needed transformation changes. We'll then think that we've institutionalized the changes only to find that another group comes behind us and has to effect more change.

My replacement, Gary Hughey, is a great Marine. He will no doubt find many things on his plate that need to be transformed and fixed. And whoever replaces Gary Hughey will have the same situation. That's not bad; that's just the strength of the command.

Dr. Matthews: Anything in particular that you worry about for national defense in this age of the global war on terror?

Gen Brown: My only concern is that the nation will be shortsighted, get tired of the war on terrorism, and not be willing to exert the level of commitment necessary to win the war.

Dr. Matthews: What excites you most about the future of transportation?

Gen Brown: The integration of transportation into a total end-to-end seamless distribution system that is an integral part of the supply chain management system and our national military strategy.

Dr. Matthews: Give me your heartfelt assessment of this assignment.

Gen Brown: First, it was the perfect assignment at the perfect time. I've spent most of my career deploying forces at the operational and tactical levels. This was one of the few jobs that I felt fully qualified for prior to assignment. In the military you are constantly being assigned to a job that supposedly grooms you for the next assignment. The reality is you're usually in a big learning curve. I actually thought I came to this job with a foundation of transportation and force projection expertise to hit the ground running. It made it fun, exciting, and interesting to work the strategic piece of force projection. I have enjoyed every moment.

Second, I've enjoyed the people here about as much as any place I've ever worked. We have a relatively senior group of civilians and military people, and they could not be more dedicated and professional. I will really miss them. The thing that I'll miss the most in the military is working with people who are imbued with our core values: loyalty, duty, respect, selfless service, honor, integrity, and personal courage. That's the part I'm going to miss because that's the part I don't think I'm going to find elsewhere.

Dr. Matthews: What do you want to do next?

Gen Brown: I don't know yet. General Robertson recently gave me some pretty good advice. He took about six months to settle on a job. I don't want to take that long, but I'm not going to jump too fast. I'm going to take a couple of months and get my thoughts and priorities all sorted out and move back to D.C. [Washington, D.C.]. I'll lay out the priorities in a couple of months and see what the options are. I want to be engaged and productive in whatever I do.

Dr. Matthews: Is there anything else you want to put on the record?

Gen Brown: No. We've discussed a lot of things that if I were putting in writing, I would try to say more briefly. [Laughter] It's funny that all the things we talked about are things we would either like to see happen or influenced. We're presently at war, and depending on the lessons learned, may see a lot more changes. If the war does not come out as anticipated, we may see a tremendous demand for change in force structure, doctrine, training, and capital investments. The war on terrorism is going to change a lot of things. Our perspective could be quite different a year from now. That's why we have unit historians.

Dr. Matthews: Yes. There are a lot of fun things about it. You think in time. One of the pleasures in working with you is that you put things in perspective. Thank you, sir.

Biography

Lieutenant General Daniel G. Brown was Deputy Commander in Chief, United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM), Scott Air Force Base, Illinois. USTRANSCOM is a unified command responsible to the Secretary of Defense for the nation's defense transportation systems. USTRANSCOM exercises command over Service transportation components of the Army, Navy, and Air Force.

The general is a native of Baltimore, Maryland, and entered the Army as a Transportation Officer in 1968 after graduating from Furman University with a degree in Political Science. He also holds a Masters of Science degree in Transportation Management from the Florida Institute of Technology. General Brown has held a variety of significant positions to include command of eight units at the company, battalion, brigade, and theater levels.

General Brown's assignments include overseas tours in Vietnam, Korea, Germany, Saudi Arabia, and Somalia. Recent key assignments include Commanding General, Combined Arms Support Command, Fort Lee, Virginia; Commanding General of the US Army Transportation Center, Fort Eustis, Virginia; Commanding General, 19th Theater Army Area Command, Korea; Chief of the Combined Arms Assessment Team, Somalia; Commander, 7th Transportation Group; and Chief of Strategic Mobility on the Army staff.

General Brown and his wife, Janie, have three children.

EDUCATION:

- 1968 Bachelor of Arts degree in Political Science, Furman University
- 1968 Transportation Officer, Basic and Advanced Courses
- 1976 Masters of Science degree in Transportation Management, Florida Institute of Technology
- 1980 Armed Forces Staff College
- 1987 Industrial College of the Armed Forces
- 1999 National Strategic Leadership Studies Program, John Hopkins University

ASSIGNMENTS:

1. January 1969-September 1969, platoon leader, Company C, 35th Supply and Service Battalion, VII Corps, United States Army Europe, Germany.
2. October 1969-October 1970, Commander, 527th Transportation Company, VII Corps, United States Army Europe, Germany.
3. November 1970-October 1971, Chief, Water Transport Section, Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, United States Army, Vietnam.
4. October 1971-May 1973, protocol officer, United States Army Garrison, Fort Hamilton, New York.

5. June 1973-January 1975, transportation movements officer, Eastern Area Military Traffic Management Command, Bayonne, New Jersey.
6. January 1975-August 1975, student, Transportation Officer Advanced Course, United States Army Transportation School, Fort Eustis, Virginia.
7. August 1975-January 1976, S-4 (Logistics), 10th Transportation Battalion, 7th Transportation Group, Fort Eustis, Virginia.
8. January 1976-May 1977, Commander, 1098th Transportation Company, 10th Transportation Battalion, 7th Transportation Group, Fort Eustis, Virginia.
9. June 1977-May 1978, Commander, 155th Transportation Company, 10th Transportation Battalion, 7th Transportation Group, Fort Eustis, Virginia.
10. May 1978-May 1979, S-2/S-3 (Intelligence and Operations), 10th Transportation Battalion, 7th Transportation Group, Fort Eustis, Virginia.
11. May 1979-August 1979, executive officer, 10th Transportation Battalion, 7th Transportation Group, Fort Eustis, Virginia.
12. August 1979-January 1980, student, Armed Forces Staff College, Norfolk, Virginia.
13. February 1980-June 1982, transportation management officer, Joint Deployment Agency, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida.
14. June 1982-December 1983, logistics plans staff officer, United States Readiness Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida.
15. January 1984-June 1986, Commander, Military Traffic Management Command Terminal, Pusan, Korea.
16. June 1986-June 1987, student, Industrial College of the Armed Forces, Washington, D.C.
17. June 1987-July 1989, Chief, Transportation Officer Assignments Branch, Officer Personnel Management Directorate, United States Army Personnel Command, Alexandria, Virginia.
18. August 1989-August 1990, Chief, Strategic Mobility Division, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff of Logistics, United States Army, Washington, D.C.
19. September 1990-August 1991, commander, 7th Transportation Group, 22d Support Command, Operation Desert Shield/Storm, Saudi Arabia.
20. August 1991-November 1992, Commander, 7th Transportation Group, Fort Eustis, Virginia.
21. November 1992-June 1993, Director, Combined Arms Assessment Team, Operation Restore Hope, Somalia.
22. June 1993-June 1995, Commanding General, 19th Theater Army Area Command, Eighth United States Army, Korea.
23. July 1995-August 1997, Commanding General, United States Army Transportation Center, Fort Eustis, Virginia.
24. August 1997-September 1999, Commanding General, United States Army Combined Arms Support Command and Fort Lee, Fort Lee, Virginia.
25. October 1999-September 2002, Deputy Commander in Chief, United States Transportation Command, Scott Air Force Base, Illinois.

SUMMARY OF JOINT ASSIGNMENTS

Feb 1980-Jun 1982, transportation management officer, Joint Deployment Agency, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida.

Jun 1982-Dec 1983, logistics plans staff officer, United States Readiness Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida.

MAJOR AWARDS AND DECORATIONS:

- Defense Distinguished Service Medal
- Distinguished Service Medal
- Legion of Merit (with 4 Oak Leaf Clusters)
- Bronze Star Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster)
- Defense Meritorious Service Medal
- Meritorious Service Medal (with 2 Oak Leaf Clusters)
- Joint Service Commendation Medal
- Army Commendation Medal (with 2 Oak Leaf Clusters)
- Parachutist Badge
- Air Assault Badge
- Army Staff Identification Badge

EFFECTIVE DATES OF PROMOTION:

Second Lieutenant	12 Sep 1968	Colonel	1 May 1990
First Lieutenant	12 Sep 1969	Brigadier General	1 Aug 1993
Captain	12 Sep 1970	Major General	1 Sep 1996
Major	11 Jun 1979	Lieutenant General	3 Oct 1999
Lieutenant Colonel	1 Jul 1984		

Glossary

AB	Air Base
ACTD	Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration
AEF	Air and Space Expeditionary Force
AFB	Air Force Base
AFMC	Air Force Materiel Command
AMC	Air Mobility Command
AOR	area of responsibility
APL	American President Lines, Limited
APOD	aerial port of debarkation
APOE	aerial port of embarkation
AT21	Agile Transportation for the 21st Century
AUTODIN	Automatic Digital Network
AWACS	Airborne Warning and Control System
BG	brigadier general
C-Day	Commencement day, day deployment operation begins
CAT	crisis action team
CENTCOM	See USCENTCOM
CFO	chief financial officer
CINC	Commander in Chief
CINCLOG	Commander in Chief, Logistics Command
CIO	chief information officer
CONPLAN	operation plan in concept format
CONUS	continental United States
COTS	commercial off-the-shelf
CPRP	Chief Information Officer (CIO) Program Review Process
CRAF	Civil Reserve Air Fleet
CRIS	Corporate Resource Information System
D-Day	Day military operation begins
DCINC	Deputy Commander in Chief
DEPORD	deployment order
DIRMOBFOR	Director for Mobility Forces
DLA	Defense Logistics Agency
DMZ	demilitarized zone
DOD	Department of Defense
DPG	Defense Planning Group
DPMO	Deployment Process Modernization Office
DPO	distribution process owner
DRE	Direct Reporting Element
DSB	Defense Science Board
DTS	Defense Transportation System

ELIST	Enhanced Logistics Intratheater Support Tool
ERP	Enterprise Resource Planning
EWG	Executive Working Group
FM	field manual
GATES	Global Air Transportation Execution System
GCCC	Global Command, Control, Communications and Computer Systems (C4S) Coordination Center
GO	general officer
GTN	Global Transportation Network
HDR	humanitarian daily ration
HSV	high speed vessel
ICODES	Integrated Computerized Deployment System
IPL	Integrated Priority List
IT	information technology
ITV	intransit visibility
IWS	Information Work Space
J1	See TCJ1
J2	See TCJ2
J3/4	See TCJ3/4
J5	See TCJ5
J6	See TCJ6
J8	See TCJ8
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JDPO	joint deployment process owner
JDTC	Joint Deployment Training Center
JFAST	Joint Flow and Analysis System for Transportation
JFCOM	See USJFCOM
JIC	see JICTRANS
JICTRANS	Joint Intelligence Center-Transportation
JLB	Joint Logistics Board
JMOC	Joint Mobility Operations Center
JOPEs	Joint Operation Planning and Execution System
JS-J4	Logistics Directorate, Joint Staff
LAD	latest arrival date
LAN	local area network
LMI	Logistics Management Institute
LSD	landing ship dock
LST	landing ship, tank
LSV	logistics support vessel
LZ	landing zone

MARAD	Maritime Administration
MCC	Mobility Control Center
MEF	Marine Expeditionary Force
MILCON	military construction
MOA	Memorandum of Agreement
MOG	maximum on ground
MSC	Military Sealift Command
MSP	Maritime Security Program
MTMC	Military Traffic Management Command
MTW	major theater war
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NIMA	National Imaging and Mapping Agency
NORTHCOM	see USNORTHCOM
O-6	officer pay grade six equal to colonel in Army, Air Force, and Marines, and captain in the Navy
OEF	Operation Enduring Freedom
OPLAN	operation plan
OPTEMPO	operating tempo
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
PACOM	See USPACOM
PAO	public affairs officer
PERSTEMPO	personnel tempo
POD	port of debarkation
POM	Program Objective Memorandum
PSRC	Presidential Selected Reserve Call-up
QDR	Quadrennial Defense Review
R & D	research and development
RDD	required delivery date
RGATES	Remote Global Air Transportation Execution System
RRF	Ready Reserve Force
RSOI	reception, staging, onward movement, and integration
SD	Strategic Distribution
SDDC	(Military) Surface Deployment and Distribution Command
SDMI	Strategic Distribution Management Initiative
SECDEF	Secretary of Defense
SES	senior executive service
TAA	tactical assembly area
TACC	Tanker Airlift Control Center

TALCE	Tanker Airlift Control Element
TCJA	Office of Chief Counsel, USTRANSCOM
TCJ1	Manpower and Personnel Directorate, USTRANSCOM
TCJ2	Intelligence Directorate, USTRANSCOM
TCJ3/4	Operations and Logistics Directorate, USTRANSCOM
TCJ5	Plans and Policy Directorate, USTRANSCOM
TCJ6	Command, Control, Communications and Computer Systems Directorate, USTRANSCOM
TCJ8	Program Management and Financial Analysis Directorate, USTRANSCOM
TFMS	Transportation Financial Management System
TPFDD	Time-Phased Force Deployment Data
TRADOC	US Army Training and Doctrine Command
TRANSCOM	See USTRANSCOM
TSV	theater support vessel
TWCF	Transportation Working Capital Fund
TWG	Threat Working Group
UCP	Unified Command Plan
UK	United Kingdom
ULN	unit line number
UPS	United Parcel Service
USCENTCOM	United States Central Command
USD AT&L	Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics
USJFCOM	United States Joint Forces Command
USNORTHCOM	United States Northern Command
USPACOM	United States Pacific Command
USTRANSCOM	United States Transportation Command
UTC	unit type code
VISA	Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement
VTC	video teleconference

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