

**13. Thinking again of ALL of the projects for which your Provincial Reconstruction Team was responsible, please describe below the THREE MOST COMMON METRICS you used to measure the effectiveness of the reconstruction and stabilization projects that your team completed.**

**FREQUENCIES**

	Frequency	Percent
Response Provided	23	85.2
No Response Provided	4	14.8
Total	27	100.0

**COMMENTS**

decrease in # of daily bomb attacks decrease in # of lives lost increase in average hours of electricity provided increase in # of shops open for business Increase in # children attending school
They changed several times and I don't remember
1. increase in irrigated farm acreage and production of wheat/barley 2. new businesses/joint ventures started 3. number of judges trained & equiped
Sustainability, Private-sector investment, overall economic impact
1. Decrease in violence in targeted areas. 2. Numbers employed 3. Businesses still functioning after a year
Employment Creation - especially for Youth and Women Increased health and well-being Decreased Violence in an area : This is in a way depends on the first two cited above as well as on increased ability of the provincial government to govern.
1) Was the business or institution sustainable. 2) Did the project reduce unemployment 3) Did the project help build sustainable capacity in local governance institutions.
1. # of at risk male youth in a positive activity. 2. quantitative improvement in essential services. 3. quantitative and qualitative measure of economic activity returning to a specific area
Virtually no metrics were actually used.
# of small businesses reopened # of district council meetings held # small grants awarded
None of the projects were well monitored or evaluated if at all. Perhaps people tried to go out and see them but if you asked a PRT member what that meant - most would not know. Most projects were feel good give aways. A waste of tax payers money.
Amount of money spent # items provided # people trained
civic participation, response terrorist attack, sense of normalcy
Site Visits, end user,
Personally -- only two, accountability and sustainability. A third can be added though, and that was how to bridge existing "stand alone" projects somehow into ones that could be accountable

and sustainable.
Whether or not there was a real development objective Whether there was a credible Iraqi counterpart Whether or not the activity was sustainable after US support terminated
Private sector strengthening, i.e. small grants to expand microfinance and support the Private Bankers League
economic growth, employment, increased stability (decrease in violence)
Quarterly maturity matrix
Peaceful coexistence
Number of Business operating Number of Businessmen/women trained Number of local officials trained
time, cost, quality

**14. What do you believe were the THREE MOST COMMON metrics used by the Embassy to measure the effectiveness of projects in your area?**

**FREQUENCIES**

	Frequency	Percent
Response Provided	20	74.1
No Response Provided	7	25.9
Total	27	100.0

**COMMENTS**

Not sure
1. progress towards security & self-sufficiency based on a subjective index for each province (combination of factors) 2. number of security incidents in province (security) 3. budget execution rate for each province (local govt capacity)
I can't speak for the embassy. They came out with a poorly attempted matrix for measuring impact but it was deeply flawed.
The Office of Provincial Affairs within US Embassy Baghdad used the Maturity Model to measure progress.
Increased governance capacity Reduction in Violence Increase in Economic Activity
1) Equitable local governance capacity and sustainability 2) Reduction in unemployment 3) Improvement in security
Public diplomacy does not seem to have metrics.
The Embassy State PRT had a general maturity model to assess projects but there was almost no follow up. In fact, they just made educated guesses on the maturity model. I saw no evidence of any data collection at all, Judgements were based on impressions of people who sat at the PRT on the airport grounds. USAID, by contrast, had monitoring and evaluation mechanisms in place for their operations.
Something related to neighborhood cleaning operation # short term jobs created
Same as above.
amount of money spent # communities receiving project(s) # items provided
Can't recall. We had a specific form that we had to fill out on a periodic basis.
civic participation, response terrorist attack, sense of normalcy
site visits, surveys
By the Embassy -- "Positive cable," GOI comfort factor, number of projects funded.
Whether or not the money got spent Who at the US State Department or US military supported the project Whether the Iraqi government wanted the project
Site visits and follow up reports by USAID unit employed to execute grants.
disbursed funds, numbers employed

decrease unemployment
I have no idea

**18. What indicators led you to believe that some CERP funding was lost to fraud or corruption? Please write in your answer.**

**FREQUENCIES**

	Frequency	Percent
Response Provided	23	85.2
No Response Provided	4	14.8
Total	27	100.0

**COMMENTS**

<p>I believe funds were lost to fraud and corruption (unintentional on the USG part) while (intentional) on the part of private businesses, and national and local leaders as acts of fraud and corruption were an intergral part of the Iraqi business culture. It was viewed as the overhead cost for doing business in an extreme volitale environment.</p>
<p>While we were very careful (we were very experienced development professionals with decades working overseas in difficult environments) I think some of the CERP money was just handed out and no real accounting was asked for. While I think the money used by USACE for electrical improvements in Sadr city was all accounted for, many of the electrical components were never installed and just sat in a warehouse. This was becasue USACE's responsiblity was to ensure that things were opurchased and delivered, which they were, but said they were not responsible for installing. While I have no personal knwoeldge of this. I would not be surprised to learn that things "disappeared" from the warehouse. I also heard that some of the components may have been destroyed due to fires and mortar rounds falling in the warehouse.</p>
<p>- Physical inspection of construction sites. Perhaps there was no out-right fraud, but quality of construction tended to be poor and overpriced. - Physical inspection of equipment delivered might be used instead of new and quality standards poor. - Feedback from recipients indicated that they were appreciative but quality of workmanship and warranty was poor. Recipients did not know how much was spent, so they did not know what quality to expect.</p>
<p>I have no way of measuring how much may have been lost to fraud. When I suspected fraud on one project, we withheld payment and investigated the matter. It was an issue of shoddy construction and we withheld payment until all the issues were corrected to the appropriate standard.</p>
<p>There were a couple of projects which we were informed were not completed by the implementing agent(s).</p>
<p>While working in the [Province] on helping establish a local farmer's cooperative I identified skimming of funds from wages paid and expenses paid by the president of the local association contracted to help establish the cooperative. In [Province] we were presented with bids by local government officials from their "selected" suppliers that were as much as 50 to75% more than bids we got from disinterested 3rd parties for the same equipment for example.</p>
<p>I visited a school in southern Baghdad province and saw a large crack in an important wall of the structure that had recently been built by an Iraqi contractor with USG funds. This poor</p>

<p>construction observation was a very frequent occurrence. Funds were not being used correctly, and contracting competent contractors was problematic.</p>
<p>I believe that the CERP money went to things like hoop houses which were not traceable. I do not think that USG people took any resources, but let them go to locals who did not put them to good use.</p>
<p>CERP funds managed by young, naive (but well intentioned) young US army Officers. Funds went to grossly overinflated cost estimates, funds used by contractors to "buy" protection/security.</p>
<p>It was a conflict post-conflict situation, it is to be expected and can't be avoided. The Iraqis knew how to manipulate us and we could not monitor or evaluate most projects so a lot of money was wasted. Maybe if we had more experienced people IN CHARGE instead of people who had never really worked outside of the US or the Embassy we could have done a much better job.</p>
<p>making payments in cash to people without quality IDs microloans were particularly egregious--take people's word, difficult to follow up, women had men outside the door just waiting for them to exit to take the money unable to check quality of items provided in difficult areas (i.e. sheep health, chicken age) hear from Iraqis (govt or community) about shoddiness of project or didn't receive what was promised</p>
<p>The programs that were implemented through government contractors (who were the government officials themselves) had a very high level of fraud and corruption. Especially the trash collection contracts. The programs we funded through international NGOs were much better.</p>
<p>limited competition</p>
<p>interviews of workers, stakeholders and NGOs</p>
<p>Deliverables were not meeting standards intended or quality of other projects similar in nature done by non-PRT organizations (NGOs).</p>
<p>There was no way to know those with whom were were dealing, and very little opportunity to check bids and follow up. With no system of monitoring and evaluation, our programs were ripe for fraud and mismanagement by all parties.</p>
<p>I have no evidence that funds were stolen or misused. Many requests that made were turned down because of the possibility of fraud.</p>
<p>I think in the environment it was very difficult to secure accurate costs, monitor project implementation and avoid corruption and colluded pricing.</p>
<p>The focus of PRT, CERP and other funding sources was to implement projects - almost any projects - and move the funds as more was usually coming down the pipeline. With such a focus, I believe that fraud and corruption thrives.</p>
<p>Gut feeling but nothing concrete</p>
<p>The rates that were being charged to carry-out various activities, especially through the military infrastructure projects. Most proposals overcharged on admin costs and salaries and with QRF we were able to mitigate it. There was one project that built a traditional Marsh Arab house more meeting place on land adjacent to a COB [contingency operating base] and funds included payment for the land which was not owned by anyone but was claimed by a tribe --there are no land title in Iraq and any land was leased to individuals, given that this land was next to the</p>

International Highway (Tampa) it could not have belonged to a tribe. The high price was used to buy good will in my opinion.

the number on NGO which suddenly showed up at the door asking for funding for their pet project the vagueness of project description and implementation plan the social positions of a number of applicants the claimed connections to obtain rapidly permits and approvals the lack of corporate history and references the impossibility to conduct effective due diligence etc...

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**19. Please provide below any additional comments you may have on the use of CERP for reconstruction and stabilization, or the measurement of its impact that you feel would be beneficial to this project. Please DO NOT enter any personal information in this field.**

**FREQUENCIES**

	Frequency	Percent
Response Provided	18	66.7
No Response Provided	9	33.3
Total	27	100.0

**COMMENTS**

For the first 9 months of my tour I was fortunate to work with a brigade commander that demonstrated every day his willingness to work with other USG partners in stabilization operations. The number of violent attacks dropped considerably as we worked together. He took risks in conflict mitigation working with the USIP [US Institute for Peace] that I found inspiring. I don't have the metrics, or remember them now but you can look at the number, violence decreased significantly.

- Increased Transparency of Funding. We should have increased transparency of the funding so that beneficiaries and local govt authorities could help demand deliver of better products and services. Since few entities knew the cost of our projects, they assumed that contractors were ripping us off but could not help us demand greater quality/value of services. - Closer Collaboration with Local Government. We should have worked closer with local council authorities, allowing them to help identify projects and sit/approve awards. We assumed that they wanted to participate only so that they could direct our contracts to their friends--based on my experience this assumption was wrong. They too were interested in ensuring that their community/province received value for the USG funds spent. Those USAID programs like CAPIII where many parties were actively engaged in the decision-making process and contract award resulted in obviously much greater value and/or lower costs. Most of our contracting specialists did not know the cost of doing business in Wasit.

1) Please realize that the goals of our work evolved. Initially, the goal was counter-insurgency and stemming the violence. This included short-term, quick fix projects. Once the violence subsided, the goal changed to longer-term, sustainable projects that required greater investment from our Iraqi counter-parts and private sector. Success / impact should be measured differently depending on the situation at the time and the objectives. I watched DOD waste a lot of money on projects that lacked buy-in from the Iraq government and private sector. The biggest waste was with the Army Corp of Engineers. For example, they built three compact water treatment units - but built them adjacent to waste-water runoff, so they were later abandoned. It was idiotic.

Many of the questions in this survey show a fundamental lack of understanding of the PRT program as it functioned in Iraq Most fundamental is the point that PRTs were not given resources to implement projects. We coordinated the projects funded and implemented by other USG entities. The only projects managed by the PRTs were those funded by the Quick



Response Fund (QRF), with small projects being directly funded and managed by the PRTs and larger projects being proposed by PRTs, approved by an OPA/USAID [Office of Provincial Affairs] chaired review committee, and implemented by the USAID Iraq Rapid Assistance Project (IRAP). I highly recommend that PRTs be given limited project funds to implement projects (small amounts directly and larger amounts through an implementing partner). The most effective single program of interventions I observed in Iraq was the voter education effort implemented by IRAP in the run up to the 2009 Provincial Elections. Over 300,000 Iraqi Citizens participated in voter education activities and millions more were reached through media and billboards.

USG needs to do a better job of screening PRT or any development staff for their experience and ability to contribute to development projects before sending them to these difficult conflict or post conflict environments. Also when switching expat staff in and out there definitely needs to be at least a two week overlap of the incumbent with the individual expected to take the incumbent's place. Once reasonable stabilization has taken place DOS and USAID need to take a stronger lead in ongoing reconstruction efforts. Civil society and economic development is their mandate!!

Be careful about PRT members using the position to enhance business opportunities post-PRT placement. Most USG have a year waiting period, but some indications were that people (military) who left the PRT/Service used their connections to promote their own business.

I also served in Afghanistan. The Iraq campaign & experience was mixed at best - but we were learning & some loss should have been expected. Some progress was definitely made & seen. It was not nearly as egregious as Afghanistan. Our work and campaign in Afghanistan was over-the top outrageous. The most intellectually dishonest exercise I have seen in my 30 years with the USG. pathetically wasteful in all accounts ( time, energy, resources, etc )

people who dreamed up projects were not experienced in development or how to make a project viable and sustainable. Much of my time was spent working with mil or State people trying to convince them of basic development principles. Because I had no authority as an advisor, I was very often ignored. Development is a sophisticated field in which much has been learned over many years. Giving people too much money to spend in a short time (and rewarding money spent instead of project quality) brought out some wild ideas that had no basis in development experience or could even pass the laugh test. And my time was toward the end when the money had considerably dried up. I shudder to think about earlier. Key points: understanding the development context (learn about how the people think and act, do not just assume that what worked in Alabama is going to work in Iraq), proper development planning (what does this project contribute to? how will it be sustained?), Iraqi leadership and ownership (Iraqi leaders are often well educated and know better than we do how things can work--we needed to work with those people not just shove something down a community's throat). I could go on and on about Embassy PRT funds and CERP. I would just like to say that, in a place like Iraq, the chances are high that much will not work. However, if that PRT and CERP funding had been channeled to broader development projects that supported Iraqi ownership, Iraqi accountability and sustainability, we would have wasted a lot less money. USAID has had many mess ups in Iraq but for all that, the people we have trained, the technical assistance we provided and the capacity we have developed in systems will prove more useful and sustainable in the long run.

All the money spent on small electrical generators was a waste. We spend even more money

paying for fuel. When we would go back to check, none of the generators were actually in use. For all the billions we spend on 1.5 to 5 KW gasoline generators, we could have built one 200 MW diesel powered thermal power plant. We (especially the military) were throwing money at the Iraqis. And we let them award the contracts. Who got the contracts? Themselves! Just look at what happened when we transitioned to ICERP. All of a sudden the Iraqis didn't want to fund contracts because now they were spending their own money. After about Jan 2008 the stability increased drastically and we really should have reduced our funding. We did eventually, by 2009 we pretty much into ICERP. Our footprint was too large, we were loath to close ePRTs and PRTs (or get rid of brigades for that matter). But the bulk of reconstruction funds were not spent through ePRTs and PRTs, it was spend by the military. Our numbers (including the USAID numbers) were really very small compared to what the army was spending. And brigade and battalion (or squadran) commanders couldn't spend it fast enough.

USG agencies such as Military, DoD, DOS, trusted many Iraqies quickly and little vetting was done. GOI although always intended to take part but thier officiels are the most crrupted.

Accountability and sustainability are key questions that needed to be asked at every plateau of the project phase, and this was simply not done in by far the majority of the cases. Projects lacked value chain aspects of development and management standards. Qualified and experienced personnel in development, not diplomacy or security specialists were not used or consulted in far too many funded projects, accounting for waisted resources and governmental funds.

There was never a plan or strategy for what ePRTs or PRTs were to accomplish. Further, they were not managed, and evaluated by development professionals, but by diplomats and soldiers. This was a tragic and wasteful flaw, albeit an avoidable one. As a result, hundreds of millions of dollars of tax payer money was wasted. I personally saw the US military give away millions of dollars of equipment and cash without any real development or COIN objective. My service on both an ePRT and PRT was one of the most challenging experiences of my development career because of the astounding level of incompetence, fraud, and mismanagement. The local counterparts with whom we dealt with during the day were dealing with the bad guys every night. Further, we relied too heavily on US or TCN [third-country national] Arabic speakers whose only talent was that they spoke the language, who viewed US assistance as an entitlement. These so called experts were responsible for the waste of tens of millions of dollars. The Iraq PRT and ePRT system should be a primer on how NOT to operate in the future! The system was a total waste of taxpayer funds and a complete failure. While I am critical of the US State Department leadership of the PRTs and waste of millions of dollars of Commander Emergency Response Funds, I do not blame the personnel. Our military folks were outstanding. They were merely given a brief that completely exceeded their skills and training. Diplomats and warriors are not development professionals. Further, USAID staffing in Iraq was miserable. It was clear they did not have the ability to bring the right people for the job. But then again, they were the junior partner in the failing troika of the US Dept of State, USAID and the military. On paper the system was flawed and in practice it was a disaster! Its only beneficiaries were inept and corrupt Iraqi government officials, selected Iraqi private sector cronies, and those in the US government system who use Iraq to feather their careers. Next time, you may consider not allowing the test takers to grade their own papers.

I have read many reports about waste and abuse that were usually questioned costs in audits, however I also know that in reply to those findings most funds were eventually accounted for in

the end. If Brigade Commanders used funds, they were authorized to do so and at least in Baghdad sought out our council to channel funds to existing USAID projects to complement the respective SOW.

Stewardship of USG resources is of course paramount as we program stabilization funds but it is also important to realize the objective for stability expenditure is to save our soldiers lives. Often getting things going quickly to accomplish that objective (saving lives) has some inherent fiscal accountability risks. It is very difficult to implement and monitor development programs in a war zone and I think we need to limit this kind of programming which has longer term and broader financial implications. Implementing successful development programs is challenging even in areas not experiencing active warfare.

A balance of practical pre-project assessment, transparent procurement, host-government or community input and contribution, project monitoring and post-project impact assessment would be a sound system. Iraq is not the US, and too many civilian advisors and military staff never really did realize this simple fact. Throwing money at perceived problem causes generally does nothing to address the actual systemic causes of a problem.

Believe that funds allocated were used responsibly and that the objectives for projects were honorable and needed. There were excellent safeguards and monitoring to ensure sound fiscal discipline were implemented.

Often initiatives were undertaken with very little analysis or stakeholder consultation, it was very personality driven. For example, on one PRT the 'onelabtop' per child program was pursued with the PRT sending folks to Boston for training. While noble in its effort the device did not support Arabic and in my opinion was not achieve its intended impact, especially when basic literacy and numeracy where the challenges face by most primary school children. Another project sought to build a bridge to a mosque over a rather small canal. It put people to work constructing the bridge but overall it really wasn't the type of projected needed for that community. In general, the short assignments of PRT reps made projects very personality driven, not to mention contingent on the flavor of the month from Washington. Most PRTs had almost no experience in community development, reconstruction or development in general. Efforts often resembled "Peace Corps on steroids" intended to build good will but not much real impact for the dollar spent. PRT' s bought a lot of much needed good will and that was useful at the time, particularly 2007-2009 but the reconstructions goals and objectives were well beyond the capacity of the teams that were charged with task. The rush to fill position and subject matter experts was haphazard and not well thought through. USAID should have had much more prevalence in decision-making but was often side-lined or contingent on the personality of the PRT leader. Individuals assigned to PRTs needed 2-3 year commitments as opposed to one year tours. The Iraqis took advantage of this situation or were often just to frustrated of seeing another American face. The military civil affairs teams often confused the situation more as their priorities often were in direct conflict with PRT priorities. In some cases it worked well, even very well but for too short a of period of time before another unit rotated in--and then back to square-one It was clear that the military did not have the experience it needed to operate functional civil affairs teams, at least in 2006/7/8 and that the need for actionable intelligence or PR outweighed good projects and spending tax dollars wisely. The number of PRT reps with Arabic language skills was unfortunately wholly inadequate. BBA's [bilingual, bi-lateral advisors] were not very competent some of which didn't really understand the Iraqi dialect. The effectiveness of a good PRT has a direct correlation with the number of individuals who could

navigate the many nuances of the Iraqi culture. In Iraq, Arabic was my sword and my shield and it helped me build more capital in trust and good will than any road or sewage treatment plant could---that's just my opinion albeit one from someone who has lived in the Arab world for 10 years prior to Iraq. In Iraq its about relationships and good will built not dollars dispersed or expended. PRT's should have focused more on building good will and less on the number of dollars spent on so-so reconstruction projects that often didn't meet our expectations or those of the Iraqis.

reconstruction and stabilization is a difficult endeavor at any time, but in time of war it is near impossible. very few USG staff were prepared for the conditions found in Iraq. A lot of good and well intended people could not catch all the balls, so you have to accept some failure (a certain amount of fraud had to be expected) do not go to war unless you are sure to win the war do not go to wa unless you are sure to win the hearts and minds of the people you fight for. Reviewing the effectiveness of USG funds for reconstruction and stabilization at this time may be too early. Now that the US troops are out (by December), let see what will happen in the next five years. Personally I am pessimistic about the sustainability of our efforts over the long run. Please redo a similar survey in 5 years