Containment Facility Design and Construction (Secondary Barriers)

skip navigation
Home Resources Program Reviews & Reports Training Facility Inspection Videos Checklists Biosafety in Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories (BMBL) Containment Facility Design and Construction (Secondary Barriers) Containment for Work with Eastern Equine Encephalitis virus Guidance for the Inactivation of Select Agents and Toxins Guidance on the Use of Infectious Waste Treatment and Radiation Facilities Outside of Registered Space Guidelines for Avian Influenza Viruses Incident Response Plan Long Term Storage NIH Guidelines Prudent Practices in the Laboratory: Handling and Management of Chemical Hazards SA Grams Security Related Information Synthetic Genomics About Us Forms APHIS/CDC Form 1 - Application for Registration for Possession, Use, and Transfer of Select Agents and Toxins APHIS/CDC Form 2 - Request to Transfer Select Agents and Toxins APHIS/CDC Form 3 - Report of Theft, Loss or Release of Select Agents or Toxins APHIS/CDC Form 4 - Report of the Identification of a Select Agent or Toxin APHIS/CDC Form 5 - Request for Exemption of Select Agents and Toxins for Public Health or Agricultural Emergency or Investigational/Experimental Product Helpful Information Regulations Legislation Privacy Statement FOIA Act Accessibility Statement Related Links Operations Security Risk Assessments Select Agents & Toxins Select Agents and Toxins List Select Agents and Toxins - Exclusions Select Agents and Toxins - Restricted Experiments Permissible Toxin Amounts FAQ's General FAQ's Report of the Identification of a Select Agent or Toxin FAQ's Security FAQ's Security Risk Assessments FAQ's Transfers FAQ's Last Updated: Wednesday, August 31, 2011
Containment Facility Design and Construction (Secondary Barriers) In high containment environments, such as BSL-3 and ABSL-3 laboratories, engineering controls play a significant role in preventing the release of pathogenic agents. Correct laboratory ventilation is one of the most effective engineering controls in high containment laboratories. The 5^th edition of the CDC/NIH publication Biosafety in Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories (BMBL) makes the following recommendations regarding the design of BSL-3 and ABSL-3 laboratory ventilation systems: BSL-3 D9: "The laboratory shall be designed such that under failure conditions the airflow will not be reversed." ABSL-3 D6: "The ABSL-3 animal facility shall be designed such that under failure conditions the airflow will not be reversed." The BMBL also makes the following recommendations regarding BSL-3/ABSL-3 general facility verification, as follows: BSL-3 D15: "The BSL-3 facility design, operational parameters and procedures must be verified and documented prior to operation. Facilities must be re-verified and documented at least annually." ABSL-3 D14: "The ABSL-3 facility design and operational procedures must be documented. The facilities must be tested to verify that the design and operational parameters have been met prior to use. Facilities should be re-verified at least annually against these procedures as modified by operational experience." The Federal Select Agent Program is in agreement with these recommendations and has developed policy to apply these recommendations to our regulatory processes. These policies on HVAC verification and overall facility verification are described in the link: BSL-3/ABSL-3 Verification.(PDF 206KB)	Change Text Size: A A A Print This Page
Home \| Resources \| About Us \| Forms \| Helpful Information \| Operations \| Select Agents & Toxins \| FAQ's