

#### NTSB National Transportation Safety Board

# The San Bruno Accident and Where We Go From Here

Honorable Mark R. Rosekind, Ph.D. Board Member


8<sup>th</sup> Annual Pipeline Opportunities Conference April 4, 2012

## **Pipeline Safety Opportunities**


Lessons learned

Actions needed













# 13,454 Safety Recommendations issued since 1967



# "Swiss Cheese" Model (Reason)



Successive layers of defenses, barriers, and safeguards



Pacific Gas and Electric Company Natural Gas Transmission Pipeline Rupture and Fire San Bruno, California September 9, 2010



**Accident Report** 

NTSB/PAR-11/01 PB2011-916501





#### **Factual Information**

- September 9, 2010 at about 6:11 p.m. (PDT)
- 30-inch-diameter segment of an intrastate natural gas transmission pipeline ruptured
- rupture produced 72 ft long by 26 ft wide crater
- ruptured pipe: 28 feet long, ~3,000 pounds, found 100 feet south of the crater
- estimated 47.6 million standard cubic feet of natural gas was released



# **Ruptured Pipe**





#### PG&E/San Bruno Gas Pipeline Explosion

- 8 fatalities
- 10 serious injuries
- 48 minor injuries





- 108 homes affected
  - 38 destroyed
  - 17 sev mod damage
  - 53 minor damage







San Bruno, CA




#### **Probable Cause: PG&E**

- (1) inadequate quality assurance and quality control in 1956 relocation project
  - allowed the installation of a substandard and poorly welded pipe section
  - with a visible seam weld flaw
  - over time grew to a critical size
  - causing the pipeline to rupture during a pressure increase
  - stemming from poorly planned electrical work



## **Ruptured Pipe**



Photograph of the 28-foot-long ruptured section of pipeline



#### **Probable Cause: PG&E**

(2) inadequate pipeline integrity management program, which failed to detect and repair or remove the defective pipe section



## **Contributing Factors**

- CPUC and DOT exemptions of existing pipelines from regulatory requirement for pressure testing
  - likely would have detected the installation defects
- CPUC's failure to detect the inadequacies of PG&E's pipeline integrity management program



### **Contributing to Accident Severity**

 lack of either automatic shutoff valves or remote control valves on the line and PG&E's flawed emergency response procedures and delay in isolating the rupture to stop the flow of gas

— 95 minutes to shutoff gas flow —



### Safety Recommendations: 39

- PHMSA (16)
- PG&E (12)
- CPUC (5)
- U.S. Secretary of Transportation (4)
- INGAA and AGA (1)
- Governor of California (1)



# Beyond San Bruno . . .



#### **Action Areas**

- Aging infrastructure
  - records
  - testing
- Leak: timely/correct response
  - leak identification/location
  - shutoff (ACV/RCSV)
  - EM plan/response
- Safety regs/integrity management
  - reactive \_\_\_\_ proactive



# Aging Infrastructure: Records



San Bruno, CA




# Testing and Inspection



DuBois pipe failure





DuBois house destruction

#### **Leak Identification and Location**







Marshall, MI




### Timely Response: ASV/RCSV

- NTSB recommendations for 40 years
   1972 (P-72-014):
  - "institute main line valve changes or modifications needed to reduce substantially the amount of time required to completely block off and isolate a failed pipeline section. Consideration should be given to the use of automatically operated valves, remotely operated valves"



## Timely Response: ASV/RCSV









#### Leak: Timely/Correct Response

- Emergency response
  - response plans/scenarios/practice
  - local first responders informed (location, substance, called)
  - coordination: company/emergency responders
  - community education

    (early warning system; emergency action)
  - post-action evaluation/improvement



## Safety Regs/Integrity Management

- Safety regulations = minimum standard
- Integrity management programs
  - 10 years old, time to evaluate
  - address strengths and limitations

Reactive proactive



## **Action Areas = Safety Opportunities**

- Aging infrastructure
  - records
  - testing
- Leak: timely/correct response
  - leak identification/location
  - shutoff (ACV/RCSV)
  - EM plan/response
- Safety regs/integrity management
  - reactive \_\_\_\_ proactive



# **Changing Safety Culture**

Safety goal . . .







NTSB