



**UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
REGION II  
SAM NUNN ATLANTA FEDERAL CENTER  
61 FORSYTH STREET SW SUITE 23T85  
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303-8931**

January 22, 2003

Florida Power & Light Company  
ATTN: Mr. J. A. Stall  
Senior Vice President of Nuclear Operations  
PO Box 14000  
Juno Beach, FL 33408-0420

**SUBJECT: TURKEY POINT NUCLEAR PLANT - INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT  
50-250/02-04, 50-251/02-04**

Dear Mr. Stall:

On January 4, 2003, the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Turkey Point Units 3 and 4. The enclosed integrated inspection report documents the inspection findings which were discussed on January 8, 2003, with Mr. J. McElwain and other members of your staff.

The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.

Based on the results of this inspection, no findings of significance were identified.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records ( PARS) component of the NRC's document system (ADAMS). Adams is accessible from the NRC Web site at <http://www.nrc.gov/NRC/ADAMS/index.html> (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

**/RA/**

Joel T. Munday, Chief  
Reactor Projects Branch 3  
Division of Reactor Projects

Docket Nos. 50-250, 50-251  
License Nos. DPR-31, DPR-41

Enclosure: Inspection Report Nos.: 50-250/02-04, 50-251/02-04

cc w/encl: (See page 2)

cc w/encl:

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION II

Docket Nos: 50-250, 50-251

License Nos: DPR-31, DPR-41

Report No: 50-250/02-04, 50-251/02-04

Licensee: Florida Power & Light Company

Facility: Turkey Point Nuclear Plant, Units 3 & 4

Location: 9760 S. W. 344<sup>th</sup> Street  
Florida City, FL 33035

Dates: September 29, 2002 - January 04, 2003

Inspectors: C. Patterson, Senior Resident Inspector  
J. Reyes, Resident Inspector  
R. Hamilton, Radiation Specialist (Sections 20S1 and 40A1.2)  
J. Wallo, Senior Security Specialist (Section 40A5)  
K. Davis, Security Specialist (Section 40A5)

Approved by: Joel T. Munday, Chief  
Reactor Projects Branch 3  
Division of Reactor Projects

Enclosure

## SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000250/2002-004, IR 05000251/2002-004; Florida Power & Light; 09/29/2002-01/04/2003; Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 3 & 4; Routine Integrated Report.

The report covered a three month period of inspection by resident inspectors and announced inspections by a regional radiation specialist and two security specialists. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, "Reactor Overnight Process", Revision 3, dated July 2000.

A. Inspector Identified and Self-Revealing Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

B. Licensee Identified Findings

None.

## REPORT DETAILS

### Summary of Plant Status:

Unit 3 operated at full power during this inspection period.

Unit 4 reactor power was reduced to less than 5 percent power and the turbine taken offline on October 4, 2002, to repair a high pressure turbine drain line steam leak. The unit returned to power operation on October 5, 2002, and remained at full power the remainder of the inspection period.

### 1. REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity (Reactor-R)

#### 1R01 Adverse Weather Protection

##### a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's cold weather preparations to verify that station procedure, 0-ONOP-103.2, Cold/Hot Weather Conditions, had been adequately implemented and to verify the station was prepared to operate the units in a cold weather environment. The inspectors reviewed specific cold weather operational issues relating to two systems, the 'B' Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) pump oil leak, and the 3B Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) lube oil immersion heaters. Work orders, condition reports, and corrective actions items were reviewed to verify they had been adequately implemented and/or scheduled commensurate with safety significance.

##### b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

#### 1R04 Equipment Alignment

##### a. Inspection Scope

Partial System Walkdowns: The inspectors performed three partial system walkdowns during this inspection period. To evaluate the alignment of redundant trains/systems when the other train/system was out-of-service, the inspectors reviewed the licensee's operating procedure, Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) system description, and system drawings to determine that the systems were correctly aligned. The inspectors reviewed the applicable tagout and tag placement on the affected systems. The following systems were inspected:

- 4A EDG while the 4B EDG was undergoing maintenance.
- Steam supply to AFW pumps while Unit 4 Train 1 steam supply was isolated for piping replacement
- Intake Cooling water (ICW) A header while B header out of service for work on POV-3-4882, ICW header isolation valve.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R05 Fire Protectiona. Inspection Scope

The inspectors toured six plant areas to evaluate conditions related to control of transient combustibles and ignition sources, the material condition and operational status of fire protection systems, and selected fire barriers used to prevent fire damage or fire propagation. The inspectors reviewed these activities against provisions in the licensee's off Normal Operating Procedure, 0-ONOP-016.8, Response to a Fire/Smoke Detection System Alarm, 0-SME-091.1, Fire and Smoke Detection System Annual Test, 0-ADM-016, Fire Protection Plan, and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R. The following areas were inspected:

- Unit 3A and 3B EDG Day Tank Fuel Room
- Unit 3A and 3B EDG Engine Room
- Unit 3 and Unit 4 Control Room
- Unit 3 and Unit 4 Cable Spreading Room
- Unit 3 and Unit 4 Direct Current Equipment Room
- Unit 3B and 4A Battery Room

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R06 Flood Protection Measuresa. Inspection Scope

The inspectors monitored the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) rooms flood protection system to review the condition and availability of the system during sump pump replacements. Each of the A and B pump rooms and the RHR heat exchanger room contain two sump pumps per sump in each room. In Unit 3 the pumps were replaced to correct various deficiencies and improve system reliability. The inspectors reviewed the work in progress and testing of the six sump pumps to ensure adequacy of the flood protection system for these rooms.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R11 Licensed Operator Requalificationa. Inspection Scope

On December 4, 2002, the inspectors observed one licensed operator re-qualification training scenario on the control room simulator to assess operator's response to a simulated accident. The inspectors reviewed the lesson plan for the scenario which involved an accident condition with an Anticipated Transient Without Scram and faulted Steam Generator. The inspectors verified that operator's response was in accordance with the Emergency Operating Procedures. The inspectors checked the emergency action levels were made consistent with the emergency plan. The inspectors attended the training critique to verify that issues identified during the training were addressed.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R12 Maintenance Effectivenessa. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the following two maintenance items to assess the effectiveness of maintenance on selected structures, systems, and components scoped into the maintenance rule, (10 CFR 50.65) and to verify procedural requirements specified in procedure O-ADM 728, Maintenance Rule Implementation. The inspectors independently reviewed the goal settings for the Unit 4 Steam Jet Air Ejector (SJAE) system particulate iodine noble gas (SPING) and the Unit 3 Containment Air Radiation Monitor. Both components were entered into A1 status for repeat maintenance preventable functional failures (MPFF) as described in CR 02-1932 and 02-1955 respectively. The inspectors also reviewed the technical issues and associated corrective actions with the system engineer. On November 7 and November 14, 2002, the inspectors attended the Maintenance Rule expert panel meeting to verify adequate A1 goal settings for systems entered into A1.

The inspectors reviewed the characterization of failures, safety significance classifications, and the appropriateness of performance criteria and corrective actions for the following condition reports (CRs):

- CR 02-1932                      U4 SJAE SPING entered into A1 for repeat MPFF
- CR 02-1955                      U3 R11 entered into A1 for repeat MPFF

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.



### 1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control

#### a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the following six emergent items, as described in the referenced CRs or work orders (WOs). The inspectors verified that the emergent work activities were adequately planned and controlled, as described in O-ADM-068, Work Week Management and O-ADM-225, On Line Risk Assessment and Management. The inspectors verified that, as appropriate, contingencies were in place to reduce risk, minimize time spent in increased risk configurations, and avoid initiating events. The following items were reviewed:

- CR - 02-1916            Reactor Trip Bypass Breaker Failure To Close Remotely
- CR - 02-2046            Train 2 AFW piping Corrosion
- CR - 02-2134            3A Condensate Pump Discharge Check Valve Failed To Close
- CR - 02-2157            4B EDG Failure During Surveillance
- CR - 02-2254            AFW Control Valve, CV-3-2817, Oscillating
- CR - 02-2107            3CD Air Compressor Internal Check Valve Failure

#### b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

### 1R14 Personnel Performance During Non-routine Plant Evolutions and Events

#### a. Inspection Scope

On November 12, 2002, the inspectors observed the Unit 3 reactor operators performance during a planned non-routine evolution associated with the condensate system. Previously while securing the condensate pump, the corresponding discharge check valve did not close. This caused back flow through the check valve and caused feedwater pump suction pressure to decrease. As a result, reheat water was automatically bypassed to the feedwater pumps. Due to the small transient, an unplanned reactivity change occurred. The licensee subsequently wrote a temporary procedure to close the 'A' condensate discharge valve so that the pump could be secured. The inspectors reviewed the temporary procedure 3-OP-073 OTSC 0261-02, Condensate System, with the control room supervisor and observed the control room activities during the evolution. Contingencies to address a potential feedwater trip and a subsequent unit trip were reviewed with operations personnel to determine if they understood the risks and significance of this evolution. The inspectors attended the reactivity review board which addressed the condition report and associated corrective actions relating to the unplanned reactivity change that occurred on November 12, 2002. Corrective actions were reviewed to verify completion as described on the CRs.

#### b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

## 1R15 Operability Evaluations

### a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed five operability evaluations affecting mitigating systems and barrier integrity to determine that operability was justified and no unrecognized increase in risk had occurred. The technical adequacy of the evaluations were reviewed and compared to the TS, FSAR, and procedural requirements as described in O-ADM-518, Condition Reports. The following list of CRs and documents were reviewed:

- CR - 02-1891 Train 2 AFW steam piping wall thickness below code requirements
- CR - 02-2123 AFW feed water piping wall thickness found below code requirements
- CR - 02-2009 3A Component Cooling Water Heat Exchanger anodes degraded and no replacements available
- CR - 02-1956 Part 21 EDG issue on water pumps
- CR - 02-2157 4B EDG failure during Surveillance

### b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

## 1R16 Operator Workarounds

### a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the Unit 3 and Unit 4 operator workaround (OWA) lists to verify that the cumulative effects of OWA would not affect multiple mitigating systems or cause mis-operation of a system, and to assess whether operators could respond in a correct and timely manner to plant transients and accidents.

The inspectors reviewed two OWAs associated with risk significant components. The inspectors reviewed the proceduralized operator work around relating to the 3B EDG standby low lube oil temperatures as a result of two failed immersion heater elements. In addition, the inspectors reviewed the operator work around relating to low flow through the number one reactor coolant pump (RCP) seal on Units 3 and 4, specifically the activities requiring operators to maintain the volume control tank at a higher temperature. Emergency operating procedures were reviewed to determine if any conflicts existed in implementing the operator work around.

### b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R17 Permanent Plant Modificationa. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed permanent plant modifications performed on-line during this period to assess the potential for adversely affecting risk significant systems, structures, and components. None were identified.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R19 Post Maintenance Testinga. Inspection Scope

For the six post maintenance tests listed below, the inspectors reviewed the test procedures and either witnessed the testing and/or reviewed test records to determine whether the scope of testing adequately verified that the work performed was correctly completed and demonstrated that the affected equipment was functional and operable. The inspectors verified that the requirements of procedure O-ADM-737, Post Maintenance Testing, were incorporated into test requirements. The inspectors reviewed the following list of tests:

- 3-OSP-055.1 Emergency Containment Cooler Operability Test
- 3-OP-049 Reactor Trip Breaker Operation for Maintenance
- WO 32020053 EDG Relay Replacement
- WO 31002209 POV-3-4882, ICW Header Isolation Valve
- WO 32016826-01 3B RHR Pump Room Sump Pumps Replacement
- WO 32022705 U4 AFW Train 1 Control Valve 4-2817 failure to fully close

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R22 Surveillance Testinga. Inspection Scope

The inspectors either reviewed or witnessed the following five surveillance tests to verify that the tests met the Technical Specification (TS), the UFSAR, and licensee procedure requirements and demonstrated the systems were capable of performing their intended safety functions and their operational readiness. The following surveillances were reviewed:

- 3 - OSP - 047.1 Charging Pumps/ Valves Inservice Test
- 3 - OSP - 023.1 3A EDG Monthly Operability Test
- 4 - OSP - 059.5 Power Range Nuclear Instrumentation Shift Check and Daily Calibration

- 3 - OSP - 024.2 Emergency Bus Load Sequencers Manual Test
- 4 - OPS - 023.1 4B EDG Operability Test

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R23 Temporary Plant Modifications

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the current four active temporary modifications to verify that risk significant items did not adversely affect the operation of a system that was altered. The inspectors reviewed plant procedure 0-ADM-503, Control and Use of Temporary System Alterations (TSA), to verify that the modifications were controlled as required by procedure. In addition, the inspectors toured plant areas and specifically looked for any temporary modifications that might not be identified to ensure that all issues were identified. The following active temporary modifications were reviewed:

- TSA 03-02-041-07, Simulator RCP vibration points to clear nuisance alarms.
- TSA 03-02-075-08, Removal of supports on AFW piping to allow inspections.
- TSA 04-02-041-10, Disable 4B RCP lower bearing oil alarms to restore monitoring of upper bearing.
- TSA 04-02-059-08, Monitor C9 Control Rod stationary coil voltage with recorder

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

2. RADIATION SAFETY

Cornerstones: Occupational Radiation Safety (OS) and Public Radiation Safety (PS)

2OS1 Access Control To Radiologically Significant Areas (71121.01)

.1 Access Control

a. Inspection Scope

During the period of December 2-6, 2002, licensee program activities for monitoring workers and controlling their access to radiologically significant areas and tasks were evaluated. The inspectors evaluated the adequacy of procedural guidance, directly observed implementation of administrative and physical controls, and assessed resultant worker exposures to radiation and radioactive material. Radiation worker and Health Physics Technician (HPT) knowledge and proficiency in implementing Radiation Protection (RP) program guidance were appraised.

During the inspection, radiological controls for a chemical and volume control system (CVCS) filter change out and RHR room sump clean-out were discussed and observed. In addition, access controls and monitoring for selected radiologically significant tasks conducted since October 1, 2001, were evaluated. The evaluations included, as applicable, Radiation Work Permit (RWP) details, use and placement of dosimetry to monitor occupational exposures involving significant dose rate gradients, and electronic dosimetry (ED) set points and use in high-noise areas. The effectiveness of established controls was assessed against area radiation and contamination survey results, potential for transient elevated dose rates, and occupational doses received.

Physical and administrative controls and their implementation for high radiation area (HRA), locked high radiation area (LHRA), and very high radiation area (VHRA) entries and for storage of highly activated material within the spent fuel pool were evaluated through interviews of HPTs and supervisory staff, reviews of current survey records, and direct observations of selected Auxiliary Building HRA/LHRA locations. Occupational worker adherence to selected RWPs and HPT proficiency in providing job coverage were evaluated through direct observations, review of selected exposure records and investigations, and interviews with licensee staff. The inspectors independently measured radiation dose rates and evaluated posting and access controls for selected areas in the Auxiliary Building.

RP program activities and their implementation were evaluated against 10 CFR 19.12; 10 CFR Part 20, Subparts B, C, F, G, H, and J; the UFSAR details in Section (§) 12, Conduct of Operations; TS §6.12; and approved licensee procedures. Licensee documents, records, and data reviewed within this inspection area are listed in § 2OS1 of the report Attachment.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.2 Problem Identification and Resolution

a. Inspection Scope

Issues identified through RPS departmental self-assessments and Corrective Action Program documents associated with radiological controls, personnel monitoring, and exposure assessments were reviewed and discussed with cognizant licensee representatives. The inspectors assessed the licensee's ability to identify and resolve the issues identified in this RP program.

Specific assessments and CR documents reviewed and evaluated in detail for this inspection area are identified in Section 2OS1 of the report Attachment.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

#### 4. OTHER ACTIVITIES [OA]

##### 4OA1 Performance Indicator (PI) Verification

###### .1 Safety System Unavailability

###### a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed licensee submittals for the performance indicators (PIs) associated with the EDGs, high head safety injection, AFW, and RHR system for the last four quarters of operation beginning with the fourth quarter 2001 and ending the third quarter of 2002. To verify the accuracy of the PI data reported during that period PI definitions and guidance contained in Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, Revision 2 and plant procedure 0-ADM-032, NRC Performance Indicators were used to verify the basis in reporting for each data element. The inspectors reviewed samples of Unit 3 and Unit 4 operator log entries and PI data sheets to verify that data was complete and accurate. The inspectors discussed with the applicable systems engineers data collection methods, reasons for changes in numbers, and recent procedure changes.

###### b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

###### .2 Occupational Radiation Safety and Public Radiation Safety

###### a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the Occupational Radiation Safety and Public Radiation Safety PIs for accuracy. To verify data submitted for the PIs, the inspectors interviewed various individuals for indications of PI related occurrences and reviewed licensee data including radiation protection log records and the effluent release program records for the period of November 1, 2001, through November 30, 2002. The licensee's disposition of the reviewed issues was evaluated against NEI 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, Revision 2. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.

###### b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

#### 4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems

##### .1 Annual Sample Review

###### a. Inspection Scope

Due to licensee's ineffective corrective actions to prevent recurring charging pump and vital electrical breaker functional failures identified in Inspection Report 50-250, 251/02-05, the inspectors reviewed a sampling of level one condition reports to assess the effectiveness of corrective actions. CR 02-2152, Entry in Containment and CR 02-2153, Incorrect Estimate of dose for containment entry were reviewed during a Plant Nuclear Safety Committee meeting presentation. The CRs were reviewed to verify that the full extent of the issues was identified, an appropriate evaluation was performed, and appropriate corrective actions were specified and prioritized. The inspectors evaluated the reports against the licensee's corrective action program requirements and 10 CFR 50, Appendix B.

###### b. Findings and Observations

There were no findings identified. The inspectors verified that the corrective action was thoroughly documented and the reviews aided by a checklist that ensured generic implications and effectiveness reviews were considered.

#### 4OA5 Other Activities

##### Temporary Instruction (TI) 2515/148, Appendix A, Pre-inspection Audit for Interim Compensatory Measures (ICMs) at Nuclear Power Plants

The inspectors conducted an audit of the licensee's actions in response to a February 25, 2002 Order, which required the licensee to implement certain interim security compensatory measures. The audit consisted of a broad-scope review of the licensee's actions in response to the Order in the areas of operations, security, emergency preparedness, and information technology as well as additional elements prescribed by the TI. The inspectors selectively reviewed relevant documentation and procedures; directly observed equipment, personnel, and activities in progress; and discussed licensee actions with personnel responsible for development and implementation of the ICM actions.

The licensee's activities were reviewed against the requirements of the February 25, 2002 Order; the provisions of TI 2515/148, Appendix A; the licensee's response to the Order; and the provisions of the NRC-endorsed NEI Implementation Guidance, dated July 24, 2002.

No findings of significance were identified. A more in-depth review of the licensee's implementation of the February 25, 2002 Order, utilizing Appendix B and C of TI 2515/148 will be conducted in the near future.

4OA6 Meetings, including Exit

.1 Exit Meeting Summary

On January 8, 2003, the resident inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. J. McElwain and other members of his staff, who acknowledged the findings. The inspectors confirmed that proprietary information was not provided or examined during the inspection.



## **SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION**

### **KEY POINTS OF CONTACT**

#### Licensee personnel:

E. Avella, Maintenance Manager  
G. Hollinger, Protection Services Manager  
T. Jones, Plant General Manager  
C. Kinne, Acting Health Physics Supervisor  
M. Lacal, Operations Manager  
G. Laughin, Acting Training Manager  
J. McElwain, Site Vice-President  
W. Parker, Licensing Manager  
W. Prevatt, Work Control Manager  
G. Warriner, Acting Quality Assurance Manager  
A. Zielonka, Site Engineering Manager

#### NRC personnel:

L. Wert, Branch Chief  
C. Patterson, Senior Resident Inspector  
R. Reyes, Resident Inspector  
R. Hamilton, Radiation Specialist  
J. Wallo, Security Specialist  
K. Davis, Security Specialist

### **LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED**

#### **Section 20S1: Access Control To Radiologically Significant Areas (71121.01)**

##### Procedures

##### Administrative Procedures (ADM)

0-ADM-600, Radiation Protection Manual, 6/11/02  
0-ADM-601, Health Physics Conduct of Operations, 3/20/02  
0-ADM-604, Radiological Protection Guidelines and Practices, 6/11/02  
0-ADM-605 Control of Radioactive Tools, Equipment and Components, 9/18/01

##### Health Physics Administrative Procedures (HPA)

0-HPA-021, Health Physics Restricted Area Key Control, 5/12/98  
0-HPA-031.2, Multibadge Exposure Monitoring, 6/11/02  
0-HPA-030, Personnel Monitoring of External Dose, 6/11/02

##### Health Physics Surveillance Procedure (HPS)

0-HPS-020, Radiation Surveys, 8/7/00  
0-HPS-021, Surface Contamination Surveys, 9/17/99  
0-HPS-021.3, Identification, Survey and Release of Material for Unrestricted Use, 10/11/02  
0-HPS-022, Airborne Contamination Surveys, 6/17/02

0-HPS-25.1, General Posting Requirements for Radiological Hazards, 3/21/02  
 0-HPS-027.2, Hot Particle Monitoring, 9/21/99  
 0-HPS-031.1, Whole Body Dosimetry Issue, 6/10/02  
 0-HPS-041, Control of Radioactive Material Inside The Radiation Controlled Area, 5/22/00  
 0-HPS-052.10, Radiological Controls For Diving Operations, 4/7/00  
 0-HPS-104, Radiography Operations, 2/7/00

#### Radiation Work Permits (RWPs)

02-112 Job Specific RWP for HP Support Activities in a HRA (Laundry/Pickups/Respirators/Area Decon/Housekeeping)  
 02-115 Job Specific RWP for Mechanical Maintenance Activities in a HRA  
 02-409 Unit 4 Containment- Power Entry (VHRA/LHRA) Inspect/Troubleshoot/Valves and Components Including Support Work  
 02-1009 Install/Changeout CVCS Filters Including Placement in HLSA or Designated Storage Area and All Support Work  
 02-1044 Job Specific RWP for Maintenance Activities In U3 RHR Including All Support Work

#### Records and Data

Listing of High Radiation Areas/Locked High Radiation Areas, as of 11/26/2002  
 Listing of multiple whole body count results used in a worker's internal dose determination, 4/3/02

#### Self-Assessments and Condition Report (CR) Documents

Self Assessment: Review of Personnel Contamination Monitoring Processes, 5/15/02  
 Health Physics Assessment 01-02: Identification of Event Precursor to Unplanned Dose Events  
 CR 02-0579, HP Technician On Wrong RWP  
 CR 02-0667, Temporary Lead Shielding Removed Based on Schedule Instead of Need  
 CR 02-1326, Unit 4 Demin Vessel Gate Was Surveyed and Dose Rates Were Found to be >100 mrem/hr @ 30cm.  
 CR 02-2062, Review the Definition of Containment Entry Pertaining to Inner and Outer Door Breaches, Confined Space Requirements, and Personnel Hatch Test Entry Requirements.  
 CR 02-2152, Operator Reentered Airlock Posted VHRA Without RP Technician  
 CR 02-2215, Hotspot Identified During Routine Survey

### **Section 40A1: Performance Indicator Verification (71151)**

#### Procedure

0-ADM-032, NRC Performance Indicators Turkey Point, 6/14/02

#### Records

Radiation Protection Related CRs List, 1/3/01 to 11/13/02  
 PI Status Reports For Occupational and Public Radiation Protection 1<sup>st</sup> Quarter 2001 to 3<sup>rd</sup> Quarter 2002.