



**UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
SAM NUNN ATLANTA FEDERAL CENTER
61 FORSYTH STREET SW SUITE 23T85
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303-8931**

April 16, 2004

South Carolina Electric & Gas Company
ATTN: Mr. Stephen A. Byrne
Senior Vice President, Nuclear Operations
Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station
P. O. Box 88
Jenkinsville, SC 29065

SUBJECT: VIRGIL C. SUMMER NUCLEAR STATION - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION
REPORT NO. 05000395/2004002

Dear Mr. Byrne:

On March 27, 2004, the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station. The enclosed integrated inspection report documents the inspection findings, which were discussed on March 30, 2004, with Mr. Jeff Archie and other members of your staff.

The inspections examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.

Based on the results of this inspection no findings of significance were identified. However, a licensee-identified violation determined to be of very low safety significance is listed in Section 4OA7 of this report. If you contest the non-cited violation (NCV) in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001, with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspector at the Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of

NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at <http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html> (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Kerry D. Landis, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch 5
Division of Reactor Projects

Docket No.: 50-395
License No.: NPF-12

Enclosure: Inspection Report No. 05000395/2004002
w/Attachment: Supplemental Information

cc w/encl.:

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PUBLIC DOCUMENT	YES NO						

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION II

Docket No.: 50-395

License No.: NPF-12

Report No.: 05000395/2004002

Licensee: South Carolina Electric & Gas (SCE&G) Company

Facility: Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station

Location: P. O. Box 88
Jenkinsville, SC 29065

Dates: December 28, 2003 - March 27, 2004

Inspectors: M. Widmann, Senior Resident Inspector (12/28/03 - 2/24/04)
J. Reece, Acting Senior Resident Inspector (3/7/04 - 3/27/04)
M. King, Resident Inspector
M. Scott, Senior Reactor Inspector, RII (Section 1R12.2)

Approved by: K. D. Landis, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch 5
Division of Reactor Projects

Enclosure

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000395/2004002; 12/28/2003 - 03/27/2004; Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station; Routine Integrated Report.

The report covered a three month period of inspection by resident inspectors and an announced inspection by one regional senior reactor inspector. No findings of significance were identified. The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) using IMC 0609, "Significance Determination Process" (SDP). Findings for which the SDP does not apply may be Green or be assigned a severity level after NRC management review. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," Revision 3, dated July 2000.

A. NRC-Identified and Self Revealing Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

B. Licensee-Identified Violation

One violation of very low safety significance, which was identified by the licensee has been reviewed by the inspectors. Corrective actions taken or planned by the licensee have been entered into the licensee's corrective action program. This violation and corrective action tracking number are listed in Section 4OA7 of this report.

Enclosure

REPORT DETAILS

Summary of Plant Status

The unit remained at or near full power operation during the inspection period.

1. REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity

1R01 Adverse Weather Protection

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed one seasonal, weather preparation inspection and one inspection for adverse weather protection to evaluate implementation of adverse weather procedure Operations Administrative Procedure, OAP-109.1, "Guidelines for Severe Weather." The seasonal review included areas associated with the sodium-hydroxide storage tank, condensate storage tank, reactor makeup storage tank and refueling water storage tank instrumentation. Additionally in response to a severe weather advisory, the inspectors performed a walkdown of the outside areas for cold weather protection and for loose debris and equipment subject to high wind conditions that could impact structures, power supplies and, sensing lines located in areas exposed to outside weather.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R04 Equipment Alignment

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors conducted three equipment alignment partial walkdowns to evaluate the operability of selected redundant trains or backup systems, listed below, with the other train or system inoperable or out of service. Correct alignment and operating conditions were determined from the applicable portions of drawings, system operating procedures (SOPs), Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR), and Technical Specifications (TS). The inspection included review of outstanding maintenance work requests (MWRs) and related condition evaluation reports (CERs) to verify that the licensee had properly identified and resolved equipment alignment problems that could impact mitigating system availability. Specific procedures and documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.

- A and B motor driven emergency feedwater pumps while turbine driven emergency feedwater pump out of service;
- A residual heat removal (RHR) pump train while the B RHR pump was out of service for planned maintenance; and,
- B emergency diesel generator (EDG) while the A EDG was out of service.

Enclosure

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R05 Fire Protectiona. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed recent CERs, MWRs, and impairments associated with the fire suppression system. The inspectors reviewed surveillance activities to determine whether they supported the operability and availability of the fire protection system. The inspectors assessed the material condition of the active and passive fire protection systems and features and observed the control of transient combustibles and ignition sources. The inspectors conducted routine inspections of the following nine areas (respective fire zones noted):

- 1DA switchgear room (IB-20);
- 1DB switchgear rooms and heating, ventilation and air conditioning (HVAC) rooms (IB-16, IB-17, IB-22.2);
- Auxiliary building switchgear room 1DB1/1DB2X (AB-1.29);
- Control room (CB-17.1);
- Relay room SSPS instrumentation and inverter (CB-6, CB-10 and CB-12);
- Diesel generator rooms A and B (DG-1.1/1.2 and DG-2.1/2.2);
- Circulating water/fire service pump house (CWPH-1 and CWPH-2);
- Service water pump house (SWPH-1, SWPH-3 and SWPH-5.1/5.2); and,
- Turbine building (TB-1).

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Programa. Inspection Scope

On January 29, 2004, the inspectors observed performance of senior reactor operators and reactor operators on the plant simulator during licensed operator requalification training. The training scenario involved a steam generator tube rupture, reactor trip, safety injection and B charging pump bearing failure (LOR-SGTR). The inspectors verified that training included risk-significant operator actions, implementation of emergency classification and the emergency plan. The inspectors assessed overall crew performance, communication, oversight of supervision and the evaluators' critique. The inspectors verified training issues were appropriately captured in the corrective action program.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness

.1 Routine Maintenance Effectiveness Inspection

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors evaluated two equipment issues described in the CERs listed below to verify the licensee's effectiveness of the corresponding preventive or corrective maintenance associated with structures, systems or components (SSCs). The inspectors reviewed maintenance rule (MR) implementation to verify that component and equipment failures were identified, entered, and scoped within the MR program. Selected SSCs were reviewed to verify proper categorization and classification as (a)(1) or (a)(2) in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65. The inspectors examined (a)(1) corrective action plans to determine if the licensee was identifying issues related to the MR at an appropriate threshold and that corrective actions were established and effective. The inspectors' review also evaluated if maintenance preventable functional failures (MPFF) or other MR findings existed that the licensee had not identified. Inspectors reviewed the licensee's controlling procedures engineering services procedure (ES)-514, "Maintenance Rule Implementation," and the Virgil C. Summer "Important To Maintenance Rule System Function and Performance Criteria Analysis" to verify consistency with the MR requirements.

- CER 0-C-03-4089, service water maintenance rule criterion for train A reactor building cooling units (RBCU's) exceeded 150 hour limit for 18 month unavailability (178.8 hours total); and,
- CER 0-C-03-2276, rapid decrease in instrument air pressure due to filter housing acrylic tube failure.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.2 Maintenance Rule Periodic Evaluation (Biennial)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's MR periodic assessment, "V. C. Summer Nuclear Station Maintenance Rule Fourth Periodic Assessment TR00010-005," for March 3, 2001 to June 3, 2002, while on-site the week of March 8, 2004. The report was issued to satisfy paragraph (a)(3) of 10 CFR 50.65 and covered the indicated period. The inspection was to determine the effectiveness of the assessment and that it was issued in accordance with the MR time requirement and included evaluation of: balancing reliability and unavailability, (a)(1) activities, (a)(2) activities, and use of

industry operating experience. To verify compliance with 10 CFR 50.65, the inspectors reviewed selected MR activities covered by the assessment period for the following maintenance rule systems: Radiation Monitors, Diesel Generators, Electrical System, Air Handling, and Chilled Water System. Specific procedures and documents reviewed are listed in the attachment to this report.

During the inspection, the inspectors reviewed selected plant work order (WO) data and the site guidance implementing procedure, discussed and reviewed relevant corrective action issues (NCN/CERs), reviewed generic operations event data, structural reports, and probabilistic risk data, and discussed issues with system engineers. Operational event information use in MR functions was evaluated by the inspectors. The inspectors selected work orders, a MR assessment, and other corrective action documents of systems recently removed from 10 CFR 50.65 a(1) status and those in a(2) status for some period to assess the justification for their status. The documents were compared to the site's MR program criteria, and the MR a(1) evaluations and MR related data bases.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's assessments of the risk impacts of removing from service those components associated with emergent work items. The inspectors evaluated the five selected SSCs listed below for: (1) the effectiveness of the risk assessments performed before maintenance activities were conducted; (2) the management of risk; (3) that, upon identification of an unforeseen situation, necessary steps were taken to plan and control the resulting emergent work activities; and (4) that emergent work problems were adequately identified and resolved. The inspectors evaluated the licensee's work prioritization and risk determination to determine, as appropriate, whether necessary steps were properly planned, controlled, and executed for the planned and emergent work activities listed below:

- Turbine driven emergency feedwater pump unplanned removal from service (CER 0-C-04-0015);
- Instrument air dryer and B service water booster pump removal from service. Decision on desiccant change out on instrument air dryers not made until tagout for plant maintenance was hung and work begun (CER 0-C-04-0089);
- Severe ice storm impact on schedules for maintenance activities (CER 0-C-04-0229);
- Planned maintenance on C charging pump (XPP0043C); loss of instrument air risk increased by a factor of two due to temperature control valve issues; CVCS makeup system troubleshooting; and,

- Planned testing per surveillance test procedure (STP)-115.001, "Penetration Isolation Verification," STP-120.004, "Emergency Feedwater Valve Operability Test," and loss of instrument air increased by a factor of two due to control valve issues.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R14 Operator Performance During Non-Routine Evolutions and Events

a. Inspection Scope

This inspection evaluated operators' preparations and response for the two listed non-routine plant evolutions to ensure they were appropriate and in accordance with the required procedures. The inspectors also evaluated performance and equipment problems to ensure that they were entered into the corrective action program.

- Response to unexpected reactivity affects on reactor power during automatic makeups using the boric acid blending system (CER 0-C-04-0067); and,
- Response to reactor coolant pump (RCP) seal injection flow decrease to alarm setpoints on A and B RCPs while placing seal injection filter (XFL-8A) in service (CER 0-C-04-0747).

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R15 Operability Evaluations

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed four selected operability evaluations affecting risk significant mitigating systems to assess, as appropriate: (1) the technical adequacy of the evaluations; (2) whether operability was properly justified and the subject component or system remained available, such that no unrecognized increase in risk occurred; (3) whether other existing degraded conditions were considered; (4) where compensatory measures were involved, whether the compensatory measures were in place, would work as intended, and were appropriately controlled; and (5) the impact on TS limiting conditions for operations and the risk significance in accordance with the SDP. The inspectors verified that the operability evaluations were performed in accordance with SAP-1131, "Corrective Action Program."

- CER 0-C-03-4348 and 0-C-04-0016, turbine driven emergency feedwater (TDEFW) pump surveillance test results; TDEFW lube oil pump pressure out of required band;

- CER/NCN 0-C-03-4519, analysis indicates a severe water hammer condition may exist in service water piping downstream of the RBCU's during swap over for RBCU cooling from the CI to SW system;
- CER 0-C-04-0112, emergency feedwater system stop check valve in service test does not check for self-closure;
- CER 0-C-04-0289, NRC-identified problem with a loose trunion bolt on the TDEFW pump trip throttle valve.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R16 Operator Work-arounds

a. Inspection Scope

On January 22, a risk significant operator work-around review was performed. An evaluation by the licensee in response to Generic Letter 96-06 determined a severe water hammer condition may exist in the service water piping downstream of the reactor building cooling units. Operator manual actions were required to minimize water hammer potential damage by air injection in the affected piping to eliminate a vacuum bubble, and subsequent corrective actions were addressed by CER/NCN 0-C-03-4519. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's actions to ascertain any impact on the functional capability of the system or the operator's ability to implement emergency or abnormal operating procedures.

Additionally, the inspectors reviewed the licensee's cumulative list of identified operator work-arounds and challenges to assess the effect on the functional capability, reliability or availability of any related mitigating system. The inspectors also reviewed the human reliability aspect of the operator work-arounds and challenges. This review was performed to determine the impact on the operator's ability to respond in a correct and timely manner to an initiating event and implement abnormal or emergency operating procedures.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing (PMT)

a. Inspection Scope

For the six PMTs listed below, the inspectors reviewed the test procedure and witnessed either the testing and/or reviewed test records to assess whether (1) the effect of testing on the plant had been adequately addressed by control room and/or engineering personnel; (2) testing was adequate for the maintenance performed; (3) acceptance criteria were clear and adequately demonstrated operational readiness consistent with

design and licensing basis documents; (4) test instrumentation had current calibrations, range, and accuracy consistent with the application; (5) tests were performed as written with applicable prerequisites satisfied; (6) jumpers installed or leads lifted were properly controlled; (7) test equipment was removed following testing; and (8) equipment was returned to the status required to perform its safety function. The inspectors verified that these activities were performed in accordance with General Test Procedure (GTP)-214, "Post Maintenance Testing Guideline."

- WO 040077, TDEFW pump speed control repair;
- Preventative Maintenance Task Sheet (PMTS) 0216782, repack of XVG-03001B-SP per STP-112.003 and MOVATS testing PMTS 0216781;
- WO 312869, B RHR pump room cooler, XAH0004B, fan belt adjustment / clean / lube;
- Fire System CO₂ Storage Unit maintenance per PMTS 0309100, 0309102, 0315496, 0315502, 0315503, 0315504;
- MWR 0317235, B component cooling water (CCW) pump motor preventive maintenance; and,
- WO 405024, CS check valve, XVC08429, replacement. PMT and VT-2 inspection of associated welds performed per WO 405084.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R22 Surveillance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

For the six surveillance tests listed below, the inspectors examined the test procedure and either witnessed the testing and/or reviewed test records to determine whether the scope of testing adequately demonstrated that the affected equipment was functional and operable:

- STP-106.001, "Moveable Rod Insertion Test;"
- STP-121.002, "Main Steam Valve Operability Testing;"
- STP-125.002A, "Diesel Generator A Operability Test;" and STP-225.001A, "Diesel Generator Support Systems Pump and Valve Test;"
- STP-205.004, "RHR Pump and Valve Operability Test," (for the B RHR pump);
- STP-220.002, "Turbine Driven Emergency Feedwater Pump and Valve Test;" and,
- STP-345.037, "Solid State Protection System Actuation Logic and Master Relay Test, train A."

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R23 Temporary Plant Modifications

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the listed temporary plant modification to verify that the modification did not affect system operability or availability as described by the TS and FSAR. In addition, the inspectors verified that the installation of the temporary modification was in accordance with the work package, that adequate configuration control was in place, procedures and drawings were updated, and post-installation tests verified operability of the affected systems.

- Bypass of the Nitrogen Accumulator Low Pressure Main Control Board Annunciator (XCP0632, Window 6-4) Bypass Authorization Request 04-01.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness

1EP6 Drill Evaluation

a. Inspection Scope

On March 3, 2004, the inspectors reviewed and observed the performance of an Emergency Planning Drill that involved a simulated failure of the reactor protection system to initiate a reactor trip, a catastrophic failure of the A reactor coolant pump, loss of coolant accident and a monitored unfiltered release outside the reactor building (EPP-03-02B, "Emergency Planning Drill"). The inspectors assessed emergency procedure usage, emergency plan classification, notifications and the licensee's identification and inclusion of any drill problems into their corrective action program. This inspection evaluated the adequacy of the licensee's conduct of the drill and critique performance. Drill issues were captured by the licensee in CER 0-C-04-0622 and were reviewed by the inspectors.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4. OTHER ACTIVITIES

4OA1 Performance Indicator (PI) Verification

.1 Reactor Safety: Initiating Events Cornerstone

a. Inspection Scope

To verify the accuracy of the PI data reported from January 2003, to January 2004, PI definitions and guidance contained in Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 99-02, "Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline," Revision 2, was used to verify the basis in reporting for each data element. The inspectors reviewed a selection of station logs, TS requirements, computer trend data, licensee event reports (LERs), power history curves, corrective action program database, the monthly operating reports, and PI data sheets to verify data reported. In addition, the inspectors also interviewed licensee personnel associated with the PI data collection, evaluation and distribution. The inspectors sampled data for the following two PIs:

- Unplanned scrams per 7,000 critical hours;
- Unplanned scrams with loss of normal heat removal.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems

.1 Routine Review of CAP Documents

a. Inspection Scope

CER 0-C-04-0741, "Pipe clamp MK-CCH-0320 is making contact with I-beam MK-CCH-0386. Reference CER 0-C-01-403 for photos, condition evaluation, actions, etc.," was selected for review. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's actions to address this condition which involved contact between two hanger support systems on a CCW pipe. The inspectors conducted a review of the licensee's problem identification and resolution activities to ensure they included:

- Complete and accurate identification of the problem in a timely manner commensurate with its significance;
- Evaluation and disposition of performance issues associated with maintenance effectiveness, including maintenance practices, work controls and risk assessment;
- Consideration of extent of condition, common cause and previous occurrences;
- Identification of root and contributing causes of the problem;
- Identification of corrective actions which are appropriately focused to correct the problem;

- Completion of corrective actions in a timely manner commensurate with the safety significance of the issue.

b. Findings and Observations

No violations or findings of significance were identified. The hanger contact condition associated with the risk significant CCW system was first identified by the licensee on March 21, 2001, documented in CER 0-C-01-403, and screened as an action level 2 category (safety-related condition adverse to quality). On March 26, 2001, the licensee downgraded the CER to an action level 3 category based on a screening statement that stated, "Operability of the CCW system was not affected." The inspectors determined that supporting documentation for the basis for this conclusion was not provided in the CER.

The inspectors reviewed Generic Letter 91-18, "Resolution of Degraded and Nonconforming Conditions," relative to the significance of the condition and the lack of documentation for an engineering functionality determination. The inspectors also reviewed the licensee's actions during the approximate three year period from the date of initial problem identification and concluded that corrective actions were untimely in that no actual work on the hanger was performed or engineering justification provided for hanger operability. The inspectors concluded the issue was a violation of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion XVI since the corrective action for the non-conforming condition was untimely; however, the violation was considered minor, in that, the licensee subsequently determined that CCW system operability was not affected by the non-conforming condition. The licensee entered the equipment issue into the non-conformance notice program for resolution under NCN 04-741, and entered the timeliness issue into their corrective action program under CER 0-C-04-0766.

.2 Daily Review of the Licensee's Correction Action Program (CAP)

a. Inspection Scope

As required by Inspection Procedure 71152, "Identification and Resolution of Problems," and in order to help identify repetitive equipment failures or specific human performance issues for follow-up, the inspectors performed a daily screening of items entered into the licensee's corrective action program. This review was accomplished by reviewing daily CER summary reports and attending daily CER review meetings.

b. Findings and Observations

There were no findings of significance identified.

4OA3 Event Followup

(Closed) LER 50-395/2003-006-00: Manual Reactor Scam Due to Digital Rod Position Indication Failure.

On November 21, 2003, during STP-106.002, "Rod Position Indication Operational Test," at zero power physics testing the licensee initiated a manual reactor trip in accordance with TS after the determination that both channels of DRPI were not functioning properly. The licensee identified and replaced a faulty data encoder card for rod M-4, and successfully completed their testing. The LER was reviewed by the inspectors and no findings of significance were identified. The licensee entered the component failure into their corrective action program as CER 0-C-03-4172.

4OA5 Other Activities

(Discussed) Temporary Instruction (TI) 2515/154, Spent Fuel Material Control and Accounting at Nuclear Power Plants

Temporary Instruction 2515/154, Spent Fuel Material Control and Accounting at Nuclear Power Plants, Phase I and Phase II, was completed during this inspection period.

4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit

.1 Exit Meeting Summary

The inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. Jeff Archie, and other members of the licensee's staff on March 30, 2004. The inspectors asked the licensee whether any of the material examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.

.2 Annual Assessment Meeting Summary

On March 24, 2004, the NRC Chief of Reactor Projects Branch 5 met with South Carolina Electric and Gas Company to discuss the NRC's Reactor Oversight Process (ROP) and the V. C. Summer Nuclear Station annual assessment of safety performance for the period of January 1, 2003 - December 31, 2003. The major topics addressed were the NRC's assessment program and the results of the V. C. Summer assessment. Attendees included V. C. Summer site management, members of site staff, a SCANA employee, a representative of Santee Cooper, and members of the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control.

This meeting was open to the public. The presentation material used for the discussion is available from the NRC's document system (ADAMS) as accession number ML041070102. ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at <http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html> (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

4OA7 Licensee-Identified Violation

The following violation of very low safety significance (Green) was identified by the licensee and is a violation of NRC requirements which meets the criteria of Section VI of the NRC Enforcement Policy, NUREG-1600, for being characterized as a non-cited violation.

10 CFR 50.47(b)(8) requires that "adequate emergency facilities and equipment to support emergency response are provided and maintained." Contrary to this on January 27, 2004, the licensee identified that the computer alarms, associated with the Emergency Warning Siren System (EWSS) and indicating a loss of emergency sirens, had been disabled and silenced. Following an ice storm the EWSS decreased below 75 percent capability on January 26, 2004. However due to the computer alarm being disabled, the problem was not recognized by the licensee until January 27, 2004, which also prevented the licensee from meeting a non-emergency, eight-hour notification requirement per 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(xiii) regarding a major loss of offsite communications capability. This finding was of very low safety significance because the state and local counties had the ability to implement appropriate compensatory actions. This condition was entered into the licensee corrective action program under CER 0-C-04-0233, CER 0-C-04-389 and CER 0-C-04-0462.

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee

J. Archie, General Manager, Nuclear Plant Operations
F. Bacon, Manager, Chemistry Services
L. Blue, Manager, Health Physics Services
R. Clary, Manager, Nuclear Licensing and Operating Experience
M. Findlay, Manager, Nuclear Protection Services
M. Fowlkes, General Manager, Engineering Services
S. Furstenberg, Manager, Nuclear Operations Training
D. Gatlin, Manager, Operations
D. Goldston, Operations Superintendent
D. Lavigne, General Manager, Organization Effectiveness
K. Nettles, General Manager, Nuclear Support Services
W. Stuart, Manager, Plant Support Engineering
A. Torres, Manager, Planning / Scheduling and Project Management
R. White, Nuclear Coordinator, South Carolina Public Service Authority
S. Zarandi, Manager, Maintenance Services

ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

Opened

None

Closed

50-395/2003-006-00	LER	Manual Reactor Scram Due to Digital Rod Position Indication Failure (Section 4OA3)
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Discussed

2515/154	TI	Spent Fuel Material Control and Accounting at Nuclear Power Plants (Section 4OA5)
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LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Section 1R04: Equipment Alignment

FSAR Sections, 5, 6, and 8.3.1
SOP- 115, "Residual Heat Removal"
SOP-211, "Emergency Feedwater"
SOP-306, "Emergency Diesel Generator"
SOP-307, "Diesel Generator Fuel Oil System"
TS Sections 3.5.2, 5.3, 5.4, 3.9.3, 3.7.1.2, 3.7.11, 3.8.1, 3.9.7.1, and 3.9.7.2

D-302-085, "Emergency Feedwater"
D-302-351, "Diesel Generator - Fuel Oil"
D-302-353, "Diesel Generator - Miscellaneous Services"
D-302-641, "Residual Heat Removal System"
Design Basis Documents for EDG, EFW and RHR systems
CER Data Base search and review of EDG, EFW, and RHR systems

Section 1R12: Maintenance Effectiveness

Section 1R12.2 - Maintenance Rule Periodic Evaluation (Biennial)

Problem Issues (CER/NCN) Reports:

CER/NCN 02-3688, DG High Lube Oil Differential Pressure
CER/NCN 01-1951, Air Receiver Inlet Check Valve
CER/NCN 02-2883, A DG Loss of Excitation Occurrence
CER/NCN 02-1708, Chilled Water "B" Compressor Shaft
CER/NCN 03-0004, Feedwater Flow Circuit Reading Low
CER/NCN 01-0968, Breaker Magnetic Latch Trip Device
CER/NCN 02-1556, Reactor Head Vent Valve Breaker
CER/NCN 02-0657, 1EB1 Substation De-energize
CER/NCN 01-2161, RB Cooling Unit Fan Motor
CER/NCN 02-0464, XSW1EA 02 Breaker Will not Rack IN
CER/NCN 02-0801, Solenoid Valve Failed to Operate

Administrative Procedures:

ES-514, "Maintenance Rule Program Implementation," Revision 2
SAP-1252, "Maintenance Rule Program," Revision 0

Miscellaneous:

Memo from L. Kachnik to J. Shep, Changes for the new EOOS Model, March 9, 2004
CER/NCN 01-2345, North Berm Maintenance Rule Inspection (in progress)
Plant Support Engineering Third/Fourth Quarterly Report for 2003
Maintenance Rule Expert Panel Meeting Minutes, February 11, 2004