UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
611 RYAN PLAZA DRIVE, SUITE 400
ARLINGTON, TEXAS 76011-8064

July 6, 2001

William T. Cottle, President and
Chief Executive Officer
STP Nuclear Operating Company
P.O. Box 289
Wadsworth, Texas 77483

SUBJECT: SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT ELECTRIC GENERATING STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2 - NRC INSPECTION REPORT 50-498/01-07; 50-499/01-07

Dear Mr. Cottle:

On June 14, 2001, the NRC completed an inspection at your South Texas Project Electric Generating Station, Units 1 and 2. The enclosed report documents the inspection findings, which were discussed on June 14, 2001, with you and other members of your staff.

This inspection was an examination of activities conducted under your license as they relate to the identification and resolution of problems, and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and the conditions of your operating license. Within these areas, the inspection involved selected examination of procedures and representative records, observations of activities, and interviews with personnel.

On the basis of the sample selected for review, there were no findings of significance identified during this inspection. The team concluded that problems were properly identified, evaluated, and resolved within the problem identification and resolution program. However, the team identified several examples where the evaluations were not clearly documented.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/NRC/ADAMS/index.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Dr. Dale A. Powers, Chief
Operations Branch
Division of Reactor Safety

Dockets: 50-498; 50-499
Licenses: NPF-76; NPF-80

Enclosure:
NRC Inspection Report
50-498/01-07; 50-499/01-07

cc w/enclosure:
J. J. Sheppard, Vice President
Engineering & Technical Services
STP Nuclear Operating Company
P.O. Box 289
Wadsworth, Texas 77483

S. M. Head, Supervisor, Licensing
Nuclear Quality & Licensing Department
STP Nuclear Operating Company
P.O. Box 289, Mail Code: N5014
Wadsworth, Texas 77483

A. Ramirez/C. M. Canady
City of Austin
Electric Utility Department
721 Barton Springs Road
Austin, Texas 78704

M. T. Hardt/W. C. Gunst
City Public Service Board
P.O. Box 1771
San Antonio, Texas 78296

D. G. Tees/R. L. Balcom
Houston Lighting & Power Company
P.O. Box 1700
Houston, Texas 77251

Jon C. Wood
Matthews & Branscomb
112 E. Pecan, Suite 1100
San Antonio, Texas 78205

A. H. Gutterman, Esq.
Morgan, Lewis & Bockius
1800 M. Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036-5869

C. A. Johnson/R. P. Powers
AEP - Central Power and Light Company
P.O. Box 289, Mail Code: N5022
Mail Code: N5012
Wadsworth, Texas 77483

INPO
Records Center
700 Galleria Parkway
Atlanta, Georgia 30339-5957

Bureau of Radiation Control
State of Texas
1100 West 49th Street
Austin, Texas 78756

Jim Calloway
Public Utility Commission
William B. Travis Building
P.O. Box 13326
1701 North Congress Avenue
Austin, Texas 78701-3326

John L. Howard, Director
Environmental and Natural Resources Policy
Office of the Governor
P.O. Box 12428
Austin, Texas 78711-3189

Judge, Matagorda County
Matagorda County Courthouse
1700 Seventh Street
Bay City, Texas 77414

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Scott Morris **(SAM1)**
NRR Event Tracking System **(IPAS)**
STP Site Secretary **(LAR)**

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ENCLOSURE

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV

Dockets:	50-498; 50-499
Licenses:	NPF-76; NPF-80
Report No.:	50-498/01-07; 50-499/01-07
Licensee:	STP Nuclear Operating Company
Facility:	South Texas Project Electric Generating Station, Units 1 and 2
Location:	FM 521 - 8 miles west of Wadsworth Wadsworth, Texas
Dates:	June 4-14, 2001
Inspectors:	H. F. Bundy, Senior Operations Engineer
	P. C. Gage, Senior Operations Engineer
	G. Guerra, Resident Inspector
Approved By:	Dr. Dale A. Powers, Chief Operations Branch Division of Reactor Safety

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000498/01-07; 05000499/01-07; STP Nuclear Operating Company; South Texas Project Electric Generating Station, Units 1 and 2; identification and resolution of problems.

The inspection was conducted by two senior operations engineers and one resident inspector. No issues were identified.

Identification and Resolution of Problems

The licensee adequately identified problems and placed them in the corrective action program. Safety significance was appropriately considered in prioritizing the extent to which individual problems would be evaluated and in establishing schedules for implementation of corrective actions. However, the team identified examples where the evaluations were not clearly documented. With minor exceptions, corrective actions were implemented in a timely manner. Corrective actions to prevent recurrence of conditions adverse to quality were effective. Licensee audits and assessments were effective in identifying problems. Based on the interviews conducted during this inspection, workers at the site felt free to input safety issues into the problem identification and resolution program (Section 4OA2).

Report Details

4. OTHER ACTIVITIES (OA)

4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems

a. Effectiveness of Problem Identification

(1) Inspection Scope

The team reviewed items selected across the seven cornerstones of safety to determine if problems were being properly identified, characterized, and entered into the corrective action program for evaluation and resolution. Specifically, the team's review included a selection of 143 condition reports (CRs) that had been opened or closed or that related to issues of regulatory noncompliance since July 1, 2000. The team also reviewed a total of 28 licensee audit, assessment, surveillance, and trending reports; selected system health reports; and various other reports and meeting minutes related to the problem identification and resolution program. The team compared the audit and assessment results with self-revealing and NRC-identified issues to determine the effectiveness of the audits and assessments.

The team evaluated the CRs and items selected by the resident inspectors from control room logs to determine the licensee's threshold for identifying problems and entering them into the corrective action program. Also, the licensee's efforts in establishing the scope of problems were evaluated by reviewing pertinent work orders, engineering modification packages, self-assessment results, and action plans.

The team also conducted plant walkdowns and interviewed plant personnel to identify other processes by which problems and issues could be identified.

(2) Issues and Findings

The team determined that the licensee was effective at identifying problems and entering them into the corrective action program. This was evidenced by the relatively few deficiencies identified by external organizations (including the NRC) that had not been previously identified by the licensee during the review period. Licensee audits and assessments were of good breadth and depth and identified issues similar to those that were self-revealing or raised during NRC inspections. The team identified no instances where conditions adverse to quality were being handled outside the corrective action program. However, the team found some examples where all aspects of the issue were not clearly entered in the database.

Some of the examples involved checking the operability and reportability blocks in the CR file. For CR 00-13689, the reportability block was checked NO. However, in reviewing the report, the team noted that Licensee Event Report 2-00-004 had been issued. For CRs 00-18644 and 01-3411, both the reportability and operability evaluation

blocks had been checked NO. However, the team noted that both licensee event reports and operability evaluations had been made for these conditions. The licensee issued CR 01-9827 to evaluate these observations. The team noted that CR 01-7337 covered a similar observation.

The above observations were considered as a part of the overall evaluation of the licensee's performance in problem identification and resolution. No specific findings relating to effectiveness of problem identification were identified.

b. Prioritization and Evaluation of Issues

(1) Inspection Scope

The team reviewed approximately 143 CRs and supporting documentation, including analyses of the problem causes, to ascertain whether the licensee's evaluation of the problems identified considered the full extent of conditions, generic implications, common causes, and previous occurrences. In addition, the team reviewed the licensee's evaluation of selected industry experience information, including operating event reports and NRC and vendor generic notices, to assess if issues applicable to the South Texas Project Electric Generating Station were appropriately addressed. In addition, the team also reviewed selected CRs issued prior to 2000, to ascertain satisfaction of the provisions of NRC Generic Letter 91-18, "Resolution of Degraded and Non-Conforming Conditions," and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, regarding timeliness of corrective action for those CRs applying to degraded or nonconforming structures, systems, and components. The team also interviewed engineering and technical personnel concerning the actions taken on CRs where it appeared that the provisions of Generic Letter 91-18 might apply. Specific items reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.

(2) Issues and Findings

Based on a review of the licensee's records, the team concluded that the licensee effectively prioritized and evaluated issues in most instances. For the more risk significant CRs, the team determined that the evaluations were of sufficient depth, the root cause determinations were accurate, and risk aspects of the conditions had been appropriately considered. However, the team identified several conditions where the evaluation had not been appropriately documented.

For CR 97-13775, which involved leaks between the component cooling water and reactor containment building chill water systems, a Generic Letter 91-18 evaluation had not been documented. It appeared that the evaluation was not documented because programmatically it was assumed to be triggered by an outstanding work order greater than 18 months old. Because there was no outstanding work order, documentation of the evaluation was not required in accordance with the licensee's program. This appeared to be a programmatic problem in that the issue (going back to at least 1987)

and the CR were much older than 18 months. The licensee had previously recognized this as a programmatic problem in that a similar issue was included in a report titled "CRG 2001 CAP Program Topics/Improvements," dated June 12, 2001. In discussing the technical issues with engineering personnel, the team determined that a satisfactory evaluation had been completed, but not documented.

For CR 01-5160, involving a small unexpected water level decrease in the reactor vessel during a refueling outage, the closure documentation was deficient in that it did not clearly describe the evaluation that had been performed and the actions which had been taken. For instance, it stated that the best guess was that the level decrease was caused by a leaking manual isolation valve, but it did not explicitly state which valve was suspected of leaking or actions taken which may have stopped the leak. In discussing this issue with involved personnel, the team learned that a reasonable evaluation had been performed and appropriate remedial actions had been taken. Condition Report 01-5160 was revised by the licensee to include this information.

For CR 97-8328, involving potential toxic chemical impact on control room habitability, closure did not appear to be timely and justification as to why it was not a significant safety issue was not well documented. In discussing this issue with technical personnel, the team learned the chemicals in question existed in very small quantities and were not likely to have any effect on control room habitability. No standardized concentration limits existed for these chemicals. However, this was not stated in the CR database and justifications for the extensions to the due date were not documented.

Condition Report 99-9690 referred to a vendor advisory on seismic qualifications of certain relays used in safety related applications. This CR was classified as a condition not adverse to quality although it described a condition adverse to quality in that safety equipment could be rendered inoperable if these relays were used in certain configurations. The assigned due date (September 2001) was over two years from the initial assigned action (June 1999) to evaluate facility applicability, and did not appear appropriate considering the potential safety impact of this issue. However, the team determined that a preliminary review had been performed to verify that none of the relays installed in the plant had more than four normally closed contacts. According to the vendor advisory, more than four normally closed contacts could compromise the seismic qualifications of the specified components. The team noted that this review was documented on a white paper which was not a part of the CR database. Also, there was no specific action to prevent further plant modifications which could change contact configuration of these components in a manner which would compromise their seismic qualifications. The team reviewed the locations and configurations of these components with engineering personnel and did not identify any safety issues. Subsequent, to the onsite inspection weeks, the licensee completed the applicability evaluation for the facility and added both interim and long-term corrective actions to ensure future modifications would not challenge the seismic qualifications of the affected relays.

The above observations were considered as a part of the overall evaluation of the licensee's performance in problem identification and resolution. No specific findings relating to prioritization and evaluation of issues were identified.

c. Effectiveness of Corrective Actions

(1) Inspection Scope

The team reviewed the CRs, audits, assessments, and trending reports described in 4OA2.a.(1) above to verify that corrective actions, related to the issues, were identified and implemented in a timely manner commensurate with safety, including corrective actions to address common cause or generic concerns. The team also conducted plant walkdowns and interviewed plant personnel to independently verify and assess the effectiveness of corrective actions implemented by the licensee. A listing of specific documents reviewed during the inspection is included in the Attachment to this report.

(2) Issues and Findings

The team concluded that, implemented corrective actions for those conditions reviewed were effective. Most investigations for significant conditions adverse to quality were completed within the 30 day goal. The team did not identify any pattern of recurrence of conditions for which previous corrective actions to prevent recurrence were ineffective.

The above observations were considered as a part of the overall evaluation of the licensee's performance in problem identification and resolution. No specific findings were identified in the area of effectiveness of corrective actions.

d. Assessment of Safety-Conscious Work Environment

(1) Inspection Scope

The team interviewed approximately 21 individuals from the licensee's staff, which represented a cross-section of functional organizations and supervisory and non-supervisory personnel, regarding their willingness to identify safety issues. These interviews assessed whether conditions existed that would challenge the establishment of a safety-conscious work environment.

(2) Issues and Findings

The team concluded, based on information collected from these interviews, that employees were willing to identify issues and accepted the responsibility to proactively identify and enter safety issues into the corrective action program. This employee willingness to identify issues was reflected by the fact that approximately 17,000 CRs had been generated in the 12-month period ending June 4, 2001.

The above observations were considered as a part of the overall evaluation of the licensee's performance in problem identification and resolution. No specific findings were identified in the area of assessment of safety-conscious work environment.

4OA6 Exit Meeting

The team discussed these findings with Mr. William T. Cottle, President and Chief Executive Officer, and other members of the licensee's staff, on June 14, 2001. Licensee management provided no further comment on the findings.

Licensee management did not identify any materials examined during the inspection as proprietary.

ATTACHMENT

PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED

Licensee

H. Atkins, Maintenance Manager
W. Bealefield, Jr., Senior Staff Specialist
D. Bednarczyk, Staff Quality Assurance Engineer
M. Berg, Operating Experience Group Manager
J. Cook, NSSS Section Supervisor
W. Cottle, President and Chief Executive Officer
B. Dowdy, Manager, Plant Support
R. Dunn, PRA Engineer
R. Engen, Supervisor, Mechanical Civil Analysis
G. Gaytko, Engineering Specialist
D. Gephart, Unit Supervisor
D. Gore, Supervisor, Reactor Engineering
E. Halpin, Manager, Operations
S. Head, Manager, Licensing
W. Humble, Supervisor, Engineering
T. Jordan, Manager, Engineering
D. Leazar, Manager, Nuclear Fuel and Analysis
J. Lovell, Manager, Training
C. Lunsford, Production Support Supervisor
M. McBurnett, Director, Quality Services
B. Mookhoek, Licensing Engineer
G. Parkey, Plant General Manager
D. Towler, Generation Quality Manager

NRC

N. O'Keefe, Senior Resident Inspector

PARTIAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

The following documents were selected and reviewed by the inspectors to accomplish the objectives and scope of the inspection and to support any findings:

Policies and Procedures

0PGP03-ZX-0002, "Condition Reporting Process," Revision 21
STP-707, "Policy: Corrective Action Program," Revision 0
STP-423, "Policy: Self-Assessment Process," Revision 0
"Station Self-Assessment Guidelines," Revision 2
0PQP01-ZA-0006, "Independent Plant Assessments," Revision 4
"Investigator's Manual," Revision 5
0PGP03-ZX-0006, "Event Review Team," Revision 4
0PGP03-ZX-0013, "Industry Events Analysis," Revision 4

0PGP03-ZA-0090, "Work Process Program," Revision 23
"Investigator's Manual," Revision 6

Audit, Assessment, Surveillance, and Trending Reports

"Quality Audit Report 00-02 (OD) Offsite Dose Calculation Manual," July 13, 2000

"Quality Audit Report 00-04 (NF) Nuclear Fuel and Analysis," August 15, 2000

"Quality Audit Report 00-05 (SE) Physical Security/Fitness-For-Duty/Access Authorization," October 2, 2000

"Quality Audit Report 00-06 (AC) Administrative Control," October 25, 2000

"Quality Audit Report 01-04 (PO), Plant Shutdown Operations," March 20, 2001

"Surveillance No. 00-014, Procurement Quality Surveillance of Baley Hinchy Downes (BHD) Interim Access Authorization Background Investigations, STP Contract ST401118," March 30, 2000

"Surveillance No. 00-029, Procurement Quality Surveillance of Westinghouse Electric Company, LLC Nuclear Fuel Business Unit - STP Unit 2 Cycle 9 Fuel Fabrication," December 18, 2000

"Quality Surveillance Report 00-030, Quality of Non-Licensed Operator (NLO) Rounds," November 21, 2000

"Quality Surveillance Report 01-002, System Engineering Department Maintenance Rule Periodic Maintenance Effectiveness Assessment," January 31, 2001

"First Quarter 2001 Corrective Action Program Trending Report"

"Steam Generator Replacement Project Corrective Action Program Assessment Third Quarter 2000"

"Plant Protection Department CAP Assessment Fourth Quarter 2000"

"Plant Operations Fourth Quarter 2000 Report"

"Quality Department 1st Quarter 2001 CAP Assessment"

"Maintenance, Work Control and Metrology & Radiological Laboratories Corrective Action Program Assessment 1st Quarter 2001"

"STP Operating Experience Group Fourth Quarter 2000 CAP Quarterly Assessment Report"

"Nuclear Licensing CAP Quarterly Assessment Fourth Quarter 2000"

"Risk Management & Industry Relations Corrective Action Program Assessment 4th Quarter 2000"

"Risk Management & Industry Relations Corrective Action Program Assessment 1st Quarter 2001"

"Projects Corrective Action Program Assessment 4th Quarter 2000"

"Health Physics CAP Quarterly Assessment Fourth Quarter 2000"

"Information Systems and Human Resources Condition Reporting Process Assessment First Quarter of 2001"

"Nuclear Purchasing & Materials Management Condition Reporting Process Assessment First Quarter 2001"

"Nuclear Training Condition Reporting Process Assessment 1st Quarter 2001"

"Planning & Controls Department First Quarter 2001 CAP Summary"

"Nuclear Engineering Department 1st Quarter 2001 CAP Summary"

CR 00-6754-2, "OPS Self-Assessment Report - CAP"

"Focused Self-Assessment 00-11650: Preliminary Analysis for Implementing Paragraph (a)(4) of the Maintenance Rule in Accordance with Industry Guidance," January 16, 2001

"Work Control Focused Self-Assessment 00-3020," October 25, 2000

"CR 00-16687: Sitewide Self-Assessment of Human Performance," December 14, 2000

Meeting Minutes and Other Reports

"4th Quarter 2000 Oversight Planning / Scheduling Review Team (OP/SRT) Meeting Minutes/1st Quarter 2001 Oversight Plan Update," January 24, 2001

"NSRB Full Board - Open Actions," May 8, 2001

"CRG 2001 CAP Program Topics/Improvements," June 12, 2001

Part 21 report: Defect in a Split Ring Retainer

Licensee Event Report 499/01-003 Steam Generator 2C Classified as Category C-3

Licensee Event Report 499/01-002 Manual Reactor Trip

Work Packages

WAN 158490 and 158489
LLRT packages for CCW Valves 197, 198, 199, 208, 209, 210

Condition Reports (CRs)

95-5593	99-14763	00-9415	00-12943	00-17601	01-3212
95-14138	99-15463	00-9571	00-13277	00-17780	01-3411
95-14323	99-15891	00-9881	00-13341	00-18052	01-3656
96-3630	99-16486	00-9884	00-13467	00-18144	01-3658
96-11475	99-16994	00-9902	00-13689	00-18201	01-3661
97-605	99-17334	00-10049	00-13850	00-18440	01-3664
97-2808	00-126	00-10216	00-14048	00-18644	01-3670
97-8328	00-302	00-10760	00-14217	00-18652	01-3767
97-13775	00-306	00-10863	00-14992	00-18658	01-3951
98-2400	00-585	00-11098	00-15302	00-18887	01-4135
98-9387	00-986	00-11193	00-15678	00-18907	01-4268
98-10214	00-1196	00-11623	00-15880	00-18922	01-4307
98-15174	00-1306	00-11657	00-15882	01-213	01-4752
99-203	00-1973	00-11834	00-15903	01-1348	01-4975
99-3274	00-2186	00-11835	00-16008	01-1971	01-5160
99-3448	00-2556	00-11851	00-16019	01-1976	01-5375
99-4056	00-2859	00-11853	00-16479	01-2078	01-5752
99-4058	00-4380	00-11946	00-16959	01-2081	01-6142
99-8520	00-4726	00-12452	00-16964	01-2086	01-6888
99-9690	00-6466	00-12484	00-17211	01-2270	01-7016
99-10981	00-6833	00-12678	00-17214	01-2284	01-8059
99-11196	00-7341	00-12697	00-17237	01-2655	01-8426
99-12853	00-7499	00-12732	00-17510	01-2819	01-8616
99-12881	00-8564				

INITIAL MATERIAL REQUESTED

Information Request 1
South Texas Project PIR (IP 71152) Inspection 50-498/01-007; 50-499/01-007

The inspection will cover the period of July 1, 2000 to June 1, 2001. All requested information should be limited to this period unless otherwise specified. The information may be provided in either electronic or paper media or a combination of these. Information provided in electronic media may be in the form of e-mail attachment(s), CDs, or 3½ floppy disks. The agency's text editing software is Corel WordPerfect 8, Presentations, and Quattro Pro; however, we have document viewing capability for MS Word, Excel, Power Point, and Adobe Acrobat (.pdf) text files.

Please provide the following information to Howard Bundy in the Region IV Arlington office by May 9, 2001:

1. Summary list of all currently open/active items for:

   condition reports of significant conditions adverse to quality
   operator work-arounds
   engineering review requests
   maintenance requests
   temporary modifications
   procedure change requests
   training needs request/evaluation
   control room and safety system deficiencies
   human performance issues

2. Summary list of all items completed/resolved/closed since July 1, 2000 for:

   condition reports of significant conditions adverse to quality
   operator work-arounds
   engineering review requests
   maintenance requests
   temporary modifications
   procedure change requests
   training needs request/evaluation
   control room and safety system deficiencies
   human performance issues

3. Summary list of all condition reports generated during the specified period and sorted by:

   chronology
   initiating organization

4. All quality assurance audits and surveillances of corrective action activities since July 1, 2000.

5. All corrective action activity and functional area self-assessments and non-NRC third party assessments since July 1, 2000.

6. Corrective action performance trending/tracking reports generated since July 1, 2000.

7. Current revision of the following procedure: "Condition Reporting Process"

8. Any additional governing procedures/policies/guidelines for:

   Condition Reporting
   Corrective Action Program
   Root Cause Evaluation/Determination

Operator Work-Arounds
Work Requests
Engineering Requests
Temporary Modifications
Procedure Change Requests
Deficiency Reporting and Resolution
Training Needs Request/Evaluation

9. For each of the items applicable to South Texas Project listed below please provide the following:

- Full text of the condition report (please indicate any findings that did not result in a condition report or corrective actions)
- Any "Roll-up" or "Aggregating" Conditions Reports related to the generic communication or condition report.
- Root Cause analysis report (if applicable)
- Risk significance assessments
- Probable Cause evaluation (if applicable)
- Approved corrective actions
- Basis for extending originally approved due dates
- Evidence of corrective action completion (work packages, design change documentation, temporary modifications, training lesson plans/material, training attendance records, procedure revisions, etc.)

a. Part 21 Reports:
   - From Ingersoll-Dresser Pump Company, "Design Defect in Split Ring Retainer (Drawing B65573), issued June 26, 2000
   - From Indian Point 3, "Possible Inoperability of a Safety Related Static Inverter," issued December 15, 2000
   - From ABB Power Distribution, "Potential Defective Control Device for HK and K-line Circuit Breakers," issued January 15, 2001

b. NRC Information Notices:
   - 2000-009, "Steam Generator Tube Failure at Indian Point, Unit 2"
   - 2000-010, "Recent Events Resulting in Extremity Exposure Exceeding Regulatory Limits"
   - 2000-012, "Potential Degradation Firefighter Primary Protective Garmets"
   - 2000-013,"Review of Refueling Outage Risk"
   - 2000-014, "Non-Vital Bus Fault Leads to Fire and Loss of Offsite Power"
   - 2000-015, "Recent Events Resulting in Whole Body Exposure Exceeding Regulatory Limits"
   - 2000-017, "Crack in Weld Area of Reactor Coolant System Hot Leg Piping @ V.C. Summer"
   - 2000-020, "Potential Loss of Redundant Safety-Related Equipment Because of the Lack of High-Energy Line Break Barriers"
   - 2000-021, "Detached Check Valve Disc Not Detected by Use of Acoustic and Magnetic Nonintrusive Test Techniques"

c. LERs:
- 498/2000-003, "Inoperable Battery"
- 499/2000-003, "Reactor Containment Building Penetration M-85 Not Properly Isolated"
- 498/2000-006, "Two Trains of Essential Chilled Water System Inoperable"
- 499/2000-004, "Circuit Breaker Trip"
- 498/2000-007, "Manual Unit Trip with Safety Injection"

d. NCVs:
- 499/0012-01, "Workers Left a Tool in Containment Recirculation Sump Following Work"
- 499/0013-02, "Failure to wear required dosimetry when entering a high radiation area"
- 499/0013-03, "Failure to follow work permit requirements"
- 499/0013-01, "Three examples of failure to follow procedures when tagging equipment out of service"

e. Other Events
- Loss of Power to One ESF Train While Performing Offsite Power Transfer on February 7, 2001
- Switchyard Breaker Leads to Manual Trip with Loss of Heat Sink on March 1, 2001
- I&C Technicians Connect Test Equipment to Wrong Card Resulting in Outward Rod Motion on March 26, 2001

10. Current System Health Reports or similar system information

11. Listing of plant safety issues generated through the employee concerns program since July 1, 2000

12. Listing of action items generated by the plant safety review committees since July 1, 2000

13. Current predictive performance summary reports

Information Request 2 - May 31, 2001
South Texas Project PIR (IP 71152) Inspection 50-498/01-007; 50-499/01-007

Please provide information related the following items to the inspectors onsite during the week of June 4, 2001. This information should include the following:

1. Full text of the condition report (please indicate any findings that did not result in a condition report or corrective actions)
2. Any "Roll-up" or "Aggregating" Conditions Reports related to the generic communication or condition report.
3. Root Cause analysis report (if applicable)
4. Risk significance assessments
5. Probable Cause evaluation (if applicable)

6. Approved corrective actions
7. Basis for extending originally approved due dates
8. Evidence of corrective action completion (work packages, design change documentation, temporary modifications, training lesson plans/material, training attendance records, procedure revisions, etc.)

Paul Gage

CR 01-3664 CR 01-3656 CR 01-3658 CR 01-6888 CR 95-5593 CR 95-14138

CR 95-14323 CR 98-9387 CR 99-9690 CR 00-9415 CR 01-6142 CR 00-11384

CR 00-17510 CR 00-18144 CR 01-2270 CR 00-13277 CR 00-18658 CR 01-3661

CR 01-3670 CR 01-4975 CR 01-3411 CR 00-986 CR 00-11193

CRs for the following:

- ❑ EDG 12 starting air receiver reliefs relieved below setpoint on 8/9/00
- ❑ Incorrect setpoints on Unit 2 1E MCC breakers on 8/31/00
- ❑ Unit 2 CCW containment isolation valve spuriously closed on 10/25/00
- ❑ Unit 1 power reduction due to a LP heater drip pump seal leak on 12/11/00
- ❑ Bearing failure on Unit 1 stator cooling water pump on 12/12/00
- ❑ BOP task force issues (FW heater level control; CW open loop cooling biofouling; feed reg valves; steam dump valves; SG PORVs; main generator hydrogen leaks.

Gilbert Guerra

LER 2-01-002 (CR 01-3411) CR 01-4752 CR 97-13775 CR 00-18652 CR 00-11657

CR 01-1457 CR 99-814 CR 00-16019 CR 01-5160 CR 01-2655 CR 00-14217

CR 00-16964 CR 00-13467 CR 00-15302 CR 00-16959 CR 99-15463-2

CR 00-4726 CR 99-814 CR 01-5725 CR 97-8328 PM 94005794

Effectiveness reviews: 00-14048 for 00-13341 99-10162 for 00-11098-6

CRs for the following;
- U1 down power on 7/20/00 for Hydrogen leak repair on cooling vent line caused by auxiliary operator.
- CW pump 12 discharge MOV failed to close on 8/9/00.
- U2 steam generator tube leak reported on 8/10/00.
- 2 times greater number of steam generator tubes required plugging in U2 in spring 2000 than expected.
- U2 main generator high vibration and Hydrogen leaks.

Howard Bundy

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