October 30, 2002

Mr. John T. Conway
Site Vice President
Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, LLC
P.O. Box 63
Lycoming, NY 13093

SUBJECT: NINE MILE POINT NUCLEAR STATION - NRC INSPECTION REPORT 50-220/02-05, 50-410/02-05

Dear Mr. Conway:

On September 28, 2002, the NRC completed an inspection of your Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2. The enclosed report documents the inspection findings which were discussed on October 4, 2002, with you and other members of your staff.

The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel. No findings of significance were identified.

The NRC has increased security requirements at the Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station in response to terrorist acts on September 11, 2001. Although the NRC is not aware of any specific threat against nuclear facilities, the NRC has issued an Order and several threat advisories to commercial power reactors to strengthen licensees' capabilities and readiness to respond to a potential attack. The NRC continues to inspect licensees' security controls and compliance with the Order and current security regulations.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publically Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document management system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Michele G. Evans, Chief
Projects Branch 1
Division of Reactor Projects

Docket Nos. 50-220
50-410
License Nos. DPR-63
NPF-69

Enclosure: Inspection Report 50-220/02-05, 50-410/02-05

Attachment 1 - Supplemental Information

cc w/encl: M. J. Wallace, President, Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, LLC
R. L. Wenderlich, Senior Constellation Officer Responsible for Nine Mile Point
G. Wilson, Esquire
M. Wetterhahn, Esquire, Winston and Strawn
J. M. Petro, Jr., Esquire, Counsel, Constellation Power Source, Inc.
J. Rettberg, New York State Electric and Gas Corporation
P. D. Eddy, Electric Division, NYS Department of Public Service
C. Donaldson, Esquire, Assistant Attorney General, New York Department of Law
J. V. Vinquist, MATS, Inc.
W. M. Flynn, President, New York State Energy Research and Development Authority
J. Spath, Program Director, New York State Energy Research and Development Authority
Supervisor, Town of Scriba
C. Adrienne Rhodes, Chairman and Executive Director, State Consumer Protection Board
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Region I Docket Room (with concurrences)

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I

Docket Nos: 50-220, 50-410

License Nos: DPR-63, NPF-69

Report No: 50-220/02-05 50-410/02-05

Licensee: Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, LLC (NMPNS)

Facility: Nine Mile Point, Units 1 and 2

Location: P. O. Box 63
Lycoming, NY 13093

Dates: June 30, 2002 - September 28, 2002

Inspectors: G. Hunegs, Senior Resident Inspector
B. Fuller, Resident Inspector
A. Della Greca, Reactor Inspector
T. Hipschman, Reactor Inspector
J. Laughlin, Operations Engineer
N. Perry, Project Engineer
J. Talieri, Reactor Inspector

Approved by: Michele G. Evans, Chief
Projects Branch 1
Division of Reactor Projects

Summary of Findings

IR 05000220-02-05, IR 05000410-02-05, on 6/30-9/28/02; Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, LLC; Nine Mile Point, Units 1 & 2. Resident Inspector Report

This inspection was conducted by resident inspectors and five region-based inspectors. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," Revision 3, dated July 2000."

A. Inspector Identified Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

Report Details

SUMMARY OF PLANT STATUS

Nine Mile Point Unit 1 (Unit 1) began the inspection period at 100 percent power and remained there through the end of the inspection period.

Nine Mile Point Unit 2 (Unit 2) began the inspection period at 100 percent power and remained there through the end of the inspection period.

1. REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity, Emergency Preparedness

1R01 Adverse Weather Protection

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector conducted a review of Unit 1 actions taken in response to forecast winds exceeding 30 miles per hour in the plant vicinity. The inspector reviewed the requirements of N1-OP-64, Meteorological Monitoring and Attachment 1 to EPIP-EPP-26, Preparation and Response to Natural Hazards, and verified completion of a sample of those requirements.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R04 Equipment Alignment

a. Inspection Scope

The following partial system walkdowns were conducted:

- The inspector selected the Unit 2 reactor core isolation cooling system (ICS) to conduct a partial system walkdown while the high pressure core spray system was out of service. The walkdown included the control room switch verification and physical inspection and verification of the ICS configuration. N2-OP-35, Reactor Core Isolation Cooling, Revision 6, was used for this review.

- The inspector selected the Unit 2 Division I emergency uninterruptible power supply (UPS) inverter while the Division II UPS inverter was out of service. The walkdown included physical inspection and verification of the UPS inverter configuration. N2-OP-71D, Uninterruptible Power Supplies, was used for this review.

- The inspector selected the Unit 1 102 switchboard while the 103 emergency diesel generator (EDG) was out of service. The walkdown included physical inspection and verification of the switchboard configuration. N1-OP-30, 4.16 kV, 600 V, and 480 V House Service, was used for this review.

- The inspector selected the Unit 1 Control Rod Drive system while calibration checks of the accumulator levels switches and pressure gauges were ongoing per N1-IPM-048-001. The walkdown included physical inspection and verification of the valve configuration using N1-OP-5, Control Rod Drive.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R05 Fire Protection

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors conducted walkdowns of fire areas to determine if there was adequate control of transient combustibles and ignition sources. The condition of fire detection devices, the readiness of the sprinkler fire suppression systems and the fire doors were also inspected against industry standards. In addition, the passive fire protection features were inspected, including the ventilation system fire dampers, structural steel fire proofing, and electrical penetration seals. The following plant areas were inspected:

- Reactor Building Elevation 198 foot (FT), area 198-01 (Corner room) (Unit 1)
- Reactor Building Elevation 198 FT, area 198-02 (Corner room) (Unit 1)
- Reactor Building Elevation 198 FT, area 198-03 (Corner room) (Unit 1)
- Reactor Building Elevation 198 FT, area 198-04 (Corner room) (Unit 1)
- Turbine Building Elevation 250 FT, area CC-01 (cable spreading room) (Unit 1)
- Turbine Building Elevation 261 FT, area C2 (Auxiliary control room) (Unit 1)
- Reactor Building Elevation 175 FT, fire zones 204SW, 205NZ, 212SW, 213SW (Unit 2)
- Reactor building elevation 289 FT, fire zones 252SW, 253XL, 255SW (Unit 2)
- Emergency diesel generator rooms, fire zones 401NZA, 402SW, 401NZB, 403SW, 401NZC, 404SW (Unit 2)

Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed licensed operator requalification training activities to assess the licensee's training program effectiveness. The inspectors observed Unit 2 licensed operator simulator training on August 8 and Unit 1 simulator training on August 21. The inspectors reviewed performance in the areas of procedure use, self and peer-checking, completion of critical tasks, and training performance objectives. Following the simulator exercise, the inspectors observed the crew debrief and critique, and reviewed simulator fidelity through a sampling process.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R12 Maintenance Rule Implementation

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed performance-based problems involving selected in-scope structures, systems, and components (SSCs) to assess the effectiveness of the maintenance program. Reviews focused on: (1) proper maintenance rule scoping, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65; (2) characterization of failed SSCs; (3) safety significance classifications; (4) 10 CFR 50.65 (a)(1) and (a)(2) classifications; and, (5) the appropriateness of performance criteria for SSCs classified as (a)(2), and goals and corrective actions for SSCs classified as (a)(1). The inspectors reviewed the licensee's system scoping documents and system health reports.

The following DERs were reviewed:

- NM-2002-3220, Control room chiller 122 tripped (Unit 1)
- NM-2002-3494, Control room chiller 112 breaker trip caused unplanned entry into TS 3.4.5e (Unit 1)

The following system was selected for review because it was a high-safety-significant system, and was scheduled to transition from (a)(1) to (a)(2) status in the near future:

- Unit 2 reactor core isolation cooling (ICS) system.

The inspectors reviewed the most recent system health report and system functional failures of the last two years. Additionally, the inspectors performed a walkdown of the ICS system, discussed the system status and recent performance with engineering and operations personnel, and reviewed the following corrective action program documents:

- NM-2001-4334
- NM-2001-5373
- NM-2001-5383
- NM-2001-5808

- NM-2002-0268

Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control

a. Inspection Scope

For selected maintenance work orders (WOs), the inspectors evaluated: (1) the effectiveness of the risk assessments performed before the maintenance activities were conducted; (2) risk management control activities; (3) the necessary steps taken to plan and control resultant emergent work tasks; and, (4) the overall adequacy of identification and resolution of emergent work and the associated maintenance risk assessments. The following documents were used for this review:

- GAP-MAI-01, Conduct of Maintenance, Revision 3
- GAP-PSH-01, Work Control, Revision 27
- NEG-CA-010, Online Configuration Risk Management Guidance

The following work items/WOs were reviewed:

- WO-02-07221, Repair 2VBA*UPS2A uninterruptible power supply inverter (Unit 2)
- WO-02-07253, Troubleshoot FWS-LV10B, feedwater level control valve, due to feedwater flow perturbations (Unit 2)
- Yellow risk probabilistic risk analysis (PRA) for switchyard work on R40 and line 4 outage during the week of July 1, 2002 (Unit 1)
- Yellow risk PRA for 11 high pressure coolant injection planned testing during the week of July 14, 2002 (Unit 1)
- Yellow risk PRA for EDG 103 planned maintenance outage during the week of August 26, 2002 (Unit 1)
- WO-02-06650, Troubleshoot 14 reactor recirculation pump positioner (Unit 1)

a. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R15 Operability Evaluations

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed operability evaluations affecting risk significant mitigating systems, to assess: (1) the technical adequacy of the evaluation; (2) whether continued system operability evaluations were warranted; (3) whether other existing degraded systems adversely impacted the affected system or compensatory measures; (4) where compensatory measures were used, whether the measures were appropriate and properly controlled; and, (5) the degraded systems impact on TS limiting condition for

operations. The following documents were used for this review:

- NIP-ECA-01, Deviation/Event Reports
- GAP-OPS-02, Administration of Operations, Revision 19
- S-ODP-OPS-0116, Operability Determinations
- 10CFR21, report number 0083 dated August 31, 2002

The following licensee documents were reviewed:

- NM-2002-3142, Small metal flakes found in the division III EDG lube oil sump (Unit 2)
- DER-NM-2002-3038, Entry into 24 hour shutdown action due to failure of 2VBA*UPS2A inverter (Unit 2)
- DER-NM-2002-3494, 121 Control room chiller compressor tripped (Unit 1)
- DER NM-2002-3559, Air actuator bolt sheared on valve 80-41, containment spray 121 bypass valve (Unit 1)
- DER NM-2002-4168, Inadequate output torque for 2RHS*MOV8A, heat exchanger bypass valve (Unit 2)

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed post-maintenance testing (PMT) procedures and associated testing activities for selected risk significant mitigating systems to assess whether: (1) the effect of testing on the plant had been adequately addressed by control room and engineering personnel; (2) testing was adequate for the maintenance performed; (3) acceptance criteria were clear and adequately demonstrated operational readiness, consistent with the design and licensing basis documents; (4) test instrumentation had current calibrations, range, and accuracy for the application; (5) tests were performed, as written, with applicable prerequisites satisfied; (6) jumpers installed or leads lifted were properly controlled; (7) test equipment was removed following testing; and (8) equipment was returned to the status required to perform its safety function. The following tests and activities were reviewed:

- WO-02-07221, Repair VBA*UPS2A inverter (Unit 2)
- WO-02-03831, 115 kV motorized disconnect switch preventive maintenance (Unit 2)
- N1-OP-20, Service, Instrument and Breathing Air Systems, for 13 Instrument Air compressor PMT after planned maintenance (Unit 1)
- N1-OP-1, Nuclear Steam Supply System, for 15 recirculation motor generator set PMT after planned maintenance (Unit 1)
- N1-OP-45, Emergency Diesel Generators, for lube and turbo oil pump PMT after planned maintenance (Unit 1)

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R22 Surveillance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors witnessed performance of surveillance test procedures and reviewed test data of selected risk significant SSCs to assess whether the SSCs satisfied Technical Specifications, Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), and licensee procedure requirements; and to determine if the testing appropriately demonstrated that the SSCs were operationally ready and capable of performing their intended safety functions. The following tests were witnessed:

b.

- N1-ST-Q16, Emergency Diesel Generator Quarterly Test (Unit 1)
- N2-ESP-ENS-Q731, Channel Functional Test of Low Pressure Core Spray/Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCS/LPCI) Pumps Auto Start Time Delay Relays (Unit 2)
- N2-OSP-EGS-M@001, Diesel Generator and Diesel Air Start Valve Operability Test - Division I (Unit 2)
- N1-ISP-201-045, Torus Temperature Monitoring (Unit 1)
- N1-ST-Q28, Containment Spray Inter-tie Check Valves (Unit 1)
- N1-IPM-048-001, HCU Level/Pressure Calibration (Unit 1)

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R23 Temporary Plant Modifications

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors selected a temporary change implemented in Unit 1 to jack open and lock the stem of the 13 Feedwater Booster Pump (FWBP) suction valve (BV-50-38). The valve actuator was broken and repair parts were not available on-site. 13 FWBP is a component in the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system at Unit 1and is therefore risk significant. The actuator is not safety related. The following documents were used for this review:

- NIP-CON-01, Configuration Control
- Temporary Change Package N1-02-148, Jack open 13 FWBP suction valve BV-50-38 until repairs can be made (Unit 1)

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1EP2 Alert and Notification System (ANS) Testing

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector toured the site where the siren activation system hardware is located and observed a bi-weekly siren silent test at the county emergency operations center. The inspector reviewed siren system design documentation to determine system testing commitments and siren testing documentation to verify compliance with those commitments. The inspector reviewed instructional material provided to residents and transient population in the emergency planning zone to determine compliance with Emergency Plan (E-Plan), Section 8.4.1 commitments. Lastly, the inspector interviewed the Supervisor, Emergency Preparedness, concerning system design, operation and maintenance. The applicable planning standard, 10 CFR 50.47(b)(5) and related requirements in 10 CFR 50 Appendix E, Section IV.D were used as reference criteria.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1EP3 Emergency Response Organization (ERO) Augmentation Testing

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector reviewed the licensee's commitments for ERO staffing and emergency facility activation. He also reviewed the ERO call-in procedure to assess its adequacy to support ERO augmentation. The inspector reviewed ERO qualification records and the ERO duty roster to ensure that sufficient staff were available to fill all positions. Lastly, the inspector reviewed a Quality Assurance audit finding concerning an adverse trend of ERO member qualification lapses and discussed this issue with the Supervisor, Emergency Preparedness. The applicable planning standard, 10 CFR 50.47(b)(2) and the related requirements in 10 CFR 50, Appendix E were used as reference criteria.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1EP4 Emergency Action Level (EAL) and Emergency Plan Changes

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector sampled recent E-Plan and implementing procedure changes to verify that the changes had not reduced the effectiveness of the E-Plan. There were no recent EAL changes to review. The applicable requirements in 10 CFR 50.54(q), 10 CFR 50.47(b), and 10 CFR 50 Appendix E were used as reference criteria.

The inspector conducted an in-office review of licensee submitted changes to emergency plan-related documents to determine if the changes decreased the effectiveness of the plan. A thorough review was conducted of documents related to the risk significant planning standards (RSPS), such as classifications, notifications and protective action recommendations. A cursory review was conducted for non-RSPS documents. These changes were reviewed against 10 CFR 50.54(q) to ensure that the changes do not decrease the effectiveness of the plan, and that the changes as made continue to meet the standards of 10 CFR 50.47(b) and the requirements of Appendix E. These changes are subject to future inspections to ensure that the impact of the changes continues to meet NRC regulations. The submitted and reviewed documents are listed in attachment 1.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1EP5 Correction of Emergency Preparedness Weaknesses and Deficiencies

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector reviewed deviation/event reports (DERs) assigned to the EP department to determine the significance of the issues, if repeat problems were occurring, and the adequacy of corrective actions. The inspector reviewed Audit Report 02007, performed to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(t), to assess whether the audit met the requirements and determine if any repeat issues were identified. He also interviewed the audit team leader to discuss finding details. The inspector reviewed licensee drill reports for further insights on licensee problem identification. The applicable planning standard, 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14)and the requirements in 10 CFR Appendix E, Section IV.F.2.g, were used as reference criteria.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

3. SAFEGUARDS

Cornerstone: Physical Protection

3PP1 Response to Contingency Events

The Office of Homeland Security (OHS) developed a Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS) to disseminate information regarding the risk of terrorist attacks. The HSAS implements five color-coded threat conditions with a description of corresponding actions at each level. NRC Regulatory Information Summary (RIS) 2002-12a, dated August 19, 2002, "NRC Threat Advisory and Protective Measures System," discusses the HSAS and provides additional information on protective measures to licensees.

a. Inspection Scope

On September 10, 2002, the NRC issued a Safeguards Advisory to reactor licensees to implement the protective measures described in RIS 2002-12a in response to the Federal government declaration of threat level "orange." Subsequently, on September 24, 2002, the OHS downgraded the national security threat condition to "yellow" and a corresponding reduction in the risk of a terrorist threat.

The inspector interviewed licensee personnel and security staff, observed the conduct of security operations, and assessed licensee implementation of the threat level "orange" protective measures. Inspection results were communicated to the region and headquarters security staff for further evaluation.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4. OTHER ACTIVITIES (OA)

4OA1 Performance Indicator (PI) Verification

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector reviewed the licensee's process for identifying the data utilized for the three emergency preparedness PIs, which are: 1) Drill and Exercise Performance (DEP), 2) Emergency Response Organization Drill Participation (ERO), and 3) Alert and Notification System Reliability (ANS). The inspector also reviewed PI data from the fourth quarter of 2001 through the second quarter of 2002 using the criteria of NEI 99-02, Revision 2, *Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline*. Lastly, the inspector verified classification, notification and protective action recommendation opportunities by reviewing selected scenarios and actual events.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector reviewed deviation/event reports (DERs) NM-2001-2253, NM-2001-3251, and NM-2001-4107 to ensure that the corrective actions for the associated plant issues were appropriate. The above issues were selected for follow-up review due to their potential safety significance in the event initiation and mitigation cornerstones. DER NM2001-2253 addressed the failure of a relay contact in the electro-hydraulic control (EHC) system that resulted in the Unit 2 turbine trip and reactor scram. This issue was reported in licensee event report (LER) No. 50-410/2001-001 and discussed in NRC inspection report (IR) 01-04. DER NM-2001-3251 was issued when the licensee determined that one of the Unit 1 offsite sources, 115 kV line No. 4, would not be able to support loss of coolant accident (LOCA) loads when the other source, line No. 1, was out of service. This issue was addressed in LER No. 50-220/2001-002 and discussed in NRC IR 01-10. DER NM-2001-4107 discussed the failure of a negative phase sequence current relay in the main generator protection circuit that resulted in a Unit 1 reactor trip. The issue was addressed in NRC IR 01-07 and reported in LER 50-220/2001-01.

In each case, the inspector reviewed the circumstances surrounding the event, the identification process, and the event evaluation performed by the licensee, including the apparent and root cause evaluation. The inspector verified that the corrective actions were commensurate with the significance of the issue, reasonable, adequately supported by the licensee's analyses, and correctly implemented. The inspector also reviewed the licensee's actions regarding extent of condition, generic implications, timeliness of corrective action, actions to prevent recurrence, and identification of the root and contributing causes of the problem. Applicable records, including maintenance and test activities were reviewed as necessary. Lastly, the inspector discussed with responsible licensee personnel the human performance issues pertaining to the events.

b. Findings

The inspector concluded that, once the issues were identified, the licensee conducted a thorough investigation and initiated reasonable and acceptable actions to correct the deficiencies and prevent recurrence. The inspector also concluded that the licensee's identification process had been ineffective in precluding the events from occurring. For instance, regarding the two relay failures that resulted in plant trips, several industry experience reports had previously identified the existence of potential deficiencies with the failed relays. In both cases, the licensee missed opportunities to take adequate actions to correct the deficiencies and prevent the plant trips. Similarly, in the case of the Unit 1 offsite source loading capability, industry experience had more than once addressed offsite power reliability and grid stability concerns, but each time the licensee's evaluation failed to identify the line No. 4 vulnerabilities and propose appropriate corrective actions.

The inspector's review of the regulatory aspect of the events determined that the relays were used in non-safety-related applications and, therefore, not subject to the stringent requirements imposed on the safety-related systems. Also, the plant response to the relay failures was as designed and as expected. Regarding the offsite source, the concern involved the setting of the degraded grid voltage relays to ensure availability of the source under postulated minimum grid voltage conditions. The inspector had no indication that the grid voltage ever dropped below or near the voltage level that would have rendered the source inoperable under postulated accident conditions. Therefore, the inspector concluded that the issues were of minor safety significance.

4OA6 Management Meetings

Exit Meeting Summary

The inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. J. Conway, Site Vice President, and other members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on October 4, 2002. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented. The inspectors asked the licensee whether any of the material examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.

ATTACHMENT 1

a. Key Points of Contact

Licensee

J. Conway, Site Vice President
R. Dean, Manager Unit 2 Engineering
G. Detter, General Manager, Support Services
L. Hopkins, Unit 1 Plant General Manager
J. Jones, Director, Emergency Preparedness
S. Minihan, Unit 2 Operations Manager
B. Montgomery, General Manager Nuclear Engineering
M. Peckham, Unit 2 Plant General Manager
B. Randall, Manager Unit 1 Engineering
C. Terry, General Manager, Quality Assurance
D. Topley, Unit 1 Operations Manager
D. Wolniak, Licensing Manager

b. List of Documents Reviewed

Deviation/Event Reports:
NM-2001-2253, NM-2001-3251, NM-2001-4016, NM-2001-4107, 2-92-Q-0040

Preventive Maintenance Procedures:
N2-EPM-GEN-V062, HFA Armature Test and Calibration, Revision 1
N2-RCPM-GEN-V070, Protective/Auxiliary Relays and Timers, Revision 2

Calculations/Studies:
4.16KVAC-BUSXFER-STDY, Bus Transfer Study, Revision 1
4.16KVAC-PB102/103SETPT/27, Degraded Voltage Relay Setpoint, Revision 1
ELMSAC-DEGVOLT-STDY, Degraded Voltage Analysis, Revision 0
NER-1E-015, NMP1 Offsite Grid Voltage Regulation Study, Revision 0
NIMO-ELMS-AC01, Performance of Electrical Auxiliary System, Revision 0
SAS-01-045, Nine Mile Point 1 Safety and Availability Assessment, Line 4 Degraded Voltage, Revision 1

Specifications:
E-174, Grid Interface Specification Nine Mile Point Units 1 and 2, Revision 0

Technical Bulletins:
700-RTC, Allen-Bradley Solid State Timing Relay
TIL 1212-2, General Electric Technical Information Letter - Plant Scram Frequency Reduction Features for BWR and PWR Nuclear Turbines with Mark I and Mark II EHC Controls

Drawings:
C-19409-C, Sh. 1 & 1A, One Line Diagram - Auxiliary System, Revision 8

Design Document Changes:
1E00798, Configuration Change - Transformers 101N and 101S Tap Changer Setting, Rev. 1

Equivalency Evaluations:
00153, Evaluation of Allen-Bradley NSR Relay Model 700-RTC00110U1, Revision 1

Work Orders:
99-06075-00

EP documents:
EPMP-EPP-01, Revision 14, Maintenance of Emergency Preparedness
EPMP-EPP-05, Revision 8, Emergency Preparedness Program Self-Assessment
EPMP-EPP-06, Revision 10, Emergency Response Organization Notification Maintenance and Surveillance
EPMP-EPP-08, Revision 8, Maintenance, Testing and Operation of the Oswego County Prompt Notification System
NIP-ECA-01, Revision 25, Deviation/Event Report
NIP-EPP-01, Revision 11, Emergency Response Organization Expectations and Responsibilities
NTP-TQS-102, Revision 16, Licensed Operator Requalification Training
NTP-TQS-202, Revision 19, Emergency Preparedness Training/Qualification Program
Site Emergency Plan, Rev. 46
EPIP-EPP-01, Classification of Emergency Conditions at Unit 1, Rev. 11
EPIP-EPP-02, Classification of Emergency Conditions at Unit 2, Rev 11
EPIP-EPP-10, Security Contingency Event, Rev. 5
EPIP-EPP-14, Emergency Access Control, Rev. 7
EPIP-EPP-18, Activation and Direction of the Emergency Plans, Rev. 9
EPMP-EPP-08, Maintenance, Testing and Operation of the Oswego County Prompt Notification System, Rev. 8
EPMP-EPP-0101, Unit 1 Emergency Classification Base, Rev. 5
EPMP-EPP-0102, Unit 2 Emergency Classification Base, Rev. 6