Staten Island, New York
May 8, 2010
NTSB Number: MAR-12-01
NTIS Number: PB2012-916401
Adopted: April 24, 2012
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On Saturday, May 8, 2010, at 0918 eastern daylight time, the passenger ferry Andrew J. Barberi allided with the terminal structure at slip No. 5 at the St. George terminal, Staten Island, New York, after a loss of propulsion control. Eighteen crewmembers, 2 New York City police officers, 2 concessionaires, and 244 passengers were on board. As a result of the allision, 3 passengers sustained serious injuries; 47 passengers, crew, and others reported minor injuries. The damage to the vessel and the terminal structure totaled $182,238.
The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of the accident was a solenoid failure, which caused a loss of propulsion control of one of the vessel's two cycloidal propellers. Contributing to the accident was the propulsion system's lack of a propeller pitch deviation alarm, which was not required by regulation, but which would have alerted the pilothouse crew to the loss of propulsion control and permitted prompt action.
Safety issues identified in this accident include: Undetected loss of propulsion control and lack of propeller pitch deviation alarms on vessels with controllable pitch or cycloidal propulsion. The Andrew J. Barberi experienced a loss of propulsion control, in which the pitch of the propeller blades failed to respond to the pilothouse crew commands. Because no alarm alerted the crewmembers to the failure, they were unaware of the problem until very little time remained to correct it. Other accidents involving passenger injury and substantial property damage have also resulted from undetected loss of propulsion control. Pitch deviation alarms audibly and visually alert operators in the shortest possible time should the propeller not respond to a command. However, these alarms are not currently required by U.S. Coast Guard regulations. Operational safety provided by safety management systems. After a 2003 accident involving the Andrew J. Barberi, the New York City Department of Transportation Ferry Division voluntarily implemented a safety management system and trained its personnel in its procedures. This effort was evident in the 2010 accident, in which the personnel carried out their designated emergency response procedures in a timely and effective manner. International regulations require safety management systems for vessels in oceangoing service. The National Transportation Safety Board is concerned, however, that safety management systems are not currently required on U.S. passenger vessels in domestic service. Lack of voyage data recorders on U.S.-flag ferries. The Andrew J. Barberi was not equipped with a voyage data recorder, nor was it required to be. Although investigators obtained video footage from the vessel's closed-circuit television security system, which aided them in this accident investigation, the footage was nevertheless incomplete. It did not provide important detailed data, such as the exact moment the vessel's propulsion system failed to properly respond to the pilothouse commands. Although international regulations require all passenger ships and other vessels of 3,000 or more gross tons on international voyages to be fitted with voyage data recorders, U.S.-flag ferries in domestic service are not currently bound by this requirement.
As a result of the Andrew J. Barberi investigation, three new recommendations are issued, two existing recommendations are reiterated, and one existing recommendation is reclassified in this report.
To the U.S. Coast Guard:
To the U.S. Coast Guard:
To the U.S. Coast Guard:
Safety Recommendation M-05-6 (previously classified "Open-Acceptable Response") is classified "Closed-Superseded" by M-12-3 in section "3.3.2 Lack of SMS on U.S.-Flag Passenger Vessels" in this report.
