

QUESTIONS TO BE DISCUSSED WITH
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, MILITARY COMMANDERS, AND UNITED STATES
AMBASSADOR TO IRAQ

Casualties

- Do we assess that the rise in casualties is due to increased exposure because of changes in our operational posture? Or is it the result of a concerted effort by the enemy -- (b)(1) or other players?
- What specific adjustments might we make to bring casualties down? What would be the implications of these changes for our strategy?

Baghdad Security Plan

- Are we succeeding? If not, why not?
- What adjustments are we making in light of the present levels of violence?
- How much improvement can be achieved through additional forces and how much requires more reconciliation?

(b)(1)

- Is the return to violence in certain cleared sectors of Baghdad occurring after security is being handed over to ISF or while MNF-I is still in charge?

(b)(1)

- Given the changing nature of the conflict in Iraq generally, are our present force levels sufficient to complete the mission and respond to contingencies? What do we have in reserve, if necessary?

(b)(1)

Benchmarks

- What are the benefits and drawbacks of laying out a timeline for Iraqi assumption of responsibility?
- Does this approach further focus us on transition rather than on security and stabilizing the country?

(b)(1)

Adjustments

- What adjustments to our tactics in pursuing our strategy have been most significant?