

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20463

February 11, 1985

MEMORANDUM

TO:

α s FRED EILAND

PRESS OFFICER

FROM:

ROBERT J. COSTA

ASSISTANT STAFF DIRECTOR

AUDIT DIVISION

SUBJECT:

PUBLIC ISSUANCE OF FINAL AUDIT REPORT -

FRIENDS OF GEORGE MCGOVERN

Attached please find a copy of the final audit report of Friends of George McGovern which was approved by the Commission on February 6, 1985.

Informational copies of the report have been received by all parties involved and the report may be released to the public.

Attachment as stated

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FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20463

FINAL REPORT OF THE AUDIT DIVISION ON FRIENDS OF GEORGE MCGOVERN

I. Background

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A. Overview

This report is based on an audit of Friends of George McGovern ("the Committee") to determine whether there has been compliance with the provisions of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, as amended ("the Act"). The audit was conducted pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 9038(a) which states that "after each matching payment period, the Commission shall conduct a thorough examination and audit of the qualified campaign expenses of every candidate and his authorized committees who received payments under Section 9037."

In addition, 26 U.S.C. § 9039(b) and 11 C.F.R. § 9038.1(a)(2) state, in relevant part, that the Commission may conduct other examinations and audits from time to time as it deems necessary.

The Committee registered with the Federal Election Commission as the McGovern for President Committee on September 26, 1983. It changed its name to Friends of George McGovern on April 7, 1984. The Committee maintains its headquarters in Washington, D.C.

The audit covered the period from the Committee's inception, September 13, 1983, through June, 30, 1984, the last day covered by the most recent report filed with the Commission at the time of the audit. (In addition, certain financial activity was reviewed through July 26, 1984.) The Committee reported an opening cash balance of \$-0-, total receipts of \$1,543,744.75, total disbursements of \$1,241,482.41 and a closing cash balance of (\$526.35) on June 30, 1984. However, it is anticipated that the Committee will continue to receive contributions and make disbursements. In addition, revised statements of Net Outstanding Campaign Obligations will be submitted with each matching fund submission as required by 11 C.F.R. § 9034.5(d). Under 11 C.F.R. § 9038.1(c)(4) additional audit work may be conducted and addenda to this report issued as necessary.

^{1/} The totals do not foot due to various reporting errors noted in Finding II.A.l.

This report is based upon documents and working papers which support each of the factual statements. They form part of the record upon which the Commission based its decisions on the matters in the report and were available to Commissioners and appropriate staff for review.

B. Key Personnel

The Treasurers of the Committee during the period audited were:

Ms. Helene Mae Bordenick 9/13/83 - 6/14/84 Ms. Paula M. Kowalczuk 6/14/84 - 1/14/85 Ms. Mary T. Curtin 1/14/85 - present

C. Scope

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The audit included such tests as verification of total reported receipts, disbursements and individual transactions; review of required supporting documentation; analysis of Committee debts and obligations; review of contribution and expenditure limitations; and such other audit procedures as deemed necessary under the circumstances.

II. Findings and Recommendations Related to Title 2 of the United States Code

A. Misstatement of Financial Activity

1. Unreported Receipts and Disbursements

Under 2 U.S.C. §§ 434(b)(1), (2) and (4) a committee is required to report the amount of cash on hand at the beginning of each reporting period, and the total sum of all receipts and disbursements for the reporting period and calendar year.

The Audit staff's reconciliation of the activity in the Committee's bank accounts to the disclosure reports filed for the period audited revealed the misstatements shown below.

a. Receipts

The Committee's reported receipts were understated by a net amount of \$45,195.08. A major portion of the difference was the result of the Committee not reporting the receipt of a \$40,000.00 loan received in March, 1984. In addition, the Audit staff identified \$17,135.53 in itemized receipts on Schedules A-P which were not carried forward to the summary pages of the Committee's reports. The difference (\$11,940.45) could not be explained.

b. <u>Disbursements</u>

The Committee's reported disbursements were understated by a net total of \$380,939.52. This amount includes \$215,931.27 in disbursements made from the Committee's headquarters' accounts and \$50,822.53 from the Committee's state accounts. The remainder of the understated amount resulted from (1) Committee errors on the summary pages of the disclosure reports2/, (2) disbursement figures reported incorrectly, (3) disbursements reported twice, and (4) transfers between Committee accounts reported as disbursements.

c. Ending Cash

The reporting errors noted above resulted in a net difference of \$21,107.69 in the Committee's reported ending cash. It should be noted that the Committee made several attempts to correct its reported cash position during the period audited, thus the net difference in ending cash is significantly less than the differences noted for receipts or disbursements.

On November 19, 1984, the Committee filed a comprehensive amendment reflecting corrected totals for cash on hand, receipts and disbursements and itemizing the unreported \$40,000 loan.

Recommendation

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The Audit staff recommends that no further action be taken on this matter.

B. <u>Itemization of Receipts</u>

Section 434(b)(3)(A) of Title 2, United States Code requires a political committee to report the identification of each person who makes a contribution to the committee aggregating in excess of \$200.00 per calendar year together with the date and amount of such contribution. Further, 2 U.S.C. § 431(13) defines identification to mean in the case of an individual, the name, mailing address, occupation, and the name of his or her employer.

Section 434(b)(3)(B) of Title 2, United States Code states that each report under this section shall disclose the identification of each political committee which makes a contribution to the reporting committee, together with the date and amount of any such contribution.

^{2/} The Committee itemized \$134,191.31 in disbursements on Schedules B-P which were not carried forward to the summary pages of the reports.

The Committee's contribution records were reviewed to determine whether all contributions aggregating in excess of \$200.00 per calendar year were itemized as required on the Committee's disclosure reports. It was noted that contributions totaling \$19,501.50 were not itemized as required. This amount represents 9.5% of the total amount of contributions requiring itemization. In addition, contributions of \$10,030.00 which were itemized on the reports did not contain adequate contributor information.

Also noted during the review of the Committee's receipts were contributions from three political committees totaling \$750.00 which were not properly itemized.

The Audit staff presented Committee officials with schedules of the unitemized contributions and the contributions lacking adequate disclosure information. The Committee officials provided no explanation for the omissions noted on the disclosure reports.

In the comprehensive amendment filed on November 19, 1984 the Committee itemized the previously unitemized contributions and included the required additional contributor information.

Recomendation

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C. Other Matter

A matter noted in the audit has been referred to the Commission's Office of General Counsel.

III. Findings and Recommendations Related to Title 26 of the United States Code

A. Apparent Non-Qualified Campaign Expenses

Section 9038(b)(2)(A) of Title 26, United States Code states that if the Commission determines that any amount of any payment made to a candidate from the matching payment account was used for any purpose other than to defray the qualified campaign expenses with respect to which such payment was made, it shall notify such candidate of the amount so used, and the candidate shall pay to the Secretary an amount equal to such amount.

The Commission, in a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking published in the <u>Federal Register</u> on June 28, 1984, set forth a pro-rata formula which would base repayments for non-qualified campaign expenses on the proportion of federal funds to total funds received by the candidate. Further, the final version and the Explanation and Justification was published in the <u>Federal Register</u> on August 22, 1984 and transmitted to Congress.

The formula and the appropriate calculation with respect to the Committee's receipt activity is as follows:

Total Matching Funds Certified Through Date of Ineligibility (3/15/84)3/

Numerator + Private Contributions Received Through 3/15/84

 $\frac{$209,337.38}{($209,337.38 + $563,161.69)} = .270987$

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Thus, the repayment ratio for non-qualified campaign expenses is 27.0987%.

1. Convention-Related Disbursements

Section 9032(9) of Title 26, United States Code defines a qualified campaign expense as a purchase, payment, distribution, loan, advance, deposit or gift of money or anything of value incurred by a candidate, or by his authorized committee, in connection with his campaign for nomination for election and neither the incurring nor payment of which constitutes a violation of any law of the United States or of the State in which the expense is incurred or paid (emphasis added).

On March 15, 1984, Senator George S. McGovern's candidacy terminated for the purpose of incurring qualified campaign expenses. In a March 15, 1984 letter to the Commission, the Senator stated that although he was no longer actively pursuing the nomination for president, he would be continuing as an inactive candidate and that his presidential committee would be maintained. In a June 4, 1984 letter to the Commission, the Committee's Deputy Director stated that the Senator planned to participate in the National Democratic Nominating Convention and this required substantial preparatory work from the staff. In addition, during the audit fieldwork, the Audit staff observed that convention-related activity was taking place. The Committee Treasurer was informed by the Audit staff that certain expenses incurred after the Candidate's date of ineligibility would have to be allocated between campaign-related activity and conventionrelated activity. The Treasurer provided the Audit staff with percentages for allocating each Committee staff person's salary,

On March 23, 1984, the Commission determined that the date of ineligibility under 11 C.F.R. § 9033.5(a) for Senator George McGovern is March 15, 1984.

Committee overhead and other expenses between the two(2) activities. Based on the Audit staff's observation of the Committee operations and staff functions, the percentages were found to be reasonable.

Certain disbursements made by the Committee between June 1, 1984 and July 26, 1984 were allocated between campaign-related and convention-related activity. The application of the allocation percentages developed resulted in the identification of \$5,300.00 in salary payments, and \$2,175.72 in overhead expenses related to the convention. Further, our review identified \$7,649.39 in expenses, the purpose of which was solely for convention-related activities.

Conclusion

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On January 29, 1985, the Commission made an <u>initial</u> <u>determination</u> that the amount (\$15,125.11) of convention-related disbursements are non-qualified campaign expenses and the prorata portion \$4,098.71 (\$15,125.11 x .270987) be repaid to the U.S. Treasury within 90 calendar days of receipt of this report in accordance with 11 C.F.R. § 9038.2(d).

Repayment Amount:

\$4,098.71

2. <u>Undocumented Disbursements</u>

Section 9033.11(a) of Title 11, Code of Federal Regulations states that each candidate shall have the burden of proving that disbursements made by the candidate or his or her authorized committee(s) or persons authorized to make expenditures on behalf of the candidate or committee(s) are qualified campaign expenses as defined in 11 C.F.R. § 9032.9.

In addition, the Commission's Regulations under 11 C.F.R. § 9033.11(b) contain the documentation requirements regarding qualified campaign expenses.

A review of the Committee's disbursements made through July 26, 1984 disclosed that no documentation or inadequate documentation was maintained for disbursements totaling \$26,455.85 from the Committee's national accounts and \$3,655.98 from the Committee's state accounts. Many of the undocumented disbursements from the national accounts were identified as being made to individuals for reimbursement of expenses or involved checks made payable to "cash". Also, the Candidate used his personal credit card to incur campaign related expenses. The Committee made payments for the credit card expenditures but was unable to demonstrate the connection between the payments and the campaign. Committee officials stated that they would attempt to get the required documentation for the disbursements.

The Committee was presented with schedules of the undocumented disbursements at the exit conference.

On November 19, 1984, the Committee submitted documentation for \$2,594.15 of the previously undocumented disbursements. Disbursements totaling \$27,517.68 (\$24,227.71 from the national accounts and \$3,289.97 from the state accounts) remain undocumented.

Conclusion

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On January 29, 1985, the Commission made an <u>initial</u> <u>determination</u> that the amount (\$27,517.68) of undocumented disbursements are non-qualified campaign expenses and the prorata portion, \$7,456.93 (\$27,517.68 x .270987), be repaid to the U.S. Treasury within 90 calendar days of receipt of this report in accordance with 11 C.F.R. § 9038.2(d).

Repayment Amount:

\$7,456.93

3. Payment of Personal Compensation to the Candidate

Under 11 C.F.R. § 9032.9(a)(2) "qualified campaign expense" means a purchase, payment, distribution, loan, advance, deposit, or gift of money or anything of value made in connection with a candidate's campaign for nomination.

The Committee paid the Candidate a \$50,000 salary in three installments: 1) \$35,000 on March 9, 1984, 2) \$10,000 on May 30, 1984 and 3) \$5,000 on June 8, 1984. 4/A Committee internal memo reviewed by the Audit staff indicates that the salary was intended to make up for missed income (income the Senator would have earned from speaking engagements had he not been a Candidate).

^{4/} The May 30, 1984 and June 8, 1984, payments were made after the Candidate's date of ineligibility.

In the interim audit report, the Audit staff recommended that the Committee provide any written arrangement or commitment with respect to the \$50,000 which shows a connection between the disbursements and the campaign effort.

On November 19, 1984, the Committee submitted a letter containing their justification that the salary payments are qualified campaign expenses. However, the Commission determined that under these circumstances, salary payments to a publicly financed candidate are not qualified campaign expenses.

Conclusion

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On January 29, 1985, the Commission made an <u>initial</u> determination that the amount (\$50,000) of salary payments to the Candidate are non-qualified campaign expenses and the pro-rata portion \$13,549.35 (\$50,000 x .270987) be repaid to the U.S. Treasury within 90 calendar days of receipt of this report in accordance with 11 C.F.R. § 9038.2(d).

Repayment Amount: \$13,549.35

4. Impact of Non-Qualified Campaign Expenses on Candidate's Entitlement

Section 9034.5(a) of Title 11, Code of Federal Regulations requires that the candidate submit a Statement of Net Outstanding Campaign Obligations ("NOCO") which contains, among other items, the total of all outstanding obligations for qualified campaign expenses and an estimate of necessary, winding down costs within 15 days of the candidate's date of ineligibility.

Further, ll C.F.R. § 9034.5(d) requires that a candidate submit a revised Statement of Net Outstanding Campaign Obligations with each submission for matching funds payments filed after the candidate's date of ineligibility, reflecting the financial status of the campaign as of the close of business on the last business day preceding the date of submission for matching funds.

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The NOCO statement is the basis for determining further matching fund entitlement. In the case of Senator McGovern's candidacy, March 15, 1984 is the date of ineligibility. Consequently, he may only receive matching payments to the extent that he has net outstanding campaign obligations as defined in 11 C.F.R. § 9034.5.

As noted in items III.A.l. 2. and 3., the Audit staff identified non-qualified campaign expenses a number of which were incurred and/or paid subsequent to the candidate's date of ineligibility. In order to insure that only the amount of post-ineligibility <u>qualified</u> campaign expenses is used to calculate the candidate's remaining entitlement to matching funds, the Audit staff proposes several adjustments to the NOCO statement prepared by the candidate. These adjustments are shown on the NOCO analysis on page 10 and fall into two areas, dependent upon whether the non-qualified campaign expense was paid or remained owing on the statement date.

B. Determination of Net Outstanding Campaign Obligations

At the inception of the audit fieldwork, the Committee had filed five (5) NOCO statements covering the period March 15, 1984 through June 15, 1984. To facilitate the verification of the Committee's net outstanding campaign obligations, the NOCO statement as of June 15, 1984 was audited. The Audit staff made necessary adjustments to this statement to properly reflect the candidate's cash position at June 15, 1984, and to correct misstatements of accounts payable and the Committee's estimate of winding down costs. In addition, documentation which was submitted by the Committee in response to the interim audit report has been incorporated into the NOCO statement. This NOCO statement as amended 5/, and the results of our verification of the items contained thereon, appear below.

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^{5/} The Committee amended its original 6/15/84 NOCO on June 27, 1984.

Friends of George McGovern

Statement of Net Outstanding Campaign Obligations As of June 15, 1984

	MOCO as Amended	<u>Audit</u>	MOCO As Amended	<u>Audit</u>
<u>assets</u>				
Cash in Bank	\$ (854.24)	(\$ 5,899.08) 2 /	•	
Accounts Receivable	60,384.00	55,172.18		
Non-Qualified Campaign Expenses 3/16 - 6/15/84				
Non-campaign related (convention)		9,607.34 <u>b</u> /		
Insufficiently documented		4,780.05 <u>b</u> /		•
Salary Payments Candidate	to	15,000,00b/		
Total Assets			\$ <u>59,529.76</u>	\$ <u>78.660.49</u>
<u>LIABILITIES</u>				
Accounts Payable for Qualified Campaign Expenses	\$106,743.89	\$98,740.90 <u>c</u> /		
Estimated Winding Down Costs				
Salaries Storage Rent Supplies Furniture Rental Telephone Fundraising	\$ 28,160.00 500.00 2,946.00 890.00 200.00 2,100.00 14,456.00 3,000.00	\$21,776.50 250.00 1,196.81 890.00 150.00 975.00 20,149.05 3,000.00		
Total Estimated Winding Down Costs	\$ 52,252.00	\$48,387.36 ·		
Total Liabilities			(\$ <u>158,995.89</u>)	(\$ <u>147,128.26</u>)
Het Outstanding Campaign Obligati	ons (Deficit)		(\$ <u>99,466.13</u>)	(\$ <u>68,467.77</u>)

Lash in bank was adjusted to accurately reflect the Candidate's cash position at June 15, 1984.

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This adjustment is necessary so as not to allow non-qualified campaign expenses to increase entitlement.

The accounts payable balance was adjusted to exclude the value of nonqualified campaign expenses included in the Committee figure. In addition, certain expenses were incorrectly included by the Committee as a payable.

The Committee estimated winding down costs through August 30, 1984, however, the Committee offices closed on July 31, 1984 and a portion of the Committee operations ceased on that date.

This amount represents actual expenses paid from 6/16/84 through 7/26/84.

As noted above, the Audit staff's verification of the items on the Committee's NOCO statement revealed various differences which resulted in a net difference (overstatement) in net outstanding campaign obligations of \$30,998.36. A portion is comprised of \$29,387.39 in non-qualified campaign expenses made by the Committee between March 16, 1984 and June 15, 1984. This inclusion is necessary so as not to allow non-qualified campaign expenses to increase the Candidate's entitlement to matching funds. Therefore, the Committee's NOCO as of June 15, 1984 should have disclosed a deficit of \$68,467.77 and not \$99,466.13 as stated by the Committee in its amended NOCO statement. In addition, our review of the Committee's deposits indicated that for the period June 16, 1984 through July 26, 1984, the Committee received \$38,588.68 in individual contributions. Further, on August 1, 1984, the Commission certified a matching fund payment of \$16,699.01.

Conclusion

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
Based on our review of the Committee's financial activity through 7/26/84, the Candidate's remaining entitlement was \$29,879.09 (\$68,467.77 - \$38,588.68). Further, after applying the August 1, 1984 certification of \$16,699.01, the Candidate's remaining entitlement is reduced to \$13,180.08.

Since audit fieldwork of the Committee ended on July 26, 1984, is report does not address any NOCO statements filed by the Committee absequent to June 15, 1984. Additional fieldwork will be conducted with respect to determining the Candidace's remaining entitlement to receipt of matching funds and an addendum will be issued as appropriate.

Recap - Amounts Repayable to the U.S. Treasury

Presented below is a recap of the amounts the Commission initially determined as subject to the repayment provisions of 26 U.S.C. § 9038(b)(2) as discussed in Section III.

Item A-1 Non-qualified Campaign Expenses - Convention-Related Disbursements	\$ 4,098.71
Item A-2 Non-qualified Campaign Expenses - Undocumented Disbursements	7,456.93
Item A-3 Non-qualified Campaign Expenses - Post-Ineligibility Salary Payments to the Candidate	13,549.35
Total Recommended Repayment	\$25,104.99



Transcript of Proceedings

BEFORE THE

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION

In the Matter of:

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FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION SPECIAL OPEN SESSION ORAL PRESENTATION BY THE FRIENDS OF GEORGE McGOVERN ORIGINAL

DATE: April 24, 1985

PLACE: Washington, D.C.

PAGES: 1-56

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Washington, D.C. 20005

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1 BEFORE THE FEDERAL ELECTIONS COMMISSION 2 3 In the Matter of: FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION SPECIAL OPEN SESSION ORAL PRESENTATION BY THE FRIENDS OF GEORGE MC GOVERN 6 7 Washington, D.C. 8 April 24, 1985 9 The above-entitled matter came on for open session, 10 pursuant to notice, before Chairman John Warren McGarry, 11 at 1325 K Street, N.W., Conference Room, Washington, 12 D.C. 20463, at 10:00 a.m. 13 APPEARANCES: 'S 14 S On behalf of The Friends of George McGovern: 15 JOHN M. QUINN, Esq. 16 Arnold & Porter 1200 New Hampshire Avenue, N.S. 17 Washington, D.C. 20036 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

PROCEEDINGS

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CHAIRMAN MC GARRY: This special open, public hearing will please come to order. The reason we are here today is because the Federal Election Commission has granted a request by former Senator George S. McGovern and his 1984 Presidential Campaign Committee for a public hearing to appeal a Commission order for repayment of federal matching funds to the U.S. Treasury.

Let me give a little background on this matter.

The statutory authority underlying the Federal Election

Commission's administration of the public funding of

presidential primary campaigns is the Presidential Primary

Matching Payment Account Act. That law requires the

Commission, among other things, to conduct a thorough

examination and audit of the qualified campaign expenses

of every candidate for nomination for President, and his or

her authorized committees who have received federal matching

payments pursuant to Title 26 U.S.C. Section 9037.

One purpose of the Commission's mandatory audit of publicly funded presidential primary candidates is to determine whether public funds have been used to meet only qualified campaign expenses. That term, qualified campaign expense, is defined by the law as a purchase, payment distribution, loan, advance, deposit, or gift of money or anything of value incurred by a candidate, or a candidate's

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authorized committee, in connection with the candidate's campaign for election or nomination for election to the office of President.

After conducting a thorough examination and audit, the Commission on January 29th, 1985 made an initial determination that the Friends of George McGovern should repay \$25,104.99 which the Commission had determined to be non-qualified expenses. Of that amount, \$13,549.35 represents the portion of public funds used by the Committee to make salary payments totalling \$50,000 to Mr. McGovern.

The Commission's initial repayment determination reflects the position that the Committee's payments of salary to Mr. McGovern were non-qualified expenses. In its March 5th response to the Commission's initial determination the McGovern Committee disputed the Commission's determination that salary payments to the candidates were non-qualified campaign expenses and that the pro rata portion of \$13,549.35 must be repaid.

In that regard Mr. McGovern through counsel requested to make an oral presentation to the Commission on this specific issue. On April 3rd, 1985, the Commission granted that request and we are convened today in special open session to hear that oral presentation pursuant to 11 CFR 9038.2(c)(3), as part of the Committee's response to the Commission's initial repayment determination.

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The sole purpose of this meeting is to give the candidate or his representative an opportunity to address the Commission and to demonstrate that no repayment, or a lesser repayment, is required. With respect to the procedure we will follow today, I would like to state that this is not an adversarial or trial-type hearing. The candidate's representative, Mr. John Quinn, will have 30 minutes to make his remarks. At the conclusion of that presentation each commissioner and ex-officio representative will have an opportunity to ask any questions he or she may have.

I will then recognize the General Counsel who may ask whatever questions he has. Now, before I recognize.

Mr. Quinn, counsel for the Friends of George McGovern and designated representative of Mr. George McGovern, I will ask the General Counsel if he has any comment or would care to add in any way to the opening statement that I have just made.

Mr. General Counsel, Charles Steele.

MR. STEELE: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. No, I think that you have summarized the proceeding and the reasons that we are here, and I see nothing to add to your statement.

CHAIRMAN MC GARRY: Thank you.

Mr. Quinn.

MR. QUINN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Members of

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the Commission. I am Jack Quinn. I am counsel to the Friends of George McGovern, Candidate for the Fresidency in 1984. With me is Mary Curtin who is the Treasurer of Friends of George McGovern.

We appreciate this orportunity to appear before you to appeal the Commission's ruling that the McGovern Committee must repay in excess of \$13,000 to the Treasury as a result of the fact that the Committee paid Senator McGovern a salary during his campaign for the presidency.

The basic issue before you is whether the payment of \$50,000 in salary to Senator McGovern was a qualified campaign expense as that term is used in the Federal Election Campaign Act and your regulations. We believe it plainly was a qualified campaign expense and as such did not result in the requirement of repayment. This result, we submit, is demanded by the plain words of the statute and your own regulations.

In fact, in ruling as you did against Senator McGovern, we believe that the Commission effectively engaged in retroactive rule-making, changed the rules after the game was played, and thereby failed to provide reasonable notice to Senator McGovern and other presidential candidates that salary payments would be regarded by you as non-qualified campaign expenses.

We believe the Commission has acted unreasonably

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and in fact illegally in this respect. Let me just lay out for you the factual background. Before becoming a presidential candidate, Senator McGovern made his livelihood earning honoraria for speeches, typically at a level of about \$5,000 per appearance. When he announced for the presidency his staff made informal inquiry of your staff as to whether the receipt of honoraria would be regarded as contributions. The staff was advised that they likely would be regarded as contributions, and as a result the Senator cancelled a series of speeches that he had made commitments to make.

This put the Senator in a dilemma. He felt it essential that he run for the presidency, he could not get by on no income at all, and he was determined to they the law in regarding contribution limitations.

Your ruling pits those aspirations against each other. It effectively says, you cannot run for the presidency if you cannot afford to do so. In this case Senator McGovern agreed with the campaign committee that in view of the fact that he would have earned between \$90,000 and \$100,000 in honoraria, that the campaign would pay to him a salary of half that amount, \$50,000. That understanding is reflected in internal campaign committee memoranda which were made available to the auditors and which in fact are referred to in the audit reports.

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It bears emphasis that Senator McGovern and his committee regarded this payment of a salary as essential. In his mind, and that of the campaign committee, but for the salary payments the campaign might not have been possible.

This, we think, goes to the heart of the central legal issue, that the salary payments should be regarded as qualified campaign expenses. They made the campaign This view enjoys the support of your General Counsel, and again we think it is dictated by the plain words of the statute and is more than amply supported by the legislative history of the Federal Election Campaign Act.

As the Chairman noted in his opening statement, the cerm "qualified campaign expense" is defined at 26 U.S.C. Section 9032, quite simply as a payment made in connection with a campaign and which is not otherwise illegal.

There is nothing in the statutory definition that remotely authorizes the Commission to pick and choose among lawful campaign expenditures and call some qualified and others non-qualified. If they are made, first, in connection with the campaign, and second, are legal, then they are qualified campaign expenses.

The salary payment was certainly made in connection with the campaign. But for the salary the campaign might literally have terminated. In this circumstance it would

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utterly defy logic to suggest that a payment necessary to allow a campaign to exist is not made in connection with the campaign. And as I pointed out in my letters to the Commission, the Commission itself recognized ten years ago the fact that a candidate benefits financially from campaign contributions or expenditures does not violate any law.

This was the holding in Advisory Opinion 1975-15 issued in respect to Governor Wallace's receipt of royalties from his presidential campaign. Thus, the salary payment fully meets the statutory requirement for a qualified campaign expense, that it be in connection with the campaign, and that it be not otherwise unlawful.

The Commission's regulations essentially repeat the statutory definition of the term "qualified campaign expense." Il C.F.R. Section 9032.9 includes within the meaning of qualified campaign expense any payment whatsoever made during the candidate's eligibility period, made in connection with the campaign, so long as those payments do not involve a violation of any law.

Again, nothing in the regulations even remotely suggests that the payment of a salary to a candidate is not a qualified campaign expense, nor is there anything in the audit or repayment provisions of the statute or the regulations that suggests that these payments would be regarded as non-qualified. Indeed, the illustrative list

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of payments which the Commission warned would be regarded as non-qualified in 11 C.F.R. Section 903(a) includes only payments that involve a violation of law.

While this list is admittedly illustrative, it provides no notice whatsoever to a candidate that the Commission would regard a salary payment to a candidate as non-qualified, or indeed any expense not within the generic group identified, namely, payments involving a violation of law. It is as though you have said to candidates, you may not buy MacIntosh apples and you may not buy Golden Delicious apples and you may not buy Granny Smith apples. And Senator McGovern bought an orange, and you said, well, we meant fruit.

That, we think, is not enough. The broad definition of qualified campaign expense is consistent with the legislative history noted in my letters to you, which makes clear that in the words of the Senate Committee report, candidates are permitted full flexibility and discretion in their election efforts, and the Congress has resisted any suggestion that those who accept federal campaign funds be obligated to conduct their campaign in particular ways or to use federal monies for specific purposes that some may think are most useful to the electorate. Whether they qualify for public assistance and acceptance or not, all candidates are free to do their own thing and decide how

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they will conduct their campaigns and employ their financial resources.

According to the General Counsel's memorandum of April 16th of this year, and the Commission's ruling against Senator McGovern, and I quote, "was based on a conclusion that the policy of public financing was not to provide personal income for a candidate and that there was no evidence that Congress intended for the statute to provide for such personal support."

This, in our view, is an inadequate basis for you ruling. There is in fact no evidence in the legislative history that Congress viewed salary payments to a candidate as non-qualified campaign expenses. Rather, as I have pointed out, the legislative history makes clear instead that candidates would be free to spend campaign money as they best see fit, as long as the expenditures are made in connection with the campaign and are not otherwise illegal.

Let me briefly address the issue of fair notice.

In ruling as it did against Senator McGovern, the Commission effectively engaged in retroactive rulemaking. It thereby failed to provide reasonable notice to Senator McGovern, and other presidential candidates, that salary payments would be regarded as non-qualified. We believe this action to be unreasonable and again illegal, because you have effectively amended the definition of qualified campaign.

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expense without providing candidates notice that you intended to do so.

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The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed an issue quite similar to this in the case called Montgomery Ward against the Federal Trade Commission. On the subject of changing rules through adjudication, which is essentially what we're about here, let me read to you from the Ninth Circuit's opinion. "The issue is whether an adjudicatory re-statement of the conduct required by a rule is an interpretation or an amendment of the rule. Adjudication allows an agency to apply a rule to a particular factual circumstance and to provide an interpretation of the required conduct in light of those circumstances. An adjudicatory restatement of the rule becomes an amendment, however, if the restatement so alters the requirements of the rule that the regulated party had inadequate notice of the required conduct. An amendment is proper only when adequate notice is provided to affected parties pursuant to the appropriate rulemaking procedures."

A similar point was made by the District Court; in Louisiana. I'd like to read from that to you too. This is a case called State of Louisiana against the Department of Energy, and in fact involved, like this case, a regulatory definition, in this case the definition of the word "property."

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The Court said, "It is clear that the original property definition was ambiguous and subject to various good faith interpretations. But even when you play pin the tail on the donkey, the rules require that you turn the blindfolded participant in the right direction. The cases are clear that a post-hoc agency interpretation of an ambiguous regulation should not be enforced retroactively against the regulated party who adopted and applied an alternate, reasonable interpretation of the regulation during the period between the initial promulgation of the ambiguous regulation and later agency interpretation."

I think the importance --

COMMISSIONER MC DONALD: Excuse me, Mr. Quinn.

Could I have the cites in these two cases -- I apologize, but would you mind giving us the --

MR. QUINN: Montgomery Ward is 691 F.2d 1322, and State of Louisiana against Department of Energy is 507 F.Supp. 1365.

COMMISSIONER MC DONALD: Thank you.

MR. QUINN: Those cases involve economic regulation. In this case the need for advance notice is even greater, when one considers that it is a criminal violation to make a nonqualified campaign expense with federal monies, and the law is clear that where there are criminal consequences the need for advance notice is even

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greater.

Now, I take the position that the statute would not permit the Commission to promulgate a regulation holding salary payments to be outside the realm of qualified campaign expenses, but even if you could, the proper way to 5 do so would be to conduct a rulemaking more precisely 6 7 defining this term so that candidates and potential 8 candidates would be on notice.

I can understand that the Commission might not approve of salary payments. You might want to see the law changed or you might want to attempt to change it through your regulations. But here, as in the case of Governor Wallace ten years ago, you should only now go so far as to say, and quoting from Advisory Opinion 1975-15, "The Commission would be less than frank if it failed to note its disapproval in principle of any practice whereby a candidate personally profits from campaign contributions. Nonetheless the law is clear."

I submit to you that the law also is clear here, that Senator McGovern's salary payments were qualified campaign expenses and that you should reverse your decision to require repayment.

Again, thank you for this opportunity to appear and I would be happy to answer any questions if I can.

CHAIRMAN MC GARRY: Thank you, Mr. Quinn. We will

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now proceed with the questioning, and the Chair will be happy to recognize any Member of the Commission who may have a question.

Commissioner Elliott.

a document in your files, "campaign committee memorandum."

Could you tell me if this was, or could ever be construed as any type of a written or oral agreement between Mr. McGovern and the candidate committee to pay a stipulated amount for some period of time for specific services rendered to the Committee?

MR. QUINN: It is not a written agreement between Senator McGovern and the Committee. It is a campaign memorandum from one staff member to another which reflects the understanding of the Committee that it would pay a salary, and indeed in this document the figure is \$91,000, not \$50,000, but I am informed that by oral agreement the Senator agreed to take half that amount.

COMMISSIONER ELLIOTT: So, there was some sort of agreement, oral agreement between the Committee and the candidate?

MR. QUINN: There was an oral agreement, yes, certainly.

COMMISSIONER ELLIOTT: Would you say that -- was there a specific duty that he was to perform under this agreement? Was anything said to him, or he to the Committee,

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that he would do something like write speeches or take on some things a part of the Committee obligation that might be compensated by some other person if they were hired to do that?

Was there anything like that?

MR. QUINN: Well, certainly there was no writing that outlined his duties. I can assure you that, particularly at the early stages of his campaign, given the resources that he had, he was effectively his own campaign manager.

used. One is "salary." One is "income." Another is "compensation," all of which have connotations all their own. So, how do you think -- what word do you think best represents the amounts paid to the Senator? What did that cover?

MR. QUINN: I think it was a salary, and the notion of missed income really arose only from the fact that the amount he was to be paid was determined in part by reference to the income he would otherwise have earned.

COMMISSIONER ELLIOTT: There were \$15,000 paid after the ineligibility date. I believe some of your documentation indicates that the expenses were incurred before the eligibility date. Is that correct?

MR. QUINN: Yes. We take the position that the Committee's obligation to make this payment was incurred

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during the eligibility period, as reflected by the March 3rd memorandum that was provided to the auditors, and that in any event the remaining \$15,000 should be regarded as winding-down costs.

CONMISSIONER ELLIOTT: You have just now indicated that the agreement was for some \$90,000 but he only got paid for \$50,000.

MR. QUINN: I'm sorry. Let me correct that.

The \$90,000 figure was the estimate of his lost income. The memorandum to which I referred would appear to have obligated the Committee to pay him the entirety of that missed income.

However, I am informed that by oral understanding, he agreed with the Committee to take something on the order of half of that amount.

COMMISSIONER ELLIOTT: Is it important for us to know, or would it be helpful -- would it be helpful for us to know whether that reduction was due to the fact that he did not do everything that he had indicated he would do, or the Committee couldn't afford it, to pay him the full amount, or some reason why that was reduced?

MR. QUINN: I can only speculate but I would bet it's because the Committee didn't have much money.

COMMISSIONER ELLIOTT: Thank you very much.

CHAIRMAN MC GARRY: Thank you, Commissioner Ellictt.

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Any further questions? Commissioner Reiche.

COMMISSIONER REICHE: First I would like to suggest, and I'm sure Mr. Quinn would agree with me, that any comments we might make, any questions that may be asked, should not be construed as any reflection on the merits of assisting challengers in presidential elections so that indeed, in a financial sense, they can mount that challenge.

We are not talking about the merits. What we are talking about, I believe, is finding a regulatory basis which would permit the Commission to consider these as qualified campaign expenditures. In terms of the merits, that's for Congress to determine. All we're trying to do is interpret the law.

It seems that implicit in your position, Mr. Quinn, is the conclusion that a campaign has some responsibility to pay maintenance for a candidate. How would you determine this with any degree of consistency?

In the case of your candidate, you're talking about missed income related to honoraria. In other cases perhaps it's salary. But if you're talking of maintenance, everybody in this world has a different lifestyle. I mean, how would you go about trying to determine what was needed by a candidate in order to personally maintain himself or herself so that they could mount a campaign?

MR. QUINN: Well, let me say first that I don't

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take the position that campaigns have a universal obligation to provide maintenance. But your question really gets to the reason why you should reverse yourself. You can't make that decision. Congress hasn't given you the authority to make that decision. And indeed, you don't have to find a regulatory basis by which to regard this as a qualified campaign expense, I submit to you that the Commission has no regulatory basis for regarding it as other than a qualified campaign expense.

The law, and your own regulations, are clear, if the payment is made in connection with the campaign, and if it is otherwise legal, then you are obligated to regard it as a qualified campaign expense. If I decide to run for the presidency and think that the best way to make myself popular is to get on the morning flight every Monday to Puerto Rico and the Friday night flight back and shake as many hands on the plane as I can, I can use contributions and I can use federal matching money to do that. And Congress has made clear that this Commission is not to say this is an inappropriate way to spend money.

Look at the analogous general election financing statute which doesn't speak of qualified campaign expenses being in connection with the campaign. It speaks even more narrowly of qualified campaign expenses being in furtherance of the campaign.

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Well, would I sit here and say that Vice President Mondale's media advertising suggesting increased taxes didn't further his campaign and he shouldn't have used money to do that, that was foolish? No. Congress made clear that the Commission is not to make those judgments. If candidates want to spend money ill-advisedly, foolishly, they are free to do that. That's for them to decide, not the Commission to decide.

of inquiry with one question, and then I think Commissioner McDonald has a question. he wants to ask before I continue.

In terms of the Commission's responsibility here, you indicated in your remarks that we had amended the definition of qualified campaign expenses, and then you proceeded to discuss what you perceived to be the distinction between amending and interpreting.

Just how do you see that distinction? When is this Commission trying to interpret that which we have been handed, namely, a statute, as opposed to a situation in which we, in your view, are amending or changing that statute?

MR. QUINN: Again, you did interpret the statute when you promulgated the regulations which identified a generic group of expenditures which would not be regarded as qualified. A common thread runs through each of the

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expenses that you said would not be qualified, the common thread being that they related to or involved illegality.

There's nothing in that list of examples that suggests that a legal expenditure, or indeed a salary payment, would also be regarded as non-qualified, and in view of that I submit to you that the practical effect of a ruling now that a solary payment last year is a non-qualified campaign expense is effectively retroactive rulemaking.

COMMISSIONER REICHE: Are you suggesting that that enumeration by the Commission was intended to be an exhaustive listing?

MR. QUINN: Not at all. I acknowledge that it was illustrative. But that illustrative group of identified non-qualified campaign expenses again has a common thread, and if I were sitting back, advising someone, there might be a circumstance where you did not identify something but it did involve illegality and I would counsel against making that expenditure because the Commission would regard it as non-qualified.

I would not conclude from the illustrative list of non-qualified campaign expenses that you have identified, that a salary payment would be regarded by the Commission as non-qualified. The Commission may not like the idea of campaigns paying candidates salaries. I can understand that.

And it may be that you have the statutory authority to engage in a rulemaking and include that in the list, but the proper way to do that is to do it prospectively and not retroactively.

COMMISSIONER REICHE: I think what this may ignore is the responsibility of the Commission to interpret a statute as best it can.

At this point, Commissioner McDonald, would you like to ask a question on this point?

COMMISSIONER MC DONALD: I think you perceived the question I wanted to ask.

MR. QUINN: Well, may I respond to that?

It is frankly beyond me how this is an interpretation of the statute. The statute is quite clear that any payment whatsoever made in connection with the campaign and which is otherwise legal, is to be regarded by you as a qualified campaign expense.

It is beyond me how one can conclude from that that the Commission has the authority to regard a salary payment as non-qualified.

COMMISSIONER REICHE: Well, as a fellow lawyer,

I'm sure you would agree with me that reasonable men can

differ, and certainly reasonable men can differ as to the

interpretation of the phrase, "in connection with the

campaign." And your position, obviously, is one that

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payments or payments for missed honoraria, whatever you choose to call them, that these were in connection with the campaign, and that's a perfectly honorable position. But I do not think it is a position that is so clear that the Commission should sit here and not examine whether that phrase as applied to these indeed could result in the same conclusion to which you come.

MR. QUINN: Unfortunately, again, the logical result of the position you have just articulated is that we will limit campaigns to those who can afford them, to those who don't need income during the course of their campaigns. That, I think, would be an unfortunate result, and one not contemplated by the statute.

COMMISSIONER REICHE: Mr. Quinn, in a personal sense I might join you in saying that that might be an unfortunate result on the merits, but the Commission has to do its level best to interpret the law as it is given to it by the Congress, and the question is, taking that into account, what should the Commission consider as qualified campaign expenses.

But let's move to another point you made. You referred to support in the legislative history for your position. Where do you perceive that support originating?

MR. QUINN: In my letter to you provides a citation

to the Senate Committee Report --

CHAIRMAN MC GARRY: Is that your letter of March 5th, 1985?

MR. QUINN: Yes, indeed.

CHAIRMAN MC GARRY: And that would be a document that we have identified as 85-55-B.

MR. QUINN: In my remarks I quoted to you from Senate Report No. 689.

contained there, basically it seems to me, and please if you disagree, please say so, but it seems to me to be saying that, yes, candidates should be afforded considerable flexibility in spending campaign funds as they see best. That still does not, in my view, get to the question of whether a salary payment or a payment for missed honoraria falls under the heading of a qualified campaign expense.

I mean, to give them considerable flexibility, fine. Probably we would all agree that that is a laudable objective. You don't want to hamstring them, particularly where you're talking about the use of public funds as we are here.

MR. QUINN: Let me try this just once more. If you will accept the proposition that a campaign could not be run, a candidate could not run for the presidency, without financial support from the campaign, if that is the case

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it is simply illogical to say that that is not an expenditure in connection with the campaign. There is no logic to that conclusion, on the very face of it.

Indeed, there could be no expenditure more in connection with the campaign than one which makes it possible, than one which enables the candidate to run.

I say this without trying to indicate where I will come out this because I don't know where I will come out on it, but this is a fact of political life, that is well known to Congress. It was well known to them at the time the statute and the various amendments were drafted and indeed enacted, and it has become traditional -- you can say poor tradition, I won't argue with you--- but it has become traditional that challengers indeed, at least as a matter of law, have to have the wherewithal to sustain themselves over the period when they are challenging.

Again, no discussion on the merits of that. It seems that if we are to find, as you would have us find -- what we have to do is to determine in the statute, in the legislative history, some indication of congressional intent—that in connection with an election, would include the kinds of payment that you're talking about here.

MR. QUINN: I disagree. I think it's not for us to point to a statutory provision, or legislative history,

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that says salary payments were contemplated by Congress as being qualified campaign expenses, any more than it is for us to point to a provision that says, flying to Puerto Rico for a fundraiser is a qualified campaign expense.

It is for you to find a reason in the statute, or in your own regulations, why this kind of payment or any other kind of payment is not a qualified campaign expense.

COMMISSIONER REICHE: Let me ask you this question.

Upon whom, do you believe, the burden of proof falls in

making the determination that these payments were a qualified campaign expense?

MR. QUINN: Well, as you know when the Committee agreed to accept federal matching money it agreed that among other things it would bear the burden of the demonstrating the relationship between a payment and the campaign.

We believe that the Committee has demonstrated to you that in view of the fact that the salary payments were essential to the life of the campaign, that it is clear that they were made in connection with the campaign. It is also clear that they were not otherwise unlawful.

COMMISSIONER REICHE: And you believe that this is an affirmative indication of the type that Congress intended to be reflective of whether you have a qualified campaign expense or not?

MR. QUINN: I'm not sure I understand the question.

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COMMISSIONER REICHE: Well, what I am suggesting is this, is this purely a negative inference drawn by you, or do you believe that you have affirmatively shown that these are qualified campaign expenses?

MR. QUINN: I believe we have affirmatively shown these are qualified campaign expenses.

COMMISSIONER REICHE: Let's go just briefly to the fact of the \$50,000. What period was intended to be covered by that \$50,000 payment?

MR. QUINN: The document to which I'm referring reflects a period of about six months from . . .

COMMISSIONER REICHE: September?

MR. QUINN: I think September through March.

COMMISSIONER REICHE: September 13th to March 13 - 15th, whenever it was, the date of ineligibility. Had Senator McGovern continued as a candidate, would this have been revised or was it intended that the \$50,000 would cover the entire campaign?

MR. QUINN: I assume it would have been revised, but I don't know the answer to that.

COMMISSIONER REICHE: And of course, as Commissioner Elliott previously pointed out, \$15,000 of that was paid after the date of ineligibility.

You gave us a description in part, of how the figure was determined. Did you take a look at the honoraria

that the Senator had received, let's say, in 1983, or before?

MR. QUINN: Do you know the answer to that?

MS. CURTIN: What do you mean, did we take a look?

COMMISSIONER REICHE: Well, did you examine the extent of the honoraria which he received the previous year in order to set what you thought was a proper figure?

MS. CURTIN: Okay, I wasn't the treasurer at the time, but that was looked at and I think that the memo reflects that and there were in fact engagements that were contracted for that were broken, of the figure of \$5,000 per lecture, so the amount was determined on the basis of income that he had received the previous year.

COMMISSIONER REICHE: Right, and presumably that honoraria figure would have been included on the ethics statement that had to be filed by the Senator when he became the presidential candidate, is that correct?

MS. CURTIN: I assume so, but I don't --

COMMISSIONER REICHE: I have examined it. I see no indication of any attribution for honoraria. Whether this is just something that was omitted simply because the concern was more with the value of assets as opposed to income, I don't know the answer to that. But if it is to serve as a valid basis, then obviously that information should have been included as indeed it is required by law to be included in the statement to be filed with the

Commission.

Did Senator McGovern continue to receive honoraria during this period at all, or did he cut them off completely?

MR. QUINN: He cut them off completely.

COMMISSIONER REIGHE: Do you recognize any distinction between what I will call the use of campaign funds in a personal way as opposed to a political way? What I am driving at here is a situation such as this Commission had in connection with Mr. LaRouche as opposed to a situation where the funds are admittedly being used for political campaign purposes. I mean, do you perceive that there is a valid distinction to be made by the Commission between those two uses?

MR. QUINN: I certainly believe that the Commission has within its power the determination whether expenditures are genuinely in connection with a campaign, and I think the LaRouche situation is on its face distinguishable in that there appeared to be absolutely no argument that those payments of rent were necessary to further the campaign.

The situation at hand, by contrast, is one in which the expenditures were essentially to the furtherance of the campaign.

COMMISSIONER REICHE: But doesn't a candidate have to maintain, hopefully, a roof, that can be tilting on occasion, but doesn't a candidate have to maintain a roof

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over his or her head and have sufficient to eat, in order to be able to campaign vigorously? I mean, there you re talking just about personal living expenses, and of course the Commission has had at least one advisory opinion with respect to this, 1980-49.

MR. QUINN: Well, if Mr. LaRouche needed a salary from the campaign in order to conduct the campaign, the campaign should have paid him a salary and in that case you would have been required to rule, I submit, that it was a qualified campaign expense.

COMMISSIONER REICHE: Thank you very much, Mr. Quinn.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

CHAIRMAN MC GARRY: Thank you, Commissioner Reiche.

Mr. Josefiak.

MR. JOSEFIAK: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Quinn, I totally agree with you that a campaign has to have a flexibility and discretion as to how it's going to spend its money in connection with the election, in relationship to that particular campaign involved.

The difficulty I'm having is to demonstrate that the monies expended in this regard are in connection with the campaign, and the reason I'm having that difficulty is, we have these terms floating back and forth it's compensation for lost income, what he would have earned if he had been

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able to make these lectures versus a salary.

that this was salary in connection with that election, as opposed to something that would have been earned whether or not he had been a candidate?

MR. QUINN: Well, again, I submit to you that the reference to lost income was merely the gauge by which the appropriate salary was determined.

MR. JOSEFIAK: But "salary" is a term you are using.

Can you demonstrate why you were giving the money, no matter

what the amount was, as to why you were giving him that money.

MR. QUINN: Well, the candidate and the Committee perceived a need to pay him a salary in order that he could be a candidate.

MR. JOSEFIAK: Well, for example, at one point you mentioned that early on Mr. McGovern was his own campaign manager, so obviously if you had hired a campaign manager you would have paid the campaign manager a salary and it would have been indicated how much he was making to do certain activities within the campaign.

After the date of ineligibility there are winding-down costs and you have to have some people around to handle those things. Was that Mr. McGovern at that stage, who was closing down the books, who was selling the assets, or was it somebody else?

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How can you relate spending the money to the campaign and how he was dealing with the campaign, or were you just giving the money to him because he was the candidate? I think there is a distinction here.

MR. QUINN: He was being given the money because in his mind and that of the Committee, were he not, the campaign might not have been possible.

MR. JOSEFIAK: It had nothing . . ., really nothing to do with what he was or was not doing within the campaign, it's the fact that he would not be a candidate without receiving those funds?

MR. QUINN: Yes, and I think that's as far as the Commission should go. I don't think the Commission should be going into campaigns and making a determination whether an advance person was doing a good enough job in connection with the campaign and should be regarded as a qualified campaign expense.

MR. JOSEFIAK: I agree with that point. The question I think, the focus, is, however, is this an expenditure in connection with that campaign? And that's what the Commission has to grapple with. We're not going to decide whether it was good, bad; or indifferent, the fact that you made a certain decision, and I totally agree with you on that point. But I think there's a distinction here to be made with regard to, you know, what is a qualified

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campaign expense and there is a definition, and somehow we've got to distinguish that between other kinds of campaigns.

MR. QUINN: I appreciate that, but I submit to you that if a candidate and a committee tell the Commission that without the payment of a salary to the candidate the campaign might not occur, that the Commission simply must regard that payment as one made in connection with the campaign.

MR. JOSEFIAK: I guess I'm going back to the point, if you make that comment you make that concept, are you classifying this properly? Is it salary?

MR. QUINN: Well, it might be that you think \$50,000 is okay but half a million dollars wouldn't be okay.

MR. JOSEFIAK: I'm trying to get a definition of what this is. Is this salary; is this compensation for lost —disregarding where we come out, . . but as far as what we're classifying this as,

I think the Commission has to determine what it is before it can decide whether it is or is not a qualified campaign expense.

MR. QUINN: Well, the Committee regarded it as salary, but again, if the Commission wants to draw some different lines than presently exist within its regulations, then I suggest to you that you conduct a rulemaking. Take comments, and amend the regulatory definition of qualified

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campaign expense. But under the statute and the regulations as you have them today, it would be inappropriate to rule retroactively that a payment which, from any reasonable reading of the regulations, should be regarded as qualified, is now not qualified.

It is a problem of process. The proper way to do what you seem to want to do is to conduct a rulemaking.

It's not to adjudicate retroactively that in addition to

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we are going to regard X as a non-qualified campaign expense.

There is no hint in the regulations that a payment of this sort would be regarded as non-qualified.

I would make, before I could even reach the conclusion whether I agree or disagree with your concept, what I was trying to get at is, in reporting that expenditure you have to report the purpose of the expenditure. And my line of questioning really was, what was this or how are we classifying this expenditure.

Before I can go to your position I've got to decide what we're talking about first.

MR. QUINN: Well, we think we're talking about a salary, and I just don't know what else to say to you about that.

MR. JOSEFIAK: Well, my concept of salary, I guess,

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and yours are a little different because I have a concept in being involved with campaigns, as to when you hay a salary there's a specific purpose as to why you're paying a salary and what it's for, and there's some relationship to something, how much you're paying, is it per, month; is it a lump sum, for what purpose you're doing this thing, some sort of a contract, oral or written, something that indicates that this is salary versus something else.

I'm not saying, just because it's not a salary classification that it's not a qualified campaign expense, but before I can make that decision I've got to find out what we're talking about.

inappropriate for the Commission to head down the road of making determinations whether campaign salaries -- and I've seen many campaign salaries paid which, believe me, were not in furtherance of the campaign, and whether they should be regarded as appropriate or not, I don't think that's the Commission's role.

MR. JOSEFIAK: I'm not talking about whether the salary's appropriate or not. I'm just trying to decide whether this is in fact a salary, or is this compensation for income that was lost because Mr. McGovern was not able to make his lectures during a year he was a candidate, or whether it's paying for living expenses or whether -- what

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we're talking about before we can make a decision, whether something is a qualified campaign expense.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, Mr. Josefiak. CHAIRMAN MC GARRY:

The Chair recognizes Commissioner Harris.

COMMISSIONER HARRIS: One thing that may not have been made sufficiently clear here is that all we're talking about is whether Senator McGovern could pay himself a salary out of public funds while running for nomination for President. If it were paid out of private contributions I think there is no problem.

What we're saying is that it does have to be so paid. I have a little trouble following your line of argument, Mr. Quinn. As you know, Section 9007 requires that after each election the Commission conduct a thorough examination and audit of the campaign. One of the specified purposes of this audit, which is detailed, expensive and lengthy, is to ascertain whether the disbursements were entirely for qualified campaign expenses.

It seems to me rather odd to suggest that the campaign has such total discretion in its use of money as to make the audit in effect meaningless.

MR. QUINN: I'm not suggesting that at all, but clearly, there are non-qualified campaign expenses ---COMMISSIONER HARRIS: The only non-qualified

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campaign expense you have suggested is one where the incurring or payment constitutes a violation of law. That, of course, is only a small part of the definition of qualified campaign expense, but it is the only part that you seem to give effect to, like parking fines.

The Commission has allowed candidates wide discretion. About all that I can recall we disallowed was Lyndon LaRouche's personal living expenses.

Now, you have also suggested that the Commission ought to have conducted a rulemaking proceeding. I suggest to you that it is impossible for the Commission to foresee every type of disbursement that a candidate might make.

We've had these matching payments in effect in '76, '80 and '84 and no other candidate has -- it has not occurred to any other candidate to pay himself a salary, so we have had lots of candidates of all kinds, many of them surely more impecunious than Senator McGovern.

Would you care to comment in that?

MR. QUINN: I would. The commission has to live by the rules it writes, and the Commission --

COMMISSIONER HARRIS: Well, I am suggesting to you that we cannot possibly foresee every type of disbursement that a campaign may see fit to make. If it's a suggestion that we list all of the things that they can do, it's quite unrealistic.

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MR. QUINN: Well, it's also quite unfair to set out rules and tell all the potential candidates out there that you don't feel free to live by them you don't feel obligated to live by them and you'll change them if an expenditure is made that you find personally offensive.

COMMISSIONER HARRIS: Are you aware that there's a provision in the Act for advisory opinions, and that if made during the course of a campaign the Commission is required to give an answer in 20 days?

MR. QUINN: I'm aware of that.

COMMISSIONER HARRIS: And Senator McGovern could have gotten an answer within 20 days as to whether this was a qualified campaign expense?

MR. QUINN: I'm aware of that, but I believe they concluded at the time that the law was clear -- I don't think there was an ambiguity here. I don't think there was uncertainty.

The Commission --

COMMISSIONER HARRIS: When you say "they," who are we talking about?

MR. QUINN: The Committee. The Commission, again, has written rules defining qualified campaign expense --

COMMISSIONER HARRIS: You don't need to repeat yourself endlessly. You've said that repeatedly. It's just -- on this question of doubt you state in your letter

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on page 2 that Senator McGovern was advised informally by the FEC staff to cancel speeches for which he would have been paid substantial honoraria.

Who was this conversation between, Senator McGovern himself?

MR. QUINN: No, George Cunningham, who was working for him, made a call to someone in the General Counsel's office.

COMMISSIONER HARRIS: Who was he talking to?

MR. QUINN: I can't tell you that. I don't know the answer to that.

COMMISSIONER HARRIS: A gentleman in the General Counsel's office that he was talking to says he didn't tell him any such thing, that he told him about the possibility of asking for an advisory opinion.

MR. QUINN: Well, I can only tell you what I was told, sir.

COMMISSIONER HARRIS: Well, the statement here is that he was told that the honoraria might be regarded as contributions. Are you aware of the provision in Section 431(3)(b)(14)? That's the provision that says that honoraria are not contributions.

MR. QUINN: Well, Commissioner Harris, I can only tell you what the Senator was advised and what he told me he was advised.

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COMMISSIONER HARRIS: This Mr. Cunningham, you mean?

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MR. QUINN: Well, I was told this by the Senator.

COMMISSIONER HARRIS: That this is what

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Mr. Cunningham was told?

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MR. QUINN: Yes.

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COMMISSIONER HARRIS: Well, it seems highly improbable. You also say that the Senator may thus be unique in having had to forego his usual source of income.

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Well, as you probably know we have had problems of

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attorneys running for office and the question has come up as

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to whether their firms may continue to pay them.

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attorneys have quite often asked for advisory opinions on the

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subject, and in some circumstances their firms have been told that

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any payment to them could be regarded as a contribution and

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subject to the ceiling.

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unique position, even if he were told what is here asserted,

So, it would not be true that the Senator was in a

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which I do not for one minute believe.

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21 situation, Commissioner Reiche asked you, do you think that

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we are supposed to inquire into the personal financial

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situation of each candidate who undertakes to pay himself

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a salary? Are we going to ask them to file detailed financial

Now, on the question of his personal financial

data with us, are we going to rely on the ethics reports,

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or what, and if you regard his personal financial situation as relevant to the propriety of his paying himself a salary, surely you must intend that we look into his personal financial situation.

MR. QUINN: Not at all. I don't think that's the proper role of the Commission at all.

COMMISSIONER HARRIS: Well, do you think we look at his ethics reports, then, or what?

MR. QUINN: Yes, that is another matter. The issue here is whether this expenditure was a qualified campaign expense.

COMMISSIONER HARRIS: Well, you have suggested that it's qualified because he wouldn't otherwise be able to run, so that certainly becomes a part of the definition of whether it is a qualified campaign expense, the way you presented it.

Now, when did the -- when did Senator McGovern register as a candidate, do you know?

IIR. QUINN: I don't. I was --

COMMISSIONER HARRIS: It was September the 26th, 1983. The first payment that he received, of \$35,000, was on March the 9th. He was through as a cardidate on March 15, six days later.

So, when you say it was impossible for him to become a candidate without these payments, he had been a

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candidate for months without these payments. He got the first one only just before he withdrew. . Is that not so?

MR. QUINN: That's what the record shows.

COMMISSIONER HARRIS: I have no other questions.

CHAIRMAN MC GARRY: Thank you, Commissioner Harris.

Commissioner McDonald.

COMMISSIONER MC DONALD: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Well, I will be brief. I clearly understand the distinctions that you made on numerous occasions this morning about what you think is at issue here. I don't wholeheartedly support, nor do I wholeheartedly dismiss what you have said, but there are a few things of great interest to me about your logic.

You have spent a great deal of time lecturing us about our logic, so I thought possibly we would just put them side by side and see what we've got.

You've indicated that you think it would be a bad move, in fact you said, I think initially in your opening statement that we would be amending the law in this area. You made several cites which were not furnished to us, but I certainly have no problem with accepting them, at least for the time being.

The question I have is that, are you not asking us to do the very thing you are accusing us of? You are saying that in essence, if we didn't provide a salary to Senator

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McGovern or other candidates, we would in fact, if I follow your logic correctly, be saying that that is bad for the process, therefore, it shouldn't be construed the way the Commission has.

I would agree with you, going back to a statement you made earlier, that the Commission -- and I would assume this would apply to yourself as well -- may think certain things about any area, whether it is this area or any other, but that in fact what we're faced with is interpreting the law as we see it.

Are you not maybe asking us the same thing, to amend the law because it would be bad, because individuals should not or could not run if they did not have these salaries? Without questioning the merit of it, and that may be the most meritorious thing in the world, I'm not sure that that's not right. I'm not sure that I don't agree with it, but that's a problem.

But where I'm having a problem, without going into the Wallace example which I see virtually, ... absolutely no corollary at all between that and this question here, even though it's cited at some length, I have a problem understanding the logic that you're coming to. There's not been a candidate in the history of the Act, that I'm aware of, that has perceived the law in the method that you do. And now you're saying that it is obvious that

the Commission is clearly trying to amend the law because it did not foresee this particular circumstance, which I think there are many we don't foresee.

I would say to you, since you saw fit earlier on to give us some advice, your advice is probably accurate. But each time we set out numerous details, the complaints we get, of course, are... the problem is that we don't allow more discretion. So then you allow more discretion and the complaint is that the problem with the Commission is, they don't cite enough examples.

So, I'm sure you, as a lawyer, can appreciate the kind of problem that we get into when we're trying to grapple with those matters. But I would only -- I'm having trouble with your logic. I think what you're suggesting here is the very thing -- we take the posture that you but forth, we may be in a position, of course, of amending the law the other way, which you fail to bring up when you are giving us advice on what we should do. You haven't indicated that that's a problem as well, and it is a problem.

I might say to you in the strongest terms

possible -- I can't speak for my colleagues -- I take deep

exception to anyone saying that the Commission's attitude

is to amend the law because we don't like it. You may

perceive it that way but that's certainly not my posture

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and I don't think it's any of my colleagues' posture.

You and I may have an honest difference of opinion about the law, but I want to say to you in the very plainest terms that I know how, that that is simply not the case, in my opinion, of either myself or any of my colleagues. We took the posture, right or wrong, that we felt like we were trying to be fair about the matter.

When you come before this Commission and indicate that we've decided to rewrite the law because we don't agree with it, it is not really accurate. I think it does a little bit of disservice to the process. If you and I disagree about the law, that's one thing. If you tell me, on the other hand, that you think in spite of the fact that there an advisory opinion process that was not sought, by the fact that you say it's clear on its face, even though this has never been done previously, to my knowledge, it's the history of the Act that it is plain and simple and it's a shame we don't understand it, I think may not be entirely correct.

I think one of the problems I'm having with your logic, quite frankly, is I think maybe you want us to amend the law the other way based on what you personally think the law ought to be. And you may be right, I don't know. It may be that all people should be entitled to some sort of salary, compensation, or -- these terms have been used

I just simply have not seen in the history of the Act where that's the case.

Are you asking us to amend the law in your favor?

MR. QUINN: I certainly think not. I think I've

made clear that I think the statute is clear, and I think

that the Commission set up rules for people to live by.

If you've amended the law, if you're right and I want to

amend the law that way, nobody's hurt.

The problem is that you have an obligation to give people notice and if I'm right and you're amending the law, then you've done so retroactively. There is a difference there.

COMMISSIONER MC DONALD: Are you suggesting that we can give notice on every conceivable question that might come before the Commission or that might later come before the Commission?

MR. QUINN: You have to give reasonable notice as to what's permitted and what's not permitted.

COMMISSIONER MC DONALD: I don't think there's a dispute about reasonable notice. You and I certainly don't differ on that score. That's not what I asked you.

I said, are you of the opinion that we can give notice on every conceivable, possible thing that might come before this Commission. Can you do that with a client?

Can you foresee -- can you tell the client every conceivable fallout that they may have on a given position that they take? If you can, I want to hire you, because I don't think that's being realistic about the process.

None of us would differ around the table. I wouldn't differ with you at all about trying to give reasonable notice.

I think that is exactly right! I don't have a problem with that.

MR. QUINN: What I submit to you is that if you list four things which are not permissible, and they have a common thread, that you cannot later hold someone to have violated your law for doing a fifth thing which has nothing in common with the four about which you warned. That is improper agency action.

COMMISSIONER MC DONALD: We have just the same dispute again. I won't inquire further.

CHAIRMAN MC GARRY: The Chair recognizes Commissioner

COMMISSIONER AIKENS: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Quinn, when we first were sworn in ten years ago, Commissioner Harris and Bob Costa and a few others in the room will recall that we attempted to define qualified campaign expense.

We found the list so exhaustive, and yet not exhaustive, that we finally gave up. We realized we could not ever list everything that would be gualified.

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MR. QUINN: Or not qualified.

commissioner alkens: Or not qualified. So, we set the general rules. I don't think it was ever contemplated by the Congress in drafting this law, or by the Commission in the ten years we've interpreted it, or tried to interpret it, that a candidate would make money from public financing.

And that's where I have the problem. Legally or not, I don't think it was ever contemplated, and I don't think the public would like very much to have their money used that way. I think that's the basis of the whole thing, it's the public financing.

MR. QUINN: May I respond?

COMMISSIONER AIKENS: As Commissioner Harris said, if it was private funds that would be a different matter.

MR. QUINN: Maybe it would, but this is the similarity with the Wallace case. Maybe the law never contemplated that.

The problem facing all of us is that the law never prohibited it, and you never prohibited it. You may want to prohibit it in the future, but it is not proper for an agency to prohibit it retroactively after the law spoke nothing about it.

COMMISSIONER AIKENS: Senator McGovern aside, can you envision what would happen to public financing if every candidate who wanted to run, and qualified, could

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be paid a salary out of public funds?

MR. QUINN: Commissioner Aikens, I may agree with you and just as the Commission said in 1975, George Wallace receiving royalties may be offensive, we may not like that, but the statute didn't prohibit it and your regulations didn't prohibit it. And if you want to change the rules of the game, change them, but you're not permitted to change them retroactively.

COMMISSIONER AIKENS: I don't think we are changing them.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

CHAIRMAN MC GARRY: Commissioner McDonald.

about the Wallace matter that you cited, and I understand your logic, but I must say to you of course that the difference there was fairly substantial. It was not a question of the candidate receiving public monies, which is what Commissioner Aikens has alluded to and Commissioner Harris mentioned earlier. It was a question of him deriving benefits, which I might say, I certainly wasn't here, it would have been offensive to me. I'm afraid I'd come out the same place as the Commission.

But there were certainly a different set of circumstances. It wasn't a question of him deriving public monies. What happened was exactly the opposite, and I think

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when I said earlier -- I didn't, if I did I didn't mean to,
I didn't mean to offend you, but I was having a great deal
of trouble understanding the logic because they are
certainly two very different phenomena involved here, and I
think we would probably agree on that.

We may not agree what the end result overall of it may be, but there were certainly two different aspects as opposed to a candidate receiving public money for a salary, and someone benefiting from royalties.

MR. QUINN: I understand that difference. The point is very simply that, that advisory opinion was right in saying, you may not like it but if it's not illegal we can't make it illegal.

COMMISSIONER MC DONALD: That's right, which I don't agree with. You and I wouldn't have a difference of opinion there.

CHAIRMAN MC GARRY: Mr. Patton.

MR. PATTON: To welcome Mr. Quinn here today, having some knowledge of his background, he's not only a lawyer but he's been in political campaigns for many years so he knows something of -- should know something of what we commonly call the blood, sweat and tears.

I think, Mr. Quinn, you're probably aware of, there are many public financing bills and have been many public financing bills in the hopper both in the House and Senate.

The House side under 439a -- we're getting into the question of intent here -- in the 1979 Amendment said that Members elected prior to January 8th, 1980 could convert excess campaign funds to personal use. But for those Members elected after that time, they could not do that.

And I guess my question is, how would you think
the Members of the House of Representatives or their candidates,
in light of that quasi-intent -- here again, it was private
monies as opposed to, what we have here is public monies,
how they would respond to the Commission's interpretation
if Senator McGovern could indeed get a salary, and obviously
I'm sure he has paid taxes on it. Prior to filing, he may
have to amend that for this particular matter. How do you
think they would respond?

How do you respond, on what they specifically did in 1979, as to intent?

MR. QUINN: Well, I can't divine how Members of Congress would respond to this situation.

MR. PATTON: I betyou have a gut feeling, though?

MR. QUINN: No, I genuinely don't. We do -- you're quite right, Congress on at least that occasion said that candidates for public office cannot personally profit from contributions. Again, we are not in the public financing context. But I would hope that Members of Congress would

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agree with me that we can't render illegal in the past

what we didn't say was going to be illegal, and that if, if this situation is one that deserves the attention of Congress or the attention of this Commission, Congress should act or this Commission should act, and it should do so so prospectively.

CHAIRMAN MC GARRY: Anything further, Mr. Patton?
The Chair recognizes Commissioner Reiche.

COMMISSIONER REICHE: Very briefly, Mr. Quinn, you have emphasized throughout your presentation that we must be wary, primarily, of situations in which such payments would be illegal for one reason or another.

You also, in your colloquy with Commissioner McDonald ar with others, myself included, have referred to the fact that you think we are amending either the statute or the regulations.

As I examine Reg. 9032.9(a)(2), please note that that makes reference in the definition of qualified campaign expense to "expenses made in connection with his or her campaign for nomination." And this is stated in the conjunctive, so you've got to be able to satisfy that.

I mention this just by way of pointing out that there's more to this discussion than trying to apply some standard of law, be it federal, state, local, and saying that, well, perhaps it's illegal. This, I submit to you, is a matter for interpretation by the Commission.

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That is not to suggest that our interpretations will always be perfect in your eyes or anyone else's, but that's what we have to grapple with, and by way of supporting the statement made by Commissioner McDonald, I firmly do not believe that there is a soul sitting at this table who is seeking to amend either the statute or the regulations.

To the contrary, we're trying to give an interpretation based on intent as we know it, based on common sense, and thelaw as it is given to us.

CHAIRMAN MC GARRY: Thank you, Mr. Reiche.
Commissioner Elliott.

me, my remark is facetious and I'm not trying to make your argument for you, but it just dawned on me, there were quite a number of candidates who were receiving public funds for salaries during the campaign. They are called Senators and Presidents and any number of other things, so my remark was just facetious, but there are people who are paying their bills with public funds.

COMMISSIONER MC DONALD: Commissioners. (Inaudible.)

CHAIRMAN MC GARRY: Yes. Anything further?

MR. PATTON: Just a comment. It doesn't deserve

an answer but I think Mr. Quinn should be aware of it.

I think the Commission is sensitive to the

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candidates, and it doesn't -- I frankly feel as though probably wif they had their druthers, would not like to be in this 'position today on interpretation of what is qualified campaign expenditure. But, without asking for an answer to that, he should be aware of the sensitivity, _____

argument that it likes to give very broad discretion to

MR. QUINN: - Well, did you quess?

CHAIRMAN MC GARRY: Anything further?

I think just about everything has been said, Mr. Quinn. You have made your position rather clear. I'm struck by the impression that there's just no limit to what you would allow, and no cutoff, as long as it was legal and I really think it's not realistic to think that the regulatory process could possibly cover every possible contingency.

Do you have any comment?

MR. QUINN: Yes, I appreciate that. I think Commissioner Aikens really made my case when she said that ten years ago the Commission considered and tried and threw up its hands and gave up, and as a result it tailored a very narrow definition of non-qualified campaign expense and one that does not include payments of the kind at issue here.

COMMISSIONER AIKENS: I did not say narrow, by the I said a broad definition. We tried to encompass way.

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what we thought would fit into that.

MR. QUINN: I m an a narrow definition of non-qualified campaign expenses, and you're right, quite a broad definition of qualified expenses.

CHAIRMAN MC GARRY: I don't want to extend it any further because I think we all understand one another and I don't want to break the house up in laughter, but it is a serious matter but there could be a lot of contingencies that, as a result of the no-limit proposition that you advanced, that would really be quite ludicrous, and you really, in effect — on the basis of the argument that you advance, and certainly I'm not foreclosing or prejudging, I will examine everything rather carefully.

You did make some rather cogent points. There's no question about it. It's a very difficult issue. But I think the bottom line is that you really would render the entire mandatory audit of candidates and their committees that receive public funding a nullity, it really would be meaningless and I don't think it was meant to be at all.

I really want to thank you for taking your time, you and Ms.Curtin, and the patience. I can assure you that it's something that we don't do frivolcusly or contemptuously or without a high regard for everyone and everything in the process.

We have given it a great deal of thought and

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deliberation, and I personally think it's been very helpful to hear from you. There may be many points that I can't agree with you on. There are some that I think were rather meaningful and cogent, but I think the exchange was fruitful.

So, the way we will close this matter out,

Mr. Quinn, is to -- the Chair wants to allow you a

reasonable period within which to submit any additional

written information you care, that you feel is relevant,

and I think you and I discussed immediately prior to the

opening of this hearing, a date of the close of business,

May 10th, 1985.

Do you still feel that would be a reasonable time?
MR. QUINN: Yes, that's fine.

THAIRMAN MC GARRY: So, if there's no objection from my colleagues, the Chair would like to allow until the close of business May 10th, 1985, a period within which former Senator McGovern or the Committee, or you of course, would have within which to submit any additional materials you feel are relevant, and after that the Commission will take any and all documentation in this case.

We will have the benefit of this transcript of this oral presentation, and on the basis of everything that has transpired, including what took place here this morning, we will have further deliberations and considerations and at the conclusion of that we will either affirm or modify

our determination, our final repayment determination which has been made.

So, if there's nothing further, that would seem to conclude our business for today. Once again, thank you very much.

(Whereupon, the hearing in the above-entitled matter was adjourned at 11:25 a.m.)



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FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION WASHINGTON D.C. 20463

CERTIFICATION

I, Mary W. Dove, Administrative Assistant to the Federal Election Commission, do hereby certify that the preceding 56-page transcript discloses the identity of each speaker and is adequate to record fully the Commission's proceedings with respect to the Oral Presentation by the Friends of George McGovern on April 24, 1985.

Attest:

5-9-85

Date


Mary W /Dove

Administrative Assistant

CERTIFICATE

	This is	to certify that the attached proceedings
	before the Federal El	ection Commission
		(Name of Agency)
•	in the matter of:	Federal Election Commission Special Open
		Session, Oral Presentation
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	Place:	Washington, D.C.
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FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20463

March 3, 1986

MEMORANDUM

TO:

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FRED EILAND

PRESS OFFICER

FROM:

ROBERT J. COSTA

ASSISTANT STAFF DIRECTOR

AUDIT DIVISION

SUBJECT:

PUBLIC ISSUANCE OF ADDENDUM TO THE FINAL

AUDIT REPORT - FRIENDS OF GEORGE MCGOVERN

Attached please find the Addendum to the Final Audit Report on Friends of George McGovern which was approved by the Commission on February 19, 1986.

Informational copies of the report have been received by all parties involved and the Addendum may be released to the public.

Attachment as stated

CC: FEC Library

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Public Record

Office of General Counsel



FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20463

ADDENDUM TO THE FINAL REPORT OF THE AUDIT DIVISION ON FRIENDS OF GEORGE MCGOVERN

I. Background

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A. Overview

On February 11, 1985, the Federal Election Commission ("the Commission") released the final audit report on Friends of George McGovern ("the Committee"). That report was based on an audit of the Committee conducted pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 9038(a) and included the Commission's initial determination regarding repayment to the U.S. Treasury. The audit covered the period September 13, 1983 through July 26, 1984.

The final audit report, Finding III.A. addressed the Commission's initial determination that the Committee made disbursements totaling \$92,642.79 for non-qualified campaign expenses: \$15,125.11 for disbursements related to the National Democratic Nominating Convention; \$27,517.68 for undocumented disbursements; and \$50,000 for salary payments to the Candidate. The Commission determined that the pro-rata portion, \$25,104.99 is repayable to the U.S. Treasury.

On June 13, 1985, the Commission made a final determination reaffirming its initial determination. A Statement of Reasons in support of the Commission's final determination was issued as required by 11 C.F.R. § 9038.2(c)(4). On July 10, 1985, a check in the amount of \$25,104.99 was received from the Committee.

This addendum is based on the follow-up fieldwork of the Committee conducted pursuant to 11 C.F.R. § 9038.1(b)(3) which states that the Commission staff may conduct additional fieldwork after completion of the fieldwork conducted pursuant to paragraph (b)(1) and (2) of this section.

In addition, 11 C.F.R. § 9038.1(e) (4) states, in part, that addenda to the audit report may be issued from time to time as circumstances warrant and additional information becomes available. Such addenda may be based, in part, on follow-up fieldwork conducted under paragraph (b) (3) of this section.

The follow-up fieldwork covered the period July 27, 1984 through April 30, 1985, the last day covered by the most recent report filed with the Commission at the time of the follow-up fieldwork.

This addendum is based upon documents and working papers which support each of its factual statements. They form part of the record upon which the Commission based its decisions on the matters in the addendum and were available to Commissioners and appropriate staff for review.

B. Key Personnel

The Treasurers of the Committee during the period reviewed were:

Ms. Paula M. Kowalczuk 7/27/84 - 1/14/85

Ms. Mary T. Curtin 1/14/85 - 4/30/85

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The fieldwork included an examination of required supporting documentation for receipts and disbursements, analysis of Committee debts and obligations (including winding down costs) and such other procedures as deemed necessary under the circumstances to determine whether the Committee received any matching fund payments in excess of the amount to which it was entitled and whether any amount of any payment made from the matching payment account was used for any purpose other than to defray the qualified campaign expenses of the Committee.

II. Findings and Recommendations

A. <u>Determination of Net Outstanding Campaign</u> <u>Obligations (NOCO)</u>

Section 9034.5(a) of Title 11, Code of Federal Regulations requires that the candidate submit a Statement of Net Outstanding Campaign Obligations ("NOCO") which contains, among other items, the total of all outstanding obligations for qualified campaign expenses and an estimate of necessary winding down costs within 15 days of the candidate's date of ineligibility.

Further, 11 C.F.R. § 9034.5(d) requires that a candidate submit a revised Statement of Net Outstanding Campaign Obligations with each submission for matching funds payments filed after the candidate's date of ineligibility, reflecting the financial status of the campaign as of the close of business on the last business day preceding the date of submission for matching funds.

Section 9038(b)(1) of Title 26, United States Code states that if the Commission determines that any portion of payments made to a candidate from the matching payment account was in excess of the aggregate amount of payments to which such candidate was entitled under section 9034, it shall notify the candidate, and the candidate shall pay to the Secretary an amount equal to the amount of the excess payments.

Finding III.B. of the final audit report addressed the Committee's financial position with respect to the Candidate's entitlement to the receipt of matching funds. The Audit staff verified the Committee's June 15, 1984 NOCO and determined that the Committee had net outstanding campaign obligations of \$68,467.77 on that date.

An addendum to the final audit report (forwarded to the Committee on September 25, 1985) contained the results of the Audit staff's review of the Committee's financial activity through April 30, 1985, and contained an update of the Committee's June 15, 1984, NOCO statement using actual expenses paid in lieu of the estimated winding down costs presented in the final audit report.

In response to that Addendum, the Committee submitted additional documentation which resulted in changes to the amounts contained in the NOCO statement and the Apparent Non-Qualified Campaign Expenses presented at Finding II.B. Specifically, the Committee submitted documentation for additional winding down costs beyond April 30, 1985 as well as adequate support for a disbursement which was previously undocumented.

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In addition, disclosure reports were reviewed through October 31, 1985 to determine whether the Committee reported any disbursements which could be includable as additional winding down costs.

An amended NOCO statement reflecting the changes noted above appears below.

Friends of George McGovern Statement of Net Outstanding Campaign Obligations as of June 15, 1984 (Prepared by Audit staff)

Assets Cash in Bank

(\$ 5,899.08)

Accounts Receivable

 $64,610.65 \, \underline{a}/$

Non-qualified campaign expenses 3/16-6/15/84

29,387.39 <u>b</u>/

. Total Assets

\$ 88,098.96

Liabilities

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Accounts Payable for

Qualified Campaign Expenses

\$85,250.24 <u>c</u>/

Winding Down Costs 6/16/84-10/31/85 (Salaries, Overhead, Supplies, Legal Fees, etc.)

55,911.18 <u>d</u>/

33,815.97 **e**∕

Fundraising Expenses through 9/11/84

Total Liabilities

(174,977.39)

Net Outstanding Campaign Obligations-Deficit

(86,878.43)

This amount is comprised of a \$48,269.00 matching fund certification of 7/6/84, offsets to operating expenditures totaling \$16,187.34 and interest of \$154.31.

This amount is included to ensure that only the amount of post-ineligibility <u>qualified</u> campaign expenses is used to calculate the candidate's remaining entitlement to matching funds.

This amount does not include \$18,020.35 in non-qualified campaign expenses paid by the Committee from 6/16 - 9/11/84. A pro-rata repayment is requested for the amount paid from 7/27 - 9/11/84. (see Finding II.B.) The Commission's Statement of Reasons requested repayment for the amount paid from 6/16 - 7/26/84.

^{☐/} This amount does not contain any estimate for post 10/31/85 winding down costs. Any estimate provided by the Committee will be considered in the calculation of the Candidate's remaining entitlement.

The Committee made fundraising disbursements totaling \$23,979.69 after 9/11/84. However, these were not included as winding down costs because the incurrence of these costs was not necessary to satisfy debts for qualified campaign expenses.

Our review of the Committee's deposits indicated that for the period June 16 through August 7, 1984 the Committee received \$50,044.23 in contributions from individuals and interest income. After applying the 8/7/84 matching fund payment of \$16,699.01, and the individual contributions and interest noted above, the Committee had a remaining entitlement of \$20,135.19. In addition, for the period August 8, through September 11, 1984 (the date of receipt of the matching fund payment certified on September 6, 1984) the Committee received \$17,917.97 in contributions from individuals and interest income. Therefore, it appears that the Candidate had entitlement to matching funds of only \$2,217.22 of the \$24,960.08 payment received on September 11, 1984 and had no entitlement to matching fund payments received subsequent to September 11, 1985.

The amount of matching fund payments in excess of the amounts to which the Committee was entitled are:

Date Paid	Amount in Excess Entitlement
September 11, 1984 October 9, 1984 November 2, 1984 December 11, 1984	\$22,742.86 <u>1</u> / 8,665.00 3,722.99 <u>5,310.00</u>
Total	\$ <u>40,440.85</u>

Based on our review of the Committee's financial activity through October 31, 1985, it is the opinion of the Audit staff that the Committee received \$40,440.85 in matching fund payments in excess of the amount to which it was entitled.

Conclusion

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On February 19, 1986, the Commission made an initial determination that \$40,440.85 be repaid to the U.S. Treasury within 90 calendar days of receipt of this addendum in accordance with 11 C.F.R. § 9038.2(d)(1).

B. Apparent Non-Qualified Campaign Expenses

Section 9038(b)(2)(A) of Title 26, United States Code states that if the Commission determines that any amount of any payment made to a candidate from the matching payment account was used for any purpose other than to defray the qualified campaign expenses with respect to which such payment was made, it shall notify such candidate of the amount so used, and the candidate shall pay to the Secretary an amount equal to such amount.

^{1/} This is the amount received (\$24,960.08) minus the amount to which the Committee was entitled (\$2,217.22).

The Commission, in a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking published in the <u>Federal Register</u> on June 28, 1984, set forth a pro-rata formula which would base repayments for non-qualified campaign expenses on the proportion of federal funds to total funds received by the candidate. The text of the regulation and the Explanation and Justification were published in the <u>Federal Register</u> on August 22, 1984 and transmitted to Congress. On March 5, 1985 revised regulations were resubmitted for publication. The proposed regulations were before the Congress for 30 legislative days as of May 20, 1985, and approved by the Commission for publication in final form on June 11, 1985.

The formula and the appropriate calculation with respect to the Committee's receipt activity is as follows:

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Total Matching Funds Certified Through Date of Ineligibility (3/15/84)2/ Numerator + Private Contributions Received Through 3/15/84

Thus, the repayment ratio for non-qualified campaign expenses is 27.0987%.

Section 9032(9) of Title 26, United States Code defines a qualified campaign expense as a purchase, payment, distribution, loan, advance, deposit or gift of money or anything of value incurred by a candidate, or by his authorized committee, in connection with his campaign for nomination for election and neither the incurring nor payment of which constitutes a violation of any law of the United States or of the State in which the expense is incurred or paid (emphasis added).

Section 9033.11(a) of Title 11, Code of Federal Regulations states that each candidate shall have the burden of proving that disbursements made by the candidate or his or her authorized committee(s) or persons authorized to make expenditures on behalf of the candidate or committee(s) are qualified campaign expenses as defined in 11 C.F.R. § 9032.9.

In addition, the Commission's Regulations under 11 C.F.R. § 9033.11(b) contain the documentation requirements regarding qualified campaign expenses.

^{2/} On March 23, 1984, the Commission determined that the date of ineligibility under 11 C.F.R. § 9033.5(a) for Senator George McGovern was March 15, 1984.

A review of the Committee's disbursements made from July 27, 1984 through September 11, 1984 disclosed that the Committee made \$6,934.61 in additional disbursements for convention-related expenses. In addition, adequate supporting documentation was not present in the Committee's records for \$2,612.54 in disbursements made during the period.

As noted above, the Committee's response to the September 25, 1985 Addendum included documentation to support one disbursement for \$1,500.00 which was previously undocumented. No documentation was presented concerning the convention-related expenses or to support the remaining undocumented disbursement of \$1,112.54. 3/

Conclusion

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On February 19, 1986, the Commission made an initial determination that the amount, \$6,934.61 of convention-related disbursements and \$1,112.54 of undocumented disbursements, be viewed as non-qualified campaign expenses and the pro-rata portion, \$2,180.67 (\$6,934.61 + \$1,112.54 x .270987 be repaid to the U.S. Treasury within 90 calendar days of receipt of this addendum in accordance with 11 C.F.R. § 9038.2(d)(1).

If the Committee maintained only a cancelled check. No additional information was made available to document the disbursement, and thus establish whether the disbursement was made "in connection with" the Candidate's campaign for nomination.

FEC DOCUMENT SEPARATOR