



Department of Defense INSTRUCTION

NUMBER 3020.42

February 17, 2006

Certified current as of April 27, 2011

USD(P)

SUBJECT: Defense Continuity Plan Development

Reference: (a) DoD Directive 3020.26, "Defense Continuity Programs (~~DCP~~),"
~~September 8, 2004~~ January 9, 2009

1. PURPOSE

This Instruction implements policy, assigns responsibility, and provides instructions for continuity plan development under the authority of Reference (a).

2. APPLICABILITY AND SCOPE

2.1 This Instruction applies to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Military Departments, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Combatant Commands, the Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, the Defense Agencies, the DoD Field Activities, and all other organizational entities within the Department of Defense (hereafter referred to collectively as the "DoD Components").

2.2. Reference (a) is a broad policy document that provides a framework to promote a coordinated effort and addresses multiple continuity disciplines and responsibilities. This Instruction focuses on DoD Component continuity plan development, which supports and complements DoD continuity planning efforts at higher levels.

3. DEFINITIONS

3.1. Capabilities. Communications, facilities, information technology, trained personnel, and other assets necessary to conduct mission essential functions (MEF) and supporting activities.

3.2. Supporting Activity. Those specific activities that a department or agency must conduct in order to perform its MEF.

4. POLICY

In accordance with Reference (a), key policy requirements relating to the development of continuity plans and procedures are:

4.1. The Department of Defense shall have a comprehensive and effective Defense Continuity Program (DCP) that ensures DoD Component MEF continue under all circumstances across the spectrum of threats.

4.2. All Defense continuity-related activities and requirements, including Continuity of Operations, Continuity of Government, and Enduring Constitutional Government, shall be coordinated under the DCP.

4.3. Performance of MEF in a continuity event shall be the basis for continuity planning, preparation, and execution.

4.4. DCP plans shall be responsive and executable with or without warning.

4.5. The DCP shall make appropriate use of information technology (IT) solutions within the continuity operating environment to provide information to leaders and other users, facilitate decision making, and issue orders and direction.

4.6. The continuity program in each DoD Component shall be under the management oversight of a senior official who is accountable to the Head of the DoD Component.

5. RESPONSIBILITIES

5.1. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)) shall oversee implementation of this Instruction and issue such additional direction and guidance as may be necessary through the ASD(HD).

5.2. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense *and Americas' Security Affairs* (~~ASD(HD)~~)(*ASD(HD&ASA)*) under the USD(P), shall monitor the implementation of this Instruction through the ~~Defense Continuity and Crisis Management Office (DCCM)-Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Defense Continuity and Crisis Management (DASD(DCCM))~~.

5.3. The Heads of the DoD Components shall:

5.3.1. Implement the requirements of this Instruction.

5.3.2. Designate in writing a senior official to manage, oversee, and ensure readiness and compliance of the Component continuity program.

5.3.3. Identify and update, as changes occur, Component MEF as the basis for their continuity planning, preparation, and execution.

5.3.4. Submit continuity plans every 2 years, or sooner if changes occur that require plan reissuance, to the DCCM for review.

5.4. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall:

5.4.1. Provide continuity plan guidance to the Service Chiefs and the Combatant Commanders consistent with Reference (a).

5.4.2. Oversee Service and Combatant Command implementation of this Instruction.

5.4.3. Review Service and Combatant Command continuity plans.

5.4.4. Ensure the Service Chiefs and Combatant Commanders develop and maintain continuity plans that support the DCP.

6. PROCEDURES

The continuity planning processes provided in this Instruction are grouped into three categories: (1) Establishment of Core Requirements, (2) Determination of Capabilities Requirements, and (3) Writing Plans and Procedures.

6.1. Establish Core Requirements for Continuity Plan Development. The identification of core requirements is the first step in continuity plan development. Core requirements include the identification of MEF, supporting activities, vital records, Component continuity staffing requirements, delegations of authority, and orders of succession. The core requirements will drive the remaining elements of the planning process.

6.1.1. Identify MEF. The accurate identification of MEF is the foundation of a valid continuity plan. The process of determining MEF is critical. All other planning elements support and are contingent upon MEF. An accurate assessment of essential functions will allow the most efficient use of available personnel and equipment during a crisis. It also allows for streamlining of support services that will be required. When identifying MEF, DoD Components shall:

6.1.1.1. List all the Component functions that have the potential to be considered “mission essential.” Areas of consideration include, but are not limited to:

6.1.1.1.1. Command and control.

6.1.1.1.2. Command decisions and strategies.

6.1.1.1.3. Crisis communications including alerts and notifications.

6.1.1.1.4. Crisis data storage, retrieval, and security.

6.1.1.1.5. Legal obligations.

6.1.1.1.6. Fiscal and contractual obligations.

6.1.1.1.7. Personnel.

6.1.1.1.8. Critical support to or from other DoD Components, Agencies, or Departments.

6.1.1.2. Establish the criticality of each function by examining the consequences of the nonperformance of those functions. Confirm or eliminate functions as mission essential based on the criticality assessment.

6.1.1.3. Prioritize the functions that have been identified as “mission essential” and plan to defer lower priority functions during a crisis.

6.1.1.3.1. Certain MEF must be uninterrupted or resumed during the first 12 hours after the occurrence of an emergency and continued through full resumption of all functions.

6.1.1.3.2. Components will ensure that their operational resiliency is commensurate with the criticality of each MEF.

6.1.1.3.3. Prioritization will guide MEF restoration operations.

6.1.2. Identify Supporting Activities. Supporting activities ensure that MEF can be performed as efficiently and effectively as possible during a continuity event. Examples of supporting activities are: situational awareness, computer, and IT support; administrative management; infrastructure preparation; personnel and personal preparation; coordination of clearances and accesses with alternate facilities; instructions for continuity staffs; and logistics. Additionally, Component continuity plans should identify interdependencies with other organizations, both within and outside the Department of Defense.

6.1.3. Identify Vital Records. Vital records and databases are those documents, references, records, and information systems needed to support MEF during a continuity event and include those records and information systems necessary for reconstitution to normal operations after the crisis. The DoD Component continuity plans will ensure that relocation sites provide adequate connectivity, hardware, software, information assurance, and related infrastructure to ensure access to the systems necessary to support their execution of MEF. All processes and procedures for the preservation and retrieval of all vital electronic records, databases, and information systems will be identified to and coordinated with the Component Chief Information Officer (CIO) or equivalent office.

6.1.4. Establish Component Continuity Staffing Requirements. Component continuity staffs consist of personnel who will proceed to an alternate operating facility to continue MEF during a continuity event. Procedures for establishing the continuity relocation staff roster are as follows:

6.1.4.1. Identify the position requirements necessary to perform MEF. Determination of position requirements involves several considerations including, but not limited to: key leadership roles, experience of available personnel, subject matter expertise, supporting activities, MEF workload requirements, special skills required, and continuous 24/7 staffing in lieu of normal duty hours requirements.

6.1.4.2. Establish primary and alternate “by name” personnel rosters to fill the positions identified. Ensure that personnel have been informed of those roles and associated responsibilities. The Heads of the DoD Components and executive leaders may have participation responsibilities in higher level continuity plans. Consideration must be given to this matter when establishing the Component relocation roster.

6.1.4.3. Develop continuity relocation staff requirements including, but not limited to:

6.1.4.3.1. Possession of a security clearance commensurate with the requirements for the MEF they will be required to perform and the security requirements of the relocation site(s).

6.1.4.3.2. Demonstrated willingness and ability of assigned individuals to relocate to a potentially austere environment for at least a 30-day period.

6.1.4.3.3. Appropriate agreements with contractors that are part of a continuity staff that legally bind and specify the contractor’s responsibilities and level of participation during a continuity event, in accordance with Reference (a).

6.1.4.4. Develop a maintenance program for the continuity staff relocation and other supporting activity staff rosters.

6.1.5. Establish Orders of Succession. Orders of succession shall be established for each DoD Component. Each Component continuity plan shall:

6.1.5.1. Identify an order of succession to the Head of the DoD Component.

6.1.5.2. Identify orders of succession for other key positions within the Component.

6.1.6. Establish Delegations of Authority. These are essential in DoD Component continuity plans. Components shall establish delegations of authorities for decision and policy making. This is crucial to allow a rapid response in a crisis situation. Continuity plans shall:

6.1.6.1. Identify what authorities are delegated and to whom including any limits of authority or accountability.

6.1.6.2. Identify the circumstances under which the authorities are delegated.

6.2. Determination of Capabilities Requirements. Once the core requirements of a continuity plan have been identified, capabilities necessary for the performance of MEF can be identified. Capabilities requirements include:

6.2.1. Alternate Operating Facilities. Alternate operating facilities will be identified for continuity operating environments. Alternate operating facilities should provide:

6.2.1.1. Immediate availability to allow continuity operations to commence rapidly in the event of a no warning attack.

6.2.1.1.1. Dual-use facilities and platforms are preferred.

6.2.1.1.2. Geographical dispersion of select Component functions is preferred.

6.2.1.1.3. The availability to devolve or transfer some or all of an organization's MEF responsibilities directly to another unaffected Component facility capable of performing MEF is recommended.

6.2.1.2. Operational capabilities for the performance of all MEF within 12 hours of an interruption or continuity event.

6.2.1.3. Sufficient space, infrastructure, power, life support, and network connectivity to accommodate the Component continuity staff personnel and equipment required to continue Component MEF.

6.2.1.3.1. Components must address the reliability of the existing level of service agreements and commitments from commercial vendors when identifying their requirements at alternate operating facilities.

6.2.1.3.2. Support for IT, telecommunications, and power supplies are critical areas of consideration.

6.2.1.4. The capability to sustain MEF operations for a minimum of 30 days.

6.2.1.5. Physical security including perimeter, access, and internal functions commensurate with Component operations. Risk assessments to identify and assess potential

hazards or limitations relative to the location of the facility should be conducted when selecting alternate operating facilities. Risk considerations include, but are not limited to, reliability and back-up capabilities inherent to local power, telecommunications, and internet grids, physical security, single points of failure for critical facility systems, geographic proximity hazards such as nearby facilities manufacturing or storing hazardous materials.

6.2.1.6. Access to reliable logistical support and essential resources such as food, lodging, water, fuel, medical facilities, and office supplies.

6.2.1.7. When the alternate operating facility belongs to another Component, a Memorandum of Agreement/Memorandum of Understanding with the host Component of the alternate operating facility to ensure facility/infrastructure availability and readiness to support Component continuity requirements.

6.2.2. Transportation and Logistics Coordination

6.2.2.1. Each Component shall develop executable transportation plans for movement of personnel to alternate operating facilities.

6.2.2.2. Procedures shall be developed for maintaining the readiness of alternate operating facilities. Consideration should be given to pre-positioning and maintaining unique equipment required to perform MEF at alternate operating facilities.

6.2.2.3. Procedures shall be developed for procuring equipment and supplies that are not pre-positioned.

6.2.2.4. Procedures shall be developed to notify and coordinate activation of alternate operating facilities.

6.2.2.5. Shelter-in-place options are acceptable, and may be preferable to facility evacuation.

6.2.3. Interoperable Communications (as required: Secure/Non-Secure, Voice, Data, Video, Fax). Communications and network connectivity at alternate operating facilities must be commensurate with the execution requirements of the Component MEF providing contact with key government leadership personnel, key DoD leadership, DoD Components, and other critical Departments and Agencies.

6.2.4. Fly-Away Kits. Fly-away kits consist of critical office items/records that cannot be pre-positioned at alternate operating facilities. An itemized list of fly-away kit contents should be developed as well as procedures for movement of the kits to an alternate operating facility.

6.2.4.1. Data that is part of a fly-away kit should be backed-up as often as possible to keep data loss to a minimum in the event of a continuity event.

6.2.4.2. Components may include the requirement for relocation staffs to assemble fly-away kits with personal and prescription items for when they have to deploy to an alternate operating facility.

6.3. Writing Plans and Procedures. Plans and procedures should provide clear objectives and instructions to Component personnel for preparation and implementation of continuity plans under all circumstances. Plans must be executable with or without warning and during duty or non-duty hours.

6.3.1. Plan content will identify:

6.3.1.1. The core requirements and capabilities elements of the Component.

6.3.1.2. Procedures for an executive decision process that allows for assessment of a threat, or potential threat situation, and the determination of plan activation for response and recovery actions.

6.3.1.3. Procedures to include the positions within the Component that have the authority to activate the Component continuity plan.

6.3.1.4. Procedures to execute the plan if the Secretary of Defense has directed activation of all or specific continuity plans.

6.3.1.5. An incident management team and/or procedures for providing critical situational information to the key decision makers of the Component.

6.3.1.5.1. Components must have the capability to monitor the condition of their facility on a 24/7 basis, and at a minimum must have procedures to remain in contact with the facility.

6.3.1.5.2. Component offices located in government buildings will establish procedures with building security for providing situational awareness to the Component incident management team.

6.3.1.5.3. Offices that are located in non-government buildings will establish a Memorandum of Agreement/Memorandum of Understanding with the building owner to obtain timely building information (e.g., fire alarms, power outages) and establish procedures for conveying pertinent facility information to the Component incident management team.

6.3.1.6. Components (specifically in the NCR) that are affected by Continuity of Government Condition (COGCON) levels shall identify relevant COGCON requirements in their Component continuity plan.

6.3.2. Operations Security (OPSEC) Requirements. Component OPSEC requirements must be integrated into all aspects of the Component plan.

6.3.3. Alert And Notification Systems for Contacting All Component Personnel

6.3.3.1. Alerts provide information and situational awareness to Component personnel and can be used to establish, or adjust, a preparedness posture.

6.3.3.2. Notification is the process of activating a continuity plan and providing follow-on directions during a continuity event.

6.3.3.3. Alerts and notifications may continue throughout a continuity event.

6.3.3.4. Alert and notification procedures shall provide guidance for all Component personnel including non-relocation staff.

6.3.3.5. Alert and notification procedures and processes will be developed that are executable during:

6.3.3.5.1. Duty hours.

6.3.3.5.2. Non-duty hours.

6.3.3.5.3. Situations that provide warning of an incident.

6.3.3.5.4. Incidents or attacks that occur with no warning.

6.3.4. Evacuation and Relocation Procedures that Include:

6.3.4.1. Use of existing building evacuation plans and supporting Component evacuation plans to exit the Component facility.

6.3.4.2. Identification of primary and alternate assembly areas for continuity relocation staff members to report to upon exiting the building. Some situations may not require the use of assembly areas (e.g., activation of a plan prior to a crisis or incident).

6.3.4.3. Identification of alternate relocation procedures for no warning attacks when primary notification/alert systems cannot be implemented.

6.3.4.4. Identification of primary and alternate transportation for relocation staff.

6.3.4.5. Accountability procedures for all Component personnel.

6.3.5. Alternate Operating Facilities Procedures. Operations procedures for the continuity relocation staff shall be developed that include, but are not limited to:

6.3.5.1. An arrival briefing covering information on the support available at the facility.

6.3.5.2. Initial action requirements at the relocation work space:

6.3.5.2.1. Stow gear and equipment.

6.3.5.2.2. Check access to vital records and essential documents.

6.3.5.2.3. Test as appropriate for the prevailing OPSEC environment:

6.3.5.2.3.1. Voice communications (all).

6.3.5.2.3.2. Information systems.

6.3.5.2.3.3. Network connectivity (SIPRNET, NIPRNET, JWICS, and others).

6.3.5.2.3.4. Fax.

6.3.5.2.3.5. Radio.

6.3.5.2.3.6. Other communications.

6.3.5.3. Initiation of communications with critical continuity elements and agencies.

6.3.5.4. Initiation of communications with virtual office elements.

6.3.5.5. Performance of accountability check for all Component staff including non-relocation personnel.

6.3.5.6. Conduct of operations:

6.3.5.6.1. Develop initial status report.

6.3.5.6.2. Determine which MEF have been affected.

6.3.5.6.3. Establish MEF restoration effort as required.

6.3.5.6.4. Determine requirements and coordinate procurement of additional equipment and/or supplies.

6.3.6. Reconstitution. Reconstitution requirements will depend directly upon the extent of the crisis and the resultant environment. The Component continuity plan shall incorporate information that will be critical to their reconstitution effort including identification of:

6.3.6.1. Facilities requirements for resumption of all Component activities.


6.3.6.2. Contacts and organizations responsible for providing reconstitution support to the Component (e.g., Washington Headquarters Services, General Services Administration).

6.3.6.3. Vendors and other outsourcing support for reconstitution.

6.3.7. Test, Training, and Exercise Programs. A test, training, and exercise program will be developed to validate Component plans. Plans will be tested and exercised according to Reference (a).

7. EFFECTIVE DATE

This Instruction is effective immediately.



Ryan Henry
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for Policy