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Jul 28, 2011 — The House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health and Human Rights held a hearing on U.S.-Africa defense and security partnership July 26, 2011.

The following is a transcript of the hearing:

SMITH: The subcommittee will come to order. And good afternoon to everybody.
Sorry for the delay. We did have a series of votes on the House floor. We're a little bit -- not too late, but a little bit.

We are meeting today to examine how United States policy is being coordinated in Africa from the security, counterterrorism, humanitarian and development perspectives since the establishment of the U.S. Africa Command in 2008 for decades, despite the wave of African independence in the 1950s through the 1970s, many American policy makers did not believe Africa held strategic importance to the United States.

According to one defense analyst, quote, "during the Cold War, the United States' foreign policy towards sub-Saharan African had little to do with Africa," close quote.
After the fall of the Soviet Union, many U.S. policy makers continued to consider the U.S. military's role and responsibilities on the continent to be minimal. In 1995, the Department of Defense asserted in its U.S. security strategy for sub-Saharan Africa that, quote, "ultimately, we see very little traditional strategic interest in Africa."

Oh, how they were wrong.

A look at current statistics amply demonstrates that the United States does have a strategic and a very strong one in sub-Saharan Africa. More than 90 percent of U.S. trade with African nations centers on American imports of African oil.

Imports from Africa comprise nearly a quarter of all American oil imports, and promises to increase as new sources of oil continue to be found throughout Africa.
Similarly, African nations have abundant minerals on which our modern society depends. In recent years, the mineral Coltan, largely from Africa, has enabled the development of computers, cell phones and electronic devices. We would be hard pressed to construct jet aircraft, automobile catalytic converters or iPods without the minerals found in Africa, and in some cases almost nowhere else to be found in the world.

Since the 1998 bombings at the American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, it has become clear that terrorism can strike the United States even in Africa. In fact, the presence of Africans on the list of planners of the 1993 and 2001 World Trade Center attacks demonstrates that terrorism in Africa is not confined to Africa itself, and can reach out and strike us even in our homeland.

In a hearing that I chaired in -- on March 12th, 1999, on U.S. embassy security, Admiral William Crowe, then chairman of the Accountability Review Board, said the Kenya and Tanzania bombings demonstrated the inadequacy of resources to provide security against terrorist attacks, as demonstrated by the lack of resources devoted to U.S. security at U.S. posts abroad.

That resulted in what we then called the Embassy Security Act of 1999. And I offered it. It became know, when it was finally enacted, as the Admiral Nance and Meg Donovan Foreign Relations Act of 2000.

When I visited Sudan in 2005, government officials in Khartoum admitted they had harbored al Qaeda in the past. And Security Chief Salah Ghosh bragged to me about how close his government was to the late Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda at one time.
Clearly, we must remain vigilant concerning the existence of terrorist organizations that threaten our interests in Africa, and, of course, Africa's people.

As we have learned during our hearings on Somalia on July 7th, we are currently in the midst of a huge famine in the Horn of Africa, as a result of severe drought that is affecting the entire eastern Africa region. The drought is said to be the worst in 60 years, has caused a severe crisis across Somalia, Ethiopia and Kenya that threatens the livelihood of more than 12 million people.

Other countries in and around the Horn of Africa, including Djibouti, Sudan, South Sudan and parts of Uganda, are also affected by a food crisis. Our government certainly now realizes the importance of Africa. But remnants of our policy neglect remain.

One example of the previous underestimation of Africa's significance was the division of American interests in Africa among three different combatant commands, the European Command, the Central Command and the Pacific Command.

Because of their differing strategic objectives and goals, Africa was hardly ever a primary concern. The creation of the African Command, or AFRICOM, demonstrates the current awareness of the strategic importance of Africa, not only to the United States, but for the world in general.

During our country's growing engagement with the nation's of Africa, our policy towards the continent has been managed by two civilian agencies, Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development.

It is therefore reasonable that AFRICOM contains a larger non-DOD civilian staff than has been the tradition with other combatant commands. But questions remain concerning whether an expanded military presence will overshadow the so-called soft power of diplomacy and humanitarian developmental assistance.

DOD officials emphasize that AFRICOM remains under development. Some details regarding the command structure and footprint are still be revised -- reviewed. For example, a decision on AFRICOM's final headquarters, location, has been postponed until 2012. And a move to the continent may not occur for several years, if at all.
This new coordination during the past three years among the State Department, USAID and Defense Department -- and has implications for U.S. policy in Africa as a whole -- will be the focus of this hearing. A former EUCom commander suggested that AFRICOM -- the Africa Command, with the interagency coordination, would be the pioneer for a new approach that other commands might adopt later.

We look forward to examining the challenges and the success of this approach with our very distinguished witnesses.

I'd like now to yield such time as he may consume to my good friend and colleague, Don Payne.

PAYNE: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And I commend you for calling this very important hearing.

Today, I look forward to the -- hearing about the recent developments in AFRICOM and mission to collaborate with State and USAID.

I think that Africa has had its problems as it moved out of decolonization following World War II, as it started to move towards independence. But as that occurred, of course, the Cold War began. And countries then were judged on what side are you on, on the Warsaw Pact nations with the USSR, or are you with democracy, as we were fighting against the Iron Curtain countries.

And so, unfortunately, because of that, dictators were put into power not on how they governed but where they stood. And we've seen people like Mobutu in Zaire and Santos in Angola. And we can go on.

This so-called constructive engagement in South Africa with Peter W. Bolta, where we looked the other way because our main concern was where do you stand against the USSR. So, unfortunately, as democratization came about, many countries felt all they had to do was to satisfy either the USA or the USSR, and move along with brutal dictators, mostly military persons.

And so we have seen the difficult transition. We did see a wave of democracy move through in the '70s, '80s and '90s, where countries had excellent elections. And we saw the military people move out of the leadership of countries, and democratically elected leaders.

Of course, we know AFRICOM was first established in 2007, made operational in 2008 to promote the U.S. national security objectives in Africa and its surrounding areas. Prior to AFRICOM's creation, there were, as we know, three Department of Defense combatant commands covering Africa, U.S. European Command, U.S. Central Command and the U.S. Pacific Command.

At that time, current U.S. Ambassador Susan Rice, then a senior fellow at Brookings Institute, criticized the three command approach by stating that Africa had been the poor step child in each of these different commands, and that it deserved full attention of a U.S. command.

Given Africa's strategic importance and the prevalence of civil violence and the development challenges on the continent, it was felt that it was appropriate for the Department of Defense, State Department and USAID to have a coordinated approach to addressing security in the region.

AFRICOM must also adhere to its state purpose, to work with African nations and African organizations to build regional security and crisis response capacity. When AFRICOM was first launched, I voiced concern regarding the role it would be playing and the motivation behind its creation.

And much of that came from African leaders. You may recall when AFRICOM was announced, General Ward, who we have so much respect for him, as, you know, he recently retired, four star general, was appointed to lead Africa -- AFRICOM, and did visit a number of African countries to inform them about this new command.
Unfortunately, not much previous announcement was given. Meetings were short and quick, had to do one or two countries every other day. And I think that it was handled totally poorly.

Therefore, African countries wondered, well, what is this all about? Secondly, our Department of Defense, in my opinion, did a very poor job of introducing it. African presidents -- I have relationships with a number of them -- wondered, well, what is this new thing? Is it just because U.S. has interests? Is it watch the Gulf of Guinea oil? Is it to fight al Qaeda?

All of these things are very positive for the United States of America. But then, secondly, well, what does it mean for us? Great for you, but what about us?
And so I think that the debacle of the -- of the poor manner in which the introduction of AFRICOM to African nations was a setback. Every single country said thanks, but no thanks, except Liberia, who, as you know, is one of our staunchest allies. And of course, the president was looking for -- for the AFRICOM to come to Liberia, because they need to have additional income.

I believe that was the main reason.

So it was handled poorly. And it was a setback.

My primary concern was, like I said, it was hastily created, although Department of Defense was thinking about it for a long time. However, they didn't let others know. Unclear mission and the potential of militarizing foreign aid.

And that was one of the other misconceptions; you had to see the general to see whether you were going to get aid or not. And as we talked about democracy all through the '70s and '80s and '90s, and said do away with the generals; they shouldn't be in charge of government; they shouldn't be the ones you go to for assistance and for jobs -- and we looked like we were putting a general in charge of what agency should get the aid or the food, or should the children get it or the adults.

So it was just, you know, poorly conceived, in my opinion. Of course, people in the Department of Defense told me I'm all wrong. State Department said it, too. However, that's just the way it is.

So we are where we are. Another concern was that African nations have expressed unwillingness to house the command, with the notable exception, as I mentioned, of Liberia. In fact, just last month, Liberia's president, Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, met with me and other members of Congress and stated her desire, once again, to have AFRICOM headquartered in Liberia.

I'm interested, as we move along, about whether the operations will move to Africa, will stay in Europe, and if Liberia is one of the countries that would be considered. I, along with many others, also question the Bush administration's intentions for AFRICOM, and worried about the -- what the -- about the increased military presence, and whether this was a reaction to China's growing investment in the region, in ways of securing Africa's valuable natural resources.

There's no doubt that the Department of Defense has resources and capabilities. That's for sure. If used a in collaborative with the Department of State, USAID, as well as African military partners, can serve as a valuable contribution to the continent.

Indeed, there are good examples for such collaboration. For example, AFRICOM has utilized USAID's conflict analysis of Southern Sudan to inform its planning efforts, and is assisting in interagency -- in the interagency in determining the appropriate approach to supporting South Sudan's security sector reform and conflict mitigation activities.

In the DRC, AFRICOM collaborated with State and USAID to address sexual and gender-based violence issues, which, as we know, is very prominent there. The command used its resources to construct or renovate buildings where the government, the U.N. or local and international non-governmental organizations delivered services.
AFRICOM also oversaw training on preventing sexual and gender based violence for the Congolese army. These successful interventions and training initiatives are good examples of how interagency cooperation on security assistance in Africa can be very effective, and that AFRICOM has the resources to be a valuable player on the continent.

It is important, however, that AFRICOM seek to maintain equal partnership and does not overreach its mandate and attempt to become a -- a leader in the U.S. diplomacy and development.

While I remain somewhat hesitant about aspects of AFRICOM, with foreign assistance funds at a risk for significant cuts as we move to the next Congresses, I welcome AFRICOM as a partner to State and USAID, since the Department of Defense is the only department that seems to be able to not have serious cuts.
I hope to learn about -- more about the interagency coordination between AFRICOM, USAID and State Department, and how this collaboration is benefiting African citizens, while also advancing American interests.

So I would certainly look forward to the testimony. And yield back the balance of my time, Mr. Chairman.

SMITH: Thank you very much.
Mr. Marino?
Ms. Bass?

BASS:
Thank you.
Well, once again, thank you, Chairman Smith and Ranking Member Payne, for convening this important hearing to discuss AFRICOM and its role in Africa.

I'd also like to thank our witness who will present testimony today. I look forward to hearing more about the interdepartmental collaborations and coordinations between AFRICOM and USAID.

Throughout the hearing, I also look forward to hearing more about direct interaction and relationship between AFRICOM and African countries. I do understand, as Mr. Payne was describing, that many African leaders are concerned, and some resistance to the idea of AFRICOM headquartered within the continent.

And I'm interested in assessing the value of relocating AFRICOM to the continent, both for Americans and Africans. And I would appreciate some additional information about the general posture of African leaders and the African Union toward AFRICOM at this time.
Thank you very much for taking the time out today.

SMITH: Thank you very much.
Ms. Buerkle?

BUERKLE: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I just want to thank you and the ranking member, Mr. Payne, for calling this very important hearing.
And look forward to hearing the testimony from our witnesses this afternoon.

SMITH: Thank you very much, Ms. Buerkle.

BUEKRLE: Thank you.

SMITH: Without objection, a full biography of each of our very distinguished witnesses will be made a part of the record. But I will just briefly introduce them to the panel, beginning -- although none of you are strangers.

Begin with Ambassador Donald Yamamoto, who is -- has testified before us as recently as March at a hearing on the DRC and another hearing just a few weeks ago on Somalia.

He has served since 2009 as the principal deputy assistant secretary for the Bureau for African Affairs of the U.S. Department of State. His prior assignments including serving as U.S. ambassador to Ethiopia from November of 2006 to July of 2009, and deputy assistant secretary of state in the Bureau for African Affairs from '03 to '06.
We'll then hear from Ambassador Vicki Huddleston, who currently serves as deputy assistant secretary for Africa in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Ambassador Huddleston began her public service career as a Peace Corps volunteer and has held a number of positions in the State Department, including several in Africa, where she served as acting ambassador to Ethiopia, and ambassador to Madagascar and Mali.
Throughout her career in the State Department, Ambassador Huddleston has worked to advance democracy and to build peace. Prior to joining DOD, she was a visiting scholar at the Brookings Institution.

And finally, we'll hear from Sharon Cromer, who is currently serving as senior deputy assistant administrator in the Africa Bureau for USAID, a position she has held since May of 2010. Ms. Cromer is a senior USAID foreign service officer, with more than 20 years of experience in the international humanity and development assistance area.
Upon her return to Washington in 2009, Ms. Cromer served assistant administrator for the Bureau of Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance, on a temporary basis, before assuming the position of deputy administrator in the Bureau of the Management.
Ambassador Yamamoto, if you would proceed?

YAMAMOTO: Thank you very much, Chairman Smith and Ranking Member Payne and distinguished members of this committee:
I extend our deep appreciation to this committee for this hearing on AFRICOM's partnership with USAID and the Department of State, and facing the challenges in Africa and forming important alliances with Africa's leaders and people.
AFRICOM's role is a paradigm shift, a new way of doing business that makes sense, promotes our national strategic interests, and accomplishes our goals and objectives by bringing the interagency closer as a team in the most effective and innovative manner.

First, AFRICOM provides greater unity of command on a continent that DOD previously split between three geographic combatant commands, and multiple functional commands. Further, AFRICOM provides a command structure capable of coordinating and commanding a multitude of U.S. military components engaged in programs in Africa, enhancing DOD's operational effectiveness, in cooperation with our embassies, ambassadors and USAID mission directors.

In the past several years, DOD components have grown to become the largest non-State Department presence in several of our missions.
Second, AFRICOM is an important partner for USAID and State as we seek to tackle problems, pursue solutions, and expand partnerships in Africa. General Ward and now General Ham do not merely meet with their military counterparts, but also with national leaders, civilian policy makers, and play an integral part in how we approach Africa, how we develop policy, and how we execute programs.

Third, AFRICOM has a civilian Department of State official as its deputy commander, as well as other State and USAID officers directly integrated into its headquarter structures, which improves coordination between agencies, which is a unique organizational arrangement not commonly found in military formations.
Duplicating in other commands, AFRICOM's unique approach is directly relevant to Secretary Clinton's launching of the QDDR Process, through which we are rethinking how we do business and integrate the interagency in achieving our common national goals and objectives.

AFRICOM, with USAID and State, are working together to address a multitude of challenges, including the conflict in Libya, implementation of the comprehensive peace agreement in Sudan, stabilization, piracy challenges in Somalia, addressing violence in Congo, development in Liberia, promoting training and infrastructure development through Africa, and transnational challenges.

In addition, we are directly collaborating on issues such as military professionalization, building counterterrorism capacity, disaster management, peace keeping capacity building, humanitarian operations, coordinated with USAID, de-mining and munition handling training, non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, destruction of excess small arms, lights weapons and ammunition, defense sector reform, maritime safety, a whole slew of activities that goes on and on.

If there's a downside to the level of engagement we have seen from AFRICOM, it is that the large number of AFRICOM's temporary assignment personnel deployed to the continent often present significant logistical challenges for our U.S. mission, which sometimes find it difficult to maintain full visibility. It provides adequate support, given their own very limited staffing levels.

Additionally, the constant turn over of temporary military personnel, working on three or six months rotation, can cause significant confusion, as both the country team and the host nation are carefully managing.

Nonetheless, we will continue to work together and coordinate closely in order to mitigate and manage these challenges, which are far outweighed by the positive gains that AFRICOM has made in the past three years.

I can report to you today that cooperation between AFRICOM and our African partners is at an all time high, despite the lingering wariness towards AFRICOM on the part of some African nations.

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, thank you again for this opportunity to appear before this committee. And I submit a longer version for the record.

SMITH: Without objection, it will be part of the record. And thank you, Mr. Ambassador.

Ambassador Huddleston?

HUDDLESTON: Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Payne, thank you, first of all, for your remarks. Certainly very much very much appreciated that.
And honorable members of the committee, thank you for the invitation to talk with you today about cooperation between the U.S. Africa Command, AFRICOM, the State Department, and the USAID on the African continent.
I also want to extend my thanks to my colleagues from State and USAID and other witnesses today.

Since its stand-up in 2008, AFRICOM has brought long-needed integration to the security dimension of our Africa policy. Up to that time, DOD had partitioned Africa among three other COCOMS, EUCOM, CENTCOM, and PACOM. As a result, Africa did not receive the attention it needed.

The lack of one Command focused exclusively on the continent meant that DOD lacked a coherent, consistent approach to and understanding of the region's vast complexities.
And both the chairman and the ranking member mentioned that.
One immediate and fully expected outcome of the creation of AFRICOM has been the expanded DOD engagement in the U.S.-Africa policymaking and implementation policy. This should have come as no surprise.

Secretary Clinton has spelled out the three legs of national security: diplomacy, development and defense. Strong diplomacy and a robust development programs have served as hallmarks of U.S. Africa policy for the half century, since the end of colonialism.

Less prominent, however, in that formulation was the third leg, defense. The embassy bombings in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam and 9/11 brought home to all of us that we could no longer afford to place Africa on the periphery of national security policy.
Today, Africa is part of the struggle against violent extremism, notably against a1-Shabaab in Somalia and al-Qaeda in the Maghreb in the north and west of the African continent. Instability on the continent affects the U.S. homeland directly, whether threats of terrorism, economic disruptions, refugee flows, or any of host of other ways.

We now all recognize the need to focus equally on that third D of Secretary Clinton's formulation.

We at the Pentagon work closely with AFRICOM and our interagency partners at the State Department and USAID to ensure that our nation's goals in Africa are well defined and our activities are closely coordinated, from planning through implementation.

And just as an aside, I can assure you that that has been my highest priority.
This close coordination occurs at all levels. I meet weekly via secure video link with my counterparts on the Joint Staff and the senior generals at AFRICOM, including J-2 Intelligence, J-5 Strategy, and J-3 Operations & Logistics.

And we meet bi-weekly with my the State Department's Africa Bureau to coordinate our policies and security cooperation and our activities. And I attend, along with Assistant secretary of state, and my colleague, Sharon Cromer, on my left, a weekly meeting at the National Security Council, chaired by the senior director.

Coordination extends much deeper, however, than myself and senior staff. Every day, action officers in my office, colonels, lieutenants, lieutenant colonels, commanders and the civilians, are on the phone, emailing and attending meetings on both side of the Potomac River.

Such is the frequency of these interactions that they are on first-name bases with their State and USAID colleagues. There is extensive cross fertilization among agencies, the concrete results of years of planning.

I have a permanent State Department position on my staff, and it is currently held by a veteran Foreign Service officer. Likewise, the Regional Security Affairs Division of the Africa Bureau has two active duty military colonels on its staff.
DOD works closely with the State Department to implement broad security cooperation efforts, leveraging the complementary authorities and funding streams available to each department. And this I think is really the heart of the matter.

The State Department, under its Title-2 authority, manages security assistance programs to promote U.S. foreign policy through diplomacy, by building professional militaries that respect international law and human rights.

These programs include the well known examples of Foreign Military Financing, International Military Education, IMET, regional security initiatives and peacekeeping capacity building.

DOD plays a crucial role in all those programs, in their implementation, through our USAFRICOM personnel, who are on the continent, and also through our defense attaches that are assigned to the embassies and are under the authority of the United States ambassadors.

DoD's Title-10 activities expand and compliment these Title 22 activities of the State Department, thereby furthering USG policy objectives set by the Department of State and the National Security Council.
Title-10 programs fund exercises that give African militaries the opportunity to work together and often to provide services to their citizens. In addition, Section 1206 authority allows State and DOD to build the counterterrorism capacity of our African partners.


These Title 10 activities reflect our overarching goals of assisting African militaries to protect and defend their borders and their citizens. The proposed new Global Security Contingency Fund would further this collaborative approach by allowing DOD and State to pool resources, thereby facilitating our national response to complex crises that require a range of military and diplomatic assistance.

USAFRICOM's security strategy ensures that our national interests are protected from potential threats on the African continent, while contributing to the stability and security for the people of Africa. Ranking Member Payne mentioned what is in it for the people of Africa.

USAFRICOM achieves these objectives by building partner nation capacity, so that our partners can counter extremism and provide for the security of their citizens and contribute to peace keeping.

In the Horn of Africa and north and west Africa, AFRICOM builds capacity of local militaries, so that they can effectively counter extremist threats. The State Department's regional program, Partnership for Regional East African Counterterrorism, PREACT, provides the framework under which AFRICOM's activities are carried out in the Horn of Africa.

AFRICOM provides military trainers to the State Department's African Contingency Operations and Training and Assistance, ACOTA, that trains Ugandan and Burundian contingents that make up the bulk of AMISOM peacekeepers in Somalia.

In West Africa, AFRICOM's special forces are building the capacity of Malian and Mauritanian forces to counter al Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb, AQIM. These efforts are conducted under the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership, TSCTP, that the State Department is responsible for. And it's in coordination with USAID as well.

AFRICOM enhances the capacity of our key African partners to provide a secure environment for democracy governance and development. State contractors and USAFRICOM trained battalions in the Democratic Republic -- trained a battalion in the Democratic Republic of Congo and the new army of Liberia.


By training professional military units that respect civilian control, these militaries become important contributors to stability and respect for the rule of law. AFRICOM's exercises provide these opportunities to African partners to continue perfecting their professional abilities.

The State Department and DOD are committed to helping African armed forces prevent and deter tragedies that result in humanitarian disasters. In response to congressional legislation, State, DOD and USAID have developed a strategy to assist the governments and the armed forces of Uganda, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and the Central African Republic to counter the atrocities that are being committed by the Lord's Resistance Army.


AFRICOM's activities will improve the regional armed forces ability to defeat the LRA. In parallel, USAID and State are working with local NGOs.
Today, we are facing a vast humanitarian crisis that you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, as a result of the severe drought in the Horn of Africa. While State and USAID are leading a significant humanitarian response on behalf of the United States government, USAFRICOM has set up task forces and is prepared to assist in any appropriate way, whenever requested.

In Libya, USAFRICOM worked closely with State and USAID to return thousands of Egyptians stranded in Tunisia to their homes. And this air bridge complimented AFRICOM's leadership of Odyssey Dawn, a coalition of 10 nations that, in accordance with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973, stopped the advance of the Libyan Army on defenseless citizens in Benghazi, and put into place a no-fly zone and a sea embargo.

Thank you again, Mr. Chairman and ranking member, for the opportunity to discuss interagency security cooperation efforts in Africa. I believe that AFRICOM's success as a command will depend on its ability to coordinate its activities with State and USAID and, indeed, with its AFRICOM partners.

And we have much improved. AFRICOM has much improved its initial roll out, which Ranking Member Payne pointed out was not as successful as we would have liked.
Over the past two years, as AFRICOM has matured as a command, this cooperation and communications with Africa and, indeed, with my colleagues her, has improved AFRICOM's ability to build partnership capacity, respond to the needs of the continent and defend our nation's interests.

USAFRICOM is proving the wisdom of establishing a single command for Africa that can provide rapid and appropriate assistance for a continent with many challenges and great possibilities.

Thank you very much.

SMITH: Ambassador Huddleston, thank you so very much for your testimony.
Ms. Cromer?

CROMER: Thank you.

Good afternoon, Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Payne, and distinguished members of the subcommittee. Thank you for the invitation to speak with you today about how USAID works with AFRICOM to achieve common U.S. foreign policy goals.
I would like to also thank Ambassadors Yamamoto and Huddleston for their work and collaboration. We really do meet on a biweekly basis, and we see a lot of each other.
With the chairman's permission, I will submit my testimony in full for the record. But today, I will make three brief points.

The first point is that USAID and AFRICOM engagement is mutually supportive of U.S. foreign policy objectives. In other words, we have found common ground.
Today's world is more interconnected and complex than ever. Instability, poverty and disease travel with ease across oceans and borders. Problems abroad all too quickly become problems at home. A peaceful, healthy and prosperous Africa benefits us all.
The link between security and development is as essential in Africa as it is elsewhere. War, terrorism and violence threaten current progress and impede potential gains in health, education, democracy and economic growth.

But with improved security, African nations can experience sustained economic growth, better living conditions and improved governance.

USAID coordination with the Department of Defense must not be perceived as contributing to specific military objectives, but, rather, as contributing to broad U.S. foreign policy goals. While we retain the essential humanitarian and development mission of USAID, we have also found mutually beneficial opportunities that support the interests of the United States and the beneficiaries in the countries in which we work.
For example, USAFRICOM had a prominent role in helping to stabilize Liberia following years of civil war. As a result, USAID has worked with the Government of Liberia to develop a long term, sustainable health program that is providing an essential package of basic health services to the Liberian people.

This type of work is not possible amidst war and strife. The military's logistical capabilities can be invaluable assets in providing humanitarian assistance during emergencies. Fortunately, we have not had an opportunity to call upon them in recent years on the continent.

Likewise, USAID's unique skills in addressing a range of essential civilian needs during times of both peace and war substantially and strategically benefit the foreign policy of the United States. Thus, USAID's coordination with the military's civic assistance programs can lead to important synergies of efforts.

For example, in some countries where USAID is providing assistance and training to teachers in rural schools, the Department of Defense's humanitarian assistance teams have renovated school structures, including dining halls and latrines, to improve hygiene and orderliness. This combined effort creates a learning environment in which improved reading and math skills prevail.

The second point is that early coordination in the planning phase between USAID and AFRICOM has vastly improved since we established staffing structures which have been described in earlier testimony. This structure includes three officers who work -- USAID officers who work at AFRICOM's headquarters in Stuttgart, as well as staff -- AFRICOM staff who work in our Office of Military Affairs in Washington.


Increased regular dialogue and joint planning helps us to align activities from the start, whereas in the past, misunderstandings and assumptions and lack of coordination could lead to problems in the implementation phase. We're now planning from the start and avoiding some of those -- those challenges.

USAID regularly engages with AFRICOM through ongoing participation in a variety of strategic visioning and planning processes, and through regular briefings on particular countries and programs. This engagement has included an unprecedented level of USAID participation and development of AFRICOM's current theater campaign plan, which directs AFRICOM's peace time activities across the continent.
In fact, just last week, we at USAID reviewed this plan with AFRICOM participants, identifying common visions and goals and objectives.

Our work in Djibouti presents an example of how strategic alignment produces mutually beneficial results. Previously, the Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa, CJTFHOA, proposed projects. And if USAID and the embassy concurred, coordination with the government of Djibouti would follow.

Under that system, projects may or may not have been aligned with local development needs and priorities.

Under the new framework, USAID works with the government of Djibouti to develop a list of needed projects first. While CJTFHOA, taking into account their own objectives and resources, can choose to contribute to any such project, if it has the endorsement of the ambassador.

For example, the opening of the Guistir Clinic near the Somali border was the first large scale project carried out under this framework. For years, USAID has been building and refurbishing rural health clinics and Djibouti at carefully selected sites.

CJTFHOA constructed the Guistir Clinic a remote border area identified by the government of Djibouti and USAID as a remaining gap in the health care system. USAID's assistance complimented CJTFHOA's efforts by equipping and staffing the clinic, which today provides access to health care for over 400 families.

The third and final point is that while USAID and AFRICOM have notable successes working together, challenges do remain. AFRICOM is still relatively new, and so, too, is its cooperation and collaboration with USAID and other U.S. government actors.
USAID is able to program a sizable amount of foreign assistance in Africa through a relatively small number of staff members, while AFRICOM has a smaller budget and more available staff.

While USAID is moving to move more resources to Africa, it's still difficult, as Ambassador Yamamoto pointed out, for us to engage fully with AFRICOM on the ground, given the fact that our staff are so stretched.

Nonetheless, the payoffs that can result from a comprehensive, whole of government approach are so important that the effort to coordinate is worthwhile.
Gains made in civil-military coordination need to be institutionalized to prevent stagnation and backsliding. We are committed to enhancing, monitoring and evaluation, so that we can learn from our mistakes and amplify best practices.

The central point of our relationship is clear. Security, stability and peace are essential for economic growth, poverty reduction and for development overall.
We welcome the continued dialogue to ensure the solutions for short term objectives are consistent with our shared long term goals.
Thank you.

SMITH: Ms. Cromer, thank you very much.
Let me just begin the questioning.

Ambassador Yamamoto, you responded to -- and Ambassador Huddleston as well -- the largely negative reaction that -- that met AFRICOM early on. And I'm wondering how that reaction has changed, and if so, why? Was it a matter of a false impression as to what we were up to?

And if you could perhaps, Ambassador Huddleston, you as well, answer that?
(off mic)

HUDDLESTON: It's changed immensely and basically because the countries in Africa have seen AFRICOM at work. General Ward was an amazing diplomat for AFRICOM. And he was all over the continent, talking with presidents as well as chiefs of staffs of militaries and ministers of defense.

General Ham has been absolutely the same. He is today, as we speak, in Ethiopia. And so they, themselves, have been very, very good ambassadors.
But what we've done with Africa is -- also makes a huge difference, because we've done exercises such as Natural Fire in Uganda, where we bring the regional militaries together, and then they carry out an exercise with us that builds a school and provides relief in a clinic.

So these are things that Africans understand. They can see how it is helping their military not only to improve their skills, but to work with their militaries in the region.

And then they've seen what's going on, for example the training of the Liberian army, the training of battalion in Kisangani, which has now been deployed up into the region where the -- where -- where the LRA is active. And hopefully, they'll be able to provide some additional protection for civilians in that area.
Where AFRICOM still runs into problems is on a political level. And in that regard, that's because some of the larger countries in Africa are worried about is AFRICOM actually going to be a competing military.

And this is a wonderful opportunity just to say no. AFRICOM is on the continent to build the capacity of professional militaries under civilian control.

SMITH: I appreciate that.

Ambassador Yamamoto?

YAMAMOTO: And I concur with Ambassador Huddleston. You know, everyone's -- at the roll out, everyone was talking about AFRICOM except AFRICOM. And until AFRICOM was able to articulate and define what AFRICOM was about, then we were able to engage and overcome a lot of misunderstandings. And -- and as -- and during these questions, we can go into some greater detail.

SMITH: Let me ask you with regards to the constant turnover -- Ambassador Yamamoto, you mentioned in your testimony -- causing confusion for the country team and the host notion.

How -- what are you talking about in terms of how long is the deployment? And what can be done to remedy that situation?

YAMAMOTO: I think it would be very difficult, given the way we -- we deploy forces, et cetera. My son is a first lieutenant with the 3rd I.D. And he was in Iraq. And of course, he had a set time. He had a set mission.
For us in the Africa Bureau, we have 1,100 officers manning 53 embassies and consuls in sub-Saharan Africa. Most of us are committed to the African continent. And we're experts on the field.

So the -- when we were setting camp on Moniet (ph), at -- they were setting up the camp. We were very struck by the large number of different units, but that they were -- they stay for maybe six weeks or two months or three months, but never any longer.
And I think we've talked to General Franks and later General Abizaid to extend those assignments. And that helps a lot now at CJTF, where you have one year assignments. That is helping.

But, again, in other parts of the continent, the assignments are very short. And so it takes a lot of onus for the ambassador and the DCMs to work with these units, to identify what are their common goals and objectives.

SMITH: Ambassador Huddleston, is that being looked at as perhaps a area for reform? Or are you happy with the way it is today?

HUDDLESTON: AFRICOM is very well aware of the problem, as obviously the State Department is as well. And as Ambassador Yamamoto said, it has improved significantly in that AFRICOM is now assigning for one year at CJTFHOA.

But, actually, one of the main problems is that AFRICOM has no assigned forces. So they -- they rely on the components. They rely on the Army. They rely on the -- the special forces. They rely on the Marines to provide them with forces to carry out the task on the continent.

Obviously, our forces are engaged in other important tasks around the world. And so they sometimes are not available for other than short periods.
We also rely upon the National Guard. Actually, the National Guard of Kansas in -- in CJTFHOA. And of course, their families don't want them to be gone for over a year.
So these are some of the challenges involved in extending the period of time on the continent.

SMITH: Thank you. Let me ask you, you've testified that building professional militaries is a function of AFRICOM. How has that worked out, if you could perhaps give some examples?

And on an area that is very close to my heart, human rights training, if you could elaborate on what kind of training we do provide to African militaries, and with particular emphasis on trafficking in persons.

As you may know, I offered the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000. And in 2001, one year after that law went into effect, a Fox News reported from Ohio walked into my office and said, congressman, you need to look at this.

And he showed me a videotape of woman who had been trafficked from Russia, Moldova, the Philippines, and indigenous South Koreans, who were being abused in -- by American service members. And the places of abuse were in absolute proximity to our military bases.

We handed that over to Joseph Schmitz, who was then the I.G. for the Department of Defense. He initiated, and we ask for a global assessment of -- of U.S. complicity, wittingly or unwittingly, in human trafficking.

And he came back very, very disturbed, with a very compelling report, looking first at Bosnia and South Korea, and then the rest of the world.

President Bush, for his part, issued a zero tolerance policy, and went even a step further and made -- changed the Uniform Code of Military to include prostitution as an actionable offense.

And word went out -- and I read them. I talk about it to other militaries all the time, and give them copies of it -- that America was serious about combating trafficking, that we wanted to be part of the solution, not part of the problem.
You know, and I went to NATO, talked to those folks. We know that Kofi Annan did the zero tolerance policy. And you know, with it, I think everyone is trying at least to do a good job there.

General LaPorte actually testified at two hearings that I co- chaired along with people like John McHugh and Duncan Hunter -- John obviously over at the -- as secretary of the Army. And General LaPorte had a best practices, which I know has been further refined and made even more efficacious.

But he talked about the importance of having, you know, on-base recreational, making sure that the men are aware of who it is that they are seeing at 4:00 in the morning, that that woman is a -- is a slave. She cannot leave. And if she does, she will be beaten.

She will be raped again. And that -- you know, we need to be on the side of protection and not on the side of oppression. And I thought he did an outstanding job.
Every time I talk to a military person in any country, I bring DOD information with me and ask them what are they doing to combat human trafficking.
The question, to make a long story short, there are 10 countries in Africa, as you know, on the tier three list as egregious violators of sex trafficking. There are 13 African countries on tier two watch lists, could easily drop into that tier three because of ongoing abuse, mostly against women and children.

The question is does AFRICOM train other militaries, especially their officer corp, on best practices, especially those that have been developed so magnificently by the Department of Defense, so that they get it? The military should be on the side of protection, not on the side of exploitation.
Ambassador?

HUDDLESTON: Yes, sir. And what I often like to point out is when we train -- when AFRICOM trains, we train to U.S. standards and to international law standards on human rights and on respect of civilians, whether women or men.

And what I like to point out particularly is when you look at Tunisia and when you look at Egypt, both of those militaries have significant U.S. and western training. And both of those militaries, as we all know in this room, stood up for the people in their country.

In Libya, there was no training by western or U.S. forces. And we have seen what has happened there.

The -- the soldiers of AFRICOM and their components only follow the highest standards of conduct on the continent. And they expect their counterparts who are training to do the same.

We have lengthy (ph) vetting, as you're aware, that vets those that we train. In addition, we provide DILS (ph) training and human rights training to all forces that we train on the continent.

And then you asked about what does our training do. Can I point to some -- some -- some good examples?

I recently visited the Liberians. And I was very impressed with their discipline, and also the fact that they had formed an engineering battalion. And the engineering battalion is working with the Bangladeshi peace keepers to do civil/military projects.
We'd like to see more of the militaries of Africa doing civil/military projects.

On the more robust front, since AFRICOM trainers joined the ACOTA trainers for the State Department, who are contract and often former military, we have been able to do COIN training, which is counterinsurgency training. And by doing that training, as you can see, the AMISOM forces have actually been able to gain area in Mogadishu, and also respect better civilians who might come into harm's way because they're in the -- in the conflict area.

SMITH:
Yes, Ms. Cromer?

CROMER:
Yes. And I'd just like to add that in 2009, AFRICOM was asked to identify ways to support U.S. efforts in the Democratic Republic of the Congo to prevent sexual and gender based violence, and support survivors.

And there AFRICOM did oversee training, but they also, in -- in coordination with the embassy and USAID, determined that the facilities that were supporting the survivors of gender based violence was substandard, and actually put in $1 million to help build up those facilities and otherwise support the survivors.

So that's another example of our coordination.

SMITH: Ambassador Yamamoto?

YAMAMOTO: Thank you.
And just to add, you know, it's more than just DOD as well. And DOD does a great job. The command and staff (inaudible) in Ethiopia does civil rights and human rights issues.

But it's also a comprehensive approach in the U.S. government, but also the host nations. And we share your -- your outrage and many of the impetus in cases that we've uncovered. And we've worked very hard with these 10 countries on tier three and the other 13 countries.

As you and Congressman Payne have so eloquently articulated, we need to stand up and work with these countries and host nations to support the development of non-legal affairs, but also going after trafficking and righting those wrongs.

And as you know, in our work in the Congo and other parts of Africa, we've -- we've done this to the best of our abilities and an interagency process.

SMITH: Just ask you again on trafficking; could we be provided a copy of what it is, a curricula, if you will, human rights training in general, but also with a particular emphasis on what it is that we're trying to convey to our friends in the African militaries with regards to human trafficking?

HUDDLESTON: Absolutely.

SMITH: I appreciate that.
Let me just ask one final question. And that would be in the area of crises. You know, it's been my experience -- and I'm one of those who believe that the military are the ultimate peace keepers. Without that, we know what chaos and how innocent victims are killed.

But very often, even in the area of providing immediate and very effective -- almost like a trauma surgeon in an emergency room, the military have the capacity, the airlift and really the capability to go into a situation, stabilize it, pass the baton then on to the NGOS and everyone.

I saw that it provided comfort when the Kurds, literally during that two to three weeks -- and I was there five days after the mass exodus to the Turkish/Iraqi border. And it had not been for special forces actually using psy-ops to put on Meals Ready to Eat, so that the MREs would be properly opened and eaten, and immunizations.
Everywhere you looked, you saw Kurds walking around with camouflaged jackets, which were essential to -- to not dying because of the elements. They did not have cold water -- cold weather clothing.

So the same thing in Tblisi. A week after the Russians went in, it was the military that came in with food, nutritions, all kind of nutritional support, medicines.
Saw the same thing in Haiti. And in the tsunami, I was on the Abraham Lincoln, briefly -- we went to several places, Phuket, Banda Aceh and Sri Lanka.

But it seemed to me that the entire ship's -- everyone on the ship wanted to move onto the -- wanted on to Banda Aceh and join with the helicopter crews and everyone else in assisting.

It was unbelievable, the esprit de corp, and the sense of humanitarianism which -- you know, the military does not get the credit that it deserves for rolling up their sleeves and jumping in and helping to assist people who are sick or dying or at risk.
And so my question is you did mention, Ambassador Hoath (ph) and -- that AFRICOM has set up task forces and is prepared to assist in any appropriate way, when requested to so by State, USAID, with regards to the severe drought.

Is it likely that -- that there will be? I mean, we know there's 750,000. And Ambassador Yamamoto and his team and other all testified just two weeks ago that this crisis is huge and getting worse by the day.

Are those plans likely to be implemented any time soon? Can you give any indication what it might look like, in terms of airlift and the like, to get food to people who are starving?

HUDDLESTON: Mr. Chairman, first of all, thank you so much for the kind remarks about all the wonderful activities and rescue and humanitarians operations that the U.S. military has done around the world.

Let me just outline this a little bit for you. And then I'll turn to my colleagues, because I know it's a very, very important question.

Right now, we have no our staff, as Ms. Cromer pointed out, USAID personnel at AFRICOM. And they're staying in close coordination. In addition, AFRICOM has developed the possibilities that it could do, should it be required to do so.

But what is going on right now is that the U.N. agencies, the NGOs are actually already expanding the capacity. There are seven additional refugee camps for feeding and distribution in Ethiopia. There are two additional camps that can be opened, one already open, outside of Dadaab in Kenya.

So, so far, the rescue agencies, the international community, the NGOs, have been able to respond to the situation in Ethiopia and Kenya.
In Somalia, of course, as we know, that's more complicated. But, of course, that would be an area that AFRICOM would not be welcome.

But again, in that area W.P., UNICEF are already pushing to get in there, talking to even al Shabaab to see if they can not work out ways in which they can get the food they so -- and water and medical assistance that's so desperately needed.
So at this point, USAID, State and NSS tell us that they have what they need. And as we're here to talk about interagency coordination.

So rest assured, we've been attending all those IPCs and DCs at the National Security Council, to make sure that we stay very much informed on what is happening and are prepared to assist, should we be called upon to do so.

SMITH: Thank you. Would either of you like to...

CROMER: OK. Mr. Chairman, USAID has been monitoring the situation in the Horn of Africa since our -- the Famine Early Warning System, which we support, alerted us to the onslaught of a -- of a potential problem last summer.

And we have been prepositioning food in the region to address the situation. To date, we're one of the largest donors in the emergency assistance, helping more than 4.6 million people.

We're working very closely, as Ambassador Huddleston mentioned, with the U.N. and other NGOs to address the crisis.

The famine has been announced for Somalia, which is an area, you know, region in Somalia that's very difficult for us to -- and other organizations to access.
And that's been a challenge. At one point, this was called a traveling famine, because of the number of Somalis that are moving out of the region, into Ethiopia and other -- other regions.

And -- but to date, we are working very closely with the U.N. and other donors. And we are coordinating in the interagency with our colleagues in Defense. And if the need should arise, I'm sure we would have the support we need.

YAMAMOTO: And -- and you're absolutely correct. There's a -- you know, there's a short term crisis that we need to address immediately. And the refugee flows over 25 -- or over 2,000 or so, or 1,500 a day into the Dadaab, Kenya, and over 1,000 into Ethiopia.

But then the long term is that the area is chronically dry. There has not been rainfall in two years, very little in five years in many areas.
And so how do you address a long terms problems? And those are things that we're addressing right now at the interagency process, at which DOD, USAID and State are very much involved in that.

And our task force is looking at how we can effectively address these short term and long term problems.

SMITH: Mr. Payne?

PAYNE: Thank you very much.
In regard to the drought, there was some negotiations, I think, that initially the al Shabaab would not allow for humanitarian aid. Then they changed and said -- they were saying it was over-played and all that business.

Well now that -- you know, it's very clear, as we knew all along, that it was very serious. They then said you -- yes, you can come in with food aid.
Have they changed again? I understand there may have been some withdrawal from the agreement that humanitarian food could -- and supplies could come in.

What is the -- do you know what the status us at this time?

YAMAMOTO: What we understand -- and it's still a very evolving situation -- is that we still cannot get into the -- into the area to deliver food. As you know, 60 percent of the people who are at risk are still in Shabaab held territories. And so feeding those areas is very difficult.

What we're seeing now is not only the flow of refugees into Ethiopia and Kenya, but also internally displaced people. Right now in Mogadishu, you're seeing equal -- a number of people going into Mogadishu, fleeing from Shabaab held territory.
And so that is going to continue to be a problem. So what we're doing now is looking at how we can feed the people we have at hand in the refugee camps and also internally displaced.

The Shabaab area is going to be a much more long term problem.

PAYNE: What about the -- as we mentioned at the Dadaab camp, as you know, it's always been overcrowded, but now it's unbelievable overcrowded. My last visit there a couple years ago, it was busting at the seems. I can imagine what it is now.
Are we getting food aid or working with the U.N. agencies to assist in the Dadaab camp?

CROMER: Yes. We are getting prepositioned food and other resources to the camp. But this is a large scale, multi-donor intervention which is underway. And the scope is massive.
We're prioritizing our aid to make sure that the most pressing needs are addressed. Our initial response is primarily focused on food and water.

We're also concerned with the spread of disease in these camps as they grow and hygiene becomes an issue. So we're addressing all of these.

PAYNE: There's a massive amount of awareness growing -- first page story on the "Washington Post" today, and just yesterday, we -- two days ago, introduced Resolution 361, that (inaudible) recognizes the effort that U.S. is doing.
And we look -- urge long term intervention. And just in two days, we have over 50 co-sponsors, just with -- with it being known that it's out there.

So there is certainly a tremendous amount of support here on Capital Hill for what -- what you're doing. Just wonder in general -- general, you said that the -- the perception of AFRICOM is better now.

Is it -- is it at the point where most of the countries are -- are -- I mean, it's a reality, but what is the -- the attitude currently? Is it at the point where you're comfortable that you can really move forward full force in what your goals are?

HUDDLESTON: We're quite comfortable with the situation right now. And as I said, it's even getting better, because General Ham is following in the footsteps of General Ward, and making it a point to visit all the -- all -- every country.

And even countries that have had some hesitation about AFRICOM have been willing to work with the components and do exercises in development with the components. One of the success stories is the African Partnership Station, which sends U.S. vessels, Navy or Coast Guard, along the coast, and participates with coast guards and navies in the coastal countries to do exercises and to do training.

In fact, last year -- and I forget the name of the vessel that was out there. It had seven mariners from various west African countries on board when we had the earthquake in Haiti. And it -- the vessel steamed to Haiti with the permission of the countries.

And that vessel, with the officers from the west African countries, provided assistance to the victims of the earthquake in Haiti.

PAYNE: Are there civilian or -- what percentage -- or it -- can you count a percentage of civilians that are involved in AFRICOM, other than military? Or is it 100 percent military at this time?

I know that, you know, they're working with USAID and working with State. But AFRICOM itself is strictly military without civilians or...

HUDDLESTON: As Ambassador Yamamoto and Ms Cromer mentioned, AFRICOM has a deputy commander. It has two deputy commanders. One of the deputy commanders is a State Department active duty officer. And he's a former ambassador.
AFRICOM also has a State Department officer who is the head of their outreach division, which is one of the major divisions of AFRICOM.

AFRICOM also has several USAID officers embedded in their planning and strategy division, to include this very excellent USAID person that is excellent on drought and humanitarian -- humanitarian relief.

In addition, AFRICOM hires civilians. So they have a number of civilian advisers.
So they have a significant contingent of civilians in the command, just as part, just like at DOD, myself. We have -- we have a significant portion of our workforce that are civilian. And that -- that is also the case for AFRICOM.

PAYNE: The -- I had an opportunity to fly to Djibouti with General Ham. And I do think that he's certainly an adequate replacement, although General -- what was his name again who just retired?

HUDDLESTON: General Ward.

PAYNE: Ward, yes. Got big feet, so it's going to be a hard act to follow, even though I was not supportive.
But the -- the -- the headquarters issue, how much of an issue is that? It's currently in Germany. They're talking about perhaps bringing it the United States.
Of course, the question of whether it should be on African soil. How much of a question is that? And how is the logistics going, as it relates to its headquarters.

HUDDLESTON:
As you know, since its inception, AFRICOM has been stationed in Stuttgart. And there, at this point, would be significant budgetary implications if AFRICOM were to pull up its roots, which it has sunk, to some degree, in Stuttgart, and moved.

AFRICOM, however, is very much aware that it has a study to complete about where would be the most appropriate location.

PAYNE: And I think you mentioned it before, but what is relationship with AFRICOM and AMISOM's mission in -- Somalia and with the TFG and their military operation?
And actually, is the AFRICOM looking at Somaliland or Puntland as it deals with the Horn and with Somalia in general?

HUDDLESTON: Thank you, congressman. That actually gives me the opportunity to talk a little bit about Title 22 and Title 10.
As you're aware, AFRICOM cannot do training or equipment with its own funds, which are Title 10. Therefore, any training that AFRICOM is doing in Africa, it's being done either with 1206, which are combined funds, or with PKO or State Department Title 22 funds.

It -- in other words, all training on the continent is with State Department funds. Therefore, everything that's done in training is authorized by the State Department.
What we were very pleased about with AFRICOM is that State Department invited AFRICOM trainers from special forces to come and train with the training that they were providing to the Ugandans and the Burundians, because, as you know, Mogadishu is a pretty violent place.

And so...

PAYNE: I know.

HUDDLESTON: ... experience -- yes, I guess you do. I'm glad they missed.

PAYNE: Yes, I am too.
I saw President Sheikh Sharif in Djibouti at the -- at the celebration of South Sudan. And he did ask me when I was coming back. And you know, my send off wasn't so hot. But we'll take another look at it, however.

HUDDLESTON: Yes. A badge of diplomatic security is not keen for you to return any -- any time.

PAYNE: Well, they didn't want me to go in the first place, as you know.

HUDDLESTON: Indeed. So -- so that -- that's what AFRICOM has done, is to provide some trainers to work in parallel and with the ACOTA trainers to provide additional training for the Ugandans and Burundians that are deploying to Mogadishu.

PAYNE: Just on a question for you; the -- there is a proposed cut in our peace keeping budget here. And I wonder, you know, how the security assistance would, you know -- would trickle down to what AFRICOM is attempting to do, or -- well, not AFRICOM necessarily, but the -- as you know, the mission in Somalia is under the U.N. and therefore depends on U.N. peace keeping allotments.

How do you see some of our -- and of course, the new one that we're trying to stand up in South Sudan, on the borders around Abyei and other areas in question, South Kordofan? How do you see that playing out?

HUDDLESTON: Since these are Title 22 funds, I'd like to ask my colleague, Ambassador Yamamoto, to answer.

YAMAMOTO: Just going back on the -- on PKO funding and others, as you know, we provide about $265 million, with your approval, on PKO, IMI (ph) and FMF. And of the PKO funding, about 15 to 20 percent of that goes to DOD to help us in assistance levels and training programs, et cetera, for AMISOM and -- and other programs.

And as you know, in the Somalia are, we have $42 million dedicated AMISOM training programs, equipping, safety, security, et cetera. And so a cut or a decrease in that amount would affect obviously the -- the operations, and also stabilization efforts.
The other issue, too, that you raised in Sudan is how do we address the recent deployment of 1,600 troops from Ethiopia into Abyei? And then the continuation of forces in Darfur. And also anticipated, what do you do in the Kordofan area, to stabilize that area?

So right now, the $265 million that we had 2010, that's not a very large amount of money. So if we decrease that, (inaudible) ability to work with DOD and host nations and other groups to do training, equipping. And security sector reform and stabilization will be affected.

PAYNE: My final question, Ms. Cromer; I think it's great -- and certainly not in -- you know, with these various titles and what you can do -- I've always felt that USAID -- it would be great if they had an opportunity to dabble in education more.
Some of the physical facilities -- we see that Department of Defense can fix up a school. However, USAID can't, you know. And of course, we've been concerned about the educational situation in Africa. As you know, many of the countries now have moved to sort of so-called universal education, where the -- maybe other than some school fees, you know, there is kind of universal education in most of the countries.

And -- and the girl challenge, you know, has been included, which is a great step in the right direction. We're looking now at how can we assist in higher education, which -- I mean, secondary, of course, in higher education, as Africa develops.

I wonder how do you see the interaction between Department of Defense, that can do things that USAID, your restrictions -- and there's a second and final part in the question.

We've had some concern about the nutritional components of USAID's food. There are two reports that have come out about -- there's not a request for additional funds, but that they look at the nutritional value of -- I think -- is it a Tufts -- GAO also did a report on the nutritional values.

We find that there's some excellent recommendations. And I -- I would hope that you would take an opportunity to look at that. I'd really like to talk to you about it.
I had a resolution that said we should -- we should do something about it. And it ended up 21 to 21, so I didn't win. But Mr. Smith did vote with me on that resolution on the food, just trying to make it more nutritional.

So if you could just answer those and then I'll yield back to the chairman.

CROMER: Thank you, Congressman Payne.
We have at USAID a new education policy that we are trying to implement. The focus of the policy is on reading with understanding, primarily at the basic education level.
This policy doesn't necessarily prohibit renovating structures, but it's with reduced funding. We're finding that we're not able to do very much of that.
So we do relish the opportunity to work with AFRICOM and identify synergies where we -- we have common goals. And they can, you know, help us in renovating schools.
We do see that we, as some of our education programs are diminished due to lack of funding and a need to focus, it would be opportune time to have a different dialogue with some of our African country partners about the funding they provide in their own development planning and -- and programming.

And taking what they do and trying to make it more efficient. We're looking at working with some of our African partners to -- at their public financial management systems, trying to streamline those systems, make them more transparent, make them more robust, so that all of the revenues going through our country partners are used to address key development challenges like education.

So if we can help those partners strengthen their own systems, so that their own resources are used more effectively, then we can see some achievement in education.
And -- and the monies that we put into those sectors will go longer and for a more sustained development objective.

On nutrition and the GAO report that you mentioned, I'm not familiar with that particular report. But we can get a response to you on that.

PAYNE: Thank you very much.
I yield back.

SMITH: Thank you, Mr. Payne.
Mr. Carnahan?

CARNAHAN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman and ranking member, for this hearing, and for our panelists being here.

And special thanks to Ambassador Yamamoto for your hospitality and getting to see your work really on the ground, first hand when we visited Ethiopia a few years ago.

I want to start with really a question for all the panelists here today. I'm particularly interested to hear about our plans for post- conflict in Libya.

I certainly want to acknowledge the significant variations in histories and cultures and size and scope of our recent interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan, and believe that insufficient and disjointed planning for post-conflict stabilization there set a poor precedent for NATO operations in Libya.

But as different parties come together on this issues, what is AFRICOM doing to prepare for post-revolution in Libya? What role does AFRICOM have after any political resolution?

And finally and most importantly, how is AFRICOM working with State and USAID on this effort?

And let's start with Ambassador Yamamoto.

Or Ambassador Huddleston, why don't you start?

HUDDLESTON: Mr. Carnahan, the only reason I am staring -- because normally it would be Ambassador Yamamoto, but he is responsible for sub-Saharan Africa. And he is not responsible for north Africa, because that falls under the Middle East division.
So, ironically, I'm the only spokesperson here among the three of us who can speak to north Africa, because AFRICOM was formed as a command for the whole continent, except for Egypt. And Egypt remained in the CENTCOM, or the Middle East command.

So I will have to apologize, in that I'm sure that my State Department colleague, Ambassador Feldman, could do a better job of answering your question than I can. But let me give it a shot.

CARNAHAN: We're happy to hear from you.

HUDDLESTON: Thank you very much. As -- let me just go back for a moment to the beginning, because I -- I would like very much to point out what President Obama said.
President Obama said that we had an international mandate. We had a broad coalition. We had the support of the Arab League. And we had the pleas of the Libyan people to go into Libya.
And we did. And it was really quite an amazing thing, in that the new commander of AFRICOM, General Ham, had only been in that position for less than two weeks. And AFRICOM became the leader of a coalition of 10 nations, including two Arab nations, that put in place the no-fly zone, the sea embargo, and most importantly, protected 800,000 people in the city of Benghazi from certain death certainly to many of them.

Now that coalition has been handed over to NATO. And that, too, has been pretty amazing and pretty unique and impressive, in that AFRICOM began the implementation of the no-fly zone and protection of civilians on March 19th. And they turned over all four missions to NATO on the 31st of March, 14 days later.

So AFRICOM is not a major player in any way now in the ongoing NATO operations. AFRICOM has -- has retained responsibility for recovery, should that be necessary.
So the -- the U.S. forces that are contributing to NATO come directly from the components, most particularly from the dual-hatted Navy commander for Europe and Africa. And that's Admiral Locklear.

And as you know, Canadian General Bouchard is the responsible person for -- for -- for NATO. So AFRICOM itself is not the major player it was at one time.

But you asked what would AFRICOM do in a post-Ghadaffi -- well, we have made it clear, as well as NATO, that we do not envision boots on the ground in Libya.

So it would be in a fairly far future post-Ghadaffi Libya, when the situation had returned to normal, embassies were reestablished, that there might be something like a defense attache and an office of security cooperation, and that with a new democratic Libyan government, we might have the opportunity then to do some training with our State Department colleagues, and the State Department funds, of a new and responsible and democratic Libyan army.

CARNAHAN: Thank you.
Ms. Cromer, do you have anything to add?

CROMER: Excuse me. Well, like -- like my State Department colleague, as Ambassador Huddleston said, we focus at USAID in the Africa Bureau on sub-Saharan Africa. So our operation doesn't cover north Africa.

CARNAHAN: Thank you.
Also, I wanted to ask -- getting back to Ms. Cromer about Somalia, with ongoing drought in the Horn of Africa, and the humanitarian crisis, the scope of which we haven't seen for decades. Last week, the U.N. officially declared a famine in two regions of Somalia.
Could you give me essentially an update on the response to the crisis, as well as partnerships with other key organizations that you're working with?

CROMER: Yes. As you've stated, the scale and severity of the famine in southern Somalia represents the most serious food insecurity situation in the world.

And it's a multi-donor response that's underway. We're prioritizing our aid to make sure that the most pressing needs are addressed. At this point, we're primarily focused on food and water. And we're, as I mentioned earlier, concerned with the spread of disease.

And so we're working to expand our health and hygiene response.
In Somalia, the World Food Program is considering strategies to counter the deteriorating food situation. They're looking at various options to address the nutrition situation in southern Somalia. They're doing an in depth food -- urban food and nutrition security assessment in 16 districts of Mogadishu.

And the assessment will seek to measure the number of food insecure people by district. So with this information, we'll be -- the international community, particularly WFP, will be guided to program their interventions in a more targeted fashion.

The access to the most food insecure populations is still an issue that's being worked out. But it -- it is a serious concern.

CARNAHAN: Thank you.

SMITH: Mr. Carnahan?

CARNAHAN: Let me ask just a few final questions.
First, on Friday, I chaired a hearing on the Helsinki Commission on Egypt. And I know none of you deal with Egypt, and you'll know why I raised it in a moment.

And that is the barbaric practice, that has gotten worse, according to our witnesses, that young Coptic Christian girls are being sold -- abducted and then sold into modern day slavery and forced marriages. Again, thousand per year. It's been largely ignored. It's not -- under appreciated by many in the human rights community.

We had a very credible panel that spoke to this egregious practice. And the women are forced to become Muslim. And then they're given to a man. And then they and the children they bare are Muslim.

And I'm wondering what kind of -- and of course, the -- in Egypt today, the military does control that -- that government.

What kind of human rights training -- Ambassador Huddleston, I think you're the one to speak to this -- when it comes to religious freedom, does the militaries get in terms of tolerance? We know that at the core of many of these conflicts have been, including Sudan, the imposition of Sharia Law, specifically with the invasion of the south of Sudan.

That was a mainstay issue. It's also been a problem obviously in Darfur, but especially in southern Sudan.

I recently met with a Catholic bishop and an Imam who couldn't make the meeting, but his representative was there, from Nigeria, who spoke how they had gone from village to village preaching a sense of tolerance and respect for all religions, but in this case those two major religions, Christianity and Islam.

And I'm wondering if in our training on human rights, if there is a religious freedom component to emphasize, with exclamation points, why all of us need to respect the other persons faith, and that forced Islamitization, the imposition of Sharia Law or any creed is not following fundamental human rights policies.
Is that something that's taught?

HUDDLESTON: Mr. Chairman, I'm sorry to hear about that situation that you were explaining in Egypt. I do not know the particulars of the -- all the training and all the human rights training that is performed by our -- our soldier overseas.
But I can get you that curriculum. And I can also say that I think that -- that what you will probably see is what we teach is respect for human life, respect for human dignity, respect for the rule of law and the constitution and the people of a country, all of which, in essence, means respect and tolerance and different religious beliefs.

But I'll be happy to give...

CARNAHAN: I appreciate that very much.
And if you could, if it's not being done, if it's something that could be sort of -- when the International Religious Freedom Act was passed in 1998 -- and I chaired all the hearings on it. It was Congressman Frank Wolf's legislation. There was profound pushback from many in the Department of State, including in the White House, against that legislation.

And part of the components that we wrote into it was the training of foreign service officers on religious freedom matters. And I say it without any fear of contradiction that the pushback was profound.

And the assistance secretary for democracy, human rights and labor testified at our hearing saying they're against it, the bill. You know, I'm sure they were for tolerance, but they were against this legislation.

So I would hope -- if you could get back to us on that, it would be very helpful.
And finally, you cite, Ms. Cromer, in your testimony a 2010 assessment that shows that of the 25 countries having the highest instability, 22 are in Africa.
And I'm wondering if -- if there's any now -- three years into AFRICOM, if there's been any improvement as a result of -- of that combatant command being stood up.

CROMER: Well, we can certainly cite Liberia as a very good example of the improvement in the security situation, which allows for improved economic growth and development and health and education. I'm sure there are other examples that we can -- we can provide.

But, again, having a professional military that respects human rights and respects good governance and democracy is a profound effort to move forward in any development situation. You really -- we really cannot proceed with our development interventions in good measure if we don't have peace and security.

So what AFRICOM has done on the continent to enhance the professionalism of militaries and support human rights and good governance is absolutely essential to what we do in development.

SMITH: Mr. Payne?

PAYNE: Just one last question.
You know, the fact the LRA (inaudible) have been roaming around for 20 some years, this seems to me that -- not that it's AFRICOM's situation, but it would seem to me that there should be some more coordinated effort to bring him to the international court of justice.
And I just wanted to -- you know, Yamamoto's had a lot of history in Africa, certainly known about the LRA, or you, Ambassador Huddleston, could give a brief synopsis of any knowledge of you have of a concerted effort to bring Mr. Kony to justice?

YAMAMOTO: That's a -- a tough issue that we've been addressing for years with you and the other members.

Right now, it's DOD and State Department and AID, all the interagency is combined together to, A, support the UPDF and their operations against Kony, and specifically in the CAR. They have distribution points in Obo (ph). And from there, the UPDF is able to bring their equipment and supplies into the -- into the front lines, to go after the -- after Kony's troops.

We have provided, on average in the last -- what is it, about $3 million to support for supplies, the fuel, rentals of the equipment and the helicopters, to bring the supplies up to Obo, and then from there, to transport them to the UPDF forces.
We're also working with the -- President Bozize and CAR to look at training troops there to form a blocking force against the -- Kony. And then with other neighboring, particularly with MONUSCO and DRC, FARDC troops, and other troops as well.
It's a very tough fight. And it's going to continue to -- until we foster a conclusion.

SMITH: Would any of you like to conclude with any final remarks?
Yes, Ambassador Huddleston?

HUDDLESTON: I didn't want to miss the opportunity just to say that, first of all, we appreciate very much that you're having the hearing, Mr. Chairman, ranking member.
And also for underlining the fact -- because the ranking member began with, you know, this roll out of AFRICOM was very difficult, and really is a great credit to our servicemen and women and to the leadership of AFRICOM that they've really turned that around.

Because they've not only turned it around with the African governments, but they've turned it around with our colleagues at the State Department and USAID, as you can hear today.

And I think it's -- AFRICOM really is making a great difference on the continent, because, as we all know, it begins with security. You know, there can't be democratic government. There can't be human rights. There can't be development unless there's security.

And by giving the local militaries the ability to provide the security for their people makes all the difference.

So thank you very much for this opportunity.

SMITH: On that very encouraging note, the hearing is adjourned.

HUDDLESTON: Thank you.