July 25, 2002

Mr. M. Nazar
Site Vice President
Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant
Nuclear Management Company, LLC
1717 Wakonade Drive East
Welch, MN 55089

SUBJECT: PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT
NRC INSPECTION REPORT 50-282/02-04; 50-306/02-04

Dear Mr. Nazar:

On June 30, 2002, the NRC completed an inspection at your Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant. The enclosed report documents the inspection findings which were discussed on July 3, 2002, with you and members of your staff.

This inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.

Based on the results of this inspection, the NRC reviewed two security related issues that were evaluated under the risk significance determination process as having very low safety significance (Green). The NRC has also determined that a violation is associated with one of those findings which pertains to protection of Safeguards Information (SGI). The violation is being treated as a Non-Cited Violation (NCV), consistent with Section VI.A of the Enforcement Policy. The NCV is described in the subject inspection report. If you contest the violation or significance of the NCV, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington DC 20555-0001, with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region III, and the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001 and the NRC Resident Inspector at the Prairie Island Nuclear Generating plant.

The NRC has increased security requirements at Prairie Island in response to terrorist acts on September 11, 2001. Although the NRC is not aware of any specific threat against nuclear facilities, the NRC issued an Order and several threat advisories to commercial power reactors to strengthen licensees' capabilities and readiness to respond to a potential attack. The NRC continues to monitor overall security controls and will issue temporary instructions in the near future to verify by inspection the licensee's compliance with the Order and current security regulations.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and any response you provide, will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Roger D. Lanksbury, Chief
Project Branch 5
Division of Reactor Projects

Docket Nos. 50-282; 50-306
License Nos. DPR-42; DPR-60

Enclosure: Inspection Report 50-282/02-04;
50-306/02-04

cc w/encl: Plant Manager, Prairie Island
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and Chief Nuclear Officer
Site Licensing Manager
Nuclear Asset Manager
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Docket Nos:	50-282, 50-306
License Nos:	DPR-42, DPR-60
Report No:	50-282/02-04; 50-306/02-04
Licensee:	Nuclear Management Company, LLC
Facility:	Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant
Location:	1717 Wakonade Drive East Welch, MN 55089
Dates:	April 1 through June 30, 2002
Inspectors:	J. Adams, Senior Resident Inspector S. Ray, Senior Resident Inspector D. Karjala, Resident Inspector M. Mitchell, Radiation Specialist, DRS A. Dunlop, Reactor Engineer, DRS M. Farber, Reactor Engineer, DRS B. Winter, Reactor Engineer, DRS G. Pirtle, Physical Security Inspector, DRS
Approved by:	Roger D. Lanksbury, Chief Project Branch 5 Division of Reactor Projects

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000282-02-04; IR 05000306-02-04, on 4/1/2002-5/16/2002; Nuclear Management Company, Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 1 & 2; Physical Protection.

This report covers a 13-week routine resident inspection. The inspection was conducted by resident and regional inspectors. Two Green security-related findings were identified. The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) using IMC 0609, "Significance Determination Process." Findings for which the Significance Determination Process (SDP) does not apply may be "Green" or be assigned a severity level after NRC management review. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," Revision 3, dated July 2000.

A. Inspector-Identified Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

B. Licensee Identified Findings

Cornerstone: Physical Protection

Two security-related findings of very low safety significance (Green) were identified by the licensee, one of which was a Non-Cited Violation, and were reviewed by the inspector. Corrective actions taken by the licensee have been entered into the licensee's corrective action program. These findings and corrective action tracking numbers are listed in Sections 4OA3.2 and 4OA7 of this report.

Report Details

Summary of Plant Status

Unit 1 was operated at or near full power for the entire inspection period. Unit 2 was operated at or near full power for the entire inspection period.

1. REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity, and Emergency Preparedness

1R01 Adverse Weather Protection (71111.01)

Hot Weather, Tornado, and Low Water Preparations

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed a detailed review of the summer plant operation, high wind, and tornado hazard procedures; Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR); design bases documents (DBDs) for the screenhouse and emergency diesel generators (EDGs); applicable Technical Specifications (TSs); and the Prairie Island Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE). The inspectors also reviewed a permanent plant modification of EDGs D1 and D2 that restored their operability with the design bases cooling water inlet temperature of 95 °F (see Section 1R17). A detailed list of the documents reviewed during this inspection is included at the end of the report.

The inspectors conducted inspections of the following risk significant mitigating systems:

- cooling water (common to both units);
- offsite alternating current (AC) power;
- Unit 1 and 2 AC Transformers;
- Unit 1 EDG D1 and D2; and
- Unit 2 EDG D5 and D6.

The inspectors reviewed the selected systems to verify that the material conditions and system configuration supported the system's availability and operability under adverse weather conditions, and to verify that additional cooling equipment specified in the summer plant operation procedure was available and operating as specified in the procedure. The inspectors conducted walkdowns of the areas specified in the tornado hazards surveillance procedure (SP) to verify that potential missile hazards to transformers and the switchyard had been removed or properly secured.

The inspectors reviewed a number of weather-related action requests (Ars) that entered problems that, if left uncorrected, could affect the performance of mitigating systems or result in an initiating event. The review was conducted to verify that the licensee entered problems into the corrective action program, identified appropriate corrective actions, and implemented those corrective actions.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R02 Evaluations of Changes, Tests, or Experiments (71111.02)

Review of Evaluations and Screenings for Changes, Tests, or Experiments

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed nine 10 CFR 50.59 evaluations and 21 screenings completed by the licensee's engineering staff during the last 2 years and performed under the 10 CFR 50.59 process. These documents were reviewed to ensure consistency with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.59. The inspectors used Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 96-07, "Guidelines for 10 CFR 50.59 Implementation," Revision 1, to determine acceptability of the completed evaluations and screenings. The NEI document was endorsed by the NRC in Regulatory Guide 1.187, "Guidance for Implementation of 10 CFR 50.59, Changes, Tests, and Experiments," November 2000. The inspectors also consulted Inspection Manual, Part 9900, "10 CFR GUIDANCE: 10 CFR 50.59, Changes, Tests, and Experiments." Documents reviewed during the inspection are listed at the end of the report.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R04 Equipment Alignment (71111.04)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed a partial equipment alignment walkdown of the following risk significant mitigating systems:

- On April 26, 2002, inspectors conducted an equipment alignment verification of the D5 EDG while the D6 EDG was unavailable for surveillance testing.

- On June 19, 2002, inspectors conducted an equipment alignment verification of the 21 component cooling water pump while the 22 component cooling water pump was unavailable for preventative maintenance.

- On June 24, 2002, inspectors conducted an equipment alignment verification of the D1 EDG while the D2 EDG was unavailable for surveillance testing.

The inspectors utilized the valve and electrical breaker status checklists to verify that system components and support systems were properly configured to support the operability of the available train. The inspectors performed a physical inspection of the available train, and reviewed outstanding work orders (WOs) and ARs to verify that the available train would be capable to perform its design function as described in USAR

and TSs. The inspectors also reviewed housekeeping in the area to verify that there were no housekeeping issues that could affect the available train's function.

The inspectors reviewed ARs to verify that minor deficiencies identified during these inspections were entered into the licensee's corrective action system. A detailed list of the documents reviewed during this inspection is included at the end of the report.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R05 Fire Protection (71111.05)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors conducted fire protection walkdowns that were focused on the availability and accessibility of fire protection equipment, the condition of fire fighting equipment, the control of transient combustibles, and the condition and operating status of installed fire barriers. The inspectors selected fire areas for inspection based on their overall contribution to internal fire risk, as documented in the IPEEE; their potential to impact equipment which could initiate a plant transient; or their impact on the plant's ability to respond to a security event. The inspectors reviewed the documents listed at the end of this report and toured fire areas to verify that fire hoses and extinguishers were in their designated locations and available for immediate use; that fire detectors and sprinklers were unobstructed; that transient material loading was within the analyzed limits; and that fire doors, dampers, and penetration seals appeared to be in satisfactory condition.

The inspectors assessed the following areas:

- Fire Area 20, Bus 15 Switchgear Room;
- Fire Area 22, Bus 111 Switchgear Room;
- Fire Area 25, EDG D1 Room;
- Fire Area 26, EDG D2 Room;
- Fire Area 31, Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) Pump 11 and 21 Room;
- Fire Area 32, AFW Pump 12 and 22 Room;
- Fire Area 33, Battery 11 Room;
- Fire Area 34, Battery 12 Room;
- Fire Area 80, Bus 121 Switchgear Room; and
- Fire Area 81, Bus 16 Switchgear Room.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R06 Flood Protection Measures (71111.06)

.1 External Flood Protection Inspection

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the applicable sections of the USAR and IPEEE associated with external flooding; the abnormal procedure for flooding; the most recently completed SP for the inspection of plant flooding barriers; the design bases document addressing internal and external hazards; and the design change package for flood panel and door design changes. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed the implemented corrective actions taken to correct the loss of safety function of plant flood barriers (see Section 4OA2) and Licensee Event Report (LER) 01-03-01 documenting the loss of safety function (see Section 4OA3).

The inspectors performed a physical inspection of all flood protection barriers with a specific focus on the deficiencies noted in the most recent performance of the SP for the inspection of plant flood barriers. The inspectors assessed whether the actions specified in the abnormal procedure for flooding could be performed in a timely manner if required, and if the necessary hardware and consumable materials were available and still within their shelf life. The inspectors also discussed the recent modifications of flood barriers with the project engineer.

The inspectors reviewed several ARs to verify that minor deficiencies identified during this inspection were entered into the licensee's corrective action program, that problems associated with plant equipment relied upon to prevent or minimize flooding were identified at an appropriate threshold, and that corrective actions commensurate with the significance of the issue were identified and implemented. A detailed list of the documents reviewed during this inspection is included at the end of the report.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.2 Internal Flood Protection Inspection

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the applicable sections of the USAR and Individual Plant Examination (IPE) associated with internal flooding in the area of the Unit 1 and Unit 2 AFW pumps and instrument air compressors, the design bases document addressing internal and external hazards, and the design bases document for the D5/D6 EDG building. The inspectors conducted a physical walkdown of the Unit 1 and Unit 2 AFW pump rooms and the D5/D6 building to verify that piping systems in these areas were being maintained, that drain paths from these areas had been maintained, and that there were no accumulations of loose materials that could plug drain paths. The inspectors reviewed the response times assumed in the flood analysis for operator actions to verify that operators could reasonably be expected to complete the required actions in the assumed time.

The inspectors reviewed several ARs to verify that problems associated with plant equipment relied upon to prevent or minimize flooding were identified at an appropriate threshold, and that corrective actions commensurate with the significance of the issue were identified and implemented. A detailed list of the documents reviewed during this inspection is included at the end of the report.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program (71111.11)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed an operating staff crew during an "as found" requalification examination on the simulator. The inspectors evaluated crew performance in the areas of:

- clarity and formality of communications;
- ability to take timely, appropriate, and safe actions;
- prioritization, interpretation, and verification of alarms;
- procedure use;
- control board manipulations;
- oversight and direction from supervisors; and
- group dynamics.

The inspectors compared crew performance in the above areas to licensee management expectations and guidelines as presented in the operations section work instructions (SWIs) listed at the end of this report and to the critical tasks listed in the exercise guide at the end of this report. The inspectors also compared simulator configurations with actual control room board configurations. The inspectors observed licensee evaluators to verify that they noted weaknesses observed by the inspectors and discussed them in the critique at the end of the session.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R12 Maintenance Rule Implementation (71111.12)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's implementation of the maintenance rule requirements for the Unit 1 reactor protection system to ensure that the maintenance rule was properly implemented. This evaluation included the following aspects:

- whether the reactor protection system was scoped in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65;

- whether the reactor protection system performance problems constituted maintenance rule functional failures;
- whether the reactor protection system had been assigned the proper safety significance classification;
- whether the licensee properly classified the reactor protection system as (a)(1) or (a)(2) based on the system's performance; and
- whether the performance criteria for the reactor protection system were appropriate for its (a)(2) classification.

The above aspects were evaluated by the inspectors during the review of the maintenance rule scoping and report documents. The inspectors also reviewed significant WOs and ARs to verify that failures were properly identified, classified, and corrected and that unavailable time had been properly calculated. A detailed list of the documents reviewed during this inspection is included at the end of the report.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control (71111.13)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's management of plant risk during emergent maintenance activities and during activities where more than one risk significant system or train was unavailable. The activities were chosen based on their potential impact on increasing the probability of an initiating event or impacting the operation of safety significant mitigating equipment. The inspection was conducted to verify that evaluation, planning, control, and performance of the work were done in a manner to reduce the risk and minimize the duration, where practical, and that contingency plans were in place where appropriate. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's daily configuration risk assessment records, observed shift turnover meetings, observed daily plant status meetings, and reviewed risk assessment documents listed at the end of this report to verify that the equipment configurations were properly listed, that protected equipment was identified and controlled, and that significant aspects of plant risk were communicated to the necessary personnel. The inspectors discussed daily and emergent risk assessments with operators and risk assessment engineers.

The inspectors reviewed the following emergent and planned maintenance activities associated with maintenance rule risk significant systems:

- On April 12, 2002, the D5 EDG was out-of-service for planned maintenance when an emergent failure of the 12 diesel driven cooling water pump lubricating water supply occurred;
- On June 4, 2002, the D1 EDG was out-of-service for replacement of the water supply solenoid valve and the 12 boric acid transfer pump was inoperable during a period of possible severe weather;

- On June 12, 2002, the 12 diesel driven cooling water pump was declared inoperable because of erratic governor operation during a routine surveillance test; and
- On June 26, 2002, the 12 component cooling water pump and the 11 boric acid storage tank were out-of-service for planned maintenance, two of the eight intake traveling screens were out-of-service for corrective maintenance, one intake traveling screen was degraded, and both bypass intake traveling screen bypass gates were degraded.

The inspectors reviewed several ARs to verify that problems associated with plant risk assessment were identified at an appropriate threshold, and that corrective actions commensurate with the significance of the issue were identified and implemented. A detailed list of the documents reviewed during this inspection is included at the end of the report.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R15 Operability Evaluations (71111.15)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors evaluated plant conditions, selected condition reports (CRs), and corrective action program (CAP) documents for risk significant components and systems in which operability issues were questioned. These conditions were evaluated to determine whether the continued operability of the components and systems were justified. The inspectors compared the component or system's function and design criteria in the applicable sections of the TSs and USAR to the licensee's evaluations to verify that the components and systems were operable. The inspectors reviewed equipment to verify that compensatory measures necessary to maintain operability were in place, functioned as intended, and were properly controlled. A detailed list of the documents reviewed during this inspection is included at the end of the report.

The inspectors evaluated the following conditions:

- Inaccurate assumptions used in the analysis for the non-return check valves in the main steam line break event (General Condition Report 2002 01283);
- Improper classification of safety-related cooling water pump lubrication water supply components as nonsafety-related (AR CAP 023064);
- Okonite/Scotch Equipment Qualification (EQ) splices installed in a non-tested configuration (AR CAP 023138);
- EQ Okonite Tape Splice Configuration Turnover Evaluation;
- Scaffold 1109R was found in contact with 21 component cooling water pump discharge header (AR CAP 023905);
- Potential excessive end play on the 11 safety injection pump (AR CAP 023818); and
- Incorrect o-ring material install on the Units 1 and 2 pressurizer power operated relief valve block valves (AR CAP 023907).

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R16 Operator Workarounds (OWA) (71111.16)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed newly identified OWAs to verify that the functional capability of the system, human reliability in responding to an initiating event, or the ability of operators to implement abnormal or emergency operating procedures was not significantly affected.

The inspectors reviewed the following OWAs:

- Diesel generator D6 fuel oil storage tank level indication from the emergency response computer system; and
- Unit 2 loop "A" pressurizer spray valve controller in manual.

The inspectors reviewed the applicable sections of the USAR and TSs and discussed the OWAs with control room operators. The inspectors reviewed several ARs to verify that problems associated with D6 fuel oil storage tank level indication and the loop "A" pressurizer spray valve controller were identified at an appropriate threshold, and that corrective actions commensurate with the significance of the issue was identified and scheduled for implementation. A detailed list of the documents reviewed during this inspection is included at the end of the report.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R17 Permanent Plant Modifications (71111.17)

.1 Permanent Plant Modification Installed On-Line

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed design change 02D101 which added several valves to the D1 and D2 coolant systems to eliminate coolant cross-flow. The licensee determined that this modification was necessary to restore the EDGs to a configuration that could provide the rated load with a cooling water flow of 400 gallons per minute at 95°F. The inspectors reviewed the modification to verify that it did not adversely affect the availability, reliability, or the functional capability of the D1/D2 EDGs. The inspectors also reviewed three supporting engineering calculations, a 10 CFR Part 21 notification from the diesel vendor, WOs for the installation of the modification, the post-modification testing, and commercial grade dedication of components. The inspectors performed a physical walkdown of the D1 and D2 EDGs and observed the operation of both engines following the installation of the modifications. A detailed list of the documents reviewed during this inspection is included at the end of the report.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.2 Biennial Review of Recent Permanent Plant Modifications

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed 20 permanent plant modifications that were performed by the licensee's engineering staff during the last 2 years. These were divided among the various programs that the licensee used to make changes to the plant. Nine of the modifications were done under the design change process. In addition, the inspectors evaluated 2 setpoint changes, 2 equivalent engineering change evaluations, 3 substitution part/component equivalent evaluations, and 4 commercial grade evaluations. The modifications were chosen based upon the effect on systems that had high probabilistic risk analysis significance or high maintenance rule safety significance. The modifications were reviewed to verify that the completed design changes were in accordance with specified design requirements and the licensing bases, and to confirm that the changes did not affect the modified system or other systems' safety function. As applicable to the status of the modification, post-modification testing was reviewed to verify that the system, and associated support systems, functioned properly and that the modification accomplished its intended function. The inspectors evaluated the modifications against the licensee's design basis documents and the USAR. The inspectors also used applicable industry standards, such as the American Society of Mechanical Engineers Code, to evaluate acceptability of the modifications.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing (71111.19)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed post-maintenance testing activities associated with maintenance on important mitigating, barrier integrity, and support systems to ensure that the post-maintenance testing was performed adequately, demonstrated that the maintenance was successful, and that operability was restored after the testing. The inspectors reviewed the appropriate sections of the TSs, the USAR, and maintenance documents to determine the systems' safety functions and the scope of the maintenance. In addition, the inspectors reviewed ARs to verify that minor deficiencies identified during these inspections were entered into the licensee's corrective action system. A detailed list of the documents reviewed during this inspection is included at the end of the report.

The inspectors observed and evaluated the post-maintenance activities for the following:

- D5 Overspeed Trip Repair and Temporary Modification Removal on April 11, 2002;

- D1 EDG Water Supply Solenoid Valve Replacement on June 4, 2002;
- 12 Diesel Cooling Water Pump Governor Adjustment on June 13, 2002; and
- 22 Component Cooling (CC) Pump Preventive Maintenance (PM) on June 19, 2002.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R22 Surveillance Testing (71111.22)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed selected surveillance tests and/or reviewed test data to verify that the equipment performance met SP acceptance criteria. The inspectors observed the tested equipment to verify that it was capable of performing its intended safety functions as described in TSs and the USAR. The inspectors reviewed documents to verify that the testing met the required TS frequency; that the tests were conducted in accordance with the applicable procedures; that operators met prerequisites and established the proper plant conditions; and that the results of the tests were properly reviewed and recorded. In addition, the inspectors reviewed several ARs to verify that the licensee was identifying surveillance test problems at an appropriate threshold, and that corrective actions commensurate with the significance of the issue were identified and implemented. A detailed list of the documents reviewed during this inspection is included at the end of the report.

The following tests were observed and/or evaluated:

- SP 1102, 11 Turbine Driven AFW Pump Monthly Test on April 17, 2002;
- SP 2307, D6 Diesel Generator 6-Month Fast Start Test on April 25, 2002;
- SP 1335, D2 Diesel Generator 18-Month 24-Hour Load Test on April 28, 2002; and
- SP 2102, 22 Turbine-Driven AFW Pump Monthly Test on May 20, 2002.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R23 Temporary Modifications (71111.23)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed temporary modification 02T121. This temporary modification installed a ground strap on the Unit 2 source range monitor 2N31 to reduce the noise-induced counts. The inspectors reviewed the temporary modification description and the 10 CFR 50.59 screening to ensure they were completed in accordance with the licensee administrative work instruction (AWI) guidance. In addition, the inspectors reviewed the applicable sections of the USAR and TSs to verify that the installation did not affect the specified design function or operability of the system. The inspectors

discussed installation and removal WOs, plans for permanent corrective action, and temporary modification removal with engineering personnel. The inspectors also reviewed documents to verify that minor deficiencies identified during the course of inspections were entered into the licensee's corrective action program. A detailed list of the documents reviewed during this inspection is included at the end of the report.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1EP6 Drill Evaluation (71114.06)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed the licensee perform an emergency preparedness drill on April 3, 2002. The inspectors observed activities in the control room simulator, technical support center, and emergency operations facility. The inspectors also attended the post-drill facility critiques in the technical support center and emergency operations facility immediately following the drill and the overall drill critique on April 4. The focus of the inspectors activities was to note any weaknesses and deficiencies in the drill performance and ensure that the licensee evaluators noted the same weaknesses and deficiencies and entered them into the corrective action program. The inspectors placed emphasis on observations regarding event classification, notifications, protective action recommendations, and site evacuation and accountability activities. As part of the inspection, the inspectors reviewed the drill package listed at the end of this report.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

2. RADIATION SAFETY

Cornerstone: Occupational Radiation Safety

2OS1 Access Control to Radiologically Significant Areas (71121.01)

.1 Plant Walkdowns

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector reviewed the radiological conditions of radiation areas and high radiation areas (HRAs) in the auxiliary and radwaste buildings. The inspector performed walkdowns and reviewed licensee controls to determine if the controls (i.e., surveys, postings, and barricades) were adequate to meet the requirements of 10 CFR Part 20 and the licensee's TSs.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

Cornerstone: Public Radiation Safety

2PS2 Radioactive Material Processing and Transportation (71122.02)

.1 Walkdown of Radioactive Waste Systems

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector reviewed the liquid and solid radioactive waste system description in the USAR and the most recent information regarding the types and amounts of radioactive waste generated and disposed. The inspector performed walkdowns of the liquid and solid radwaste processing systems to verify that the systems agreed with the descriptions in the USAR and the Process Control Program, and to assess the material condition and operability of the systems. The inspector reviewed the current processes for transferring waste resins into transportation containers to determine if appropriate waste stream mixing and/or sampling procedures were utilized. The inspector also reviewed the methodologies for waste concentration averaging to determine if representative samples of the waste product were provided for the purposes of waste classification in accordance with 10 CFR 61.55. During this inspection, the licensee was not conducting waste processing.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.2 Waste Characterization and Classification

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector reviewed the licensee's radiochemical sample analysis results for each of the licensee's waste streams, including dry active waste, resins, and filters. The inspector also reviewed the licensee's use of scaling factors to quantify difficult-to-measure radionuclides (e.g., pure alpha or beta emitting radionuclides). The reviews were conducted to verify that the licensee's program assured compliance with 10 CFR 61.55 and 10 CFR 61.56, as required by Appendix G of 10 CFR Part 20. The inspector also reviewed the licensee's waste characterization and classification program to ensure that the waste stream composition data accounted for changing operational parameters and thus remained valid between the annual sample analysis updates.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.3 Transportation Records

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector reviewed five exempt and non-exempt package shipment manifests completed in 2000 and 2001 to verify compliance with NRC and Department of Transportation requirements (i.e., 10 CFR Parts 20 and 71 and 49 CFR Parts 172 and 173). The licensee did not have any non-exempt package preparation or shipping underway during the inspection.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.4 Identification and Resolution of Problems

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector reviewed a Quality Assurance audit of the Radioactive Waste and Transportation Program, along with self-assessments of the Radioactive Waste and Transportation Programs to evaluate the effectiveness of the self-assessment process to identify, characterize, and prioritize problems. The inspector also reviewed corrective action documentation to verify that previous radioactive waste and radioactive materials transportation related issues were adequately addressed. The inspector also selectively reviewed year 2001 CRs that addressed radioactive waste and radioactive materials transportation program deficiencies, to verify that the licensee had effectively implemented the corrective action program.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

3. SAFEGUARDS

Cornerstone: Physical Protection

3PP1 Access Authorization (AA) Program (Behavior Observation Only) (71130.01)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector interviewed five supervisors and five non-supervisors (both licensee and contractor employees) to determine their knowledge level and practice for implementing the licensee's program responsibilities. Selected procedures pertaining to the Behavior Observation Program and associated training activities were reviewed. Also licensee Fitness-For-Duty (FFD) semi-annual test results were reviewed. In addition, the inspector reviewed a sample of licensee self-assessments and security logged events. The inspector also interviewed security managers to evaluate their knowledge and use of the licensee's corrective action program.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

3PP2 Access Control (Identification, Authorization and Search of Personnel, Packages, and Vehicles) (71130.02)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector reviewed the licensee's protected area access control equipment testing and maintenance procedures. The inspector observed licensee testing of all access control equipment to determine if testing and maintenance practices were performance based. On two occasions, during peak ingress periods, the inspector observed in-processing search of personnel, packages, and vehicles to determine if search practices were conducted in accordance with regulatory requirements and that staffing was sufficient to adequately control the ingress process. Interviews were conducted and records were reviewed to verify that security staffing levels were consistently and appropriately implemented, and that procedures were prepared to address denial of unescorted access authorization. Also the inspector reviewed the licensee's process for limiting access to only authorized personnel to the protected area and vital equipment. The inspector reviewed the licensee's program to control security keys and security related computer data.

The inspector reviewed a sample of licensee self-assessments, maintenance request records, and security logged events for identification and resolution of problems. In addition, the inspector interviewed security managers to evaluate their knowledge and use of the licensee's corrective action system.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4. OTHER ACTIVITIES

4OA1 Performance Indicator (PI) Verification (71151)

.1 Initiating Events Cornerstone Performance Indicators

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the PI data submitted by the licensee for completeness and accuracy for the following PIs in the Initiating Events Cornerstone:

1. Unplanned Scrams per 7,000 Critical Hours, and
2. Unplanned Scrams with Loss of Normal Heat Removal

The inspectors compared the data reported by the licensee to the definitions and guidance contained in the NEI guidance listed at the end of this report. The inspectors

reviewed licensee event reports, monthly operating reports, and NRC inspection reports for the period July 2001 through March 2002 to verify that the licensee had reported all occurrences for those three quarters.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.2 Physical Protection Performance Indicators

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector verified the data for the Physical Protection Performance Indicators (PI) pertaining to Fitness-For-Duty Personnel Reliability, Personnel Screening Program, and Protected Area Security Equipment. Specifically, a sample of plant reports related to security events, security shift activity logs, fitness-for-duty reports, and other applicable security records were reviewed for the fourth quarter of 2001 and the first quarter of 2002.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems (71152)

.1 Review of Corrective Actions For the D5/D6 Fuel and Lubricating Oil Incompatibility Event

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors evaluated the completeness and the effectiveness of licensee corrective actions for a previous finding that involved the incompatibility of the fuel oil and lubricating oil in the Unit 2 D5 and D6 EDGs. Inspectors reviewed the completion of corrective actions and ensured that the timeliness of the licensee's corrective actions were commensurate with the safety significance of the issue.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.2 Review of Corrective Actions For the Loss of Function Associated with Flood Barriers

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors evaluated the completeness and the effectiveness of licensee corrective actions for a previous finding that involved deficiencies with the plant flood barriers. These deficiencies resulted in the plant being in an unanalyzed condition. The inspectors reviewed CR 20015571 that initially documented the deficient flood barriers, the subsequent root cause evaluation, LER 1-03-01, LER 1-03-01 Supplement 1, and

the documentation associated with the permanent plant modification that implemented the corrective actions that restored the function of the flood barriers.

The inspectors assessed whether the timeliness of the licensee's corrective actions were commensurate with the safety significance of the issue. The inspectors compared the completion dates of the actions that restored function to the flood barriers to the annual period when the plant experiences a high susceptibility to external flooding. The inspectors reviewed USAR and IPEEE sections discussing external flooding and which indicated that the period of high susceptibility existed in the months of March and April. The inspectors reviewed all corrective actions completed by the end of January 2002 to verify these actions restored the flood barrier function.

The inspectors reviewed other corrective actions, not required for the restoration of flood barrier function and which had not been completed by January 2002, to verify that they would not prevent the flood barriers from protecting the plant in the event of external flooding.

The inspectors performed a physical walkdown of the flood barriers to assess the current material condition of the flood barriers and note any deficiencies that would prevent the barriers from performing their function. The inspectors also observed the performance of SP 1293, "Inspection of Flood Control Measures," to verify that all acceptance criteria were met.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.3 Identification and Resolution of Problems Associated With Permanent Plant Modifications

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed 12 CRs associated with Prairie Island's permanent plant modifications and 10 CFR 50.59 program to verify that the licensee had an appropriate threshold for identifying issues and to verify the effectiveness of corrective actions for the identified issues.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4OA3 Event Followup (71153)

.1 (Closed) LER 1-01-03, Supplement 1: Plant in Unanalyzed Condition Due to Flood Panel Deficiencies.

This event report described a licensee-identified condition where 16 of 17 flood panels, that would be installed during a flood condition where water level crest is predicted to exceed 692' elevation, were degraded. The issue included not having the correct

gasket materials, inadequate anchor bolt installation capabilities, and the inability to install the panels in a timely manner. A Phase 3 risk assessment was completed using information from the IPEEE. Based on the assessment, it was determined that the issue was of very low risk significance (Green).

The inspectors reviewed Supplement 1 to this event report and noted that the licensee identified two additional deficiencies during the implementation of corrective actions to correct the D5/D6 flood panel deficiencies discussed in the original LER. These additional deficiencies did not change the significance of the event since the flood panels in question were determined to have been non-functional due to degraded gasket material. These new deficiencies were identified during corrective actions to restore the flood barrier function. The newly identified deficiencies were entered into the corrective action program with AR CAP 023003 and CAP 023071. Corrective actions had been completed and the function of all flood panels had been fully restored.

.2 (Closed) Licensee Event Report No. 50-282/01-06-00: "Security Responders Out-of-Position Due to Plant Fire."

Green. On August 3, 2001, a fire occurred within the protected area (PA) due to an electrical fault in non-safeguards Bus 12. The Red Wing Fire Department responded to assist in the control of the fire. While involved in fire control support activities, some armed responders were in locations that would have prevented them from being able to respond to their established defensive positions within the time lines established (specific time lines are SGI and exempt from public disclosure). The responders were out of position for between 15 minutes and two hours. During these time periods, the responders were always within the PA and able to provide some level of contingency response, but not within the specific time lines established for their positions.

Since the incident occurred prior to September 11, 2001, the regulatory requirement for the minimum number of armed responders was identified in the security plan (number of required armed responders is SGI and exempt from public disclosure). In this case, the number of actual armed responders exceeded the minimum number required by the security plan and no violations of NRC requirements occurred. The licensee had developed a response strategy and voluntarily added responders to enhance their capabilities. Part of that strategy included self-imposed requirements regarding the timeliness of responders. This incident effected that timeliness.

Additionally, within an hour of the start of the fire an additional supervisor, qualified for armed response duties, arrived onsite and could have provided an additional level of response in case of a contingency event. This issue was reported to the NRC within one hour, and a written Licensee Event Report was submitted to the NRC within 30 days. No prior similar events have occurred. Interviews with the security director disclosed that in the future, armed responders would not be used as they were in this incident, with a limited exception.

This issue was evaluated through the SDP and determined to be of low safety significance (Green). The issue is considered greater than minor, but of low safety significance, because, although the cornerstone attribute relating to response was effected (for a limited time and only a small portion of the capability) it represented a

vulnerability in the response system because it increased the potential for failure; but there were no actual intrusions and less than two similar findings were identified during the past four quarters. Moreover, the fire within the PA was an unpredictable event and the mis-positioning of the responders would have been unknown to an adversary.

4OA6 Meeting(s)

.1 Interim Exit Meeting Summary of the Access Control, As-Low-As-Is-Reasonably Achievable (ALARA), Instrumentation, and Transportation

The results of the access control, ALARA, instrumentation, and transportation inspection were presented to Mr. Mano Nazar and other members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on May 17, 2002. The licensee acknowledged the information presented. The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.

.2 Interim Exit Meeting Summary of the Permanent Plant Modification and Evaluations of Changes, Tests, and Experiments Inspection

The results of the permanent plant modification and evaluations of changes, tests, and experiments inspection were presented to Mr. Mano Nazar and other members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on June 21, 2002. The licensee acknowledged the information presented. The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.

.3 Interim Exit Meeting Summary of the Physical Security Inspection

The results of the Safeguards inspection were presented to Mr. Mano Nazar and other members of the licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on June 21, 2002. The licensee staff was advised that an unresolved item pertaining to protection of SGI was identified, and that they would be advised later of the resolution of the issue. The inspector asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered safeguards or proprietary information. No safeguards or proprietary information was identified.

On July 9, 2002, the licensee was advised that the unresolved item discussed above pertaining to inadequate protection of SGI was a licensee identified severity level IV Non-Cited Violation.

.4 Exit Meeting

The resident inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. Mano Nazar and other members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on July 3, 2002. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented. No proprietary information was identified.

4OA7 Licensee-Identified Violations

The following violation of very low safety significance (Green) was identified by the licensee and is a violation of NRC requirements which meets the criteria of Section VI of the NRC Enforcement Policy, NUREG-1600, for being dispositioned as an NCV.

10 CFR 73.21(d)(2) states in part, "While unattended, SGI shall be stored in a locked security storage container."

Contrary to this requirement, SGI (lesson plans and portions of security plans) found in the security trainer's office (located outside of the protected area) was not stored in a locked security storage container. The duration of this issue is not know, but may have existed for up to one year (50-282/306/02-04-01).

The licensee inventoried and assumed control of the SGI, entered the issue into their corrective action program (CAP 023101), and entered the incident in their safeguards event log. Because there was no evidence that the significant SGI (portions of security plans) was compromised, this violation is not more than of very low significance, and is being treated as a Non-Cited Violation.

On April 12, 2002, the licensee discovered some lesson plans marked as SGI, and a double-enveloped package (both envelopes sealed) with SGI (portions of security plans) within it. It was stored in an unlocked filing cabinet in the security trainer's office located outside of the protected area. The outer sealed envelope was addressed to the security trainer with no SGI markings, and the inner sealed envelope was marked as SGI. The inadequate storage of the SGI may have occurred for up to one year. The individual the package was addressed to had not worked in the security trainer position and office for up to a year prior to the discovery date (April 12, 2002), and had terminated employment prior to the discovery date. Therefore, he was not available for the licensee or inspector to interview to determine further circumstances and details pertaining to receipt, transportation, or use of the SGI material.

This issue was evaluated through the SDP and determined to be of low safety significance (Green). The inspector's review of the material determined that the information in the lesson plans would not substantially assist an individual in gaining unauthorized or undetected access to the plant. The most significant documents were pages of the Point Beach and Prairie Island security plans (stored within a double sealed envelope) that described the location and description of vital areas, which could assist in radiological sabotage if the information was compromised. Although the SGI material was subject to compromise (not stored adequately) for up to a year, the fact that both envelopes were sealed when discovered indicates that the material was not compromised.

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee

T. Amundson, Manager Business Support
P. Huffman, Manager of System Engineering
B. Jefferson, Director Site Operations
J. Jensen, Interim Director of Engineering
A. Johnson, General Superintendent Radiation Protection and Chemistry
J. Kivi, Licensing Engineer
R. Lingle, Operations Manager
J. Maki, Production Planning Manager
M. McKeown, Manager of Design Engineering
L. Meyer, General Superintendent Plant Maintenance
M. Nazar, Site Vice President
J. Waddell, Superintendent Security
M. Werner, Plant Manager
R. Womack, Manager of Engineering Programs
D. Blakesley, Senior Nuclear Security Consultant
J. Corwin, Nuclear Security Consultant
H. Nyberg, Training Coordinator, The Wackenhut Corporation
J. Waddell, Security Manager

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

Opened

50-282/306/20-04-01	NCV	SGI was not Adequately Protected (Section 4OA7)

Closed

50-282/01-01-03, Supplement 1	LER	Plant in Unanalyzed Condition Due to Flood Panel Deficiencies (Section 1R15)
50-282/01-06-00	LER	Security Responders Out of Position Due to Plant Fire (Section 4OA3)
50-282/306/20-04-01	NCV	SGI was not Adequately Protected (Section 4OA7)

Discussed

None

LIST OF ACRONYMS USED

AB	Abnormal Operating Procedure
AC	Alternating Current
ADAMS	Agencywide Documents Access and Management System
AFW	Auxiliary Feedwater
ALARA	As-Low-As Reasonably Achievable
AR	Action Request
AWI	Administrative Work Instruction
CAP	Corrective Action Program
CC	Component Cooling
CE	Condition Evaluation
CFR	Code of Federal Regulations
CR	Condition Report
DBD	Design Bases Document
DRS	Division of Reactor Safety
EDG	Emergency Diesel Generator
EQ	Equipment Qualification
ERCS	Emergency Response Computer System
FFD	Fitness-For-Duty
GEN	General Condition Report
HRA	High Radiation Area
IMC	Inspection Manual Chapter
INPO	Institute of Nuclear Power Operations
IPE	Individual Plant Examination
IPEEE	Individual Plant Examination of External Events
IR	Inspection Report
LCO	Limiting Conditions for Operation
LER	Licensee Event Report
NEI	Nuclear Energy Institute
NRC	Nuclear Regulatory Commission
OPR	Operability Determination
OWA	Operator Workaround
PA	Protected Area
PARS	Publicly Available Records
PI	Performance Indicator

PINGP	Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant
PM	Preventive Maintenance
PRA	Probalistic Risk Assessment
RCP	Reactor Coolant Pump
SDP	Significance Determination Process
SGI	Safeguards Information
SI	Safety Injection
SP	Surveillance Procedure
SWI	Section Work Instruction
TCN	Temporary Change Notice
TS	Technical Specification
USAR	Updated Safety Analysis Report
WO	Work Order
XOE	External Operating Experience

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

1R01 Adverse Weather Protection

SP 1039 (WO 0116291)	Tornado Hazard Monthly Site Inspection	Revision 6
Abnormal Operating Procedure (AB) 2	Tornado/Severe Thunderstorm	Revision 19
Test Procedure 1636 (WO 0117413)	Summer Plant Operation	Revision 10
Temporary Instruction 02-29	D1/D2 Cooling Water Configuration	March 22, 2002
NSPLMI-96001	Individual Plant Examination of External Events, Section C2	Revision 0
Design Bases Document (DBD) STR-04	Design Bases Document for the Prairie Island Screenhouse, Page 60	Revision 3
DBD TOP-03	Design Bases Document - Environmental Qualification of Electrical Equipment, Section 2.10, Page A-20	Revision 3
ENG-ME-178	Screenhouse Ventilation Evaluation	
DBD SYS-38A	Design Bases Document - Emergency Diesel Generators, Section 4.2.5, Page 91	Revision 2
DBD TOP-03	Design Bases Document - Environmental Qualification of Electrical Equipment, Section 2.7, Page A-17	Revision 3
USAR	Diesel Ventilation, Section 10.3.12	Revision 23
AR CAP 023084	2RY Transformer Local Alarm Received	April 12, 2002
AR CAP 023259	Missile Hazards During Tornado Season	April 24, 2002
Condition Evaluation (CE) 000122	Evaluation of Policy Related to Leaving Carts In or Near the Vehicle Trap	April 26, 2002
AR CAP 023298	Missing Roof Hatch Allowing Rain to Leak On Energized Equipment	April 28, 2002
CE 000136	Evaluate Missing Roof Hatch Above Motor Control Center 2F	April 29, 2002
AR CAP 023324	Tornado Missiles Near D1/D2	April 30, 2002
Corrective Action (CA) 001022	Tornado Missile Hazard Correction	May 2, 2002
CE 000149	Evaluate Change to the Tornado Missile Protection Process	May 2, 2002
AR CAP 023641	Received Equipment High Temperature Alarms on 11Circ Water Pump	May 30, 2002
AR CAP 023751	SP 1039 Tornado Hazard Monthly Site Inspection	June 7, 2002

AR CAP 023949	1GT Generator Main Transformer High Oil Temperature	June 23, 2002
AR CAP 023965	Evaluate the Effectiveness of the "Summer Operation Procedure"	June 24, 2002
AR CAP 023967	Failure to Change Generation Transformer Filter Media	June 24, 2002
AR CAP 023969	Known Overheating Problem Caused by Filter Media	June 25, 2002

1R02 Evaluations of Changes, Tests, or Experiments

Procedures

	NMC 50.59 Resource Manual	Revision 1
5AWI 3.3.5	50.59 Screenings	Revision 5
5AWI 3.3.6	10CFR50.59 Evaluations	Revision 2
5AWI 4.9.0	Safety Analysis Reports	Revision 8
5AWI 6.1.4	Design Change Project Description/Safety Assessment	Revision 2
1C18 AOP1	Makeup or Boration of the Reactor Coolant System Using a Safety Injection Pump	Revision 0
1E-0	Reactor Trip or Safety Injection	Revision 21
1ECA-0.0	Loss of All Safeguards AC Power	Revision 15
1ES-0.1	Reactor Trip Recovery	Revision 19

Condition Reports Written as a Result of Inspection

AR CAP 023916	Incorrect Completion of PINGP [Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant] 279 for Safety Evaluation 584	June 20, 2002
AR CAP 023917	Distribution of Completed 50.59 Evaluations	June 20, 2002
AR OTH 020549	Clarity USAR Page 6.2-23 Concerning Safety Injection (SI) Accumulator Check Valves	June 21, 2002

10 CFR 50.59 Screenings

218	11/22 Diesel Driven Cooling Water Pump Shaft Bearing Isolation Valves	April 29, 2002
1017	Update to 2 Emergency Contingency Action 0.0	June 26, 2001
1063	00RV01, Bottom Mount Reduced Inventory Thermocouples	July 24, 2001

1173	Substitution Part/Component Equivalent ME-0690	September 19, 2001
1189	Use SI Pump for Borated Water Makeup	October 12, 2001
1098	Cross-Connect CC Pumps	August 23, 2001
1215	Turbine Driven AFW Pump Control Switch in Manual	January 15, 2002
1259	22 Diesel Cooling Water Pump Governor Replacement	November 1, 2001
1262	WO 0114936, Setpoint Change 2456	November 2, 2001
1285	Calculation ENG-ME-481	January 8, 2002
1296	Temporary Modification 01T102	January 11, 2002
1402	Temporary Change to SP 1106A	February 16, 2002
1419	Replace FV-PCV-1025 DC45/46 with LPN-RK Fuses	February 28, 2002
1423	Equipment Engineering Change 1406, Bearing Change	March 8, 2002
1430	11, 21, and 22 CC Unit Cooler Coil Replacement	March 18, 2002
1435	Calculation ENG-ME-499, Revision 0	April 3, 2002
1458	WO 0108013 - Fuse Change	April 10, 2002
1464	12 & 22 Diesel Cooling Water Panel Audible Alarms	April 17, 2002
1468	Fuse Replacement for BKR 253-21/Setpoint 2462. WO 0203609	April 18, 2002
1482	Loop Delta T Emergency Response Computer System (ERCS) Alarm Setpoint Changes WO 0203637 & 0203639	May 7, 2002
01VC01	Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) Seal Water Injection Check Valve Replacement/ Relocation	January 8, 2002
<u>50.59 Evaluations</u>		
123	Downgrading Chemical and Volume Control System Charging Pump	November 30, 2001
181	Safety Evaluation for the Improper Install of Raychem Manufactured Heat Shrinkable Tubing at Prairie Island Unit 1	December 21, 2001

251	Charging Pump Reclassification	December 14, 1994
252	Molded Case Circuit Breakers on Safety Related Equipment	January 26, 2002
265	Untraceable Molded Case Circuit Breakers Installed in Safety Related Applications	January 26, 2002
584	Appendix R Program Document Update - Containment Sump B Valve Hot Short Issue	April 18, 2001
1004	Spent Fuel Pool Cooling	January 23, 2002
1007	Steam Generator Level and Containment Temperature Restrictions in Support of Main Steam Line Break Analysis	April 1, 2002
02D101	Isolate D1/D2 Coolant System Crossflow	May 1, 2002
<u>USAR</u>		
6.2.1	Safety Injection System Design Basis	Revision 22
10.2.3	Chemical and Volume Control System	Revision 23
10.4.2	Component Cooling System	Revision 22
11.9.1.2	Auxiliary Feedwater System Design Basis	Revision 23
11.9.2.2	Auxiliary Feedwater System Description	Revision 23
<u>USAR Submittal Inputs</u>		
000309	Single Failure Discussion	December 7, 2000
000302	Single Failure Analysis Containment Spray System	December 3, 2000
010004	AFW System	January 10, 2001
010034	Cooling Water	February 25, 2001
010056	Containment Isolation Valves	March 22, 2001
<u>Miscellaneous</u>		
10 CFR 50.71(e) Letter to NRC	Submittal of Revision No. 23 to the USAR	July 1, 2001
10 CFR 50.59	Changes, Tests, or Experiments	
NEI 96.07	Guidelines for 10 CFR 50.59 Evaluations	Revision 1

1R04 Equipment Alignment

D5 EDG

TS 3.7	Auxiliary Electrical Systems	Revision 110
USAR Section 8.4	Plant Standby Diesel Generator Systems	Revision 23
Integrated Checklist C1.1.20.7-9	D5 Diesel Generator Valve Status	Revision 9
Integrated Checklist C1.1.20.7-10	D5 Diesel Generator Auxiliaries and Local Panels and Switches	Revision 5
Integrated Checklist C1.1.20.7-11	D5 Diesel Generator Main Control Room Switch and Indicating Light Status	Revision 3
Integrated Checklist C1.1.20.7-12	D5 Diesel Generator Circuit Breakers and Panel Switches	Revision 8
WO 0109522	D5 2B Start Air Receiver Pressure Transmitter	

21 CC Pump

TS 3.3.C	Component Cooling Water System	Revision 91
USAR Section 10.4.2	Component Cooling System	Revision 22
Integrated Checklist C1.1.14-2	Unit 2 Component Cooling System	Revision 22
WO 0203695	2CC-1-13 Has an Oil Leak on Actuator Gear Box	April 22, 2002
AR CAP 023905	Tubing on Scaffold 1109 Touching CC Pump 21	June 19, 2002
AR CAP 023948	Scaffolds Erected Too Close to Equipment	June 23, 2002

D1 EDG

TS 3.7	Auxiliary Electrical Systems	Revision 110
USAR Section 8.4	Plant Standby Diesel Generator Systems	Revision 23
Integrated Checklist C1.1.20.7-1	D1 Diesel Generator Valve Status	Revision 19
Integrated Checklist C1.1.20.7-2	D1 Diesel Generator Auxiliaries and Room Cooling Local Panels	Revision 8W
Integrated Checklist C1.1.20.7-3	D1 Diesel Generator Main Control Room Switch and Indicating Light Status	Revision 13
Integrated Checklist C1.1.20.7-4	D1 Diesel Generator Circuit Breakers and Panel Switches	Revision 11

1R05 Fire Protection

Plant Safety Procedure F5	Fire Fighting	Revision 27

Plant Safety Procedure F5, Appendix A	Detection Zones and Fire Areas, Fire Detection Zone 82, Emergency Diesel Generator D-1 Room	Revision 10
Plant Safety Procedure F5, Appendix A	Detection Zones and Fire Areas, Fire Detection Zone 6, Emergency Diesel Generator D-2 Room	Revision 10
Plant Safety Procedure F5, Appendix A	Detection Zones and Fire Areas, Fire Detection Zone 2, Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Rooms	Revision 10
Plant Safety Procedure F5, Appendix A	Detection Zones and Fire Areas, Fire Detection Zone 1, Batteries 11 and 12 Rooms	Revision 7
Plant Safety Procedure F5, Appendix A	Detection Zones and Fire Areas, Fire Detection Zone 11, Bus 15 & 16 Switchgear Rooms	Revision 7
Plant Safety Procedure F5, Appendix A	Detection Zones and Fire Areas, Fire Detection Zone 43, Bus 111 & 121 Switchgear Rooms	Revision 7
Plant Safety Procedure F5, Appendix F	Fire Hazard Analysis	Revision 12
Plant Safety Procedure F5, Appendix D	Impact of Fire Outside Control/Relay Room	Revision 8
Plant Safety Procedure F5, Appendix A	Fire Strategies	Revision 7
IPEEE NSPLMI-96001 Appendix B	Internal Fires Analysis	Revision 2

1R06 Flood Protection Measures

External Flooding

USAR Section 2.4.3.5	Floods	Revision 21
USAR Appendix F	Probable Maximum Flood Study	Revision 4
IPEEE NSPLMI-96001 Appendix C, Section C.2.3.1	External Flooding	Revision 0
DBD-TOP-05	Design Bases Document for Harzards	Revision 2
AB 4	Flood	Revision 20
SP 1293 (WO 0113018)	Inspection of Flood Control Measures	Revision 9
Design Change 01BM02	Flood Panel and Door Design Changes	Revision 1
50.59 Screening 1184	Design Change 01BM02, Revision 1	Revision 1
AR CAP 023335	Review of Surveillance SP 1293 “Inspection of Flood Control Measures”	May 1, 2002

AR CAP 023129	121 Cooling Tower Pump House Sump Pump Tripped on Overload	April 16, 2002
AR CAP 023071	Defect in Weld in Flood Panel MK-1	April 11, 2002
Internal Flooding		
IPE NSPLMI-94001 Section 3.3.8	Internal Flooding Evaluation	Revision 0
IPE NSPLMI-94001 Section 6.3	Class FEH-TB1, Flood with Loss of Secondary Cooling and Bleed and Feed	Revision 0
DBD-TOP-05	Design Bases Document for Harzards	Revision 2
DBD-STR-05	Design Bases Document for the D5/D6 Building	Revision 2
AR CAP 023110	Burned Up Starter Coil Found On Breaker 253-21 for 21 Turbine Building Sump Pump	April 15, 2002
AR CAP 023910	Evaluate as a Temporary Modification Bilge Pumps in the Turbine Building Drain - Unit 1 Condenser Pit North West Corner	June 20, 2002

1R011 Licensed Operator Requalification Program

Simulator Exercise Guide	Simulator Cycle Quiz 37	Revision 0
SWI O-0	Conduct of Operations	Revision 1
SWI O-2	Shift Organization, Operations, and Turnover	Revision 46
SWI O-10	Operation Manual Usage	Revision 41
SWI O-25	Periodic Data Acquisition and Logkeeping	Revision 29

1R12 Maintenance Rule Implementation

General		
	2000 Equipment Performance Annual Report	April 20, 2001
	Maintenance Rule System Basis Document, Volume 1A	Revision 3
	Maintenance Rule System Basis Document, Volume 1B	Revision 3
NUMARC 93-01	NEI Industry Guideline for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants	Revision 2
Regulatory Guide 1.160	Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants	Revision 2
AR CAP 023100	1PC-478 A/B Repeatedly Found Out-of-Tolerance	April 12, 2002

Apparent Cause Evaluation 008290	Perform Apparent Cause Evaluation Into Why 1PC-478 A/B Has Been Found 1PC-4 Found Out-of-Tolerance Repeatedly	April 18, 2002
CE 000057	Conduct Rework Analysis Into the Repeated Instances of 1PC-478 A/B is Found Out-of-Tolerance During the Performance of Quarterly SP 1003	April 18, 2002
Maintenance Rule Evaluation 000005	Evaluate 1PC-478 A/B Out-of-Tolerance	May 31, 2002
AR CAP 023395	Repeated Calibration Trend Based on SP 1003	May 6, 2002
AR CAP 023657	AR CAPs Were Found Not Flagged as Potential Maintenance Rule Functional Failure or Assigned a Maintenance Rule Evaluation During Screening	May 31, 2002
AR CAP 023908	Decreasing Bay Levels Due to Lost Intake Screens	June 19, 2002

1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control

TS 3.7	Auxiliary Electrical Systems	Revision 110
USAR Section 8.4	Plant Standby Diesel Generator Systems	Revision 23
5AWI 1.9.0	Look Ahead Process	Revision 0
5AWI 15.1.7	Voluntary Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCO) Process	Revision 1
WO 0204455	D1 Water Supply Solenoid Valve	May 14, 2002
TS 3.3.D	Cooling Water System	Revision 131
USAR Section 10.4	Plant Cooling System	Revision 22
AR CAP 023800	12 Diesel Driven Cooling Water Pump Inoperable Due to Governor Hunting	June 12, 2002
AR CAP 023170	12 Diesel Driven Cooling Water Pump Speed Hunting	April 19, 2002
	Daily Risk Assessments	April, 12, 2002, June 4, 12, and 26, 2002
Probalistic Risk Assessment (PRA) Project File V.SPA.02.008	Risk Significance of Intake Traveling Screens/Bypass Gates Failure Event	June 24, 2002
H 24.1	Assessment and Management of Risk Associated with Maintenance Activities	Revision 3
AR CAP 023088	Units 1 and 2 in PRA Orange Condition	April 12, 2002

AR CAP 023133	11 Condensate Pump Removed from Service for Maintenance Prior to Risk Assessment	April 16, 2002
AR CAP 023154	Failure to Log Entry into PRA Orange Condition	April 18, 2002
AR CAP 023257	Apparent Error in Prairie Island IPEEE	April 24, 2002
AR CAP 023970	Stopped Work Control Center from Tagging Out 21 Cooling Water Strainer with D2 Out-of-Service During “B” Week	June 25, 2002
AR CAP 023986	LCO Time Extended Because Breaker Inspection Not Performed in a Timely Manner	June 26, 2002

1R15 Operability Evaluations

General Condition Report (GEN) 2002 01283	Inaccurate Assumptions Used in the Analysis for the Non-Return Check Valves in the Main Steam Line Break Event	February 11, 2002
P. Huffman Update to GEN 2002 01283	Inaccurate Assumptions Used in the Analysis for the Non-Return Check Valves in the Main Steam Line Break Event	February 22, 2002
Detailed Basis For Operability 2002-02-08	Operability Determination Addendum	March 13, 2002
Nuclear Analysis Department File OC.PX.2002.021	H. Nelson Memo to P. Huffman	March 4, 2002
Reportability Determination for GEN 2002 01283	Inaccurate Assumptions Used in the Analysis for the Non-return Check Valves in the Main Steam Line Break Event	
H. Nelson Memo to S. Thomas, Nuclear Analysis Department OC.PX.2002.024	Main Steam Line Break Significance Determination Analysis	March 14, 2002
50.59 Evaluation Analysis 1007	Steam Generator Level and Containment Temperature Restrictions in Support of Main Steam Line Break Analysis	Revsion 0
USAR Section 14.5.5	Rupture of a Steam Pipe	Revision 22
AR CAP 023064	Assess Classification of the Bearing Lubricating Water Supply Piping and Flow Switches	April 10, 2002
AR CAP 023118	Incomplete Engineering Judgement	April 15, 2002
USAR Section 10.4	Plant Cooling Water System	Revision 23
	Evaluation of Vertical Cooling Water Pump Flow Switches	April 15, 2002

AR CAP 023138	Okonite/Scotch EQ Splices Installed in a Non-Tested Configuration	April 17, 2002
	EQ Okonite Tape Splice Configuration Turnover Evaluation	
	Clarification on "EQ Okonite Tape Splice Configuration Turnover Evaluation," Section "Number of Wraps Around Splice"	April 23, 2002
AR CAP 023737	A Pipe Hanger Near MV-32034 in Old Screenhouse is Contacting Conduit	June 6, 2002
Operability Determination (OPR) 000315	Pipe Hanger Rubbing Against Conduit for the 121 Motor Driven Cooling Water Pump	June 10, 2002
AR CAP 023905	Scaffold 1109 Touching Component Cooling Pump 21	June 19, 2002
AR CAP 023948	Scaffolds Erected Too Close to Equipment	June 23, 2002
AR CAP 023948 (Supplement)	Supplemental Engineering Information	June 27, 2002
AR CAP 023818	11 SI Pump Motor is Seeking Magnetic Center	June 13, 2002
OPR 000316	Evaluate the Operability of 11 SI Pump	June 13, 2002
Vendor Manual XH-1-1393	Bingham Willamette SI Pump	
WO 0205412	Perform Test Procedure 1087A	June 13, 2002
AR CAP 023907	Incorrect O-Ring Material Was Used for EQ MOV's [Motor-Operated Valves] in Containment	June 19, 2002
OPR 000319	Operability Determination for the Use of Incorrect O-Ring Material on Power Operated Relief Valve (PORV) Block Valves	June 19, 2002
TS Section 3.1.A.2	Pressurizer PORVs	Revision 135
TS Bases, Section 3.1	Reactor Coolant System Bases	Revision 135
USAR, Section 4.4	Reactor Pressure Relief System	Revision 23

1R16 OWAs

D6 Fuel Oil Level

AR CAP023556	D6 Fuel Oil Storage Tank ERCS Level Indication	May 20, 2002
WO 0201784	ERCS PT 2U8003A is Erratic and Unreliable	
TS 4.6.A	Diesel Generators	Revision 147
SP 2001	Unit 2 Daily Control Room Log	Revision 56
2C38	D5/D6 Fuel Oil System, Attachment A	Revision 15

Temporary Instruction 02-13	24 D6 Fuel Oil Storage Tank ERCS Point	

Unit 2 Pressurizer Spray Valve "A" in Manual

TS Section 3.1.B.2	Pressure/Temperature Limits	Revision 135
USAR, Section 4.4	Reactor Pressure Relief System	Revision 23
DBD SYS-04	Design Bases Document for the Reactor Coolant System	Revision 2
AR CAP 023297	Unit 2 Loop A Pressurizer Spray Valve CV-31228 is Controlling Erratically	April 27, 2002
CE 000135	Evaluate Control Response of the Unit 2 Loop A Pressurizer Spray Valve	April 29, 2002

1R17 Permanent Plant Modifications

USAR, Section 8.4	Plant Standby Diesel Generator System	Revision 23
Design Change Notice 02D101	Isolate D1/D2 Coolant System Cross-Flow	Revision 0
WO 0202198	Install Cross Flow Isolation Valve, Air Vent, Coolant Sample Valve, and Re-Route Expansion Tank Overflow Pipe at D1 Diesel Generator	May 13, 2002
WO 0202199	Install Cross Flow Isolation Valve, Air Vent, Coolant Sample Valve, and Re-Route Expansion Tank Overflow Pipe at D2 Diesel Generator	May 21, 2002
Coltec Industries Letter	Standby Diesel Generator Crossflow	July 8, 1992
Coltec Industries 10 CFR 21 Notification	Part 21 Notification for Fairbanks Morse Engine Division Model 38TD8-1/8 Cooling System Investigation - Arkansas Nuclear One Unit 2	September 13, 1991
ENG-ME-409	Unit 1 Emergency Diesel Generator Heat Exchanger Performance with Reduced Cooling Water Flow	April 9, 2002
ENG-ME-479	Tube Plugging Criteria for Unit 1 Diesel Generator Heat Exchanger	September 27, 2001
ENG-ME-480	Operability Determination for Unit 1 Diesel Generator Heat Exchangers with Tubes Plugged and 85°F Cooling Water	September 28, 2001
Commercial Grade Evaluation Number PI-0348	Application of the Armstrong Model AV-11 Vent in the D1/D2 Diesel Generator Jacket Coolant Lines	Revision 0
Drawing NF-39255-1	Diesel Generator D1 & D2 Units 1 and 2 Flow diagram	Revision Z

Permanent Plant Modifications Biennial Inspection Documents

Procedures

5AWI 3.14.1	Setpoint Control	Revision 12
5AWI 3.14.2	Electrical Process and Protection Setpoint Control	Revision 8
5AWI 6.1.0	Design Change General	Revision 7
5AWI 6.1.1	Design Inputs	Revision 3
5AWI 6.1.2	Design Documents, Review, and Verification	Revision 4
5AWI 6.1.3	Design Change Package, Logs and Records	Revision 2
5AWI 6.1.5	Design Change Implementation Plans	Revision 3
5AWI 6.1.6	Design Change Review and Approval	Revision 5
5AWI 6.1.7	Design Change Work Orders	Revision 5
5AWI 6.1.8	Engineering Change Requests	Revision 2
5AWI 6.1.9	Design Change Turnover for Operation	Revision 3
5AWI 6.1.10	Design Change Close-out	Revision 2
5AWI 6.2.0	Equipment Engineering Change Evaluation	Revision 4
5AWI 6.4.0	Existing Component Functional Performance and Design Requirements Identification	Revision 1
5AWI 6.4.0	Existing Component Functional Performance and Design Requirements Identification	Revision 1
5AWI 8.2.3	Dedication of Commercial Grade Items	Revision 3
C1.1.20.7-1	D1 Diesel Generator Valve Status	Revision 19
C70300	Remote Alarm Response Procedure (Raw Water Supply Not Available)	Revision 1
H9	Fuse Control Program	Revision 6
SP 1210	Monthly Safeguards Hold Verification	Revision 18

Commercial Grade Evaluations

PI-0064	Cooling Water Strainer Parts	Revision 4
PI-0190	VP 591 Flowrite Double Seated Valves and Valve Parts	Revision 4
PI-0343	Westinghouse Test Relay Model 1161540	Revision 1
PI-0348	Armstrong Model AV-11 Vent	Revision 0

Design Changes

99DC02	Replace 12 & 22 Batteries	Revision 0

99DC03	Relocation of 125 Volts Direct Current EQ Circuits	Revision 1
99SF02	Replace Spent Fuel Pool Heat Exchanger	Revision 0
99SI02	Repower Residual Heat Removal Sump B Suction Valves	Revision 0
00FP01	PORV and PORV Block Valve Cable Reroute	Revision 0
00RV01	Bottom Mount Reduced Inventory Thermocouples	Revision 0
01EA01	Bus 12 Control & Instrument Cable Restoration	Revision 0
01VC01	RCP Seal Water Injection Check Valve Replacement/Relocation	Revision 0
02D101	Isolate D1/D2 Coolant System Crossflow	Revision 0
Equipment Engineering Change Evaluations		
1020	AFW Pump Suction and Discharge Pressure Switches	January 31, 2002
1023	RCP Seal Water Injection Check Valves	February 4, 2002
Drawings		
NE-40008, Sh. 39	11 Containment Sump B Isolation Valve B-1 MV 32077	Revision BU
Setpoint Changes		
2TM-405R	New Gains per SP 2722 Loop Delta T	Revision 5
2TR-2002/3	Increase to 190 Degrees. After Replacement Return Setpoint to Original 185 Degrees	Revision 2
Substitution Part/Component Equivalent		
ME-0336	Charging Pump Drive Shaft Keyway Dimensions	December 14, 2001
ME-0690	Replace Diesel Driven Cooling Water Pump Discharge Check Valves	September 27, 2001
PN-0617	Diesel Driven Cooling Water Pump Heat Exchanger Cooling Outlet Valves	April 6, 2001
USAR		
4.4.4	Reactor Pressure Relief System Design Basis	Revision 23
10.2.2	Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System	Revision 23
Miscellaneous		
Temporary Change Notice (TCN) 2002-1056	Unit 1 Startup Procedure	April 9, 2002

TCN 2001-1405	Air Removal System	April 4, 2001
	Engineering Design Standard for Motor Control Center Control Circuit Fuse Selection Criteria, Section 3.3.1.6	Revision 1

1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing

WO 0200988	Replace 2SSH-5566, D5 Engine 1 Overspeed Detector High	
SP 2295	D5 Diesel Generator 6-Month Fast Start	Revision 23
TS 3.7	Auxiliary Electrical Systems	Revision 110
USAR Section 8.4	Plant Standby Diesel Generator Systems	Revision 23
WO 0204455	D1 Water Supply Solenoid Valve	May 14, 2002
TS 3.3.D	Cooling Water System	Revision 131
USAR Section 10.4	Plant Cooling System	Revision 22
AR CAP 023800	12 Diesel Cooling Water Pump Inoperable Due to Governor Hunting	June 12, 2002
SP 1106A	12 Diesel Cooling Water Pump Monthly Test	Revision 59
TS 3.3.C	Component Cooling Water System	Revision 91
USAR Section 10.4.2	Component Cooling System	Revision 22
WO 0115753	P3119-1-22 22 Component Cooling Pump PM	June 19, 2002
Preventive Maintenance Procedure PM 3119-1-22	22 CC Pump Annual Inspection	Revision 13

1R22 Surveillance Testing

SP 1102	11 Turbine-Driven AFW Pump Monthly Test	Revision 75
SP 2102	22 Turbine-Driven AFW Pump Monthly Test	Revision 68
TS 4.8.A	Auxiliary Feedwater System	Revision 116
USAR Section 11.9.2.2	Auxiliary Feedwater System	Revision 23
WO 0201947	Steam Leak on Control Valve 31060	February 28, 2002
SP 1335	D2 Diesel Generator 18-Month 24-Hour Load Test	Revision 7
SP 2307	D6 Diesel Generator 6-Month Fast Start Test	Revision 17
TS 4.6	Periodic Testing of Emergency Power Systems	Revision 113
USAR Section 8.4	Plant Standby Diesel Generator Systems	Revision 23
SP 2094	Bus 25 Load Sequencer Test	Revision 16

TS 4.1-1c, Item 11	Auto Load Sequencers	Revision 161
USAR Section 8.3.2.2	Load Sequencing	Revision 21
AR CAP 023175	Both PORVs Not Declared Inoperable During Performance of SP 1182A (Over-Pressure Protection System Test)	April 19,2002
SP 1182A	Overpressure Protection System Refueling Outage Functional Test	Revision 13W
TS Section 3.1.A.2	Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valves	Revision 135

1R23 Temporary Modifications

5AWI 6.5.0	Temporary Modifications	Revision 11
AR CAP 023902	No AR Written for Portable Fan Set Up at RMU 141	June 19, 2002
Temporary Modification Package 02T121	Installation of a Ground Strap on 2N31 Preamplifier	
50.59 Screening 1408	Temporary Modification 02T121	Revision 0
WO 0201740	Installation of Temporary Modification 02T121	
WO 0201741	Remove Temporary Modification 02T121	
TS Section 3.5	Instrumentation	Revision 111
USAR, Section 7.3	Nuclear Instruments	Revision 23

1EP6 Drill Evaluation

	Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant Emergency Plan Rehearsal Drill Package	April 3, 2002 Revision 0
AR CAP 000092	Technical Support Center Ventilation Door is Not Always Closed After Ventilation is Set Up	
AR CAP 023008	Accountability Report Included Names of Individuals Who Are No Longer Employed	

4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification

NEI 99-02	Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline	Revision 2
LER 1-01-04	Water Intrusion into a Control Rod Electrical Cabinet Results in Dropped Rods Causing a Negative Flux Reactor Trip	Revision 0
LER 1-01-05	Fault and Fire in Non-Safeguards Circuit Breaker Results in Reactor Trip and AFW System Actuation	Revision 0

LER 2-01-04	Manual Turbine Trip/Reactor Trip Due to High Differential Condenser Backpressure	Revision 0
LER 2-01-05	Manual Reactor Trip on Unit 2 Initiated in Response to a High Differential Pressure Between the Turbine Steam Condensers Caused by an Inadvertent Venting of One Condenser While Isolating a Steam Leak	Revision 0
Monthly Operating Reports	July 2001 Through March 2002	
NRC Inspection Reports	01-15, 01-16, 01-17, 01-18, and 01-19	

4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems

USAR Section 2.4.3.5	Floods	Revision 21
USAR Appendix F	Probable Maximum Flood Study	Revision 4
IPEEE NSPLMI-96001 Appendix C, Section C.2.3.1	External Flooding	Revision 0
AB 4	Flood	Revision 20
SP1293	Inspection of Flood Control Measures	Revision 9
Design Change 01BM02	Flood Panel and Door Design Changes	Revision 1
50.59 Screening 1184	Design Change 01BM02, Revision 1	Revision 1
LER 1-01-03	Plant in an Unanalyzed Condition Due to Flood Panel Deficiencies	September 10, 2001
LER 1-01-03, Supplement 1	Plant in an Unanalyzed Condition Due to Flood Panel Deficiencies	April 12, 2002
AR CAP 023003	Defect Weld in Flood Panel MK-4	April 1, 2002
AR CAP 023071	Defect Weld in Flood Panel MK-1	April 11, 2002
AR OTH 023859	AR OTH 000188 Related to D6 Root Cause Closed with Incomplete Action	June 14, 2002
AR OTH 001239	Followup on Status of Technical Communication	May 24, 2002
AR OTH 000188	Revise Communication Process	May 26, 2002
CR 20014617	Prairie Island Not Receiving Technical Service Notes	May 27, 2001
CR 20014518	Perform Independent Review of SACM Related External Operating Experience (XOE) Assessments	May 23, 2001
CR 20015167	Establish Standards for Independence of Technical Advice from Outside Vendors	June 21, 2001
CR 20013446	Develop/Implement Process on Use of Operating Experience	May 14, 2001

CR 20014150	Reassess XOE	May 9, 2001
CR 20014252	Submit LER 2-01-03 for Unit 2 Shutdown	May 14, 2001
CR 20014601	Revise 18-Month PMs for Six-Year AMOT Valves	May 25, 2001
CR 20014611	Evaluate Organization & Programmatic Issues	May 26, 2001
CR 20014612	Review Use of Shell Rotella T in D5 and D6	May 26, 2001
CR 20014696	Develop, Implement, and Reinforce Standardized Tools for Problem Solving	May 30, 2001
CR 20015166	Enforce Management Expectations Involving Independence of Technical Reviews for XOEs	June 21, 2001
CR 20015168	Add a Process to XOE Responses to Monitor Critical Characteristics	June 21, 2001
CR 20017857	Have a Living, Component Specific Database of Operating Experience	September 23, 2001
CR 200185151	Perform a Self-Assessment of the Effectiveness of the Operating Experience Program	October 17, 2001
Permanent Plant Modifications Biennial Inspection Documents		
CR 20016428	Screening 1025 Did Not Identify the Function or Performance Requirement for the Component Being Changed	August 1, 2001
CR 20016467	Screening 1035 Does Not Adequately Identify Design Function	August 3, 2001
CR 20016619	Incomplete 50.59 Screening	August 10, 2001
CR 20016829	Screened Vent Opening Cut in Ends of Buses 11 and in 1990 Without Modification, Now Design Change Process	August 17, 2001
CR 20017759	PINGP 1300 - TCN Marked That Change Was Not Exempt from 50.59 Screening but No Screening Was Documented (20011405)	September 20, 2001
CR 20018422	Screening 1195 and 1194 Did Not Sufficiently Address Why Setpoint Increase Is Not Adverse	October 11, 2001
CR 200185705	50.59 Screening 1196 Did Not Identify in Part 2 That the Activity Involved Could Initiate a Transient	November 1, 2001
CR 200185788	50.59 Screening 1208 & 1209 Not in Compliance with 5AWI 3.3.5	November 5 , 2001
CR 200186587	The Second Factory Acceptance Test for 22 Replacement Battery	November 29, 2001

CR 200187181	Self-Assessment of 50.59 Process	December 18, 2001
CR 200200116	Drawing Changes Contain Errors - Mod 94L473	February 5 , 2002
CR 200200204	Turnover on Modification Was Done Without Work Being Completed. WO Status Was 85 “Work Complete” and Then Was Lost. Work Not Done.	February 27, 2002
CR 200200514	Inadequate Work Order Reviews and/or Walkdowns	January 21, 2002
CR 200200625	Modification 99SF04 Not Closed Within 1 Year as Required by 5AWI6.1.0	January 22, 2002
CR 200200988	Drawing X-H-106-1936 Was Not Updated to Reflect Changes Associated with Modification 79L537	February 1, 2002
CR 200201209	22 Battery Rack Had One HILTI Bolt - Required Minimum Embedment Not Met	February 5, 2002
CR 200201241	Foreign Material Found in One Battery Cell	February 7, 2002
CR 200201335	Piece of Battery Plug Floating Inside 22 Battery Cell	February 9, 2002
CR 200202163	TCN to SP 2103 and SP 2101 Implemented Without 50.59 Screening.	March 5, 2002
AR CAP 000023	Drawing NF 92190 Not Upgraded During Design Change 96C006	March 22, 2002
AR CAP 023224	Potential Negative Trend in Modification Turnovers and Reviews	April 22, 2002
AR CAP 023385	Less Than Adequate Design Change Planning Activities	May 6, 2002
AR CAP 023506	Pipe Support Installed at Wrong Elevation	May 15, 2001
CE 000243	Standard Quality Part Used Where Safety Related Parts are Required	May 17, 2001

4OA3 Event Followup

LER 1-01-03	Plant In Unanalyzed Condition Due to Flood Panel Deficiencies	September 10, 2001
LER 1-01-03, Supplement 1	Plant In Unanalyzed Condition Due to Flood Panel Deficiencies	April 12, 2002
Design Change 01BM02	Flood Panel and Door Design Changes	Revision 1
AR CAP 023003	Defect Weld in Flood Panel MK-4	April 1, 2002
AR CAP 023071	Defect Weld in Flood Panel MK-1	April 11, 2002

3PP Plant Protection

Administrative Work Instruction 5AWI 5.1.0	Site Security	Revision 7
Administrative Work Instruction 5AWI 3.18.0	Fitness-For-Duty Program	Revision 5
Corporate Control Directive N1ACD 2.12	Fitness-For-Duty Program	Revision 3
	Fitness-For-Duty Program Performance Data	June 30 and December 31, 2001
	Security Event Logs	September 2001 through May 2002
Nuclear Oversight Observation Report (NOOR) 2001-06-1116	Fitness-For-Duty	August 6 and September 6, 2001
NOOR 2001-06-130	Corrective Actions	September 17-19, 2001
NOOR 2001-06-131	Self-Assessments	September 21, 2001
Security Administrative Procedure SAP 2.8	Quarterly Security Report	Revision 2
Security Instruction Procedure (SIP) 1.1	Badge Control	Revision 0
SIP 1.5	Escort Responsibilities	Revision 0
SIP 4.1	Testing and Inspection of Systems and Equipment	revision 2
SIP 4.2	Calibration and Surveillance Procedure	Revision 0
SIP 5.1	Reporting of Security Events	Revision 3
SP 1620	Quarterly Metal Detector Calibration	Revision 10
SP 1621	Explosive Vapor Detector Annual Test	Revision 13
SP 1653	Quarterly X-Ray Machine Test	Revision 6
	Summary of Access Equipment WO/PM/SPS	July 17.2001 through June 14, 2002

	Security Activity Reports	October 2001 through March 2002
4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification		
	FFD Personnel Reliability, Personnel Screening, and Security Equipment Performance Indicator Data	Fourth Quarter 2001 through First Quarter 2002
SAP 2.8	Quarterly Security Report	Revision 2
	Security Event Logs	October 2001 through March 2002