Nov. 19, 2009: Trees left after others were harvested for lumber in the Van Eck Oregon Forest. A cap-and-trade system could pay private forest owners for trees left standing. The Pacific Forest Trust manages this forest for carbon storage & lumber.
AP Photo
Post-Durban Climate Policy Architecture Based on Linkage of Cap-and-Trade Systems
In a new discussion paper, Matthew Ranson and Harvard Project Director Robert Stavins evaluate links among independent tradable permit systems for greenhouse gases. Because linkage reduces the cost of achieving given targets, tremendous pressure exists to link existing and planned cap-and-trade systems.
FEATURED PUBLICATIONS
April 26, 2012
New Policy Idea: Buy Coal! A Case for Supply-Side Environmental Policy
By Bryan Galcik
Bard Harstad, Associate Professor of Managerial Economics and Decision Sciences at the Kellogg School of Management at Northwestern University, recently released a study, "Buy Coal! A Case for Supply-Side Environmental Policy," which will be published in a forthcoming issue of the Journal of Political Economy.
May 22, 2012
"Post-Kyoto International Climate Policy: Implementing Architectures for Agreement"
By Bryan Galcik
Carol Dahl, Professor of Mineral and Energy Economics at the Colorado School of Mines, recently published an extensive review and summary (log in may be required) of this Harvard-Project volume, along with the companion Post-Kyoto International Climate Policy: Summary for Policy Makers, in the Energy Journal (Vol. 33, No. 2, 2012). Professor Dahl notes that "Anyone interested in climate policy, especially economists and policy makers that are non-specialist in the area, but looking for a good overview of the problems and potential solutions, can benefit from this book."
March 2012
"Incentives and Stability of International Climate Coalitions: An Integrated Assessment"
By Valentina Bosetti, Carlo Carraro, Enrica De Cian, Emanuele Massetti and Massimo Tavoni
"A successful international climate policy framework will have to meet two conditions, build a coalition of countries that is potentially effective and give each member country sufficient incentives to join and remain in this coalition. Such coalition should be capable of delivering ambitious emission reduction even if some countries do not take mitigation action. In addition, it should meet the target without exceedingly high mitigation costs and deliver a net benefit to member countries as a whole. The novel contribution of this paper is mostly methodological, but it also adds a better qualification of well-known results that are policy relevant."
March 2012
"A Good Opening: The Key to Make the Most of Unilateral Climate Action"
By Valentina Bosetti and Enrica De Cian
In a new Harvard Project Discussion Paper, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei's Valentina Bosetti and Enrica De Cian model the behavior of countries not participating in a cooperative climate regime. The regime imposes counterbalancing influences upon these countries, but under some conditions they may act to both reduce emissions and increase clean-energy R&D
January 2012
The SO2 Allowance Trading System and the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990: Reflections on Twenty Years of Policy Innovation
By Gabriel Chan, Robert N. Stavins, Albert Pratt Professor of Business and Government; Member of the Board; Director, Harvard Project on Climate Agreements, Robert C. Stowe, Executive Director, Harvard Environmental Economics Program; Manager, Harvard Project on Climate Agreements and Richard Sweeney
The introduction of the U.S. SO2 allowance-trading program to address the threat of acid rain as part of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 is a landmark event in the history of environmental regulation. The program was a great success by almost all measures. Ironically, cap and trade seems especially well suited to addressing the problem of climate change, in that emitted greenhouse gases are evenly distributed throughout the world's atmosphere. Recent hostility toward cap and trade in debates about U.S. climate legislation may reflect the broader political environment of the climate debate more than the substantive merits of market-based regulation.
February 16, 2012
"Harvard Project on Climate Agreements Hosts Chinese Climate Change Study Tour"
By Robert C. Stowe, Executive Director, Harvard Environmental Economics Program; Manager, Harvard Project on Climate Agreements
The Harvard Project on Climate Agreements hosted, on January 10, 2012, a study tour of Chinese officials working in climate and energy policy. The tour was organized by the World Resources Institute's China office. The study tour and several members of the Harvard faculty discussed options and prospects for international policy to address global climate change.
December 5, 2011
"A Wave of the Future: International Linkage of Carbon Markets"
Outreach
By Robert N. Stavins, Albert Pratt Professor of Business and Government; Member of the Board; Director, Harvard Project on Climate Agreements
"...[I]t remains true that cap-and-trade is still the most likely domestic policy approach for CO2 emissions reductions throughout the industrialised world, given the rather unattractive set of available alternative approaches. This makes it important to think about the possibility of linking these national and regional cap-and-trade systems in the future. Such linking occurs when the government that maintains one system allows regulated entities to use allowances or credits from other systems to meet compliance obligations."