Unleashing the Nuclear Watchdog: Strengthening and Reform of the IAEA
A new report by Managing the Atom fellow Trevor Findlay suggests reforms that could toughen the IAEA’s role as the world’s principal nuclear safety and security agency. Findlay wrote the study for two leading Canadian nuclear research groups as the culmination of a two-year research project that examined all aspects of the mandate and operations of the International Atomic Energy Agency
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FEATURED PUBLICATIONS
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May 21, 2012
"How To Avoid a War with Iran"
Foreign Policy
By Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom; Co-Principal Investigator, Energy Research, Development, Demonstration, and Deployment (ERD3) Policy Project and Abbas Maleki, Senior Associate, International Security Program
Observers would be forgiven for dismissing negotiations over Iran's nuclear program as Kabuki theater. Despite years of on-again, off-again efforts, after all, fears of war continue to simmer. Such frustrations are understandable -- but they may not be entirely justified.
Press TV
May 28, 2012
"Prospects for a WMD-Free Zone in the Middle East"
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
By Martin B. Malin, Executive Director, Project on Managing the Atom
As negotiations with Iran over the future of its nuclear program inch toward a possible deal, another intractable Middle East problem with a nuclear dimension is likely to start getting more serious attention. It is the question of whether there is any chance that Israel, Iran, and their Arab neighbors will agree to discuss establishing a regional zone free of all nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and their delivery systems. After decades of backsliding, proliferation, and conflict in the Middle East, the conventional wisdom says the current round of efforts will fail. I think the conventional wisdom is wrong.
AP Photo/Jorge Saenz
March 2012
Progress on Securing Nuclear Weapons and Materials: The Four-Year Effort and Beyond
By Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom; Co-Principal Investigator, Energy Research, Development, Demonstration, and Deployment (ERD3) Policy Project, Eben Harrell, Research Associate, Project on Managing the Atom and Martin B. Malin, Executive Director, Project on Managing the Atom
On the eve of the Nuclear Security Summit in Seoul, South Korea, a new study finds that an international initiative to secure all vulnerable nuclear stockpiles within four years has reduced the dangers they pose.
U.S. Department of Energy
March 2012
Consolidation: Thwarting Nuclear Theft
By Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom; Co-Principal Investigator, Energy Research, Development, Demonstration, and Deployment (ERD3) Policy Project and Eben Harrell, Research Associate, Project on Managing the Atom
A detailed assessment of the campaign to consolidate dangerous nuclear materials worldwide in fewer, more secure sites, with analysis of success stories, ongoing risks, near-term opportunities, and numerous recommendations for next steps.
AP Photo
January/February 2012
"Nuclear Weapons 2011: Momentum Slows, Reality Returns"
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, issue 1, volume 68
By Steven E. Miller, Director, International Security Program; Editor-in-Chief, International Security; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom
In the Doomsday Clock issue of the Bulletin, the author takes a look at five events that unfolded in 2011 and that seem certain to cast a powerful shadow in months and years to come. No new breakthroughs occurred, the author writes, adding that 2012 could be a much more difficult year.
Winter 2012
Reducing Nuclear Dangers
Issues in Science and Technology, issue 2, volume 28
By Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom; Co-Principal Investigator, Energy Research, Development, Demonstration, and Deployment (ERD3) Policy Project
Matthew Bunn reviewed Ron Rosenbaum's How the End Begins: The Road to a Nuclear World War III for Issues in Science and Technology, arguing that Rosenbaum is right to be alarmed, but misses both some of the most important threats and some of the most compelling solutions that would help make the world safer.
December 20, 2011
Pyongyang's Proliferation
Time
By Eben Harrell, Research Associate, Project on Managing the Atom
Eben Harrell published an op-ed on TIME.com about Kim Jong Il's nuclear proliferation legacy.
AP Photo
May 26, 2011
"Preventing the Next Fukushima"
By Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom; Co-Principal Investigator, Energy Research, Development, Demonstration, and Deployment (ERD3) Policy Project and Olli Heinonen, Senior Fellow, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs
This week, when the leaders of the G8 industrial democracies gather in France, their meeting will include discussions of what steps must be taken to strengthen global nuclear safety and global nuclear security in the aftermath of the tragedy at Fukushima. The Belfer Center's Matthew Bunn and Olli Heinonen suggest new actions the world community should take in five key areas in order to prevent another Fukushima.
AP Photo
September 16, 2011
"Nuclear Proliferation: The Crime with No Punishment?"
TIME / time.com
By Eben Harrell, Research Associate, Project on Managing the Atom
"Nuclear proliferation is a crime that pays well. Those involved in the Khan network were made very wealthy for their efforts, and the inability of the international community to effectively punish them has resulted in a missed opportunity to provide a deterrent against future black-market salesmen."
May 2011
Limiting Transfers of Enrichment and Reprocessing Technology: Issues, Constraints, Options
By Fred McGoldrick, Associate, Project on Managing the Atom, Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom; Co-Principal Investigator, Energy Research, Development, Demonstration, and Deployment (ERD3) Policy Project, Martin B. Malin, Executive Director, Project on Managing the Atom and William H. Tobey, Senior Fellow, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs
Fred McGoldrick authored a report, entitled "Limiting Transfers of Enrichment and Reprocessing Technology: Issues, Constraints, Options" that provides an informed analysis and set of recommendations on how to strengthen restraints on the transfer of enrichment and reprocessing technologies in a manner that would be acceptable to all Nuclear Suppliers Group members, and would be credible to the major exporting states and industry.
AP Photo
March 15, 2011
"Japan's Nuclear Crisis: 6 Reasons Why We Should—and Shouldn't—Worry"
Christian Science Monitor
By Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom; Co-Principal Investigator, Energy Research, Development, Demonstration, and Deployment (ERD3) Policy Project
"Security, by contrast, is something most people in the nuclear industry might get a half-hour briefing on once a year. If you have intelligent adversaries, it wouldn't be a surprise to have the main power for the cooling and the backup power both fail — the adversaries would plan to make sure that happened. This transforms all the probabilities we rely on for safety. The global nuclear safety regime needs strengthening — but it is far stronger than the global nuclear security regime. And that applies to theft of nuclear material as well as sabotage of facilities."
April 2010
Securing the Bomb 2010
By Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom; Co-Principal Investigator, Energy Research, Development, Demonstration, and Deployment (ERD3) Policy Project
Associate Professor of Public Policy and Project on Managing the Atom Co-Principal Investigator Matthew Bunn provides a comprehensive assessment of global efforts to secure and consolidate nuclear stockpiles, and a detailed action plan for securing all nuclear materials in four years. Securing the Bomb 2010 was commissioned by the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI). The full report, with additional information on the threat of nuclear terrorism, is available for download on the NTI website.
October 2010
Promoting Safe, Secure, and Peaceful Growth of Nuclear Energy: Next Steps for Russia and the United States
By Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom; Co-Principal Investigator, Energy Research, Development, Demonstration, and Deployment (ERD3) Policy Project and Evgeny Velikhov
The Managing the Atom (MTA) Project and the Russian Research Center’s "Kurchatov Institute" collaboratively authored a report entitled Promoting Safe, Secure, and Peaceful Growth of Nuclear Energy: Next Steps for Russia and the United States. This report is intended to provide recommendations for enabling large-scale growth of nuclear energy while achieving even higher standards of safety, security, and nonproliferation than are in place today.
www.raceforiran.com
June 8, 2010
"Four Reasons the US Could Get Israel to Talk About a Middle East Free of Weapons of Mass Destruction"
Christian Science Monitor
By Martin B. Malin, Executive Director, Project on Managing the Atom
Martin Malin articulates four reasons the US could get Israel to talk about a Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction, even in light of the recent furor over Israel's attack on the Gaza-bound flotilla in an Op-Ed in the Christian Science Monitor.
Fall 2009
"Enabling a Nuclear Revival—and Managing Its Risks"
Innovations, issue 4, volume 4
By Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom; Co-Principal Investigator, Energy Research, Development, Demonstration, and Deployment (ERD3) Policy Project and Martin B. Malin, Executive Director, Project on Managing the Atom
Matthew Bunn and Martin B. Malin examine the conditions needed for nuclear energy to grow on a scale large enough for it to be a significant part of the world’s response to climate change. They consider the safety, security, nonproliferation, and waste management risks associated with such growth and recommend approaches to managing these risks. Bunn and Malin argue that although technological solutions may contribute to nuclear expansion in the coming decades, in the near term, creating the conditions for large-scale nuclear energy growth will require major international institutional innovation.
April 2010
"China's Perspective on a Nuclear-Free World"
Washington Quarterly, issue 2, volume 33
By Hui Zhang, Senior Research Associate, Project on Managing the Atom
Hui Zhang argues that China's pledge of no-first-use of nuclear weapons, while constraining its nuclear force at a minimum level, maintaining its deeply de-alerted status, and upholding its long-standing position to support complete nuclear disarmament, has set a good example for other nuclear nations, in particular the two nuclear superpowers. Zhang suggests that Beijing believes that all nuclear states should adopt a no-first-use policy and redefine the role of nuclear weapons in their national security doctrines. Although China stands ready to support the nuclear-free agenda, it is up to the two countries with the overwhelming number of the world's warheads to take the lead.
AP Photo
Fall 2009
"Nuclear Power Without Nuclear Proliferation?"
Daedalus, issue 4, volume 138
By Steven E. Miller, Director, International Security Program; Editor-in-Chief, International Security; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom and Scott Sagan, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, 1981-1982; Editorial Board Member, Quarterly Journal: International Security
Will the growth of nuclear power lead to increased risks of nuclear weapons proliferation and nuclear terrorism? Will the nonproliferation regime be adequate to ensure safety and security in a world more widely and heavily invested in nuclear power? The authors in this two-volume (Fall 2009 and Winter 2010) special issue of Dædalus have one simple and clear answer to these questions: It depends.
June 2008
100 Grams (and Counting...): Notes from the Nuclear Underworld
This report on the 2006 seizure of weapon-grade highly enriched uranium (HEU) in Georgia, by journalist Michael Bronner, provides new insights on both nuclear smugglers and those trying to stop them.
April, 1998
Getting to Zero: Is Pursuing a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World Too Difficult? Too Dangerous? Too Distracting?
By John P. Holdren, Former Director and Faculty Chair, Science, Technology and Public Policy Program
John P. Holdren sorts out some of the conceptual and terminological ambiguities about the meaning of "zero" nuclear weapons in this paper.
December 2003
The Economics of Reprocessing vs. Direct Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel
By Bob van der Zwaan, Former Research Associate, Energy Technology Innovation Research Group/Project on Managing the Atom Project/Science, Technology, and Public Policy Program, 2001-2005, John P. Holdren, Former Director and Faculty Chair, Science, Technology and Public Policy Program, Steve Fetter, Former Associate, Science, Technology, and Public Policy Program and Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom; Co-Principal Investigator, Energy Research, Development, Demonstration, and Deployment (ERD3) Policy Project
For decades, there has been an intense debate over the best approach to managing spent fuel from nuclear power reactors, whether it is better to dispose of it directly in geologic repositories, or reprocess it to recover and recycle the plutonium and uranium, disposing only of the wastes from reprocessing and recycling.
