U.S. NRC Blog

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Radioactive Rumor Mill Doesn’t Help Anyone

Last week, the NRC’s Region III Office in Chicago spent the better part of a day dispelling rumors of a nuclear emergency on the border of Indiana and Michigan after two non-governmental radiation monitoring networks allegedly showed extremely high radiation readings. Before the readings were verified as anything beyond equipment malfunction – which is exactly what they were – social media and the rumor mill kicked into gear.

A YouTube video about the “radiation spike” was posted early in the morning and spread like wildfire. In the blink of an eye media outlets were inundated with panicked calls from the public who had seen the YouTube video. Calls from the media and the public poured into the NRC, state officials and to the nearest nuclear power plants — Palisades and D.C. Cook.

We did our due diligence –we checked with the power plants, which were operating normally with no unusual radiation release, and we checked with the state officials in Indiana and Michigan. And we also reported the calls to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security.

Eventually, the radiation network reporting the spike, organized and maintained by local citizens, informed the public that they had experienced an equipment malfunction and made a reporting mistake due to “out-of-control readings on the GeigerGraph screen.”

Fortunately, the incident was not real and the rumor mill in this instance was short lived. Though a week later we are still receiving calls from the public and media outlets who had not heard it was a false rumor. It’s important to remember that local and state agencies and the federal government are the best, most accurate source of verified, credible emergency information. As we’ve seen before, unofficial social media can get information wrong.

Prema Chandrathil
Public Affairs Officer, Region III

Potassium Iodine – A protective measure not a magic pill

One of the protective measures that communities around nuclear power plants might use in the case of a radiological emergency is potassium iodine. But potassium iodine, often just called by its chemical symbol, KI, can be confusing for the public — exactly what does it do and when should it be taken?

So here are some facts about KI:

  • It is not an “anti radiation” pill. Potassium iodide is a salt, similar to table salt. It is routinely added to table salt to make it “iodized.” Potassium iodide, if taken within the appropriate time and at the appropriate dosage prevents the thyroid gland from taking in radioactive iodine. This can help to reduce the risk from thyroid disease, including cancer as a result of a severe reactor accident. KI doesn’t protect the thyroid gland from any other radioactive element nor does it protect the thyroid or the whole body from external exposure to radiation. Its use is very limited.
  • KI comes as a tablet, either in 65 mg or 130 mg strengths. The usual dose for a child is 65 mg, however, it is very important that the FDA dosing guidelines be followed for small children as too much stable iodine can also be harmful to them. The tablet can be easily crushed and mixed with liquid to make it easier to swallow.
  • It is important that KI not be taken unless directed by appropriate state or local authorities during the emergency and then, it should be taken in accordance with those directions.
  • KI is NOT the same thing as table salt, and table salt should never be ingested as a substitute.
  • The NRC provides KI – free of charge — to states that have requested it for their population within the 10-mile emergency planning zone of a nuclear power plant. Some states have distributed KI to residents of a plant’s emergency planning zone. In other states, KI is stockpiled and would be distributed if and when it is necessary.
  • In the event of a serious nuclear incident, KI could be used in addition to evacuation or sheltering in place in accordance with directions from responsible state/local officials. For more information, see Consideration of Potassium Iodide in Emergency Planning.

The FDA’s Frequently Asked Questions on KI is a very good resource if you want more information.

Patricia Milligan
Senior Level Advisor

The Saga of the Californium Flux Multiplier

Kodak is one of the nation’s iconic brands, forever associated with camera equipment, photographic film, and related materials and services. The idea of capturing a “Kodak moment” is a familiar one to many Americans, especially those of a certain age.

Based in Rochester, N.Y., and known more formally as the Eastman Kodak Co., its origins date to 1889, when George Eastman founded the firm. In recent years, Kodak has sought to keep pace with changing consumer demand by transforming itself into a digitally oriented company and, as part of this shift, has made a number of changes.

It was against this backdrop that the Rochester Democrat and Chronicle newspaper reported in early May that Kodak had, for more than three decades, operated a small nuclear research reactor, unbeknownst to the public. More about that last part in a moment.

But one element of the story that needs clarifying is that the device – known by the elegant name of Californium Flux Multiplier – was a “reactor.” In the truest sense of the word, it did not qualify as one.

While the Kodak device, which was decommissioned and removed in 2007, made use of plates containing highly enriched uranium, it was incapable of sustaining the fissioning, or splitting, of atoms. In nuclear power reactors, atoms are fissioned to release large amounts of heat that can then be tapped to produce power for the grid.

This unique piece of equipment was used to conduct chemical and radiological analyses on manufacturing processes. It also was used to investigate new chemicals and explore new technologies that might be of interest to any of the company’s various operating divisions.

Enriched uranium contained in the Californium Flux Multiplier was in the form of fuel plates clad in aluminum alloy. The plates formed a sub-critical (or below the point of fissioning) assembly that surrounded a Cf-252 (Cf stands for Californium) source. The U-235 (U stands for uranium) fuel was able to multiply the neutrons coming from the Cf-252 source, which fissions spontaneously.

The device was designed to remain always sub-critical, but it nevertheless yielded sufficient neutrons for neutron activation analysis.

After the Californium Flux Multiplier was shut down, all of the fuel plates were removed from the facility and transferred back to the U.S. Department of Energy in late November 2007.

So even though media outlets might use the shorthand reference of “reactor” to refer to the device, in this case a reactor by any other name is not a reactor.

The Democrat and Chronicle reported that it learned of the device from a Kodak employee and emphasized the lack of public awareness regarding it over its many years of operation. But a lack of awareness should not be confused with an effort to keep information about the Californium Flux Multiplier under wraps.

Indeed, a quick check of the NRC’s web site yields numerous documents regarding the device. One area of exception would be details related to security, including shipments of the special nuclear materials used in the device. There are thousands of NRC-licensed devices containing nuclear materials in use across the U.S. Some, it could be said, are easier to picture than others.

Neil Sheehan
Public Affairs Officer, Region I

The Challenge of Decommissioning a One-of-a-Kind Reactor

The spent fuel cask will be moved from the dome-shaped reactor building using a heavy-duty overhead crane. A special “crawler” vehicle (not pictured) will move the fuel cask to a secure storage pad.

Early nuclear power plants in the United States were custom designs, but the LaCrosse Boiling Water Reactor in Wisconsin was truly unique in both its design and construction. That uniqueness has carried over into the work to decommission and dismantle the plant.

Owned by the Dairyland Power Cooperative, the facility on the Mississippi River near Genoa, Wisconsin, is very small — producing just 50 megawatts of electricity — compared to 1,000 or more megawatts from later reactor designs. It was one of several demonstration reactors funded, in part, by the Atomic Energy Commission, the predecessor to the NRC. The plant was completed in 1967 and operated until April 1987. It was the only reactor built by Allis Chalmers, a company best known until the mid-1980s for its tractors and farm equipment.

In the 25 years since the plant was shut down, the NRC has monitored and inspected activities at the plant to assure continued protection of public safety and the environment. NRC requirements have also remained in place to maintain security at the facility.

Since shutdown, the plant has been maintained in a safe and secure condition until the plant can be fully decommissioned. In 2007 the 310-ton reactor vessel was removed from the plant and shipped to South Carolina for permanent disposal.

Spent fuel from the reactor’s 20 years of operation has been safely housed in the plant’s spent fuel storage pool. The Dairyland Power Cooperative has been developing plans over the past several years to transfer that fuel into five concrete and steel storage casks for interim storage on a specially constructed concrete pad at the site. Similar dry cask storage systems are in use at about 65 sites across the country.

Moving that fuel, however, has posed special challenges for this unique facility. The pool holding the spent fuel is too small to accommodate the cask used to load and transfer the spent fuel. Faced with the lack of space in the spent fuel pool itself, LaCrosse engineers devised a unique solution of converting the structure that formerly housed the reactor into a cask loading pool. The former reactor structure, which adjoins the spent fuel storage pool, will be filled with water for the cask loading. Once the cask is loaded, the loading pool will be drained and a gateway opened. A heavy-load overhead crane will move the cask outside the loading area.

Throughout the process, NRC engineers and inspectors have evaluated each step, including review of the construction of the storage pad and modifications to form the cask loading pool. All activities are assessed to assure that the unique concepts can be safely implemented for workers, the public, and the environment.

Before actually loading and moving the spent fuel, plant personnel are performing “dry runs” without actually loading the fuel assemblies to assure that the cask loading and transport equipment and procedures are ready for safe movement of the fuel. NRC inspectors have been on site to inspect these “dry run” activities.

The actual fuel movements will begin later this summer and NRC inspectors will be on hand to inspect the loading and movement of at least the first of the five casks.

Christine Lipa, Chief
Materials Control, ISFSI and Decommissioning Branch
Region III

Monitoring Labor Negotiations Is Part of the Regulator’s Job

The NRC’s Region I Office has been monitoring contract negotiations for some unionized workers at the Pilgrim nuclear power plant. The Plymouth, Mass., plant is operated by Entergy Nuclear Operations. The United Workers Union of America Local 369 represents members of the maintenance, radiation protection, chemistry, and operations organizations. The two sides have been unable to reach a contract agreement and Entergy is using replacement workers to staff union positions throughout the plant.

This isn’t the first contract negotiations the region, or agency, has tracked. Most have settled before contract expiration, but workers at Nine Mile Point in Scriba, N.Y., took to the picket lines last summer for several week. And, unionized workers at Oyster Creek in Forked River, N.J. struck for nearly three months in 2003.

While job actions don’t happen that frequently, the NRC is prepared when they do. In advance of the contract expiration, the company that operates the plant develops a contingency plan to allow it to continue operating in the event of a strike. The NRC Resident Inspectors assigned to the site review the plans and discuss the actions being taken to prepare for a strike, should it occur.

The NRC doesn’t involve itself in contract negotiations. We ensure that the minimum requirements of the facility’s license and technical specifications are maintained at all times. We also review the qualifications of replacement workers to ensure the continued safe operation of the facility.

During the final hours of a contract, the two NRC Resident Inspectors at the site are supplemented by additional inspectors from the Regional Office. Should there be a strike, we have round-the-clock control room coverage by NRC inspectors for the first 48 hours and continued additional site coverage for at least the first two weeks.

Until a settlement is reached, we’ll ensure the plant continues to be operated safely.

Diane Screnci
Senior Public Affairs Officer, Region I
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