GRANTED ISSUES
NOTE: THE WORDING OF THE ISSUES IS TAKEN VERBATIM FROM THE PARTIES’ PETITIONS FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW.
ISSUES GRANTED SEPTEMBER 30, 2009
PDR NO. NAME COUNTY OFFENSE
09-0512 KUCIEMBA, JULIAN WASHINGTON DRIVING WHILE
INTOXICATED
In order for the evidence to be legally sufficient to sustain a conviction for driving while intoxicated, is it necessary that there be presented direct evidence, instead of circumstantial evidence, of the time of the defendant's driving, thereby establishing a direct link, as opposed to a circumstantial link, to the defendant's intoxicated state at the time of driving?
ALPHABETICAL LISTING WITHOUT ISSUES
PDR NO. NAME DATE GRANTED
08-1219-21 ADAMS, JOHNNY, JR. 01/29/09
08-0144 AMADOR, JUSTIN 04/30/08
08-1441 ANDERSON, DAVID LEE, II 02/04/09
09-0039 BLACKSHERE, HARVILL 03/18/09
09-0914 BOWLEY, TROY A. 09/16/09
09-0210 BROOKS, KELVIN KIANTA 06/03/09
07-1046 BROOKS, TENIKA 10/10/07
09-1081 CAMPBELL, JAMES L. 09/23/09
09-0606 CARTER, CARL ALLEN 09/23/09
09-0250/51 CHADWICK, CLAUDE WAYNE 09/16/09
09-0529-45 COLYANDRO, JOHN DOMINICK 08/19/09
09-0531-45 COLYANDRO, JOHN DOMINICK 08/19/09
09-0490 CONTRERAS, SAUL 09/23/09
09-0145 COVEY, JOHN CHRISTOPHER, JR. 04/29/09
07-1634 CRUMPTON, LINDSEY ALYN 04/09/08
09-0873 DOBBS, MATTHEW RYAN 09/16/09
09-0504 DOSTER, OSCAR ROY 06/10/09
08-1713 DUNBAR, WENDY R. 03/11/09
09-0529-45 ELLIS, JAMES W. 08/19/09
07-1616 ESPARZA, EDWARD 02/06/08
09-0147 EVANS, TIMOTHY K. 03/18/09
09-1016 FLORES, FELIX 09/23/09
08-1753 FORD, ROSS LAYTON 02/11/09
08-1323 GARFIAS, CHRISTOPHER 03/18/09
07-0904 GARNER, CHRISTOPHER 10/31/07
08-1761 GARZA, ALVIN MIKE 03/25/09
09-0381 GARZA, DAVID 05/20/09
08-1645 GILBERT, STEPHEN 01/28/09
08-1086 GOLLIHAR, ORALIA LOPEZ 11/05/08
09-0337 GONZALES, ROBERT L. 08/19/09
08-0882 GONZALES, RUDY 12/10/08
09-0137 GREY, STEVEN 03/25/09
08-1661/62 GUERRERO, EDUARDO 01/14/09
09-0319 HOBBS, ERIC CHARLES 05/20/09
09-0493 HUBERT, DOUGLAS MICHAEL 06/10/09
08-1123 HUGHEN, JEFFERY DANIEL 04/22/09
08-1124 HUGHEN, JEFFERY DANIEL 01/14/09
08-1097 IRBY, CHRISTOPHER 11/19/08
09-0261 JENNINGS, DELVETRA LASHERL 04/29/09
09-0499/500 JONES, STEPHEN BERNARD 09/16/09
08-1111 JOSEPH, WESLEY CHARLES 02/11/09
09-0666 JUAREZ, JAIME CASA, JR. 06/10/09
08-1318 KENNEDY, MICHAEL PATRICK 02/25/09
09-0379 KRISCH, BRIAN THOMAS 04/29/09
09-0512 KUCIEMBA, JULIAN 09/30/09
08-1780 LANGHAM, PAMELA SHAREKA 02/04/09
09-0401 LOVILL, AMBER 05/06/09
08-1263 MANSFIELD, RODGER EUGENE, JR. 02/11/09
09-0069 MAYER, KENNETH LEE 06/10/09
08-1494 McFATRIDGE, MELANIE D. 04/08/09
09-1121 MERCIER, EUGENE 09/23/09
08-1708/09 MILES, LEONARD, III 09/23/09
09-0154 MONGE, ABELINO 08/19/09
07-0240 MORRIS, REGINALD EUGENE 09/12/07
08-0798 MURPHY, ANN ELIZABETH 09/24/08
08-1055 MURRAY, RAYMOND DESMOND 11/05/08
09-0560 PEREZ, OSCAR, JR. 09/23/09
08-1205 POWELL, ROBERT LEAHY 01/14/09
08-1611 PRUDHOLM, GABRIEL LEMELL 03/18/09
08-0812 RAMOS, HERNAN ARQUIMIDES 12/10/08
08-0917 RESENDEZ, ANGEL 11/26/08
08-0463 RODRIGUEZ, ROMAN 06/18/08
09-0513 RODRIGUEZ, ROSS A. 06/10/09
08-1533 ROUSE, JEFFERY 01/14/09
08-0198 SAAVEDRA, JOSE CARMON 04/09/08
09-245/46 SAFETY NATIONAL CASUALTY CORP.,
AGENT MICHAEL W. COX 06/24/09
07-0961 SANCHEZ, ORLANDO 10/03/07
08-1805 SMITH, JOSEPH DENVER 05/20/09
08-1569 STRINGER, FRANCIS WILLIAM 04/08/09
09-0266-68 TAYLOR, TRACY PAUL 08/19/09
09-0265 TOLBERT, VICKIE LASHUN 03/25/09
08-1218 TRINIDAD, FRANK 01/28/09
08-0385 URANGA, JOHN III 08/20/08
08-1366-69 VITAL, JOSEPH aka VOTTA, JOSEPH 01/28/09
09-0193 WHITE, JIMMIE DALE 06/24/09
09-0307 WILSON, RONALD 04/08/09
09-0008 WILSON, WILLIAM RODNEY aka 07/01/09
CORRICK, WILLIAM
NUMERICAL LISTING WITH ISSUES GRANTED
07-0240 MORRIS, REGINALD EUGENE 09/12/07
APPELLANT’S & STATE’S MONTGOMERY INTOXICATION
MANSLAUGHTER
APPELLANT’S:
1. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN REFORMING THE TRIAL COURT’S STACKING ORDER RATHER THAN VACATING IT IN ITS ENTIRETY.
2. THE COURT OF APPEALS DECISION CONCERNING APPELLANT’S COMPETENCY TO STAND TRIAL CONFLICTS WITH THIS COURT’S DECISIONS IN JACKSON V. STATE, 548 S.W.2D 685 (TEX. CRIM. APP. 1977), CASEY V. STATE, 924 S.W.2D 936 (TEX. CRIM. APP. 1996) AND MERAZ V. STATE, 785 S.W.2D 146 (TEX. CRIM. APP. 1990).
STATE’S:
1. SHOULD JACKSON V. STATE, 548 S.W.2D 685 (TEX. CRIM. APP. 1977), BE OVERRULED IN PART BECAUSE THE REVIEW OF THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF A COMPETENCY JURY’S VERDICT SHOULD BE RESTRICTED TO THE EVIDENCE BEFORE THE JURY?
2. IF A TRIAL COURT PRONOUNCES A LEGAL ALTERNATIVE RULING ON THE CUMULATION OF SENTENCES, SHOULD A COURT OF APPEALS REFORM THE JUDGMENT CONTRARY TO THAT RULING? IN OTHER WORDS, SHOULD EX PARTE SADLER, 283 S.W.2D 235 (TEX. CRIM. APP. 1955), BE OVERRULED WITH RESPECT TO ITS AUTOMATIC REFORMATION OF A JUDGMENT TO STRIKE THE ERRONEOUS CUMULATION ORDER AND RUN THE SENTENCES CONCURRENTLY?
07-0904 GARNER, CHRISTOPHER 10/31/07
COURT’S MOTION BRAZOS AGGRAVATED ROBBERY
ON COURT’S OWN MOTION
IS THE COURT OF APPEALS’ OPINION, WHICH ADDRESSES THE MERITS OF POINTS OF ERROR OF AN ANDERS APPEAL, CONSISTENT WITH BLEDSOE V. STATE, 178 S.W.3d 824 (TEX.CRIM.APP. 2005)?
07-0961 SANCHEZ, ORLANDO 10/03/07
STATE’S HIDALGO MURDER
1. DOES A TRIAL COURT COMMIT ERROR BY INSTRUCTING THE JURY ON THE STATE'S ALTERNATE THEORY OF MURDER BY A "MANNER AND MEANS TO THE GRAND JURY UNKNOWN" WHERE THE SOLE MEDICAL EXPERT TESTIFIED REPEATEDLY THAT HE COULD NOT DETERMINE THE EXACT MANNER AND MEANS OF DEATH BY ASPHYXIATION?
2. WHEN ASSESSING CHARGE ERROR, IS A COURT OF APPEALS FREE TO REWEIGH AND REINTERPRET THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED AT TRIAL?
3. MAY AN APPELLATE COURT USE THE HICKS RULE TO EVALUATE WHETHER A "MANNER AND MEANS UNKNOWN TO THE GRAND JURY" THEORY WAS PROPERLY SUBMITTED TO THE JURY AND, IF SO, HAS THE THIRTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS APPLIED THE RULE CORRECTLY?
4. IN THE ALTERNATIVE, CAN AN ERRONEOUSLY SUBMITTED ALTERNATE THEORY BE HARMFUL WHEN THE REVIEWING COURT FINDS THE EVIDENCE SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE CONVICTION UNDER ANOTHER SUBMITTED THEORY?
07-1046 BROOKS, TENIKA 10/10/07
APPELLANT’S NACOGDOCHES AGGREGATE THEFT
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS MISCHARACTERIZED PETITIONER'S CHALLENGE TO THE INSTANT INDICTMENT AS A CHALLENGE ONLY TO AN UN-PLED TOLLING PROVISION, RATHER THAN AS A THOROUGH CHALLENGE TO THE TIMELINESS OF THE INSTANT INDICTMENT.
07-1616 ESPARZA, EDWARD 02/06/08
APPELLANT’S HARRIS AGGRAVATED SEXUAL
ASSAULT
1. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS WAS CORRECT IN RULING THAT THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING THE MOTION FOR DNA TESTING BECAUSE PETITIONER FAILED TO ESTABLISH HE WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN CONVICTED IF EXCULPATORY RESULTS HAD BEEN OBTAINED THROUGH DNA TESTING.
2. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS DECIDED AN IMPORTANT QUESTION OF STATE LAW IN A WAY THAT CONFLICTS WITH THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS.
07-1634 CRUMPTON, LINDSEY ALYN 04/09/08
APPELLANT’S DALLAS CRIMINALLY NEGLIGENT
HOMICIDE
1. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE TRIAL COURT’S ENTRY OF AN AFFIRMATIVE FINDING OF A DEADLY WEAPON IN THE JUDGMENT BECAUSE PETITIONER WAS CONVICTED OF A LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE AND THE APPLICATION PARAGRAPH OF THE CHARGE DID NOT REFER TO A DEADLY WEAPON, THE JURY WAS NOT ASKED TO MAKE AN AFFIRMATIVE FINDING, AND AN AUTOMOBILE IS NOT A DEADLY WEAPON PER SE.
2. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE ASSESSMENT OF PETITIONER’S PUNISHMENT WITHIN THE RANGE FOR A THIRD DEGREE FELONY BECAUSE PETITIONER WAS CONVICTED OF A STATE JAIL FELONY AND THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY ENHANCED THE PUNISHMENT RANGE TO A THIRD DEGREE FELONY BASED ON A FINDING, THAT WAS NEVER MADE, THE AT PETITIONER USED A DEADLY WEAPON IN THE COMMISSION OF THE OFFENSE.
08-0198 SAAVEDRA, JOSE CARMON 04/09/08
STATE’S DALLAS AGGRAVATED SEXUAL
ASSAULT
IF A TRANSLATOR IS A MERE LANGUAGE-CONDUIT, OR AGENT, FOR THE SPEAKER, SHOULD THE STATEMENTS OF THE TRANSLATOR BE REGARDED AS THE STATEMENTS OF THE SPEAKER THEMSELVES WITHOUT CREATING AN ADDITIONAL LAYER OF HEARSAY?
08-0385 URANGA, JOHN III 08/20/08
APPELLANT’S WICHITA THEFT; POSSESSION OF
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE
DOES THE IMPLIED BIAS DOCTRINE APPLY IN A CASE, LIKE MR. URANGA'S, WHERE IT IS REVEALED DURING PUNISHMENT THAT ONE OF THE JURORS WAS THE VICTIM OF THE DEFENDANT'S ALLEGED EXTRANEOUS CONDUCT?
08-0463 RODRIGUEZ, ROMAN 06/18/08
STATE’S BEXAR DISCHARGE OF FIREARM
IN MUNICIPALITY
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT CONCLUDED THAT AN ALLEGATION THAT A DEFENDANT: "RECKLESSLY DISCHARGED A FIREARM . . . BY PULLING THE TRIGGER ON A FIREARM WHICH CONTAINED AMMUNITION AND WAS OPERABLE" WAS INSUFFICIENT TO SATISFY THE REQUIREMENT THAT THE INFORMATION "ALLEGE WITH REASONABLE CERTAINTY THE ACT OR ACTS RELIED UPON TO CONSTITUTE RECKLESSNESS."
08-0798 MURPHY, ANN ELIZABETH 09/24/2008
APPELLANT’S HARRIS CAPITAL MURDER
1. IN THIS NON-DEATH CAPITAL MURDER CASE THE APPELLANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIM THAT SHE WAS DENIED THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AND DUE PROCESS OF LAW WAS PRESERVED FOR APPELLATE REVIEW WHEN THE TRIAL COURT REFUSED TO ADVISE THE VENIRE THAT MS. MURPHY WOULD BE SENTENCED WITHOUT PAROLE IF CONVICTED OF CAPITAL MURDER WHEN REQUESTED BY TRIAL COUNSEL AS MANDATED BY TEX. PEN. CODE. ANN. § 12.31(b) AND THEN PROHIBITED COUNSEL FROM DOING SO EVEN THOUGH HE FAILED TO PROVIDE THE COURT WITH A PARTICULARIZED QUESTION ON THE ISSUE PURSUANT TO SELLS V. STATE, 121 S.W.3d 748 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003).
2. BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT DECLINED TO ADVISE THE APPELLANT'S VENIRE THAT SHE WOULD BE SENTENCED TO LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE AS MANDATED BY TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 12.31(b) AND THEN PROHIBITED HER ATTORNEY FROM DOING SO DURING VOIR DIRE, MS. MURPHY WAS DENIED THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AND DUE PROCESS OF LAW ON THIS ISSUE DURING VOIR DIRE AND THE HARM SHE SUFFERED SHOULD BE ASSESSED UNDER TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(a).
3. BECAUSE THE PURPOSE OF TEX. PEN CODE ANN. §12.31(b) IS ITS OWN CLEARLY STATED MANDATE THAT THE VENIRE IN A NON-DEATH CAPITAL MURDER CASE SHALL KNOW THE GUILTY DEFENDANT WILL RECEIVE A SENTENCE OF LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE, AND REVIEW OF THE HARM CAUSED BY THE TRIAL COURT'S MULTIPLE FAILURES TO SO INFORM THE APPELLANT'S JURY SHOULD BE CONDUCTED IN LIGHT OF THAT STATED PURPOSE UNDER TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(b).
08-0812 RAMOS, HERNAN ARQUIMIDES 12/10/08
APPELLANT’S HARRIS FORGERY OF
GOVERNMENT INSTRUMENT
1. DID THE COURT OF APPEALS ERR IN HOLDING THAT THE TERM GOVERNMENT "INSTRUMENT" IN TEXAS PENAL CODE §32.21(E)(3) (FORGERY) IS A BROAD TERM THAT ENCOMPASSES THE "GOVERNMENT RECORD[S]" IN §32.21(E)(2)?
2. DID THE COURT OF APPEALS ERR IN HOLDING THAT A SOCIAL SECURITY CARD MAY PROPERLY BE A "GOVERNMENT RECORD" OR A "GOVERNMENT INSTRUMENT" FOR THE PURPOSES OF THE FORGERY STATUTE?
3. DID THE COURT OF APPEALS ERR IN HOLDING THAT THE TERM "INSTRUMENT" AS USED IN THE FORGERY STATUTE IS A WORD IN COMMON USE, ITS MEANING CLEAR AND WELL UNDERSTOOD BY THE ORDINARY PERSON, RATHER THAN A TERM WITH AN ACQUIRED TECHNICAL LEGAL MEANING SO AS TO REQUIRE DEFINITION IN THE JURY CHARGE?
08-0882 GONZALES, RUDY 12/10/08
STATE’S JACKSON DRIVING WHILE INTOXICATED
1. DID THE COURT OF APPEALS ERR IN CONCLUDING THAT THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN RESPONDENT’S CONVICTION FOR DRIVING WHILE INTOXICATED?
2. DID THE COURT OF APPEALS ERR IN EFFECTIVELY CONCLUDING THAT THE WRITTEN STATEMENT OF A COUNTY JUDGMENT EFFECTIVELY OVERRULES AN ACT OF THE LEGISLATURE?
3. DID THE COURT OF APPEALS ERR IN CONCLUDING THAT A JUDGMENT OF THE COUNTY COURT OF COLORADO COUNTY, TEXAS, WHICH STATED THAT “THE COURT HAVING HEARD THE INFORMATION READ AND THE EVIDENCE SUBMITTED THEREON, IT IS CONSIDERED AND ADJUDGED BY THE COURT THAT THE DEFENDANT IS GUILTY AS CHARGED IN THE INFORMATION” DID NOT CONTAIN AN ADJUDICATION OF GUILT?
4. DID THE COURT OF APPEALS ERR IN CONCLUDING THAT RESPONDENT’S CONVICTION IN THE COUNTY COURT OF COLORADO COUNTY, TEXAS WAS UNAVAILABLE FOR ENHANCEMENT PURPOSES BECAUSE IT WAS NOT A FINAL CONVICTION?
5. DID THE COURT OF APPEALS ERR IN CONCLUDING THAT IT HAD NO AUTHORITY TO REFORM THE JUDGMENT TO REFLECT CONVICTION OF RESPONDENT ON A LESSER-INCLUDED OFFENSE BECAUSE THE JURY CHARGE DID NOT AUTHORIZE RESPONDENT’S CONVICTION FOR THE LESSER-INCLUDED OFFENSE OF MISDEMEANOR DWI WITH ONE CONVICTION?
6. DID THE COURT OF APPEALS ERR IN ORDERING A JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL IN THIS CASE?
08-0917 RESENDEZ, ANGEL 11/26/08
STATE’S HARRIS MURDER
1. DID APPELLANT PRESERVE AN ARTICLE 38.22 CLAIM WHEN HE FAILED TO MENTION ARTICLE 38.22 AT THE SUPPRESSION HEARING AND HE FILED TWO SUPPRESSION MOTIONS – ONE THAT WHOLLY FAILED TO MENTION ARTICLE 38.22 AND ANOTHER ONE (FILED ONE YEAR EARLIER BY A DIFFERENT ATTORNEY) THAT MERELY CITED ARTICLE 38.22 IN THE RUBBLE OF A SHOTGUN OBJECTION GLOBALLY CITING NUMEROUS AUTHORITIES?
2. WAS APPELLANT IN CUSTODY ONCE HE ADMITTED SHOOTING AMANDA WHEN THERE WERE INSUFFICIENT "OTHER CIRCUMSTANCES," PER DOWTHITT, THAT WOULD LEAD A CONFESSING PERSON TO BELIEVE HE WAS UNDER ARREST?
08-1055 MURRAY, RAYMOND DESMOND 11/05/08
STATE’S HARRIS FORGERY
1. Did the court of appeals err by applying the cognate-pleading test, which is applicable only in a contested jury trial, to determine whether the offense of misdemeanor forgery is a lesser offense of the charged offense of making a false statement to obtain credit for which a district court can lawfully convict in a plea-bargained guilty plea proceeding such as that in this case?
2. Did the court of appeals err by failing to hold appellant estopped from complaining that the trial court’s judgment is void because his plea bargained conviction for misdemeanor forgery is not a lesser-included offense of the charged offense where he sought and requested that conviction?
08-1086 GOLLIHAR, ORALIA LOPEZ 11/05/08
APPELLANT’S BANDERA TAMPERING WITH
GOVERNMENTAL RECORD
The court of appeals erred when it found that a police officer could be another and harmed as defined by texas penal code ann. §37.10, tampering with a governmental document.
08-1097 IRBY, CHRISTOPHER 11/19/08
APPELLANT’S DALLAS SEXUAL ASSAULT
Whether the court of appeals properly applied the sixth amendment, as interpreted by the united states supreme court, to the question of whether the trial court's refusal to permit the victim to be cross-examined about a case for which he was on probation violated appellant's constitutional rights to confrontation.
08-1111 JOSEPH, WESLEY CHARLES 02/11/09
APPELLANT’S BEXAR MURDER
The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court’s denial of the motion to suppress Mr. Joseph’s statement, because Mr. Joseph did not make a knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver of his rights under TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. Art. 38.22 and Miranda v. Arizona.
08-1123 HUGHEN, JEFFERY DANIEL 04/22/09
COURT’S OWN MOTION FANNIN AGGRAVATED ASSAULT
Was Appellant’s waiver of counsel during police interrogation valid when he had previously invoked his right to counsel at the time he was brought before a magistrate? [consolidated w/PDR NO 1124-08]
08-1124 HUGHEN, JEFFERY DANIEL 01/14/09
APPELLANT’S FANNIN ATTEMPTED MURDER
The court of appeals erred in failing to recognize that this case is controlled by the sixth amendment, brewer v. williams and Rothgery v. Gillespie Co.
08-1205 POWELL, ROBERT LEAHY 01/14/09
STATE’S TARRANT POSSESSION OF
METHAMPHETAMINE
1. Did the court of appeals err by holding that the search and seizure of the locked safe(s) found on appellee’s premises was not within the scope of the search which was supported by a search warrant based on probable cause?
2. Did the court of appeals err in concluding that a locked safe(s) could not be seized, notwithstanding it could be reasonably concluded that it was a repository for forged checks and other fruits which were listed to be seized pursuant to a search warrant based on probable cause?
3. Did the court of appeals err in failing to utilize the correct analytical construct appropriate to items seized and not listed to be seized in a search warrant based on probable cause and issued pursuant to article 18.02(1), (8), (9) and (12) of the texas code of criminal procedure?
4. Did the court of appeals implicitly hold the plain view doctrine was inapplicable because the officer executing the search warrant seized “mere evidence,” i.e. the locked safe(s), not listed as an item to be searched or seized in the warrant supported by probable cause?
08-1218 TRINIDAD, FRANK 01/28/09
STATE’S ATASCOSA MURDER
The Court of Appeals erred in determining that the presence of an alternate juror in jury deliberations was reversible error as the requirement under both the Code of Criminal Procedure and the Texas Constitution for a twelve member jury was violated.
08-1219/1220/1221 ADAMS, JOHNNY JR. 01/28/09
STATE’S WILSON AGGRAVATED SEXUAL
ASSAULT
The Court of Appeals erred in determining that the presence of an alternate juror in jury deliberations was reversible error as the requirement under both the Code of Criminal Procedure and the Texas Constitution for a twelve member jury was violated.
08-1263 MANSFIELD, RODGER EUGENE, JR. 02/11/09
APPELLANT’S HARRIS AGGRAVATED SEXUAL
ASSAULT
The court of appeals has held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to permit a father to testify that his son, the appellant, had never before been placed on community supervision, thus forcing appellant to take the stand to establish probation eligibility.
08-1318 KENNEDY, MICHAEL PATRICK 02/25/09
APPELLANT’S COMAL AGGRAVATED ASSAULT
The court of appeals erred in holding that appellant waived the right to appeal the trial court’s rulings on his motion to suppress.
08-1323 GARFIAS, CHRISTOPHER 03/18/09
APPELLANT’S TARRANT AGGRAVATED ROBBERY;
AGGRAVATED ASSAULT
1. In this one criminal transaction, the jury cannot have convicted Appellant of both aggravated robbery and aggravated assault and the Court of Appeals erred because it should have vacated the aggravated assault conviction, the lesser of the two.
2. The jury’s convicting Appellant of these two offenses violated his constitutional rights under the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause, the protection “against multiple punishments for the same offense.”
08-1340 MOORE, JONATHAN JAMES 11/26/08
STATE’S MONTAGUE MANUFACTURING
METHAMPHETAMINE
1. May a complaint that the trial court erred by adding conditions to a plea bargain between the state and the defendant and not "allowing the defendant the opportunity to withdraw his plea" when the trial court assessed a punishment greater than that agreed to by the parties be raised for the first time on appeal?
2. The court of appeals erred by failing to conduct a harm analysis after finding that the trial court erred by adding conditions to a plea bargain between the state and the defendant and not "allowing the defendant the opportunity to withdraw his plea" when the trial court assessed a punishment greater than that agreed to by the parties.
08-1366/1367/1368/1369 VITAL, JOSEPH aka VOTTA JOSEPH 01/28/09
STATE’S JACKSON POSSESSION OF
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE;
BAIL JUMPING; FAILURE
TO APPEAR
1. Did the court of appeals err in refusing to require the trial court to enter findings of act [sic] and conclusions of law?
2. Did the court of appeals err in concluding that respondent made a proper request for final disposition of charges, as required by art. 51.14, v.a.c.c.p. to both the prosecuting officer and the appropriate court as is required to invoke the jurisdiction of that act and authorize the trial court to dismiss pending indictments?
3. Did the court of appeals err in concluding that respondent's request for final disposition of charges under a name other than the name under which he is charged is sufficient to give the prosecutor notice of respondent's request?
4. Did the court of appeals err in concluding that a motion filed by respondent seeking dismissal of charges constituted compliance under article 51.14, v.a.c.c.p. as a request to be returned to the state of texas for final disposition of pending charges?
5. Did the court of appeals err in concluding that the trial court had authority to dismiss cause nos. 97-2-5827 and 97-2-5828 (for bail jumping and failure to appear) under the requirement of article 51.14 that only causes which were subject to detainers could be dismissed?
6. Did the court of appeals err in concluding that detainers were filed against respondent in cause nos. 97-2-5827 and 97-2-5828 (the bail jumping and failure to appear indictments)?
7. Did the court of appeals err in concluding that reference to "bond forfeiture" constituted placing a detainer on respondent under art. 51.14, v.a.c.c.p.?
08-1441 ANDERSON, DAVID LEE II 02/04/09
STATE’S GALVESTON AGGRAVATED SEXUAL ASSAULT
1. Whether a court of appeals has decided an important question of state law that conflicts with the decision of the court of criminal appeals. [Is a written motion an absolute requirement to preserve error on a claim of improper denial of a motion for continuance]
2. Whether the decision of the court of appeals conflicts with another court of appeals on the same issue.
08-1494 McFATRIDGE, MELANIE D. 04/08/09
APPELLANT’S NAVARRO DRIVING WHILE INTOXICATED
1. How can I not be indigent when my income is only $550.00 a month.
2. How can I come up with $3,000.00 from old furniture that is not in sellable condition?
3. How can I acquire any money from the tract of land $6,670.00 when it is not in a sellable condition and that has a lien for child support in the amount of $5,834.00 against it.
08-1533 ROUSE, JEFFERY 01/14/09
STATE’S TRAVIS ROBBERY
1. May an appellate court, in deciding that a plea was entered involuntarily, rely on unsworn allegations made by trial counsel in a document that was faxed to the court coordinator, and later filed with the district clerk, when no fact-finder has evaluated that statement?
2. When a defendant enters an open plea of guilty and the trial court, after admonishing the defendant, accepts the plea and finds the defendant guilty, does the trial court’s subsequent offer of a non-negotiated sentence-settlement constitute judicial coercion or judicial plea-bargaining affecting the voluntariness of the defendant’s guilty plea?
08-1569 STRINGER, FRANCIS WILLIAM 04/08/09
APPELLANT’S TARRANT POSSESSION OF CHILD
PORNOGRAPHY
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in deciding that because the Appellant filed an application for probation, and relied upon the positive information in the PSI to urge the trial court to consider probation, he forfeited or is estopped from asserting his Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause objection to testimonial statements in the PSI, and whether as a result of finding the claim forfeited the Court of Appeals wrongly rejected the argument that the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause was violated when the trial court in assessing punishment considered statements regarding an unadjudicated felony where those declarants were unavailable for cross examination and the Appellant had no prior opportunity to question them. (1 R.R. 6-8) (Presentence Report, p. 11)
08-1611 PRUDHOLM, GABRIEL LEMELL 03/18/09
STATE’S HARRIS COMPELLING PROSTITUTION;
SEXUAL ASSAULT
1. The Court of Appeals erred in holding the elements of the California offense of sexual battery are not "substantially similar" to the elements of an offense listed in former section 12.42(c)(2)(B)(i)-(iv) of the Texas Penal Code.
2. Consequentially, the Court of Appeals further erred in holding the trial court erred in submitting the enhancement paragraph in the charge and in charging the jury on the mandatory life sentence.
08-1645 GILBERT, STEPHEN 01/28/09
APPELLANT’S BRAZOS AGGRAVATED ROBBERY
1. The Court of Appeals failed to consider the law of parties upon determining Appellant was not entitled to a jury charge on the justification of necessity.
2. The Court of Appeals failed to view the evidence in the light most favorable to Appellant's requested change on the justification of necessity.
08-1661/1662 GUERRERO, EDUARDO 01/14/09
STATE’S BEXAR POSSESSION OF METHAMPHETAMINE
POSSESSION OF METHAMPHETAMINE
W/INTENT TO DELIVER
MANUFACTURE OF METHAMPHETAMINE
The court of appeals erred in finding that jeopardy barred the prosecution of manufacturing methamphetamine and possession with intent to deliver methamphetamine on the basis that those offenses were the result of the same original impulse and could not be punished separately. That court's opinion misconstrues this court's opinion in lopez v. state, 108 s.w.3d 293 (tex. Crim. App. 2003), and the court of appeals' holding is contrary to the holding in several federal circuit courts on this same vitally important question of state and federal law. See, tex. R. app. P. §66.3(b) & (c).
08-1708/1709 MILES, LEONARD, III 09/23/09
APPELLANT’S DALLAS POSSESSION OF FIREARM
BY FELON;
POSSESSION OF CONTROLLED
SUBSTANCE
What codeine concentration is required to support a conviction for possession of codeine as a first-degree felony?
08-1713 DUNBAR, WENDY R. 03/11/09
APPELLEE’S MONTGOMERY INDECENCY W/CHILD
Did the Court of Appeals err in holding that the State did not waive their right to appeal by not objecting to the trial court placing the petitioner on probation at the time the court ordered shock probation.
08-1753 FORD, ROSS LAYTON 02/11/09
STATE’S FANNIN POSSESSION OF CONTROLLED
SUBSTANCE
1. May a court of appeals decide an issue based on an argument that was not made in the trial court?
2. May a trial court base its ruling on an unsworn police report offered into evidence at a pre-trial suppression hearing?
08-1761 GARZA, ALVIN MIKE 03/25/09
STATE’S HALE ATTEMPTED AGGRAVATED ASSAULT
1. May a court of appeals, through unassigned error, raise an issue that an Appellant would be precluded from raising on appeal?
2. Did the information filed in conjunction with Appellant's waiver of indictment permit a conviction for the felony offense to which Appellant pled and stipulated his guilt when the information facially alleged a misdemeanor?
3. Should error be assigned and briefing ordered before a court of appeals may reverse a conviction based on error not raised by the parties, even when a novel constitutional issue is not involved?
08-1780 LANGHAM, PAMELA SHAREKA 02/04/09
APPELLANT’S TAYLOR POSSESSION OF COCAINE
The court of appeals erred in determining that hearsay statements from the confidential informant that implicated appellant in drug dealing from the house in question were not testimonial, and were further not harmful.
08-1805 SMITH, JOSEPH DENVER 05/20/09
APPELLANTS HARRIS INDECENT EXPOSURE
The First Court of Appeals erred by finding that the Information alleged with reasonable certainty, the acts relied upon to constitute recklessness.
09-0008 WILSON, WILLIAM RODNEY aka CORRICK, WILLIAM 07/01/09
STATE’S WASHINGTON DRIVING WHILE INTOXICATED
1. A defendant is not “actually innocent” of felony DWI when one of the prior DWI convictions alleged to elevate the primary offense to a felony is invalid.
2. An invalid prior conviction used to elevate the primary offense to a felony does not render the resulting sentence illegal.
3. A defendant who pleads guilty, pursuant to a plea bargain, to felony DWI and admits to the jurisdictional prior convictions is estopped from claiming that his sentence is illegal because the prior convictions are invalid.
09-0039 BLACKSHERE, HARVILL 03/18/09
APPELLANT’S BROWN POSSESSION OF CONTROLLED
SUBSTANCE
Whether the Court of Appeals had any jurisdiction to hear the States [sic] Appeal.
09-0069 MAYER, KENNETH LEE 06/10/09
STATE’S SWISHER AGGRAVATED KIDNAPPING
1. The Court of Appeals erred in reaching the attorney fee reimbursement issue for the first time on appeal, when no objection whatsoever was made by Appellant at the trial court level, resulting in a procedural default.
2. The Court of Appeals erred in deciding the indigent status of Appellant as it existed at the time of trial without remanding the case to the trial court to give the State an opportunity to be heard on this issue in the trial court, and to give the trial court an opportunity to decide the issue. The Court below has decided an important issue of state law that has not been decided, but should be settled by this Court. Tex. R. App. P. 66.3(b).
09-0137 GREY, STEVEN 03/25/09
STATE’S HAYS ASSAULT
Arevalo v. State should be overruled.
09-0145 COVEY, JOHN CHRISTOPHER, JR. 04/29/09
APPELLANT’S NOLAN ATTEMPTED SEXUAL ASSAULT
The Court of Appeals erred in holding Appellant has not established he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel.
09-0147 EVANS, TIMOTHY K. 03/18/09
STATE’S BEXAR AGGRAVATED SEXUAL ASSAULT;
INDECENCY W/CHILD
Have the holdings of Cunningham v. State, 726 S.W.2d 151 (Tex.Cr.App. 1987), and Ochoa v. State, 982 S.W.2d 904 (Tex.Cr.App. 1998), been undermined by the Court’s subsequent decision in Hall v. State, 225 S.W.3d 524 (Tex.Cr.App. 2007)?
09-0154 MONGE, ABELINO 08/18/09
APPELLANT’S HARRIS CAPITAL MURDER
Did the Court of Appeals err in holding that the prosecution discharged its affirmative burden of establishing that the appellant’s confession was not the product of his illegal arrest and detention and, therefore, was admissible against him, by concluding that the act of police interrogators in confronting the appellant with the inculpatory admissions of an alleged co-defendant prior to eliciting appellant’s confession, constituted an adequate “intervening event” which supposedly broke the causal chain between his illegal arrest and detention rendering his confession “a product of free will,” notwithstanding the fact, that the record irrefutably demonstrates that the appellant was arrested illegally, without the benefit of a warrant issued by a neutral and detached magistrate, in violation of Chapter 14 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, was thereafter interrogated while illegally detained, was, at all times during his 22 hours at the homicide division, in the presence and under the control of the police, was never taken to a magistrate, never spoke with a lawyer and was mislead by the interrogators about what he was actually being charged with?
09-0193 WHITE, JIMMIE DALE 06/24/09
STATE’S TRAVIS MURDER
May a court of appeals affirm the trial court's dismissal of an indictment on the basis of an alleged violation of the accused's right to a speedy trial, without performing the required analysis to determine whether the Sixth Amendment claim has any merit?
09-0210 BROOKS, KELVIN KIANTA 06/03/09
APPELLANT’S & STATE’S McLENNAN POSSESSION OF COCAINE
W/INTENT TO DELIVER
Appellant’s:
The Court of Appeals erred in holding the evidence was legally sufficient to establish appellant had the intent to distribute cocaine, where the court found the same evidence was factually insufficient to establish the necessary intent. State’s:
1. Is there any meaningful distinction between legal sufficiency review under Jackson v. Virginia and factually sufficiency review when that review is limited to the weakness of the evidence in the abstract and, if so, does it escape review in this Court?
2. Did the Tenth Court of Appeals ignore its duty to adequately explain why the evidence, though legally sufficient, is so weak as to render the jury's verdict clearly wrong and manifestly unjust?
09-0245 SAFETY NATIONAL CASUALTY CORP., 06/24/09
09-0246 AGENT MICHAEL W. COX
APPELLANT’S HARRIS BAIL BOND FORFEITURE
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals should accept this petition for discretionary review. This case involves a case of state wide importance regarding whether bondsman [sic] are being overcharged court costs in Texas. Rule 66.3 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure states that the following will be considered by the court in deciding whether to grant discretionary review:
(a) whether a court of appeals' decision conflicts with another court of appeals' decision on the same issue;
(b) whether a court of appeals has decided an important question of state or federal law that has not been, but should be settled by the Court of Criminal Appeals;
(d) whether a court of appeals has declared a statute, rule regulation, or ordinance unconstitutional, or appears to have misconstrued a statute, rule, or regulation, or ordinance;
In the present case, the Court of Criminal Appeals has authority to grant this petition for discretionary review under each of the provisions set out above.
09-0250 CHADWICK, CLAUDE WAYNE 09/16/09
09-0251 ASSAULT;
APPELLANT’S TOM GREEN ATTEMPTING TO TAKE
WEAPON FROM PEACE OFFICER
The federal right to self-representation requires that a defendant who is competent to be tried for a crime be permitted to proceed pro se if that is the defendant's choice. The Court of Appeals erred in effectively holding that Indiana v. Edwards overruled Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975) and its progeny; and in holding that a finding that Mr. Chadwick was not competent to represent himself could be inferred from the record in the absence of any findings by the trial court in that regard and in the absence of any evidence in the record to support those implied findings.
09-0261 JENNINGS, DELVETRA LASHERL 04/29/09
APPELLANT’S HALE BURGLARY OF HABITATION
1. Were the jury verdict forms submitted to the jury in this case a part of the court's charge to the jury?
2. If the jury verdict forms submitted to the jury in this case were not part of the jury charge, are the forms an integral part of the verdict and subsequent judgment of the court based on the jury's verdict?
3. Should an improper verdict form submitted to the jury in this case be subject to the harm analysis described in Almanza v. State?
4. Were Petitioner's due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United State's Constitution and right to due course of law under Article 1, §19 of the Texas Constitution violated as a result of the failure of the court to submit a "not guilty" verdict on all charges to the jury?
09-0265 TOLBERT, VICKIE LASHUN 03/25/09
STATE’S DALLAS CAPITAL MURDER
Criminal jury charges contain "law applicable to the case," and often "defensive issues." To obtain review on appeal, complaints involving "law applicable to the case" need not be preserved at trial but "defensive issues" must be preserved. Did the Fifth Court of Appeals wrongly hold that where a defendant states "no objection" to the proposed charge and then complains on appeal about the omission of a lesser-included offense instruction, the Almanza standard applies? (Vi r.r. at 64).
09-0266-68 TAYLOR, TRACY PAUL 08/19/09
STATE’S HARRIS AGGRAVATED SEXUAL ASSAULT
1. Is the age-based defense located in Section 8.07(b) of the Texas Penal Code a "defensive issue" (as opposed to "law applicable to the case") for purposes of determining whether the trial judge must sua sponte submit a jury instruction on this defense?
2. Was Appellant harmed by any error resulting from the absence of an instruction on the age-based defense located in Section 8.07(b) of the Texas Penal Code when the victim testified that the worst abuse occurred after Appellant turned 17 years old?
09-0307 WILSON, RONALD 04/08/09
STATE’S BEXAR MURDER
Did the Court of Appeals err in equating the use of deception in the creation of a document for interrogation purposes with a violation of Tex. Pen. Code 37.09?
09-0319 HOBBS, ERIC CHARLES 05/20/09
APPELLANT’S DALLAS AGGRAVATED ASSAULT
1. Did the trial court violate Appellant’s constitutional and statutory right to a jury trial by denying Appellant’s request to withdraw his jury waiver.
2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it failed to hold a hearing on the motion for new trial which alleged matters that were not determinable from the record?
09-0337 GONZALES, ROBERT L., JR. 08/19/09
APPELLANT’S & STATE’S LUBBOCK AGGRAVATED SEXUAL
ASSAULT (2 COUNTS)
Appellant's
The appellate court erred when it found that the trial court did not abuse in [sic] discretion in overruling Appellant's motion for new trial and held that the allegations raised in the motion were determinable from the trial record.
State's
Is sexual assault by causing the penetration of the victim's anus the same offense as causing the penetration of the victim's sexual organ?
09-0379 KIRSCH, BRIAN THOMAS 04/29/09
APPELLANT’S HARRIS DRIVING WHILE INTOXICATED
The First Court of Appeals erred in permitting a jury charge for per se intoxication when evidence of appellant’s blood alcohol level was admitted pursuant to a limiting instruction and there was no evidence that appellant was intoxicated per se at the time he was driving the automobile.
09-0381 GARZA, DAVID 05/20/09
STATE’S HARRIS DRIVING WHILE INTOXICATED
1. The First Court of Appeals erred in holding a jury of five was a mandatory alternative to mistrial when the United States Supreme Court has found a jury of five members unconstitutional.
2. The Court of Appeals erred in finding the record suggests the State and Appellant were willing to proceed with five jurors.
09-0401 LOVILL, AMBER 05/06/09
STATE’S NUECES FORGERY
1. Was the Court of Appeals correct in effectively interpreting Young to mean that any error that contributed to the inception or continuation of the criminal proceeding before a plea of true was entered is preserved?
2. Alternately, does the Young rule apply to a collateral attack raising errors that occurred before an open guilty plea was entered, or does collateral review fall back on stricter standards of waiver?
3.When the factual basis for a selective prosecution claim has become apparent, must the defendant raise his specific constitutional claim at that time in order to avoid waiver?
4. Whether in an appeal from the trial court's denial of an 11.072 application for writ of habeas corpus the appellate court may disregard the trial court's findings when it concludes that there is "overwhelming evidence" to the contrary?
5. Whether a probation officer's consideration of the effects of a probationer's pregnancy on her own health and that of her unborn child, in connection with the decision to submit a violation report, amounts to gender discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause?
6. Whether the health of an unborn child is an important and even compelling state interest which justifies the State in treating a pregnant probationer differently than it would a probationer who is not pregnant?
7. Whether one who raises a claim of selective prosecution/discriminatory enforcement must show that the discriminatory action actually caused some harm?
09-0490 CONTRERAS, SAUL 09/23/09
APPELLANT’S EL PASO MURDER
1. The Court of Appeals erred in failing to find that a factual dispute existed which would entitle Appellant to an application paragraph under Article 38.23(a).
2. The Court of Appeals erred in holding that Appellant was not entitled to a unanimous verdict as to the underlying predicate offenses of either intentional or knowing injury to a child, reckless injury to a child, or criminally negligent injury to a child, as those separate offenses are not morally and conceptually equivalent.
09-0493 HUBERT, DOUGLAS MICHAEL 06/10/09
STATE’S NUECES UNLAWFUL POSSESSION
OF A FIREARM
1. Did the Court of Appeals err by holding that appellant’s grandfather, the owner of the house where appellant lived, did not have actual or apparent authority to consent to a search of appellant’s bedroom just because the grandfather did not sleep in appellant’s bedroom?
2. Were police, who knew appellant’s grandfather owned the home where appellant lived, required to inquire further into his authority over appellant’s bedroom when he invited police to search the bedroom for his missing guns?
09-0499 JONES, STEPHEN BERNARD 09/16/09
09-0500
STATE’S TARRANT FALSE STATEMENT TO OBTAIN
PROPERTY OR CREDIT
1. The court of appeals erred in holding that a double-jeopardy violation occurred when Appellant was convicted and punished for each distinct material false or misleading statement he made in each loan application at issue because each such statement constituted an allowable unit of prosecution under Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 32.32 given that each statement related to separate matters and was sufficient standing alone to cause the granting of credit in an amount of more than $200,0002.
2. The court of appeals' holding that the gravamen of the offense of false statement to obtain property or credit is the property or credit sought or obtained pursuant to the false or misleading statement or statements conflicts with the plain language of Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 32.32 defining the offense and is, therefore, contrary to the principles of statutory construction.
3. The court of appeals' holding that the gravamen of the offense of false statement to obtain property or credit is the property or credit sought or obtained pursuant to the false or misleading statement or statements conflicts with the decision in Cheney v. State, 755 S.W.2d 123 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988), stating that the gravamen of the offense is the act of making such a statement and that the offense is complete once the written, deceptive statement relative to obtaining property or credit is made.
4. The court of appeals erred in analogizing the offense of false statement to obtain property or credit, which addresses deceptive conduct, and the offense of felony theft, which focuses on the acquisition of property, to determine the allowable unit of prosecution under Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 32.32 for false statement to obtain property or credit.
5.By holding that the allowable unit of prosecution for false statement to obtain property or credit is the property or credit sought or obtained pursuant to the false or misleading statement or statements rather than each material false or misleading statement made to obtain property or credit, the court of appeals has judicially mandated aggregation of distinct offenses committed under Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 32.32 and denied the State discretion in matters of aggregation.
09-0504 DOSTER, OSCAR ROY 06/10/09
APPELLANT’S FREESTONE CAPITAL MURDER
To secure Appellant's presence for a capital murder trial, Texas lodged a detainer on Mr. Doster with the Alabama prison authorities and extradited him to Texas for purposes of this same prosecution. Under these circumstances, did the Court of Appeals offend the principles that underlay United States v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340 (1978), when it refused to enforce the Interstate Agreement on Detainers?
09-0512 KUCIEMBA, JULIAN 09/30/09
STATE’S WASHINGTON DRIVING WHILE INTOXICATED
In order for the evidence to be legally sufficient to sustain a conviction for driving while intoxicated, is it necessary that there be presented direct evidence, instead of circumstantial evidence, of the time of the defendant's driving, thereby establishing a direct link, as opposed to a circumstantial link, to the defendant's intoxicated state at the time of driving?
09-0513 RODRIGUEZ, ROSS A. 06/10/09
APPELLANT’S BEXAR BAIL BOND FORFEITURE
Whether a bail bond surety is liable after executing a bail bond when the State of Texas subsequently changes and adds more serious charges to the charge for which the surety executed the bail bond.
09-0529 ELLIS, JAMES W. 08/19/09
09-0530
09–531-45 COLYANDRO, JOHN DOMINICK
STATE’S TRAVIS UNLAWFUL ACCEPTANCE OF
CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS;
MONEY LAUNDERING
1. The court of appeals erred by addressing the appellants’ “as applied” challenge to the 2002 money laundering statute brought in a pretrial writ of habeas corpus, where only a facial challenge was cognizable. In holding that this “as applied” challenge was actually a facial challenge, the court improperly looked behind the face of the indictment and misinterpreted a decision of the United States Supreme Court.
2. The court of appeals erred in performing unnecessary statutory analysis and in examining legislative history and treatises to interpret the meaning of terms in the statute when the plain text was not ambiguous and did not lead to an absurd result.
09-0531-45 COLYANDRO, JOHN DOMINICK 08/19/09
APPELLANT’S TRAVIS UNLAWFUL ACCEPTANCE OF
CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS;
MONEY LAUNDERING
1. The Court of Appeals erred in finding that section 253.094 of the Texas Election Code was not unconstitutionally vague employing a standard of review applicable to civil, not criminal, cases.
2. The Court of Appeals erred in finding that section 253.094 of the Texas Election Code was not unconstitutionally overbroad, employing a standard of review applicable to civil, not criminal, cases.
09-0560 PEREZ, OSCAR, JR. 09/23/09
APPELLANT’S BRAZORIA AGGRAVATED ROBBERY
The Fourteenth Court of Appeals erred by failing to conclude that Appellant was prejudiced by his counsel's deficient performance.
09-0606 CARTER, CARL ALLEN 09/23/09
STATE’S WHEELER POSSESSION OF COCAINE
W/INTENT TO DELIVER
Whether the Court below erred in finding that both the pre and post-Miranda statements made by appellant to a trooper were the product of an illegal two-step interrogation technique that undermined appellant’s right to remain silent and his ability to voluntarily waive that right. This holding contravenes decisions from this Court, as well as the United States Supreme Court, and therefore calls for this Court to grant the State’s Petition for Discretionary Review. See, Tex.R.App.P. § 66.3( c).
09-0666 JUAREZ, JAMIE CASA, JR. 06/10/09
STATE’S SMITH AGGRAVATED ASSAULT
Did the Court of Appeals properly reverse the conviction in this case for a failure to charge on the affirmative defense of “necessity” where appellant refused to admit that he intentionally, knowing[ly] or recklessly committed the offense of aggravated assault of a peace officer?
09-0873 DOBBS, MATTHEW RYAN 09/16/09
STATE’S COLLIN THEFT
Supreme Court precedent allows the seizure of an item in plain view when it is immediately apparent the item is evidence without any further search of the object. But in White v. State, this Court held that an item in plain view may only be seized when its evidentiary nature is apparent without any further investigation. Should White be overruled because it is contrary to binding Fourth Amendment precedent of the Supreme Court?
09-0914 BOWLEY, TROY A. 09/16/09
STATE’S LUBBOCK DRIVING WHILE INTOXICATED
1. Is a defendant immune from impeachment when he opens the door by basing his entire defense around the implicit representation that he always pleads guilty when he is guilty?
2. Is questioning the defendant's underlying motives for refusing to accept a plea offer error in all situations, no matter what the defendant says or does through his own testimony?
3. Was the court of appeals correct in essentially finding harm per se based solely on a public policy analysis without any meaningful harm analysis?
09-1016 FLORES, FELIX 09/23/09
APPELLANT’S HAYS POSSESSION OF COCAINE
W/INTENT TO DELIVER
When no other facts in a search warrant affidavit establish probable cause, should Texas have a blanket rule that finding traces of contraband in trash outside a residence on two consecutive weeks automatically supports issuance of a warrant to search that home?
09-1081 CAMPBELL, JAMES L. 09/23/09
APPELLANT’S POTTER POSSESSION OF CONTROLLED
SUBSTANCE
The Court of Appeals erred in holding that the mailbox rule filing and received by clerk after deposited within ten days applied to indigent criminal defendants acting pro se.
09-1121 MERCIER, EUGENE 09/23/09
STATE’S HIDALGO CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT
BARRATRY
Is the trial court's erroneous failure to quash a charging instrument for its omission of language tolling the statute of limitations subject to a harmless-error analysis?