

Microsoft Anticompetitive Conduct which the Court Found Unlawful Which Microsoft's Proposed Remedy Permits It to Continue

1. Using its monopoly power and other means to induce and threaten competitors to agree not to compete. See, e.g., Findings ¶¶ 87-90 (Netscape), 93-103 (Intel), 104-110 (Apple), 111-114 (Real Networks), 115-132 (IBM).
2. Contractually tying two separate products (e.g., its IE 1 and IE 2 browsers to its Windows 95 monopoly operating system) without any technological integration. See, e.g., Findings ¶¶ 149-154, 155-159.
3. Binding together two separate products (e.g., its IE 3 and IE 4 browsers to its Windows 98 monopoly operating system) without any technological justification and for the express purpose of precluding competition on the merits and maintaining barriers to entry. See, e.g., Findings ¶¶ 149-154, 160-174.
4. Making predatory expenditures with no expectation of making a profit or recovering its losses except from maintaining its monopoly. See, e.g., Findings ¶¶ 136-142, 247, 260-261, 317.
5. Using its monopoly power and other "incentives and threats" to retaliate against OEMs who used, promoted, or distributed non-Microsoft products or who refused to use, distribute, or promote, Microsoft products. See, e.g., Findings ¶¶ 230-231, 234, 236-238 (price discrimination on Microsoft's monopoly operating system), 232, 235-236 (cooperative ventures and marketing and technical assistance), 233 (bounties), 241 (penalties).

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6. Using its monopoly power and other means to induce and threaten IAPs to use, promote and distribute Microsoft products and not to use, promote, and distribute non-Microsoft products -- at substantial cost, without any expectation of profit, and for the purpose of suppressing competition and maintaining barriers to entry. See, e.g., Findings ¶¶ 243-252.
7. Conditioning ISVs early access to critical technical information concerning its monopoly operating system on the ISVs agreement to incorporate Microsoft's version of middleware (e.g., Microsoft's browsers, Microsoft's version of Java) into the ISVs programs. See, e.g., Findings ¶¶ 337-340 (browsers), 399-406 (Java).
8. Using its monopoly power and other means to induce ICPs to agree to use and promote Microsoft middleware, and not to use or promote non-Microsoft middleware (or to do so only in a restricted or degraded way) -- again, at substantial cost, without any expectation of profit, and for the purpose of precluding competition on the merits and maintaining barriers to entry. See, e.g., Findings ¶¶ 311-336.
9. Conditioning the continued development of critical applications programs for Apple on Apple's agreement to use, promote, and distribute Microsoft's middleware and to restrict Apple's use, promotion, and distribution of other browsers. See, e.g., Findings ¶¶ 344-355.
10. Redesigning Microsoft's monopoly operating system for the express purpose of making the interconnection of non-Microsoft software a "jolting experience" for the user. See, e.g., Findings ¶¶ 160, 170-172, 177-178, 190-191.