

10. The front brakeman of train APW did not take action required by Rule 34 when the engineer passed signals 613.9 and 612.9 without complying with their indications.
11. The conductor and flagman of train APW could not discern the aspects of signals 613.9 and 612.9 before the locomotive passed them; however, they should have known the speed limits and recognized that the train was exceeding the maximum authorized speed for a clear signal on signal 612.9.

PROBABLE CAUSE

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of the accident was the failure of the crew of Extra 8992 West to stop their train, which was being operated at excessive speed by an engineer under the influence of alcohol. Contributing to this failure was the ineffectiveness of the Southern Pacific in assuring compliance with its operating rules and procedures, which were specifically designed to prevent an accident if a crewmember failed to perform his duties.

RECOMMENDATIONS

R-74-9-12

The National Transportation Safety Board recommends that:

1. The Federal Railroad Administration include in their proposed Standards for Rules Governing the Operation of Trains, regulations that will in effect prohibit the use of narcotics and intoxicants by employes for a specified period prior to their reporting for duty and while they are on duty. (Conclusions 1, 3, 5) (Recommendation R-74-9)
2. The Southern Pacific Transportation Company:
 - (a) Establish more effective procedures to insure that employes comply with the operating rules such as by requiring that conductors examine crewmembers coming on duty to ascertain their apparent physical competence to perform their responsibilities. (Conclusions 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 9, 10, 11) (Recommendation R-74-10)
 - (b) Train all new employes including brakemen in their responsibilities and duties so that they understand their responsibility to monitor the performance of other employes and to take positive action when the situation warrants. (Conclusions 1, 2, 4, 9, 10) (Recommendation R-74-11)
 - (c) Require the use of dead-man control, overspeed, and other safety devices on their locomotives and, if such devices

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are inoperative, require that all members of the crew be so notified. (Conclusions 1, 2, 6) (Recommendation R-74-12)

The Safety Board reiterates the following recommendations made in the Board's report on the collision of two Penn Central freight trains at Herndon, Pennsylvania, on March 12, 1972:

1. The Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), in cooperation with the Association of American Railroads, develop a fail-safe device to stop a train in the event that the engineer becomes incapacitated by sickness or death, or falls asleep. Regulations should be promulgated to require installation, use, and maintenance of such a device. (Conclusions 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11) (Recommendation No. R-73-8)
2. The FRA include in its present investigation of the safety of locomotive-control compartments a study of environmental conditions that could distract crews from their duties or cause them to fall asleep at the controls. Regulations should be promulgated to correct any undesirable conditions disclosed. (Conclusions 2, 4, 9, 10) (Recommendation R-73-9)
3. The FRA, in the promulgation of regulations governing railroad operating rules, where responsibility for safe operation of the train is assigned jointly to the engineer and the conductor, require that they be located and informed so that they can make quick, effective decisions. (Conclusion 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 9, 10, 11) (Recommendation R-73-11)

BY THE NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

/s/ JOHN H. REED
Chairman

/s/ LOUIS M. THAYER
Member

/s/ ISABEL A. BURGESS
Member

/s/ WILLIAM R. HALEY
Member

Francis H. McAdams, Member, was absent, and did not participate in the adoption of this report

March 20, 1974