

RECOMMENDATIONS

The National Transportation Safety Board recommends that:

1. The Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) insure that inspection efforts of railroads to find defects on other cars having a center sill design similar to that which failed in this accident, are continued in periodic inspection until all such cars have been inspected. (Recommendation R-74-31)
2. The FRA reevaluate the Federal Track Standards to determine whether the spiking and crosstie requirements for tracks on curves are adequate to prevent the rails from spreading when subjected to the lateral forces produced by an emergency application of train brakes from trains of a wide range of consists and operating speeds. (Recommendation R-74-32)
3. The FRA employ the information developed by their tank car studies and by those of the RPI-AAR Railroad Tank Car Safety Research and Test Project and expedite the promulgation of regulations that will eliminate or reduce to manageable dimensions the severity of the possible losses to communities which develop when tank cars of the general type of 112A and 114A loaded with hazardous materials are exposed to a railroad accident or a fire. (Recommendation R-74-33)
4. The FRA promulgate regulations to require railroads to provide pertinent lading information to crewmembers on both the locomotive and caboose regarding those cars transporting hazardous materials. The information could be presented in a manner similar to that required for explosives in 49 CFR 174.589(f). In addition, these notices should contain the name of the commodity and its hazard rating. (Recommendation R-74-34)

The Safety Board reiterates and emphasizes the importance of the following recommendations made in previous accident reports which have not been fully implemented and are applicable to this accident:

Railroad Accident Report, Southern Railway Company, Laurel, Mississippi, January 25, 1969:

- "5. The Safety Board recommends that the Association of American Railroads and the American Short Line Railroad Association develop plans that will result in the fire chief of each community through which the track of a member road passes knowing where immediate information can be obtained, describing the location and characteristics of all hazardous materials in any train involved in a train accident that affects a community. This recommendation can be accomplished in a relatively short time regardless of the level of training which may be achieved later by fire departments." (Recommendation No. R-69-22)

Railroad Accident report NTSB-RAR-70-2, Illinois Central Railroad Company, Glendora, Mississippi, September 11, 1969:

- "2. The Federal Railroad Administration initiate research and development to provide prototype models of freight train braking systems
- (a) capable of providing shorter stopping distances which nearly approach the theoretical limits under all conditions of loading and length of trains;
 - (b) capable of stopping a train in the emergency applications now required by regulations without internal collisions, train separations, or damage to the train or its lading;
 - (c) capable of propagating brake application, both service and emergency, throughout the length of train more expeditiously and surely;
 - (d) capable of more rapid application of the full intended stopping force to the rails at each car after the application signal is received at each car."
(Recommendation No. R-70-16)

THE NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD:

/s/ JOHN H. REED
Chairman

/s/ FRANCIS H. McADAMS
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October 18, 1974