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Recommendations concerning one false alarm caused by the approach light system at BOS, and the mode selector of the Sperry Flight Director System, were forwarded to the Administrator, FAA, on January 25, 1974, (A-74-1 through A-74-4). Copies of the recommendations and Administrator's response are included in Appendix I.

Testimony at the public hearing indicated that pilots do not fully understand RVR (Runway Visual Range). Opinions concerning the interpretation of the reported RVR value differed. Generally, pilots are not aware of the criteria for locating the transmissometer equipment, nor of the 51.1-second delay in updating the digital displays in the FAA facilities. The fact that RVR values may differ from actual runway visibility conditions in a nonhomogeneous atmosphere apparently is not understood.

Further investigation revealed that FAA Advisory Circular, AC-00-13A, issued on February 24, 1965, which had dealt with the subject of runway visibility measurement, had been cancelled. No advisory circular replacing AC-00-13A has been issued.

Since no description of RVR equipment, its location, operation and limitations exists, the Board recommends that the Federal Aviation Administration:

Issue an advisory circular which describes the RVR equipment and emphasizes that the RVR value is a sampling of a small segment of the atmosphere, usually near the touchdown point. It should also be emphasized that RVR value does not necessarily represent actual runway visibility conditions near the touchdown point and includes a significant time delay before reaching the crew. This information should also be placed in the Airmen's Information Manual.
(Recommendation A-74-19.)

BY THE NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

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