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TO

~~SECRET~~ 06 09 30 Z APR 74 SENSITIVE

CITE TEHRAN

TO: THE WHITE HOUSE

FOR: GENERAL BRENT SCOWCROFT, EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

FROM: AMBASSADOR HELMS, TEHRAN

A. PLEASE PASS WHAT FOLLOWS TO SECRETARY KISSINGER AS
CONVENIENT:

1. COMPARING THE SITUATION IN THE GULF TODAY WITH WHAT IT
WAS A YEAR AGO, I THINK WE HAVE CAUSE FOR SOME MODEST OPTIMISM.
THERE ARE STILL PLENTY OF PROBLEMS AND DANGER AREAS, BUT OUR
INTELLIGENCE ON THE GULF HAS MEASURABLY IMPROVED AND WE SEEM TO
BE HEADED IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION. OUR NEW PACKAGE FOR SAUDI
ARABIA WHEN CONSUMMATED, WILL PROVIDE BOTH OUR COUNTRIES WITH A
BREADTH AND DEPTH OF SECURITY WE HAVE NOT KNOWN BEFORE. THIS
WILL ENHANCE THE LONG-RANGE SECURITY OUTLOOK FOR ALL OF THE ARAB
GULF STATES, EVEN IF SOME ARE INITIALLY A LITTLE JEALOUS THAT THE
SAUDIS WERE THE FIRST SELECTED FOR SPECIAL FAVOR. IN THE SHORTER
RANGE THERE ARE SOME PROBLEMS ON WHICH WE SHOULD KEEP A WEATHER
EYE IN OMAN, THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES (U.A.E.), BAHRAIN AND
KUWAIT.

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: MAR 2008

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2. IN OMAN, THE SHAH'S MARCH AGREEMENT WITH SULTAN QABUS WILL PROVIDE THE LATTER WITH ABOUT A BRIGADE OF IRANIAN TROOPS TO HELP OMANI FORCES COMBAT THE DHUFARI INSURGENTS AND SEAL THE BORDER WITH THE PEOPLES DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF YEMEN (PDRY) WHEN THE AIRSTRIP AT MIDWAY IS IMPROVED, PERHAPS BY SEPTEMBER, THE SHAH PLANS TO SEND F-4'S THERE TO GUARD AGAINST POSSIBLE INTRUSIONS INTO OMAN BY PDRY MIG'S. THIS IS NOT OVER-KILL. RATHER, IT IS PUTTING ENOUGH FORCE TO BEAR TO BRING THIS LONG ULCEROUS WAR TO A CONCLUSION AND TO PROTECT THE OMANI AND IRANIAN TROOPS FROM DIRECT ATTACK BY THE PDRY.

3. SULTAN QABUS AND THE SHAH KNOW THAT PARALLEL TO MILITARY ACTION, POLITICAL AND SOCIAL ACTION MUST BE TAKEN BY QABUS TO REMOVE THE CAUSES OF DISSIDENCE IN DHUFAR AND IN OMAN ITSELF. THE SHAH SAID HE DISCUSSED THIS WITH THE SULTAN AND, IN VIEW OF HIS OWN SUCCESSFUL EXAMPLE, HIS ADVICE SHOULD CARRY WEIGHT. WE HOPE THE SHAH, HAVING SCORED SUBSTANTIAL GAINS FOR THE SECURITY OF THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ, AND HAVING EVOKED LITTLE OPPOSITION EXCEPT FROM THE SOVIET BLOC, IRAQ, THE PDRY AND KUWAIT, WILL NOT VAUNT HIS SUCCESS TO THE POINT OF SCARING OR ANTAGONIZING KING FAYSAL AND SHAYKH ZAYID OF THE U.A.E.

4. THE UNION OF ARAB EMIRATES UNDER THE PRESIDENCY OF

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SHAYKH ZAYID OF ABU DHABI, CONTINUES TO BE A SOURCE OF CONCERN. THE U.A.E. IS RIFE WITH RIVALRIES AND TENSIONS, ESPECIALLY BETWEEN ZAYID, AND IRAN'S FRIENDS, THE RULERS OF DUBAI AND SHARJA. ZAYID FEARS BOTH KING FAYSAL AND THE SHAH AND HAS ENOUGH MONEY TO ASPIRE TO BE SOMETHING OF A POWER HIMSELF. UNDER CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES ZAYID MIGHT BE TEMPTED TO INVITE THE RUSSIANS IN AS A POTENTIAL PROTECTION AGAINST HIS BIGGER NEIGHBORS. EVEN IF THIS DOES NOT HAPPEN, THE U.A.E. SECURITY SERVICE FIRED ITS EXPATRIATE BRITISH OFFICERS SOME TIME AGO AND IT IS MUCH LESS ABLE TO COPE WITH INDIGENOUS LEFT-WING SUBVERSIVES OF THE PFLOAG AND BA'THI VARIETY THAN IT ONCE WAS. THE U.A.E. IS RICH, BUT NOT VERY HEALTHY.

5. IN BAHRAIN LAST YEAR'S ELECTIONS IN THE WAKE OF THE OCTOBER WAR BROUGHT INTO THE ASSEMBLY A STRONG LEFT-WING ELEMENT WITH WHOM THE RATHER PUDGY ROYAL FAMILY ARE NOT WELL-EQUIPPED TO COPE. ONE OF THE LEFTIST LEADERS IS KHALIFA KHALFAN, A DEDICATED COMMUNIST WHO FOR MANY YEARS WAS DOMINANT IN THE NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT OF SAUDI ARABIA WHICH HAD PARTY ACTIVISTS IN THE SAUDI GOVERNMENT AND IN ARAMCO. KHALFAN SPENT

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SEVERAL YEARS IN SAUDI PRISONS AND IS A TOUGH, SMART, DEDICATED CAMPAIGNER.

6. IN THE PAST FEW MONTHS BAHRAIN HAS EASED UP VISA RESTRICTIONS ON BLOC OFFICIALS. SINCE THEN, TWO KGB OFFICERS HAVE GONE TO BAHRAIN AND HAVE MET WITH LEFT-WING LEADERS. THEY TOLD THEM THEY ARE DEPENDING ON KUWAIT AND BAHRAIN TO ASSIST THE SOVIETS IN GAINING ACCEPTANCE IN THE OTHER GULF STATES. FORTUNATELY BAHRAIN STILL HAS SOME GOOD EXPATRIATE BRITISH SECURITY OFFICERS WHO MONITOR THE SITUATION CLOSELY ALTHOUGH THEY HAVE ONLY VERY LIMITED POWER TO TAKE EFFECTIVE COUNTER-ACTION. THE RULER OF BAHRAIN IS MAKING AN EFFORT TO REGAIN SOME OF THE CONTROL HE LOST DURING THE ANTI-AMERICAN RADICAL WAVE OF FEELING WHICH SWEEPED THE GULF, AND ESPECIALLY BAHRAIN, DURING THE OCTOBER WAR AND IMMEDIATELY AFTER. HE SHOULD BE ENCOURAGED IN THIS.

7. AS FOR KUWAIT THE EXTERNAL DANGER CONTINUES TO BE FROM IRAQ, WHICH COMPLETELY OUTCLASSES KUWAIT IN EVERYTHING BUT FOREIGN EXCHANGE, AND COULD OCCUPY THE COUNTRY VERY QUICKLY IF ITS FORCES WERE NOT TIED DOWN BY THE KURDS AND IF IT COULD BE SURE IRAN WOULD NOT REACT. KUWAIT'S UNWILLINGNESS TO ENTER A DEFENSIVE TREATY WITH IRAN OR EVEN SAUDI ARABIA LEAVES HER VERY

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EXPOSED IF THE IRAQIS CAN FREE THEMSELVES OF THEIR KURDISH CHALLENGE AND DECIDE TO SEIZE KUWAITI TERRITORY TO PROTECT THEIR GROWING PORT OF UMM QASR. INTERNALLY, KUWAIT'S WEAKNESS IS A PROBLEM OF THE LONGER TERM. HER LAISSEZ-FAIRE POLITICAL POLICY HAS TOLERATED RADICAL SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITY DIRECTED AGAINST HER NEIGHBORS SO LONG AS THE ACTIVISTS HAVE NOT OPERATED AGAINST THE KUWAIT REGIME. THIS HAS HELPED NOT ONLY THE PALESTINIAN TERRORISTS BUT ALSO THE PDRY AND THE POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF OMAN AND THE ARAB GULF (PFLOAG). THE RUSSIANS HAVE BEEN TRYING TO PERSUADE THE KUWAITIS TO BUY SOVIET ARMS, WHICH THEY HOPE WOULD SET A PRECEDENT FOR OTHER GULF STATES. THEY HAVE HAD A DIPLOMATIC MISSION IN KUWAIT FOR TEN YEARS. ALTHOUGH THEIR EMBASSY STAFF WAS LOADED WITH INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS, THEY HAVE BEEN CIRCUMSPECT IN THEIR OPERATIONS AND HAVE LULLED THE KUWAITIS INTO COMPLACENCY ABOUT THEM. THE RUSSIANS HOPE THAT BAHRAIN AND THE U.A.E. WILL FOLLOW KUWAIT'S EXAMPLE AND ALLOW THEM TO OPEN DIPLOMATIC ESTABLISHMENTS. GIVEN THE LIMITED SECURITY CAPABILITIES OF BAHRAIN AND THE U.A.E., THIS WOULD OPEN THEM FURTHER TO SUBVERSION.

8. THESE PROBLEMS HAVING BEEN NOTED, THERE IS MUCH ON THE Releasing Officer

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POSITIVE SIDE TO SUPPORT THE RESTRAINED OPTIMISM WHICH I EXPRESSED EARLIER. OUR EMERGING MULTI-FACETED ENTENTE WITH SAUDI ARABIA WILL BE OF TREMENDOUS IMPORTANCE AND WILL HELP TO SHORE UP EVERYTHING ELSE. THE SHAH IS HELPING OMAN ON A MAJOR SCALE AND THE SAUDIS HAVE NOT REACTED UNFAVORABLY TO THIS. THE SHAH IS ALSO TAKING STEPS TO GIVE HIS OWN MASSES A GREATER SENSE OF SHARING IN THE INCREASED NATIONAL OIL INCOME. OUR PROJECT OF GETTING RESIDENT AMBASSADORS IN KEY GULF STATES IS MOVING FORWARD.

and my own ear

9. OUR PEOPLE TELL ME THAT SECRETARY KISSINGER'S REPUTATION IN THE GULF IS AT AN ALL-TIME HIGH. PEOPLE WHO ARE NOT COMMUNIST-ORIENTED, ARE HOPEFUL THAT HIS PROBLEM-SOLVING SKILLS WILL EVENTUALLY BE EMPLOYED FOR THEIR BENEFIT. HE HAS AN INVITATION TO VISIT KUWAIT ON HIS NEXT MIDDLE EAST TRIP. SULTAN QABUS OF OMAN IS SCHEDULED TO VISIT WASHINGTON IN AUGUST. IT MIGHT BE A GOOD IDEA BEFORE THE SECRETARY VISITS KUWAIT TO SEND LETTERS OF GREETING AND PRAISE, PEGGED TO SOME APPROPRIATE ACTION OR EVENT, TO THE RULERS OF QATAR, BAHRAIN AND THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES. THESE RULERS WATCH FOR SIGNS OF OUR FAVOR AS JEALOUSLY AS THE SHAH AND KING FAYSAL DO. FRIENDLY LETTERS WOULD HELP REASSURE THEM THAT WE REGARD THEM NO LESS HIGHLY THAN THEIR

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BIGGER NEIGHBORS.

B. WARM REGARDS.

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