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Intelligence Report

*Peking's Support of Insurgencies
In Southeast Asia*

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PEKING'S SUPPORT OF INSURGENCIES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This study establishes the facts and examines the purposes of China's support of insurgencies in Southeast Asia.

It is a fact that, despite China's overall policy of friendly relations, and despite the passage of some four years since the general ending of Cultural Revolution militancy, China continues to sponsor and support insurgencies against certain governments in Southeast Asia. Furthermore, in the cases of Burma and Thailand, such covert assistance has significantly expanded: high-ranking officers from the PLA's 11th Army perform command roles in insurgent headquarters; PLA officers and non-coms help fill out the ranks of insurgent combat forces; PLA units in nearby Yunnan Province train and supply the rebels; and China-based "insurgent" radio stations beam operational guidance and anti-government propaganda support into Burma and Thailand. These remote insurgencies are not likely to threaten the Rangoon or Bangkok governments, but the fact remains that China's covert sponsorship of these insurrections is clearly impeding China's diplomatic attempts to elicit further responsiveness from these same governments.

This study examines various possible purposes behind this self-defeating course -- "two faced," as the Burmese call it. Is the Chinese purpose essentially

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that of attempting to exert added pressure on certain of China's small neighbors? Or a concern not to be up-staged by any new Soviet presence in Southeast Asia and in the support of revolutionary movements? Or an unwillingness or inability to cease supporting insurgencies once begun? Or bureaucratic disarray in the conduct of Chinese foreign relations? Or, a reflection of Maoist impulses? The study concludes that it is the latter of these purposes which carries the greatest force: China supports certain insurgencies in Southeast Asia largely because that's the way the boss, Mao Tse-tung, wants it -- for his own mix of stubbornly-held ideological and personal reasons.

This study has received constructive assistance from a number of CIA offices. The study's interpretations are those of its author, Arthur A. Cohen, and of this Staff.

Hal Ford
Chief, DD/I Special Research Staff

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PEKING'S SUPPORT OF INSURGENCIES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

Summary

Peking has a two-level foreign policy with respect to certain governments in Southeast Asia: ostensibly friendly diplomacy on one level; and insurgency-support on another -- most notably in Burma and Thailand, to a lesser extent in Malaysia and the Philippines. The explanation for this anomaly is to be found mainly in the ideological and personal predilections of Mao Tse-tung, who still has such authority in the PRC that he can and does require the continuation of one policy, insurgency-support, which impedes Chinese progress in its overall diplomatic efforts.

The policy of insurgency-support does not seem to be essentially a device for exerting pressure on nearby governments, the stick of a rationally-conceived carrot-and-stick approach. Burma, for example, gives the Chinese leaders no cause for applying pressure: it is non-aligned, it has paid reparations to Peking for the damages of the mid-1967 anti-Chinese riots, and it has exchanged ambassadors with the PRC. Nonetheless, China is not only supporting but sponsoring the northeast insurgency, and the results are now detrimental to Peking's diplomatic interests -- so much so that Prime Minister Ne Win is being forced out of his quiet isolationist policy into an active search for a common front against Peking, including a possible detente with Thailand. For its part, Thailand does give the Chinese leaders cause for applying pressure in order to eliminate the US military presence there,

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but Peking has not indicated that insurgency-support would end if that cause were to be removed: the Chinese-run operational radio, Voice of the People of Thailand, broadcasting from south China, continues to attack the US military presence in Thailand but has never suggested that the insurgents might settle with Bangkok if that presence were removed.

Nor does insurgency-support seem intended to prevent the Soviets from filling the "vacuum" left by US withdrawals from the area. Nearby countries have their own inclinations and reasons for avoiding a request for a Soviet presence. Ironically, if anything might work to frighten nearby countries, providing for them a reason to turn to the Soviets for concrete military aid, it would be the heightening of Chinese insurgency-support.

Similarly, the Chinese do not appear to be supporting these insurgencies in order to demonstrate to radicals, world-wide, that they are more revolutionary than the Soviets. The evidence is that the Chinese have shown no particular concern with their image among radicals in recent years: for example, China disparaged the revolutionary actions of rebels in Ceylon and Bangladesh in 1971; and the Chinese opened themselves to charges within the world Communist movement of "opportunistic betrayal" in July 1971 when they quickly moved to strengthen relations with the new government in the Sudan, which had arrested large numbers of Communists.

Neither does insurgency-support seem to have been continued (and even somewhat increased in the cases of Burma and Thailand) because of momentum, or "bureaucratic lag." Mao surely has the authority to end insurgency-support if he so desired. He demonstrated his ability to turn policy around completely with respect to relations with the US. He

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also changed from encouraging Hanoi to "protract" its effort against South Vietnam to accepting the cease-fire arrangements. It would be far less difficult for him to knock off covert support of small-scale insurrection in nearby countries.

Chou En-lai has apparently had to comply with Mao's wishes in this respect. He has explicitly endorsed continuation of insurgency-support. So far as can be observed and judged, Chou has never, since Mao came to dominate the Chinese leadership in 1935, opposed Mao's will, once Mao had made clear what policy he wanted carried out. Chou's survival suggests not that he is more subtle in thwarting Mao's preferences than other Chinese leaders purged in recent years, but that he has never tried to deceive Mao. His style of work seems to have been, and still to be, that of using persuasion at a time when Mao is open to persuasion. Chou apparently has been permitted by Mao to subordinate revolution-support to PRC diplomatic needs in several cases outside Southeast Asia, Ethiopia and Zaire being notable examples. But he has apparently had to comply with Mao's abiding view on support for the nearby insurgencies.

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in [REDACTED] talks with envoys from Burma, Thailand, Malaysia, and the Philippines, Chinese officials (including Chou) have refused in each case to give a promise to end support of insurgencies. In these private talks, no Chinese official has offered a "reasonable" deal -- that is, cessation of support in return for breaking ties with Taipei. And no other trade-off has been offered. By contrast, explicit and concrete guarantees to end insurgency-support have been given with alacrity to envoys from Ethiopia and Zaire, the payoff having been formal diplomatic recognition of the PRC.

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[REDACTED] A growing body of information proves conclusively that in two cases (Burma and Thailand) Peking has sent in men to keep the insurgencies moving. This manpower has included PLA officers (as high in rank as the equivalent of "general"), PLA non-commissioned soldiers, PRC ethnic minority citizens recruited in China, and insurgent leaders trained in China. The Chinese themselves for the first time admitted (in March 1973) that sustained Chinese aid would include "manpower" inputs into Burma. Additional support is present in the form of material aid: this has included modern weapons and supplies, as well as the extensive use of a PLA hospital near the Burma and Thailand border. In addition, the insurgents have had special training on the China-side of the border in PLA-run camps.

The insurgents in the field receive indoctrination and guidance regularly from three China-based and Chinese-run clandestine radio stations, one each for Burma, Thailand, and Malaysia. These are operational radios -- that is, shortwave transmitters broadcasting to professional insurgents. In this way, the Chinese disseminate their ideas -- including virtual directives -- on how to strengthen and expand the insurgent territory. The broadcasts contain timely materials (well-researched in China) on developments within each target country, inspirational propaganda, and guidelines for activities. The Chinese leaders have refused explicit requests from Rangoon, Bangkok, and Kuala Lumpur to cease this operational broadcasting, and on 1 March 1973 their clandestine radio for Thailand declared that it would not cease its "mobilization and morale-boosting" work. This policy indicates that when faced with the concrete, specific choice of either priority to diplomacy or priority to insurgency-support, the

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Chinese leaders thus far are continuing to give priority to the latter in dealing with these countries.

In Burma, some PLA officers are ensconced in the Northeast Command -- the insurgents' operational headquarters. These officers are the de facto commanders of the insurgent forces, and the decision to initiate any big attack, such as a sustained assault on a town, apparently is made by these Chinese officers, in coordination with insurgent leaders. The PLA men almost certainly are responsive to directives from the nearby Kunming Military Region -- active in insurgent aid -- and ultimately to Peking. The theory that the Kunming MR commander is acting independently of, and against the policy of, Peking is not credible. There probably now is a separate, all-Chinese PLA military unit operating in a field command role within Burma's northeast. Mixed platoons form part of the bulk of the 4,000 to 5,000 insurgent forces.

In Thailand, at least one former PLA officer of "general" rank (or the equivalent) is [REDACTED] acting as an advisor to an insurgent leader in north Thailand. He was infiltrated with a group of about 200 former PLA officers and men, specially trained and selected for duty with the insurgents. Several officers of the infiltrated unit may also have a command role, as they reportedly include the political officer of a PLA regiment, a field grade officer of a PLA regiment, and a deputy commander of a PLA company. These 200 professional soldiers arrived in north Thailand bases in November 1971, and it is likely that more specially-trained PLA personnel will be sent in to improve the military integrity of the insurgents in the north (about 2,900 men) and the northeast (about 2,000 men).

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In Malaysia, Peking's support of the 1,800 insurgents does not include direct inputs of personnel or weapons, for obvious logistical reasons. This handicap is also operative in Peking's support of the 1,000 Maoist insurgents in the Philippines. The Communist leadership of both these insurgencies is loyal to Peking on an entire range of issues and is pledged to fight a long, Mao-model war against the government. The Chinese-run operational radio, Voice of the Malayan Revolution, broadcasts regularly from South China to insurgents in Malaysia, calling for an expansion of their armed struggle. There is no sign that these broadcasts will be discontinued in the near future.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Southeast Asian leaders believe the single most important obstacle to establishing diplomatic relations with Peking is this insurgency-support. Peking's policy strengthens the argument against establishing relations by those men within the respective country leaderships who desire a go-slow approach; it weakens the argument of those who advocate early recognition. Undoubtedly, Chou En-lai is fully informed of this impediment to new diplomatic successes, and sees the irrationality of it.

The main reason for the continuation of Peking's self-defeating policy to support insurgencies nearby seems clearly to be Mao's ideological and personal desire to prove that Mao-model armed struggles can be born and survive. On a deeper, perhaps even unconscious, level he may want to prove this to himself -- as well as to the scoffing Soviets, who have disputed this point with him for over a decade. Mao still insists that armed struggle is the only road to national power for Communists. This dogma in Mao's thinking apparently is not as firmly rooted

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in Chou's thinking. As with Stalin, it will probably prove to be the case that after the dominant leader is dead certain of the old leader's obsessions -- including, in the Chinese case, support of insurgencies -- will be exposed for what they are, irrational concepts impeding policy, and will then be marked for discard.

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PEKING'S SUPPORT OF INSURGENCIES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

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PEKING'S SUPPORT OF INSURGENCIES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

IDEOLOGY: THE UNSHAKEN FOUNDATION

Since Mao Tse-tung's Cultural Revolution in 1967, and earlier in the case of Thailand, Peking has been playing a major role in stimulating the revival of floundering insurgencies in several Southeast Asian countries. The armed insurgencies in Burma, Thailand, Malaysia, and the Philippines virtually had collapsed in the 1950's and in effect, had been abandoned by Peking for purposes of diplomacy. This policy of disengagement was reversed in the case of Thailand in 1965, and in the cases of Burma, Malaysia, and the Philippines in 1967. The new policy of political stimulation and various kinds of material support stems basically from the ideological and personal inclinations of Mao which had been touched off by a punishment motive but which are not now sustained by that motive.

The Source of Insurgency Revival


The thrust -- that is, the initial propulsion -- for revival of the insurgencies came from Peking rather than from the guerrillas who were hiding in the jungles. In the earliest case, Thailand, the Chinese overall promoting role was suggested by the remark of Foreign Minister Chen Yi [redacted] on 8 January 1965: "we may have a guerrilla war going on in Thailand before the year is out." Shortly thereafter, Mao himself, speaking of the war in Vietnam and other guerrilla wars, insisted that the major Communist

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SOUTHEAST ASIA: Areas of Communist Insurgency



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powers must play an activating, inciting role. He lectured his visitor, Premier Kosygin, on 11 February 1965 on the need to promote the insurgencies: "We must stimulate." Mao asserted this in a direct rejection of Kosygin's statement that it should be the sole decision of "each party" whether guerrilla war should be started.

The policy of deliberate stimulation included an entire range of methods of practical support. One of the material inputs which required a Chinese leadership decision was the diplomatically sensitive one of supplying Chinese-made weapons. Prior to the Cultural Revolution, it had been Chinese practice to avoid such a policy of supply, inasmuch as captured Chinese-made weapons would be concrete evidence of PRC interference in revolution beyond its borders. But in 1967, Mao apparently decided to change this cautious and prudent policy. Speaking to cadres in late June or early July 1967 about the "Strategic Arrangements" (or, overall plan) of his Cultural Revolution, Mao discussed his attitude toward guerrilla fighters abroad.

We should give them arms and can now openly give them arms, including clearly inscribed Chinese weapons (except in certain areas).

Evidence later revealed (for the first time in 1969), that the Thai insurgents were being supplied with clearly identified Chinese-made AK-47 assault rifles. The insurgents in Burma were also shown to have been receiving easily identifiable Chinese-made weapons. That this was deliberate Chinese policy, rather than a policy the North Vietnamese on their own were

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practicing from caches in Laos, is indicated by the statement of Politburo member Kang Sheng. Speaking on 13 February 1968 to Red Guards representatives from Yunnan Province, Kang said that "Our arms are also made to help Vietnam to fight the Americans, to aid the Burmese and Thai people."

In addition to supplying weapons from Yunnan, the Chinese have used that strategically-located border province as a base for infiltrating PLA personnel and for providing China-side training for the insurgencies in Burma and Thailand. The central role of this province was indicated by another Politburo member, Hsieh Fu-chih, in his speech to the abovementioned Red Guards representatives. Hsieh said that "Yunnan is not only the rear area behind Vietnam but also an important base for revolutionaries in Burma, Thailand, and Laos."

The shift from a policy of disengagement to one of deliberate stimulation and support was accompanied by Chinese insistence to the insurgents that the guerrilla war must be well-organized in order to make positive gains. At an early date, the Chinese began to show their pleasure with the new and serious way the insurgents were prosecuting the small war. For example, speaking to an "activist congress" in Shanghai on 4 April 1968, Politburo member Chang Chun-chiao said that "In Burma, guerrilla warfare has made faster progress in one year than in the past 20 years." The three clandestine radio stations beaming broadcasts into the nearby insurgencies from China for several years have noted the improvement in organization, commitment, and fighting tactics of the insurgents Peking supports. The contrast with the poor showing of the 1950's is striking.

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The Incongruous Mix in Southeast Asia


Peking's foreign policy toward Southeast Asia is strikingly marked by a dual approach. The People's Republic of China (PRC) is simultaneously trying to improve relations with countries in the area while the CCP is supporting insurrections -- and helping to expand them -- within these countries. Both policies are going forward at the same time. Diplomacy toward Burma, Thailand, Malaysia (including North Borneo), and the Philippines is not displacing insurgency-support. Insurgency-support is not displacing diplomacy. By contrast, policy toward Africa (other than PRC support of insurgencies against colonial or white governments) and Latin America reveals a clear-cut displacement of insurgency-support by diplomacy. In the Middle East, PRC support of Arab insurgency against Israel primarily aids national self-interest rather than revolutionary interest. Only in Southeast Asia is the PRC policy equally and inharmoniously mixed.

Officials from non-Asian countries, who have held talks with Chinese officials in recent years have reported on the incongruous nature of Peking's dual policy. They see a conflicting, rather than a harmonious, mix of the two components.

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This is further evidence that PRC diplomacy must work within revolutionary limits. PRC Foreign Ministry officials (and Chou En-lai) have a warrant to "adopt a flexible attitude" to improve government-to-government relations "even if a country previously adopted a policy hostile to China" (as a joint editorial of 1 October 1972 put it). But they have no warrant, even in private talks, to promise an end to insurgency-support in Southeast Asia.

Chou, and Foreign Ministry officials working for him, apparently are operating under an overall guideline of Mao's. This guideline requires that they maintain for Southeast Asia a two-level policy, clearly duplicitous in the view of leaders in nearby countries,

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and duplicitous in the Chinese leaders' own perception of it. There is evidence that the two-level policy is a deliberate and planned course of action, rather than a dying remnant of a policy Mao retains reluctantly. In capsule form, the policy requires that Chou work for improved relations with Burma, Thailand, Malaysia, and the Philippines but not at the expense of ceasing support of the insurgencies in these four countries.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The two-level policy as implemented by Chou had not aided PRC diplomacy. Thai leaders were not driven to change their foreign policy lines. On the contrary, some of them cited Chou's revolutionary statement as cause for going slow -- slower than other Thais desired -- in increasing contacts with Peking. In Burma, Ne Win has been driven to seek rapprochement with Thailand.

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The most recent confirmation that insurgency-support is a deliberate policy, rather than an aberrant

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holdover, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] during Ne Win's visit to Peking (August 1971), Chou En-lai [REDACTED] made it clear to Ne Win that China welcomes improved state-to-state relations with Burma, but that the Chinese Communist Party cannot ignore its obligation to aid, as Mao points out, "all fraternal parties which are struggling for a just cause and for their liberation." Chou's conclusion: the Chinese Communists "will continue" to support the Burmese Communists. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Radio Peking and the Clandestine Radios

The Chinese seem to recognize that their image with the Western powers and Japan requires a concealment of the extent of PRC support of insurgency. This fact is reflected most clearly in Chou's well-documented actions to differentiate government from party support, and open from covert support.

Radio Peking, which beams broadcasts to a wide range of international audiences, has reduced its coverage of nearby insurgency developments. This has taken place, step-by-step, since the fall of 1970 in the case of Burma, and since mid-1971 in the cases of Thailand, Malaysia, and the Philippines. Recourse to a similar low-profile, or disengagement from open support, has been the policy also with the PRC central press. Radio Peking and the central press now only rarely initiate a commentary on the nearby insurgencies. The practice has become one of rebroadcasting or

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reprinting either an item from one of the clandestine radios in south China or from foreign news sources.

The three clandestine radios, broadcasting from complexes in China -- two from Yunnan and one from Hunan ---continue to beam native language programs regularly to the insurgents in Burma, Thailand, and Malaysia. Programs detailing aspects of the insurgency in the Philippines are carried by the radio handling Malaysian guerrilla developments. The broadcasts range in content from guidance and indoctrination programs to highly abusive attacks on the leaders of nearby governments in the area. The attacks are more abusive than those Radio Peking had carried, except for a period in 1967 at the peak of Mao's Cultural Revolution. They are a source of concern to leaders of nearby governments, and they are one of the concrete Chinese practices which has slowed down the progress of PRC diplomacy in the area.

Aside from the emphasis in the broadcasts on how to make the insurgencies work, the radio programs are conceived on the assumption that the men in the field are under a strong study discipline. On occasion, the assumption seems to be that they are under roughly the same study discipline as CCP mainland cadres. For example, in May 1972, the text of one of Mao's essays was broadcast to insurgent cadres in Malaysia by the broadcasts of the clandestine Voice of the Malayan Revolution (VMR). On other occasions, the complete text of PRC statements are broadcast, obviously for study and memorization.

There is considerable evidence that Chou En-lai is the most important official implementing the transparent device of separating state-to-state from party-to-party relations. Chou's personal activities began in the spring of 1971, included the visit of Ne Win in August 1971, and appeared openly as a basic policy in October 1971, when Peking started to hold separate

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National Day receptions for foreign diplomats and foreign Communists.

The number of greeting messages, connected with various Chinese anniversary dates and attributed to Communist parties engaged in the nearby insurgencies, has been reduced in Radio Peking and central press coverage. These messages are handled by the clandestine radios assigned to each insurgency. Messages of greetings from one Communist Party to another are also assigned to the clandestine radios, a recent example being the message from the Burmese Communists to the Thai Communists on 30 November 1972, commending the Thais for fighting against the "traitorous Thanom-Praphat clique" and for "following the teaching of great Chairman Mao Tse-tung that political power grows out of the barrel of a gun." The broadcast stated that the Burmese Communists are following the same Mao-model policy.

The Retreat from Ideological Rigidity Elsewhere

Beyond Southeast Asia, Chinese spokesmen have a less restricted scope which permits them in private talks to promise to cease supporting uprisings within other countries. They are able effectively to avoid risking damage to PRC diplomacy; they need not accept a slowdown in its advance by rigidly supporting insurrections or sudden coups.

Africa and the Middle East

A clear indication that the Chinese are aware of the incongruity of revolution and diplomacy is found in the way they have downgraded insurgency-support (except in cases of colonial or white regimes) when

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they desire a rapid advance of government-to-government relations. In order to let diplomacy take command, they have begun to say that China cannot support insurrection in Africa because there is no potential there for it. Politburo member Kang Sheng told visiting Latin American Communist Party leaders in the summer of 1970 that there were "no revolutionary possibilities" emerging in Africa and Latin America." Kang went on to say that, with countries there, China's relations were on a "government-to-government" level. This has become the established line for the PRC Foreign Ministry. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

The shift of the Chinese from support of revolution is most striking in the case of Africa. In the captured Tibetan documents of 1961, the enunciated policy was that Africa provided the best prospect (better, even, than Southeast Asia) for revolutionary situations. The policy was that revolution there should be stimulated and that the whole continent could be rolled up like a map. In compliance with this kind of ideological hubris, Chou En-lai himself declared in Somalia in February 1964 that "Africa is ripe for revolution." This was a diplomatic blunder, uncharacteristic of Chou, which immediately and subsequently impeded the progress of PRC diplomacy and temporarily aided that of Taipei on the continent. In more recent years, given the warrant to be diplomatically prudent, Chou and Chinese Foreign Ministry officials have adopted an attitude of disengagement from revolution. More importantly, they have been permitted to be precise and explicit in stating this attitude.

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The Chinese indicated to the Ethiopians, during the visit of Haile Selassie in early October 1971, that their policy had changed to non-support of the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) insurgents. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Chou promised that no further PRC commitments would be made to provide aid to Somalia or the Sudan without prior consultation with Ethiopia. Chou promised that the PRC would take measures to ensure that subversive activities against Ethiopia from Somalia and the Sudan would in no way benefit from Chinese aid, advice, or support. Chou promised that China would make clear to other Arab countries that its "new policy" of friendship for Ethiopia as a leading country of Africa meant that the PRC did not favor Arab encouragement of ELF insurgents. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Peking in fact has acted on these specific pledges.

A specific pledge was later given to officials from Zaire, again with the intention of advancing PRC diplomacy at a rapid pace. In the second week of November 1972, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] the Zairian envoy in Peking insisted that China give a precise guarantee that it would cease all subversive activities against the Kinshasa government. PRC Deputy Foreign Minister Ho Ying replied without equivocation. China, he said, gives its "word of honor" as a "guarantee" that it will not interfere in Zairian affairs. Zaire, Ho continued, must believe that China will keep its "promise."

This attitude is in direct contrast to that displayed by Foreign Ministry officials when they are

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asked for similar guarantees, or promises, from envoys visiting from Southeast Asian countries. In the latter case, the Chinese deny that they are involved in the insurgencies, but refuse to give a promise or guarantee of future non-involvement and insert a revolutionary statement about Mao's principle "to support" guerrilla wars anywhere.

In the Middle East, Chinese diplomacy requires PRC support of a certain guerrilla war -- that is, the one Arab fedayeen are trying to wage against Israel. The Arab guerrillas are not ideological allies. They are not Communists, and they are not likely to establish a Communist regime, or a viable base area, or even a Communist Party organization. The ideological element here is dominated by the practical one of PRC diplomacy toward Arab governments, even though in this case Peking is openly supporting "armed struggle."

Latin America

In Latin America also diplomacy has taken command. The main thrust of policy is to avoid revolutionary statements and to stress government-to-government relations. One exception will be discussed later.

Chinese officials told foreign Communists in Peking in mid-1971 that China intends to be very cautious when it comes to supporting armed revolts and guerrilla movements in Latin America. They were frank; they said that the PRC does not intend to jeopardize current prospects for diplomatic gains by ill-conceived support of revolutionary movements they really know nothing about. (Actually, in Latin America as in Africa, the Chinese are now unwilling to support guerrilla wars

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about which they know a great deal.) This policy of disengagement was more fully elaborated on 25 August 1971 by Keng Piao, Director of the International Liaison Department, CCP. Keng told visiting Latin American Communists that China would support only "organized" pro-Peking Communist parties, presumably only those which were unfractured and amenable to CCP guidance. Keng said that China would not become involved with adventurous movements like the Tupamaros in Uruguay, the rebel armed forces in Guatemala, and (obviously) "Che" Guevara's men. He went further, warning the group that even if an "organized" party elected to start "armed rebellion" against an established government, the PRC would look the situation over very carefully before committing itself to material or monetary support. Keng remained silent about the prospect for overt political support which, if given, would be easily detected and therefore damaging to PRC diplomacy.

Chou En-lai was to put the policy into practice. Following Peru's recognition of the PRC (2 November 1971), the Chinese desired a further improvement of government-to-government relations. When, therefore, a visiting cabinet minister of Peru asked Chou, in mid-January 1972, why pro-Peking parties in Peru were allowed to continue to attack the Lima government as a "fascist regime" when, supposedly, good relations existed between the two governments, Chou reacted against the revolutionaries. He angrily condemned the action of these groups. He said that no party in Peru had ever received official authorization to include "China" in its party name or to assume that it represented the Chinese people or the CCP. By contrast, in Southeast Asia, the China-based clandestine radios continue to disparage certain nearby governments as "fascist regimes."

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The Durability of Ideology: "Armed Struggle"

In Latin American policy, there is at least one exception of considerable significance. That is, there is an instance in which an ideological concept was defended -- openly and deliberately -- in a way not conducive to PRC diplomatic progress. It was defended by the man with the most diplomatic sense in the Chinese leadership: Chou En-lai. The instance is yet another confirmation that certain elements -- indestructable core elements -- still exist in Mao's thinking. In this case, the core element was Mao's view that the only way to permanent national power for revolutionaries is by way of "armed struggle."

In early September 1971, one year after Allende's electoral victory in Chile, in an interview with a Mexican editor in Peking, Chou was asked about the CCP's position that national power must be seized only by "armed force." He was asked how he viewed the parliamentary road -- the path of elections Allende had taken. Chou's response was along rigid ideological lines. He chose not to be diplomatic; that is, he did not equivocate and did not avoid disparaging Allende's election route to power. He chose a critical tack despite the fact that Allende's government had shown goodwill: it had cut ties with Taipei and granted formal recognition to Peking on 5 January 1971. This action had provided Peking with an important breakthrough in government relations in Latin America.

Chou proceeded to give an analysis for worldwide publication which was similar to that of doctrinal extremists in Chile and not flattering to

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Allende. Disregarding the fact that Allende had attained decisive political support before the assassination of General Schneider, Chou insisted that "what most helped Salvador Allende, the truly decisive factor, was a counter-revolutionary bullet, an assassin's bullet, which killed General Schneider... therefore, the majority vote went to Allende." Chou made the point explicitly that:

*We do not believe in struggle by
the parliamentary method.*

He described Allende's victory in unflattering terms as a "transitory phenomenon" which could be lost, and Allende as having won the "government but not the power" because he did not control the army, which later could be used against him. Pro-Soviet Communists in Chile immediately attacked Chou for this example of ideological gaucherie, and Allende himself undoubtedly was angered by it.

This exceptional behavior is a case of ideology taking precedence over diplomatic tact. The fact that Mao holds tenaciously to certain ideological positions because of doctrinal and personal predilection -- and holds them ever more tenaciously because the Soviets continue to oppose them -- is the fundamental reason why doctrine displaced diplomatic prudence in the case of Allende's victory.

Allende's victory had been portrayed by various Communists in the international movement as a valid demonstration that Mao was wrong about "armed struggle" being the only road to national power. Peking's defense of Mao's ideological position had been set forth at

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great length, with great heat, and with great publicity in the joint editorial in Peking's central press on 17 March 1971.

*Comrade Mao Tse-tung...points out:
'According to the Marxist theory of the state, the army is the chief component of state power. Whoever wants to seize and retain state power must have a strong army.'*

Violent revolution is the universal principle of proletarian revolution... and there is no exception...

In the past decades, many Communist parties have participated in elections and parliaments, but none has set up a dictatorship of the proletariat by such means. Even if a Communist party should win a majority in parliament or participate in the government, this would not mean any change in the character of bourgeois political power, still less in the smashing of the old state machine...

The proletariat must use the gun to seize political power and must use the gun to defend it... (emphasis supplied)

An analysis of Chou's early September 1971 interview strongly suggests that he was repeating the ideological position of the abovementioned March 1971 joint editorial. Prior to Allende's electoral victory, Peking

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had been supporting a more radical group of Chilean Communists against the pro-Moscow local Communists. In July 1970, Politburo member Kang Sheng had made a special point of praising the pro-Chinese Revolutionary Communist Party of Chile precisely because it held the line of taking power only through "armed struggle," as opposed to the "revisionist line of the Soviet clique." Allende's popular-vote victory was a direct refutation of Mao's dogmatic view. But in early September 1971, Chou had to comply with Mao's ideological position, and he had to do so publicly. In trying to demonstrate that somehow "armed struggle" had aided Allende -- "an assassin's bullet" -- and that Allende might not be able to consolidate his victory because he did not control the army, Chou was being abrasive, making statements contrary to what would have benefited PRC national interests in Santiago.

The ideological view that national power must be seized along the road of "armed struggle" rather than along the parliamentary road cuts across the grain of a foreign policy of flexibility. It could impede progress in diplomacy toward democracies which already have recognized the PRC as China's only legal government, or which are being encouraged to grant such recognition. There is some evidence that Chou is aware of this and may want to dilute the doctrine in certain cases. He may be seeking Mao's permission to be more selective about defending the "armed struggle" concept outside of the insurgencies in Southeast Asia which the PRC supports.



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
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There is also reporting which suggests that the more rigid formula is the view that offically prevails. The Peking central press has published excerpts of an article written by the Central Committee of the pro-Chinese Communist Party of Brazil which included the statement that the Brazilian people's

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"road of armed struggle" is "the only road possible" for revolutionary victory. (Peking, NCNA, 17 February 1972) Elsewhere, in late April 1972, a Chinese embassy official in Rome told several pro-Peking Communist leaders that the CCP is against "parliamentary" activities and that the CCP believes it to be a betrayal of the people's revolution for a Marxist-Leninist party to engage in them "whether the electoral efforts of such parties succeed in electing party candidates or not."

The Durability of Chinese Insurgency-Support

The ideological position that "armed struggle," rather than the parliamentary road, is the only road to power is being sustained in Chinese comment on the insurgencies they support. It appears on occasion in the central press. All three clandestine radios continue to beam this fixed position into Burma, Thailand, and Malaysia. These insurgencies, and the one Peking helps to inspire in the Philippines, comprise the clearest example, in Mao's apparent view, that he is right and the Soviet leaders are wrong in the fervently contested view that guerrilla wars, not

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elections, are the best way to seize national power. The Chinese are telling their client insurgents in the field that even Stalin had denounced the parliamentary road. The Chinese-operated VMR, between 20 and 26 September 1972, beamed broadcasts into Malaysia containing the first half of Stalin's work, Foundations of Leninism, in which Stalin criticized the parties of the Second International for being subservient to the parliamentary road. This is the ideological position with which cadres in the insurgencies must comply.

This is Mao's ideological core position, with which Chou must comply. Thus far, it seems to be impervious to change despite the shift to flexibility in foreign policy. The end of the war in Vietnam, therefore, will probably not lead to an end of Chinese insurgency-support. It probably will continue at least until Mao dies.

It is the basic assumption of this paper that Mao dominates the Chinese leaders in making major policy decisions. He dominates, for example, his wife and Chou. So far as can be observed and judged, Chou has never, since Mao came to dominate the Chinese

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leadership in 1935, opposed Mao's will, once Mao had made it clear what he wanted carried out in policy. Chou's survival suggests not that he is more subtle in thwarting Mao's preferences than other Chinese leaders (who are now political corpses), but that he has never tried to deceive Mao. His style of work seems to have been, and still to be, that of using persuasion at a time when Mao is open to persuasion. The 1969 firefights on the Sino-Soviet border and Soviet verbal threats provided Chou with a great opportunity to persuade Mao convincingly of the benefits (and need) of a foreign policy of flexible maneuver. Chou's conjectured persuasion of Mao included an effort to make Mao see the wisdom of restricting Chinese support of insurgencies outside Southeast Asia (with certain exceptions). Mao told Zaire's President Mobutu in Peking in mid-January 1973 that Chou had disagreed with Mao's belief in "war" -- in the context, the Congo insurgency in mid-1960 against Mobutu's regime. Mao went on to say that Chou was responsible for promoting peaceful coexistence and that Chou was, therefore, responsible for the friendship between Kinshasa and Peking. By implication, Chou was given the credit for ceasing PRC support to the Zairian rebels.

Chou has been permitted by Mao to have his way in subordinating revolution-support to PRC diplomatic needs in several cases outside Southeast Asia. He and other Chinese officials have criticized "Che" Guevara, the Tupamaros, pro-Peking Communists in Peru, and the Ceylonese short-term insurgents. Chou, on the evidence, seems to have had a lower opinion of foreign insurgents as worthwhile clients than Mao has had. This difference in appraisal almost certainly exists today, especially regarding some nearby states.

While Mao now permits Chou to end insurgency-support elsewhere, his abiding view apparently is to sustain support for those which are gradually expanding in Burma, Thailand, Malaysia, and the Philippines. Chou clearly must comply with this abiding view.

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
Within the framework of interpretation which sees Maoist ideology -- Mao's personal "thought" -- as the main reason for sustained insurgency-support, this support is being provided in a sensible way. The Chinese are making small inputs gradually, rather than big inputs at priority speed, into the insurgencies in Burma and Thailand. The ideologically-motivated policy is being carried out only in certain countries where it is feasible for the Chinese to guide it. The capability to guide and influence -- this is the first requirement for Chinese support. Provided that such a capability is at hand, certain other criteria determine the Chinese policy. First, the Chinese must control the insurgency directly with their own cadres, or through pro-Chinese cadres in the insurgent ranks. Second, proximity to the borders of China determines, to some degree, the capability the Chinese have in guiding an insurgency. Third, the insurgency must be viable to begin with, or open to a Chinese role in making it viable. The insurgency must be amenable to Chinese guidance on organizational work, ideological commitment, and military integrity.

Mao apparently does not seem deterred from sponsoring or supporting these insurgencies in Southeast Asia by the probability that they will not spread from the periphery to the vital center of the countries where they are developing. It seems to be more important at present to him that they exist than that they are made to expand rapidly and extensively. Mao apparently believes that withdrawing Peking's support (and thereby risking the collapse of some of them) would give the Soviet leaders a big ideological victory in the dispute over "armed struggle." The anti-Soviet animus in his thinking may buttress his own ideological predilection to sustain insurgency-support.

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The importance of the ideological motivation, the persistence of dogma in Mao's thinking, seems to be far greater than in Chou's thinking. Moreover, Chou has no pretensions to doctrinal creativity. As with Stalin, it will probably prove to be the case that only after the dominant leader is dead that certain detrimental obsessions with ideology will be exposed for what they are, irrational concepts impeding policy, and will then be marked for discard.

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PEKING'S PRIMARY ROLE IN THE INSURGENCIES

Burma

China is the main propelling force in the expanding insurgency in Burma's northeast. Its personnel are directly involved. PLA officers are ensconced in the very matrix of the command structure inside Burma. The northeast insurgency is controlled at the top by PLA officers, aided tactically in the field by PLA company-level officers and above, and supported in the ranks by non-commissioned PLA soldiers and by Chinese-recruited militia. There probably are all-PLA independent units now engaged in direct military action in Burma.

The need to send across the border such an impressive array of PLA personnel is a measure of how badly the Communist insurgency had floundered prior to 1967 when operating on its own, and of how badly it might deteriorate if Peking were to withdraw its thoroughgoing sponsorship.

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Major military actions -- such as engagements involving one regiment or more -- fall under the control of PLA and insurgent officers in the Northeast Command of the insurgency, located within Burma.*

[REDACTED] from the China-side, the PLA's 11th Army, Kunming Military Region, has a command and training role in the insurgency. Below the command level, the Kachins and Shans, effective fighters who are allied with the Chinese and Burmese Communists, fill out the ranks of the forces. They do not control the main course of the insurgency, which is ultimately controlled by the Chinese leadership in Peking. There is no evidence, and it is not credible, that the Commander of the Kunming Military Region is acting independently of Peking.


The insurgency is not controlled by local Burmese Communists. Specifically, it is not controlled by the Chairman of the Burma Communist Party -- the BCP (White Flag), led by Chairman Thakin Zin. He is operating farther south, in the Pegu Yoma mountains, with a small remnant force which is euphemistically touted as the "Central Command." It is still an ineffective remnant of the pre-1967 Burmese Communist forces; Peking's efforts have shifted

* [REDACTED] the highest ranking PLA officer within the Northeast Command has a rank equivalent to an Army deputy commander (major general) or division deputy commander (colonel). Presumably it was with this officer in mind that Ne Win in August 1971 complained to Chou En-lai about the military advisor of the insurgents who was a "PLA commander."

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BURMA: Areas of Communist Insurgency



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to the more effective tribal fighters of the geographical Northeast Command, which they control through PLA officers assigned to most fighting units and at the highest command level. Theoretically, Chairman Thakin Zin is responsible for making policy decisions, and as recent as 20 August 1972, the PRC-run clandestine radio station beamed his "instructions" to Burma insurgents. In practice, however, he and his group of followers defer to the instructions from the Northeast Command on all key issues.

Compared to the small gains in territory made by the end of 1969, the land the insurgents now hold in the northeast shows a course of expansion rather than contraction. China's input also is growing. Everything the Chinese diplomats have done on the level of government-to-government relations with Rangoon and Ne Win has not changed the fact that Peking covertly is sponsoring this expansion by continuing to train tribal insurgents in China and by sending in men, weapons, ammunition, and medical supplies.

As a result of the Chinese input of special PLA personnel, and also because of intensive organizational work conducted among the tribal peoples, the insurgency in the northeast is now the most effective one that Rangoon has ever had to grapple with. The professional political and organizational work of the Chinese which raises the level of discipline and competence has also been urged upon insurgent forces in Thailand, Malaysia, and the Philippines by Peking. As a result, these forces are no longer ineffectual roving bands of "only-military" (Guevaraist-type) guerrillas, as they had been prior to 1967. All this points beyond mere rhetoric, mere token support, and mere gesture to a serious, professional policy intended, on the practical level, to make certain insurgencies in Southeast Asia take hold and gradually expand along the road of "protracted war."

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The Burma case shows more clearly than any other case the existence of a motivation in addition to, or more important and durable than, the more rational one of punishment. In the summer of 1967, Mao acted to punish Ne Win for the anti-Chinese riots in Rangoon, and the method he used was to revive the insurgency in the northeast. But Ne Win has agreed to reparations and the grudge Mao has held against him may no longer be the major motivation which sustains Peking's insurgency-support.

Another motivation of Mao's existed side-by-side with the punishment (or revenge-for-riots) motivation. This was his revolutionary compulsion which dominated his foreign policy thinking in 1966 and 1967. It is neither anti-Ne Win nor anti-U.S. It is an independent ideological element in Mao's political thinking. The anti-Chinese riots, in retrospect, appear to have been a triggering mechanism for directing PRC hostility toward Burma. But in 1973, revenge for the riots probably is not the major motivation for sustaining insurgency support.

In short, there are two reasons for sustaining the small war today; namely, Mao's nursing of a grudge -- in 1973 probably secondary -- and Mao's revolutionary urge to make a Mao-model insurgency work. Neither one makes good sense from the viewpoint of Peking's national interests, especially as the main thrust of those interests is to maneuver internationally around the USSR's foreign policy. This requires flexibility toward Burma as well as other states in the area.

Several alternative explanations of PRC motivation appear weak. PRC sponsorship of the Burma insurgency in the northeast does not help Hanoi in its war effort in the region. Furthermore, it leaves the new flexible diplomacy carried out by Chou En-lai open

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to the risk that the Soviets might be welcomed in to supply military items by a frustrated Ne Win (or his successor), forced to turn away from China. Yet there is good evidence that Chinese diplomacy is partly directed toward keeping Soviet influence out of the area. Finally, he may seek a common front with Thailand.

Explaining the insurgency as a pressuring tool is also difficult. Territory in the mountainous tribal area of Burma's northeast does not now provide Peking with leverage to exert real pressure at the leadership level in Rangoon. Ne Win's foreign policy has not been moved by such pressure to be more anti-U.S., or to be any more "neutral" than it has been. Holding and expanding territory still is a long way from moving the tribal-based insurrection in the northeast mountains into the lowlands where the Burma people live. And in the lowlands, it would be more effectively resisted. It would provide the Burmese leaders with an easy-to-publicize international issue of a national threat -- an issue which would be injurious to Peking's foreign policy posture as a government which does not interfere in other governments' internal affairs.

Chinese diplomacy is not supplemented by it. Insurgency-support is not the stick of a carrot-and-stick policy, cleverly directed toward driving Rangoon to adopt PRC foreign policy preferences. On the contrary, the hard evidence is that PRC diplomacy is impeded by insurgency-support.

As flexible diplomacy gathered momentum, in mid-1970, NCNA articles (i.e., media commentaries which could be easily attributed to Peking as the source) were reduced in numbers and made less anti-Rangoon. But a clandestine radio station (broadcasting media commentaries which could not be as easily attributed to Peking as the source) was established (March 1971). Chou En-lai and Foreign Ministry

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officials have had to take a duplicitous line -- that is, denying insurgency-support in such a way as to leave their listeners with a strong sense of Chinese insincerity, and with no pledge of an end to PRC support.

The existence of this incongruity seems to reflect Mao's desires, with which Chou must comply.

Since the mid-1950's, Chinese Communist policy toward the Burma insurgency had been to give advice but not material support to the old Burma Communist Party. In the mid-1950's also, Peking was careful not to give overt propaganda support to these Communist dissidents. Behind-the-scenes, the Chinese leaders had encouraged the BCP to come in from the countryside to negotiate with the government for a ceasefire; but they had not gone so far as to require the BCP to meet Rangoon's key demand that it turn in its weapons.

This non-support situation changed during Mao's Cultural Revolution. The triggering incident was the anti-Chinese riots in Rangoon of June 1967. In these riots, 50-80 local Chinese and one PRC aid-technician were killed. A motivation for punishment and a motivation for revolution were aroused in Mao's thinking. On 29 June 1967, Peking for the first time praised the "armed struggle" waged against the government. By early July, Peking was calling for the government's "overthrow." At the same time (July 1967) speaking in a revolutionary way, a Burmese Communist client resident in Peking denounced Liu Shao-chi for having "betrayed" the revolution in Burma -- the implication being that it would not be abandoned again.

Evidence that the Chinese had opted for a policy of material inputs (beyond intensified propaganda

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support) appeared soon afterward. In late July 1967, Chinese military officers contacted Kachin and Shan insurgents in the northeast to begin military planning. Starting in August, the Chinese began their important organizational efforts, designed to strengthen the influence of Peking and the newer BCP (White Flag) among the tribal Kachins and Shans. This political work was also necessary to regularize the activities of the insurgents, to add discipline to their fighting fervor, and to make clear an ultimate political goal. Thereafter, Chinese training and supply of the tribal insurgents in the northeast expanded. Peking supplied decisive guidance to make the new insurgency viable in the border region. The insurgency became a Chinese-sponsored guerrilla war of mainly Kachins and Shans against government troops, inasmuch as Peking had abandoned the old BCP which got nowhere in its operations in central Burma and which had appointed a new party chairman, Thakin Zin, not of Peking's choosing.



A major step was taken when the Chinese went beyond using only Burma-side nationals: they began to recruit PRC citizens (mainly tribal minorities with some Han Chinese) on the Yunnan-side for fighting in northeast Burma. By March 1968 such Yunnan-side recruitment was well underway. Rather than wait until Burma-side tribal minorities could be mustered into combat units, the Chinese, who showed every sign of being anxious to put muscle into this "people's war" in the northeast, recruited quickly on their side.

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
Overall direction of the insurgency in the field is controlled by a military headquarters located at Mengya -- the Northeast Command. Since 1969 it has been in charge of all military action in the insurgent-infested strip of land contiguous to China, running along the border in an area about 50 miles northeast of Lashio. It controls between 4,000 and 5,000 personnel. It has some authority over "support" camps on the China-side which train and equip troops and contain a major hospital for the insurgents.

The Command is a mix of PLA officers and insurgent leaders. The presence of a four-man PLA advisory unit at the very center of the Northeast Command is a fact 

 It has relevance to the crucial matter of Peking's control over military operations. According to one defector, all military programs developed by the Northeast Command have to be submitted to the Chinese advisory group for approval. This means that the decision to begin a large-scale attack is made by PLA officers in Burma's northeast who are responsive to the Kunming Military Region (and to Peking). Thus it is highly unlikely that Peking is unable to control big operations in the northeast. Peking almost certainly has foreknowledge of, and makes the final decision on, major military operations there.

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Below the four-man PLA advisory group in the Command, PLA field-grade officers have been reported active with insurgent forces in battle situations.

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[REDACTED] This suggests that by the time the four-man PLA advisory group was noted operating in the Command in the spring of 1969, officers in insurgent units at the battalion and company levels were mostly PLA men. That is, PLA men were staffing the units regularly, rather than merely serving individually, here and there, as temporary advisors in the field.

The China-side recruits are trained with Chinese-made weapons. Burma-side insurgents, after training, are also equipped with modern Chinese-made weapons. These are transported overland from China by porters or pack-mule caravans. [REDACTED]

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Weapons used by the insurgents coming in from Yunnan are new and add to the military effectiveness of the Communist forces. They now include 40mm rocket launchers, 60mm and 82mm mortars, and artillery.

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the presence, on the China side, of training bases for the insurgent forces. The two most frequently mentioned are at Mangshih (Luhsi) and Changning (Yutien). At each of these two bases, one insurgent regiment composed of PLA and ethnic minority officers and men, conduct training for the units to be sent into Burma. In addition, many reports identify Chefang, on the Yunnan side, as the location of the hospital most frequently used by the insurgents, who are brought across through Mengko for treatment after battles with government forces. The hospital is operated by a mixed-staff PLA-insurgent regiment and is directly subordinated to the Northeast Command. Weapons training is also given to the insurgents at a camp at Tengchung, Yunnan.

The Chinese have made some effort to conceal the nature and extent of their support, particularly since 1969 when Peking's diplomacy was activated as an instrument of maneuver primarily against the USSR. When, in July 1970, Politburo member Kang Sheng told visiting Communists that the insurgents had "support bases of their own," he portrayed the insurgency as entirely an internal Burma matter. Kang indicated that Peking estimated the number of armed guerrillas in the north at "several thousand" men -- an estimate close to that made at the time by Western observers. What Kang did not say was that arms, ammunition, medicines, and food supplies were being sent to the

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"support bases of their own" from Yunnan. [redacted]

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supplies were trucked on the China-side to points near the border and then transported across along trails to insurgent camps and villages by human carrier or mule caravans.

Peking's public media began to play down the Chinese statements of support, reflecting a decision which probably was made in late August or early September 1970. The last NCNA initiated comment on the insurgency was broadcast on 4 September. Subsequently, NCNA has not initiated its own comment, citing instead other sources.

The source of propaganda was shifted to broadcasts of a new political instrument: The Voice of the People of Burma (VPB). It is a clandestine radio operation, broadcasting from within China, pinpointed in location to Mangshih, Yunnan and established in March 1971. Depicted to foreign audiences as the insurgents' "own" radio station, it is run by the Chinese. This shift in the overt source of propaganda, intended to conceal from innocents the fact that Peking was the ultimate source, and intended to improve the PRC international image, almost certainly reflects Chou En-lai's diplomacy-conscious thinking. Chou apparently had persuaded Mao that insurgency-support impedes diplomatic maneuvering, that such support should be given a much lower public profile, and that one way to lower the public profile would be to establish a new clandestine radio attributed to the insurgents alone. The establishment of the radio also suggests that while Mao was persuaded to act to aid PRC diplomatic requirements, he preferred a course which was only a new way to provide propaganda guidance and encouragement of the insurgency, not the total cessation

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of support. The cases of Thailand and Malaysia show a similar shift of propaganda guidance and support away from Peking's public media (particularly Radio Peking broadcasts and NCNA press articles) to the ongoing broadcasts of the clandestine radios assigned to beam programs into Thailand and Malaysia.

The new not-made-in-Peking profile was also used to pave the way for an exchange of ambassadors, with the Burmese man arriving in Peking in November 1970. When, in March 1971, the Chinese finally sent their ambassador to Rangoon, the Chinese inaugurated the new clandestine radio. But it would seem that Chinese material aid to the insurgents is a more accurate measure of Peking's attitude toward Rangoon than the state of diplomatic relations. Ever since the change in overt propaganda support in the fall of 1970, there has been no evidence of a reduction in Chinese military aid in the period. There have continued to be shipments of weapons, ammunition, and food to the Northeast Command from China, training of insurgents in Yunnan training camps, PLA recruiting on the China-side of Kachin and Shan nationals of the PRC for military combat in Burma, and direct assistance to the Northeast Command of PLA advisors. On 22 October 1970, the Chinese charge in Rangoon commented to a British official on the intention to sustain aid despite the requirements of Peking's diplomacy. He said that despite the PRC's peaceful coexistence policy on the state-to-state level, Peking had a duty "to give help" to "any" oppressed people in a foreign country. Chou En-lai made a virtually identical statement in September 1972, as did another Chinese official in March 1973.

When the Chinese inaugurated their clandestine radio (March 1971), a BCP official from Peking [REDACTED] [REDACTED] visited the Northeast Command

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to relay Chinese advice on the need to strengthen the political base of the insurgency to make it a long-term threat to Burma. His new instructions from the Chinese were that the Command must "put increased emphasis on civil administration in the Communist-occupied areas, as opposed to concentrating solely on armed conflicts with the Burmese Army." Since that visit, Command forces are known to have acted in order to build a strong political base in the villages of the border area. (Instructions emphasizing the need to strengthen the political base of insurgency were transmitted to Thai Communist guerrillas in northeast Thailand earlier, in 1969.) Thus secret directives added to propaganda encouragement from the new clandestine radio were brought into use to make the insurgency politically-organizationally permanent, as the Chinese leaders took precautions against "Guevaratism" -- fighting a purely military small war without a popular (or mass) base in the villages.

The Chinese leaders were not that much anxious to improve diplomatic relations with Rangoon that they would avoid criticizing Ne Win's government. On the contrary, they used the clandestine radio to mount vehement attacks on that government, and Ne Win was reported to have been extremely embarrassed by the start of the broadcasts less than one week after the arrival of the new Chinese ambassador in Rangoon (March 1971). The clandestine radio provided even stronger political support for the insurgency and more provocative attacks on Ne Win than Radio Peking had been issuing.

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Aside from the matter of whether Mao still demands an abject apology from Ne Win for the mid-1967 Rangoon anti-Chinese riots, the Burmese have moved on another issue to satisfy Peking. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] a personal aide of Chou En-lai told an emissary of Ne Win in late October 1971 that the matter of compensation for damage and loss of life suffered by the Overseas Chinese in the riots had finally been "settled" to the satisfaction of the PRC. But when the emissary said that he had been personally asked by Ne Win to request that Peking stop the clandestine radio broadcasts, Chou's aide replied negatively. He said that it was difficult for the Chinese to do so since that was a "party-to-party" matter and it "could not be a subject of negotiation" between the two governments. On this occasion, and on other occasions of talks with envoys from Thailand, Malaysia, and the Philippines, the Chinese made it clear that they would not trade or make deals for an end to insurgency-support.

The inflexibility of the Chinese position had been made clear earlier when Ne Win attempted to use personal diplomacy with Peking. Despite wishful thinking on the part of his lieutenants after Ne Win's visit to Peking (from 6-12 August 1971) to the effect that Peking would reduce its support of the insurgents, in fact the Chinese did not do so. On the contrary, they seem to have been stimulated to demonstrate their determination to sustain aid. [REDACTED]

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[redacted] important Sino-Burmese differences persist. [redacted] Ne Win complained [redacted] to Chou En-lai about the broadcasts from Mangsai, Yunnan, of the VPB, to which Chou replied that the radio station (located in China) was an internal Burmese matter and China is pledged to a position of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries. Ne Win also complained to Chou about the PLA commander from Yunnan who was serving as a military advisor to the northeast insurgents. [redacted]

[redacted] Chou presumably turned aside this complaint also. In his speech toasting Ne Win, Chou made no mention of peaceful coexistence between the two countries and he did not mention the Sino-Burmese Treaty of Friendship and Non-Aggression. Ne Win's speech, which pathetically claimed that an "understanding" had been reached, was edited by NCNA, which dropped this claim. In response to Ne Win's request that Peking drop its support of the insurgents, Chou is reported to have hypocritically suggested that the Burmese leaders "contact BCP officials in Peking" to iron out this purely Burmese affair. Thus despite outward appearances -- e.g., NCNA's depiction of Ne Win's talk with Mao on 7 August as "friendly" and Chou's reference to the Burmese leader on the preceding day as a "friend" -- Chinese broadcasts supporting the insurgents were not diminished. The China-based clandestine radio on 15 August not only called for Ne Win's "overthrow" but ended with the call: "Long live (BCP) Chairman Thakin Zin and Mao Tse-tung."

The Chinese not only did not close down their clandestine radio or drop their insurgency-support but they seem to have intensified this activity -- after several quiet months -- subsequent to Ne Win's personal appeals. On 12 August, the very day that Ne Win returned from China, forces of the

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Northeast Command overran Burmese counterinsurgency bases near Kunlong, a town about 60 miles northeast of Lashio and only 15 miles from the border. On 15 August, the clandestine radio in Yunnan called his visit one of several "sly tricks" to overcome his domestic problems and repeated the belligerent appeal to Burmese to unite with the BCP "to crush the reactionary Ne Win government." On 17 August, the insurgents captured Hopang, a town 10 miles east of Kunlong. In view of Chinese control over the Northeast Command's military operations, these mid-August attacks (the first since the seizure of Mengmao in May, 70 miles east of Lashio) may have been ordered by Peking partly with the purpose of reminding Ne Win of China's policy to sustain the insurgency.

Ne Win was silent for more than a month after his return. There is little doubt that during many long hours of private talks with Chou he had not succeeded in gaining an assurance that support for the insurgents would end. The Yunnan-based VPB continued to hammer at him as "the common enemy" who had to be "crushed." (VPB broadcast of 3 October 1971) It also taunted him for having tried to prevent his troops from listening to VPB broadcasts: "Even if Ne Win prohibits them, they will listen to the broadcasts..." (VPB broadcast of 7 October 1971) As for the guidance-disseminating role of the VPB, on 20 August 1972, important instructions were being beamed into Burma from the clandestine radio. On that date, the excerpts of an instructional speech (given by Chairman Thakin Zin) were relayed by the radio, stressing the need for recruitment of new party members based on a "unity-with-allies" principle. The instructions also declared the necessity to "crush" the "common enemy, the Ne Win-San Yu clique."

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In the field of actual fighting, the highest point of the insurgency in the northeast occurred after Ne Win's visit and his requests in Peking that PRC support be ended. On 20 November 1971, undoubtedly with Chinese initiative, insurgent forces attacked Kunlong and held it under siege for a month. On 5 December, the Chinese-run VPB beamed a broadcast commenting on the fighting, boasting that 60 government troops had been killed. Until this major attack -- the biggest engagement since Independence in Burma -- the insurgents had confined themselves to attacks on smaller targets. The Burmese army command viewed the battle as one of strategic importance, as the fall of the city would have provided the insurgent forces strategically with a solid territorial corridor running south from Kokang to Kunlong, Panglong and Mengmao. By 20 December the roughly 1,000 Burmese defenders continued to suffer from an inability to be resupplied by land, while the insurgents were using bullock carts and river boats to shuttle supplies and wounded to and from base points in China. When Burmese army artillery fired at insurgent positions, these guns were almost immediately silenced by "extremely accurate enemy counter-battery fire,"

[REDACTED] This artillery accuracy strongly suggests the presence of PLA artillery officers among insurgent ranks. After an all-costs defense by Burmese army units, the insurgents pulled back on 28 December. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] weapons and supplies taken during the Kunlong siege provided clear proof of direct Chinese aid. This was [REDACTED] [REDACTED] in addition to Chinese military advisors.

VPB broadcasts from Yunnan haranged Rangoon after the siege. In January 1972, deputy prime minister Brigadier General San Yu, who was head of the government during Ne Win's temporary absence in December and who had flown to Strategic Command

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Headquarters in Lashio personally to assess the siege, was for the first time attacked by the VPB. This extension of Chinese hostility to Ne Win's probable successor was a more accurate indication of the state of Peking-Rangoon relations than the improvement of economic relations earlier in August, the dispatch of a Burmese ping pong team to Peking in November, and the Chinese request that Burma represent PRC interests in Bangladesh in December 1971. In mid-February 1972, Burma's intelligence chief, Colonel Chit Khin, stated privately that Rangoon is under "no illusion" concerning continued PLA training and equipping of the insurgents. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] a battalion of about 200 troops was formed by the Northeast Command and sent to Mangshih, Yunnan for training in February 1972.

In addition to the training bases [REDACTED] [REDACTED] in operation on the Yunnan side of the border, the Chinese and their insurgent clients are using camps and towns in the northeast border strip under Communist control. For example, Mengmao has become a training site for ethnic Wa people, who were intensively indoctrinated throughout 1971 on the need to "liberate" the entire Wa State and who were formed into combat units. Ethnic Wa cadres from Yunnan recently have been reported as attached to some of these units as military and logistic advisors. As for transshipment points, Mengko, a town just south of the Yunnan border and in insurgent hands since May 1971, has become increasingly important for the shipment of Chinese arms and supplies into the northeast.

The Wa region became an area of insurgent military success in 1972. Chinese regular troops directly participated in at least one of these battles (Pangyang), having been sent across from Yunnan and incorporated into insurgent platoons, according to one report. Moving southward from territory held north of Kunlong, Chinese-supported

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insurgents by January 1972 were engaged in military operations around Pangyang -- at that time a government-held town 90 miles southeast of Lashio in the southern Wa region. Wa tribal people were intensively recruited and trained. By May, units made up of Communist-trained Wa people were fighting alongside the insurgents to help seize Pangyang from two companies of Burma army troops. Also in the Wa region, on 2 June, the insurgents captured the government outpost at Man Manghseng, 30 miles north of Pangyang where they seized valuable stores of rice.

Armed insurgent strength in the Wa region south of Kunlong was estimated in June 1972 to be about 1,500. These units are well-armed with Chinese-made weapons. The contingents which seized Pangyang in May used mortars before the final assault. In support of the attack on Pangyang, Chinese military supplies were transported from Yunnan bases through the insurgent-held town of Mengko just inside Burma by pack-mule caravans. Burmese military officers believe that the insurgents plan to take all territory east of the Salween River from the northern Shan State border with China southward to Pangyang. Kunlong may again be brought under siege by the insurgents.

The fighting in the Wa area was the most intensive and extensive since the attacks on Kunlong. Insurgent successes there may have been a factor in the timing of Ne Win's decision, reported in mid-June, to seek military equipment from the Soviet Union. Rangoon is mainly interested in automatic weapons and ammunition, mortars, and artillery shells. Subsequently, Ne Win decided against seeking Soviet aid. About half of the government's military effort is directed against insurgents, primarily those supported by the PRC in the northeast. Ne Win continues to

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conceal Chinese Communist support for the northeast insurgency from the public, fearing a strongly hostile reaction from Peking. He also intends to conceal from Peking his approach to Moscow for military equipment. Were he to publicly accuse Peking of support, he could greatly embarrass the Chinese Communists and provide important political ammunition for Moscow to use in exposing the PRC's interference in the internal affairs of a sovereign state. Such exposure could hurt Peking's diplomatic image internationally.

However, Peking is taking only superficial actions to conceal its support for the BCP (White Flag). One of these moves is the decision to keep Burmese Communist leaders away from the 31 July 1972 Army Day reception in Peking, in contrast with their attendance at the 1971 turnout. Nevertheless, on 20 August 1972, the clandestine radio broadcast instructions to the insurgents from the party leader, Thakin Zin.

Peking is expanding the insurgency -- already spaced out over six years -- at a slow pace. The intention seems to be to keep it at a low boil and to seize small amounts of land, calculating that such nibbling will not be used by Ne Win to sound an alarm among major world powers. Some of the land now seized is referred to as "liberated areas" by the insurgents in the field and their Chinese sponsors, and it is unlikely that it will be voluntarily returned to the control of government or non-Communist forces.

Prior to the ceasefire in Vietnam (January 1973) there was no indication that it would in any way affect the PRC's policy of sponsoring the insurgency in Burma. The Chinese-run VPB made it clear

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that this policy would go forward at a deliberate pace, and subsequently, as recent as 18 March 1973, the VPB called for more people in Burma to take the path of "revolution," demanding that they "oppose and fight the Ne Win-San Yu military government."


The insurgency in the northeast probably will continue to be sponsored by Peking at least until Mao dies. Chou En-lai and other Chinese officials have attributed the PRC policy directly to Mao -- as something that he desires. In the view of this author, this is the single most important factor in Peking's sponsoring role.

Thailand

The insurgency in north and northeast Thailand is inspired and guided by Peking. When, in 1967, the more active dissident area -- the northeast -- was hard hit by Thai government forces, Peking subsequently acted to give it material aid, political resolve, and psychological sense of purpose. Peking almost certainly has the ultimate deciding voice in the strategy of insurgency in both areas, demonstrably


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THAILAND: Areas of Communist Insurgency



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NORTH THAILAND Areas of Communist Insurgency



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so in the north and apparently so in the northeast. Thus within the context of overall guidance, Peking is the dominant influence among Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) leaders. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] friction has developed between China-trained and North Vietnam-Pathet Lao trained cadres, but Peking's dominance of the Thai insurgent movement is being sustained.

The CPT has been under Chinese Communist control ever since it came into existence in 1926. The CPT leadership which emerged in later years did so exclusively under the tutelage of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Peking has retained the ability to exert overall guidance of the insurgency in the north and northeast because the top leaders of the CPT remain loyal to the huge parent party, the CCP. The CCP trained these leaders, promoted them, and now sustains them. The CPT leaders who are in China are not independent entities; the CPT leaders and military commanders who give tactical guidance in the field are subordinated to the central CPT leadership. Men in both places are subservient to the CCP. They adopt all CCP positions on China's internal and foreign policies, and they

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indocctrinate their party cadres in the "thought of Mao Tse-tung." More importantly, there are no signs of real organizational independence, although leaders in the northeast may have some autonomy in tactical matters. There are no independent Ho Chi Minhs or Fidel Castros in the CPT. The tie between the CCP and the CPT is more than an ideological link. It is an organizational link.

The main radio station devoted to guidance and indoctrination of the CPT insurgents in the north and northeast is the Chinese-run Voice of the People of Thailand (VPT), broadcasting into Thailand from its base near Kunming, Yunnan. Radio Hanoi re-plays various broadcasts of the VPT, including battle reports, but the North Vietnamese do not have a separate radio station assigned to covering the insurgency.

The VPT, like the two additional clandestine radio stations broadcasting from south China, relays something more than mere propaganda. It is concrete guidance. The 1 December 1972 CPT Central Committee "statement" which it broadcast into Thailand contained explicit instructions on an entire range of concrete policies. The contents of the CPT "statement" -- identical in style, wording, and policy-position with CCP materials -- make it highly likely that it was drafted by the Chinese Communists in China and approved by the CCP leadership. The "statement" is an operational one, inasmuch as it tells insurgents in the field what they must do.

The "statement" lays it down to CPT personnel that "armed struggle" is the only way to attain national power -- the position opposed by the Soviets, and by some CPT members in previous years. The

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insurgency has "proven" that Mao's doctrine is the correct one.

The past 30 years have proven that the revolution can never be achieved through peaceful means, a parliamentary system or a coup d'etat over a deadly enemy, armed from head to foot, which rules by a savage fascist dictatorship.

It states that the insurgent army is set up on the Mao model as "a new-type revolutionary army, in accordance with Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tsetung Thought;" this army has a 10-point "code of conduct" and was established with great stress on "cultivating a sense of political consciousness in our fighters." The "statement" instructs that guerrilla areas must be "transformed" into strongholds.

Moreover, in order to strengthen these revolutionary strongholds, we must further enhance the people's revolutionary power, expand the people's armed forces -- including irregular forces, regional forces, and village fighters -- raise the political and ideological level of the people, lead the masses in solving land problems, promote economic development, improve the welfare of the people, and raise their cultural and hygienic standards. (emphasis supplied)

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Continuing this instruction, personnel are told that "we must" construct the CPT along Maoist political, organizational, and ideological lines; all party members "must" grasp party policy, which includes Mao's prescription for inner-party struggle -- namely, "cure the sickness to help the patient, and unity-criticism-self-criticism-unity." Further instructions are that all party units "must" do a good job in recruiting new members, "must" train local cadres, "must" study ability and performance before promoting cadres, and "must" promote organizational and disciplinary principles within the party.

The "statement" sets a "main task" for the CPT. It stresses the need to "build more strongholds and strengthen them, and expand the guerrilla zone." It does not clarify the distinction between stronghold and guerrilla zone. The "statement" details the steps that "must" be undertaken by the populace in the strongholds and by all insurgent combat personnel.

As for the people in the strongholds, they must heighten their revolutionary spirit, support the armed forces, the state power and the revolutionary war, exert utmost efforts to strengthen the strongholds, boost food production, increase political awareness, and resolutely fight to safeguard these strong bases.

All commanders and fighters in the people's armed forces must strive to raise their political standards, exert efforts to study the strategy

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and tactics of the revolutionary war, improve military techniques, and further heighten the solidarity between the commanding echelon and fighters and between the armed forces and the people...

The "statement" goes well beyond the broadcasts which the VPT occasionally beams into Thailand for morale-building purposes and for informational purposes -- two types of broadcasts which in themselves are more than rhetoric or propaganda in the usual sense. It presents guidance, a concrete program which CPT cadres in the field "must" put into action. Guidance is also supplied by an even more concealed means -- namely, the infiltration of Chinese-trained CPT cadres back into Thailand from bases in Yunnan.

Other indications of Chinese Communist domination over the CPT include the kinds of political-indoctrination actually being used in the field in the north and northeast. Captured documents explicitly cite Mao's ideas and "thought" as the doctrinal guiding philosophy for their party. Bona fide CPT materials indicate that Mao's practical ideas are being used by Peking-loyal provincial-level leaders, converted into concrete policies, and imposed on cadres. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] a north-east Thailand provincial committee secretary of the CPT, newly "elected" in February 1971, was tightening up CPT leadership in his area of responsibility and implementing "work programs" which were based on the "thought of Mao Tse-tung." Evidence indicates that specific ideas of Mao's were to be used as the "guiding principle" for all inner-CPT work in the area,

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particularly in all military and political improvement activity. The loyalties of even the local militia unit members -- presumably people who have not qualified for CPT membership -- are clearly to the Chinese Communists.

[REDACTED]

CPT leaders in Thailand's cities also directly apply Mao's ideas to concrete policies. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Some of Mao's earlier works (such as On Policy) and more recent materials (such as the July 1971 50th anniversary of the CCP editorial and "radio broadcasts") were being used as guiding and line-setting instruments. "Town committee" members organized visual study tours, one such tour being to China regarding matters of a CPT "branch" located in Bangkok. This was undertaken by one cadre in 1972, but contact with the mainland by covert couriers is maintained either northward through the jungles, to Laos, and on to Yunnan, or southward and eastward through the Bangkok-Hong Kong route.

There is some evidence of a Chinese-supported funding apparatus that operates between Chinese agents in Hong Kong and CPT contacts who travel from Bangkok.

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The CPT leadership is primarily Chinese, with only a few Thais having been promoted to key positions, and these having been trained for many years in China. This ethnic Chinese domination at the top of a Peking-controlled party apparatus helps to sustain that control. It was significant that the delegates representing the CPT at the November 1960 conference of Communist parties in Moscow spoke in Chinese, not Thai. [REDACTED] in 1965, resentment at the Chinese hold on the top positions had caused ambitious but frustrated Thai members to leave party ranks. A cleavage developed between the CCP-loyal ethnic party leadership and Thai rank and file members. Thai resentment in the CPT regarding an overbearing attitude on the part of the Chinese was so strongly felt as to be a definite hindrance to party operations. Thai members viewed the Chinese as having preempted all the leadership positions and thus saw little reason to exert themselves. Further, Thai members were convinced that what little advancement they could aspire to would come only through fawning over their Chinese leaders rather than through achievement of merit. Despite CPT recruitment among Thais, entry seemed to be weighted in favor of ethnic Chinese. Thai candidates in 1965 were subjected to more complicated and time consuming procedures than were the Chinese. Thai trainees experienced discrimination in China and one returnee complained that the CPT was controlled by the Chinese only for "their" benefit. Subsequently, the Chinese have tried to assuage Thai feelings, but this kind of alienation probably continues to exist.

CPT subordination to the CCP is also apparent in the obedient and unequivocal support given to every position the CCP adopts in the Sino-Soviet dispute. The

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CPT does not display any of the independence associated with a really unsubordinated party apparatus. By contrast, the independent North Vietnamese -- leaders of the Lao Dong Party -- adopt a position of neutrality in the dispute, clearly showing unsubordinated status. CPT greetings to the CCP have none of the self-respect of Lao Dong Party greetings, but they display instead a sycophantic quality to the parent party, especially in the sustained tribute to Mao's "thought," indicating apparatus subordination.

The CPT is neither free from Peking's control nor subordinated to Hanoi's control at the top leadership level. But at the lower level, the situation has been changing. At least since 1969, and probably somewhat earlier, disputes between China-trained and North Vietnam-trained lower-level cadres have been reported

[REDACTED] consideration was being given (by the CPT) to closing down all training of Thai Communists at North Vietnam's Hoa Binh camp, partly because of the DRV's increasing involvement in the war in South Vietnam and partly because an ideological dispute was raging between the Mao-oriented CPT and North Vietnamese personnel. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

During the summer of 1969, [REDACTED] [REDACTED] CPT headquarters in Hin Long Kia in the tri-province area of north-central Thailand was embroiled in a dispute over ideology. Those who had been trained earlier in Hoa Binh (DRV) [REDACTED] could not accept the official CPT line adhering to Mao's

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"thought" as the correct ideological policy for protracted warfare. CPT leaders at the camp accused the North Vietnamese of being "weak Communists, death-fearing, and pleasure-seeking." The Lao Dong Party was said to be "semi-revisionist." The CPT at the camp prohibited the singing of North Vietnamese songs and held daily ceremonies wishing long life to Mao and Lin Piao.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] special PLA group was told that Peking did not fully trust the DRV army. That army, as Peking saw it, while opposed to western "imperialism," was never against the "imperialism of the Soviet Union." CPT political officers told the special PLA group that Peking had a closer relationship with the CPT because the CPT was following the example of China and had adopted Mao's Marxist-Leninist ideals.

The information [REDACTED] since 1969 suggests that Hanoi has made some inroads in lower cadre ranks. It also suggests that the CPT has been instructed by the CCP to have its cadres combat any further spread of this North Vietnamese penetration.

Top leaders of the CPT had been trained in China in the 1950's at a time when the Vietnamese Communists had no training role. Only in the mid-1960's, and afterward, were the North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao allowed to help in the training of cadres. They took on a considerable share of the task of training, equipping, and reinfiltrating insurgent cadres. North Vietnam's insurgent training school at Hoa Binh has been training Thai insurgents since about 1962. Training also takes place at special bases in Laos. These men filled out the middle and lower-level leadership ranks. The more intensive and sophisticated training required of top leadership cadres is given in China. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] during 1969 and 1970, trainees in North Vietnam who were sent on for "additional" study in China had to have six months of training in North Vietnam, to be members of the CPT, and otherwise qualified. Only two or three persons were chosen from each trainee-group trained in North Vietnam for further training in China. The training curriculum in China was far more difficult than in North Vietnam.

The evidence [REDACTED] seems to be that the CPT leadership has been trained in and is loyal to China. The middle and lower-level cadres have been given North Vietnamese-Pathet Lao training, and some of these men probably are loyal to Hanoi.

There are mainland Chinese and North Vietnamese in Thailand [REDACTED] (The mainland Chinese presence will be discussed later in this paper.)

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Some of the North Vietnamese were group leaders and instructors. Others were with local insurgent military units. [REDACTED] their activities included instructing the insurgents in the use of the Soviet RPG anti-tank grenade launcher, the 60mm mortar, the M-79 grenade launcher, and field radios.

Prior to 1967, the insurgency in the northeast was not well-organized and there was nothing of significance under CPT control stirring in the tribal areas of the north. The Chinese, in several steps strung out over the years, and with North Vietnamese help, moved in the direction of sponsoring a viable guerrilla war, making it more professional and efficient than anything previously in Thailand.

In mid-1962, the Chinese established a key guidance and indoctrination instrument: the VPT radio station near Kunming, Yunnan. VPT broadcasts encouraged the insurgents to begin a Mao-model "armed struggle" against local government forces. Only a small number of insurgents were active at that time in the northeast; others were still being trained in Yunnan and in the Hoa Binh training center, North Vietnam.

Peking introduced a sense of urgency into this low-boil insurgency only when larger strategic considerations confronted the Chinese and North Vietnamese leaders. The major consideration was the establishment of more U.S. air bases in Thailand to be used in support of the allied effort in Laos. (Souvanna Phouma first requested U.S. reconnaissance in May 1964, and a month later these planes were authorized to return fire. Thai pilots participated by mid-1964, manning some T-28 bombers. All this was from bases in Thailand.) Peking's attention turned to Thailand to warn the Thai leaders

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against cooperation with the U.S. against Communist forces in Laos, and then to punish the Thai leaders for not responding properly to the warning. Thus the marked increase in Peking's attention to the Thai insurgency had its beginning in a punishment motive. But, as will be shown, at the same time a revolutionary motive was present in Mao's policy thinking on supporting such insurgencies.

The Chinese acted to revive the small insurgency by directing CPT cadres in the field to expand their recruitment among non-Communist dissidents. An additional course of action was Chinese use of various anti-Bangkok Thai leaders in several "front" groups to serve as a rallying point for dissidents anywhere in Thailand.

The "front" groups were organized in Peking. In November 1965, Radio Peking and the VPT simultaneously announced the formation of the openly anti-Bangkok Thai Independence Movement (TIM). On 1 January 1966, the Thai Patriotic Front (TPF) was placed alongside the TIM to serve as a possible rallying organization for anti-Bangkok dissidents. The idea was to bring together Thai elements who would agree to openly criticize the government and cooperate with Peking in building an out-of-country political entity. These "fronts," however, later proved to be ineffective. They included in their ranks Thai exiles who began to quarrel among themselves, and in 1969 they were marked for discard when the Chinese decided to stress the direct leadership role of the CPT of the insurgency. Unlike the "fronts," the CPT was a disciplined and obedient instrument of Peking's policy.

The course taken to expand the insurgency can be traced back to September 1964, although low-boil training of guerrilla fighters had taken place in

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previous years. In September 1964, reports indicated that a new and strong emphasis was being given to the Thai language in the new Peking Foreign Languages Institute, almost certainly to quickly train competent Chinese officials who were to organize Thai cadres on a large scale. On 8 December 1964, Radio Peking for the first time called for the "overthrow" of the Bangkok government. On 8 January 1965, the Chinese overall inspirational and guiding role was suggested by the remark of Foreign Minister Chen Yi [REDACTED] in Peking. Chen Yi declared that:

We may have a guerrilla war going on in Thailand before the year is out.

The implication was that there had not been a serious and well-organized insurgency effort in Thailand prior to 1965, and that it was now Peking's intention to make it serious. This was not a CPT decision, independently made in the field. CPT leadership cadres, whether in Peking, Hanoi, or Thailand (or Laos staging-areas) do not have such strategic decision-making authority. The decision was made in Peking.

Mao himself, within one month, privately indicated the nature of the decisions being made in Peking not only regarding the Vietnam war but also other guerrilla wars. He lectured his visitor, Premier Kosygin, in February 1965 in Peking, on what the role of big Communist powers must be to promote insurgencies. Mao

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insisted that, "We must stimulate."* There was a difference in the nature of Mao's remarks to Kosygin and Chen Yi's remarks [REDACTED] (one month earlier). Mao clearly was talking about a doctrinal point -- namely, stimulating revolution rather than avoiding revolution. He was not talking about the practical (or rational) policy of punishing an anti-China country. His remarks reflected the revolutionary obsession he has about making guerrilla wars the road to power for certain pro-Peking Marxists-Leninists; this had been a major issue between him and the Soviet leaders. Chen Yi had not been making a doctrinal point; [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] He was indicating a practical way of punishing Bangkok. The remarks of Mao and Chen point up the two fundamental motives then operative in Peking's policy of insurgency promotion. One is doctrinal, ideological, and revolutionary. The other is practical.

The year 1965 included not only a top-level Chinese decision to beef up the Thailand insurgency but also implementation of that decision in the form of training and strategic planning. [REDACTED]


[REDACTED]

**It was in the course of an argument with Kosygin on the matter of promoting guerrilla wars that Mao used this capsule formulation. Disputing privately on 11 February 1965, Mao had said that: "We are against world war but we are for revolutionary war... A situation of revolutionary war must be created." Kosygin immediately had replied that "Each country must determine that. Each party." Mao's immediate reply was to insist on an outside, big-power, activating role: "We must stimulate."*


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[redacted] Chinese instructors also stressed the long-term nature of the insurgency, indicating that Maoist strategy was to make the war "protracted."



[redacted] Thus the Chinese strategists at that time had projected to 1972 or 1975 the consolidation of a secure area in the northeast for the insurgents. This Chinese projection, as seen today, appears to be professional, cautious, and realistic.

In the field in the northeast, it was not until 1966 that the CPT-led insurgents shifted their tactics from avoiding contact with Thai armed forces to a military campaign directed against local police forces. By the end of 1966, the insurgents had inflicted about 50 casualties on Thai government personnel. But the

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guerrillas were handed a major defeat in 1967. In February and August, Thai security forces captured key Communist guerrillas in the northeast, virtually destroying the insurgency there for several years.

The Chinese shifted their attention in 1967 from the ruins of the guerrilla effort in the northeast to the north. In the north, the Chinese saw greater assets and potential. The insurgents were mostly tribal (Meo), and they were better fighters. The rugged mountains provided safer sanctuary; and supply lines from China through Laos were shorter. The CPT was to recruit among them.

Meo people in the north had been trained, on a small scale, in North Vietnam and China prior to 1967. But in that year, the effort may have been stepped up.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The Chinese have placed a very strong emphasis on the need for insurgents to be totally indoctrinated and organizationally well-disciplined. The idea of insurgents "gradually raising their political consciousness and sense of organization" in order to make a revolution succeed (Peking People's Daily, Red Flag, Liberation Army Daily joint editorial of 1 October 1972) is considered by the Chinese one of the clear differences between Mao's road and Guevara's "purely military" road. The imposition of this idea on the practical activities of the CPT recruiters and

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organizers in the north and northeast has helped give the insurgencies there the firm foundation of discipline needed to make a revolution advance. Political commitment undoubtedly was stressed in the course of training of Meo and Yao tribesmen who were reported in June 1968 in the insurgent school at Tali, Yunnan.

The shift to the Meo insurgents in the north was also reflected in Peking's indoctrination and guidance instruments. Starting in the summer of 1968, Radio Peking and the VPT began carrying Meo-language broadcasts to the tribal fighters. The content was inflammatory and clearly intended to turn the Meos decisively against the government. (Fighting between the Meos and government forces had already broken out in the north in early 1968; more seriously, an insurgent unit had attacked the town of Chon Daen in the tri-province area farther south in November 1968.) In September 1968, greatly intensified broadcasting from China became a regular feature of Chinese support and guidance. The theme was oppression of the Meo people. The theme has been carried through to the present time. An example of Peking's indoctrination and stimulation effort follows:

The US-Thanom clique has constantly looked down upon the Meo people.... The Meo tribesmen have earned their living for generations without the help of an oppressive administration... the CPT is leading the people to rise and stage a revolution...the Meo people have no alternative...than to take arms and fight against it... (Yunnan-based VPT broadcast of 30 August 1969) (Emphasis supplied)

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These broadcasts are also beamed in to help the insurgents in their recruitment effort. For example, the contents of a leaflet mailed to a "village volunteer" member in south Thailand on 26 June 1972 used themes which appear in VPT broadcasts: the goal of the insurgency is to "overthrow" the government, there is only one party -- the CPT -- and there is "no foreigner in the CPT," the small war is expanding and the government cannot "suppress us," every day the people "give more support to the TPLAF," and "you should turn the barrel of your gun on the US-Thanom-Praphat regime which is the enemy of the people."

[REDACTED] a change in the nature of material support had started in 1969 in the north. At that time, newer weapons -- particularly AK-47 rifles -- and medical supplies and uniforms began to come in. The weapons were Chinese-made rather than only the older American and French carbines. All military equipment in the north apparently originated, and now originates, in China. Stockpiles in north Thailand were filled by inputs from Yunnan directly, or from North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao caches of Chinese-made arms in northwest Laos. The newer and better Chinese-made equipment supplied to the insurgents in the north was not evident among the bypassed guerrillas in the northeast for a year. But in February 1970, insurgents were [REDACTED] infiltrating from Yunnan training camps into the northeast carrying good equipment, including the Chinese-made AK-47 assault rifles.

In parallel with their stress on political commitment, the Chinese placed heavy emphasis on strengthening military organization in insurgent ranks. A regular army command was established as the "Supreme Command." Significantly, this information was for the first time revealed by Radio Peking in a broadcast of

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1 January 1969. The insurgent forces in north and northeast Thailand were renamed the "Thai People's Liberation Armed Forces" (TPLAF), organized to fight under the "Supreme Command." On 3 January Radio Peking took the unprecedented step of having a Chinese official's promise made public to provide "more powerful support to...the revolutionary people of Thailand."

Thereafter in 1969, the Chinese began to refer openly to another organizational improvement -- namely, to the CPT's leadership role of the insurgency. References to the useless political "fronts" (the TIM and TPF) were dropped from Peking media statements. At least one of the "front" leaders, who concurrently had been a CPT leader (and therefore a more disciplined cadre) was later infiltrated into the Laos-based headquarters of the insurgency for north Thailand to serve in the more practical capacity as a conduit for Peking's instructions, as well as a tactical headquarters commander.

Recruitment and organizational efforts were thereafter partly directed toward winning the support of the Meo people for the TPLAF. In March 1970, a three-man CPT armed propaganda team, led by a party member who had had five years of training in China, lectured villagers in the Doi Luang hill area, Chiang Rai Province of north Thailand. In the course of his propaganda and recruitment sessions, the leader strongly criticized Bangkok policies of "oppression" of the hill people and asked them for more cooperation with the "army" -- meaning, with the TPLAF. Operations of the TPLAF had become a point of new emphasis in Chinese public media, beginning in 1969.

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There is [REDACTED] documentation indicating a stepped-up effort, from 1970 onwards, to send more CPT cadres into the northeast -- the area neglected for two previous years. Their task has been reported to be to tighten up cadre discipline in the northeast, to expand the CPT political base among the populace, and to strengthen the growing TPLAF ranks.

Regarding the TPLAF, by the spring of 1971, or somewhat earlier, the Chinese apparently made a decision to make it a viable military force. The decision seems to have been to take two measures to build it up.

One measure was to greatly expand a reservoir force, the village militia. As early as 1969, enlarging the militia units in villages was stressed by organizers in the northeast in order to strengthen the CPT's village-level apparatus, politically and militarily. (In March 1971, a similar decision on militia-building had been transmitted to insurgents under Chinese control in northeast Burma.) The militia were used not only for political control, but also to flesh out the ranks of the TPLAF. [REDACTED] by July 1971 the CPT was upgrading the capability of the village militia in at least one northeast district so that it could be reorganized into regular companies for inclusion in the TPLAF.

The second measure carried out by the Chinese to improve the TPLAF was to send in, covertly, specially-trained PLA soldiers from Yunnan. [REDACTED]



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
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The men learned that they were going to be guerrilla fighters in Thailand and were to remain there, permanently. They were warned on pain of death not to reveal to anyone they were from China. That is, the PLA input was to be deeply covert and was to try to avoid discrediting Peking's diplomatic posture of non-interference.



Doi Pha Chi is the CPT headquarters for "Area 12." It is a base camp, relatively secure, located in

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[REDACTED]

Pong District, Nan Province, north Thailand. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

The mission of the PLA infiltrators was said [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] to be military training of insurgents.

[REDACTED]
their mission in Thailand was, first, to "encourage" the Thai community to fight for eventual "liberation," second, to serve the Thai people, and third, to learn from the Thai Communists what it meant to endure hardships in the fight for an ideal. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Some of the PLA infiltrators later went into combat with the insurgent units to which they were assigned. After arrival in Thailand, the PLA personnel were broken down and sent to existing TPLAF squads operating under the area command, headquarters at Doi Pha Chi. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] (In Burma, PLA personnel among insurgent ranks have also been in combat, suggesting that the Chinese Communist policy is to have PLA infiltrators improve the fighting capability of the guerrillas, and to do so as combat-allies in the field.)

In addition to training, a probable military-command role was included in their mission. [REDACTED]


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There are clear-cut parallels between Peking's covert input of personnel into the Burma insurgency and its input in Thailand. [redacted] most of a 30-man PLA group operating with the insurgents in one sector of northern Thailand -- presumably part of some 200 infiltrators -- were members of ethnic minority tribes from Yunnan, although several were Han Chinese. (In Burma, those PLA men sent across the border were primarily ethnic minority peoples.) Moreover, PLA soldier-groups were broken down and assigned to existing TPLAF squads -- five PLA infiltrators to a TPLAF line squad of from six to nine men. (In Burma, PLA men were integrated into these lower -- as well as higher -- ranks of the insurgent combat units.) Beyond that, PLA-reinforced squads, in at least one case, engaged in a firefight with Thai government forces. (In Burma, PLA-butressed units engaged Burmese government forces in a number of firefights and on a bigger scale.) Finally, most medical equipment was from China and casualties who required long recovery were sent back to China. (In Burma, medical supplies were primarily from China, and badly wounded insurgents and PLA personnel were sent back to the PLA special hospital at Chefang, Yunnan.) That is, those Chinese actions which had begun in Burma in 1968 were carried out in Thailand beginning in the spring of 1971.

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Beyond the military input of this 200-man group, the Chinese have engaged in, and probably still are engaged in, indoctrinating people by sending them to a PLA-run "cultural school" in Laos near the China border. Children of villagers in Thailand were dispatched in two groups, one in October 1971 and another in May 1972, to the school, travelling on the Laos side northward by truck (presumably along the PLA-built road in northwest Laos toward the Yunnan border). [REDACTED]



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[REDACTED] The PLA school course was for periods between seven and 16 months, with work on basic steps in reading and writing. A few students were to be selected to go on to China for "additional schooling." Each child was told before he left for the school that he was expected to join the CPT. That is, the Chinese are gradually expanding the ranks of their client party, the CPT, at a PLA school which ensures loyalty to Peking (rather than to Hanoi).

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Beginning in early 1971, Chinese broadcasts reflected an apparently optimistic appraisal of the insurgency gains in the north and northeast. By late summer, the claims were that "relatively consolidated revolutionary base areas have been set up in certain regions in north Thailand." (NCNA article of 6 August 1971) The Doi Pha Chi camp was a consolidated base area. Privately, this optimism was reflected in a statement made by a Chinese official regarding the durability and organizational integrity of the insurgency. In mid-November 1971, the head of the PRC Foreign Ministry Africa and Asia Department stated privately that Peking objects to terrorist-type movements but is always willing to support colonial wars of liberation, as in Mozambique, or

genuine, well-organized people's liberation movements, as in Thailand.



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[REDACTED] It is probable that the expansion of the insurgent forces in the north and the northeast is being monitored and directed, ultimately, by PLA authorities in the adjacent Kunming Military Region. It is also probable that the PLA officers and men who had been infiltrated in 1971 are in courier and radio contact with these authorities in China while serving as "advisors" to the Thai Communist insurgents.

In the immediate future, it is highly unlikely that Peking will stop sponsoring the insurgency. If it were merely a matter of improving its international image for diplomatic reasons such support might cease. However, not only the clandestine VPT radio station but NCNA, in its own name, has denounced the "Thanom-Praphat clique," praised the outlawed CPT, and encouraged the TPLAF to fight on and grow in strength "under extremely difficult conditions." (NCNA commentary on the 8th anniversary of the insurgency, broadcast from Peking on 7 August 1972) Thus despite Chou En-lai's friendly welcome to the leader ("advisor") of the Thai table tennis delegation on 5 September 1972, government-to-government relations will be kept distinct from PRC support.

This was made clear first by Vice Foreign Minister Han Nien-lung and then by Chou himself in their early September comments to Thai delegation "advisor" Prasit during his Peking visit. Han told Prasit that China could not export revolution, noting that if a people were not willing to rise up against the established authority, no outside force could create difficulties.

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Han continued: if, on the other hand, the population supported a revolutionary movement, no one in the world could stop it. Later, when Prasit asked Chou to reduce the level of support to the insurgents as a gesture of friendship, Chou replied that China had no intention of involving itself in the internal activities of any country, but would "assist" liberation movements "anywhere." On the same day that Chou was refusing to end Peking's support, the China-based VPT broadcast a tirade against "the traitorous Thanom-Praphat clique" regarding an internal Thailand matter. (VPT broadcast in Thai to Thailand of 5 September 1972)

While Mao lives, Peking probably will persist in sponsoring the CPT in the insurgency. At the same time, it will continue with its diplomacy, raising it to a higher level of official contact with Bangkok. This dual policy will require a clear-cut separation of insurgency-support from diplomacy, and Peking in October 1972 did just that by avoiding any mention of National Day greetings from the CPT. Nevertheless, the VPT still beams its broadcasts into Thailand from China to buoy up insurgent morale, to set propaganda themes for them, and to incite anti-Bangkok animosity in order to help them recruit followers.

The Thais have asked that the Chinese stop the VPT's subversive broadcasts. The response of the Chinese leaders has been most recently made clear by a broadcast stating, in effect, that the request will be denied. The broadcast, beamed from China, celebrated the 11th anniversary of the VPT, and went on to declare that

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The Thai people, under oppression by the US-Thanom clique, have as their propaganda weapon and their voice this VPT. They have been working together in the mobilization and morale-boosting of the forces...

No matter what methods, tricks, or how slanderous a propaganda campaign it resorts to, the bandit US-Thanom clique will never thwart and destroy the VPT.
(VPT broadcast in Thai to Thailand of 1 March 1973) (emphasis supplied)

This deliberate Chinese rebuke to the Thai leaders is another indication that insurgency-support will continue despite the ceasefire in Vietnam.

The insurgency has shown significant concrete gains in the last two years. More PLA personnel may be sent in to be integrated into insurgent ranks. The number of insurgents in the north and northeast has been increasing each year. In September 1972, estimates put the figures at about 2,900 armed personnel in the north and about 2,000 in the northeast. Peking probably will support the expansion of these regular force units with even more Chinese-made armament, which may include new items, such as heavy machine guns, to supplement the weapons now coming into the north and northeast.

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PEKING'S INSPIRATIONAL ROLE

The Philippines


Peking's support of the new, Maoist anti-government insurgency in the various Philippine islands is primarily in the form of political guidance and encouragement. However, there is good evidence of training and some funding of pro-Peking leftists over the years.

By far the most important, enduring, and substantive input from the Chinese Communists, however, is the mental hold they have over the young Filipino Communist, Jose Ma. Sison (aka Amado Guerro) who has strongly supported Peking on political issues and on the tactics for carrying out the insurgency. This commitment was made between mid-1966 and mid-1967, during his visits to China. Through Peking's guidance and influence, Sison has split off a young and more violence-oriented faction of Communists from the old Communist Party of the Philippines (PKP) and a less corrupted faction of insurgents from the old and degenerated Huk guerrilla movement. With this nucleus and with strong political support from Peking, Sison has implanted a new insurgency in northeastern Luzon (recently taking hold in other areas) which is more disciplined than the old Huk movement. He has directed the expansion of his political and military components along the lines prescribed by his "god," Mao Tse-tung. Sison stresses gradual expansion of "base areas," "quick-decision" warfare, "mass work," organizational discipline, and party control over the army ("the party controls the gun"). The Chinese seem to be satisfied that the commitment of this new leader to Mao's policies is so strong that he is as good as a CCP official in the field.

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Philippines: Areas of Maoist Communist Insurgency



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The conversion of PKP-member Sison from his dedication to urban youth radical activities -- as leader of the ultra-left Patriotic Youth organization in Manila -- to dedication to Maoist rural armed insurgency was the result of a confluence of several events. First, he had been feuding with older PKP leaders at the time when Mao's Cultural Revolution erupted in China. Also at that time, the Chinese leaders were casting about for support from radicals in various non-Communist Asian countries where US forces were based and were being used to aid Vietnam war efforts. Finally, Mao's dispute with the Soviet leaders on an entire range of issues -- including the demands that foreign Communists condemn the CPSU openly and support Mao's obsession that "only" armed insurgency is the road to power for Communist parties -- was intensifying. Unlike the leaders of the old PKP, who avoided denouncing the US, remained neutral in the Sino-Soviet dispute, and rejected rural insurgency, Sison adopted all of Mao's positions.

In the fall of 1966, Sison was far more willing than the PKP leadership to denounce the presence of US bases in the Philippines and to launch his youth activists into organized demonstrations against this presence. And he was willing to take on the PKP in an internecine fight to move it into the Chinese camp against the Soviets. He was strongly encouraged and influenced by the Chinese all along the way.

The Chinese role in Sison's conversion was spread out over a period of two years, 1966 and 1967. As in the Thailand case, Peking first began to encourage insurgent forces in Luzon -- the old Huk units -- when it became apparent to the Chinese leaders that President Marcos' administration had decided to cooperate with the US military effort in Vietnam. In February 1966, at the time when the Vietnam aid bill of Marcos was pending

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in Congress and was the center of a major dispute, Radio Peking broadcasts to the Philippines for the first time changed in nature, from avoidance of comment on Philippine internal matters to open encouragement of the insurgents. Broadcasts in Tagalog and Filipino to the islands drastically increased. Some Chinese leaders may have tried to keep this change from injuring the few contacts made with Philippine political figures on the diplomatic level. For example, Foreign Minister Chen Yi told a visiting senator from the islands in March 1966 that the presence of US bases in the Philippines, while deplorable, should not prevent friendly Chinese-Philippine relations. Nevertheless, the Chinese leaders seem to have made a decision to establish contacts with Philippine leftists. Sison was invited to China, reportedly with all expenses paid, and stayed from late May to mid-June 1966 as a guest of the Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs -- the organization which functions as the liaison instrument for bringing leftists into China under the cover of purely "cultural" visits. Sison is reported to have made other visits to China in 1966, and in late July 1966 he had meetings with the Chinese delegation to the anti-atom bomb conference held in Japan. The Chinese effort with him that year seems to have been to encourage him to organize anti-US, anti-Vietnam demonstrations, and he was instrumental in such activity in October. The Chinese apparently had not yet reached the point of encouraging a split in the old PKP, and in August 1966, they invited a PKP member, A.V. Hernandez, to Peking, where he spoke in praise of Mao, condemned "revisionism," and attacked the US on the Vietnam war. The Chinese clearly had begun to think in terms of punishment for the government when, in late 1966, Peking began to add "the Philippines" to Laos, South Vietnam, Thailand, Indonesia, and Malaysia as Asian countries where armed struggle was developing.

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In 1967, Sison found more favor with Peking. He had become an officer in two radical organizations set up in the spring of 1967, and he became active in these in addition to retaining his post as chairman of the radical youth organization. More importantly, at a time when Peking was encouraging splits within old-line parties of the Communist movement, Sison held a position on the Secretariat Staff of the PKP. Sison feuded with PKP leaders from the fall of 1966 to the spring of 1967 -- that is, after his first visit to Peking and just before his second tour in China. The older PKP leaders insisted on remaining neutral rather than siding with Mao against the Soviet leaders, and because Sison could not impose his line (and for other reasons), he withdrew his small faction from the PKP in mid-April 1967. This took place at a private meeting where he demanded that the party's General Secretary F. Lava -- whom he abused with the Maoist epithet, "a part-time revolutionary" -- be replaced. How much encouragement the Chinese gave Sison to split the PKP from within is not known, but he clearly was aware that Peking was encouraging splits within other neutral or pro-Soviet parties. In any case, the result of his deliberate internal opposition was the formation of a nucleus within the PKP for Peking to support. Peking took Sison on as the most promising of the young, violence-oriented Communists for the purpose of carrying out Mao's policy of making armed insurgency work.

Following this internal split and prior to the formation of a separate party, the Chinese hosted Sison for seven weeks, beginning with his entry into China in May 1967. As in 1966, he held discussions with officials of the liaison organ, the Chinese People's Institute for Foreign Affairs, who almost certainly were briefed on the course of the internal PKP split. He was received by Foreign Minister Chen Yi on 7 June.

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It was during this Chinese-sponsored visit that he became the carrier of Mao's policy for the Philippine insurgency.

In early May in Peking, Sison made his commitment clear in a strongly Maoist speech. He called for expulsion of the US from the islands, condemnation by the PKP of the CPSU, affirmation of "unity" with the CCP, and acceptance of the "success" of Mao's Cultural Revolution and of the superiority of Mao's doctrines. Sison declared "armed struggle" to be the PKP policy. He made an inspired defense of Mao's view that the "only" way to attain national power for Communists is "armed struggle," in the course of which the party must be entirely rebuilt and "rural bases" must be developed. (Reprinted in New Zealand's People's Voice, 10 May 1967) His early May speech in Peking was followed by an NCNA announcement on 21 May which reported that, in a letter to the CCP on 1 May, the PKP had pledged itself to a policy of "armed struggle."

This direct intervention by the Chinese into the factional dispute within the PKP aligned the CCP with Sison's faction; the CCP supported his faction and encouraged him in his opposition. The Chinese-inspired "PKP" pledge appeared as a formal "PKP" politburo statement, the text of which was broadcast in Tagalog to the Philippines. It declared war on the "revisionist" faction. Later in May, a Peking-directed propaganda campaign was unleashed, the broadcasts stressing Huk military operations and claiming that this was "a new development" toward armed insurgency in the Philippines revolution. On 29 May, for the first time, an NCNA article revealed that a Philippine People's Liberation Army "led by the PKP" was actively engaged in guerrilla warfare on Luzon. On the 30th, a People's Daily commentary spoke of final victory "if, armed

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with Mao Tse-tung's Thought, they fight a people's war, establish revolutionary base areas, and encircle the cities from the countryside." Chinese influence in the formulations was undeniable.

Owing to Mao's adamantly-pursued dispute with Moscow on ideological issues, the touting of the "PKP" at the time as a party dedicated to the doctrine of "armed struggle" was important. As in the cases of Burma, Thailand, and Malaysia, there is a very special motivation for Peking's enduring support of armed insurgency -- something aside from the anti-US aspect. That motivation is Mao's obsession -- or compulsion (Khrushchev had described it as an "itch") -- to prove to himself and to others that his road to power is the best and "only" road for revolutionaries. This obsession is irrational, as there are examples of revolutionaries taking power by palace coups and by legal election processes. But it exists as a fundamental motivating force, imbuing an otherwise strongly pragmatic foreign policy with an encumbering dogma. As recently as 1 December 1972, the Chinese have again asserted that neither coups nor elections can supplant "armed struggle" as the only way to attain national power.

When it is expedient, for reasons of national interest, to disengage from insurgencies elsewhere in the world, the Chinese leader who desires such disengagement (Chou En-lai is the most important) must persuade Mao that a particular insurgency must not be openly supported by Peking. And Mao apparently will accept disengagement from some but not from all insurgencies Peking had been supporting. The Philippines case shows continuing political support and favor towards the man who is leading "armed struggle" in the islands.

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Sison, the carrier of Mao's policy, has claimed that during his mid-1967 visit to China, he wrote an article on "revolutionary art" -- Mao's Yen-an lectures on art were being publicized in mainland media at the time -- which he used for a speech at Yen-an, and that he was told by the Chinese that it would be carried in the PRC's Foreign Ministry journal and that copies would be sent to PRC embassies. It is credible that the Chinese would flatter him in this way; this flattery was not only recompense for his support but also a further effort by the Chinese to solidify the hold Mao's policies had acquired over his mind.

In June 1967, the factional split between Sison and the more conservative PKP leaders increased following his return from discussions in Peking. Sison accused the older leaders of bungling the entire revolution over the years and attacked some of them as "revisionists." His group began openly to glamorize the frenzied actions of Mao's Red Guards and tried to place a Red Guard discipline over his Patriotic Youth organization, having established a Red Guard group complete with Mao badges and red arm bands inside it in August 1967. Some of his group began to carry firearms.

It was in the summer of 1967, after his China briefings, that Sison reportedly established close contacts with one of the Huk commanders, probably on the advice of the Chinese. The strong stress on "armed struggle" made in the Chinese articles of May on the Philippine revolution and reference to the active insurgents reflected, among other things, Peking's counsel that Sison look to the insurgents for action, ally himself with them, and subordinate their activities to his political control.

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Within the following two years, that was roughly what Sison was successful in doing. Sison formed the new, pro-Chinese Philippine Communist Party-Marxist/Leninist (PKP-M/L) when, on 26 December 1968, he took his followers out of the old, neutral PKP, breaking with the old-line leader Pedro Taruc and his followers. As for the military arm of the new Party, Sison managed to acquire this component of his new organization through an alliance. "Commander Dante," a former old-line Huk, split with his Huk chief and joined Sison, and formed the New People's Army (NPA), the formation date being declared as 29 March 1969.

In line with what Peking at that time in 1969 was prescribing for insurgencies in Burma, Thailand, and Malaysia -- namely, that the party lead the army -- the NPA was made subordinate to the party, headed by Chairman of the Central Committee Sison. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] by mid-August 1969 Sison had become the "boss" of army leader "Commander Dante," and had even begun to share the function of devising military strategy for NPA operations. [REDACTED] Sison, "Dante," and one other officer formed the party's Military Commission which oversaw the NPA -- a Chinese-type arrangement for ensuring that "the party controls the gun." In Peking's first article indicating endorsement, in public, of the NPA, the point was made explicitly that the NPA is "led by the party." (NCNA article of 4 August 1970)

Friction developed between Sison and "Dante," stemming partly from Sison's pretensions to being a military strategist and his wish to decide on the timing and location of firefights. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Sison formed a new politburo of seven men in November 1971. There was no military representation on the reorganized main directing body. It did not even

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include "Dante," the acting commander-in-chief of the NPA at that time. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] "Dante" at that time was ill and weak, and unhappy with the ascendancy of the ex-Philippine Armed Forces Lt. Victor Corpus -- who had defected to Sison's forces in December 1970 -- in the NPA leadership. It is probable that Sison already has named a new NPA commander-in-chief. Corpus would be the most likely choice. In any case, the involved Chinese have made it clear that they want Sison's men to continue to repudiate "the roving-rebel ideology" of the old Huks. (NCNA article of 26 December 1971)

The insurgents seem to have been careful from the start to emplace themselves in secure areas. Within one year of its formation, the NPA had moved the area of its military operations from central Luzon -- the old bailiwick of the Huks -- to Isabela Province in northeast Luzon, where the presence of sympathizers (particularly the local governor) facilitated survival, and where the terrain (surrounding mountains) enabled Sison and "Dante" to expand their forces in relative security. Sison himself removed from Manila to the mountain area in May 1969, [REDACTED] and this physical removal completed the transformation of Sison from urban Communist radical into rural Maoist insurgent. However, he moves freely, and on occasion returns to Manila, covertly, to contact non-Communist anti-government leaders.

The Maoist orientation of Sison and his insurgent allies is apparent in many aspects. Political methods and guerrilla tactics have been taken from Mao's writings by Sison, who has annoyed other leaders by reiterating the Chinese hero's ideas on guerrilla warfare incessantly. Sison disseminates these ideas throughout the PKP-M/L and NPA in indoctrination materials and in the

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lectures he gives as Director of the party's School of Mao Tse-tung Thought (located near San Guillermo in central Isabela Province). As for more practical Maoist policies, the emphasis given to building political organizations from the grass roots and making base areas secure politically (as well as militarily) is apparent

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[REDACTED] encourage-
ment and praise from Peking had come in the form of an NCNA broadcast of 24 August which noted that NPA "propaganda teams" had been active, that "militia" organizations had been established in some villages, that "despotic landlords" and "local tyrants" had been punished, and that Mao's ideas had been propagated among the "poor peasants."

Documents disseminated by an NPA commander at Concepcion, Tarlac Province, and retrieved in June 1970 by Philippine security forces, devoted considerable space to the need for establishing good political relations with the surrounding peasantry. Another point of Maoist emphasis was the step-by-step procedure for establishing, expanding, and sustaining "base areas" which were to be converted into "liberated areas" later on. The instructions were: to begin by investigation of local conditions (NPA documents captured earlier had contained copies of one of Mao's works relevant to this first step: Rural Surveys of 1941), then to conduct "mass work" (agitation and organization), and finally to form party organizations and military units in the local areas.

Yet another point of stress was on formation of militia forces, or self-defense corps, under the guise

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of what appeared to be legitimate associations called Barrio [i.e., village] Youth Organizations. This activity was intended to help mobilize for the NPA an entire community and place it on a virtual war footing "in defense of a barrio" against government forces. A similar course had been followed in Burma and Thailand. As for improving the military integrity of the NPA and the militia, one document mentioned the existence of a Lin Piao Military Academy -- a special branch of Sison's School of Mao Tse-tung Thought. (No doubt the Academy's name has since been changed.) The NPA, according to an NCNA broadcast of 21 December 1971, has its own official newspaper (as the PKP-M/L has its own), and it is clear from what Peking media stressed that the NPA has been tasked with making political cadres out of its fighting men. The documents also indicate very detailed guidance on Maoist military tactics, particularly on the need of the NPA to concentrate superior forces to strike a small government unit, to make quick-decision attacks, and to achieve maximum surprise. North Vietnamese insurgent experiences are also studied as supplementary materials to the main Maoist corpus.

Within NPA-controlled areas, other Maoist formations -- in addition to the existing village "revolutionary committees," "propaganda teams," and "local militia" -- have been reported in early 1972. Some "communes" have been established and captured documents reveal plans to set up "people's courts" composed of PKP-M/L, NPA, and village "revolutionary committee" representatives -- a system which would further strengthen insurgent political control and increase popular support. The Philippine security forces are impressed by the variety of practical organizations being used to secure rural areas politically, and they are aware of the good reputation the insurgents have acquired in some areas as defenders of the people and their rights.

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Basic programmatic materials [redacted]

[redacted] contain additional indications of strong ties between the insurgents and Peking. The [redacted] Program of Action of the PKP-M/L politburo (written sometime between December 1968 and June 1969) lays it down that the party must maintain "unity" with the CCP and must comply with Mao's "Thought." This would seem to mean subordination to CCP policies and ideological positions. The Constitution declares the goal of the party to be the "overthrow" of the Philippine government by armed force: Mao's prescription. Immediate practical steps to be taken on this long road are: to rebuild the party through recruitment, to set up "base areas" in the countryside from which "armed struggle" is to be carried out, and to expand territory gradually.

Peking, for its part, transmitted via NCNA a 26 December 1970 statement of the PKP-M/L Central Committee which stated that the party adhered to Mao's "Thought" and was pursuing "to the end" the purge of the old "Lava revisionist renegade clique and the Taruc-Sumulong gangster clique" -- reference to the pro-Soviet Lava (arrested in 1964), Huk commander Sumulong (captured in September 1970 by Philippines security forces), and old-line PKP leader Taruc (killed in October 1970). Subsequent Peking-carried statements of the Philippine insurgents led by Sison strongly suggest that a dispute was waged within the old PKP over the wisdom of forming the NPA. An NPA statement of 29 March 1971 (carried by NCNA on 10 April 1971) declared that the "complete collapse" of the Taruc-Sumulong "gangster clique" in "less than two years after its mass criticism and repudiation" had "totally vindicated the correctness of the establishment of the NPA under a Communist party inspired by Marxism-Leninism Mao Tse-tung Thought." (emphasis supplied) The old

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PKP in 1972 has shown some signs of being revived -- or temporarily propped up -- as it has tried to compete for support among urban intellectuals by engaging in acts of violence (bomb-planting and assassination). But it clearly is now the inferior Communist Party in numbers, morale, and appeal among youthful radicals.

As in the cases of Burma, Thailand, and Malaysia, small advances in diplomacy did not curtail Peking's support for the Sison insurgents. When in mid-May 1971 two unofficial Philippine economic missions visited China and were received by Chou for a "friendly" conversation, Peking had already lumped President Marcos together with Ne Win in a Voice of the People of Burma (VPB) broadcast on 18 April which declared that these two leaders could not prevent the "doom of being overthrown by their own peoples." Following the economic missions' visits, NCNA cited a 21 May 1971 PKP-M/L newspaper article which praised the NPA exploits against the forces of the Philippine "reactionary government." And following the completion of the first major Philippine-PRC trade agreement in late August 1971, NCNA carried two news articles on the 26 August destruction of three government helicopters by the NPA.

Peking has carried reports indicating the areas of guerrilla activity and some of the Maoist military techniques being used. The insurgents were reported as operating not only in northeastern Luzon but also in other Luzon provinces, and in the Visayas and Mindanao. In February 1972, the insurgents claimed that

Units of the NPA are now actively carrying out armed struggle in northern Luzon, central Luzon, southern Luzon, and the western

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Visayas. In Mindanao, the party and the NPA have deployed cadres to train fighters from the poor peasants and oppressed national minorities to fight the landgrabbers and the reactionary armed forces. (NCNA excerpts of Ang Bayan article, broadcast by Radio Peking on 3 May 1972)

The PKP-M/L organ Ang Bayan claimed in late April 1972 that "regular fighters" have increased eight-fold since 1969 and that "mass" support has been extended to 18 provinces of Luzon and western Visayas. Ang Bayan also claimed that the NPA now has the capability "to launch tactical offensives within the strategic defense," the meaning of "tactical offensives" (as can be derived from insurgent materials) probably being quick-decision ambush actions against government patrols of platoon size. (NCNA report of 29 April 1972) Sison's party organ on 9 September 1972 carried a completely Mao-oriented report on how NPA forces had been able to thwart the encirclement campaign of the Philippine army's "reactionary" troops. "The NPA concentrated its main forces while evading the enemy main forces and annihilated small and isolated enemy units." (NCNA excerpts of Ang Bayan article, broadcast by Radio Peking on 5 December 1972)

The Philippine insurgency has been expanding under Sison's control, even though its numbers are small.

[REDACTED] the party has a membership of 2,000 members. The strength of the NPA [REDACTED] being "800 regulars armed with modern weapons," forming 72 regular squads, 10 regular platoons, and one regular company. The NPA also commands "1,500 local guerrilla fighters armed mainly with old single-action rifles and homemade rifles of the shotgun type" and about "16,000 militia members...armed mainly with homemade guns" and spears and bolos. Some of the guerrilla units have been formed into squads and

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platoons. With the exception of the document's figure on militia members, its totals are close to those of a Philippine intelligence estimate completed on 30 June 1972. The estimate puts the figures at 1,090 regular armed cadres and 2,158 "service-support" personnel.

There are many reports of student radicals, from Sison's youth organization and from other groups, helping in the rural expansion-recruitment drives, using such techniques of group indoctrination as teach-ins and live-ins among the populace. The old Huk organization insurgents are also active, but they do not pose the long-term threat that the more cohesive, disciplined, and politicized NPA insurgents represent.

The main source of arms and ammunition for the NPA is internal, that is, equipment comes from combat captures, purchases from gun-traffickers, and weapons roundups (or collection drives) carried out in the islands. In order to conceal the sordid, covert nature of some acquisitions of weapons, the insurgents claim that they are using primarily the prescription -- a Maoist one -- of obtaining weapons from the enemy. Mao had said of China's civil war that "the enemy is our supply sergeant" -- a position now found convenient for Peking to paraphrase in connection with weapons-supplying of the NPA. Thus NCNA on 3 March 1972 made the following excerpts of a PKP-M/L newspaper article when discussing weapons acquisition:

Confronted with the large-scale recruitment of commanders and fighters for the NPA, the party and the people's army are fulfilling their arms requirement primarily by relying on their own strength. The primary source of arms and military equipment for the people's army is the battlefield. More than 90 percent of the weapons of the people's army come from the enemy. Victories

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*in ambushes and raids ensure arms
and ammunition for the Red fighters.
(emphasis supplied)*

Given the availability of smuggled guns and the practice of many radicals of acquiring and storing weapons in urban areas, the 90 percent figure probably exaggerates the proportion taken in combat. The newspaper article sensibly does not indicate the source of the other 10 percent of acquisitions.

Reports since 1969 of vessels bringing in military aid secretly from China or North Vietnam are unconfirmed. However, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] on 3 July 1972, government patrol aircraft spotted a vessel (a 25-ton fishing trawler) lightering its cargo ashore onto the sparsely populated east coast of Luzon near the remote town, Palanan. Government troops sent to the scene two days later to seize the stranded vessel were directly engaged in a firefight by local NPA forces. The vessel finally was captured together with the offloaded cargo (cached inland at an NPA camp). [REDACTED]

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
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

[redacted] The captured equipment included 737 M-14 rifles [redacted] 158,113 rounds of ammunition for the M-14s, five antitank rocket launchers (possibly PRC-made), 564 40mm rockets, a field telephone switchboard, and seven field telephone sets. The equipment is expensive. Some of the weapons, especially the rocket launchers, are not usually available to local gun-traffickers. More than 200 documents were seized, including the ship's log, entries which suddenly ended in early June 1972, presumably to conceal the sensitive matter of the ship's onloading destination. The vessel had offloaded another military cargo at Palanan earlier, in May. The vessel originally had been a fishing boat, which was purchased in Japan in April by a radical Filipino and former friend of Sison.





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


There is no certain way to determine the actual source of the weapons and equipment. 



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
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
In any case, the discovery of the vessel, the evidence that it had made a previous supply run in May 1972 for the NPA, and the nature of its cargo reveal a new dimension in NPA strategy to Philippine officials. That is, larger amounts of weapons and a new category of arms -- i.e., rocket launchers -- are being absorbed on Luzon for military operations.

Aside from arms and ammunition, another source of material support -- namely, money to be used for various activities of Sison's followers -- seems to be locally acquired. Money is derived by Sison's insurgents mainly from the local communities, primarily from the local Chinese. Some of the money comes in the form of voluntary contributions from sympathizers in the Communist cause. Some of it comes from out-and-out extortion -- i.e., from "protection money."

There is some evidence, however, of a tie-in with the Chinese Communists as the ultimate source of part of his total take of funds. The evidence goes back several years, and it is difficult to determine how much of it is still valid.



There is, in fact, no difficulty in making contacts with the Chinese Communists by visits to Hong Kong only



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[redacted] Much of this travel reportedly is for sending money to the mainland from Overseas Chinese sources, but some of it is for smuggling goods back into the Philippines. The goods are then resold, and ultimately the money reportedly is used to help finance insurgent operations.

It is not always clear whether local Chinese businessmen contribute to Sison's coffers as pro-Maoist sympathizers or for "protection" from the insurgents. [redacted]

[redacted] the NPA also extracts money and rice on various of the islands in the form of a regular "tax."

Aside from covert contacts probably in existence between Sison and Chinese Communist agents, Peking may well have other lines of communication to other of its sympathizers in the Philippines. [redacted]

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[REDACTED] Nevertheless, as far as intelligence operations are concerned, it is not unlikely that Peking has had, and now sustains, its own information lines directly into the Philippines through agents acting in the Chinese communities there and shuttling between the islands and Hong Kong.


Training of the Maoist insurgents is primarily carried out in the Philippines, where locals are recruited and intensively indoctrinated. However, [REDACTED] a handful have been and are being trained in China and Algeria.

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
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On the diplomatic level, Peking's policy can be expected to move toward rationality by small degrees. This would mean more people-to-people contacts and, eventually, some official contacts. For more than a year -- that is, since June 1971, and even several months earlier -- NCNA articles broadcast by Peking on developments in the Philippines have shown a diplomatic sensibleness in avoiding, for the most part, attacks on the Marcos administration by name. More recently, Peking was careful to use foreign press reports to imply its criticism of Marcos' declaration of martial law (22 September 1972), and this particular restraint has been maintained. This is in line with the low profile of insurgency-support that Peking has adopted in open media. Peking desires non-official relations now and official relations later with Manila. But not



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at the expense of ending all political support to the Sison forces. When President Marcos' brother-in-law, Governor Romualdez, visited Peking in February 1972, Chou used ambiguous language [REDACTED] to set forth the Chinese position. Chou first said that China does not interfere in the domestic affairs of other countries and does not believe that revolutions can be exported; but he then said that China is committed "to support" national liberation movements from imperialist interference. China does not interfere, China supports. Manila was left to interpret the precise meaning of this position.

The Chinese will probably continue their broadcasting of reports on developments in the insurgency. On the one hand, Radio Peking broadcasts will probably continue to avoid direct attacks on the Marcos administration by name, using foreign press sources to relay such criticism. On the other hand, the VMR will probably be used, as it has been up until the present, to carry vituperative attacks on the Manila government. The Chinese do not operate a separate radio station for the Philippine insurgency; their policy has been to use the VMR. For example, on 9 September 1972, the VMR was used to broadcast to Malaysia and Singapore a statement from Sison's PKP-M/L which derided the government of President Marcos as a "puppet" regime of the U.S.

The dedication of Sison to Mao's revolutionary views marks him as the most fervent Mao-idolizer of all pro-Peking foreign Communist leaders. In practical terms, this means he is conducting himself obediently in the Sino-Soviet dispute in criticizing Moscow by name and expanding the Mao-model revolution in the islands. Thus in his letter to the CCP on the 50th

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anniversary of the Chinese party (July 1971), Sison personally disparaged the "Soviet Union" as "the center of modern revisionism." He was emphatic in dedicating his party to sustained learning from the Chinese model:

The Communist Party of the Philippines emulates the CCP. It constantly strives to grasp the teachings of Chairman Mao. The living study and application of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tsetung Thought in Philippine conditions is today the main concern of the Communist Party of the Philippines. (Sison message published by NCNA, 10 July 1971)

Sison spoke also of moving the insurgency into the stage of "socialist revolution," which is to be the final revolutionary stage before seizure of national power. Even the future form of the Communist state is to be the "people's democracy" of Mao's terminology. On 3 June 1972, an NCNA article declared the final goal of the Philippine insurgents led by the PKP-M/L to be such a Maoist "people's democracy." On 5 December 1972, an NCNA article praised the NPA for using Mao's tactics to destroy "reactionary" troops.

Sison is acting to win important non-Communist political support for his insurgency, and has dangled the bait of a share in a future revolutionary government to prospective allies. [REDACTED]

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Sison apparently is also trying to establish a working alliance with the Muslim dissidents in the southern Philippines. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Peking's two-level policy of diplomacy and insurgency-support probably will continue. As for Sison's policy, he probably will adhere to Mao's prescription for waging a protracted war, only gradually expanding party ranks, the NPA, and territorial holdings.

Malaysia


West

Peking has the overall guiding role in the revived insurgency in northern West Malaysia (south of the Thai border). Its dominant influence is based on its control of the Malayan Communist Party (MCP). This party is virtually an operational wing of the CCP, and in the late 1940s and early 1950s some top MCP officials held dual membership in the CCP and the MCP. Top MCP officials may still be controlled by such dual membership today. In addition to the organizational tie, the strong racial tie is very important in sustaining the subordination of the MCP and its insurgents to

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MALAYSIA: Areas of Communist Insurgency



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the parent Chinese party: most of the insurgent Communists are ethnic Chinese. Malaysia's Chinese school system has radical youth organizations which act as recruiting centers for the MCP, and recruiting in the countryside is also most effective among Chinese.

The MCP today shows none of the independence which marks a free, unsubordinated Communist party. It obediently adopts all CCP positions in the Sino-Soviet dispute without variation. It issues servile statements of tribute to the CCP and its leaders. For example, the 1 April 1972 MCP Central Committee letter of condolence on the death of CCP Politburo member Hsieh Fu-chih pledged to take Hsieh's revolutionary attitude "as a model of our learning." Moreover, from 24-27 May 1972 the Voice of the Malayan Revolution (VMR) -- the Chinese-run covert radio station broadcasting from Changsha, Hunan in south-central China -- imposed on insurgents in the field a series of broadcasts carrying the complete text of Mao's Talks at the Yen-an Forum on Art and Literature (1942). Mainland cadres were subjected to the same study task on the 30th anniversary of Mao's Talks. The broadcasts implied that the MCP insurgents in the field were under the same CCP ideological and organizational discipline as mainland cadres.

The most important contribution Peking makes to the insurgency, is high-level guidance, indoctrination, and encouragement. There is abundant evidence that insurgents in the field use broadcasts of the VMR to set themes for indoctrination lectures. Many of the broadcasts used for political-toughening also carry detailed information on PRC developments through the broadcasting of articles in the Peking People's Daily and Red Flag. The organizing and political-toughening role of this radio station's broadcasts goes beyond mere revolutionary rhetoric and becomes practical aid.

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Most of the insurgents in northern West Malaysia are Chinese, not Malays (who distrust Communist concepts), and some have been infiltrated from China. But most of them have been in the field since the end of the Emergency (1948-1960), when Malaysian security forces chased them into southern Thailand. Many new cadres have been recruited in the field and never have been to the mainland. Because of the difficult jungle terrain and the cooperation of the local inhabitants in West Malaysia -- mostly cooperation by local Chinese -- Malaysian security forces are encountering difficulties in counterinsurgency operations. Peking now seems to be determined to broaden the ranks of the MCP and its combat arm, the Malayan National Liberation Army (MNLA) so that more Malays are brought in. The insurgents are going about this kind of party-building in a gradual, deliberate way, but the resistance of the Malays to Communist appeals will continue to impede the pace of expansion.

Chinese support of the insurgency is maintained under a clear distinction between government and party relations. Like the situation existing between Peking on the one hand, and Rangoon, Bangkok, and Manila on the other hand, improvements in government relations do not carry with them a reduction or cessation of PRC support of the Communist insurgents. Mao is apparently unwilling to close down support, as was done in the period just after World War II by the Soviets and in the mid-1950s by the Chinese during the policy of Bandung-inspired peaceful coexistence. Ending of support was criticized as a "mistake" at the peak of Mao's Cultural Revolution in August 1967 in Peking by a Malayan Communist leader, who is a client of the CCP. In a real sense, PRC support of the insurgency is a continuation of Mao's thinking during his Cultural Revolution regarding nearby guerrilla wars.

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The support, in contrast to the direct support given the Burma and Thailand insurgencies, does not include direct physical inputs, for obvious logistical reasons. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Chinese junks allegedly land on both sides of the Malay Peninsula. There is, however, no confirmation of these claims, and no credible instance of such a landing. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

But money for the insurgent cause probably is a different, and less difficult, problem of aid inputs. Couriers using Hong Kong and Macao from the mainland, and couriers using these colonial money-markets coming from West Malaysia, would have no real trouble in giving and receiving financial aid.

The impetus for reviving the insurgency in West Malaysia came from Peking, and at the time of the peak of Mao's "anti-revisionist" Cultural Revolution, in mid-1967. By mid-1968, some 600 armed Communist insurgents, who had huddled in sanctuaries in southern Thailand where they had been chased in the late 1950s by Malaysian security forces, began to move gradually from inactive to active status under stimulation from Peking. They moved back across the border, first to reconnoiter and then permanently to position themselves in small base areas in northern West Malaysia. The CTs -- that is, Communist Terrorists or members of the MNLA -- numbered about 600 regular armed cadres

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at the close of the Emergency (1948-1960), expanded to about 1,000 by mid-1968, to about 1,600 in mid-1970, and to about 1,800 in mid-1972. The slow upward progression in the number of armed insurgents represents a positive gain, and the existence of small bases capable of accommodating about 40-60 CTs points toward a long-term potential expansion.

The kindling spark was presumably in the form of a secret directive during Mao's Cultural Revolution, but the public form of the spark came as an article written by a Chinese Communist client in Peking: a Malay Communist, P.V. Sarma, Chief of the Malayan National Liberation League (MNLL). The exhortations in the article, which was published in the MNLL's Mao-line journal in August 1967, in effect directed the Malayan Communists to get out of front activities in Malayan parliamentary politics and out of the southern Thailand sanctuaries, to take up their weapons, and to start organizing themselves for serious work: guerrilla warfare. It insisted that "armed struggle" was the only way to attain political power, that the MCP had made a serious "mistake" in abandoning armed struggle just after World War II, and that the situation was becoming favorable for a resumption of guerrilla warfare to be handled in a well-organized way.

The article of Sarma had considerable significance. The fact that this key article was written while the author was in Peking as the representative of the MNLL and that it contained Mao-type exhortations on the absolute need for "armed struggle" as the only road to power in Malaysia indicates that it represented a Chinese Communist initiative. Peking's ideological position that "armed struggle" should be the main form of struggle in Malaysia was affirmed in the formal MCP statement of 1 June 1968. Army-insurgent work would

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replace political-front work and "parliamentary" politics. The statement was another indication of MCP subordination to the parent Chinese party.

Thus the stage of beginning the armed struggle was reached in West Malaysia in June 1968. The same held true for the beginning of political agitation among the "masses": also in June, the MCP issued a covert "directive" ordering the revival of political-indoctrination of the populace for the purpose of preparing safe areas in which the insurgency could take hold. The course of insurgent military actions between 1968 and 1972 in the field demonstrates that Peking and its client, the MCP, were not engaged only in the rhetoric of revolution, but were also engaged in the real thing. That is, Peking's support was not merely token aid, not simulated aid of no real account. On the contrary, Peking's guidance, indoctrination, and encouragement activities were positive concrete acts designed to have the effect of reviving an insurgency and making sure that the revival did not die at its rebirth.

The Peking-inspired revival of the armed insurgency can be fixed to the date of 17 June 1968 when a force of the MRLA for the first time since the late 1950s attacked a Malaysian security force unit on Malaysian territory. This well-trained Communist force numbered about 40 armed and uniformed men, and their ambush was effectively carried out. The evidence is that the revival of the insurgency in mid-1968 reflected from the start considerable military competence: good planning, tactical caution, good execution. CT units were armed and given uniforms in southern Thailand and were infiltrated skillfully into Malaysian territory with the initial mission of reconnoitering and re-establishing contacts with underground insurgents. Their mission later became that of making selective attacks on Malaysian security force

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units and undertaking selective sabotage of key installations in West Malaysia. Toward the end of 1968, the number of MNLA -- or CT -- incursions from southern Thailand gradually increased. In late 1970, it was solidly confirmed that small groups of CT infiltrators had permanently established small bases for inside-Malaysia operations -- a development occurring for the first time since the late 1950s. Later, the base camps were reported to be capable of servicing 40-60 CTs, as they included food caches.

The CTs were still building their units and were not in a phase of general offensive operations. But they did engage in selective strikes against government forces. A major incident involving the mining by CT forces of the main west coast road linking Malaysia and Thailand took place in late October 1969. On 10 December, a strategic installation was hit: a group of CTs blew up the 100-foot-long railway bridge on Malaysian territory about two miles southwest of Padang Besar, Perlis Province, severing for a few days the main railway link between Thailand and Malaysia. Gradually the CTs increased the number of cross-border incursions, their calculation having been to demonstrate their ability to operate on Malaysian territory without suffering excessive combat losses. They wanted to test their own ability to safely infiltrate, to hit important installations and roads, and to move bigger units across undetected. The planning was careful, the pace deliberate, and the actions generally low-risk.

Peking's role in the overall guidance of these developments is further suggested by its establishing, on PRC soil, the clandestine radio station -- the VMR -- at a time when CT units first began to be embedded across the southern Thailand border. Inaugurated on 15 November 1969, the radio station claimed to be the

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"Malayan people's own radio station." Actually, according to technical observations, the VMR broadcasts from a location near Changsha, in Yunnan Province in south-central China. The November broadcast declared that the VMR

...will exert utmost efforts to propagate Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tsetung Thought and the policies of the MCP...it will prepare revolutionary public opinion for the launching of an extensive people's war in Malaya with the purpose of crushing imperialism, modern revisionism, and all reactionaries at home, and establishing a people's republic of Malaya. (emphasis supplied)

In order to set forth "policies" and prepare "revolutionary" public opinion, the VMR has been broadcasting to Malaysia and Singapore 56 hours per week. On occasion, an entire week is devoted to one major subject. For example, from 4 to 10 October 1972, the VMR devoted its time exclusively to broadcasting the MCP's New Constitution.

Since the fall of 1970, Peking has been sanitizing Radio Peking replays of VMR broadcasts, editing out derogatory references to the Malaysian leaders by name. But this effort to improve the diplomatic image to foreign audiences has not changed the nature of the broadcasts of the VMR which are beamed into Malaysia and Singapore. These broadcasts continue to direct the insurgents to sustain their "armed struggle" in a protracted way against government forces.

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In order to increase the mass following of the MCP, the Chinese have decided to cross ethnic lines in setting forth their Communist appeals. It is a significant fact that PRC-directed VMR broadcasts are made in three languages -- Chinese, Malay, and Tamil -- with almost equal time to Malay and Chinese. Thus despite the fact that most pro-Communist elements in West Malaysia are Chinese, Peking is actively trying to make inroads among the Malays. The strong emphasis placed on influencing Malays toward the Communist insurgency reflects Peking's awareness that the guerilla war cannot expand in a big way in actual territory seized without bringing in this dominant national group. According to a report of the summer of 1971, Malay CTs (as distinct from Chinese insurgent cadres) were being used in a program to help win the support of non-Communist Malays. Members of the primarily Malay 10th Regiment in the MNLA based just north of the border in Thailand had begun to cross into Malaysia more and more frequently to indoctrinate rural Malays near the border. In addition to this new recruitment trend, Peking has dropped its criticisms of "Malay chauvinism" and the alleged persecution of Chinese and other minorities in Malaysia.

Peking had been carrying out a policy of unity-of-all-nationalities in Burma and Thailand to expand insurgent ranks there. That a similar policy was operative in Malaysia is indicated by the new appeals to Malays in the field and in Peking-originated guidance. An example of such guidance is the VMR editorial of 29 April 1972, later carried by NCNA on 4 May in excerpt form, declaring that the MCP is the real representative of "all nationalities" of the country. For the most part, however, Malays (in contrast to the Chinese) have remained impervious to the influence of such Maoist indoctrination.

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Since the revival of the insurgency in 1968, Peking has been working to raise the determination of the fighters to persist in a protracted war. Morale-building broadcasts are exaggerating the losses of government units whenever a minor clash between Malaysian security forces and the MNLA in border areas occurs. For example, on 3 July 1970, NCNA, quoting the China-based radio station, VMR, claimed that the CTs' 12th Regiment had shot down a fighter-bomber and a helicopter and had damaged another helicopter. It also insisted that "the broad masses in the enemy-occupied areas are waging more extensive armed struggle in enthusiastic response to the call of the MCP."

The VMR continues to call for the "overthrow" of the government, to declare Mao's road to be the "only" one to attain power, and to remind MCP cadres that they "must" sustain their study of Mao's ideology. In a major editorial greeting the PRC's National Day, the VMR declared on 30 September 1972 that

Socialist China is an unshakable base area for the world revolution....

From their protracted revolutionary practice, the people of our country have fully realized that to overthrow an imperialist-colonialist rule and their puppets, we must rely only on arms but not on ballot boxes, as was pointed out in the important statement of the Central Committee of the MCP of 25 April 1972

The Razak clique is shouting for the setting up of a national front, and the

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Lee Kuan Yew clique has been staging its general elections comedy drama.... Their death-bed struggle cannot save them from their doom....

We must raise still higher the great red banner of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tsetung Thought... (emphasis supplied)

Subsequently, the insurgents have been told "to fight to the end" against the "Razak clique." (VMR broadcast of 4 November 1972)

Separating diplomacy out from Peking's dual policy of diplomacy-insurgency has been the task of Chou En-lai, who skillfully accentuated the positive during the May 1971 visit of the Malaysian trade delegation to Peking. Stressing diplomacy, Chou seemed to accept Malaysia as one country: he was the first Chinese leader to drop the usage, "Malaya," which had implied Peking's insistence (since the formation of Malaysia as a Federation in 1963) that it was still unacceptable as a single new state. Chou tried to stay away from explicit and unequivocal statements regarding the insurgency half of Peking's policy toward Malaysia. [REDACTED] when questioned about Peking's support of the insurgents, Chou told delegation members that government-to-government relations were "different" from party-to-party relations. The implication of this dodge was, as in the case of Chou's dodge on a similar situation in Burma, that Peking would not change its support for the Communist guerrillas.

Actually, Chou's acceptance of Malaysia as a single country was only a dialectical tactic, to use

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CCP language. Peking does not accept the existence of Malaysia. Chinese maps in 1965 did not show a federated Malaysia, but rather depicted Malaya as a separate country in the west and Sarawak and Sabah (i.e., most of North Borneo) as still under colonial rule in the east. Peking's new World Atlas, published in February 1972 by the PRC's Cartographic Institute and therefore representing the official view, continues this policy. It adheres to the pre-1963 name of "Malaya" on its map pages, and in the commentary accompanying the maps, the relevant section is called "Malaya." It also maintains ambiguity about whether Singapore is now an independent country or part of Malaya. Singapore is discussed under the "Malaya" section of the commentary, and on the map pages, it is divided from "Malaya" by a regional rather than an international boundary. More importantly, the commentary carries forward Peking's policy of supporting the insurgency, declaring in the "Malaya" section that "on 1 February 1949, a national liberation army was established under the leadership of the Malayan Communist Party; it actively began a people's armed struggle."

Chinese officials in August 1971 denied to Malaysian officials that they had any connection with the MCP, but refused to repeat this denial in Peking's public media. At the same time, the VMR attacked "Razak and his ilk" (VMR broadcast of 28 August 1971). Similar attacks against the Malaysian leader have been continued by the Chinese-run clandestine radio.

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Keeping any improvement in diplomatic or trade relations as a separate matter, which will not effect support for the insurgency, Peking had its NCNA publish two articles, one on insurgency in West Malaysia and the other on terrorist actions in East Malaysia (North Borneo), using the PRC-based VMR as the source of the commentaries. There have been small steps toward improving relations. For example, a ping-pong delegation was sent to Peking in mid-August 1972, the PRC ambassador in Rangoon attended the Malaysian National Day reception there on 31 August, and PRC central media avoided any mention of greetings from the MCP during the 1 October National Day celebrations in Peking. Nevertheless, the Chinese have not disengaged from support of the insurgency.

Most recently, they again have refused to disavow support of the MCP-led insurgents. In the course of this refusal, Chinese officials showed subtlety in trying to equate the anti-Razak broadcasts with the non-subversive, non-hostile, and non-revolutionary practices of most Western countries in disseminating religious and political views abroad. They adopted the tactic of making analogies where, in fact, sharp contrasts exist. Their analogy-making procedure avoided all mention of the hostile nature of almost every VMR broadcast beamed into Malaysia which attack the domestic and foreign policies of Prime Minister Razak, as well as the Prime Minister personally as a "fascist

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dictator." More importantly, their procedure was an effort to conceal the revolutionary-subversive intent of the broadcasts -- namely, to provide guidance and to encourage the insurgents to do a professional job of expanding their armed units and the territory they hold.

Despite the fact that the only condition Malaysia placed on establishing relations with Peking was that the PRC renounce its support of the MCP, in late November 1972 such a promise was not given.

The Secretary General of the Malaysian Ministry of Foreign Affairs told the US ambassador in Kuala Lumpur on 7 December 1972 that during his November talks with Chou, Chou reviewed the PRC position on the MCP in historical perspective, saying that China indeed supported the MCP in its struggle against British imperialism. PRC support continued today as a matter of ideology -- Chou depicted it as "akin to religion" -- to provide moral support for other socialist movements. Chou went on to say that this continued support should not be a matter of concern for Kuala Lumpur because China would limit such support to the propaganda level. China would not engage in direct support of subversion against the Malaysian government. Chou also said that he was sure that this problem could be arranged between the two countries in a mutually satisfactory way. It is possible that Chou was hinting at a deal whereby Kuala Lumpur would agree to recognize the PRC as the only government of China at the price of Peking ceasing its

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VMR broadcasts into Malaysia. It is more likely, however, that Chou's remark was intended to increase the optimism of Kuala Lumpur about an end to Chinese support in order to combat the retarding effect on improved relations of counsel given Razak by Djakarta, Bangkok, and Manila. This would mean a greater inclination in Kuala Lumpur to further improve relations without, beforehand, attaining a PRC promise to end insurgency-support.

In effect, as late as November 1972, Chinese officials explicitly refused to disavow support for wars of "national liberation," stating to Malaysian officials that support in the form of radio broadcasts and sympathy "would continue." This Chinese position was a direct rebuff to an explicit Malaysian request for an end to PRC insurgency-support.

The insurgents in Malaysia are not yet in a general offensive stage. They are intensively working mainly on establishing more bases and recruiting personnel. NCNA broadcasts (as well as the VMR) have noted this situation, reflecting an awareness in Peking that the MNLA still represents a small insurgency by contrast with the Malaysian security forces in northern West Malaysia. Possibly in the next year or two, the MNLA will resort to more offensive forays from base areas. Chinese political and radio propaganda support continues, and most likely will continue, at least until Mao dies.

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Malaysia

East: North Borneo

Peking keeps its political support of the insurgency in West Malaysia separate from its support of the even smaller terrorist operations of Communists in "North Kalimantan" -- the name Peking uses for North Borneo, consisting of Sarawak and Sabah in East Malaysia. The Chinese leaders were forced to a decision in 1963 when "North Kalimantan" became part of the new Malaysia Federation: to accept the coalescence of the new Malaysia and encourage the Sarawak Communists to coalesce into one party with the MCP or to follow Sukarno's "confrontation" policy of opposing the union of "North Kalimantan" with Malaysia and thereby keeping the Sarawak Communists apart from the MCP. In deciding upon the latter course, the Chinese leaders in 1964 established in Peking a front, the North Kalimantan National Liberation League, led by Sarawak Communists. Peking media thereafter touted the small insurgency in broadcasts as a revolutionary "armed struggle" distinct from MCP operations. The Sarawak Communists, desiring independence from Indonesia as well as from Malaysia, have also kept clear of subordination to the Indonesian Communist Party.

Until recently, the Chinese have equivocated on the matter of the existence or non-existence of a separate, independent "North Kalimantan Communist Party." [redacted] earlier had indicated that a Sarawak Communist party had been established in January 1968 and that its party constitution exists as well as its covert apparatus. The Chinese now seem willing to recognize the party. Their Yunnan-based VMR during the period between 2 and 12 December 1972 for the first time referred to the "North Kalimantan Communist Party,"

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suggesting Peking's apparent view that the Sarawak insurgents are somewhat more unified than previously and should be encouraged further to tighten up their organization.

Chinese support of the North Kalimantan guerrillas -- the Sarawak Communist Organization (SCO), a name used for convenience in referring to them -- consists of political guidance and encouragement. Ever since the formation of Malaysia in 1963, the Chinese have housed and used various Sarawak Communist leaders and "front" leaders in Peking. The journal of the North Kalimantan National Liberation League, Liberation News, is printed in China. In the fall of 1965, when the Indonesian army began a large-scale annihilation of Communists and suspected Communists, remnants of the Sarawak guerrillas moved across the border into the nearby jungles of East Malaysia, and the Chinese supported their cause. But systematic political guidance and encouragement did not begin until the start of Mao's Cultural Revolution.

The new, systematic stage of Chinese guidance and encouragement began on 9 July 1966. On that day, a North Kalimantan client of the Chinese -- ostensibly a "delegate" to the Emergency Meeting of the Chinese-controlled Afro-Asian Writers Association held in Peking -- put forth a program for the guerrilla war in East Malaysia. The North Kalimantan puppet called for the guerrillas to

- (1) *"take up arms" in order to attain "national liberation,"*

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- (2) *"fully mobilize the masses of peasants" of various "nationalities" (rather than almost exclusively rallying local Chinese),*
 - (3) *"unite" all the "classes and nationalities" that can be united,*
 - (4) *"expose" the "reactionary" nature of the "ruling clique,"*
 - (5) *"wage the people's war," and*
 - (6) *"persist in self-reliance."*

This Peking initiative was given additional force within one month. Another North Kalimantan client of the Chinese was used by them to make a declaration from Shanghai on 9 August 1966.

We must wage a people's war in accordance with Mao Tse-tung's strategy and tactics for guerrilla war. In particular, we must do mass work and rely on local armed units and militia.

The Chinese used these two men to fire the opening shot in order to revive the small insurgency. By means of such programmatic instructions, the Chinese helped move the insurgency into a new stage, stressing the serious matters of the need to work with the populace, of the need for increased discipline and political commitment, and of the need for military professionalism.

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The North Kalimantan guerrillas began to indoctrinate their rank and file. Peking later stated that the North Kalimantan "People's Armed Forces" had "initiated a movement to study and apply, creatively, Chairman Mao's brilliant writings," especially those which insisted that real revolutionaries can win against the worst odds. (NCNA article of 28 December 1968) The guerrillas "study Mao Tsetung thought in the course of their war, use it to review and sum up the practice of their struggle, and raise their understanding steadily." (NCNA article of 2 November 1969) Thus despite the small size of the insurgency, the Chinese were determined to help the guerrillas discipline their ranks and deepen their political commitment so that the movement would not sputter and die.

Most of the weapons held by men in the field in this North Borneo mini-insurgency have been stolen, and there is no evidence of outside sources of arms, ammunition, or other supplies. Their groups still are not big enough to combine into a guerrilla army which could mount a sustained insurgency. However, from 1971 to the spring of 1972 their numbers have increased from 500 to about 1,000. Peking broadcasts since 1969 have been stressing the need to gain support of minority nationalities. The SCO has made some progress in recruiting among the Ibans -- a non-Malay tribal group which, together with local Chinese, provides areas of sanctuary for the terrorists when hounded by Malaysian government security forces. They do not seem to have a disciplined political organization. They do not have an intensive military training program or permanent base areas, as do the CTs in West Malaysia. However, they are troublesome enough to have impelled Malaysian authorities to launch counterinsurgency operations against them, draining off some security forces from West Malaysia.

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In recent years, both the VMR and Radio Peking have referred more and more to the North Kalimantan People's Armed Forces and have virtually dropped references to the front of the Sarawak Communists since 1969. As in the case of Burma, Thailand, and West Malaysia, great stress has been placed on building up contacts with "all" nationalities (rather than keeping the insurgency exclusively ethnic Chinese). But since permanent "base areas" apparently do not exist in Sarawak yet, such areas are not mentioned in broadcasts, although "mass work" reportedly has opened up some safe-havens among the "various nationalities." An NCNA article of 23 February 1972, which claimed that the People's Armed Forces have existed since 1965, discussed SCO areas of operations without claiming the establishment of "base areas" -- presumably a future target for the SCO. For the present, friendly zones were adequate.

In the course of protracted revolutionary struggle, the People's Armed Forces have done mass work apart from fighting. Thus they have established close relations with the masses of people of various nationalities like those of fish to water. The commanders and combatants of the People's Forces frequently go to the areas of various nationalities to live and labor together with the local people. They give medical treatment to the sick, concern themselves with the well-being of the masses, and propagate revolutionary truth among them. Not a few of the people have rendered support and protection to the People's Armed Forces, disregarding their own safety and even sacrificing their own lives. Whenever the reactionary troops

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and police came to launch "encirclement and suppression" operations, the people passed on information to the People's Forces and rendered them all kinds of support so that they could know the enemy's movements and, using flexible tactics, attack the enemy.

The article claims that the insurgents are improving their military and political training, studying "people's war" doctrine -- Mao's, by implication -- in order to "enhance their combat capability." As for the goals of the "protracted" war, the article maintains Peking's ambiguity, saying only that the "revolution" in North Kalimantan should succeed but making no mention as to who is to be overthrown and whether it is independence that is to be attained.

The insurgents in Sarawak and farther south in the western portion of Borneo (Kalimantan) apparently are still avoiding use of the phrase, "Communist Party," to depict their organization. The ambiguity of whether they are a separate "Communist Party" in a separate country or part of the larger MCP is being sustained. The insurgents may have banded together in a new organization to improve their internal control structure.

[REDACTED] the Sarawak guerrillas and the insurgents in the western part of Borneo have integrated themselves into a new organization: The Organization for the Defense of the People and Fatherland. The title is ambiguous about which country is the "fatherland." It also avoids the idea of "liberation" of the country. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] the Organization has nine groups, operating in various cities of Indonesia, and [REDACTED] communications with the groups in the western part

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[redacted]

of Borneo (Kalimantan) is conducted by radio. [redacted] [redacted] transmissions originate in Djakarta, and are sent out following news broadcasts of Radio Peking. Each group has a radio receiver which is operated by a member trained for this purpose. Transmissions include reports on President Suharto, and on Foreign Minister A. Malik's riches. These are intended as psychological warfare material to undermine confidence in government officials. The Peking-run VMR continues to broadcast on developments in the insurgency in east Malaysia, and it is likely that these broadcasts as well as those of Radio Peking are monitored and utilized by the guerrillas.

As in other cases of Peking's support for insurgency in Southeast Asia, there is today a clash between insurgency-support and diplomatic-advance in PRC policy. On the one hand, Peking's propaganda implies that liberation or independence from the Malaysian Federation is a demand of Sarawak Communists, that that is what they are fighting for, and that that is what the Chinese leaders are supporting. On the other hand, for diplomacy purposes, Chou En-lai in May 1971 made reference to "Malaysia." This implied that Peking accepts the permanency and territorial integrity of the Federation as one state formed in 1963. This two-level policy of both insurgency-support and diplomacy shows no signs of ending.

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