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ANNEX

TEN YEARS OF CHINESE COMMUNIST FOREIGN POLICY

Section II: South and Southeast Asia
(Reference Title: POLO XXVII)

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ANNEX

TEN YEARS OF CHINESE COMMUNIST FOREIGN POLICY

South and Southeast Asia

This ANNEX is a detailed review and analysis of Chinese Communist Foreign Policy in South and Southeast Asia. It provides the basic data upon which the shorter, original Intelligence Report was based and is circulated for the benefit of those who desire to pursue the subject in depth.

This publication is part of a series of studies of Chinese Communist foreign policy being produced by the Special Research Staff. Arthur Cohen is the analyst in charge.

John Kerry King
Chief, Special Research Staff

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ANNEX

TEN YEARS OF CHINESE COMMUNIST FOREIGN POLICY

Section II: South and Southeast Asia

Contents

TEN YEARS OF CHINESE COMMUNIST FOREIGN POLICY

Section II: South and Southeast Asia

Introduction

Revolutionary and national interests always have been present in Mao Tse-tung's foreign policy as conflicting elements. His revolutionary compulsion (as well as his craving for adulation) has been detrimental to national interests, but he will not (or cannot) abandon this course. On occasion, however, he has partially suppressed it, the most important instance having been the period from 1954-65 in relations with countries in the Far East.

As early as December 1936, Mao believed that his revolution should "exert a far-reaching influence on the revolution in the East as well as in the whole world" (Strategic Problems of China's Revolutionary War). This personal desire was later made national policy, and Liu Shao-chi insisted on 16 November 1949 that Mao's "road" of guerrilla war should be the model for all Communist-led revolutions in "colonial and semi-colonial" countries, his apparent immediate concern having been the insurgencies in Southeast Asia. (Speech to the Trade Union Conference of Asian and Australasian Countries in Peking) But side by side with this policy of openly encouraging revolution was to be Mao's dawning recognition of the fact that Communist-led insurrections, so far from spreading like a prairie fire throughout the area, were making no rapid progress beyond Vietnam. More importantly, he began to recognize that an explicitly revolutionary policy could result in the establishment of a new American presence, beyond Korea and near Chinese borders in Indo-China. The advent of a less doctrinaire Soviet leadership after Stalin's death (March 1953), the end of the Korean war

(July 1953), the desire to rehabilitate the economy of his regime, and Washington's clearly expressed determination to prevent by containment any new Communist aggression in Asia helped to erode the prospects for a revolutionary advance and to convince him of the need to shift to a more moderate (and internationally more acceptable) policy. A new nonrevolutionary strategy was formulated in order to attract rather than repel the non-Communist leaders of states on the mainland's periphery, and by 1954 Mao's revolutionary compulsion had been partially suppressed, displaced by his desire to ensure national security and attain "great power" status for his regime.

After the spring of 1954, Mao permitted Chou En-lai to advance a policy of assurance-against-subversion toward governments which, he believed, might otherwise have permitted American forces to establish bases near the mainland's borders. A key principle of Chou's five principles of peaceful coexistence (which he set forth with Nehru in April 1954) was used to try to assure nearby governments that Peking's policy was one of "non-interference" in their internal affairs.* "China has no

*In his speech of 1 October 1949, Mao had not given such an assurance and discussed only the principles of "equality, mutual benefit, and mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty" in relations among nations. Chou's five principles were:

(1) mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty,
(2) mutual non-aggression,
(3) mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs,
(4) equality and mutual benefit, and
(5) peaceful coexistence.

Principle (3) was to be cited in 1967 as the one the Chinese leaders had violated in trying to impose Mao's "thought" on Cambodians. Sihanouk publicly complained on 11 September 1967 that a message from Peking to the Cambodian-Chinese Friendship Association was "an extraordinary interference in the affairs of a sovereign state," and on 12

(footnote continued on page 3)

intention whatsoever to subvert the government of its neighboring countries." (Chou's speech at the Afro-Asian Conference at Bandung on 19 April 1955) This new strategy was designed to encourage neutralism, and neutral countries were, in turn, to become parts of a continuous territorial buffer preventing "encirclement" of the mainland. The antidote to the American policy of containment--depicted at various times as an effort to "encircle and blockade" (Marshal Yeh Chien-ying's phrase of 6 October 1950) or to "encircle and isolate" the mainland (Mao's phrase reported on 23 February 1961)--was to be Mao's implicit admission that diplomacy could be more useful than revolution. Mao began to reduce Peking's support for Communist revolutionaries in these countries in the second half of 1951. Further, he permitted Chou to assure non-Communist leaders that local Overseas Chinese in their countries would not be organized and exploited as a subversive weapon against their national regimes and internal (or foreign) policies. In short, he permitted Chou to adopt tactics of considerateness (that is, diplomatically "correct" tactics) in observing the nationalistic sensitivities of these leaders.

I. Two Types of Neutral Neighbors

Mao and his aides did not view these governments as one homogenous or undifferentiated group of neutrals, and they clearly indicated their preference for the policies of those countries which were involved in Mao's anti-

(footnote continued from page 2)
September, he stated that Peking's action "is contrary to the peaceful coexistence principles which you set forth... in 1955. You claimed that peaceful coexistence means mutual respect without intervening in the affairs of others..." On 1 November 1967, Sihanouk announced that Chou had reassured him (in a message) on precisely the non-intervention principle.

Americanism--viz., Cambodia and Indonesia. Those which were not involved--viz., Burma, Nepal, Afghanistan, and Ceylon--were nevertheless treated as if they were part of an anti-American front, or were on the way to becoming part of such a common bloc. They viewed Pakistan as a special case--that is, as a quasi-ally which was useful in opposing India, the latter having been transformed in 1959 into a major enemy. They treated with varying degrees of contempt their old enemies--viz., Thailand, Malaya, and the Philippines--but were reluctant to call for the overthrow of these governments until the 1966-67 period. Chou was convincing when he repeatedly insisted that, even toward countries aligned with the U.S. or otherwise hostile to Peking, the Chinese Communist leaders had no interest in the political character of the internal regime but only in the foreign relations between nearby countries and the mainland government.

Mao's idea of a "genuinely" neutral country was one that would not oppose his policies and would not permit U.S. bases on its territory. Even after some tensions had developed in relations with several leaders of nearby countries, his criteria for considering them as acceptable neutrals was sustained. Chen Yi made the definitive statement on the matter to Japanese newsmen in an interview of 29 May 1962:

> The countries that truly adopt a policy of peace and neutrality, maintain peaceful contacts with all countries, maintain friendly ties with China, and call for peaceful coexistence with countries which have different ideologies and social systems, namely, Nepal, Afghanistan, Cambodia, Burma, and Indonesia, are not being occupied by the U.S. But the countries that call for opposition to Communist China are receiving U.S. imperialism, offering military bases to the U.S., and consequently are receiving the wolf into their homes....The genuine peaceful and neutral countries mentioned above do not need U.S. 'protection' or occupation because they abide by the five principles of

peaceful coexistence and because their internal order is in good shape.

However, the record of his relations with these countries indicates that he has made a distinction between different kinds of neutrals, prefering those which are involved with his anti-Americanism and which are assertive in opposing Washington's policies.

A. Asian Countries Involved with Mao's Anti-Americanism

1. Cambodia

Mao was pleased with Sihanouk for staying out of SEATO and for opposing a SEATO member, Thailand, and an old enemy, South Vietnam. He was to become even more pleased with Cambodia's chief of state for actions to eliminate the U.S. presence in Phnom Penh.* Although Chou En-lai had been tactful, since his February 1956 discussions, in moving Sihanouk away from the West and toward neutralism and although he had attained recognition for the Peking regime (in July 1958, when Sihanouk was rebuked in Bangkok and felt threatened by Thailand and South Vietnam), he had warned the Cambodian leader that Peking would not make problems for him "unless Cambodia permitted the entry of U.S. troops." Sihanouk, in

*Mao is reported to have expressed admiration, in talking with the Cambodian military delegation on 31 March 1964, over the way in which Sihanouk had put an end to U.S. aid and was ready to face the "reactions of the imperialists in all their forms." On 10 September 1964, Mao described Cambodia to the French ambassador as a good example of a "truly" neutral state, and in late September 1965, Mao made Sihanouk an honorary Communist by saying he was "very, very red" and "my comrade" because "like me, you are struggling against the imperialists." (Cited in Sihanouk speech of 17 October 1965)

his Tokyo press conference in late October 1961, had attributed this remark of Chou's to some unspecified time "in the past"--apparently a remark made by Chou either in Cambodia in early May 1960 or in Peking in December 1960, when Sihanouk signed a nonaggress on treaty. In 1960, Sihanouk sent his three sons to study on the mainland--another sign to the Chinese leaders that he wanted them to act as his defenders. By that time, it was clear to the Chinese that Sihanouk looked to Peking rather than Washington for military support, and Sino-Cambodian relations centered on the basic matter of whether Sihanouk was to be given a clear statement of commitment to defend Cambodia from Thai and Vietnamese incursions. Chou's task was to string him along with statements which implied such a commitment, but never explicitly declared it. When, on 5 November 1962, Sihanouk complained in Phnom Penh that "some American circles even here" talk of a much harder U.S. policy toward Cambodia, he publicly insisted that this would not work because the Chinese Communist ambassador "this morning" had assured him that Cambodia "in no case would be abandoned" (as Khrushchev had abandoned Cuba). Actually, Sihanouk was aware that the PLA would not be used to help him. His practice had been to imply, or even directly claim, that the Chinese would intervene militarily to defend his regime. But he has also publicly admitted that on at least one occasion--namely, his diplomatic break with Thailand in October 1961--"I made believe there was someone behind me to support me. Actually, there was no one at that moment." (Sihanouk speech of late November 1961)

Compensating for cautious and vague statements, the Chinese privately declared their willingness to supply military aid if he were to renounce his policy of accepting aid from the U.S. Sihanouk said that during his visit to the mainland in February 1963, Chen Yi "repeatedly urged me to give h s country the honor of helping Cambodia in the military and national defense fields." (Sihanouk speech of 15 March 1964) The Chinese at the time were anxious to gain his support and goodwill, and Chou had the major role in persuading him to adopt Peking's positions. For example, in a private discussion with the Cambodian chief of state in Kunming on 10 February 1963,

Chou persuaded him to reverse his position and accept Peking's view of the dispute with India. Chou also joined Mao in warning Sihanouk of a plot to overthrow him, establishing a status of credibility with the Cambodian leader: "Mr. Mao Tse-tung himself asked me to do my best to avoid being overthrown. Mr. Chou En-lai...asked me to be careful because 'something is being prepared against you.'" (Sihanouk speech of 28 February 1963) Sihanouk was surprised and delighted that Mao and Chou would alert him to a maneuver to which the prestige of the small crypto-Communist Pracheachon (People's Party) and other leftists were committed. But maintenance of an apologist for Peking, as Sihanouk had then become, was more important to Mao and Chou than the prospects in Cambodia of leftist comrades. Liu Shao-chi tried to sustain Peking's influence, and he visited Cambodia within one month (in May 1963) after Sihanouk had concluded a military aid agreement--his first with a bloc country--with the USSR.

By the fall of 1963, the Chinese leaders had attained a good understanding of Sihanouk's personality, appraising him as a leader highly susceptible to flattery but also emotionally unstable and anxious to involve them in fighting his battles, political and military. When, therefore, on 5 November 1963, Sihanouk declared his intention to replace U.S. assistance with aid from Peking, they took their time and calculated the risks they might incur if they moved too rapidly to defend him during his political rampage against the U.S. By 21 November, they apparently believed that a response would not entail military risks; they belatedly and cautiously pledged "all-out support" (not direct PLA involvement) in the event Cambodia were to be invaded* and concluded the first military aid agreement between the two countries (Peking's

*"The Chinese government hereby solemnly declares that if the Kingdom of Cambodia which has persevered in its policy of peace and neutrality should encounter armed invasion instigated by the U.S. and its vassals, the Chinese government and people will firmly side with the Kingdom of Cambodia and give it all-out support." (PRC statement
(footnote continued on page 8)

first economic aid agreement with a non-Communist government was concluded with Phnom Penh in mid-1956) in December 1963. Further, the long-pending Sino Cambodian civil air agreement was signed on 25 November. Lavish flattery of Sihanouk and successive military aid agreements--in October 1964 and November 1965--were used by the Chinese leaders to try to obscure the ambiguity on the precise nature of their commitment to Cambodia. Sihanouk was useful to them partly because of his temperamental outbursts against the U.S. (and later against the USSR), but for this same reason they were careful to retain some leeway so that their actions would not be conditioned upon his unstable temperament.

As Sihanouk became aware of this sustained ambiguity, they had to work hard to "explain" their unwillingness to use the PLA to defend Cambodian territory. When, on 10 April, Sihanouk complained about Chou's apparent reluctance to impell Souvanna Phouma to recognize Cambodia's territorial integrity in the Sino-Laotian communique of 8 April, (Sihanouk having said that now "we cannot

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(footnote continued from page 7)
of 21 November 1963) Sihanouk later tried to make Peking's commitment appear total and unconditional: "In its November 1963 statement...China...promised that it is ready to bring all necessary assistance to Cambodia...and this assistance will be unconditional." (Sihanouk speech 15 March 1964) Nevertheless, major Chinese spokesmen held closely to the vague formulation, as witness Lo Jui-ching's faithful reiteration of it in his speech of greeting to the Cambodian military delegation in Peking on 13 March 1964. At the same time, Peking Radio did not report Sihanouk's 11 March statement that in the event of attack, the PRC "will help us in accordance with her written promise." At a later date, the Chinese remained silent about another Sihanoukian exaggeration, namely, his statement on 4 January 1966 that if war is forced upon Cambodia, Peking "has promised that it will come to Cambodia's aid, not only with arms but with volunteer troops as they did during the Korean war."

trust anyone"), the Chinese tried to reassure him. Chen Yi in mid-April tried to get the Cambodian delegate to the Afro-Asian conference in Djakarta to believe that he (Chen) had warned Souvanna in Peking that the PRC would not allow anyone to trouble Cambodia.

> Mr. Chen Yi also warned: 'Take care not to invade Khmer territory, as People's China will not permit such an act. I warn you that if you dare trouble Cambodia, People's China will surely come to Cambodia's aid.' Then, Prince Souvanna Phouma asked Mr. Chen Yi what road China would take to help Cambodia, which is so far from China. Mr. Chen Yi replied that he would send aid to Cambodia through North Vietnam and that by crossing part of Laotian territory, the Chinese would be able to reach Cambodia. On hearing this answer, Prince Souvanna Phouma found out that things would not go well for him and that there would be no hope for him.*
>
> When our military delegation...was visiting People's China, Mr. Mao Tse-tung, father of China, clearly stated (on 31 March 1964) that if someone dared attack Cambodia, People's China surely would side with the Khmer to check the enemy. (Sihanouk's speech of 19 April 1964)

If Sihanouk was quoting Chen and Mao correctly, it appears that the Chinese leaders were somewhat bolder in boasting to Cambodian officials in private remarks than in public

*Chen's statement contains elements of deceit. For example, he slides quickly over the hypothetical transit of North Vietnamese territory by PLA troops--an action which Ho and other Hanoi leaders would have been reluctant to permit.

statements.* On 12 May 1964, Sihanouk again claimed that "People's China promises us that if the Americans dare walk into Khmer territory, the Chinese will, in the Khmer's place, fight the Americans until they are defeated." Further, on 8 October 1964, just after his return from a visit to Peking (where the Chinese leaders complied with his privately stated demand to be treated as China's "most honored" guest),** Sihanouk reported on Chou En-lai's statements to him at a meeting held on 4 October. He said that Chou "explained" in private that the only reason the Sino-Cambodian joint communique (issued on 5 October) should not contain a pledge of Chinese military intervention in the event of invasion of Cambodia by U.S. and "satellite" forces was to avoid "malevolent interpretation by our enemies" that the Cambodians have abandoned neutrality for an alignment with China. He also said Chou demurred on the ground that Cambodia is not a "socialist"

*Sihanouk on 13 May quoted Mao as having told his military delegation on 31 March that "if the U.S. imperialists and their lackeys attack Cambodia, 700 million-strong China will fight beside the Khmer"--a stronger commitment than the one Sihanouk attributed to Liu Shao-chi. Sihanouk on 25 March quoted from a telegram that he had received from his defense minister in Peking reporting Liu's "pledge": "In the case of aggression against Cambodia, China gives formal assurance that it will stand beside Cambodia." Mao may well have given a stronger commitment unintentionally, as he is responsible to no higher authority and has often used language more freely than his subordinates, who are always liable to be called to account by him.

**Sihanouk, who has visited Peking five times since 1960, has been received and praised by Mao, Liu, Chou, and Chen and "Each time I have been in Peking, the Chinese authorities have tried different methods of giving me a better reception." "At any great Chinese celebration, which was attended by four or five chiefs of state, Cambodia always occupied the first place, near Mao Tse-tung." (Sihanouk speech of 17 October 1965)

country. He said that Chou stated: if Cambodia is invaded and if Cambodia makes an express request, China will provide not only new war materiel, but also "support in military personnel."* This incident indicates that the Chinese leaders have been somewhat bolder in private than in public statements of commitment and that they have been impelled constantly to "explain" their public caution with various fatuous rationalizations. Their trouble with Sihanouk was increased because he used these privately stated assurances as firm commitments in making public speeches intended to deter Thailand and South Vietnam from attacking Cambodian territory.

Actually, even Chou's alleged promise of 4 October did not provide Sihanouk with a significantly greater degree of protection from Cambodia's traditional enemies, and the Chinese leaders did not bind themselves (despite Sihanouk's efforts) to do anything more than they desired for him. They apparently believed that Saigon would not take the risk of launching an all-out attack against Cambodia and that Sihanouk could be convinced that small patrol clashes could be handled by his own forces without PLA intervention. When, therefore, Sihanouk on 26 October 1964 complained to the Chinese leaders of alleged U.S. airstrikes, which he depicted in strong terms as "an open act of war against Cambodia" against which he would "strike back," Liu Shao-chi and Chou En-lai in a joint message on 31 October (and a People's Daily editorial of 3 November

*The 5 October communique does not pledge Chinese military intervention and uses the old formulation of providing "all out support and assistance" in the event of "foreign armed aggression." In lieu of a clear public commitment, the Chinese signed a new military aid agreement with Sihanouk which was a substantial expansion of their previous military supplies program. Later, on 23 June 1965, the Chinese formally agreed to provide Chinese military technicians, presumably to maintain weapons and equipment and to train Cambodian forces in their use, but almost certainly not to participate in any fighting.

1964) side-stepped Sihanouk's more extreme pronouncements on acts of war and went only the same distance they had gone before in promising nothing more than "all-out support" for the struggle" of the Cambodian people."*

At no great cost--i.e., political support for Cambodia's border policy and the provision of military equipment--the Chinese gained from Sihanouk political assistance. At the Colombo Conference in December 1962, he adopted Peking's position on the border dispute with India; in May 1963, he signed a "friendship" treaty (but Mao would not give him a military defense treaty), in July 1963, he refused to sign and disparaged the nuclear test-ban agreement, in August and September 1964, he supported Peking's position on the Gulf of Tonkin incidents, in October 1964, he praised the explosion of Peking's first nuclear device, and in May 1965, he pleased Mao by breaking diplomatic relations with Washington.

More than any other Chinese leader, Chou En-lai had the job of feeding his ego and retaining his goodwill.

*Even the ebullient Chen Yi chose his words carefully in Phnom Penh on 13 November 1964 when he specified publicly that Peking would provide "all-out support" if "the imperialist aggressors dare to invade Cambodia on a massive scale," the implication being that anything less than a "massive scale" invasion, such as an isolated air strike or patrol clash, would leave the Chinese free to decide the form and scale of their "support."

Later, when the Chinese felt impelled to give the impression that they were strengthening their vague commitment to Cambodia, responding to Washington's reference to "hot pursuit" of the Viet Cong over the Cambodian border, they first cited a strong statement by Sihanouk (with apparent approval) and then merely repeated their own position which did not refer to Chinese fighting Americans. (People's Daily editorial of 24 December 1965) Adopting the phrase, "rear shield," used in deterrent statements on Vietnam in February 1965, they made it clear to the U.S. that they would not intervene.

Chou, described by Sihanouk as the "great genius" (speech of 27 December 1964), handled the details of Peking's military aid program to Phnom Penh.* He provided him with advice on uniquely Cambodian problems. For example, Chou cautioned Sihanouk to be "careful" in deciding whether to sign an agreement with Hanoi and the Liberation Front regarding their recognition of Cambodia's frontiers, the assumed danger for Phnom Penh being the prospective American reaction. Chou referred to the importance of neutrality for Cambodia which, unlike Algeria and Indonesia, had to contend with "the Americans and their lackeys in Saigon nearby." (Sihanouk speech of 27 December 1964) Chou had to act against his desires in March 1965, expressing Peking's refusal to support an international conference on Cambodia (as a venue for possible Hanoi-Washington talks), but on 20 May 1965, after Sihanouk had severed diplomatic relations with the U.S., Chou effusively praised him, pointing to those parts of Sihanouk's "righteous and stirring speech" of 17 May which, in fact, complied with Peking's position on a wide range of issues, including an attack on the UN. Chou was joined by other leaders during Sihanouk's last visit to the mainland in October 1965, the effort having been to sustain his anti-Americanism and deter him from looking for aid from Moscow.

Chen Yi met him on the way out in Kunming and insisted that he stand clear of the U.S. Referring to Chen's "advice," Sihanouk later stated that

> China told us frankly that if we change our attitude toward the Americans, China will change its attitude toward us. This is normal, because the Chinese like us less than they do their own interests. (Sihanouk speech of 25 October 1965)

*In October 1965, Chou requested that Sihanouk send his military experts to discuss the particular aspects of the program "directly with him" (i.e., with Chou).

Publicly, Chen Yi praised the Cambodian chief of state's hostile attitude toward the U.S.* The Chinese leaders were delighted that, as a result of Sihanouk's adoption of several CCP positions in the dispute with the CPSU, he was rebuked by the Soviet leaders (the Soviet ambassador treated him with designed contempt in Pyongyang during a side-trip there in early October 1965), and Liu Shao-chi and Chen Yi professed to him their view that this behavior reflected the long-term process whereby the Soviets were "becoming Americans." Mao and Liu warned him against accepting aid either from the Russians or the Americans, insisting that "It is not a good solution to rely on foreign aid and loans for building a country... we hope that your country...will only have commercial relations with foreign countries..." (Sihanouk speech of 17 October 1965, (emphasis supplied). Sihanouk had seemed to them at the time to accept their advice.**

*"I greatly admire the statement made by Prince Sihanouk when he was in Peking: that if there were some 15 countries in the world that followed the line of non-cooperation toward U.S. imperialism, refused to provide it with military bases, and forbade its aircraft and ships to use their airfields and ports, this would be enough to force U.S. imperialism to retreat. This is a correct appraisal." (Kunming speech of 13 October 1965 at end of Sihanouk's visit) Unintentionally, Chen had admitted that the number of countries which the Chinese leaders could induce to join Mao's anti-American "united front" was smaller than 15, and probably far smaller.

**After citing Liu Shao-chi's advice to "Try to advance, but slowly by relying on your own means," Sihanouk pronounced the Chinese leader to be "correct...I think we must surmount the difficulties by ourselves instead of relying on the aid of the big powers. This is clearly proven by our relations with the Americans and the Russians." (Sihanouk speech of 25 October 1965) Mao and his aides were clearly aware that Moscow and Washington easily could defeat him in a direct competition to provide economic aid to Sihanouk's government and other underdeveloped countries, and for several years they had been (footnote continued on page 15)

Within six months, however, he discarded it, and on 18 March 1966, his aides signed in Moscow a Soviet-initiated protocol for $2.3 million worth of military materiel. Sihanouk paraded the Soviet aid agreement--"the world is amazed, but we did it"--and he claimed that Peking had accepted Cambodia's "renewal of friendship" with the Soviet Union without any comment or interference. (Statements Sihanouk made to Singapore's Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew on 11 April 1966) While not making immediate demands on Sihanouk or revealing his contempt for the independent action of the leader who had acted as Peking's political toady, Mao apparently began to view him as a duplicitous and opportunistic trafficker with the "revisionists." Sihanouk's action had made Mao's judgment look bad, as Mao had been more effusive in praise of the Cambodian chief of state than any other Chinese Communist leader and was suddenly impelled to reconsider that praise.

The decision of Mao and his aides following the signing of the Soviet-Cambodian aid protocol seems to have been to avoid priming the temperamental leader with special deference, but to try to pull him back from increased contacts with the Soviets and the Western powers. They apparently were aware that he was beginning to examine the feasibility of returning to a basic policy of a rapprochement with the West. But tensions began to develop and when, on 26 April 1966, Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien arrived

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trying to persuade leaders in these countries to rely on their own resources. Even after Chou En-lai expounded his eight principles of foreign aid (January 1964), the Chinese continued to suggest that their capability to provide aid was limited. "Of course, our country's economic strength is not yet great and our country's foreign aid is on a limited scale because it was not very long ago that our country started its own construction." (Nan Han-chen statement of 20 June 1964 to Asian Economic Seminar in Pyongyang)

in Phnom Penh to conclude an economic and cultural cooperation agreement (initialed on 29 April and designating factory equipment for Cambodia), he implied that frictions were present and insisted that Sino-Cambodian friendship "can stand all tests."

At some point between June and August 1966, Sihanouk apparently decided that it would be safer than it ever had been for him to criticize Peking openly and directly.* He began to complain that in September-October 1965 during his mainland trip the Chinese leaders had used their peculiar logic on him to keep Cambodia poor, and he stated sarcastically in August 1966 that "the Chinese policy of 'Let us be as poor as possible as long as possible,' is not for Cambodia." He ranged over other issues. Speaking publicly, he insisted that "Since even China [at Warsaw] does not refuse talks, we will not refuse talks with Harriman"--later, he refused--and he complained that "China will not intervene physically in our favor" in the event of outside attack. (Statements of 8 August 1966)**

*He had begun to criticize Peking indirectly in mid-May 1966 when he quietly published the text of one of his talks with Mao (October 1965), his apparent intention being to demonstrate that Mao had made it clear that Peking would not provide Phnom Penh with significant additional aid.

**For this boldness, he was rewarded with a demand from Peking that he refuse to meet with Harriman, and he is reported to have complained in late August during De Gaulle's visit that, unlike deft French behavior to him, "the advice of other friends is sometimes a bit heavy." He was also antagonized by the heavy adivce of the Chinese leaders when they attacked his proposal for strengthening the ICC--an action which, Sihanouk believed, would reduce the likelihood of U.S. and South Vietnamese punitive military operations across his borders and would limit the size of Vietnamese Communist forces on Cambodian territory. In mid-August, the government press in Phnom Penh reflected Sihanouk's contempt for Peking's position by publishing his proposal side-by-side with the Chinese depiction of it as "an American imperialist plot."

Mao's purge on the mainland had induced in Sihanouk an attitude of outspokeness, inasmuch as he believed that mainland developments were holding the attention of the Chinese dictator on internal rather than external policy to an unprecedented degree. He was even emboldened to take what he considered to be a form of retaliatory action. In late August, he indicated to French officials his concern over mainland developments, and all Cambodian diplomatic posts were instructed at that time to avoid praising Communist China in public statements because Peking "does not like Cambodia."

Although increasingly outspoken, Sihanouk was still aware that the Chinese leaders could provide the only counterweight to the American presence in the area, that their political goodwill was still important even in a reduced amount, and that they would still respond favorably to his anti-Americanism. In October 1966, Sihanouk reacted to press reports that he was "swinging back" toward the West, and he sustained public attacks on the U.S., defending Communist positions on a whole range of issues including that of the Vietnam war.* When, therefore, in the fall of 1966, the Mao-Sihanouk relationship became increasingly cool, appearances of friendship were sustained by both sides. Sihanouk's son, studying in Peking, was given preferential treatment when, in September 1966, he was assigned special teachers after most foreign students had been told to leave the mainland. Mutual adulation was intended to show that relations had not deteriorated. On 8 November 1966, Sihanouk's son appraised Mao's purge as "good" at the reception where Chen Yi described his

*He held to his conviction as enunciated ten years earlier: "As long as the feelings of the Government of Communist China...are not belied by some signs of change, I cannot, as the present leader of...a small people of only five million, under any circumstances rebuff the friendship of the leader of a people of six hundred million." (Speech to the Philippine Congress in February 1956)

father as the leader who "dares to sever diplomatic relations with the U.S., dares to reject U.S. aid, dares to build the country in the spirit of self-reliance, and is not dependent on foreign aid that has political conditions." Chen was implicitly advising Sihanouk that he could count on Peking's good will only so long as his opposition to Washington was sustained. In line with this policy, Madame Chen Yi projected an appearance of good will during her visit to Cambodia in early November. For his part, Sihanouk returned the flattery of Peking, praising Mao's purge in mid-February 1967 in Paris and receiving reciprocal flattery from NCNA on 25 February 1967. And when, in early April 1967, he acted to crush Khmer dissidents and assured Peking that he would remain "neutral" in his foreign policy, Peking reported with approval his anti-American letter to an American newspaper. (NCNA dispatch of 9 May 1967)

Behind the scenes, however, frictions continued to develop. In November 1966, Sihanouk privately had blocked the Chinese effort to use the Asian games in Cambodia as a forum for condemning the U.S., and in the same month [redacted] Sihanouk's remark that Mao's purge and Red Guard abominations had caused him "to reevaluate" his relationship with Peking. By the spring of 1967, Chinese diplomats in Cambodia became newly-indoctrinated apostles of revolutionary and subversive Maoism. [redacted] Cambodian government officials in April 1967 acquired a copy of a speech given at Peking University on 13 September 1966 by Liao Cheng-chih containing unequivocal references to the significant subversive potential of Overseas Chinese in their countries of residence. The speech is said to have alarmed government officials, who wanted to publish its contents, but Sihanouk was still reluctant to openly attack the Chinese. However, on 9 May, Sihanouk complained publicly about Communist subversion and insisted that several newspapers had been supplied with funds from unspecified foreign Communists. On 15 May, he came closer to a charge of subversion from the outside (i.e. from Peking). In a radio speech, he disclosed that certain Chinese in Cambodia were guilty of various abuses, particularly concerning

currency exchange, contraband, and subversion. He said that Prime Minister Son Sann had just revealed to him the names of two Chinese residents guilty of these crimes. One of these had left for the mainland, and he had asked that he should not return to Cambodia. The second was involved in the currency black market and was the head of the contraband movement, and he had decided to expel him from the country. Sihanouk went on to say that subversion by Chinese Communist elements in Cambodia, carried out from the Cambodian-Chinese Friendship Association and other academic establishments was a well-known fact. He said that Minister for National Security Dy Bellong had provided him with details about this and that he was conducting further investigations. He ended by saying that there was no proof at all that any Chinese official or the Chinese embassy was responsible for this subversion, but the implication of his entire presentation was that he was not far from acquiring such proof.

Sihanouk's 15 May speech sparked a series of articles in the Cambodian press critical of Peking and unprecedented in explicitly accusing Chinese Communists of a whole range of subversive activities in Cambodia. The revolutionized officials in the Chinese embassy struck back by publishing two letters (on 22 and 28 May respectively, the latter having been an "open letter" to the Cambodian press), attacking the anti-Peking articles and provoking counter-articles. On 30 May, the revolutionized Chinese embassy was implicated by the Cambodians for shielding pro-Communists and was again publicly accused of subversion by one publication. Peking did not refer to this escalating dispute or to the letters of its embassy in Phnom Penh. However, it began to disseminate tributes to Mao which were to become offensive to Cambodian nationalistic sensibilities. On 31 May, NCNA claimed in a dispatch that the "Cambodian working class" considered Mao to be the supreme commander of the world's peoples.

Sihanouk was later to complain about this export of Mao-cult fanaticism.*

Beyond the embassy-press dispute and the issue of the dissemination of the Mao-cult (after Sihanouk had warned Cambodians not to wear Mao buttons they had attained from Chinese Communist sources), a new irritant developed in relations between the two countries.** Mao was still piqued by Sihanouk's willingness to accept Soviet aid and to act more independently of Peking on other issues.

*Rejecting a Chinese demarche that there had been no interference in Cambodian affairs, Sihanouk said: "How is it that it has not interfered, when NCNA cabled to Peking that the Khmer said this or that about Mr. Mao Tse-tung and sang such and such songs?" (Sihanouk speech of 13 September 1967)

**According to a official in Phnom Penh, the Cambodians (including Sihanouk personally) were worried about elements of the Overseas Chinese community who had engaged in "Red Guard" type activities in addition to agitating in schools and universities. They complained privately to local Chinese leaders. On 25 August 1967, the Cambodian Secretary of State for National Security Oum Manourine told a Japanese Foreign Ministry official that he had been responsible for prohibiting the wearing of Mao buttons and the public use of Mao quotations in Cambodia and that Sihanouk had later endorsed his action. Oum Manourine also stated that he had called in four leaders of the Chinese community in Cambodia and warned them that unless Overseas Chinese refrained from further political activities, the government would impose heavy restrictions similar to those imposed by the Burmese government. He concluded that there had been no further trouble from the local Chinese community. the government in early August had already placed stricter controls over the activities of Chinese schools in Phnom Penh to further curtail their use as centers of dissemination of Mao's "thought."

In May 1967, the Cambodian government asked "friendly countries" to declare their recognition of its territorial integrity. The Liberation Front, the USSR, and North Vietnam complied--on 31 May and on 6 and 8 June, in that order. (Sihanouk established diplomatic relations with Ho's regime on 15 June.) Mao was confronted with the choice of (1) rewarding Sihanouk, who was impeding dissemination of his "thought" among Cambodians and trafficking with the "revisionists" or (2) punishing Sihanouk by refusing to comply. His apparent decision was not to comply. Mao apparently found it particularly difficult to accept independent (and, on occasion, anti-Chinese) actions from a man who had been a complete toady for many years in relations with Peking.* Further, Mao was engaged in the process of "revolutionizing" his Foreign Ministry, having turned Red Guards loose in it, and submission to the request of a "feudal" prince (Sihanouk) would have appeared, at that time, to be a nonrevolutionary act. For these reasons, Mao apparently rejected the more rational consideration that he could not for long avoid complying. His ally, Ho, had complied; his opponents, the Soviet leaders, also had complied. But he refused despite the isolated position in which the refusal placed him. Becoming

*Mao's increasing annoyance with Sihanouk's independent actions against his policies (and against Chinese embassy activities in Cambodia) was reflected in items printed in May and July 1967 in a restricted-circulation news bulletin, Reference News. Disapproval was implied concerning Sihanouk's letter of gratitude to Gromyko in early June on Moscow's decision to "recognize" Cambodian frontiers, suppression of the revolt in Battambang province, measures to restrict spread of the Mao-cult in Overseas Chinese private schools, Sihanouk's criticism of the subversive activities of certain foreign-aid technicians, and Phnom Penh's concern over excessive influence of the Chinese embassy in the Overseas Chinese community. This material almost certainly would have been used against Sihanouk if Chou had not convinced Mao in September 1967 that the prince was still very anti-American.

increasingly bold and decreasingly a toady, Sihanouk used the opportunity of Soviet recognition to criticize Mao's stand against recognition: he publicly ridiculed Peking's private explanation for "hesitating"--namely, because of fear of the Thai and the Vietnamese. (Sihanouk speech of 7 June 1967) As an additional factor contributing to Mao's footdragging, he probably had been angered by Hanoi's independent act of recognition, as it suggested that Sihanouk had used Ho against him. Moreover, Ho, in Mao's apparent view, had cooperated with Moscow and Phnom Penh, but not with Peking. (For his part, Ho probably was irritated because Mao was creating political problems with Cambodia at a time when it was necessary to sustain Sihanouk's acquiescence in the use of Cambodia's border areas as military sanctuaries and the country as a logistic base.)

It should have been clear to Mao--it almost certainly was clear to Chou En-lai--that he could not continue indefinitely to refuse to take an action which Hanoi and Moscow had taken and which Sihanouk was using to ridicule his regime. On 13 June, Mao made a small but slippery concession: Peking's Foreign Ministry statement on that day "reaffirmed" that the PRC "fully respects the territorial integrity of the Kingdom of Cambodia in her present borders." This was no more than saying that Mao "respects" the frontier in physical terms (just as he "respects" the Sino-Soviet border and will not step over it) but does not recognize its validity as an internationally accepted frontier at all points. He was still punishing Sihanouk and he was refusing to permit the leader of such a small country to out-maneuver the leader of such a big one. Mao sustained this attitude until 31 July 1967, when the charge of the Chinese embassy in Phnom Penh finally was directed to inform the Cambodians that Peking "recognizes" the present territorial frontiers of Cambodia. Chou may have been the moving force in this action, and he may have guided Mao back to rationality by reminding him that Cambodia was a source of supplies for the Viet Cong and a sanctuary for them.* He almost

*The earlier "recognition" of Cambodia's borders by the Liberation Front had been motivated by the fact that
(footnote continued on page 23)

certainly alerted Mao to the need to dissociate Peking from the 10 July U.S. statement of "respect" for Khmer territorial integrity (as well as from Peking's earlier position). He almost certainly reported to Mao that Sihanouk was still anti-American, and it was Cambodia's struggle against the U.S. which Chen Yi praised when he said he was "adhering to Chairman Mao's teachings" in supporting Phnom Penh. (Chen Yi speech of 18 August 1967)*

The effort of Chou and Chen to retain Sihanouk's good will was made within the new guidelines of a fanatical policy derived basically from Mao's insatiable craving for adulation. In this case, it was a matter of international adulation and not only domestic cultist praise for his "thought." There apparently was a dispute among the Chinese leaders during Mao's purge regarding disseminating the Mao-cult and its applicability to revolutionary movements outside the mainland. Chen Yi seems to have been irascibly outspoken in opposing Mao's apparent desire

(footnote continued from page 22)
Cambodia had become "a useful strategic and logistic base area" for the Viet Cong, according to the statement on 17 June 1967 of a Vietnamese Communist cell leader in Phnom Penh. It was intended to mollify Sihanouk.

"Recognition," however, has not provided Sihanouk with a border treaty which delineates the precise alignment of the frontier. Hanoi is not willing to provide him with such a firm acceptance of his territorial claims.

*Chen Yi referred explicitly to the common cause in opposing the U.S. but avoided mentioning the discarded principle of mutual non-interference in the internal affairs of each country. Actually, he had joined Chou and Vice Foreign Minister Han Nien-lung in their effort to induce the visiting Cambodian foreign minister to gain Sihanouk's acquiescence in the Chinese embassy's right to disseminate the symbols of Mao's cult. That is, he was engaged with Chou in asking for the right to interfere in Cambodia's internal affairs.

to spread it abroad, but by February 1967, he seems to have fallen into line on the matter of external dissemination.* Chou and Chen had to comply with the decision to

*In the period ranging roughly from February to June 1966 when Peking media made a major effort to "prove" that Mao's doctrines were being favorably received all over the world, Chen seems to have refused to accept export of the Mao-cult as an operational policy of departments in and connected with the Foreign Ministry. "In June 1966, when Chen Yi was discussing the resolution passed by the Afro-Asian Writers' Meeting, he said: 'The aim of this meeting is to build a united front against imperialism headed by the U.S. We cannot force them to accept all this Mao thought and Cultural Revolution stuff.' In February 1966, he said to members of the Bureau for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries: 'Don't we want to make everyone love Mao's thought? Mao's thought is a completely Chinese thing. We do not want to take it abroad. If we do, people will say that this is not our thing and we do not want it. In that case, what can we do?'" "Even as late as 1967" Chen Yi said that "I do not agree with reading Mao quotations abroad and presenting Mao badges." (Items in Red Guard Newspaper of 15 September 1967) However, shortly after he had been impelled to make a self-criticism in January 1967 on various issues, particularly on his refusal to purge the Foreign Ministry and his action in defending some of its personnel, Chen complied on the issue of exporting the Mao-cult. He stated privately that Mao's "thought" applies to underdeveloped countries and to Australia and New Zealand and he indirectly attributed claims for Mao's theoretical abilities to Mao himself: "Mao Tse-tung has said that his works...further helped in the development of Marxism-Leninism." (Chen Yi interview with visiting Australian and New Zealand students of 6 February 1967) The nationalistic reactions against the spread of the Mao-cult in Cambodia, Burma, Nepal, and Ceylon (among other countries) indicates that Chen had accurately appraised the prospective attitude of foreign governments as early as February 1966.

indoctrinate Overseas Chinese and Cambodians in Mao's "thought"--a decision which was diplomatically irrational and which led to an increase in Sino-Cambodian frictions.

That the decision was diplomatically foolish is indicated by the fact that even Cambodian military personnel were made the target of Mao-cult indoctrination. It transgressed the diplomatic practice of keeping a sense of sobriety in government-to-government contacts and protocols. Cambodia's Military Governor told French officers in Phnom Penh on 6 June 1967 that the team of Chinese military technicians who arrived to assemble 3 MIG-17s from crates had tried to induce the Cambodians to sign a protocol which read in part: "The Chinese side engages itself to assemble the aircraft with zeal in line with the thought of Mao Tse-tung." They were rebuffed, after two days of discussions, on the grounds that Mao's "thought" had nothing to do with the aircraft. The Chinese further angered the Cambodians by stopping assembly work every half hour to read and comment on their leader's "thought" in French and Khmer. Alert to this crude dissemination procedure, the Cambodian officers told the Chinese to discuss his "thought" only in their own language and never in the presence of Cambodian military personnel. The Khmer military were reported to be very disgusted and disenchanted with the Chinese.

Chou had to swim with the tide of Mao-cult export. Foreign Minister Phurissara, who had travelled to Peking in mid-August 1967 to attain a "guarantee" from the Chinese leaders that they would prevent pro-Peking demonstrations and stop disseminating the Mao-cult, is reported to have been kept "cooling his heels" in Pyongyang for two days before the Chinese--Mao, Chou, and Chen--were ready to talk to him. According to Sihanouk (speech of 12 September 1967), Chou asked him to permit Overseas Chinese to "show their love for Mao Tse-tung."

Chen Yi (and probably his boss, Chou) apparently continued to include Cambodians among the targets of the undiplomatic policy. The Cambodian-Chinese Friendship Association (whose vice-president had met with Chen Yi in Peking on 5 August 1967) and the Chinese embassy

apparently continued to disseminate Maoist doctrines and policies among Cambodians. When, on 1 September, Sihanouk dissolved the Cambodia-Chinese Friendship Association for "subversive activities," the Chinese leaders further angered the Cambodian chief of state by sending a message to the Association on 4 September referring to "reactionaries." Sihanouk reacted vigorously: this message was the PRC's "first attack...an official attack" on Cambodia and was "an extraordinary interference in the affairs of a sovereign state." "It is possible for a state to criticize another, but not to order my compatriots to continue an association which I, in my capacity as head of the government and chief of state, dissolved with Parliament's consent." (Sihanouk speech on 11 September 1967)*

Sihanouk's various statements in mid-September 1967 suggest a sequence of events in which Chou had to implement two contradictory policies, namely, support for the continued dissemination in Cambodia of Mao's cult and support for continued Sino-Cambodian diplomatic relations. Chou apparently was impelled, by Mao's revolutionization of foreign policy in the spring of 1967, to break his

*Sihanouk attributed subtlety to Chou and sophistication to the Chinese Communist intelligence network in Phnom Penh. He said that Chou apparently felt confident that this message would not cause a diplomatic break because Chou had been secretly informed that Sihanouk had decided to retain two of Cambodia's diplomats in the Peking embassy. "There were surely spies in the Chamcar Mon and in the Premier's office who immediately informed the Chinese embassy and transmitted the news [that the two Cambodian diplomats would not be withdrawn] by radio [to Peking]." (Sihanouk speech of 18 September 1967)

Chou, who had already (by 23 August) put an end to the activities of the fanatical former charge of the Djakarta embassy (Yao Teng-shan) within Peking's Foreign Ministry, nevertheless had had to respond in a revolutionary manner to Sihanouk's dissolution of the Cambodian-China Friendship Association.

"promise" (date unspecified, but probably in October 1965) to prevent an increase in Chinese Communist subversive activities among Cambodians, especially as engaged in by embassy officials in making local contacts. Sihanouk was angered by security information that "everybody"--that is, not only Chinese, but also Cambodians--who knocked at the embassy door (and even those Cambodians who did not want to come to the embassy) were targets of indoctrination. (Sihanouk speech of 18 September 1967) He complained that "Chou En-lai does not seem to know" that embassy officials and pro-Peking local Chinese leaders were trying to indoctrinate not only Overseas Chinese, but also Cambodians.

> And it was at this point that the Chinese abused their rights because, when Chou En-lai met me recently, he promised that these Chinese would stop exercising their influence on the Khmer. (Sihanouk speech of 12 September 1967) (emphasis supplied)

Chou had not only failed to order the embassy to stop its Mao-cult dissemination work, but also had made a special request of Cambodia's foreign minister during his mid-August 1967 visit to Peking. "Chou has asked Prince Phurissara to tell Sihanouk, the chief of state of Cambodia, that China wanted a favor; that is, authorization for the Chinese to show their love for Mao Tse-tung and Communism on the grounds that they are Chinese not Khmer, a request that the Chinese in Cambodia have freedom." (Sihanouk speech of 12 September 1967) Sihanouk made it clear that he would not permit Chou the luxury of mongering Mao's doctrines from the Chinese embassy, on the one hand, and sustaining Sino-Cambodian diplomatic ties, on the other hand. He was spurred into action by Cambodian leftists Chau Seng and So Nem, who published the text of the insulting 4 September Peking message in the 9 September issue of La Nouvella Depeche.

He almost certainly surprised Chou by the vigor of his reaction. On 11 September, he complained that "Peking had dictated" orders to Cambodians and that the two men responsible for publishing Peking's derogatory

message had "betrayed" Cambodia and would be dismissed from their government posts. In his speech of 13 September, Sihanouk stated that it was "now necessary to avoid an eventual attack by the Chinese on the Cambodian embassy," that the wife of the ambassador had returned from Peking because she "did not know when the Chinese would come to attack us," and that "I want the personnel of our embassy to get out immediately...I want to withdraw at once lest they come and attack."* This threat to pull out Cambodian embassy officials--"I will leave only one person, that is, an official of very low status to keep the house as a guardian"--appeared to be sufficiently genuine to Chou and it apparently provided him with the crisis situation with which to confront Mao and argue him into rationality. Chou moved quickly to assure the Cambodian ambassador in Peking (meeting of 14 September) that Sihanouk need not worry about injury to Cambodian embassy personnel because only certain embassies had been targeted: "mass manifestations against certain embassies had their reasons and were comprehensible acts because the Chinese people know

*Although in his speech of 13 September, Sihanouk referred several times to his fear that the Cambodian embassy would be attacked, he apparently was encouraged by Chou's assurances of 14 September that such a development would not occur. Subsequently, he moved against the activities of the Chinese embassy which, he had been told, included the dissemination in Phnom Penh of clandestine tracts distributed in the Overseas Chinese sectors of the city from 0400 onward and which informed local Chinese on how to react to the Cambodian government's decisions on various matters. On 16 September, the Cambodian Department of Information informed NCNA officials that they could no longer circulate the NCNA daily bulletin without first giving a copy of their cables to their Cambodian counterparts, officials of AKP. On 18 September, the government announced prohibitive restrictions on social contacts between Cambodian nationals and embassies in Phnom Penh--an extension of a restriction which had been selectively applied in the past only to some Western missions.

who is their enemy and who is their friend" and "due to friendship and good relations between our two countries, the Chinese government and people have, to date, envisaged nothing against the Cambodian embassy." (Sihanouk quoting Chou in speech of 18 September) (emphasis supplied) This assurance, and the fact that certain embassies were not put under siege, suggest that Chou almost certainly was able to persuade Mao to differentiate between "friendly" and "non-friendly" missions in considering struggles against the representatives of various countries. Sihanouk was mollified, and on 18 September he declared that he would not withdraw his diplomats from Peking, praising "my old friend Chou En-lai for having, once again, played a role in safeguarding this friendship." Regarding the gauche Peking message of 4 September, he did not absolve Chou of responsibility for it--"a very well-calculated and well-planned punch" to determine Sihanouk's domestic "weakness"--but he attributed the sending of it to a deeper motive. Chou and Chen Yi, he said sympathetically, had had to "save their own skins first." (Sihanouk speech of 18 September 1967)

Chou presided over the retreat from the confrontation with Sihanouk. He almost certainly had the major role in convincing Mao that it would be detrimental to their Cambodian policy to publish Sihanouk's anti-Peking speech of 11 September and he clearly was the most active figure in the subsequent effort to mollify the temperamental prince, who threatened to discard Chinese aid. (Speech of 17 October 1967) Sihanouk's willingness to be mollified facilitated Chou's effort. Sihanouk stated on 1 November 1967 that he accepted Chou's most recent message of reassurance on the matter of Peking's professed desire to avoid intervention in Cambodia's domestic affairs.*

*Chou seems to have asked for and attained, in exchange for a promise "to strictly respect the Bandung principles in relations with Cambodia," a promise from Sihanouk to muzzle the Cambodian press and radio. "I beg the Ministry of Information to forbid our radio station and press to speak of People's China as of tomorrow. If they want to speak, they must deal only with friendship without criticism or mention of the past affair, which should be forgotten from now on. Mr. Chou En-lai has requested it in
(footnote continued on page 30)

To keep Sihanouk in tow, the PRC Foreign Ministry was directed to issue a statement (26 November 1967) declaring that Peking "supports" Cambodia's stand against violation of its borders by American or South Vietnamese forces and pledging that the Chinese people "stand on the side of the Cambodian people." Further, the Chinese agreed to send additional military aid including patrol boats and reconnaissance aircraft. (Prime Minister Son Sann's letter of appreciation to Chou in early December 1967) This "new unconditional aid," however, was implicitly tied to the mutually acceptable proposition that Sihanouk would continue to be assertively anti-American.

Chou may not be able to keep Mao convinced that, so long as Sihanouk is demonstrably anti-American and supports the Communist position on the Vietnam war, he should be kept in tow. Cambodian officials are concerned about the militant activities of pro-Chinese "political commissars" in Battambang and Kompong Cham provinces, and Mao may shift gradually to a revolutionary-insurrectionist policy in Cambodia.

2. Indonesia

Before becoming assertively anti-American in the 1960s, the Indonesians had angered Mao and Chou (following signing of a Dual Nationality Treaty at Bandung on 22 April 1955), the primary complaint having been persecution of local Chinese merchants under the Indonesian decree prohibiting alien tradesmen from operating retail

(footnote continued from page 29)
the capacity of an old friend. I cannot refuse and am obliged to ffer him this gift--that is, let us forget that affair." (Sihanouk special message to the nation of 1 November 1967)

enterprises outside urban areas.* When, in October 1959, Foreign Minister Subandrio visited the mainland, he reported that Chou was "a changed man" from the reasonable diplomat of Bandung: he threatened Subandrio with economic sanctions against Djakarta and waved a threatening finger at him. Chou had adjusted to Mao's policy of subjecting the Indonesian leaders to strong pressures, and Mao himself made Subandrio wait until the middle of the night before peremptorily summoning him and subjecting him to a humiliating lecture. Mao had commented derisively on the Indonesian anti-Chinese economic decree and had treated him "like a schoolboy"--that is, like he has treated his own lieutenants on occasion. Chen Yi insisted that Djakarta should ratify the dual-nationality treaty "immediately" and requested that the government "will... truly protect the proper rights and interests" of the Overseas Chinese and "check any discrimination against and persecution of them." (Chen Yi letter to Subandrio of 9 December 1959) The Indonesians (after five years of

*The decree, issued in November 1959, provoked the Chinese leaders to direct the embassy in Djakarta to protest, but the ineffectiveness of these formal demarches impelled them to act as champion for the Overseas Chinese in a different way. They decided to start repatriation for those who wanted to escape to the mainland in December 1959, and within a year, approximately 96,000 had arrived, creating a new problem for Mao and his aides. They began to find that mass repatriation repeatedly involved them in disputes with Indonesian authorities over details of ship schedules and that the repatriated Chinese had to be subjected to special indoctrination routines to make them accept the rigors and disappointments of collectivized life. They began to restrict the numbers of Chinese they were willing to repatriate in 1960 and, fortunately for Peking, the Sukarno leadership began to reduce the severity of anti-Chinese measures, which had earlier necessitated repatriation.

internal debate) ratified the Dual Nationality Treaty in 1960, and Sukarno's action toward the PKI helped promote a reduction of Peking-Djakarta tensions.*

In the course of trying to consolidate his authority over the Indonesian military, Sukarno in mid-1960 took the first step to end recriminations with the Chinese leaders.** Mao and Chou seized the opportunity, reflected in Sukarno's decreased anti-Chinese hostility. to reduce pressures on Djakarta. They seem to have appraised Sukarno as the man who could replace Nehru as their major ally and who could defend Peking's position in the Sino-Indian dispute. Further, internal dislocations on the mainland had impelled a softening of foreign policy. In December 1960, Mao agreed to the implementation of the Dual Nationality Treaty with the Indonesians and on 1 April 1961, Chen Yi in Djakarta, commenting on the new draft Sino-Indonesian "friendship" treaty, stated that "the question of Overseas Chinese is not an important question." Chen's visit and Sukarno's trip to Peking in

*While not criticizing Sukarno publicly, in August 1958 Chinese Communist officials in Peking privately had described him to Latin American students as "a great opportunist," who alternatively used Communist (PKI) support and then put local Communists in jail. Sukarno changed this policy in 1960.

**Sukarno's dispute with the military in 1960 included the issue of suppressing the PKI or permitting its leaders to attain greater power. According to General Nasution (statement of 13 February 1967), in 1960 he warned Sukarno against the PKI threat, particularly against appointing PKI members to government posts. Sukarno rejected this advice and cancelled the army's order calling for the arrest of Aidit and the suspension of the PKI newspaper as well as Communist activities in various regions. After that time, "the President advocated indoctrination in NASAKOM unity and the crushing of Communist phobia."

June 1961 advanced the process of reconciliation, which was formalized in the final "Treaty of Friendship," and Sukarno (like Chen) depicted the Overseas Chinese issue as a trifle.

Typically, in a situation of policy reversal, Mao, who had been responsible for the gauche pressures, apparently complained to his diplomats, demanding that they recognize the idea of flexibility. The PRC Foreign Ministry Review document of January 1961 implied that the hard line of 1957-60 had been damaging to Peking's interests and that the "diplomatic struggle" for Indonesian good will should not have been (and should no longer be) subordinated to a defense of Overseas Chinese interests:

> In 1960, Chairman Mao again instructed us repeatedly that in our struggles, some leeway must be provided....In our struggle against Indonesia, we never attack Sukarno personally....In our work, at times we only see the mound and not the mountain...For instance, during one period of our struggle against Indonesia, we failed to take into consideration our struggle against India. In enforcing the Central Committee's policy on Overseas Chinese and the Indonesian government, we failed to differentiate between the struggle of the masses and the diplomatic struggle.

But it had been Mao, more than his diplomats, who saw only "the mound and not the mountain." That is, it was the Chinese dictator who had been carried away by a defense of the Chinese "masses" in Indonesia to the detriment of a long-sighted cultivation of Sukarno's good will.

In order to promote further the procedure of reconciliation, Mao and his wife met with Madame Hartini Sukarno on 29 September 1962--the first time Madame Mao appeared publicly in a role relevant to a major foreign policy effort. Prior to the announcement of a cease-fire on the Sino Indian border (21 November 1962), the Chinese leaders reportedly had tried to induce Sukarno to come

to Peking so that he could take the credit before the world for their announcement. Their primary purpose was to maneuver Sukarno, by flattery and argument, to accept their position regarding the border dispute. In early January 1963, they gave Foreign Minister Subandrio a lavish welcome and worked on him to accept their interpretation (rather than Nehru's) of the December 1962 Colombo Conference proposals for Sino-Indian discussions.* They also were working to attain Indonesia's support for the Afro-Asian (Bandung) Conference as a direct counter to the Belgrade Conference of non-aligned nations, which

*The Indonesians were also viewed as prospective major allies for the Soviet leaders in Asia, and Mao worked to prevent the heavy Soviet aid commitment from taking Sukarno into Moscow's camp in the Sino-Soviet dispute. He had his diplomats appeal to Asian sentiment and his concept of "self-reliance" to reduce the degree of Soviet influence which military supplies and support for "confrontation against Malaysia" had attained for Moscow. Chen Yi in Djakarta in March 1961 appealed to small nations and Asian sentiment when he told the Indonesian Supreme Advisory Council that the U.S., Britain, France, and the Soviet Union had been unable to solve world problems. Liu Shao-chi in April 1963 asked Sukarno to make an anti-Soviet public statement, but Sukarno refused. As this effort was sustained, the Russians were later impelled to try to demonstrate that the USSR should belong to the Asian nations "club," that Moscow is just as revolutionary as is Peking, that the Russians (unlike the Chinese) back up their words with material aid, and that "confrontation against Malaysia" had strong Soviet support. Mikoyan in Indonesia in June 1964 tried to improve Moscow's position and went so far as to say (in Surabaya) that Soviet soldiers had been prepared to march alongside Indonesians to take West Irian--a statement which Gromyko later denied ever seeing and which Mikoyan himself depicted privately to a high-level Western official as reflecting a need to speak "as an agitator speaking to the masses."

India would try to use (with Yugoslav and UAR assistance) to attack Peking's policy regarding the border dispute. The Yugoslavs had been moving at a leisurely pace toward a non-aligned conference, but the Chinese apparently urged Djakarta to suggest a Bandung Preparatory Meeting at an early date. This was welcomed by the Indonesians, who had become isolated over the Malaysia dispute and were trying desperately to recoup their prestige among Afro-Asian leaders. Mao was allowing some "leeway" and was permitting Chou to be tactically clever at a time when Peking's and Djakarta's motivations for a Bandung conference initiative coincided for different reasons.*

*The Indonesians were delighted to be the major new ally of Mao, replacing Nehru, and were euphoric in viewing the relationship as one they could manipulate. But the Chinese set them straight about the matter. When, on 19 April 1963, Sukarno suggested to Liu Shao-chi during discussions on Bali that heavy shelling of Chinmen would keep the U.S. Seventh Fleet occupied and tied down in the Taiwan Strait at a "suitable time" when the anti-Malaysian campaign intensified, Liu was non-commital on this proposal and cut off the discussion by stating that he would have to raise the suggestion with his government.

Chou En-lai may have resented Liu's intrusion into the arena of Chinese Communist foreign policy--a field which he and Chen Yi had monopolized in a series of swings through various countries in the past decade. But there seems to have been nothing in Liu's actions in Indonesia in April 1963 to provide valid cause for disparaging him as the chief formulator of a moderate foreign policy. At the time when Liu took a moderate line--for example, when he and his new wife worked together on a major foreign policy assignment (in September 1962) to strengthen the Peking-Djakarta rapprochement by receiving cordially Mme. Sukarno--the entire line was moderate and other Chinese leaders were giving the Indonesians lavish treatment. Mme. Mao's first venture in public into a foreign policy matter was to aid her husband in receiving Mme. Sukarno on 29 September 1962, and it seems to have been a joint effort by the Maos and Lius.

Nevertheless, they were reluctant to openly support Djakarta's confrontation policy on Malaysia, delaying their statement backing Indonesia's position on the formation of Malaysia (established 16 September 1963) until 27 September, and even then the Ta Kung Pao comment was relatively mild as were subsequent discussions of the British "colonialists" until 1964.

Sukarno's assertive anti-Americanism was a key unifying factor and when, on 25 March 1964, the Indonesian leader made his "To hell with your aid speech," Peking picked it up and began to build anti-Americanism into its propaganda on Malaysia. Malaysia was a "neo-colonialist product of British imperialism with the blessing of U.S. imperialism...confrontation is just" and the North Kalimantan "struggle for national liberation is just." (People's Daily editorial of 27 March 1964) Mao, obsessed with his idea that the anti-U.S. revolutionary struggle must be extended wherever possible, apparently decided to encourage Sukarno with offers of support, but these fell far short of a commitment to fight the British and Americans in his behalf.

Mao apparently was informed in mid-1964 that Sukarno had impelled the army to realign its military policy away from its anti-Peking focus. Sukarno's "Living Dangerously" speech of 17 August 1964--in which he shifted further to the left of neutralism, denounced the U.S. in effect as his main enemy, and aligned Djakarta with all Asian Communist regimes and the PKI's internal program--apparently was viewed by Mao as a further indication that Sukarno's "confrontation" policy had useful anti-U.S. ingredients. The Chinese leaders, who earlier had been cautious on "confrontation,"* made their strongest statement

*For example, Liu Shao-chi is [redacted] reported to have refused to go beyond a generalized statement of support of Sukarno's anti-Malaysia stand following his speech in Djakarta of 18 April 1963 and avoided a strong statement in the communique. Three reasons seem to have dominated his action in refusing: (1) following the punitive attack on Indian forces in October 1962 the (footnote continued on page 37)

of support for this policy after his speech. They professed to see an anti-Chinese objective in establishing Malaysia (the first such claim, although Malaysia had been attacked by Sukarno since its establishment in September 1963) and a "common task" for Peking and Djakarta in struggling against it. (People's Daily editorial of 9 September 1964) This line probably reflected Mao's decision, after two years of cautious non-involvement in the matter, to bolster Sukarno's determination to confront the British. (The British unofficially had warned of retaliation in the wake of such actions as Indonesian parachutist drops in Johore on the Malay peninsula.)

But Mao likes small wars fought by others, and Peking's actual military commitment in this case was, typically, vague. Like other formulations--e.g., on Vietnam and Cambodia--the Chinese depicted their contribution without reference to direct PLA action: "The Chinese people will not look on with folded arms in the face of this sinister scheme of the imperialists. Should U.S. imperialism dare to launch aggression against Indonesia, the Chinese people will back the Indonesian people with all their might." (People's Daily editorial of 9 September 1964) Significantly, the real prospect, namely, British "aggression," was not cited in this context of

(footnote continued from page 36)
Chinese leaders were concentrating a major part of their foreign policy effort on creating a new image as a non-aggressive regime, (2) Sukarno had asked for pressure on the U.S. in the Taiwan Strait area and on the UK in Hong Kong and, in view of this effort to commit Peking, Liu was unwilling to imply in the communique that any military action would be taken to support the Indonesians, particularly against the British, with whom Peking was trying to increase trade, and (3) Sukarno had refused to include strong anti-Soviet and anti-U.S. statements in the communique.

Chinese support.* Primarily because the Chinese desired to expand trade with the UK, their commentaries in September 1964 did not suggest pleasure over the losses inflicted on British commercial interests or mob damage to the British embassy in Indonesia.

In the course of encouraging Sukarno to wage a small war against Malaysia, Mao and his aides kept Peking's military commitment down to a promise to supply small arms and a handful of guerrilla warfare experts. [redacted] in late November 1964, Chen Yi told Sukarno and Subandrio in Indonesia that Peking's military support would not involve PLA participation in the Malaysia war zone. The Chinese, he said, would prefer to increase war tensions by stepping up their activities (the nature of which was unspecified) in Vietnam and the Sino-Indian border area. In this way, Chen sustained Mao's basic policy of keeping PLA units within mainland borders to be used only when those borders are threatened, in which case they must be used to punish neighboring countries, especially those which can be punished safely, like India.

Chen encouraged Sukarno to step up "confrontation" and to take heart from the Communist operations in South Vietnam which tied-up the U.S. He is reported to have

*After a decade of observing the Chinese Communist leaders, some Asian leaders seem to have acquired a good understanding of the degree of deception they have practiced. Nevertheless, they have found these vague pledges politically useful and have tried on occasion to keep their own skepticism compartmented, instructing their diplomats not to be skeptical in the presence of foreign officials. For example, Indonesia's Foreign Affairs Department informed the Indonesian embassy in Belgrade on 13 January 1965 that "China has stated that it will not remain quiet if Indonesia is attacked. In this case, you must show understanding and conviction in facing negativism (regarding Chinese support for Indonesia)."

been free with advice, suggesting that the Indonesians concentrate their guerrilla warfare efforts in North Borneo against Sarawak rather than in the Malay peninsula. As for fighting themselves, the Chinese Communist leaders were willing to provide only token military support. In April 1964, the Chinese embassy in Djakarta reportedly indicated Peking's willingness to supply only a handful of guerrilla warfare experts and, at that time, a prominent PKI official claimed that "several" Chinese army officers already were in Borneo with anti-Malaysian forces. As for logistical support, in late 1964 and early 1965, four Chinese ships were reported to have off-loaded small arms and ammunition on the west coast of Borneo at a time when the Indonesian buildup was underway.

Economic aid was a safer way to help encourage Sukarno to intensify "confrontation," and Chen Yi in November-December 1964 offered it to the Indonesian leaders. This offer was partly a bribe to keep Sukarno in tow and to impel him to be more cooperative in blocking Moscow's effort to gain the right to participate in the Afro-Asian (Bandung) conference. The $50-million long-term and interest-free oan he set before the Indonesians included $10-million to be paid to Sukarno personally, presumably for his construction projects and for his "travel expenses."

As Sukarno continued to strengthen his "confrontation" forces, he sent Foreign Minister Subandrio on 20 January 1965 to ask for specific and firm Chinese Communist military commitments in the event of a British attack. He apparently was trying to attain a military pact which could be publicized and, as a consequence, have a greater deterrent effect than any dialectical (or phoney) promises the Chinese might make privately. Actually, Sukarno was aware that important army leaders would not accept any large number of PLA troops in Indonesia even if Mao were willing to send, and could arrange to transport, "15 divisions"--a number attributed by certain army officers to a statement of Chen Yi who, they said, during discussions in Djakarta in December 1964, "promised" to send them. At the very most, the number of troops Mao and his aides were [redacted] reported to be willing to send apparently did not exceed several thousand, and these were to be

instructors.* At the conclusion of Subandrio's mission, the Chinese agreed to send "some" guerrilla warfare instructors, to train Indonesian troops, and some equipment for the army and marine corps.

The Chinese were cautious about making any public military commitment when they encouraged the Indonesians privately. For example, on 20 January 1965--the day of Subandrio's departure for Peking--NCNA deleted passages from a Djakarta dispatch which quoted Subandrio as referring to military men in his delegation and which quoted him as saying: "You can see from here how far the PRC will help us if the British dare to launch an attack on Indonesia." Subandrio told Indonesian diplomats in Bangkok on 28 January, after leaving the mainland, that no agreement was reached on a military treaty and that the only definite military commitment was Peking's offer to train Indonesian troops in guerrilla warfare tactics against troops with modern weapons. Deputy Foreign Minister Suwito later stated privately that they were told the following (to use Suwito's paraphrase):

> Militarily speaking, we have our difficulties. In view of the Vietnam situation, we have to maintain a large force in South China. Because of Korea, we maintain a second large force in the area from the Korean border south as far as Shanghai. Our third area of commitment is yours--i.e., Southeast Asia. We cannot say

*According to Third Deputy Prime Minister Leimena, the Chinese ambassador and Aidit told Sukarno, just before Subandrio left for Peking and Rangoon, that the PRC had authorized him to offer a number of trained and experienced Chinese guerrilla warfare experts for use by the Indonesians in Borneo. The offer included "several thousand" Chinese troops, presumably to be brought into Indonesia rather than moved in an attack across and into Malaysia. Leimena said that Sukarno turned it down partly because the army would not accept outside help.

at the moment just how we can best help you. Much depends on what the imperialists will do. (From Suwito briefing of senior Foreign Department officials given on 1 February 1965)

Chou and Chen handled most of the discussions from 23 to 28 January, and while avoiding any new public commitment to support "confrontation," they apparently depreciated the capability of UK and U.S. forces and urged the Indonesians not to be intimidated into stopping guerrilla warfare and infiltration.* Their unusually bitter attacks on the British and unprecedented disparagement of Malaysia as "utterly detestable" (Chou's speech of 24 January 1965) were surrogates for the failure to provide a firm military commitment to Djakarta. The Chinese leaders apparently believed that they could keep Sukarno in tow primarily by providing political support. In the military field, they offered instructions; in the economic

*Chou was short on commitments and long on depreciatory remarks in his speech of 24 January 1965. He said only that if the U.S. and UK "dare to impose war on the Indonesian people, the Chinese people absolutely will not sit idly by" in the commitment part of his speech. He then attacked Malaysia in the strongest terms ever used by a Chinese leader up to that time and, in the depreciatory part of his speech, said that UK military forces assembled in the area represent "no more than several tens of thousands of troops and a few dozen warships" and U.S. forces in South Vietnam are "paper-tigers" and are "miserably meagre and feeble...don't be overawed." Another Chinese leader was as cautious as Chou, or even more cautious because the implied Chinese counteraction was made contingent on American participation in some way in a hypothetical attack: "if the British imperialists, with the support of the U.S. imperialists, dare to launch attacks against Indonesia, then the 650 million Chinese people assuredly will not stand by idly with folded arms." (Lo Jui-ching speech of 25 January 1965)

field, they offered a total of $150 million in credits --including the $50 million offered by Chen Yi earlier without interest and a grace period of 10 years, with 10 additional years to repay the principal. Chou reportedly repeated what Chen Yi had told the Indonesians in November 1964, namely that they need not hurry to repay Soviet credits.

The Chinese also tried to increase the power position of the PKI in Indonesia, and on the second day of the January 1965 talks, they reportedly made any military commitment contingent on Sukarno's granting the PKI more cabinet representation and influence. Further, they are reported to have "suggested" a larger role in the government for the PKI to assure "proper administration of the economic credits." Mao's apparent decision to provide support for Aidit's campaign for greater power also had been reflected in the unusual publicity Aidit began to receive.* He established close contacts with the Chinese Communist embassy in Djakarta.** The military officers in Subandrio's delegation, who opposed any further extension of PKI power, are reported to have rejected this Chinese "suggestion," whereupon the Chinese dropped the highly sensitive matter.***

*For example, NCNA listed Aidit as second in the order of precedence (after the Acting President) among dignitaries greeting Chen Yi at Djakarta's airport in late November 1964.

**On 20 January 1965, Aidit teamed up with the Chinese Communist ambassador to convey Peking's offer to Sukarno to send guerrilla warfare experts to Indonesia.

***Liu Shao-chi may have joined Chou and Chen in "suggesting" increased power for the PKI as a precondition for granting more aid. According to the Indonesian air communications minister, Liu had "asked questions about certain matters concerning implementation of credits already extended to Indonesia, and concerning new credits which will be given." Liu told him that "China will investigate to determine whether deficiencies exist in extension of credit to Indonesia, and hopes that Indonesia
(footnote continued on page 43)

This Maoist move to buy more power for a Communist ally within a non-Communist government exposed the hypocrisy of Chou En-lai's January 1964 eight principles of foreign aid, in which he had touted Peking's disavowal of any effort to attach strings to economic assistance. More importantly, it seems to have reflected the appraisal of Mao and his aides of the PKI's strategy of working within this "bourgeois-nationalist" government as well as outside it subversively to attain power for the Communists. They probably encouraged Aidit in his suggestion of 14 January 1965 to arm 10 million peasants and 5 million workers to meet a prospective British attack, as this would have placed considerable military power in the hands of the PKI, who were at that time the only successful organizers of the peasants and workers.* At the very least, Aidit's suggestion was a psychological warfare deterrent against the British. But in terms of the internal maneuvering for power between the PKI and the army, the suggestion was intended to improve the Communists' domestic image. Sukarno continued to be alert to balancing PKI with army power and apparently turned down the proposal. Later, in the summer of 1965, he apparently reversed this decision and in preparing for his showdown with the army, he was willing to have Chinese-made arms brought into the country, destined for Communist use.

(footnote continued from page 42)
will investigate to see whether there are deficiencies in implementation of the credits extended." Presumably the PKI would have to have a role in the "proper administration" of the credits, and this was precisely the point made by other Chinese leaders in discussions with Subandrio.

*Chou is reported to have offered the Subandrio mission 100,000 rifles to create a "Fifth Force" of peasants, the Chinese Communists' intention having been to provide the PKI with a mass basis of military power for the future and to provide Sukarno with a mass basis of leftist-oriented military power to offset the power of Indonesia's rightist generals.

By the summer of 1965, Sino-Indonesian relations were better than ever and cooperation against the American and the British position in the Far East was a key unifying factor. Mao encouraged the relationship, receiving an Indonesian parliamentarian in early July 1965 and permitting a Sino-Indonesian shipping agreement to be concluded on 24 July. On 21 August, Chen Yi in Djakarta was authorized to assure Subandrio that Peking would not recognize the new nation of Singapore. In August and September, Chinese doctors continued to examine and try to treat Sukarno for his kidney ailment, reporting to Peking on the very serious nature of his condition. Both sides exchanged a variety of delegations and the Chinese sent construction personnel to speed work on Sukarno's CONEFO site, which embodied his desire to construct buildings to serve as a new UN for anti-imperialist nations.* On 29 September, Chou En-lai was reported to have told a group of Indonesian political figures in Peking that the Chinese would like to have a special agreement for economic cooperation among China, Indonesia, Cambodia, Pakistan, and North Korea and that "special technical cooperation" (i.e., on nuclear energy) between Peking and Djakarta would be decided upon with Sukarno sometime after the Afro-Asian conference.** These were concepts which the Chinese leaders recognized as being part of Sukarno's special regional program, and they were anxious to sustain his hopes by hinting at a regional "axis" and some degree of nuclear energy technical advice.

*Mao wanted to have his own Afro-Asian solidarity organization and he apparently intended to use Indonesia as the front behind which his aides could set up and dominate a pro-Chinese secretariat.

**Peking officially endorsed Aidit's idea of a "Djakarta-Phnom Penh-Hanoi-Peking-Pyongyang axis" on 7 October 1965. Although on that day NCNA attributed the idea to Sukarno, it had been expounded earlier, in August 1964, by Aidit.

The coup which began in the early hours of 1 October 1965 in Djakarta, and had failed by 2 October, led to events which reduced Sino-Indonesian relations to a state more miserable than they had been even in 1959. By the fall of 1967, Mao will have risked a complete break in government relations with Djakarta and will have introduced a new innovation in his foreign policy, namely, the holding of Indonesian diplomats as hostages in Peking (by refusing to issue them exit visas) to prevent attacks on the Chinese embassy in Djakarta. The following account discusses only some of the major issues involved in Peking-Djakarta relations after the coup.

The army professed to have information on direct Chinese involvement. The Chinese leaders may have acquired some degree of prior knowledge of the coup from air force chief, Omar Dani, when he met with Chou En-lai in Peking on 16 September 1965 (apparently to attain the 100,000 rifles Chou had offered to Subandrio's mission in January). However, the extent of Chinese information on the planning and timing probably was far less than the army generals later claimed. Mao himself made remarks on the eve of the coup which suggest that he was unaware of an immediate crisis. Discussing the parallels with the Chinese experience, he was not alert to the danger that such parallels could later be used to demonstrate Chinese complicity in the planning and execution of the coup.* Chou indicated to the Indonesian parliamentary

*On 30 September 1965, Mao talked to a group of visiting Indonesian political figures in general terms about the current stage of the revolution in Indonesia (placing it in the same period of the Chinese revolution before the Communists moved against the government and were still cooperating with Sun Yat-sen). He then discoursed on one of his obsessions, namely, military training, and turned to one of his visitors and lectured him with the remark: "You must be a military man like me to lead a revolution. Of course, I have military assistants, like Lin Piao and Chu Te." It is unlikely that Mao would have discussed the stage of the revolution in Indonesia if he had been informed of the coup plot; his line of discussion would have avoided the matter of a parallel Chinese situation and of the need to be a "military man like me."

delegation on 1 October that there had been "a coup of some type" but that contact with the Chinese embassy in Djakarta had been cut off and that he had been trying to get information from Singapore and Kuala Lumpur radio broadcasts. On the evening of 1 October, the Chinese were privately portraying the coup (by word of mouth and not in any public media) in the same disingenuous terms as were the army rebels and the PKI, namely, they claimed that an "imperialist coup" had been smashed in Djakarta by the rebels and that there had been a "plot to kill Sukarno." They believed the rebels had been successful. When they conveyed this news privately to British visitors, they were reported as being "smug," implying a Chinese triumph. This behavior is consistent with the view that the Chinese leaders had no prior knowledge of the coup, but were privately delighted to welcome the prospect of a complete ouster of anti-Communist military leaders.*

When, on 2 October, it became clear to outsiders that the coup had failed and that the anti-Communist army generals were engaged in a counter-coup, the Chinese leaders seem to have acted to provide sanctuary for the PKI and the rebels. On the morning of 2 October, the PKI delegation disappeared from their quarters in the Peking Hotel and efforts of the Indonesian military attache to contact them were impeded by Chinese officials. On 4 October, an Indonesian air force C-130 arrived in Canton from Djakarta to pick up the Indonesian parliamentary delegation, but the Chinese failed to inform the military attache about the matter, and when it returned to Djakarta on 6 October, three crew members stayed behind together with an air force captain. The Chinese would not turn

*The Chinese showed their preference for the original coup in another way. When news of the Untung coup first reached them, they are reported to have offered the visiting Indones an parliamentary delegation large quantitie of rice and other commodities in support of the Colonel. But when later news reached Peking that Untung had failed, this offer was not repeated.

these men over to the military attache and cooperated only with the pro-Chinese ambassador, Djawoto, who later defected to Peking.

Mao and his aides apparently believed that Sukarno and Subandrio might have the influence to impede Suharto's actions. They tried to bolster Sukarno's determination to fight back by hinting at support for him (Liu Shao-chi and Chou En-lai message of 3 October 1965 to Sukarno) and were careful to avoid antagonizing Suharto by any public reference to his counter-coup. But as of 2 October, they seem also to have calculated that the anti-Communist army leaders would take an anti-Chinese course, and on that day, Chinese diplomats reportedly began snubbing Indonesian diplomats in various countries.

Partly to avoid creating the impression that they were in any way involved in the original coup and partly to determine definitely the extent of Sukarno's loss of power, the Chinese did not comment on the Indonesian crisis until 18 October, when they officially protested the search by Suharto's troops of the office of the commercial counsellor of the Chinese embassy in Djakarta--an act which an officer in command of the troops is said to have conceded was on "orders of the government." Thereafter, the Chinese Communist press became increasingly hostile to the army leadership, rapidly jettisoning the strategy of public restraint they had adopted earlier and disregarding the real difficulties their protests would create for Sukarno.

Mao apparently was concerned with demonstrating that, as a revolutionary, he would not absorb the anti-Communist actions of "rightist" leaders and would wage a "blow-for-blow struggle," escalating at each stage just as the Indonesian army leadership escalated. Moreover, he appears to have been angered by the thought that army rightists were destroying a useful relationship with Indonesian leftists, which had been developed over the course of five years, and he apparently was unwilling to subside until the army leadership desisted from all anti-Chinese actions. The Chinese ambassador in Indonesia called on Sukarno on 31 October and presented him with

four "requests," which were in fact demands: (1) that the Indonesian military's efforts to eradicate the PKI be stopped, (2) that Chinese citizens and properties not be d sturbed, (3) that Chinese ships be permitted to enter Indonesian ports "unhampered,"* and (4) that changes be made in the leadership of the armed forces, particularly in the army, as soon as possible. The fourth demand was simply an unrealistic Maoist command to Sukarno to bring down his opponents--an action he would have been delighted to execute if he could.

Sukarno's inability to turn the tide against the army leaders was finally acknowledged by Mao and his lieutenants, and they began to publicize the relaxation of his efforts to shield the PKI. On 19 October 1965, NCNA indicated Peking's displeasure. On 7 November, NCNA noted that Sukarno had made a speech in which he mentioned no more the three-way alliance (which included the PKI) as the foundation of Indonesian national political life; NCNA also noted that Subandrio pledged to be firm not only with the U.S., but with "the PRC as well." Subandri was trying to save himself, and on 2 December he attacked Peking for attempting to interfere in Indonesian internal affairs.

Sukarno tried to sustain some authority by using a thin reed which the Chinese had offered him; Peking had not yet completely discarded him. According to one report, at an early January 1966 meeting of the cabinet, Sukarno produced a letter from Liu Shao-chi and Chou En-lai offering Indonesia $100 million in cash aid, and then he lectured cabinet officials on the need to concede that the PRC (not the U.S.) was Djakarta's only friend. But this effort to support Sukarno (in the hope that he still

*The Chinese did not want to be accused of having broken the shipping agreement signed in July 1965, and later (on 9 December) one of their ships visited Indonesia in the name of "friendship" to indicate the continued existence of government-to-government relations.

retained good will for Peking) was drastically undercut by Peking's own protest notes. When, on 9 February, Subandrio raised with Sukarno the question of a strong note from Peking in the presence of several witnesses, Sukarno (embarrassed and squirming) said that "Mao Tse-tung is very uncouth"--a clear indication that the PRC notes had pushed him far out on a political limb despite the Chinese leaders' view of him as their only prospective asset and their desire to provide him with some support.

Throughout February and into late March 1966, the Chinese waged a "blow-for-blow struggle" with the Indonesian army leadership, but they seem to have been unwilling to break relations. They depicted the mutual withdrawal of diplomatic personnel as "temporary" and tried to get Djakarta to call a halt. "We want to say to the Indonesian government that you have gone far enough in this direction. If you continue to slide down this road of worsening relations between our two countries, then you must be held completely responsible for all the consequences." (People's Daily editorial of 30 March 1966) The PRC Foreign Ministry note of 27 March significantly spoke of the closing down of the NCNA office in Djakarta as "temporary" and as only one link "in the chain" of Sino-Indonesian friendship. Chou may have justified a policy of trying to hang on by persuading Mao of the need to avoid total defeat when Maoist policies elsewhere--in the Congo, Burundi, Ghana, Algeria, and the India-Pakistan clash--had already badly damaged Peking's prestige. Chou may also have been the man in charge of justifying, to party and army officials as well as to the populace, the meaning of these defeats, namely, that they were not Mao's failure (inasmuch as the revolutionary tide in the world follows a natural "law" which no mortal can change) and that they must take heart because the night is darkest before the dawn.*

*This is the theme of an unusual series of articles, published in the People's Daily beginning in late February 1966 (following the coup in Ghana on 24 February) and continuing into April 1966. They contain a more unrealistic account--including distortions and flat
(footnote continued on page 50)

The dawn in Indonesia, however, was dark and beginning on 4 April 1966, Mao seems to have conceded that Sukarno was a lost ally. On that day, NCNA carried an unusual analysis of the entire coup situation and, for the first time in Peking's media, depicted Sukarno as a mere figurehead retained by the army for display. The analysis referred back to the 12 March 1966 order of Suharto's banning the PKI and repeated a Japanese view that a statement of Sukarno's on 16 March 1966 was "his last act of resistance." The Chinese went on to indict the new Indonesian government in the strongest terms up to that time--"a group of petty thugs" (People's Daily editorial of 16 April 1966) -and while raising the issue of a diplomatic "rupture," they seem to have preferred that any such action must come first from Djakarta. In order to discredit the army leadership and to improve Peking's image among Overseas Chinese (who were being subjected to the worst persecution since Indonesia's independence), the Chinese widely publicized their protests to Djakarta and their actions to provide ships for those "patriots" who wanted to move to the mainland, the first ship arriving in Indonesia in late September 1966.

It was at this time that a new revolutionary factor was introduced into the dispute, moving Peking's policy further to the left of normal diplomatic relations. Mao approved a suggestion to change the "bourgeois" style of Chinese diplomats abroad and called for "a revolutionization" of "all foreign affairs offices abroad." (Mao's statement of 9 September 1966) Subsequently, Chinese

(footnote continued from page 49)
lies--of the condition of the "revolutionary tide" in the world than Peking has ever published. They do not carry the tone of genuine optimism which had marked the Chinese Communist statements on global strategy in late 1957 and part of 1958. They were designed to rationalize a detrimental aspect of Mao's revolutionary foreign policy line, and at those points, where the future is discussed, the optimism is contrived.

ambassadors and some charges were recalled to Peking for indoctrination. In December 1966, when the Chinese embassy --staffed by "red diplomatic fighters"--began to implement a program of subversion and resistance among certain Overseas Chinese in the islands, Sino-Indonesian relations became as hostile as Sino-Indian relations, and diplomatic communications were used to exchange protests, insults, and threats.

Mao's plan to replace a former champion of Peking's interests (India) with a new champion of these interests (Indonesia) had been ruined. At the same time, a major ally in his dispute with the Soviet leaders, namely, the PKI, had been destroyed as a national political force. This double blow, however, did not impel him to adopt a new and cautious policy of non-involvement in Djakarta's internal affairs. On the contrary, he turned to a revolutionary and subversive program which apparently was intended, in the short run, to encourage political opposition to Suharto and, in the long run, to bring h m down and to replace him with the PKI. The PRC embassy in Djakarta on 9 December 1966 told a group of pro-Peking Overseas Chinese leaders that they must circulate propaganda linking Suharto's regime with the U.S. and support left-wing parties, which were sheltering PKI members, inasmuch as it is through these parties that "the PKI will rise again." Mao's new revolutionized policy toward Djakarta was praised by a rally of Red Guards and others, and it was advanced by Chen Yi, who condemned the "rightwing military clique" and warned that "A reckoning will be made of the blood debts incurred by the Indonesian reactionaries." (Chen Yi speech of 29 December 1966) The Chinese Communist military attache in Djakarta also began to act like a revolutionary and when, at a reception on 19 January 1967, he insulted Suharto by deliberately refusing to shake hands, he was ordered out of the country. When he returned to Peking and stepped off the plane on 31 January, "representatives of the liaison post of the revolutionary rebels in the Foreign Ministry" were among the first to meet him. (NCNA dispatch of 31 January 1967) The military attache apparently was used on his return as an example of a revolutionary diplomat.

Mao and his aides launched a policy of gradually increasing harassment of the Indonesian embassy and its officials in Peking in response to anti-Chinese actions. On 12 April, groups of Red Guards were encouraged to demonstrate against the Indonesian embassy in a manner similar to the siege directed against the Soviet embassy in early February; in neither case were embassy grounds invaded. On 13 April, an NCNA report depicted Suharto as "a lapdog with human skin." Chinese officials in Djakarta apparently were directed to intensify their "revolutionary" actions against the government; as a result, Djakarta accused them of having shouted anti-government slogans during a funeral procession for a local Chinese on 20 April. A demonstration against the Chinese embassy was held on the 22nd and the Chinese charge and consul general were declared persona non grata on the 24th. The Chinese leaders, who apparently wanted to have things both ways --that is, open harassment of Indonesian diplomats and sustained formal relations with Indonesia--were impelled to increase their retaliation, and on the 24th they ordered the Indonesian charge and counsellor to leave. They intensified the siege, and on the 25th, Red Guards burned effigies of Suharto and Nasution in front of the embassy and openly praised the Indonesian Communists. Mao was willing to risk a break; on 26 April the PRC government statement--the highest level in Peking's arsenal of foreign policy pronouncements--encouraged Chinese in Indonesia to "struggle" against persecution. This was an official instruction to interfere in Indonesia's internal affairs and an open violation of principle (3) of Chou's five principles of peaceful coexistence of April 1955. The statement attacked the "out-and-out fascist regime" and predicted that the "people will eventually overthrow the reactionary rule."

Mao apparently decided to permit cruder retaliatory actions, and after Hsieh Fu-chih condemned Indonesian "atrocities" on 27 April, the two expelled Indonesian diplomats were subjected on the way out to various forms

of physical abuse.* At their last stop-over point, Canton's airport, they and their families (including small children) were "pushed, insulted, kicked, beaten, spat upon..." (statement released by the Indonesian embassy in Tokyo on 30 May 1967). On the other hand, the expelled Chinese charge and consul general were effusively greeted by Chou at the Peking airport on 30 April. "You have put up a very good fight. We welcome you." These men--Yao Teng-shan and Hsu Jen--were received on the same evening by Mao and Lin Piao, and another indication of Mao's favor appeared in the Peking Review of 5 May 1967 which depicted them as "Chairman Mao's two red diplomatic fighters." Beyond that, Yao was to become a fanatical new member of the rebel "liaison station" in the Foreign Ministry, starting his short rise-and-fall career in it with an attack on the film of Liu Shao-chi's April 1963 visit to Indonesia. (Yao published a joint article on this subject which was broadcast in Peking on 13 July 1967.)

Yao probably helped to organize the Red Guard attack on the Indonesian embassy on 5 August 1967 in which the charge was beaten with iron bars and which resulted in burning of an office and the destruction of telecommunications equipment of the embassy. This was in retaliation to the invasion of the Chinese embassy in Djakarta

*Hsieh also expanded the 26 April government statement's appeal for bringing down the military regime. "The Indonesian people will certainly smash the reactionary rule of U.S. imperialism and its lackeys in Indonesia. Indonesia will certainly become a revolutionary Indonesia."

These official statements of late April 1967 revealed a small part of the Chinese Communists' intention to support the remnants of the PKI in Indonesia--an intention which had been privately expressed by Chen Yi in late April 1966. Chen is [redacted] reported to have promised Indonesian Communists that the PKI would be provided with arms and funds and that he would arrange for all PKI members of Chinese extraction to stay on in Indonesia; he suggested that the PKI should listen to Peking Radio for the "most authoritative" reporting of world events.

on 5 August. The Chinese did not permit other Indonesian officials to leave the ambassador's residence until 9 August and they did not take down the PRC flag, which demonstrators had hoisted above the embassy to replace the Indonesian flag, until 10 August. As a consequence, the Indonesian Foreign Ministry was reported to have decided on 21 August to withdraw its remaining officials from Peking, suspending relations. Neither Djakarta or Peking had publicized the sacking of the Indonesian embassy, and Foreign Ministry officials told the American ambassador in Djakarta that should the complete account of the extent of the damage become known to the public, Djakarta youth would wreck the Chinese embassy and provoke further Chinese Communist retaliation in Peking. The Foreign Ministry tried to defend its diplomats from new assaults, and on 24 August, the Foreign Ministry delivered a note to the new Chinese charge in Djakarta requesting that the PRC issue exit permits for members of the embassy.

Yao's influence within the PRC Foreign Ministry, reportedly at its fanatical highest point between 19 and 23 August, ended after the 22 August burning of the UK charge's office. Chou apparently convinced Mao that demonstrations which included invasion of foreign embassy grounds and the burning of offices would lead to breaks in diplomatic relations with "unfriendly" countries where the Chinese must necessarily retain an official representation, if only to strengthen anti-government revolutionary forces. When, therefore, Peking replied to the 24 August request for exit permits, refusing the request on the grounds that Indonesians would be held as a guarantee for the future safety of Chinese officials, the additional motive was to try to prevent an Indonesian exodus from Peking which would require a Chinese exodus from Djakarta and other cities. Chou moved to control the scope and the vigor of demonstrations. Demonstrations in September in front of the Indian embassy reportedly were carefully controlled and, in contrast to the forceful entry of embassies in the previous month, demonstrators apparently were kept out of the Indian mission despite the firefights on the Tibet-Sikkim border. Chou seems to have been trying to prevent complete ruptures with several governments, and this seems to have been the primary purpose of his

embassy-struggle restrictive order of 1 September and the State Council's decree of 7 October.

In an effort to pry their officials in Peking loose from the hostage policy, Foreign Minister Malik declared the Chinese charge and second secretary persona non grata on 14 September, and a Foreign Ministry official told an American embassy officer at the time that the move was designed to impel the Chinese to reciprocate by allowing two Indonesians from the embassy staff to leave. On 25 September, the Chinese complied, declaring two Indonesian diplomats persona non grata, and were willing to permit them to leave by the 29th. Chou apparently believed that this limited retreat from the hostage policy would enable him to retain a handful of Chinese in the Djakarta embassy and various consulates, thereby avoiding a complete break in diplomatic relations. However, his apparent plan to retain representatives in Indonesia was to encounter a decisive blow.

On 1 October, about 200 students, mostly Moslem and most of whom had been celebrating the second anniversary of the abortive Sukarno Aidit coup, attacked the Chinese embassy in Djakarta, destroying communications equipment and seriously injuring two embassy officers.* Chou was impelled to take a harder line while trying to avoid a complete break. On 1 or 2 October, the Chinese told the UAR ambassador, who had been reported seeking exit visas for the Indonesians, to mind his own business and that no Indonesians would leave until the situation of

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That the Foreign Minister and the Ministry were taken by surprise is suggested by Malik's private remark in Tokyo on 4 October that he blamed the attack on "poor coordination" between the Indonesian army and his Foreign Ministry.

the Djakarta embassy had been rectified. Also on 1 October, the Indonesian charge was summoned by the Chinese Foreign Ministry and informed of Peking's protest against the "fresh fascist atrocities." Chou apparently still hoped to retain a presence in Indonesia and on 5 October, the PRC Foreign Ministry informed the Indonesians that the Chinese desired to send a plane to evacuate the diplomats injured by "the troops, police, and ruffians organized by the reactionary Indonesian government." The demarche did not include a request for the return of all Chinese embassy officers. Chou had to praise the acts of resistance by Chinese diplomats while working to keep some of them in place. On 7 October he cabled "heartfelt concern" on behalf of the central committee and the State Council for the embassy staff whose members were an "example" for other Maoist diplomats. (Cable released by NCNA on 9 October) On the 9th, the Indonesians suggested a simultaneous withdrawal of embassy staffs, making it clear that they wanted all of the Chinese (rather than just the injured officers) to leave the country. Under considerable domestic political pressure, Malik on the 10th announced that Djakarta was "suspending" relations.*

On the 12th, the Chinese refused the suggestion for a mutual withdrawal of all embassy personnel on each side and repeated their demand for an end to restrictions which had been imposed on their diplomats. Pressure on Malik continued to force his hand: on 23 October, Djakarta asked Peking in a Foreign Ministry note to pull out its embassy and consulates "in the shortest possible time," and it stated that the chancery of the Peking embassy would be closed. On the 27th, Chou reluctantly conceded total defeat: the PRC government statement denounced the suspension of diplomatic relations and announced that the PRC "cannot but announce the temporary closing of the Chinese

*Chou kept this dismal defeat out of Peking's media until 27 October partly to temporarily conceal the decisiveness of the setback and partly to impress Djakarta with Peking's reluctance to break completely.

embassy and consulates in Indonesia and the withdrawal of all embassy and consular personnel." (emphasis supplied) On 31 October, the Indonesian charge and other embassy personnel were flown to Djakarta in a Chinese aircraft, which returned with the expelled Chinese diplomats.

In sum, although Chou apparently had convinced Mao that it was important for his new revolutionary policy toward Indonesia to keep diplomatic representatives in the country, Chou was constantly impelled t take harder positions and retaliatory action which further intensified Djakarta-Peking frictions ending in a complete break. That Chou tried to control the degree of Peking's retaliation is suggested by the fact that the 1 October assault on the embassy in Djakarta was not answered with a new attack on Indonesian embassy personnel or lodgings in Peking.

Mao and Chou by late October were confronted with the detrimental results of roughly two years of disputation with the post-Sukarno Indonesian government, namely, the loss of strategic assets (the embassy in Djakarta and the consulates in Djakarta, Medan, Makassar, and Bandjarmasin) which had provided them with bases of operations to organize Overseas Chinese and PKI members for various forms of "revolutionary" anti-government activity. Mao's subversive program was to be impeded, but not stopped.

Prior to the "suspension" of relations, the revolutionary and subversive program Mao and his aides envisaged against the military government included the use of Overseas Chinese and encouragement of the remnants of the PKI. Dissemination of anti-government propaganda had intensified in early December 1966 after the Chinese embassy in Djakarta directed pro-Peking Overseas Chinese there to link Suharto with Washington. In East Java, beginning in early May 1967, Overseas Chinese directed by Djakarta embassy officials increased their activities against the government's anti-Chinese decrees in order to create greater economic difficulties in the area.

Regarding encouragement of the PKI, the remaining leaders who escaped with their lives have been told that

they must recast the party along Maoist lines to conduct a revolutionary struggle. Following publication of the PKI "self-criticism" in September 1966, PKI leader Adjitorop told the Albanian party congress on 3 November that the "three urgent tasks" of the party are reconstruction of the PKI "on a Marxist-Leninist [i.e., pro-Peking] basis." preparation "to lead a long armed struggle" which will be integrated with peasant insurrection, and formation of a "united front" of all forces opposing the military government. Quoting former leader Aidit, he said that this was Mao's road--another sign of the open revival of the concept which Peking had downplayed since late 1951. A Red Flag editorial in the 9 July 1967 issue insisted that the PKI had to change from legal and peaceful struggle to illegal and armed struggle: "there is no alternative for them but to master" armed struggle. It delcared that the "CCP and the Chinese people...firmly support the PKI in leading the Indonesian people's struggle to overthrow the Suharto-Nasution fascist regime..." Peking's capabilities in the islands is limited but the Chinese leaders have continued to encourage and support anti-government guerrilla warfare. In late July 1967, Foreign Minister Malik stated privately (probably on the basis of military-security briefings) that Peking had infiltrated mainland-trained guerrilla organizers from Sarawak to the West Borneo border area, and, in early September, army-controlled newspapers reported that the People's Guerrilla Force of Sarawak, operating with mainland-trained personnel, was active in the West Borneo border area. Peking has exaggerated the size and importance of the guerrilla elements in the field, and NCNA's report of 27 September 1967 was fatuous in its claim that "the prairie fire of revolutionary armed struggle has flared up in the countryside in Java, Kalimantan, Sulawesi, and Sumatra." Despite the exaggerations, Mao and his aides seem to be determined to encourage a long-term revolutionary struggle and will continue to insist that it must be armed struggle.*

*"From the lesson they paid in blood, they have learned with profound understanding the incontrovertible truth of the great leader Chairman Mao that 'political power grows out of the barrel of a gun' and are determined to (footnote continued on page 59)

The basic shift to a revolutionary-insurrectionist policy toward Djakarta has impelled Mao and Chou to use the scapegoat procedure, depicting Liu Shao-chi as the man who desired a moderate and cooperative policy toward Sukarno ever since 1960. Liu ("China's Khrushchev") was accused of having (1) praised the "leading representative of the Indonesian bourgeoisie"--the new designation for Sukarno--during his April 1963 visit to Indonesia, (2) misled the PKI by diluting its "revolutionary vigilance" with talk of peaceful coexistence, (3) enhanced his own prestige, and (4) failed to refer to Mao. (People's Daily article of 13 June 1967) But regarding (1), Liu had rejected several of Sukarno's specific requests during the April 1963 discussions, namely, that Peking should create a diversion in the Taiwan Strait or against Hong Kong by the summer of 1963 and that it should provide Djakarta with more support on "confrontation." Regarding (2) it was Chou rather than Liu who had spoken most frequently and extensively on peaceful coexistence when discussing Indonesian policy. It had been Chou (with Mao's apparent encouragement) who had advanced the policy of the "Bandung Spirit" in the mid-1950s and early 1960s (and at various times thereafter). When that policy was gradually downgraded in relations with some neutrals in 1964 and 1965 (although retained with Indonesia until the 1 October 1965 coup), Liu was the most prominent proponent of the new revolutionary "Bandung Spirit." Liu's version of the spirit was far more revolutionary than Chou's had been, as witness Liu's references to the "militant spirit...and

(footnote continued from page 58)
follow the road of the Chinese revolution." (People's Daily editorial of 29 October 1967) Concealing their own earlier encouragement of the PKI along the lines of legal struggle within the government, the Chinese now say that the PKI should have moved to armed struggle at an earlier stage of the Communist effort in the country. (Statement of senior Chinese Communist official on 14 December 1967 to delegation of pro-CCP faction of the Spanish Communist Party)

struggle" in eulogizing the 10th anniversary of the Bandung conference. (Red Flag on 30 April 1965 carried Liu's eulogy of 5 April) Regarding (3), Liu in fact had begun to create an image of himself as a figure of importance at least equal to Chou's in foreign policy, and Chou in fact may have deeply resented Liu's new role as Peking's international troubleshooter with non-Communist governments. Regarding (4), Liu probably believed that sycophantic references to Mao (or to his "thought") during such a trip would be diplomatically stupid. Chou and Chen Yi apparently held the same view until the issue of eulogistic praise for Mao had become an important test of loyalty to the Chinese dictator in the spring of 1966 (and thereafter).

Additional charges against Liu's view of policy toward Indonesia appear to be primarily necessitated by the scapegoat procedure. For example, Liu has been accused of having told the PKI (at some unspecified time) that it was a good thing "to have more party members in ministerial posts in the government." (Broadcast of 4 December 1967 of a Liberation Army Daily article in a series) But Mao and Chou had not disparaged this policy when Aidit was advancing it, and they showed their support for his parliamentary road by welcoming him personally (People's Daily of 4 September 1963) and by having his 4 September 1963 speech--in which he complained that Communists were not yet in "responsible government" positions and insisted that the next step was to include Communists in the Indonesian cabinet--published in the People's Daily on 5 September 1963.

In addition to his shift to a revolutionary-insurrectionist line, Mao may have decided to use the Overseas Chinese more actively as an important subversive asset in Indonesia. This is a radical change from the earlier policy which Chou had formulated in 1954 to demonstrate at the start of the Bandung era the sincerity of Peking's desire for a relaxation of tension between Asian countries and for a non-subversive paternalism toward Overseas Chinese. "For our part, we are willing to urge Overseas Chinese to respect the laws of the governments and the social customs of the countries in which they live." (Chou's

speech to the first NPC on 24 September 1954)* However, Chou has not been attacked for having formulated and implemented this early policy of subordinating political mobilization of Overseas Chinese to the requirements of foreign policy. Men lower in the organizational hierarchy of the Chinese Communist leadership have been made the scapegoats for his earlier policy and it is a measure of Chou's authority that he is able to shunt the blame to other men. Chen Yi and Liao Cheng-chih have had to accept the blame for implementing the relatively softer line, and the formulation of this line was fatuously attributed to Liu Shao-chi.

*Section XI of the April 1955 Dual Nationality Treaty adds that Peking and Djakarta will encourage its citizens in the other country "not to take part in the political activities of that country." This new principle was an important departure in Peking's policy toward the Overseas Chinese, inasmuch as it reduced their potential to act as organized opponents of future anti-Peking policies implemented by Indonesia and other countries. That Chou was the major advocate of this policy in the Chinese leadership and that he was permitted by Mao to try to extend it to areas other than Indonesia is indicated by his statement that Chinese citizens living in Singapore should "refrain from taking part in political activities" in the city (statement to David Marshall, former Singapore Chief Minister made in October 1956), by his reported statement made in 1957 (precise date not given) that Chinese in Burma should "not interfere in Burmese politics," and by his statement that during his tour of Cambodia, India, Burma, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Nepal, and Ceylon "where there are a considerable number of Overseas Chinese in most of these countries...we...urged upon them to respect the laws and customs of the country of their residence, work for a closer friendship with the people among whom they have come to live, and strive for still more cordial relations between China and the country in which they reside." (Chou's report of 5 March 1957)

Chen was accused of having "hindered" Overseas Chinese in Indonesia from organizing and defending themselves during anti-Chinese outbreaks in 1963, the Chinese embassy having been directed to tell them "to put up with things." He was also accused of having been so "frightened" after the 1 October 1965 coup that "he hastily ordered three of our consulates in Indonesia temporarily to stop work and their personnel to assemble in our embassy in Djakarta." On the various occasions when Overseas Chinese were persecuted as a result of Indonesian government decrees, Chen was said to have declined to "launch a mass struggle among Overseas Chinese and simply relied on a few so-called 'overseas community leaders,' that is, the bourgeoisie among the Overseas Chinese, to go and report to the Indonesian reactionary authorities and to reason with them, to try to bring about an understanding....Or, he would urge them to use the method of bribery in an effort to secure a temporary relaxation in the anti-Chinese policy." "What Chen Yi did was to wholeheartedly implement the capitulationist line of Liu Shao-chi." In contrast to Chen's policy, the new policy was indicated as one of organized struggle: "See how since the second half of 1966 the Overseas Chinese in Indonesia have already begun an organized struggle for self-defense..." (Extracts from item on Chen Yi's "capitulationism" published in joint issue of Foreign Affairs Red Flag and Revolutionary Overseas Chinese Newspaper of 12 September 1967)

Liao Cheng-chih was attacked along the same lines and was accused of having acted contrary to Mao's view that "Class struggle must also be carried out in Overseas Chinese affairs."* This Mao quote is not dated, probably

*As in the case of Chen Yi, Liao's view of Overseas Chinese policy is attributed not to Chou--who apparently was the most important figure in the formulation of this policy--but to Liu Shao-chi. "After the founding of New China, instructed by Liu Shao-chi, he drew up a series of counter-revolutionary revisionist policies on Overseas Chinese affairs..." (Criticize Liao Combat Bulletin of
(footnote continued on page 63)

because the authors of the criticism desire to conceal its recent origin and to imply that it had been Mao's view all along. Liao was said to have suppressed mass movements of Overseas Chinese during the Korean war because he feared they would "irritate" local governments, dissolved Overseas Chinese "mass organizations to educate and organize the broad revolutionary masses" because he feared they might cause "suspicion," and ordered the dissolution of "groups studying Chairman Mao's works and repeatedly prevented Overseas Chinese organizations and schools from conducting political studies" because local governments might suspect "subversive activities" and this would "impair diplomatic relations." Later, presumably in the mid-1950s, Liao told Overseas Chinese "to mind their own business," "to stick to their own posts," and "not to criticize the internal affairs of the local governments." He was said to have warned them to "obey the local laws and respect the local customs and habits" and to carry out all their work publicly and lawfully." During the persecution of rural Chinese tradesmen in Indonesia in 1959-60, Liao was said to have failed to organize an Overseas Chinese counter-struggle and, "on the contrary, he suggested the plan of withdrawing 600,000 from Indonesia in one year." At the same time, he even suggested "'withdrawal of 3 to 5 million Overseas Chinese from various parts of the world in 7 or 8 years to come.'" Following the coup in the fall of 1965, he is said to have objected to Overseas Chinese efforts to get organized, to have "screamed that 'it is better to be Right than to be Left

(footnote continued from page 62)
18 June 1967) Liu had some influence on Overseas Chinese policy as Mao's deputy in the CCP party machine, in which he presided over Liao, who had been one of eight deputy directors of the Central Committee's United Front Work Department; part of the Department's work was with Overseas Chinese. However, Liao seems to have been most active in Overseas Chinese policy when he worked closely with Chou and Chen as Chairman of the government-administrative body, the Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission.

at present,'" and to have instructed his personnel that they should not intefere because "Overseas Chinese can protect themselves." The authors of these charges declared that Overseas Chinese "should aid the local people in their revolutionary cause." (Extracts from Criticize Liao Combat Bulletin of 18 June 1967)

The prospect seems to be for a revolutionary and subversive policy directed against the Indonesian government and open encouragement of guerrilla warfare. Switching from the "parliamentary road" -the PKI had not taken Mao's road of armed struggle in the 1940s (the Communist uprising in 1948 was a debacle for them) or 1950s--to an insurrectionist policy in the rural areas of the islands, however, the Chinese leaders are competing with the Soviets for PKI loyalties. They will be at a disadvantage, inasmuch as they have lost their embassy and consulates as important channels for contacting PKI remnants. Further, they have declared open political warfare on the government and they will not be in a position to profess to the PKI insurgents with credibility that they have the power to intercede with Djakarta on their behalf. Nevertheless, because the nine-member politburo is pro-Peking and in late November 1967 decided to adopt a Maoist policy of guerrilla warfare (at such time in the future when it acquires capability), the Soviet diplomatic advantage may be of small importance in the Sino-Soviet competition for party loyalty.

B. Asian Countries Not Involved with Mao's Anti-Americanism

1. Burma

Mao apparently believed that the joint statement he permitted Chou En-lai to issue with Prime Minister U Nu on 29 June 1954 declaring nonaggression and noninterference in each other's affairs would help to sustain Burma's policy of keeping American forces from establishing bases on Burmese territory. Although he preferred more anti-Americanism in Rangoon's foreign policy, noninvolvement in SEATO by the first non-Communist government

to recognize his regime was a sufficient reason for Mao to act as if he would comply with Burmese requests that Peking must not support the Communist insurgents or engage in subversive activities, either over Sino Burmese borders or through Overseas Chinese or officials in the Chinese embassy. Although the Chinese Communists have had the capability to support the insurgent Communists and to conduct extensive subversive activities throughout Burma (among various minority peoples near the border and among Overseas Chinese), they apparently have kept their operations restricted in most periods. Mao seems to have accepted the advice of his foreign policy aides that Rangoon might react to extensive anti-government operations by requesting American assistance.

Chen Yi concealed the degree of Chinese Communist subversive activity when he touted Peking's restraint in a conversation with the British charge on 7 April 1962. He claimed that although the Burmese Communists (he did not specify Red or White Flags) had been resisting the government for years, the Chinese had had "no" contact with them and had not given them "any" aid. Chen did not say whether the leaders of the Peking regime had ever suggested to Burmese leaders that they should cease demanding a complete surrender of the insurgents (as they had suggested on occasion privately to U Nu and Ne Win). Chen also concealed the fact that the Chinese covertly had continued to disseminate some pro-Peking propaganda among Kachin and Shan tribal insurgents in areas near the Yunnan Province border. Further, Chen concealed the fact that the Chinese leaders had not only retained for future use some Burmese Communists who had escaped to the mainland following the decline of their insurgency in Burma after mid-1951, but also sustained some contacts with Burmese Communists who remained in the field. Actually, the Chinese Communists had engaged in various forms of subversive activities but they had sufficiently limited the scope of their covert operations to deter the Burmese leaders from making the issue a major foreign policy dispute.

Apparently convinced that U Nu would not change his neutral course and surprise them by joining the anti-

Communist military alliance in Southeast Asia, Mao and Chou at various times calculated that psychological pressures could be applied to the Burmese leaders without any great risk to their policy of keeping them in tow. In 1956, they seem to have been trying to impel U Nu to concede frontier territory which Peking claimed on its maps. They sent PLA patrols into the Kachin State in mid-1956, and in October 1956, they hinted to U Nu in Peking that this PLA "mistake" was caused by the undemarcated nature of the border. Following protracted discussions with Chou for nearly a week, U Nu (temporarily out of office) declared on 10 November 1956 that a provisional agreement had been concluded in which Rangoon recognized three northern Kachin villages as Chinese territory and abrogated Burma's perpetual lease of the strategic Namwan Assigned Tract in the southern Kachin State. Burmese troops were to withdraw from the three villages which commanded importnat border passes and the PLA was to pull back from territory west of the line in the north established by the British in 1941. However, Mao and Chou desired additional concessions and they stalled on implementing the provisional agreement until the Tibet revolt in 1959 and the open border dispute with India impelled them to conclude the Sino-Burma border agreement to "prove" that they were not the intransigents in the struggle with New Delhi. (Khrushchev and Nehru had been criticizing the Chinese leaders for being the intransigent party.) Chou was the key tactician for the Chinese, and after the Chinese ambassador in Rangoon on 25 September 1959 assured the Burmese that the authorities in Peking accepted Burma's definition of the border, Chou personally induced Premier Ne Win to come to Peking to make final arrangements. Chou took a very conciliatory line, and on 28 January 1960, Ne Win signed the border agreement--an agreement "in principle" which Chou immediately used against Nehru's argument that a prior agreement "in principle regarding the Sino Indian border was meaningless. The agreement "returned" the three villages and an area in the Wa territory to Peking for the Namwan Assigned Tract and led

to demarcation of the border, most of which complied with Burma's map claims.* The conciliatory line was sustained, and in November 1960, Mao and Chou used PLA units to assist in Burma's campaign against Chinese Nationalist irregulars operating in the border areas. Although they could easily have supplanted Burmese authority in many border villages, the units apparently were not given such a mission--a hypothetical mission which probably would have stimulated the Burmese leaders to seek aid from the West.

Mao and Chou at various critical times, particularly in connection with their dispute with India and their position regarding the Vietnam war, have probed Ne Win's determination to move from a neutral to a pro-Peking foreign policy. Immediately following the PLA punitive attack on Indian positions in October 1962, Chou asked the Burmese ambassador in Peking what nation Rangoon would turn to for support if its neutrality were threatened. (New Delhi at the time had turned to the U.S. and the UK for support.) The Burmese were uncertain about the meaning of Chou's question and conjectured that it may have been a hint that Peking might want to send PLA troops across Burmese territory to outflank Indian positions in the event of a renewal of the border war. However, the PLA was in fact outflanking Indian troops within Indian territory with no significant difficulty, and Chou's intention seems to have been a political probe regarding Rangoon's basic attitude toward the U.S. and the UK. Later, in 1964 and again in 1965, the Chinese leaders reportedly asked the Burmese for permission to move forces across their country "if" the Vietnam war were expanded. These requests, ostensibly intended to support contingency planning for the border dispute with India and the Vietnam war, were at least partly intended as reminders to

*U Nu, who became premier again in April 1960--Ne Win had been in office from September 1958 to April 1960--signed the final agreement with Chou in Peking on 1 October 1960 and the demarcation protocol in October 1961.

Ne Win that his interests were with supporting Peking against India and the U.S. Further, the Chinese leaders may have intended that the requests in 1964 and 1965 would be reported to American officials in order to deter the U.S. from further involvement in Vietnam.

Following Peking's apparent decision at the June 1964 work conference of the CCP central committee to increase support for the Vietnamese Communists, and in the context of the Sino-Soviet dispute, Ne Win was subjected to greater pressure to adopt a more anti-U.S. and anti-USSR position. Ne Win's sensitivities were disregarded as Chou En-lai and Chen Yi descended on Rangoon, uninvited, in a series of visits reflecting a new stage in Mao's revolutionary diplomacy, which was to be marked by a new degree of crude behavior.

Regarding the anti-U.S. part of their basic effort, Chou and Chen during their visit from 10 to 12 July 1964 tried to commit Ne Win to the old principle that he would not join a military organization against Peking.* They induced him to republish such a pledge in the joint communique of 12 July. The British charge reported from Peking that he had been informed that the Chinese leaders believed Ne Win was clearly turning pro-U.S. and had decided to apply pressure to halt this development. The Swedish ambassador in Rangoon reported that his probing question put to the Chinese ambassador there--namely, that Peking cannot really doubt Burma's commitment to the policy of neutrality--was answered: "Not at all, the Americans are pushing vigorously in Burma." Ne Win also

*The joint communique reaffirmed Article Three of the Sino-Burmese Friendship Treaty pledging each country not to commit aggression or enter into a military pact directed against the other. This was the major aspect of the anti-U.S. part of the Chou-Chen visit. They wanted to determine what Burma's policy would be if "the U.S. expands the war" in Indochina. (This line was publicized by the Hong Kong Communist paper Wen Wei Pao on 14 July 1964.)

agreed to state publicly in the joint communique his concurrence with Peking on the need to convene a conference of 14 Geneva powers on Laos, the Chinese intention having been to seek a forum to denounce American involvement in the area. According to other sources, Chou asked Ne Win for the right of passage of Chinese troops into Laos in the event of an expansion of the Vietnam war. Chou was telling Ne Win in effect that he should work hard to support the Chinese position because an expanded war would mean PLA troops on Burmese soil.

Regarding the anti-USSR part, the Chinese in the mid-July discussions wanted to determine what commitments Ne Win had made to Mikoyan during his visit to Rangoon. According to the UAR ambassador, the Chinese envoy told him that the "primary reason" for the Chou-Chen visit was to ensure that Rangoon did not accede to a Soviet request for overflight and refueling rights in Burma for Soviet aircraft enroute to Indonesia (manned by Soviet military specialists). The Chinese ambassador also informed his UAR colleague that when Ne Win told Chou he had refused Mikoyan's request for these rights, Chou nevertheless delivered his warning: "We want to tell you that we will not allow it." The Burmese previously had permitted such Soviet delivery overflights, and the Chinese desire to offset Soviet influence in Indonesia during the "confrontation" with Malaysia spurred them to warn Ne Win off. Chou also asked Ne Win to attend the non-aligned and Afro-Asian conferences, apparently with the intention of having him adopt anti-Soviet (and anti-Indian) positions among neutrals.

The Chinese leaders' apparent intention was to alert Ne Win, who was in disfavor with them, to the need to take Peking's interests into full account on all issues publicly. Ne Win was not happy about this diplomatic hectoring, but Mao's aides persisted. In late August 1964, his aides sent Ne Win a note depicting the possibility of co-ordinated U.S. and UK military attacks in Southeast Asia during the coming dry season, implying that Rangoon should take a more anti-U.S. public position in order to expose this alleged plan. The note also attacked the Soviets and Indians and hinted that the Chinese

might have to take some action "to defend peace in Asia." Ne Win was angered by this Maoist gaucherie, and in November 1964, a Burmese Foreign office official said the General felt strongly that Peking was trying to make Rangoon a "partner" in its attempts to dominate Southeast Asia and in its hostility to the West. Ne Win said that Chinese pressure would be resisted.

Mao not only increased pressure on Ne Win on the level of crude hectoring diplomacy, but also provided encouragement and support to avowed anti-government political organizations. In the first week of September 1964, Ne Win was informed and shown evidence that the Chinese embassy in Rangoon had supplied political guidance and propaganda materials to the underground National Democratic United Front (NDUF), a Communist-controlled insurgent coalition which was disseminating leaflets attacking the government as a "fascist military dictatorship." The evidence spurred Ne Win to instruct his ambassador to protest in Peking. At the same time, the Burmese Foreign Office protested to the Chinese embassy in Rangoon regarding its activities in providing guidance for the Sino-Burmese Friendship Society, and the Burmese Military Intelligence Service began to set up units at Mandalay, Lashio, Kengtung, and Tachilek to obtain information about the operations of Chinese Communist officials visiting those areas. Earlier, in February 1964, Ne Win had shown real concern and moved against the Chinese consulate in Mandalay by impelling the Chinese to close it because of its activities in disseminating pro-Peking propaganda in the area. More significant for future official Burmese attitudes was Peking Radio's 30 September 1964 broadcast of a message from the Communist Party of Burma (presumably the White Flag wing) which insisted that the party would "strive for the establishment of a new Burma of real independence."

As a consequence, Ne Win was [redacted] reported to have become further disillusioned with Peking. He and his advisers viewed this thinly veiled call for the replacement of his government as a new departure in Sino-Burmese relations which presaged increased frictions. Ne Win privately complained to his officials that he did not

approve of the continued sheltering in Peking of White Flag leader, Thakin Than Tun, and when Burmese officials complained to the Chinese about the 30 September broadcast, they were told peremptorily that it was a matter between two Communist parties and of "no concern" to the two governments. The incident was an early indication that Mao was subordinating diplomacy to revolution in the fall of 1964 in his policy toward Burma.

Mao continued to pressure Ne Win on the diplomatic level to adopt various of Peking's positions, but the hectoring only further antagonized the General. From 3 to 6 December 1964, Chen Yi, who had invited himself down and had given Burmese officials only one hour's notice of his pending arrival, tried to commit the General to a promise to attend the Afro-Asian conference and to oppose Soviet participation. When Ne Win rejected Chen's request for personal attendance, the Chinese Foreign Minister asked when the General would visit the mainland, to which he replied that such a visit might take place but only after visits to India, Pakistan, and Ceylon. Chen further antagonized Ne Win by discussing an internal Burmese matter, namely, the need for Rangoon to make another effort to come to terms with the dissident White Flag Communists by including them in a "united front" government. Finally, he was asked to play a more active role in supporting the Chinese view of the Sino-Indian border dispute and to join Cambodia and Indonesia in anti-U.S. agitation regarding the Vietnam war. At no point did Chen succeed in his various demands ("proposals"), and after the results of Chen's visit to Cambodia and Indonesia prior to the stop in Burma were appriased by Mao and his aides in Peking, they had further evidence of the sharp contrast between assertively anti-U.S. leaders (Sihanouk and Sukarno) and a more neutral leader (Ne Win).

Ne Win's neutral position also made him a special target of New Delhi and Moscow, and as the competition for gaining his support increased, Mao and his aides decided to work even harder to move him closer to their positions. Mao's diplomats engaged him in more government-to-government discussions than did the diplomats of any other national leader, inasmuch as the Chinese leader

apparently viewed Ne Win as backyard property. Chou was given the important job of trying to impel Ne Win to recognize the unique status of Peking's representations and to impel him to drop his neutral stand and adopt a whole range of Maoist positions.

The arm-twisting diplomacy (which was used on Ne Win within a month after the June 1964 work conference of the CCP central committee) was intensified in April 1965. The Chinese leaders desired condemnation of the U.S. airstrikes against the North Vietnamese which were continuing into April. Chou invited himself to Rangoon three times in one month (visiting from 3 to 4 April, on 16 April, and on 26 and 28 April, in and out of jaunts abroad) and although Ne Win tried to work out a full ceremonial schedule which would leave little time for lectures from Chou on substantive matters, the clever Chinese premier always changed arrangements and managed several hours of discussion. Chou tried to brainwash Ne Win. For example, during the visit on 26 April, when Chou was outbound for a trip to Indonesia, he told Ne Win that he wished to talk only about Vietnam and the Afro-Asian conference and proceeded to talk for three hours straight on Vietnam. He repeated "over and over" his version of the facts of the Geneva agreements and made propaganda charges "over and over," until Ne Win suggested that the hour was late and they should adjourn, whereupon Chou irritably complained that he had not finished his first subject and promised to deal with it on his way back from Djakarta on 28 April.

This undiplomatic treatment further antagonized Ne Win, who was not only worried by White Flag activities but also by the dissemination of what he believed was a Chinese Communist anti-government pamphlet. Regarding White Flag leaders in refuge in Peking, Ne Win told Gordon-Walker on 22 April that earlier he had told Chou he held the Chinese responsible for keeping "a close watch on exiles." He had not taken kindly to Chinese support for 20 White Flag leaders who had come from Peking in the fall of 1963 upon invitation from Rangoon to negotiate

terms for an end to the Communist insurgency.* Ne Win is [redacted] reported to have told his military commanders in mid-April 1965 that the White Flags were preparing to intensify anti-government operations and were meeting to discuss their new strategy following a conference "held in Peking" in March 1965 between the Chinese leaders and senior White Flag insurgent Bo Aung Gyi.

Ne Win was subjected to a new round of undiplomatic harangues designed to make him more assertively anti-American. During the General's visit to Peking from 24 July to 1 August 1965 (when he was engaged in balancing his natural position between Moscow and Peking (as well as Peking and New Delhi), Chou asked him for the right to send PLA troops into northern Burma in the event the Vietnam war expanded. Although Ne Win was careful to evade responding definitively to this request, the Chinese embassy in Rangoon subsequently conveyed it to him in official notes in more precise terms. These notes reportedly asked for the right to move PLA troops into Burma up to a depth of 100 miles along a front from a point five miles north of Lashio to the northern tip of the country.

*Negotiations over the years had broken down on the issue of surrendering Communist personnel (and their weapons) to the central authorities. When hard pressed in an earlier period, Thakin Than Tun had offered to "come in" (28 March 1958), but U Nu rejected his bid because Than Tun refused to renounce the policy of armed struggle. Than Tun wrote to U Nu again in April, and on 20 May 1958 he sent an arrogant note demanding face-to-face talks, rejecting surrender demands, and insisting on legalization of his insurgent forces. Than Tun rejected U Nu's 31 July 1958 amnesty decree for all insurgents who renounced their insurgency in advance, and he wrote to Nu again in January 1961 that he would not surrender and wanted talks without prior conditions. Agreement for talks was finally reached in October 1963 when Premier Ne Win was willing to guarantee the safety of White Flag negotiators, but the discussions were broken off by the Premier in November 1963.

Ne Win, convinced that the Chinese in this way (among various other ways) were trying to stir his anxiety to a point at which he would feel impelled to discard neutral politics, believed that he was on safe legal ground and that his friendship treaty with Peking did not give the PLA access to Burmese territory under Article Three. Mao had a "cordial and friendly conversation" with the General during his visit, but the substantive talks apparently were held with Liu and Chou, who discussed matters of "cooperation...and international questions of common interest." (Sino-Burmese communique of 1 August 1965) Ne Win resisted their effort to induce him to endorse their position on Vietnam and conceded only the lesser points, such as support for Peking's "right" to UN membership. While the Chinese leaders publicly praised his policy of non-alignment, privately they were displeased with it and did not reprint speeches made at the Burmese embassy reception as relations became cooler. According to a Canadian correspondent at the Burmese embassy reception attended by Chou and Ne Win, Chou sarcastically remarked that invitations to the embassy had come to be "rare occasions" for the Chinese.

The major foreign policy reverses suffered by the Chinese from the summer of 1965 to the spring of 1966 may have impelled Mao to retreat and take a softer line toward the few governments which were not openly disparaging Peking. Liu Shao-chi was reported by Ne Win to have been rather "subdued" during his visit with Chen Yi in Rangoon from 17 to 19 April 1966 in contrast with the hectoring attitude Chou and Chen had taken in 1964 and 1965. The visit was said to have been a "quiet and sober affair," and the Chinese delegation seemed less intransigent than usual and did not press Ne Win with the usual request for right of entry of PLA troops into Burma in the event of expansion of the Vietnam war. They were reported to have been worried that some accommodation would be reached between the U.S. and USSR over Vietnam, and Liu reportedly indicated to Ne Win his concern for his own status in Peking. Liu was insistent, in his speech of 17 April 1966, that the essential points of Hanoi's 4-point position were "immediate withdrawal of all American military forces in Vietnam and recognition of the Liberation Front as the

sole legal representative" of the South Vietnamese. But he was reported to have been "discreetly silent" on American-Burmese relations. Although he attacked U.S. "aggression" in Vietnam in his 17 April speech, he apparently did not insist that Vietnam should be mentioned in the communique of 19 April. It was not mentioned, and Liu left the Burmese leaders with the impression that he was primarily concerned with emphasizing "good relations" with Burma, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Cambodia at a time when Peking had suffered major foreign policy reverses in other countries.

Encouraged by the obvious fact that Mao's attention was focused on internal matters on the mainland, Ne Win began to move faster and more vigorously to suppress anti-government activity engaged in by the Chinese embassy which was in contact with Overseas Chinese in the country.* He was angered by the pledge of Peking-based Burmese Communists, in their 6 November 1966 message to Tirana, "to overthrow" his government. In a speech on 14 November 1966, Ne Win depicted certain Chinese as "rank opportunists" and warned that certain "foreign elements" were a potential danger to Burma's economy. Surfacing of the pledge of Peking-based Burmese Communists to bring down Ne Win's government reflected Mao's view of Ne Win as an opponent. This apparent view may have been decisively formed after Ne Win's trip to the U.S. in August 1966.

*He had taken some steps at an earlier time, even before Mao became engrossed with the purge, to limit Chinese propaganda activities among Overseas Chinese in Burma. For example, he nationalized Chinese schools in the spring of 1965 and closed down the remaining (and pro-Communist) Chinese language newspapers in January 1966, apparently because these papers did not mention Prime Minister Shastri's visit to Rangoon in December 1965--a silence which suggested Chinese embassy guidance. Peking did not retaliate at the time, but began to respond to his pressures on local Chinese after Mao's purge was underway (in early December 1966).

Ne Win's hard line in November probably confirmed Mao in this view (although Ne Win was reacting to Peking's gaucherie). Reports indicate that the Chinese Communists anticipated more vigorous Burmese action against Overseas Chinese as a result of Ne Win's speech of 14 November 1966 and in that month, the Chinese embassy in Rangoon instructed local Chinese to be "careful and patient" in dealing with Burmese officials and the populace in order to avoid an anti-Chinese incident. The morale of Overseas Chinese had declined so far that in early December, the Chinese embassy had to send out small teams to assure them that Peking would champion their interests by using PLA forces in Yunnan to protect them if necessary; they were also told not to compare themselves to the Chinese in Indonesia, who could not be helped by Peking because of the distance. A new and seemingly more plausible argument was added to this line when, on 20 December, a Chinese embassy officer told leftist Overseas Chinese in Rangoon that in the event of harassment by the Burmese authorities, Peking would intervene forcefully and successfully as it had "in Macao."

As Mao's policy toward Ne Win became more revolutionary, the General reacted with increasing irritability and with firmer anti-Peking actions. He was reported to have reacted "furiously" in late 1966 when he rejected the suggestion of the Chinese ambassador that he should resume talks with the Burmese Communist insurgents, and Ne Win told his Foreign Minister that this proposal was typical of "more aggressive Chinese Communist intentions." Apparently convinced that Mao's purge had provided him with leeway to be bolder in his anti-Peking moves, he also told his Foreign Minister that he should "tone down" Rangoon's support of Peking on all foreign policy issues, including UN membership, and to withdraw from use by Chinese technicians all Burmese-provided cars because he was "damned" if he would give the Soviets the idea that Burma was providing the Chinese with transportation for demonstrations against their embassy. He also directed his Foreign Minister to inform the Chinese ambassador that he and the Soviets should keep their quarrels private, that he would not tolerate any demonstrations in Burma, and that his government would take whatever security or

military action was necessary to prevent such demonstrations. When, in late January 1967, Chinese aid technicians threatened the Soviets with a demonstration against their embassy, Ne Win immediately ordered security forces and guards to be stationed around the building. He directed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to curtail aid from Peking and to tell the Chinese of the decision after they completed work on the sugar refinery and paper mill. He was concerned about the number of Chinese technicians (about 450) and ordered internal security forces to keep them (and Chinese embassy officials) under surveillance, as they presented a new security hazard. By early February 1967, he had decided to permit a government-owned newspaper to publicize the actions of about 300 Chinese refugees who had crossed into Burma to escape Mao's purge and the abominations of the Red Guards.

By the spring of 1967, when the new revolutionary line was implemented in Burma by revolutionized Chinese embassy personnel, Mao had dropped most aspects of the old policy of avoiding the appearance of indoctrinating Overseas Chinese. The Chinese embassy, working on young Chinese residents in Rangoon, began distributing Mao buttons, showing bi-weekly movies at the embassy, and organizing groups to perform "voluntary manual labor" on embassy premises. They also organized after-hours Chinese language schools, where Maoist doctrine was included in the curriculum. Couriers from the embassy were reported to be providing guidance and financing of a Maoist indoctrination effort among Chinese in northern Burma in the spring of 1967. By mid-June, Ne Win began to act against Mao's program to create in Burma a network of young Maoist fanatics antagonistic to his government. On 14 June 1967, when Chinese students in Bhamo who were told to remove the Mao buttons they were wearing refused to comply, 64 were expelled from the school. As a result of the incident, the Ministry of Education issued an order, which was publicized locally on 19 June, declaring that students were permitted to wear only badges recognized by the Burmese government.

It was in reaction to this order that pro-Communist Burmese and Chinese students at Rangoon University began

wearing Mao badges, which they had received from the Chinese embassy. Ne Win apparently was informed that the embassy encouraged wearing of these badges by pro-Communist Burmese as well as Chinese students and he almost certainly was told that, by mid-June, the Chinese embassy was requiring Chinese high-school students to write from memory 15 verses from Mao's works before giving an individual his Mao button. The Burmese protested to the Chinese embassy about these activities, but embassy personnel did not desist. On 22 June 1967, during a demonstration against the order banning the wearing of Mao buttons which began at two state-run schools in Rangoon's Chinese section, Chinese embassy personnel reportedly drove up in an embassy car, criticized the headmaster for trying to have the buttons removed, and then passed out more buttons and pamphlets to the students. With Ne Win's permission, the Rangoon press carried this story as well as the pictures showing students mauling Burmese reporters. As a result, Burmese officials closed the schools. The element of Burmese-Chinese national hostility became a major factor in the school demonstrations, and on 26 June, when two Chinese embassy personnel drove past one of several Chinese schools which students were demanding should be opened (and at which the students were shouting slogans praising Mao), the car was stoned by a crowd of angry Burmese. The subsequent events--viz., the smashing of Chinese property by Burmese on the eve of the 26th, the killing of more than 30 local Chinese on the eve of the 27th, and the murder of a Chinese embassy technician on the eve of the 28th--impelled Mao to escalate his revolutionary policy toward Ne Win into open government-to-government recriminations.

Behind the scenes, since early June, complaints and counter-complaints were being exchanged between the Burmese government and the Chinese embassy regarding interference in Burma's internal affairs, the embassy position having been that it was justified in disseminating Maoism in the country as a "necessary step to improve fraternal relations between socialist countries." The PRC Foreign Ministry note of 28 June 1967 protested the incidents but left the Burmese some room for a gradual retreat. However, under pressure from non-professionals

[redacted]

and in the atmosphere of a "revolutionization" of the Foreign Ministry, officials in the Ministry may have been impelled to discard the small degree of restraint in the note. NCNA issued reports, several hours later on the 28th and early on the 29th of June, attacking Rangoon as "reactionary and depicting Ne Win as Peking's enemy.

The incidents seem to have stemmed from a combination of the spontaneous reaction of the Chinese students and the arrogant ("revolutionary") contempt which Chinese diplomats were impelled to display when opposed by a national leader who tried to prevent the dissemination of Maoist doctrine and Mao-cult symbols in his country. In perspective, it was the result of the new missionary activities which Mao required of recently revolutionized diplomats. The American embassy in Rangoon reported in late June 1967 that some members of the Chinese embassy had recently returned from indoctrination courses in Peking. Others had returned earlier. Training in new, revoluionary diplomacy was mandatory for all embassy officials. The two top men in the embassy--i.e., the ambassador and the counsellor--left Rangoon for Peking on 9 January 1967. As of 23 January, 37 diplomats and staff members had left for the mainland. [redacted] a training course in Mao's "thought" and a purge were being carried out among the returned personnel. By mid-January, the "first group" which had taken this course were back in Rangoon. By late January, Chinese aid technicians were threatening the Soviets in Rangoon with a revolutionary demonstration against their embassy. In mid-February, the Red Guard newspaper, Combat News, was distributed in Peking carrying an attack on Ne Win for being an associate of Liu Shao-chi (Liu was indirectly named). In March and April 1967, Mao's "thought" and Mao-cult symbols were being disseminated in Rangoon and northern Burma by Chinese embassy officials and couriers.

Dissemination of the Mao-cult was the immediate cause of the open exchange of recriminations in June and July--an exchange which Peking's encouragement of subversives (viz., training of insurgents and public support for the anti-government goal of the Communist Party of

[redacted]

Burma) had not in itself produced.* It apparently was the smuggling of Maoist propaganda tracts and symbols of the Mao-cult through the Chinese embassy that most intensively stirred resentment against the Chinese leaders. Even the Chinese Communist aid technicians working in the Meiktila textile m ll they had built were primarily engaged, in the spring of 1967, with proselyting Maoist doctrine in the mill and among Burmese laborers in nearby villages, but reports that they had smuggled weapons into the area for transfer to the White Flags were not confirmed.

Dissemination of the Mao-cult, reflecting Mao's contempt for Burmese nationalistic sensitivities, was sustained and justified in early July. Speakers at the Peking rally of 5 July demanded that Rangoon permit Overseas Chinese and "the Burmese people to study, propagate, and defend the great thought of Mao Tse-tung," and the People's Daily, while avoiding in its issue of 10 July the formulation about the "Burmese people," continued to insist that "The propagation of Mao Tse-tung's thought is the sacred and inviolable right of the Chinese personnel working abroad. It is absolutely proper and justified for the patriotic Overseas Chinese to love the great leader Chairman Mao Tse-tung, study his works, and wear badges with his profile."

Mao's reaction to the events of June was to seek revenge. His punitive action against the Ne Win government was tied directly to ransacking of "the economic counsellor's office of the Chinese embassy in charge of China's economic aid to Burma" on 27 June, the murder of

*Open support for the Burmese Communists became a diplomatic sin requiring retribution only after recriminations regarding the dissemination of the Mao-cult and the riots had been well under way. For example, Rangoon did not act until 17 July 1967 to withdraw the stay permit of the NCNA correspondent, ordering him to leave by 17 July, for an offense which had occurred on 28 June when he reported in full the statement of the Communist Party of Burma which had called for the "complete overthrow" of Ne Win.

"Chinese expert Liu I" on 28 June, and the subsequent Burmese action in asking Chinese aid personnel to stay in their residences at work sites in order to ensure their security. Peking claimed that these actions had made it "very difficult for them to continue working normally." (PRC government note to Rangoon of 5 July 1967) That is, the Chinese leaders had ordered the technicians to stop work. Ne Win moved to make Peking take the responsibility for discontinuing the aid program, and in early August he instructed senior foreign policy aides to ask the Chinese when they would resume work and to use any indication that the stoppage would continue as the pretext for asking them to leave the country. In notes on 16 and 24 August, the Burmese insisted on Peking's responsibility for suspending work on the projects and declared that Burma would rather see the aid agreement broken than accept continued Chinese mixing of political with economic matters. On 29 August, the Chinese charge was summoned to the Foreign Ministry and was given a note which in effect asked the Chinese to leave if they insisted on making their work-stoppage a matter of political retribution.* That the Chinese throughout July and August were not directed by Peking either to resume work or to leave the country suggested that the Chinese leaders were reluctant to terminate the aid project because it would end Peking's influence, which the Soviets might be requested to replace in the form of a new aid program.**

*This note of 29 August was a follow-up to the Burmese note of 16 August which had asked if the technicians would resume work and, if so, when--a line of probing intended to force the Chinese to withdraw which had been suggested to senior foreign policy aides by Ne Win in early August.

**An eight-man Soviet aid delegation had arrived in Rangoon on 27 July, and although their primary mission was to discuss a technical problem--water leakage at a dam of the major irrigation project built with Soviet aid--the Chinese may have believed that they were negotiating a new agreement at a time of Peking-Rangoon recriminations. The Soviets actually were asking to take over Chinese aid projects, but they were rebuffed.

Nevertheless, while desiring to retain their personnel in the country, the Chinese leaders continued their recriminatory exchanges with Rangoon, repeating the revolutionary and undiplomatic formulations that Ne Win's government was "reactionary" and that it would have to pay a "blood debt."* The Chinese were refused permission to send an investigation-consolation delegation (Burmese government note of 6 September 1967); they warned Rangoon that pending a satisfactory reply to "five demands" (which included punishment of persons involved in raids on the Chinese embassy in late June) "there exists no condition whatever for the Chinese experts to continue their work." (Peking Radio broadcast of 4 October) But the Burmese had no intention of complying: on 4 October, they had released the only man accused of entering the embassy and stabbing the aid expert. Ne Win acted to force the Chinese out by having his Foreign Office Executive Secretary U Ohn Khin summon the Chinese charge, Hsiao Ming, on 6 October and, using as the immediate cause the Peking Radio broadcast of the 4th, asked that the aid experts be withdrawn. The Chinese did not comply--they may have been hoping that prior to the withdrawal deadline of 31 October Ne Win would rescind his request. Finally, in their statement of 31 October 1967, they announced that they were pulling out all of their aid personnel and, for the first time, publicly conceded that (1) Rangoon had demanded such a drastic withdrawal and (2) the Chinese experts had not been on the job since late June. The statement's warning that Peking will continue to support the "Burmese people's revolutionary struggle" was merely a public declaration of a series of concrete actions which

*They refused to tone down their vituperation, and the Chinese charge transgressed diplomatic usage by telling the Burma-Chinese Chamber of Commerce meeting in his speech of 1 October that "the reactionary Burmese government is responsible for the recent Sino-Burmese incidents in this country. The sacrifices of those Chinese who suffered defending Mao's thoughts demand a repayment for the blood debt owed by the Burmese government."

the Chinese Communists already had taken to support anti-government insurgents.

Mao's new revolutionary policy toward Ne Win had started, in July 1967, to incorporate an effort to subvert tribal minority groups and to enlist them in a general Communist-led rural insurrection against Rangoon. The effort was to be aided from the mainland across the Yunnan border, thereby providing all insurgents with sanctuary when needed and with equipment and training. Mao's strategy since the late 1920s had placed a high value on the merits of operating in border areas, both in China from province to province and, later, along international borders.

the effort to gain the loyalty of Kachin (total of about 4,000) and Shan (a similar total) rebels and to have them assist the White Flag Communists (also a similar total) in a protracted guerrilla war began in July when the Chinese established contacts and desired to train and supply these groups.

Regarding the Kachins, a former Kachin army officer, who had escaped to the mainland in mid-1950 returned to north Burma and held talks with two active Kachin leaders in late July 1967. In mid-August, PLA personnel reportedly crossed the border and contacted the headquarters of the insurgent Kachin Independence Army offering arms aid; the Kachin Independence Army chief, Zaw Tu, who reportedly had met with Chinese Communist officials in late August, issued orders in mid-October to all Kachins to study Mao's "thought," to eliminate KMT remnants, and to prepare to launch an anti-government offensive in 1968. Regarding the Shans, the Shan insurgent leader in the Namhkam-Muse area was reported to have met with a PLA brigadier general on 24 July near Meng Mao in Yunnan Province where he was given arms, uniforms, and money for provisioning his 150 troops; the former Kachin army officer talked with Shan as well as Kachin insurgent leaders in late July. Kachin and Shan border-corssers visiting the Wan-ting area for rice and salt purchases on the Chinese side were reported in August to have been told by the Chinese Communists that "If the Kachin Independence Army leaders

will enter China seeking aid, they will be allowed to buy weapons and ammunition." Regarding local Chinese, the Chinese embassy in Rangoon reportedly sent four Overseas Chinese to north Burma in early September to help organize an armed underground force among local Chinese. These contacts with the Kachins and Shans may have had a purpose beyond organization and training, namely to arrange for improved means of contact with the White Flag Communists in central Burma.

Regarding the White Flag Communists, Mao's new revolutionary policy included an appeal to them which was more extensively and openly disseminated than ever before demanding the overthrow of Ne Win. Peking Radio on 1 July broadcast a Communist Party of Burma statement, dated 28 June, calling for the "complete overthrow" of Ne Win and praising Mao. This appeal was later made in the name of the CCP itself; in the unprecedented open message sent by the Central Committee to "Chairman Thakin Than Tun" on 14 August, the Chinese called for the "overthrow of the reactionary Ne Win government" and "complete victory in the revolutionary war in Burma." Reports of developments within the White Flag wing of the party suggest that a major dispute on strategy had been under way since early 1967 among two leadership groups. A White Flag official [redacted] stated [redacted] that the Communist Party of Burma had become Peking-oriented and that it had been sending mainland-trained personnel to rural areas of Burma to conduct indoctrination work. He said that the "cultural revolution" on the mainland had been debated among party leaders and that following a dispute among them, two politburo members, Goshal and Thakin Htay, who had refused to accept the insurrectionist line, were killed in Burma by members who had preferred Mao's strategy. He also said that a directive had been issued by CPB leaders to all area commanders ordering them to arrest all members who would not accept the Maoist line. On 11 August 1967, NCNA carried excerpts from an article dated December 1966 from the Communist Party of Burma organ claiming that the Burmese party had adopted Mao's people's war doctrine at a central committee meeting in 1964 but had had to wage a hard struggle since then against an opposition line within

the party. The imposition of Mao's guerrilla warfare line, following the suppression of the dissenters, apparently was reflected in reports that, in late June 1967, the White Flags had started to "reorient" all cadres to become revolutionary insurgents in central Burma. The Chinese began to claim in the summer of 1967 that "the Burmese people's armed forces" were active in the countryside and that several thousand people in one of the rural "base areas" had held an anti-government rally "under the leadership of the Communist Party of Burma." (NCNA report of 9 August 1967) [redacted] in late August, between 30 and 50 White Flag guerrillas had been sent across the border for training by the Chinese Communists in paramilitary operations in a course to last for four months, after which time they were to be re-infiltrated and dispatched to various parts of Burma to provide military-political training for other young White Flag fighters. In September, the White Flags were reported to have been trying to improve the party organization in the Shan states to facilitate transit to and from the mainland. According to a report in early December, roughly 40 Burmese Communist guerrillas were receiving military training on the mainland and, when sent back to Burma, were to provide a new cadre nucleus for the party in certain areas. Mao had revived his policy of the late 1940s and early 1950s when he and his chief revolutionary aide, Liu Shao-chi, had encouraged Asian Communists, including the Burmese, to wage "armed struggle" against their governments.

Mao attributed to another man the responsibility for a policy which he (Mao) and Chou had changed at an earlier period. The scapegoat for the restrained policy toward Rangoon (from mid-1951 to 1966) was Liu Shao-chi. The public falsification of Liu's role and the accusations against him were made by "the first deputy chairman of the Communist Party of Burma, Thakin Ba Thein Tin," a White Flag resident in Peking for six years. He claimed that:

> Because of the wrecking [activities] of China's Khrushchev, the Burmese revolution and the Chinese people were transformed from close

> friends to distant relatives. China's Khrushchev treated Ne Win as a relative but did not have a good thought for the Burmese Communists. This is not accidental; there is a reason for it. Twenty years ago [1947] our party was loyal to Marxism-Leninism and the thought of Mao Tse-tung. For this reason it is natural that China's Khrushchev, who opposes Marxism-Leninism and the thought of Mao Tse-tung, should treat us badly. Although China's Khrushchev did not like us, we continued the struggle for more than 19 years in accordance with Chairman Mao's teaching on self-reliance...China's Khrushchev... already has had his authority swept in the dust. (Speech given at the Peking memorial ceremony on 5 July 1967 and published in People's Daily on 6 July)

But the record indicates that Chou En-lai and Chen Yi were far more directly involved in Mao's policy to encourage neutralism in Burma starting in 1952 than Liu had been. When Mao's policy required that Ne Win should be further mollified and that Burmese Communist interests should be further subordinated to Peking's foreign policy interests, Liu merely complied with Mao's new line. But compliance has been twisted to mean blame for initiating a reduction of insurgency.* At a time when Mao and Chou

*The beginning of the low ebb of the insurgency in Burma was "mid-1951" which resulted from "pressure exerted" by Liu in order to reduce the number of battles fought and to impose a "strategic withdrawal" from the cities. (Thakin Ba Thein Tin article published in Peking Review in two parts, the second appearing in the issue of 1 September 1967) The article contains statements which suggest that disputes had arisen among the Burmese Communists (and between the Chinese and Soviets as well as among the Chinese leaders themselves) on whether armed struggles could be waged in a "small" country, or on an island, whether it was necessary to concentrate in "every" (footnote continued on page 87)

(as well as other Chinese leaders) were trying to rebuild Peking's image as a reasonable and non-aggressive regime following the Sino-Indian border war of late 1962 and the Chinese rejection of the partial nuclear test ban treaty in mid-1963, the policy was to encourage the Burmese to accept peace talks with Ne Win, and 20 White Flag leaders resident in Peking were sent to Burma in October 1963 to participate in these negotiations. Liu apparently was among the Chinese leaders who talked with them (and with Burma-based Communists who had come to Peking for instructions), but he would not have encouraged them if he had not gained Mao's concurrence (if, in fact, he were not acting on Mao's instruction). The post facto accusation includes the complaint that

> He went so far as to tell the Communist Party of Burma to lay down its arms, alleging: 'You can do without your weapons or bury them underground or you can reorganize your troops into the national defense forces'. (Talk with a foreigner on 26 April 1963); and 'cooperate' with Ne Win, 'to what end?' 'To carry out a socialist revolution.' (Talk with foreign comrades on 20 July 1963). (Joint Red Flag-People's Daily article of 14 August 1967)

This aspect of the effort to completely disparage Liu Shao-chi is centered on the charge that he suppressed armed struggle in Southeast Asian countries--"Whether or not the countries of Southeast Asia should follow the

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(footnote continued from page 86)
battle an "absolutely" superior guerrilla force, and whether initially small and weak forces could eventually become big and strong. The answers were, of course, given in the affirmative and later, on 19 December 1967, Mao personally and for the first time declared that his protracted war strategy was applicable to "small" as well as big countries.

Chinese revolutionary road or follow the Indian road, became the fundamental issue between Chairman Mao and the revisionists." (Leadership speeches of 3 June 1967 printed in Red Guard Newspaper of 15 September 1967).* In view of Liu's earlier prestige in the CCP as the man most closely associated from 1949-1951 with the expansion of armed struggles in Southeast Asia, the attack also seems to be intended as a way to deprive him of that prestige and to transfer it to Mao.

Sino-Burmese relations are formally sustained by the continued presence of official representatives in the embassy of each country, but Mao's revived revolutionary line has significantly reduced (if not completely ruined) his prospects for ever moving Ne Win from a neutral to an assertively anti-American position. Any effort to organize and use pro-Peking Overseas Chinese, particularly

*The 15 September issue of this paper attributes the "pacifist line" to Liu, Teng Hsiao-ping, Peng Chen, Wang Chia-hsiang, and others (unspecified), that is, to men Mao had purged and who were incapable of defending themselves by pointing to the early policy role of Mao and Chou.

Liu Shao-chi has also been made the scapegoat for the previous cautious policy toward Overseas Chinese in Burma --a policy which Chou En-lai in fact had implemented in the period from 1954 to 1966. It was Liu's policy which Chen Yi was said to have implemented, and it was part of this policy to "capitulate" to Ne Win. "Chen Yi always thought in terms of making concessions in order to bring about a 'normalization' of relations between the two countries. Ne Win took a mile when given an inch. In June 1967, he started forbidding Chinese students from wearing Mao badges...Chen Yi opposed Mao's thought and did not regard it as an important force for carrying out world revolution and aiding the local people's rev lutionary struggle." (Item in joint issue of Foreign Affairs Red Flag and Revolutionary Overseas Chinese Newspaper of 12 September 1967)

the Fukienese and Cantonese groups in Rangoon, will be additional reason for Ne Win to sustain the close security surveillance of Chinese embassy officers and to refuse to accept any increase in personnel from the mainland. Armed struggle will become a real problem for the government, and the prospect is for (1) increased Chinese material aid to the guerrillas and (2) strengthening of the contacts between White Flag and tribal (mainly) Kachin insurgents and formation of Maoist-type guerrilla base-areas.

2. Nepal

Nepal has been encouraged to remain neutral not only to prevent it from joining CENTO, but also to detach it from New Delhi's dominant influence. Mao and Chou moved cautiously in the mid-1950s, and when Peking was formally recognized by King Mahendra on 1 August 1955, they still deferred to Nehru's sensibilities, using the Chinese and Nepalese ambassadors to New Delhi to act concurrently in that capitol as representatives to each other and avoiding the issue of sending an ambassador directly to Kathmandu. But following the Tibet revolt in March 1959 and intensified Sino-Indian border clashes thereafter, Mao and Chou apparently viewed closer relations with the Nepalese as a means to help isolate Nehru internationally. They apparently decided to try to make their charges of Indian "expansionism" appear credible by treating Nepal as a completely independent country, intending this to be a contrast with New Delhi's depreciatory paternalism.

At the same time, in the fall of 1959 they continued to view the U.S. as the real threat in Asia, far greater than India, and they were worried about the establishment of military rule in Pakistan. They tried to operate on Mao's incongruous principle of "uniting with while struggling against" Nehru, that is, to take a hard line on their territorial claims along the border but to maneuver Nehru toward a border agreement which would in itself reduce Sino-Indian frictions. They were alert to the possibility that a military regime might be established in New Delhi and on 8 October 1959, Mao and Liu Shao-chi tried to

deflect complaints from Indian Communist Party leader Ajoy Ghosh that Nehru was being pushed by Peking's policy on the border dispute into the "Anglo-American camp." Mao and Liu told Ghosh that they were aware of this possible development, and Liu included India and Nepal among the countries which the U.S. intended "to capture...to encircle the socialist camp militarily." Mao made a distinction between Nehru and his "rightist" advisers, who wanted to exploit the border dispute to help Washington "isolate China." Mao professed to believe that Nehru might still be induced to negotiate a border agreement with Peking. Characteristically, Liu took a harder line. He stated that Nehru's attitude was that of "a reactionary who is basically anti-Communist; he is not even like Sukarno, who has appreciated the Indonesian Communist Party." This was a harder position than Chou En-lai had taken regarding Nehru at the time.* Chou was used by Mao to try to advance the "unite-with-Nehru" half of his policy, and he was sent to New Delhi in April 1960 to

*Teng Hsiao-ping also depicted Nehru as a reactionary and seems to have preferred the "struggle against Nehru" half of Mao's policy. Teng said that Nehru must be struggled against as well as mollified, otherwise the bloc--he meant Khrushchev--would "inflate his reactionary arrogance." (Speech of 14 November 1960 at the Moscow conference of Communist parties) The image of Liu and Teng which emerges from reports on their view of Nehru is that they were more disparaging of him than Mao and Chou had been.

Regarding possible differences between Chou's moderate line and the apparent Liu-Teng hard line, Chou's prestige among CCP officials had been built partly on his ability to work productively with Nehru, to keep him nonaligned and a defender of Peking's "rights" in the UN, and Chou may have feared that any shift to a harder "struggle" line would be capitulating to the Liu-Teng policy of attacking Nehru as a reactionary. Firefights on the border and a direct rebuff from Nehru in New Delhi in April 1960 impelled Chou to comply with the harder line.

convince Nehru and his advisers that it was in their interest to negotiate a border agreement. He was rebuffed, and although he tried, almost desperately, at the press conference immediately before his return to Peking to portray his mission as a new advance, Sino-Indian relations continued to worsen. Mao was impelled to use Chou in the "struggle-against-Nehru" half of his policy, which included a major effort to depict India--in contrast to Nepal, Burma, Afghanistan, and Pakistan--as the intransigent party in the border dispute. Nepal was accorded even more deliberate treatment as a completely independent country than ever before.

Chou En-lai had the major role in moving the Nepalese away from New Delhi, and he was successful in gaining their agreement in March 1960 to demilitarize the border and to start the process of demarcation. He also had the job of trying to mollify Prime Minister Koirala in July 1960 following a Sino-Nepalese firefight near Mustang (28 June), in the course of which maneuvering he took a soft line, admitting that the cause had been Chinese "carelessness," expressing regret, and accepting Nepalese demands for compensation--all this in an effort to prevent the Nepalese from extensively publicizing the Chinese military action and thereby providing New Delhi with an exploitable event. In August 1960, the Nepalese had been mollified and accepted closer ties as indicated by Peking's placement of an ambassador in Kathmandu. The Chinese leaders later (on 4 October 1961) were able to underscore New Delhi's intransigence by signing a border agreement with the Nepalese (Burma already had been moved into Peking's camp with the agreement in 1960). The agreement, when finally settled on specific issues, used the "traditional boundary" and split the difference on ownership of Mt. Everest by drawing the line through its summit. Chou, who was impelled to take increasingly hard positions regarding Nehru, had been the diplomatic commander in this exercise. By the spring of 1962, the Chinese were exploiting New Delhi's depreciatory paternalism toward Nepal openly, and they formally accused India of "great-nation chauvinism," claiming that in India's view "Nepal no longer exists, Sikkim no longer exists, and Bhutan no longer exists." (PRC note to New Delhi of 31 May 1962)

Deferential treatment of the Nepalese was used to increase the degree of their anti-Indian sentiment, and several Chinese leaders indicated their awareness of the power of flattery. They made political gains by convincing Nepalese officials that only fairminded leaders of a big country would respect the sensibilities of leaders of a small country. They also made gains by indirectly disparaging the Indians. For example, implying a contrast with the courageous Nepalese fighters, Chen Yi in December 1962 disparaged Indian soldiers in the course of a discussion with Nepal's Special Ambassador R. Shaha. Reporting to American officials about his December 1962 trip to Peking, Shaha also stated that Liu, Chou, and Chen had "impressed" him with their "Oriental politeness," citing as an example Liu's behavior in descending from his office to the street to hold the car door open for him; he did not say why he believed this was uniquely Oriental. Chou handled the important substantive matters with him and insisted that Shaha ask King Mahendra to agree in writing to stipulate in the Sino-Nepalese aid agreement that the Chinese have the permission to bring into Nepal "from the north" heavy equipment necessary to build the 65-mile Kodari-Kathmandu road. Chou stated that New Delhi would not permit this equipment to come to Nepal through India, and when, on 13 January 1963, a protocol was signed in Kathmandu concerning the "machinery" as well as the experts and goods to be provided for building the road, the implication was that Chou had won his point on moving equipment into Nepal "from the north." This was an important advance in the effort to increase Peking's influence and closer contacts by cutting out New Delhi from Sino-Nepalese relations and operating from Tibet.

Mao had moved a considerable distance in a common cause with a "feudal" regime, leaving his doctrinal position to be adjusted later in the course of the advance. Justification for working with "feudalists" was finally set forth in the important CCP letter to the CPSU on 14 June 1963: among our allies we may include "certain kings, princes, and aristocrats, who are patriotic." Mao's aides sustained the advance with new offers of economic assistance, and regarding a prestige project of the King's--the 100-mile stretch of Nepal's East-West highway which was

aligned just north of the Indian-Nepalese border--the Chinese signed an agreement on 27 April 1964 to finance their part of this road with $20 million.* But the King was impelled by pressure from New Delhi to turn over the project to the Indian government. As a result, the Chinese leaders in March 1965 were confronted with a rebuff to which they could have replied in high dudgeon, but Mao and Chou apparently decided to absorb the insult and offer support for additional aid projects. They chose not to warm Indian hearts with the spectacle of a Sino-Nepalese political dispute and they apparently did not protest the King's decision. However, they implicitly warned the Nepalese against New Delhi's dilatory tactics to prolong the presence of Indian aid experts in the country. On 31 March 1965, Chen Yi performed admirably in Kathmandu as a man full of "understanding," on the one hand, but he told Foreign Minister Thapa that he hoped the Indians would build the East-West highway "as soon as possible" and that it would prove to be of great economic benefit to Nepal, on the other hand. This sarcasm reflected a Chinese effort, from a fallback position, to keep the Nepalese leaders from committing themselves too deeply and for too long to the Indians and Americans.**

*The $20 million was made available to the King by the cancellation of two earlier-projected Chinese aid projects. The Chinese had to abandon construction of the cement and paper plant because, as the Sino-Soviet dispute intensified, they could not, they claimed, acquire equipment from East Germany and Czechoslovakia. By June 1964, the Soviets were engaged in a direct competition to aid the Nepalese and they began to complain that the Chinese were deliberately interfering with their work at Panauti by failing to keep open part of the Kathmandu-Kodari road for transit of Soviet equipment.

**Mao later directed a similar warning at the Nepalese. In discussions with Nepal's Crown Prince Birendra on 12 July 1966, he stressed self-reliance and contrasted "unselfish" aid (Peking's) with aid with strings attached from other countries--countries which intentionally "drag out" their aid projects to ensure a continued presence in Nepal.

The Chinese had good reason to be restrained in their warnings to the Nepalese leaders because the King was useful to them. The "feudal" King was receptive to the Chinese effort to move the majority group of the Communist Party of Nepal out of the CPSU camp in the Sino-Soviet dispute. In early August 1964, the leader of the pro-Soviet group, Secretary General Rayamajhi, complained privately that the King was pressing him to support openly the CCP. Rayamajhi implied clear-cut CCP collusion with Mahendra and stated that the "highest secretaries" in government ministries had been "bought" by Chinese officials. The Chinese ambassador personally tried to enlist Rayamajhi on 1 October 1964, ticking off a series of "patriotic" reasons why the leader of the pro-Soviet majority group should support the CCP. Rayamajhi rejected the approach and reported to the Soviets. Nevertheless, the Chinese ambassador persisted and offered to meet individual Nepalese Communist officials himself to try to persuade them, and he suggested that his actions would not be criticized by the King even though he was "a diplomat meeting with party members." The Chinese effort to subvert the pro-Soviet majority was not successful, but it was not because Mahendra had not participated; on the contrary, on 29 September 1964, Rayamajhi informed Soviet embassy officials that the King himself had been persistent in urging him to meet with the Chinese ambassador. The Chinese used other methods to move local Communists into their camp. [redacted] during February and March 1965, 45 influential members of the Communist Party of Nepal were given four weeks of training by the Chinese under the cover of the Kodari road project, the lectures having included the CCP line on the dispute with the CPSU, India's "domination" of Nepal and the West's "domination" of India, espionage techniques to be used against Indian and Nepalese armed forces, and weapons acquisition and use.

The Chinese continued to expand their presence in the country through additional projects and aid in the amount of $43 million. On 7 September 1965, they agreed to help the Nepalese build a new highway fr m Kathmandu to Pokhara and to assist in Nepal's new five-year plan. Mao and Chou worked together on 11 July 1966 in an effort

to reassure a Nepalese delegation that they wanted to continue the aid policy, inasmuch as Nepal was pursuing an "independent" foreign policy. Mao was critical of aid projects from unspecified "other" countries which were dragged out to permit a continued foreign presence, and he stressed to Crown Prince Birendra the importance of sustaining a policy of self-reliance--an implicit warning against accepting more aid from New Delhi and Washington. During the visit, the Crown Prince and his delegation attained agreement for an additional $20 million in aid (the final documents were signed on 21 December 1966). Sino-Nepalese relations continued on a friendly basis until the spring and summer of 1967 when in the course of Mao's purge on the mainland his cult was exported to Nepal. When, on 25 May 1967, a Chinese economic delegation signed an agreement to build a hydroelectric plant, a second long road and two short ones (in the Kathmandu valley), and cooperated with the Nepalese to prepare for the celebration of the opening of the Kathmandu-Kodari road on the 26th, Mao's policy toward Nepal seemed to be unchanged by the purge on the mainland.

However, "revolutionized" Chinese officials had returned to the embassy in late May following their indoctrination in Peking on the methods for and necessity of disseminating the Mao-cult abroad. In NCNA's account of the Kathmandu-Kodari road opening ceremony on 26 May, Nepalese sensitivities were irritated by the ludicrous claim that "many" Nepalese people shouted that "the great leader, Chairman Mao, is the red sun which shines most brightly in the hearts of the people all over the world." The Mao-cult was also being disseminated along the road between the capitol, Kathmandu, and the Nepalese village on the Tibet border, Kodari, according to a USAID employee who had taken a trip along the road and reported to the American embassy in mid-July that Nepalese workers, school boys, and even a beggar were wearing Mao badges at all points along the road. He also stated that the Chinese were disseminating Mao's "thought" in various ways in every village on the route. This information confirmed earlier reports of a similar nature, reports which had already seriously troubled the King and Prime Minister Thapa. On 6 March, Thapa had already been reported as

ready to train Nepalese police in techniques for countering this propaganda work.* The export of the Mao-cult beginning in the spring of 1967 on a large scale and with increasing openness by the embassy in Kathmandu and Chinese aid experts along the raod--10 to 15 bags of mail a day came through the Nepalese postal system from Kodari containing mostly printed material--alerted the Foreign Ministry to the probability of a showdown. The Nepalese press in Kathmandu began to complain about the cult and these complaints helped start a chain of events which turned Sino-Nepalese relations onto a rocky road.

In March and April 1967, several papers commented on the implication of photos (published in Peking Review on 24 February 1967) that the Nepalese peasants and workers consider Mao to be their leader. The Foreign Ministry did not formally protest, but "discussed" the matter with officials at the Chinese embassy. On June 17, 24, and 25, Chinese embassy officials conducted anti-India and anti-U.S. demonstrations for Chinese diplomats transitting Kathmandu airport after their expulsion from New Delhi, and the Nepalese leaders warned the Chinese against such actions, at first indirectly in a confidential circular to all embassies (on 22 June) and later directly following the demonstration on the 25th. Foreign Minister Bista and Foreign Ministry Secretary Singha apparently took a "firm line" with the Chinese ambassador and embassy officials, warning them to abide by Nepalese regulations if they wished to remain in the country. The Nepalese press was less restrained, and with secret encouragement from government officials, criticized the Chinese by name for trying to dissiminate the Mao-cult and for disregarding diplomatic propriety.

*Earlier, the Chinese Communist embassy had been active (beginning in October 1966) in assisting a handful of pro-Chinese members of the Communist Party of Nepal to establish a "research bureau" for the study of Mao's "thought," and knowledge of the group's existence probably created suspicions among Nepalese security officials.

Following the airport incidents, deep anti-Peking resentments were sustained among officials and students. On the evening of 1 July, anti-Chinese students demanded that the red star and the PRC flag should be removed from the Chinese exhibition at the fairgrounds during the annual King's birthday fete. They complained that there was no tribute to the King at the Chinese stall and that, on the contrary, only Mao was being idolized. They burned Mao in effigy and attacked a Chinese photographer and an embassy car. A Nepalese official promised to comply with the students' demands (and was later criticized in the Chinese protest of 8 July for having done so). The anti-Chinese students acted after a smaller group of pro-Chinese had moved from the local college to the fairgrounds and raised pro-Chinese posters. According to another account, the anti-Chinese students had given the Nepalese authorities an ultimatum, expiring on 1 July, to remove Mao's portrait from the Chinese stall and warned that they would pull it down if the authorities failed to act. In any case, the resentment following the gauche demonstrations of revolutionary Chinese embassy officials at the airport* had burst into anti-Chinese group action, and one mob marched from the fairgrounds to the center of town, throwing books of quotations from Mao onto the street from a stall specializing in Chinese Communist publications and tearing down the sign over the Sino-Nepalese Friendship Library.

There is some evidence which suggests that the professionals--viz., the men in the Chinese embassy and in the Foreign Ministry--reacted with caution, but that "revolutionized" non-professionals later decided to take a hard line by accusing Kathmandu of complicity. Following

*The airport demonstrations had started a government-supported campaign to curtail dissemination of the Mao-cult in Nepal and part of the effort had been encouragement of the press to print articles critical of Chinese activities. In addition, local schools had been ordered to prohibit the waring of Mao buttons.

the 1 July incidents, Peking Radio did not comment immediately, and the Chinese at first kept the dispute in private channels. On 4 July, the Chinese ambassador protested privately, but this action was not publicized by Peking and its content was not distributed by the Chinese embassy. At roughly the same time during the first week in July, the Chinese embassy was reported to have complied with a Nepalese request to stop a Chinese cultural troupe from distributing Mao buttons and books. Peking's first comment, a broadcast of 5 July, was (for the Chinese Communists) relatively non-provocative, accusing only the U.S. and India of responsibility for the 1 July incidents. As late as 8 July, a Nepalese newspaper, known to have had contacts with Chinese embassy officials, announced that Peking had asked Nepalese students (who left in 1966) to return to the mainland to resume classes by 10 August. (Nepal's Foreign Secretary told U.S. officials that he had questioned the Chinese ambassador "recently" on the promised return of Nepalese students and the ambassador simply said he would query Peking.) As of 8 July, the Chinese embassy had not publicized the protest. Chou En-lai may have been making the decisions for Mao on handling the Nepalese situation, trying to dampen down the effects on Sino-Nepalese relations of the 1 July incidents while authorizing a protest as a warning to the King and his aides against further incidents.

Non-professional fanatics in the Foreign Ministry may have intervened on 8 July to charge the Nepalese government for the first time with complicity. This may have been the reason for the change to a hard line on the 8th. Their intervention suggests that they had (or believed they had) Mao's permission to take an abusive, undiplomatic line. In any case, a "revolutionary" decision was made, and on 8 July the 4 July protest was publicized along with a claim that in the protest "the Chinese ambassador...on instruction of the Chinese government" pointed out that the incidents were "planned" by the U.S. and India and were "approved and supported by the Nepalese government." The 8 July NCNA report criticized "reactionary forces in Nepal" for prohibiting the wearing of Mao buttons and carrying of Mao-quotation books by Nepalese students. These and other

charges in the 8 July blast took many Nepalese officials by surprise, inasmuch as they believed that the Chinese leaders in Peking were acting as professionally and rationally as the ambassador in an effort to downplay the incidents. The Nepalese tried to prevent the situation from escalating into a major exchange of recriminations. Their Foreign Ministry denial of the 8 July NCNA accusations as "false and baseless" was carried in the government press on 10 July without comment, and on 11 July, the Director of Publicity tried to convince all non-government editors of the need to make no comment. Despite the effort, some editorials were published, attacking both prohibited subjects, namely, China and Mao, by name. More importantly, the Foreign Secretary reported that the Chinese ambassador did not react vehemently in response to the Nepalese protest of 10 July--a protest which had been combined with assurances of Kathmandu's interest in good relations with China. The Chinese ambassador, in turn, stated that Peking did not wish to embarrass Nepal.

In direct contrast to the moderate and rational behavior of the Chinese ambassador, an NCNA report of 21 July thundered a series of demands to Kathmandu, dictating a hard line to the Chinese ambassador. It sarcastically referred to Nepalese professions to "the Chinese ambassador" of a desire to maintain good relations and then demanded that Kathmandu "must promptly annul all measures discriminating against China and stop all anti-Chinese utterances and deeds on Nepalese territory." (emphasis supplied) In contrast to the non-vitriolic reaction of the Chinese ambassador to Nepal's 10 July protest of NCNA's 8 July harangue, the NCNA blast of 21 July declared that the Nepalese government had refused "to admit" complicity in the anti-Chinese incidents: "The Chinese government catagorically rejected this unwarranted protest." (emphasis supplied) The Chinese ambassador, Yang Kung-su, was not mentioned by name (as he had been, favorably, in the NCNA blast of 8 July) and the new protest note was made in the name of the "Chinese embassy"--a more impersonal formulation. He may have been in trouble over his failure to reject all the protests which Nepalese officials had made since the confidential circular of 22 June 1967. The

ambassador apparently was recalled and replaced as acting chief of the embassy by Li Chung-ho, the charge. Fanatic non-professionals who, it is here conjectured, may have been permitted by Mao to make the hard-line decisions, apparently were trying to defend their irrational actions when they later insisted that it had been the Nepalese "and not the NCNA report" of 8 July which had damaged Kathmandu's reputation. (NCNA report of 21 July 1967)

Chou En-lai apparently was not permitted to reassert a rational and professional attitude in Sino-Nepalese relations until mid-August. According to Nepal's Foreign Secretary, the Chinese charge, who returned from Peking to the Chinese embassy on 14 August, hand-carried a letter to King Mahendra from Chou in which Chou stated that in the interests of "friendship," the Chinese would take no retaliatory actions in Peking (presumably against Nepalese officials and their embassy) for the recent anti-Chinese actions in Nepal. This significant foreign policy move suggests that Chou continues to be the man responsible for the ingredients of sanity and relative restraint that appear, on occasion, to cut across Mao's compulsion to shift all aspects of Peking's foreign policy to the left.

Although elements of rationality have reappeared and open hostility has subsided from the peak of July 1967, Mao's Nepal policy has been shifted to the left.*

*Peking and Kathmandu dropped recriminations in August 1967 and both sides have reaffirmed traditional "friendship," the Chinese charge in his speech at the dedication ceremony for a Chinese warehouse project in Kathmandu on 27 September and King Mahendra in his message of 1 October to Mao. However, Peking's behavior in July has made the Nepalese more suspicious of the Chinese then they had been in recent years. The government has established a committee in the Foreign Ministry to investigate the activities and contacts of all Foreign Ministry officials and staff members to determine which of them are agents of Peking and Moscow. Another Foreign Ministry committee has been established to evaluate security reports on the activities of Chinese and Soviet officials.

It will continue to have new "revolutionary" features requiring demonstrations of official contempt for any Nepalese contacts with the U.S. despite the major concern to mollify Kathmandu, on occasion, in order to prevent New Delhi from reasserting its influence more extensively in the country.*

3. Afghanistan

Afghanistan's unobtrusive neutralism and generally inactive role in major international developments have kept it on the periphery of Peking's foreign policy efforts, and its top diplomats have been less active in Kabul than in any "friendly" country on mainland borders. Nevertheless, Mao permitted Chou to enlist its leaders in his cause to demonstrate extensive international recognition of the Peking regime as a major world power following the Korean war and the Geneva conference of 1954. Ambassadors were exchanged in July 1955 following Chou's diplomatic contacts at the Bandung conference, and on 19 January 1957, Chou for the first time visited Kabul and

*The Chinese ambassador's replacement continued to act as a "revolutionized" diplomat in September, but subsided finally in December. He stated on 27 September 1967 that "we will be able to implement the diplomacy and principles followed by Chairman Mao. We shall strongly support the national struggle for freedom in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, and we shall strongly oppose the imperialist policies of aggression and war, and we shall also oppose the policy of surrender of revisionism..." (emphasis supplied) When, therefore, airport ceremonies were held at the departure on 20 October of the King and Queen for their State Visit to the U.S., the Chinese were the only embassy group unrepresented, and this incensed Nepalese Foreign Ministry officials. However, the Chinese charge appeared at the airport ceremonies on 10 December to welcome the King and Queen on their return.

had "friendly talks" with Prime Minister Daud and other leaders. In his report of the visit, he did not refer to the fact that Afghanistan (like Nepal) was a "feudal" regime and tried to explain that cordial relations with such a doctrinally unacceptable kingdom was possible because it was anti-imperialist and nationalistic. (Report on his visit with Ho Lung to 11 countries, given on 5 March 1957)

With the development of the Sino-Indian and Sino-Soviet disputes, Mao and Chou apparently hoped to add the Afghans to their camp, or at least deter them from adopting New Delhi's and Moscow's positions against Peking's on a whole range of issues. A friendship and nonaggression treaty was signed in 1960, a border agreement was signed in November 1963,* and in March 1965 economic aid and cultural exchange agreements were concluded. But the Chinese have not come close to the level of Soviet economic aid, viz., $600 million, and they are arguing with the Afghans about details for implementing the Parwan Irrigation Project on the Panjshir River. More importantly, the Afghans have not been responsive to Chinese efforts to recruit them to attack U.S. policy on Vietnam. They rebuffed Liu Shao-chi and his delegation on 8 April 1966 when the Chinese tried to induce them to condemn that policy in the Sino-Afghan joint communique issued at the end of his 5-day visit. The communique implied a divergence of views on Vietnam and the U.S., as witness the use of the phrase, "respective stands." An Afghan Foreign Ministry official privately depicted the Chinese attitude on the wording as firm: "If we wouldn't say it their way, they didn't want it included."

*Peng Chen on 22 November 1963 made the signing ceremony the occasion for an indirect jibe at India's intransigence, noting that four countries--Burma, Nepal, Pakistan, and Afghanistan--had adopted an attitude of "active cooperation."

Thus far, however, the unobtrusive Afghans have not stirred any deep resentments and the Chinese have assured Kabul that Mao's purge would not affect the two Afghan art students who are on the mainland and have been permitted to continue their studies there.

4. Ceylon

Mao and Chou established contacts with Ceylon's leaders in 1952 when a trade agreement on an exchange of Chinese rice for Ceylonese rubber was signed, but they remained at a low level. Prime Minister Kotelawala's nonalignment policy had not prevented him from criticizing Communist colonialism and suggesting a "two Chinas" plan at the Bandung conference in April 1955. Later, however, Prime Minister Bandaranaike turned Ceylon's nonalignment policy into a warmer relationship with Peking and as a direct result of an important visit by Chou En-lai, diplomatic relations were established on 7 February 1957 after "fully satisfactory" discussions with Bandaranaike (Chou's foreign policy report of 5 March 1957). Relations became cooler following Ceylon's criticism of the PLA suppression of the Tibet revolt in 1959 and Peking's rejection of the Colombo Conference proposals of December 1962 as binding "preconditions" for starting talks on the Sino-Indian border dispute.*

Nevertheless, both countries agreed to conclude a Maritime Transport Agreement (July 1963) providing

*Chou tried to convince the Prime Minister, Mrs. Bandaranaike, that Nehru was the real intransigent regarding the Colombo Conference proposals. In trying in January 1963 to convince her of his "reasonableness," Chou stated, according to a Ceylonese diplomat, that "I am a man who is always prepared to negotiate. I even negotiated with J.F. Dulles." The Chinese preferred a strong pro-Peking stand from the Prime Minister but did not get it.

for vessels of the two countries to sail to and from the ports of either country and to undertake cargo and passenger services between them and with third countries. Mrs. Bandaranaike's opposition later distorted this agreement, alleging, during the March 1965 general election, that, as the former Prime Minister, she had entered into a secret agreement with Peking, providing the Chinese with naval base rights in Trincomalee and giving Chinese warships access to Ceylon's ports. In mid-March, Mrs. Bandaranaike issued a communique asserting that the agreement was "essentially a pact to regulate commercial shipping," and the former Port Commissioner in Colombo reaffirmed this position to a U.S. embassy officer in November 1966.

Mao's purge and the "revolutionization" of his diplomacy and diplomats exacerbated Sino-Ceylonese relations to an unprecedented degree.* Prime Minister D. Senanayake apparently was angered by information provided him by security officials during a briefing on 1 March 1967 regarding shipments into Ceylon of Maoist propaganda tracts and their sale on the local market or trans-shipment to India. He was further angered by the defense of Mao's purge--a defense which was made publicly in late March by Ceylon's ambassador to Peking, Robert Gunawardena, during a two-week home leave visit. Gunawardena had also declared privately that he wanted to start a Red Guard movement in Ceylon, and in late March, the Prime Minister is reported to have instructed his Foreign Minister to keep Gunawardena from making further speeches. Although Chinese embassy officials at one time had shown some

*That the Ceylonese were anxious to avoid a dispute was indicated by their restrained handling of the Chinese embassy letter, circulated by the Chinese officials in Colombo, which had been addressed to the Soviet ambassador attacking Brezhnev and Kosygin as "filthy swine." In mid-February 1957, Ceylon's Foreign Ministry officials stated only that they were examining the propriety of the Chinese action.

interest in recruiting Gunawardena and supporting him as a leader of the pro-CCP group of the Ceylon Communists, politburo member N. Sanmagathasan was still the Chinese leaders' first choice. On 26 May 1967, NCNA carried an account of his speech to Red Guards in Peking in which he depicted Peking as the "center of world revolution" and Mao as "the greatest teacher, leader, and Marxist-Leninist alive." As a result, Mao showed his personal approval of this kind of sycophancy by having "an extremely cordial conversation" with him on 6 June, despite the fact that support of a Communist regarded by Colombo as a subversive was an insult to Ceylonese sensibilities. Mao's personal encouragement of Sanmagathasan provoked a response by Ceylon's Foreign Minister, who called in the Chinese charge on 11 August 1967 and complained about Peking's support for the Communist leader who was advocating "overthrow" of the government. The charge replied in the most revolutionary way he could--namely, by quoting from Mao's "thought"--and, for such diplomacy, he was ordered out of the Foreign Minister's office.

The immediate cause of open Sino-Ceylonese recriminations, however, was the alleged theft of Chinese goods and the delay of a parcel of Mao buttons (addressed to the Chinese embassy) by Ceylon's customs officials. The Chinese embassy sent a protest note to the government on 15 August complaining of "an open robbery of the export goods from China and the diplomatic articles of the Chinese embassy" at the port of Colombo. The note was then released to the press, indicating that the Chinese embassy had been instructed not to downplay the incident and to move recriminations into public channels. Release of the note to the press forced Ceylonese officials, who had preferred to keep the exchange in private channels, to release their reply to the press. Their counter-protest of 19 August rejected as "frivolous and absurd" the Chinese charge of government complicity in the theft of the Chinese goods. Regarding the delay of the parcel of 300 Mao buttons, the Ceylonese counter-protest note stated that the government was exercising legitimate authority in asking what reasonable use the Chinese embassy of 34 persons had for 300 buttons. It went on to say that while a reasonable quantity of buttons for the embassy was acceptable,

the government could not agree to the importation of 300, "the bulk of which could be distributed to residents of Ceylon." The note in effect warned the Chinese (and local sympathizers) not to go too far in spreading the Mao-cult in Ceylon. The Chinese reply was to organize a demonstration in front of Ceylon's embassy in Peking on 20 August and to send a note to Colombo through the Chinese embassy there on the 22nd (publicized by NCNA on the 23rd). The note of 22 August opened a general attack on Colombo, ostensibly for inviting Chinese Nationalist girl-guides to participate in a Colombo conference on 12 August, but actually for retributive motives.* Demonstrations against the embassy in Peking were again staged in early September, but these were closely controlled, nonviolent, and were neither as sustained as the early February 1967 siege of the Soviet embassy or the entry and burning of offices in the Indonesian and British embassies on 5 and 22 August, respectively.

The Chinese now seem to be reluctant to warm Indian hearts by protracting the dispute with Colombo. Aware that New Delhi had openly speculated about the possibility in September that Peking would not renew its rice-for-rubber barter arrangement, as part of its trade-and-payments agreement with Colombo, the Chinese probably were further impelled to conclude a new five-year agreement on 6 November (with annual contracts to be negotiated and quantities and prices to be worked out each year). However, increased support for pro-Peking Communists may provoke Colombo into a new round of protests, to which the Chinese leaders, operating under a new and more revolutionary policy, almost certainly would respond with open vituperation.

*Following a harangue concerning "the present Ceylon government" and its "unseemly connections" with Taipei (among other charges), it warned that the Chinese would support subversion against Colombo as expressed in the locution about opposition arising from "the people of his own country."

II. An Anti-Communist Quasi-Ally: Pakistan

Mao and Chou apparently viewed Pakistan as a counterweight to India in South Asia, and ever since the establishment of Sino-Pakistani relations in May 1951, they have avoided antagonizing Karachi on the important Kashmir issue. Unlike the Soviets, who supported Indian claims, they equivocated, which meant a refusal to recognize Indian sovereignty over the area. Chou took an equivocal public position on Kashmir when pressed on the matter during a news conference in Karachi on 24 December 1956, saying that he had not "studied" the matter and adroitly suggesting that India and Pakistan settle it by negotiations. By contrast, Moscow had recognized the juridical accession of Kashmir to India; negotiations were unacceptable. Mao and Chou were displeased with Pakistan's participation in SEATO and CENTO--"As everybody knows, we differ on certain questions. Take the Manila Treaty and the Baghdad Pact for example." (Chou's 5 March 1957 statement on his visit to Pakistan in late December 1956) Nevertheless, they chose to view this participation as directed against India and the USSR rather than against the Peking regime and they were alert to Karachi's policy of avoiding hostility toward them.

From Karachi's viewpoint, in 1959 and 1960 Peking was becoming the enemy of India, and the U.S. was becoming India's best friend. Karachi, therefore, tried to gain greater support against India by moving toward a closer relationship with Peking and when, in December 1960, the Chinese were trying to isolate India and suggested border negotiations with the Pakistanis, the latter complied and agreed "in principle" on the need to hammer out a definitive boundary. By December 1962, they had also agreed in principle on the "alignment" of their common border, and on 2 March 1963 the border agreement was concluded. Chou was publicly defensive about Peking's move toward an anti-Communist military dictatorship, but cleverly put the onus of opportunism on the Pakistanis: he conceded in an interview on 31 March 1963 in Peking that there is "a certain contradiction" between Pakistan's signing of a border agreement with the mainland regime and its membership in SEATO.

Pakistan's complaints about U.S. and Soviet aid to India provided the Chinese leaders with the opportunity to move President Ayub into a closer quasi-alliance with Peking. Mao and Chou were anxious to apply more pressure on India and embarrass the U.S. Closer relations with Pakistan could also be used to demonstrate that the foreign policy of Mao and Chou had not resulted in increased isolation of Peking.* Pakistan's ties with the U.S. were discreetly handled; that is, they were not criticized. During his visit to Pakistan in February 1964, Chou took a "very reasonable" line on Sino-U.S. differences in trying to impress Ayub with his open-mindedness on Sino-U.S. talks. Ayub said Chou emphasized that he was prepared to be very reasonable, accommodating, and patient in implementing an agreement once it was obtained "in principle," but the American ambassador had to explain to the President that the agreement Chou mentioned was simply one for a U.S. surrender on the Taiwan issue. During his visit, Chou may have arranged to provide Pakistan with military aid in the form of PLA advisers and various kinds of equipment, but reports of a "mutual defense" agreement at the time may have reflected a vague promise of unspecified Chinese action of a limited nature in the event of an India-Pakistan war. In any case, by February 1964, Ayub had become Mao's quasi-ally.

As the Chinese and Pakistanis moved toward a closer relationship, Chen Yi indicated that Peking's effort was directed against three major enemies of Mao's regime, namely, the U.S., the USSR, and India--Chen's euphemistic usage referred to Pakistan's role in the effort against "imperialism, big-nation chauvinism, and expansionism."

*Chen Yi on 1 May 1964 stated defensively (regarding the inauguration of a regular airline service between the mainland and Pakistan agreed to in August 1963) that "those who tried to isolate and blockade China have failed."

(Interview with Pakistani journalist in early August 1964)* Mao himself, avoiding any reference to Ayub's hard line on local Communists or to his ties with the U.S., declared that he "appreciated" Ayub's support on various questions of Peking's international relations. (Interview with Pakistan's Commerce Minister on 16 July 1964) From Ayub's viewpoint, the increasing willingness of the Chinese leaders to join with him in a common front--including some unspecified form of PLA help--against New Delhi encouraged him in his anti-India belligerency.

Short of committing the PLA to defend Pakistan, Mao and Chou apparently were willing to supply increasing amounts of military aid to their quasi-ally. They were cautious on the subject of just how the PLA would help. [redacted] the Chinese Communist vice consul in Dacca, East Pakistan, stated privately on 22 July 1965 that in the event of U.S. participation in a India-Pakistan war, Chinese army and technical people are ready to help the Pakistanis "in the same way" they are helping the Vietnamese. Reports of Chinese military aid (including MIG aircraft and pilot training) increased in September 1965 after the Pakistanis in early August began to attack Kashmir. Chen Yi is reported to have agreed with Foreign Minister Bhutto in Karachi on 3-4 September 1965 to support the Pakistani war effort with arms and ammunition when requested. Chen is said to have agreed to open a "second front" to engage Indian troops on the north only after mutual agreement of Peking and Karachi. Pending a more direct involvement

*Pakistan's shift toward a more critical line on Moscow's support for India was the subject of a Soviet embassy protest to the Director General of the Foreign Affairs Ministry in April 1964. The Soviets were increasingly concerned that as Mao moved toward Ayub, they were becoming more isolated in the country, and they tried to purchase advertising space in the local press to publicize their case against Peking but were rebuffed by major Pakistani news outlets.

of Chinese troops, Chen agreed to exert diplomatic pressure by attacking New Delhi's belligerency. Bhutto, according to the same report, told Chen that Pakistan did not want Chinese support to create a situation which would result in open U.S. assistance to New Delhi, and it was agreed that Pakistan would probably not request Chinese aid unless its military situation became grave. The Chinese kept their first warnings to New Delhi in private channels, and on 3 September, the Nepalese ambassador in Moscow told the Australians there that in the "previous week," New Delhi already had received two private notes from Peking warning that if the situation worsened, the Chinese might raise the issue of their claims on the Sino-Indian border. The Chinese did not speak out publicly until Chen Yi's statement of "support" on 4 September, suggesting that they had waited until Pakistan itself moved openly to declare itself an active protagonist and commit its regular forces to help its guerrillas.

Following two four-hour sessions with Bhutto on 3 and 4 September, Chen Yi at a press conference on the 4th spoke in the name of the "Chinese government and people" to warn that they would "firmly support" Pakistan's action to repel India's "armed provocations." On 5 September, a People's Daily Observer article "advised" New Delhi to stop "bullying" Pakistan. In neither of the statements was Peking thus far committed to active participation in the fighting. On 6 September, Ayub privately stated that he had declined direct Chinese help in order to avoid U.S. and UK help to India. This is roughly the line that had been taken two days earlier by Bhutto in his discussions with Chen Yi.

On 7 September, however, Mao and his aides apparently decided in the interests of helping Ayub, to hint for the first time at Chinese intervention by claiming Indian "intrusions and provocations" along the Sino-Indian border and by declaring that Peking is "strengthening its defenses and heightening its alertness along its borders." (PRC government statement of 7 September 1965) This increased the political support of the Chinese but committed the PLA only to preparing for an Indian attack. Regarding the position of individual Chinese leaders,

personal involvement was used to warn New Delhi that Pakistan had a major ally. On 7 September, Peking indicated higher-level support--that is, higher than Chen Yi's--by publicly and prominently referring to talks held between Pakistan's ambassador and Chou; on 8 September, reference was made, also publicly and prominently, to talks between the ambassador and Liu Shao-chi.

On 8 September, the date of Liu's discussions with the ambassador, the Chinese leaders began to edge their way toward a military commitment to use the PLA as a maneuvering force on the border in support of the actions of a non-Communist regime. In the first of a series of notes, the Chinese demanded that the Indians dismantle structures and withdraw troops from the Chinese side of the Sikkim border. They clearly believed that they could control the extent and nature of any skirmishes with Indian border patrols and that the Indians would not react by launching a major attack.

Developments suggest that Chou felt impelled to take the strongest and most vigorous anti-Indian positions that he publicly has ever taken. Ever since 1959, when relations with India had begun to deteriorate, Chou seems to have been vulnerable to criticism from within the Chinese leadership for having coddled New Delhi with his five principles of peaceful coexistence and talk of Asian unity. In the mid-1950s, Mao had permitted Chou to play the major role in exploiting the concept of India's nonalignment, and in the mid-1960s, Mao apparently has permitted him to clear his (Chou's own) name from association with such a moderate policy. Speaking at the Korean embassy on 9 September 1965 in the presence of men who may have criticized his India policy, namely, Liu Shao-chi, Teng Hsiao-ping, and Peng Chen, Chou dissociated himself from his India policy of the 1950s in the most explicit terms he has ever used on the matter in public:

> India's armed aggression against Pakistan thoroughly exposed the Indian reactionaries' vaunted nonsense about their policy of nonalignment and peaceful coexistence. How can there be a peaceful and neutral country that

commits aggression at will against its neighbors? How can there be a model of peaceful coexistence that interprets aggression as peace? The Chinese government holds that right and wrong must be distinguished in international relations, and that such major issues of principle as that between aggression and anti-aggression must never be steeped in the dyeing pot of so-called nonalignment and peaceful coexistence. (emphasis supplied)

This repetitious attack on "peaceful coexistence" in the context of India's image--an image which he, more than any other Chinese leader, had played the major role in creating--suggests that Chou was anxious to go beyond earlier positions to obliterate the record of his earlier unity policy toward New Delhi at a time when he was vulnerable to other leaders' criticism of him for that earlier policy. Regarding the Pakistan-India war, Chou made a vague "stern warning" to New Delhi and hinted at hypothetical PLA involvement by depicting the war as "unfolding beside China." Chou's abovementioned statement was also an implicit criticism of the Soviet effort to expose Peking's encouragement of the Pakistanis to fight, and the PRC statement of 10 September attacked Moscow for desiring a cease-fire and for failing to distinguish between India ("the aggressor") and Pakistan "its victim"). Soviet complaints that the Chinese leaders were anxious to fan the flames of the conflict reflected a good understanding of what Mao was in fact trying to do.

Mao apparently viewed his support of Ayub as a major political war by proxy against the Soviet leaders who were supporting Shastri. His opposition to the Soviet leaders' efforts toward a peaceful solution probably increased significantly by 13 September. On that day, TASS issued a statement which, in effect, warned Mao not to get the PLA involved in the conflict. [redacted] the statement was made at the direct request of New Delhi. On 15 September, India's ambassador publicly thanked the Soviets for their support. Mao's inclination in the Sino-Soviet dispute has been, since the 10th plenum in September 1962, to act more and more openly

against Moscow's advice for a compromise. For example, Moscow's advice for restraint in the polemic was rejected by him in October 1962 (during the Cuban missile crisis), in July 1964 (during an interview with a Japanese visitor), and in February 1965 (during an interview with Kosygin). By September 1965, his contempt for Moscow's advice on moving toward peace in Vietnam and his desire to attack the concept of "peaceful settlements" of international disputes were among the motivating factors in his apparent decision to keep the Pakistan-India war inflamed. His reaction to the TASS warning of the 13th was to act directly contrary to it.

For the first time in the Sino-Indian border dispute, Mao committed the PLA to some form of action within a specified time limit. Such a drastic and politically vulnerable commitment could not have been made by any Chinese leader other than Mao: it was too important, and it was an unprecedented involvement in a military situation in support of a non-Communist quasi-ally. The Indians received the full force of this major decision in a note delivered to their charge in Peking on 16 September 1965 at 1 o'clock in the morning. Rejecting Soviet advice, it threatened the Indians with "grave consequences" arising from their failure to comply with this ultimatum to dismantle structures on the Sikkim-Tibet border within three days. An official of the Indian embassy in Washington, Bannerjee, told a U.S. official on the evening of the 16th that formerly he had been the Indian charge in Peking and had accepted 83 Chinese Communist protest notes, but he had never seen one like this.

Mao had additional motives for making this unprecedented commitment, the most immediate being his desires (a) to humiliate the Indians and (b) to force them to ease pressure on Pakistani forces which were taking a beating after 11 September. Regarding the humiliation aspect, Mao apparently was prepared to have PLA forces attack Indian troops if they did not pull down the structures on the Sikkim-Tibet border; the existence of these structures was privately conceded on 17 September by the

Indian Army Chief of Staff.* Mao and his aides were prepared to disparage the Indians if they did comply with the ultimatum to dismantle them. Regarding the easing of pressure on Pakistani forces, the Chinese leaders apparently believed that the implied threat of a PLA thrust down the Chumbi Valley within three days (i.e., on the 19th, on expiration of the unprecedented ultimatum) might have the effect of drawing off Indian forces from the fighting or of tying them down. PLA forces were reported to have made minor moves after the ultimatum was issued on the 16th by maneuvering, in one case, beh nd an Indian border post in the western sector and temporarily cutting it off; other patrols crossed into Indian territory at several points and some units began digging in just north of the Sikkim border.** Regarding Mao's anti-Soviet motivation, it was expressed in the People's Daily editorial of 18 September which accused the "Soviet leaders" of working with the U.S. and implied that, despite private Soviet warnings about the dangers of PLA involvement, the Chinese leaders were justified in encouraging Ayub to keep fighting. Further, the Soviet charge regarding Peking's "incendiary" behavior was a betrayal of all true revolutionaries. By depicting the Soviet leaders as being completely in the camp of Washington and New Delhi, the Chinese went beyond positions which the Pakistanis and the North Vietnamese had maintained regarding ties with Moscow.

The question arises: In what sense was the ultimatum implying some for of PLA action, a risk? Militarily, dismantling of old Indian structures on the Tibet side of the Sikkim border (and destruction of some old structures

*The existence of Indian structures about 500 yards "on the other side of the line" at Jelep La and Natu La passes was privately conceded on 19 September by another Indian army general, who said that they had been set up during the clashes in 1962 and later abandoned.

**Prime Minister Shastri claimed on 20 September that the Chinese had fired on Indian posts in Sikkim and Ladakh.

in the western sector) was a small risk, in view of the Chinese capability to handle Indian forces on the border in previous skirmishes. Psychologically, the Indians had been given a bloody nose in 1962 and were reluctant to take another beating.

Politically, however, Mao and his aides were taking a bigger risk. They could not control the situation--that is, they could not prevent (as they were trying to prevent) Ayub from negotiating his way out of the war. They had committed the PLA to some form of action against Indian forces and they had touted their ultimatum publicly, so that not to act would be construed internationally as a backdown. When, on 18 September, Ayub and his aides decided to save their remaining forces by ending the war, Mao's diplomats were out on a political limb. They had to explain that Peking had delayed its ultimatum by three days more in order to provide an opportunity for the fighting to stop, as witness Chen Yi's "explanation" of 20 September to an Afghan Foreign Office officia.* Chen was referring to the Chinese fallback note on the 19th which extended the deadline to the 22nd and which diluted the psychological advantage that Peking had had over New Delhi as master directing serf to comply with a command. As the new deadline of the 22nd approached, the Chinese tried to regain their psychological advantage by claiming that the Indians had demolished their old positions on the Jelep La Pass surreptitiously and had abandoned other military structures on three other Sikkim passes. (Peking broadcast of 21 September 1965) It is difficult

*Ayub began to move to accept Kosygin's invitation of the 19th to meet on Soviet soil for talks with Shastri. He probably informed Mao that whatever he had intended to do with PLA forces when the ultimatum expired on the 19th, Mao had better not do it. Ayub told Ambassador Conaughy on the 20th that he had sent a message to Peking, "recently," telling the Chinese leaders "For God's sake do not come in. Do not aggravate the situation." This message apparently was sufficient cause for Mao to desist and to leave to his diplomats the task of backing down.

to separate out just what action the Indians had taken and it is only a conjecture that they may have in fact demolished the structures at the Jelep La Pass. As for the additional Chinese claim that they abandoned other structures, Peking may have distorted the matter by failing to mention that some of these structures had been abandoned since 1962. In any case, the Chinese claimed that the Indians had been forced to comply by destroying their "military works" on Chinese territory and allowed the deadline to pass without using the PLA. (People's Daily article of 22 September 1965) The cease-fire between India and Pakistan went into effect on the 22nd.

Mao and his aides, having complied with Ayub's request to take no action on the border, emerged from the crisis at a political disadvantage in relation to New Delhi (which criticized Peking's interference and aggressiveness) and Moscow (which defended the Indians in various ways, including extensive coverage of New Delhi's notes of protest regarding Chinese interference). International opinion, which was extremely critical of Mao's war-like interference in the India-Pakistan fighting and favorable to Moscow, confronted Mao with a major foreign policy defeat.* Ayub's agreement to the cease-fire almost certainly was a development which Mao favored the least, and other Chinese leaders implied that Ayub had deserted

*The Chinese leaders' anger over Soviet ability to demonstrate war-like interference was reflected later in a statement made by Chen Yi, who on occasion reveals Maoist attitudes in splenetic outbursts. "Some people" accused China of "adding fuel to the fire" and "fishing in troubled waters" by supporting Pakistan against Indian aggression and for Kashmir self-determination. Should China have supplied large amounts of arms to the aggressor and supported India's annexation of Kashmir while disguising itself as an impartial mediator as "they" did in Tashkent? (Chen Yi speech in Dacca of 15 April 1966)

the Kashmiris.* Mao was also confronted with the need to have his diplomats explain that Peking's retreat from the ultimatum of 16 September had been the result of Indian compliance with Chinese demands, and Chen Yi on 29 September used part of his frenetic press conference to try to demonstrate that the PLA could handle not only the Indians but also the Americans, British, and Russians--all at the same time.

The political risk which Mao had fastened upon Peking by issuing the unprecedented time-limit ultimatum of 16 September was a new departure in Chinese Communist foreign policy. This deep commitment to the national policy interests of a non-Communist regime--that is, to Ayub's military venture--had tied Peking's policy too closely to that of a government whose actions could not be controlled by the Chinese. This move apparently reflected Mao's increasing reluctance, in recent years, to act on the basis of what his foreign policy experts (Chou, particularly) tell him about the probable dangerous consequences of revolutionary moves. In any case, the Chinese leaders tried to absorb the political defeat and retain Ayub as a useful counterweight to India, Peking's major enemy in South Asia, and on 4 October 1965, Po I-po provided some rather strained reassurance to a visiting Pakistani delegation by professing that Sino-Pakistani friendship "can stand all tests."

*Po I-po on 29 September declared that Peking would not desert the Kashmiris: "the Chinese people will not cease for a single day their support to the people of Kashmir in their struggle for their right to self-determination; this stand of China will never change." (emphasis supplied) Chou En-lai on the 30th expressed support for "the people of Kashmir in their struggle for the right to national self-determination." Chou in effect had declared the struggle for Kashmir a "national" liberation war--a reflection of Mao's apparent view that the Kashmiris should have developed a protracted guerrilla insurrection against the Indians.

Although the Chinese agreed to supply Ayub with large amounts of military aid, including aircraft and training, following the disastrous developments in September 1965, their suspicions increased. Ayub's statements to editors at his home on 27 October 1965 again confirmed to the Chinese (if his participation in the Tashkent discussions had not already confirmed to them) that he was not entirely in Peking's camp.

> I want you to remember that while we have good neighborly relations with China, the U.S. has been our friend and I intend that she remain so. Only the U.S. can help Pakistan, pressure India, and lead the UN to tackle Kashmir.

Chinese embassy officials in Karachi were reported to have complained privately on 6 November that Ayub was trying to work both sides of the street by asking for help from both Washington and Peking. Nevertheless, Ayub's partial disillusionment with the U.S. and opposition to New Delhi continued to be the major Chinese consideration, and on 2 December Chen Yi was permitted to pledge support for Pakistan against India. Chen's statement did not imply direct PLA involvement and he was careful to make a distinction between what would "inevitably" be the result of an attack on Pakistan--a vague formulation--and Chinese "support."* This was a retreat from the positions Peking had adopted in September 1965 and suggests that Mao probably will not repeat his rash act of committing the PLA to help the Pakistanis in a new crisis. Ayub's discussion

*Chen said: "Should the Indian reactionaries, with the support of U.S. imperialism and modern revisionism, launch another armed aggression against Pakistan, they will inevitably meet with a still greater defeat. As in the past, the Chinese government and people will resolutely support Pakistan in her struggle against Indian aggression." (Interview with Dawn correspondent of 2 December 1965)

with major enemies of Peking--for example, in Washington in December 1965 and in Tashkent in January 1966--impelled the Chinese to try to limit the extent of U.S. and Soviet influence on him. Liu Shao-chi and Chen Yi, in addition to trying to demonstrate that Peking still had a few important friends in the world, used their trip to east and west Pakistan to reaffirm Peking's desire to support him against New Delhi. Liu stressed Peking's military aid in time of need and referred to a continuing policy "to stand on the side of" Pakistan to repel aggression and to "firmly support" Rawalpindi on the Kashmir issue. (Liu speech of 26 March 1966) Chinese Communist arms were paraded during the Liu-Chen visit; this indicated that some Pakistani leaders, including pro-Peking Bhutto, wanted to convince the populace that Peking, not Washington, was indeed Pakistan's true friend. Chen Yi on 29 March again declared "firm support" against any Indian aggression as the Chinese leaders tried to demonstrate the importance of their assistance. Nevertheless, Ayub refused to comply with the apparent suggestions of Liu and Chen to include attacks on the U.S. and to refer to Vietnam in the communique issued at the end of the visit. Chou's turn came on 29 June 1966, when he may have tried to convince Ayub in their private discussions that Peking's good will would continue and would include large-scale military aid, MIG-19s, and tanks.

The Pakistanis have been accorded special treatment and have been exempted from the gaucherie resulting from Mao's "cultural revolution." In mid-August 1966, Chen Yi was permitted to placate the Pakistani ambassador about Red Guard abominations and the closing of the mosques in Peking, and Mao probably tried to reassure Ayub of his personal favor for continuing a warm relationship by meeting with Foreign Minister Pirzada in late October 1966. In late March 1967, Chen Yi had to assure the Pakistanis that the purge had not changed Peking's overall foreign policy, but what he really meant was that it had not changed Peking's policy toward Karachi. Signs of deference to Ayub's diplomats included the use by the Chinese of the Pakistani commercial counsellor Malik in late July 1967 to tell David Oancia, the Canadian correspondent, that the Foreign Ministry warning to him

about his "behavior" was not really severe and that the Chinese could have beaten him more soundly. (Oancia and two other correspondents had only been punched, kicked, and beaten with belt buckles by Red Guards.) In late September 1967 the Chinese diplomatic mission leaving Tunisia turned over Peking's interests there to the Pakistani embassy.

The Chinese leaders continued to assure the Pakistanis of military aid and special deference in order to encourage them against the Indians. For example, a Pakistani official stated in Karachi in late April 1967 that "recently" the Chinese had offered "safe" Chinese bases as staging areas if bases in West Pakistan were to be knocked out by an Indian armed forces attack. Although the Chinese probably provided the Pakistanis with some kind of assurance that Chinese bases could be used for some kind of sanctuary, it is unlikely that, in the event of a disaster as conjectured, they would permit the Pakistanis to fly operational missions from mainland bases. Their effort was primarily intended to deter the Pakistani leaders from moving back into a closer relationship with the U.S. and from consulting the Soviets (if only to argue with them about Moscow's support for New Delhi). Their concern was to prevent a cooling off of relations, despite Sino-Pakistani frictions. In late May 1967, during the visit of Pakistan's Foreign Affairs Secretary and Defense Minister, they declared that although the U.S. "and its followers" had tried to make Pakistan jettison its independent foreign policy and join "imperialism, revisionism, and reaction..." against Peking, the Pakistanis "had resisted this pressure." (Yeh Chien-ying speech of 26 May 1967) They insisted that the Sino-Pakistani relationship "is sincere and can weather tests; no force whatsoever can disrupt it." (Yeh Chien-ying speech of 29 May 1967) In two private conversations with Ayub's Foreign Affairs Secretary in late May and early June, Chou almost certainly tried to reassure the Pakistanis of Peking's continued willingness to supply them with fighter aircraft and various other types of equipment--military aid which Moscow, because of its open support of New Delhi, could not supply without severe damage to its relations with the Indian leaders--and two days after the departure of the

high-level Pakistani delegation, the Chinese seemed to be warning Ayub to be wary of the American-Soviet "plot" to initiate a reconciliation between India and Pakistan. At least one Soviet leader later tried to convince Ayub that he should disengage from his close relationship with the Chinese. Kosygin told Prime Minister Indira Gandhi on 8 October 1967 that although he had spared no words in reminding Ayub (during his late September visit to Moscow) that the Chinese leaders were dedicated to creating unrest and instability in the world, the Pakistani president had maintained a "friendly attitude" toward Peking throughout their conversation.* Ayub was aware of Moscow's unwillingness to drop its support of New Delhi--an unwillingness which he unfavorably contrasted, no doubt, with Peking's willingness to continue to be Pakistan's political champion. The Chinese leaders apparently will continue to accept an opportunistic Ayub --they refer to his "independent foreign policy" as being constantly under "pressure" from the U.S. and Soviet Union--and they will continue to support him so long as he remains an enemy of India.

*Kosygin apparently has had an important role in trying to dissuade the Pakistanis from sustaining a close relationship with Peking. He is [redacted] reported earlier to have criticized Ayub (at Tashkent in January 1966) for his working partnership with the Chinese.

III. Non-Communist Enemies

A. A New Enemy: India

India had been a major friend, and after the establishment of diplomatic relations on 1 April 1950, Chou was given considerable leeway to try to keep it that way. He argued in the mid-1950s that two different roads to power--a euphemistic way of concealing the differences between the attainment of independence by democratic men and the seizure of power by Communist totalitarians--could not prevent sustained good relations.* He also insisted that these relations were blessed with a personal man-to-man friendship.** India's transformation in 1959 from a major friend to a major enemy was a development which Mao and Chou apparently accepted with considerable reluctance. Even after Sino-Indian recriminations had been exchanged following the Tibet revolt in March 1959, Peking professed

*"The paths and methods through which China and India achieved their national independence were not entirely the same. The Chinese revolution was accomplished under the leadership of the CCP through long armed struggle. India took a different path. Some people attempt to use this dissimilarity to prove that friendship between China and India is devoid of a basis or that it will not last. But such an argument is untenable...." (Chou's speech to the Indian parliament of 29 November 1955)

**"We, Prime Minister Nehru and I, have known each other for more than two years. We are old friends and therefore can talk on any questions." (Chou's statement at the New Delhi news conference on 1 December 1956) Chou had worked so well along this line that Nehru later found it difficult to accept him as an enemy--as hardboiled and not amenable to personal appeals or gentlemanly reason. In early September 1959, Nehru reportedly was "deeply hurt" that Chou had not replied to many "personal letters."

to see that Nehru still "in general advocates Sino-Indian friendship." (People's Daily article of 5 May 1959) The Foreign Policy Review document published in January 1961 laid it down that:

> During the first half of 1960, we pursued an all-out counterattack against the anti-Chinese struggle in India. In the international context, however, our struggle against India should be subordinate to the struggle against imperialism. Our struggle against India should not go beyond this limit.

This document's instruction to Chinese diplomats to view each national situation in the context of Peking's entire world strategy against the U.S. was attributed to Mao.* The document also attributed to Mao recognition of the importance of diplomatic flexibility.** Applied to India, these exhortations to be cautious meant that despite the need for recriminations ("struggle"), diplomatic relations must not be severed ("unity"):

> Our policy is: 'do not start it,' 'stick to the struggle,' 'leave some leeway,' 'insist on unity,' and 'oppose a split.' With India and other nationalist countries, we have had both struggle and unity. For instance, India started an anti-Chinese movement and this we opposed with determination. Then, after our opposition, the Premier went to New Delhi [in April 1960] to negotiate with Nehru. The two chiefs of state [sic] met. At the border, a clash was avoided. The relations between the two countries again temporarily

*"Chairman Mao instructed us in the importance of taking cognizance of the whole...to be able to maneuver the parts."

**"In 1960, Chairman Mao again instructed us repeatedly that in our struggles, some leeway must be provided."

calmed down. The struggle against India shows how we applied our principles and used the tactic of flexibility.

For the year 1961, the document stated that "We will strive to have better relations with India and influence India into assuming a passive position on the border problem. This is important." Mao's dialectical policy of "struggle and unity" toward India was cited in November 1960 for indoctrination of border troops in the Tibet Military Region Command Headquarters, the main thrust of the policy being depicted as necessary even with "two-faced national states" because "to make a friend is to lose an enemy, and this is true in the international struggle."

Because of India's importance, Chou in April 1960 had been permitted to try to bring Nehru to negotiate the border dispute. Nehru found it domestically embarrassing to agree to negotiate, and as the Indians moved toward a policy of occupying positions near and even behind Chinese positions (after the Chinese themselves in the western sector had moved into Indian territory earlier), the Sino-Indian border dispute escalated into a major clash. Shortly after their first punitive attack on Indian positions in October 1962, the Chinese published another appreciation of Nehru, formalizing Mao's appraisal of him as a man who has "put himself in the position of a lackey of the imperialists." (People's Daily article of 27 October 1962) Although the real appraisal of the Chinese leaders apparently was that negotiations would continue to be rejected by New Delhi and that the border dispute would continue to be a basic source of tension, they professed a willingness to reach an agreement. Their professions were intended to make the Indian leaders appear to be the real recalcitrants. Chen Yi told a group of Japanese reporters that the border dispute is a "contradiction between China and a friendly neighboring country, and a peaceful settlement can be brought to this contradiction. We expect India's reconsideration." (Interview of 9 November 1962) At a later time, Mao himself in the fall of 1964 still professed a desire to settle the border dispute by negotiations "on the basis of" the December 1962 Colombo proposals (rather than on acceptance of these

proposals as "preconditions"), "to wait more" for Indian concurrence with the idea of talks, and to keep the quarrel in secret channels--"In one of our notes, we told India that we were not ready to make our notes public." (Mao's interview with French delegation and Ambassador Paye on 11 September 1964) Despite Mao's effort to appear reasonable and, incidentally, to shift the entire blame for intransigence to the Indians, his policy toward New Delhi was to discard more and more openly any desire to settle the border dispute by negotiations.

Small-scale patrol clashes and an interminable exchange of insults in government notes have marked Mao's post 1964 policy, which completely discarded the "unity" half of his former strategy and became a plan to wage all-out open political warfare against the Indian leaders. This included active border patrolling and occasional probes onto Indian-claimed territory. Particularly in Sikkim (but not exclusively there), the Chinese have tried to test Indian reactions to their claims. On 29 November 1965, Ambassador Bowles was handed an aide-memoire by the Foreign Secretary which accused the Chinese of incursions across the border "since the middle of September" in the Sikkim area and in the western sector, where the PLA has "practically remilitarized the 20-kilometer demilitarized zone, thereby violating the provisions of the Colombo Proposals as well as China's own unilateral declaration." Sporadic skirmishes in 1965 had been [redacted] reported, but the extent of the Chinese presence at all points within the western demilitarized zone was unclear. Shallow PLA patrol probes may have been intended not only to assert Peking's claims along the border, but also to encourage the Pakistanis to sustain their military confrontation with Indian forces. Mao's purge on the mainland apparently was an additional reason for sustaining the political warfare and occasional patrol probes on the border.*

*At first, the form of protest notes to the Indian leaders was changed to reflect "revolutionary" contempt. For example, Peking's note of 16 January 1967, protesting alleged Indian violations of Tibet's land and airspace throughout 1966, contained no customary diplomatic courtesy phrases (footnote continued on page 126)

New Delhi's complaint concerning creeping aggression on the border had stated that this process had started in mid-September 1965--that is, prior to Mao's purge--and that this process in effect indicated that Peking had "dishonored" its three commitments (1) not to cross the "line of actual control," (2) to maintain a 20-kilometer demilitarized zone in the western sector, and (3) not to send troops to the "disputed' areas in the eastern sector.* Reports indicate that PLA patrols had adopted the practice of making shallow incursions for several hours and then returning to their side of the "line of actual control." (Most of these charges were carried in New Delhi's protest note of 2 February 1967.)

Following a significant intensifiecation of political tensions between Peking and New Delhi in the summer of 1967 in the wake of Chinese support for Indian Communist insurrectionists and Red Guard beatings of Indian diplomats, the practice of making shallow incursions was resumed in August and New Delhi charged that "since the first week of August," the PLA had moved units up to the Sikkim border, where they began digging trenches "well into" Indian territory starting on 17 August. (Foreign Ministry note of 11 September 1967) Regarding the first skirmish, [redacted] on 7 September 1967, the Indian army commander whose forces confronted

(footnote continued from page 125)
at the beginning or end. A Ministry of External Affairs official in New Delhi told a U.S. official there in February 1967 that the Chinese had abandoned these courtsey phrases in their notes since December 1966 and that, when they were asked about it, Chinese officials had replied that Peking had the "sovereign right" to choose modes of addressing notes and that it had done so in keeping with the "cultural revolution."

*Increased PLA patrol activity in the fall of 1965 was directly a consequence of Mao's policy to support Ayub during the Pakistani-Indian war in September 1965.

PLA troops at the Natu La Pass on the border determined that trenches "recently" dug by Chinese soldiers extended across the actual border at one point by about "two yards." He directed his troops to string barbed wire just inside what he regarded as the border, and this wire cut the PLA trenches at one point, resulting in a shouting match, followed by a fist and bayonet skirmish. On the morning of 11 September, the Indian commander, detecting a gap in his newly strung barbed wire, ordered some soldiers to close it, whereupon the Chinese opened fire with rifles and the Indians returned the fire. Both sides quickly added automatic weapons fire and later mortar fire; the Chinese moved up to use artillery (from the vicinity of Jelep La Pass) and so did the Indian forces. Artillery exchanges on 12 September were extended by the PLA forces to Sebu La and Yak La passes, both immediately north of Natu La Pass, and the Chief of Staff of the Eastern Command, Major General N.S. Nair, told American officials in Calcutta on the 12th that he seriously doubted Chinese troops would have taken such quick recourse to widespread and provocative firing, including artillery, without specific approval of higher authority, presumably from Peking. PLA firing was resumed and continued beyond the morning hour set for a cease-fire on the 13th by New Delhi, the Chinese having started firing on the Indian patrol trying to recover bodies of soldiers killed along the barbed wire fence earlier in the skirmish. The Chinese recovered these bodies and, after firing ceased in the afternoon of the 13th, prepared to blame the Indians for "intrusions," which they touted in Peking media on 16 September and thereafter with photos of the Indian commander receiving bodies of the Indian dead at a ceremony at Natu La Pass. A smaller firefight began on 1 October farther north at Cho La Pass after an Indian soldier, walking his post, was challenged by a Chinese soldier opposite to him with the warning to get off "Chairman Mao's territory." When he refused to give ground, he reportedly was attacked by a Chinese with a bayonet and by a second Chinese who ran up to join the fight, which resulted in an exchange of fire, including the use of recoilless rifles and mortars. The firing was broken off by the Chinese in the afternoon, and Indian losses in this skirmish were 39 dead and wounded (in contrast with 50 casualties resulting

from the 11-13 September clash). Unlike the earlier clash, however, the area of conflict was not extended to other passes by the Chinese or sustained beyond one day of exchanges. By mid-October 1967, both the Chinese and Indians entered a new period of restraint, the former because Chou apparently informed Mao of the new charges of Chinese aggression being discussed throughout the world and the latter because of genuine concern over the prospect of having to fight a new border war with the PLA which had whipped Indian troops decisively in 1962.

Beyond the border skirmishes, Sino-Indian relations became intensely antagonistic on the matter of Chinese interference in Indian domestic affairs (i.e., open support for Indian Communists against New Delhi) and on the matter of beating Indian diplomats in Peking. Both sides were to stop short of a complete break in diplomatic relations, but the idea of peaceful coexistence between them was discarded as an anachronism.

Regarding more and more open support for opponents of the government, the Chinese leaders' response to mass arrests of Indian Communists (started on 30 December 1964) was to encourage pro-Peking Communists to struggle for political supremacy, along a long road, without specifying tactics to be used. "History will prove that the genuine representatives of the interests of the Indian people and nation are those Indian Communists who uphold truth and justice and adhere to Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism. The future of India certainly belongs to them, to the people of India." (People's Daily article of 17 January 1965) They had not at that time (1965) indicated which group of Indian Communists they would support, and as late as 24 March 1967, People's Daily was vague in suggesting that "revolution" was the only road for India. However, when Mao's purge began to influence the relatively rational and moderate aspects of Peking's foreign policy (spring and summer of 1967), the Chinese began gradually to make clear that they would reject even former pro-Peking Communists and would support only those Indian Communists who agreed totally, rather than partially, with Mao's road of armed struggle. Peking's line moved from indirect criticism to an open attack on Communists taking the "parliamentary road" in the state

governments of Kerala and West Bengal; at the same time, Peking encouraged only the extremist elements of the CPI/L because they were adhering to Mao's theories of armed struggle, establishing a rural base area in the Darjeeling district of West Bengal.

The Chinese leaders, at first, became less reticent about openly discussing the competing factions in the Indian Communist movement and then moved on to target individuals whom they would not support (because they would not accept the armed-struggle aspect of the Chinese revolutionary model). Following an attack on Dange's speech of 24 April 1967, an NCNA report on 7 May 1967 went on to criticize a former pro-Peking group--"another small handful of revisionists" who agreed with Dange--for trying to use the February 1967 voting results, which put Communists into the Kerala and West Bengal state governments, to sabotage the revolution in India. They were depicted as being like-minded revisionists for accepting Dange's appeal for viewing united front governments throughout India as the way (on the Kerala model) to oust the ruling Congress party. The report depicted the two state governments as still being "component parts" of India's big bourgeoisie, and it insisted that the entire old state apparatus must be smashed by violent means. The new line attacking Communists in the two state governments was sustained in subsequent articles, and tactics were more openly recommended. On 19 May, a People's Daily Commentator article declared "rebellion" by violence to be "the only way out" for the Indian people and praised the "armed struggle" of the Nagas and Mizos.* A Red Guard writer

*The Chinese leaders had begun to encourage the Naga tribes even prior to the publication of the Commentator article, having insisted that the Nagas must "struggle" against the "reactionary" Indian government (Peking broadcast of 11 April 1967) and having claimed more generally that "Sparks of revolt are growing in different parts of India." (NCNA dispatch of 19 April 1967) New Delhi's claims that the Chinese, since early 1967, have been training and equipping small groups of Naga guerrillas, have been confirmed by several reports. Further, at least one source reports that Peking has been training Mizos guerrillas.

stated in his article in People's Daily on 2 June 1967 that "the only way" is "rebellion" and "use of the gun to overthrow the reactionary ruling classes." The "revisionists" who had been depicted as being no better than Dange had not yet been named.

The Chinese leaders significantly increased their publicity on both the peasant insurgency (which they praised) and the "non-Congress government" (which they attacked) in West Bengal on 27 June 1967, shortly after starting the Sino-Indian dispute over the expulsion of two Indian diplomats. They moved to make somewhat clearer the line of demarcation between Indian Communists who take the "parliamentary road" and those who would take Mao's road of peasant insurrection. An NCNA report on 27 June 1967, praised the peasant insurgents in the Darjeeling district of West Bengal centered on Naxalbari as "the revolutionaries of the Indian Communist Party" who in 1965 prepared for armed struggle and in March 1967 set up a "red district" there. The NCNA report insisted that Indians must proceed along "Mao's road" to overthrow the government. An NCNA report on 29 June complained that the "reactionary central government of India" was preparing to crush the revolt. Indian authorities were aided by this outside encouragement of the rebels to argue more forcefully for the need to take strong action against them.* They also protested to the Chinese through their embassy in New Delhi on 5 July 1967, complaining that the two NCNA reports of late June, which had been broadcast by Peking Radio, were aimed at "instigating armed struggle" and at the "territorial dismemberment of India."

*Early in the morning of 12 July 1967, a strong police force moved into one of the "strongholds" of the rebels in the village of Naxalbari, arrested 70 persons, and seized huge quantities of "bows, arrows, and spears," according to a Delhi domestic service broadcast of the 12th.

At the same time, the Chinese were moving further to make an open declaration of a policy they had discarded in 1952, namely, the policy of imposing the Chinese model --i.e., "Mao's road"--on other revolutionary movements. The definitive statement on this policy for Indians was made in the People's Daily editorial of 5 July 1967:

> The Indian revolution must take the road of relying on the peasants, establishing base areas in the countryside, persisting in protracted armed struggle, and using the countryside to encircle and finally capture the cities. This is Mao Tse-tung's road, the road that has led the Chinese revolution to victory, and the only road to victory for revolution of all oppressed nations and people. (emphasis supplied)

Mao has returned to the policy of 1948-1952 when he and his lieutenants, primarily Liu Shao-chi, touted his insurrectionist road to power.* But the current formulation is more inclusive than the earlier one, inasmuch as it insists that this road applies not only to Asian but to "all" countries.** He is also insisting that insurrectionists

*Peking adulates peasant uprisings more than any other kind, primarily because they can be construed as being roughly similar to Mao's road, as witness the publicity given to the peasant revolt "from 1946-51" in Telengana, Andhra State, in the Peking Review article of 11 August 1967.

**The earlier formulation stated that "just as the Chinese people have done, all or at least some of the colonial people of the East can hold big or small base areas and maintain revolutionary regimes for an extended period, carry on protracted revolutionary war to encircle the cities from the countryside, and proceed gradually to take over the cities and win nationwide victory in their respective countries." (emphasis supplied) (Footnote in the 1951 version of Mao's essay, Why Can China's Red Political Power Continue to Exist? of October 1928)

must use his military strategy or, as the 5 July editorial puts it for India, "the flexible strategy and tactics of people's war personally worked out by Chairman Mao."

Peking's support apparently had encouraged the Naxalbari rebels to reject CPI/L discipline and to create problems for pro-Chinese leaders in the militant part of the Indian Communist party. B.T. Ranadive, a defender of Maoist positions in the Sino-Soviet dispute against the Dange pro-Soviet members, was reported to have drafted a letter to the CCP on 24 July 1967, complaining that he had not been in touch "recently" with the Chinese leaders, particularly on the Naxalbari developments. He also complained that NCNA encouragement of the insurgents had caused the CPI/L "tactical difficulties," namely, "Many of the adventurist elements in the Naxalbari struggle are flaunting party discipline and thus threatening the ability of the CPI/L to speak with one voice." Ranadive requested that "the CCP" should suspend publication of the NCNA materials until after inter-party consultations. The reply was partly contained in an NCNA report of 1 August which criticized as "revisionist" those leaders of the CPI/L in West Bengal who had attacked revolutionary Indian Communists for adventurist and anti-party activity. By 3 August, a People's Daily article discussed the CPI left and right groups in historical perspective, attacking both Namboodiripad and Dange by name, and on 10 August, an article in the party newspaper again denounced both men for taking the "parliamentary road," i.e., for taking posts in the state government. (Namboodiripad, as chief minister in the Kerala united front government was, in Mao's apparent view, no better than Dange because he was acting within a "bourgeois democratic government" rather than fighting openly against it along "Mao's road" of armed struggle.)* To sum up, spurred on by the intensified Sino-

*The Chinese leaders had had an additional reason for attacking him: in September 1965, Namboodiripad temporarily had adopted an anti-Peking position regarding the India-Pakistan war.

Indian diplomat dispute in late June 1967, Mao and his aides decided to go beyond attacks on the CPI/R and Dange (for several years dismissed by Peking as an unregenerate "revisionist") to open criticism and dissection of members of the CPI/L, coming to rest finally on extremist elements of the CPI/L because they advocate "seizure of power by armed struggle" and are "taking the road of the Chinese people." (NCNA report of 2 August 1967) The Chinese leaders seemed thereafter to be edging toward approval of the formation of a distinctly Maoist, third Indian Communist Party, using those men who had been expelled from the CPI/L and who, in mid-November 1967, reportedly decided to form a new party to attain "a people's democratic revolution through building militant rural bases and extending them to encircle the cities." (Bombay PIT broadcast of 17 November 1967)* In the course of expressing malicious satisfaction over the fall of the West Bengal united front government, a People's Daily Observer article of 5 December 1967 stated that the extremists have found the correct road, which requires a "political party of the proletariat" to lead the peasant insurrection.

Regarding the details of the Sino-Indian diplomatic dispute, it developed in mid-1967 at a time when Mao was permitting (if not encouraging) fanatics in the Foreign Ministry to defy the established international practice of diplomatic immunity. When, following warnings to foreign diplomats in Peking in late May 1967 against reading and taking notes from wall newspapers or from buying Red Guard newspapers, the second secretary of the Indian embassy (who had continued this practice) was seized by Red Guards (on 4 June), the stage was set to make the Indian official a "negative example." He was released after the film

*Peking, in quoting Indian journals which attacked Indian "revisionists," included the statement that the revisionist leadership should either be jettisoned or the extremists should "leave the fold of these neo-revisionists and come together into a really revolutionary party." (NCNA report of 16 November 1967)

he took indicated that he had only photographed a temple and not a nearby military barracks. On the following day (5 June), his summons to the Foreign Ministry was cancelled without explanation. On 12 June, the Indian charge was called in and informed in a Foreign Ministry note handed to him that the second secretary was to face a mass trial and was to be stripped of his diplomatic immunity.

The rational half of this plan was to warn foreigners, including diplomats, against reporting on developments related to Mao's purge. The irrational half was to demonstrate a new, "revolutionary" style in handling diplomats of enemy countries. The second secretary did not appear at his mass trial on 13 June, but he was found "guilty" of various charges and marked for deportation without diplomatic immunity. He and his colleague were beaten for 50 minutes by Red Guards at the Peking airport on 14 June, and they were later exposed to the poles, fists, and belt-buckles of other Red Guards at each stop en route from Peking to Hong Kong, the last stop, Canton, having been the most damaging to their persons. Reporting on the irrational half of the plan, the second secretary described these beatings as "cruel and sadistic" (interview of 19 June 1967),* but it is likely that Mao was kept informed of the beatings and appraised them as very good.

The Indian retaliatory attack on the Chinese embassy in New Delhi on 16 June and the Chinese reply to that in

*The Indian second secretary reported that the "escorts provided by the authorities" acted on apparent orders to prevent him from being seriously injured while approving a variety of less disastrous assaults on him, such as being clawed in Peking, hit in the stomach in Shanghai, forced to bow-the-head in Hangchow, and hit with "stones, spit, and fists" in Canton. (Interview of 19 June 1967) That is, he came through bruised but intact. The Chinese leaders avoided a diplomatic break by making sure that he was not killed or dismembered.

the seige of the Indian embassy in Peking on the 17th further strained relations. Sporadic demonstrations against the Indian embassy occurred, but by 1 October following the border clash, they were limited in scope.

The prospect seems to be for sporadic small-scale patrol clashes at various points on the border, for government-to-government political abuse, and for sustained Chinese support for Naga guerrillas and the new extremists of the Indian Communist movement. They will insist on complete support from any Indian Communist who is willing to be pro-Peking. By their action in firefights during September 1967 on the Sikkim-Tibet border, the Chinese have discarded the earlier policy contained in the pledge they had made to "first of all inform all the Colombo conference countries" before taking military action against Indian forces. (People's Daily article of 13 October 1963)

B. Old Enemies

1. Thailand

Chou En-lai had invited Thailand's representatives at the Bandung conference in April 1955 to visit Peking, and in this way he initiated the effort to move Bangkok to loosen its ties with SEATO and Washington. (Chou's invitation is referred to in his foreign policy report of 30 July 1955) At the same conference, Chen Yi worked with him and tried to mollify Foreign Minister Prince Wan (Chen interview of 28 July 1958) As a result, some Thais visited Peking and some trade developed, until it was restricted by Thai-imposed import controls in early 1959. Chou and Chen attained very little in all their efforts, the main difficulty for them having been the fact that Bangkok, with no experience of Western colonial domination to make its leaders anti-Western in attitude, preferred a strong assertive alignment with the U.S. and an assertive opposition to Communism in Southeast Asia. They openly rejected a policy of accommodation with Peking and Hanoi.

Failure to move the Thais away from their close relationship with the U.S. and toward a neutral foreign policy position and the increased presence of the U.S. in Thailand impelled the Chinese leaders to drop their restraint and to begin to denounce Bangkok for its attitude of supporting anti-Communist efforts in the area. In mid-1962, Chen Yi referred to the authorities in Bangkok as "reactionary," and stated that the country was a "bridgehead for invading Laos" (speech of 12 July 1962). Regarding the war in Vietnam, they viewed Thai support of the South Vietnamese and American effort as sufficiently important to require warnings to Bangkok to cease this support or accept the consequences, namely, a subversive movement of insurgents in the Thai countryside. At some time between the central committee work conference of June 1964 and the U.S. airstrikes against North Vietnam in August 1964, the Chinese leaders apparently decided to create trouble for Bangkok by organizing all anti-government Thais, including prominent non-Communists, into a united front of political and military opponents. This action probably reflected a decision to discard the 1954-1964 policy of non-support, or low-key support, for Bangkok's internal enemies. According to [redacted] reports, in late summer of 1964, Communist-led insurgent activities (assasinations of police informants and propaganda attacks on the government) had increased considerably. As organizational activities moved forward among Thai insurgents, the Chinese leaders began to enlist the active support of prominent political figures, the most prominent having been sheltered in Canton. On 19 September 1964, the son of Pridi Banonmyong, the former Prime Minister, reported that "recently" the Chinese had permitted (or encouraged) leaders of the "patriotic movement" in Thailand to visit Pridi in his Canton sanctuary. These leaders apparently tried to induce Pridi to directly associate his name with their group in an effort to gain some support among non-Communist Thai political figures. Pridi apparently did not agree; further, he did not agree to any association with Thai Communists on the mainland or in Thailand.

Nevertheless, the Chinese continued on their course; on 13 December 1964, NCNA rebroadcast a manifesto issued

by the Independence Movement of Thailand (said to have been founded on 1 November and originally reported in the clandestine radio broadcast of the Voice of the People of Thailand on 8 December), declaring as policy the expulsion of U.S. personnel from Thailand and the "overthrow" of the Thanom government. The manifesto stated that the Independence group was willing "to cooperate" with "any" individuals or organization who were "patriotic" --i.e., anti-government--and in this usage it was similar to the greetings sent to the PRC on 1 October by the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT). U.S. officials in Hong Kong noted this similarity and also commented that Thai was among the first three foreign languages to be studied in Peking's new (established on 5 September 1964) Foreign Language Institute. By January 1965, the Thai Patriotic Front was launched as the second anti-government organization which was "willing to cooperate with all compatriots... who love peace and democracy." (Voice of the People of Thailand broadcast of 23 January 1965 reporting the formation of the Front on 1 January) Both organizations were given wide and unprecedented coverage by Peking and Hanoi media, suggesting the primary role of these Communist capitols in organizing and supporting the subversives.

Activation of the Thai insurgent and subversive movement was one of the ways the Chinese had decided to react to increased U.S. involvement in Vietnam. Chen Yi had stated to the French ambassador in January 1965 that guerrilla warfare might "spread" to Thailand in 1965, and Chen apparently was making a statement of intent. Prime Minister Thanom declared on 19 January that the Chinese had already sent agents into Thailand and were financing them partly through funds made available in Thai currency in Hong Kong banks. By March 1965, Communist insurgent activity in northeastern Thailand was reported to be well organized and in the same month, Communist-led Independent Movement personnel were circulating propaganda tracts in Bangkok. The "liaison representative" of the Independence Movement, a Thai, reported that he had arrived in Peking on 24 March, had been provided broadcasting facilities, and then denounced the Thai government for permitting the country to be used as a base for attacks on North Vietnam ("neighboring countries"). Peking broadcasts in the Thai

language intensified by May 1965 and the People's Daily on 30 July 1965 attacked Bangkok authorities for "playing the role of an accomplice of the U.S."

Direct Chinese participation has centered on training of Thai cadres and financing political and military operations. Thai cadres captured in December 1965 told Thai authorities that they had received two months training in Peking sponsored by the Thai front organization but conducted by Chinese instructors. A course in subversion and guerrilla warfare was conducted in Peking for a single Thai student in May 1965, and the reported route for trainees to travel to and from the mainland was either through Laos or by way of Hong Kong-Macao. A Sino-Thai, who had received training in Peking for one month in the spring of 1965 at a "tutorial" course conducted by three PLA officers, reported that building a "people's army in Thailand" was one of the main subjects; another was the strategy and tactics of Mao's guerrilla warfare doctrine. Another student reported in a letter from Peking (10 April 1965) that he was being instructed on the matter of accelerating the process of "world revolution," and he affirmed in this context that "An army capable of carrying out the revolutionary struggle has been formed in Thailand." By mid-1965, Communist-led insurgents and "patriotic" figures in Thailand were working actively along the lines of Mao's prescription for a revolutionary seizure of power, namely the building of an army in isolated territorial base areas and the organization of Communists and non-Communists in a broad united front in order to wage a protracted military and political war against the central government.*

*Thai Front leaders in Peking indicated to a Thai trainee in the fall of 1965 that the insurgency plan for Thailand was to (1) establish bases in the main mountain ranges which separate the country into three sections, (2) establish guerrilla training centers, one near Laos close to the route connecting Muong Sing with Yunnan Province, (3) send for PLA instructors while using Thai trainees from Peking for political indoctrination work, (4) gain control of as many remote villages as possible before the (footnote continued on page 139)

Mao himself participated in the effort to exploit Peking-based opponents of the Bangkok government when, on the morning of 6 October 1965, he received and had "a cordial, friendly conversation" in Peking with Pridi (with the help of Liao Cheng-chih and Wu Hsiu-chuan). Pridi's son is [redacted] reported to have viewed this as a move by the Chinese leaders to publicly associate his father with the two Peking-sponsored Thai front movements; he said that his father refused to lend his name to either front group. He also stated that the leader of the Independence Movement was "definitely a member of the Communist Party of Thailand." He also said that his father was strongly opposed to the Chinese strategy, namely, that the best way to support the North Vietnamese was to extend the armed struggle to "Laos and Thailand."* While he referred to

(footnote continued from page 138)
government can establish strategic hamlets, and (5) ultimately expand into the urban areas, using troops recruited "from the people."

The leader of the Thailand Patriotic Front indirectly confirmed that part of this plan was being implemented: "Our compatriots' armed uprisings, which were staged in the northeastern and southern regions of Thailand and which will be followed by our compatriots in other regions, are aimed solely at waging the struggle for self-defense and at repelling U.S. imperialists and the reactionary traitors." (Peking Radio Broadcast in Thai to Thailand of 7 December 1965) (emphasis supplied)

*Sihanouk claimed that Chou En-lai and Pham Van Dong were preparing a plan "to warn" the Thai Prime Minister against involvement with U.S. operations in Vietnam, but were unable to do so only because the Thai leader did not stay in Djakarta (at the April 1965 anniversary of the Bandung conference) long enough for the plan to be implemented. (Sihanouk speech of 30 May 1965) Peking and Hanoi support for the insurgents suggests some degree of cooperation between the two Communist regimes. [redacted] reports indicate that not only the Chinese and Vietnamese but also the Pathet Lao have infiltrated instructors into northeast Thailand from Laos to assist and train Thai insurgents, the latter appearing in September and October 1965 in the northeast.

three PRC organizations as responsible for subversion in Thailand--viz., the Prime Minister's Office, the CCP, and the Thai section of the Foreign Ministry--it seems that Mao has engaged his own prestige in support of the effort to use Pridi's name to attract non-Communist recruits to the front movements, which are led by CPT members.*

By the fall of 1965, the Chinese leaders were actively engaged in reviving the armed struggle policy which Mao had permitted Chou En-lai to discard.** Thai Communists, who submerged in 1952 and who had made their way to Canton and Peking, were reported in September 1965 to be back in Thailand actively organizing youth front groups. According to several sources, some Thai cadres resent the Peking-oriented leadership (which includes ethnic Chinese) for national reasons and because they do not agree with the Maoist emphasis on armed struggle. In any case, Mao's personal intervention in early October 1965 seems to have resulted in a considerable step up in Peking's public

*High-level CPT members captured in the summer of 1967 have provided more precise information on the Chinese Communist departments which have been responsible since 1950 for maintaining contacts with Thai subversives. According to their accounts, the CCP's International Liaison Department had handled relations with the CPT; within this liaison department, the Afro-Asian and Latin American Committee has handled relations with Communist front organizations such as the Thai Patriotic Front. The Staff Office for Foreign Affairs of China's State Council--an office responsive to Chou En-lai and Chen Yi--has dealt with non-Communist groups (used for Communist recruiting and propaganda purposes) such as that of Pridi Panomyong.

**The CPT's Second Congress in 1952 is said by the Chinese to have proclaimed armed struggle as "the only path" for seizing power in Thailand. However, by late 1951, Mao was under pressure from Stalin's aides to drop the concept of his road as the model for Asian Communist revolutionaries, and he complied, moving toward a more diplomatic policy centered on improving Peking's international image.

warnings to Thailand that closer Thai-U.S. military cooperation would lead to an intensification of the "patriotic struggle" in Thailand. (People's Daily article of 7 October 1965, published one day after Mao met with Pridi) A CPT cell was informed on 10 October that the party had "now" decided to shift from defensive to offensive tactics, and by late 1965, instructors from the mainland and North Vietnam were training Thai hill tribesmen at two centers in northern Laos under Thai Communist party direction.

Liao Cheng-chih, who appeared with Mao during the Pridi interview, continued to shepherd Thai front leaders in Peking, meeting with them on 1 November 1965 on the first anniversary of the founding of the Independence Movement and probably implementing a new policy of higher level Chinese leaders to make the fronts a more compact fighting unit by uniting them.* On 1 November 1965, the Independence Movement announced that it had joined the United Patriotic Front. The first Communist insurgent attack against a government installation, indicating a switch to more aggressive tactics, was conducted by a 12-man raiding group on 21 December 1965. Liao tied the subversive Thai political effort (he remained silent on insurgent activities) to peace "in Indochina" and the world and appealed for "bigger contributions" from various political groups "in 1966." (Liao speech of 2 January 1966) However, a People's Daily article of 28 January 1966 did refer to the insurgents: the Thais have taken up arms and are determined to overthrow "the reactionary

*In October 1966, the former Lao charge in Peking, who had met with Thai front leaders on the mainland, stated that the Chinese leaders had tried to induce Pridi to become the leader of the combined organization, but he is said to have refused.

rule of the traitorous Thanom Kittikachorn government by means of people's war." This article also was unprecedented in official party and government publications because it had dropped the equivocal euphemism, "Thai authorities," and had disparaged the Thanom government specifically and in highly derogatory terms. Peking increased its public support. On 24 March 1966, Peking Radio rebroadcast a Voice of the People of Thailand report that the Thailand Patriotic Youth Organization was established on 15 February 1966; on 13 April, Liao referred publicly to the Thai "people's war" and the readiness of the Chinese people to help "at any moment;" and on 27 April, a People's Daily article praised the battles fought by "the patriotic people's armed forces of Thailand."*

The Chinese leaders were careful to indicate that increased Thai involvement in the Vietnam war would be handled by others, by a riposte to be delivered by Thai insurgents and by the Vietnamese Communists and the Pathet Lao. For example, following the 6 January 1967 announcement in Bangkok that 100 Thai troops would be sent to Vietnam, Peking (following Hanoi by an interval of five days) warned that "the peoples of Vietnam and other Indochinese states will certainly deal you resolute counterblows and the Thai people, too, will certainly rebel against you extensively and in enhanced unity." (PRC Foreign Ministry statement of 19 January 1967) Peking's reaction to the announcement that B-52s would use Thai bases was attacked in a "Brief Commentary" in People's Daily on 25 March 1967 which warned that this action "will inevitably add fuel to the flames of the armed struggle of the

*The Chinese had been helping at earlier "moments" in subtler ways without using the PLA directly, that is, by training Thai insurgents over the years. For example, [redacted] indicate that all six of the high-ranking members of the CPT, captured in the summer of 1967, had been trained in Communist China and that the party is dominated by its Chinese members.

Thai people." The Chinese leaders' reluctance to commit the PLA to any action, while hinting that the North Vietnamese and the Pathet Lao might retaliate, was a reflection of caution and a source of embarrassment. But in subsequent comment, they still avoided saying what Peking would do in response to the enlargement of U.S. military bases in Thailand, committing the Vietnamese to "hit still harder." (People's Daily editorial of 2 April 1967)

The prospect appears to be for greater Chinese encouragement of the Thai insurgents and Thai front groups. This almost certainly will include military training and covert financing.

2. Malaysia

Malay's leaders in the 1950s had refused to recognize Peking while Communist insurgent activity continued in the countryside. Prime Minister Rahman had stated this position on 23 August 1957, eight days prior to Malayan independence, and this was repeated by his successor on 11 May 1959. Before they had granted the Malayans independence, the British refused to accept any Peking representatives in the country, as the CCP's guidance of the Communist Party of Malaya made Chinese Communist officials a direct security threat. However, the Malayans viewed the early establishment of trade relations as a secure form of contact with Peking, and by 1964, the Chinese had exported $95 million to Malaya and had imported $210,000 in commodities. As noted earlier in the section of this paper discussing Indonesia, the Chinese Communist leaders were cautious after the establishment of Malaysia as an extended country on 16 September 1963, at first avoiding any direct commitment to support Sukarno's "confrontation" policy in the hope that a relatively non-antagonistic attitude would sustain their trade relations with Kuala Lumpur and Malaysia's friends, the British.

However, the Chinese leaders significantly increased their support of Sukarno in the fall of 1964 when the Indonesian leader became more assertively anti-U.S. and after the U.S. airstrikes of August 1964 on North Vietnam. On 15 April 1965, the CCP sent a message greeting the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM) on its 35th anniversary (released

by NCNA on 30 April 1965). The message made it clear that the Chinese leaders were intensifying their support of the small insurgent group operating from almost inaccessible bases in southern Thailand against Malaysian authorities.* Following the arrest of some leaders of the CPM front organization--the Malayan National Liberation League (MNLL)--in Indonesia after the unsuccessful coup of 1 October 1965, the Chinese dusted off one of their own Malayan puppets in Peking and on 12 January 1966, publicized the establishment of a mission "in China" of the MNLL with P.V. Sarma as its chief. Sarma joined other puppets (i.e., the Thai front leaders and the Palestine Liberation Organization mission members as well as secretaries of the formerly Djakarta-based Afro-Asian Journalists Association and the Indonesian AAPSO group), and on 12 January, he declared, in the presence of Liao Cheng-chih, that his organization was the united front group of the Malayan people's movement fighting to crush Malaysia and that they recognized that "people's revolutionary war is the only answer to counter-revolutionary war." A Chinese Communist spokesman pledged Peking's "all-out support" for the Malayans fighting against the government authorities and stated that the "National Liberation Army of Malaya" was making progress against the "British colonialists and their running dogs."

The Chinese leaders were declaring in effect that their response to increased U.S. and Thai involvement in the Vietnam war would be reactivation of Communist insurgent movements in anti-Communist countries in Southeast Asia. They tied the small Malayan insurgency to Vietnam, using their Malayan puppet to warn that "the Malayan people would intensify their anti-Malaysia campaign to coalesce with the anti-imperialist struggle in Vietnam and Southeast

*The message recounted the two "armed struggles" led by the CPM, first against the Japanese and second against "British imperialism and its running dog, the Rahman clique," and indicated that the second struggle was continuing. It concluded with a pledge of support and a declaration that both parties would "fight shoulder to shoulder."

Asia." (P.V. Sarma speech in Peking on 1 February 1966) (emphasis supplied) [redacted] by the spring of 1966, most Malaysian and Singapore Chinese newspapers began taking a strong pro-Peking position in commenting on the Vietnam war in compliance with a reported CPM directive, which included instructions on the need to intensify study of Mao's "thought."

Study of Mao's doctrines almost certainly increased as Mao's purge expanded on the mainland, and by 1 February 1967 Sarma was impelled to praise the Red Guards and to insist that the "Malayan people...were adhering to Chairman Mao's teaching by relying on armed struggle." (In response, a "representative of the revolutionary rebels" in Peking expressed the support of mainland Chinese for Malayans who are "completely sweeping away all the freaks and monsters who are lording it over the people of Malaysia." Liao Cheng-chih declared that the people of China and Malaya would always "fight together.") Sarma claimed that in the year 1966

> the Malayan National Liberation Army and people, led by the Communist Party, were increasingly active in central and northern Malaya, and especially in the latter region bordering Thailand.

Actually, the center of activities for the CPM is in southern Thailand. Captured documents indicate that since the establishment in early 1966 of a training camp for the Communist Terrorist Organization (composed largely of ethnic Chinese guerrillas who were driven from Malaya between 1948 and 1960) hard-core strength of the insurgents was about 1,000 by early 1967.* The prospect

*Contacts between the Chinese Communists and the CPM have been maintained through Thailand. According to Thai Communists captured in the summer of 1967, the Communist Party of Thailand in 1961 acted as a channel for orders, funds, and supplies passed from Communist China to the CPM.

appears to be for sustained Peking encouragement of the CPM insurgents and greater CPM efforts to send subversive elements into the Malay peninsula to infiltrate legal parties, especially the Labor Party of Malaya and the Barisan Sosialis Party.

3. Singapore

Singapore's secession from Malaysia on 9 August 1965 provided the Chinese leaders with (1) an opponent of Rahman's whose anti-Malayan position could be used to disparage Kuala Lumpur and (2) a possible friend who would at least agree to trade with Peking. They reported favorably on Lee Kuan Yew's press conferences of 9 and 10 August 1965 and quoted him as saying that "we want to trade with the world, including the PRC." (NCNA dispatch of 10 August 1965) However, the desire of the Chinese leaders to recognize Singapore and establish their influence there, using assets among Singapore Chinese, was subordinated to the more important consideration of complying with Indonesian demands that they avoid taking such an anti-Djakarta action. [redacted] to have told the Japanese consulate general officer in Hong Kong in September 1965 that the Chinese leaders had wanted to recognize Singapore, but during Indonesian independence day celebrations (17 August 1965), Chen Yi in Djakarta was prevailed upon to have Peking withhold recognition. The Japanese official also reported that Peking's strategy in September was to defer recognition and "cultivate" Lee Kuan Yew and elements of the People's Action Party, encouraging them to develop contacts with Djakarta. The Chinese ambassador in Dar-es-Salaam told visiting Singapore officials in late September 1965 that they should send a trade mission to Peking and that recognition "will come in due course." The Chinese ambassador also insisted that since secession, Peking had not criticized the new government, that no pro-Barisan broadcasts had been made by Peking Radio since separation, and that no bombs had been exploded since Singapore left the union. According to another report of a meeting between the two parties on 1 October 1965, the Chinese

ambassador requested that the new state produce evidence of its "anti-colonialism" and "anti-imperialism" and warned that it would have to demonstrate that it would reject contacts with "revisionism." That is, the Chinese leaders were prepared to avoid criticism of Singapore only on condition that it joined Peking's camp against the British, Americans, and Soviets.

Lee Kuan Yew would not oblige them, and, following upon the Singapore government's mid-October 1965 statement affirming nonalignment, the Chinese attitude became more hostile; a senior Hong Kong Communist official stated privately in late October that Peking was now displeased with Lee's international position. Lee made it clear why he was unwilling to line up with the Chinese leaders on a whole range of international issues, and on 12 February 1967, he told a group of Chinese in Singapore that "only" the Western powers could check Peking and that Singapore must attain their support by demonstrating that local Chinese are not part of China. He indicated that his anti-Peking line was based on a consideration of the balance of military power in the area: "What I am saying here tonight would be very different. When the day comes that China has the power to match the U.S. militarily, then I know what I will have to say."

The prospect seems to be for stepped up efforts to penetrate various political parties* by pro-Peking

*For example, the Barisan Socialist Party is a key target. A Chinese Communist official told a Singapore Chinese in Canton in May 1967 that the BSP was not Communist and would not "liberate the people," but he went on to say that leftwing elements and labor organizations in Singapore should support the party. The organ of the BSP, Chen Hsien Pao, keeps fairly in step with Peking's positions and BSP chairman, Dr. Lee Siew Choh, receives occasional covert guidance on Peking's line from the London-based group ostensibly representing Malaysia in the AAPSO, particularly from J. Eber of that group. The most active apologists of Mao's purge have been BSP elements and leftwing trade union members.

Communists in the new stage. Peking has also dropped the distinction between Rahman and Lee, and is using them as an undifferentiated target. Following the Soviet action in signing a trade agreement with Kuala Lumpur and agreeing to exchange diplomatic missions (announced on 3 April 1967), the Chinese leaders used their Malayan puppets to attack the joint target.* According to a Chinese official's statement in Canton in late May 1967, Peking will depict the situation as requiring the "liberation" of Malaysia and Singapore by the CPM.

4. The Philippines

Despite the Philippines' participation in SEATO and recognition of Taipei, Filipino leaders were encouraged by Chou En-lai and Chen Yi at the Bandung conference in April 1955 and thereafter to establish relations with Peking.** The Chinese leaders hoped to detach the Filipinos

*"All genuine Malayan patriots must therefore step up their struggle against modern revisionism with the leading group of the CPSU at its center, at the same time as stepping up their struggle against U.S.-backed British imperialism and the Malayan (Rahman-Lee Kuan Yew) puppets, in order to crush 'Malaysia' and the new-type colony of Singapore, and achieve the genuine independence of a unified Malaya." (Statement of the Central Committee of the MNLL carried by NCNA on 14 May 1967) (emphasis supplied)

**"At the Bandung conference, we said to Mr. Romulo that there is no hatred between China and the Philippines, and that if the Philippines go by the spirit of the Bandung conference and the five principles of peaceful coexistence, friendly relations of mutual assistance can be established." (Chen Yi interview with Manila Vice Mayor and newsmen on 28 July 1958) "Since the Bandung conference, we have been constantly thinking about how to promote and develop relations between our two countries." (Chou En-lai interview with Filipino newsmen on 27 October 1964)

from their close alignment with the U.S., calculating that a gradual process of non-official contacts would erode Manila's commitment. In a revealing statement on this matter, Chou in 1964 indicated that the strategy of establishing contacts gradually was similar to Peking's view of contacts with Japan:

> ...the Philippines is a member of SEATO... but changes, indeed great changes have taken place in the situation and nature of the aligned countries...The relations between China and the Philippines can and should be improved....
>
> ...the Philippines is maintaining diplomatic relations with the Chiang Kai-shek clique in Taiwan. But we think that this, too, will not stand in the way of the establishment and development of relations between our two countries. [Japan also maintains relations with Taipei] but that has not prevented Japan from establishing and developing general contacts with China...friendly contacts on a popular level are becoming ever more frequent [although] U.S. troops are still being stationed in Japan, and a part of Japanese territory is still being occupied by the U.S. All this shows that the situation is complicated, but it does not mean that nothing can be done about it. Such being the case with Japan, why should not the same apply to the Philippines? (Chou En-lai interview with Filipino newsmen on 27 October 1964) (emphasis supplied)

This expressed Chou's willingness to look for small openings to establish contacts with U.S.-aligned countries rather than declare the task hopeless and adopt a revolutionary attitude of complete and overt hostility, avoiding all contacts with these countries. The latter attitude was clearly more revolutionary, but as late as the fall of 1965, Chou was still advancing a flexible policy, and probably had Mao's sanction for doing so.

He apparently also felt that he had Mao's concurrence to continue the policy of publicly dissociating Peking from support of Communist insurgents in the islands. Chou insisted that Peking would not use popular diplomacy as a means to gain access to Filipino Communists, and he referred to the "principle" involved:

> Revolution cannot be exported. We have consistently persisted in this principle. Revolution can only be conducted by the people of the country concerned. (Chou interview with Filipino newsmen on 27 October 1964)

At the time Chou was declaring this as a "principle" relative to Peking's attitude toward internal developments in the Filipino insurgent movement, the Chinese leaders had advanced a considerable distance in discarding it in Southeast Asia, Africa, and Latin America and were depicting the CCP as the "leader" of insurgent Communists and Peking as the "center" of world revolution. Chou's moderate line with the Filipinos in October 1964 reflected the desire of the Chinese leaders to enlist Manila in their camp against the Soviets on the issue of Moscow's participation in the second Bandung conference (Chou referred to the "very good contact" Chen Yi had had with Romulo at the preparatory meeting for the conference "not long ago"). It also reflected their decision to try to deter the Filipino leaders from direct involvement in the Vietnam war following the U.S. airstrikes against North Vietnam in August and September 1964.

The Chinese leaders did not abandon their policy of trying to enlist the support of Filipino political figures to promote the policy of establishing contacts with Manila. Chen Yi in mid-March 1966 told visiting Senator Katigbak that the deplorable presence of U.S. bases in the Philippines should not prevent friendly relations between their two countries and a Chinese spokesman stated (NCNA report of 14 March 1966) that "there were no difficulties on the Chinese side" to improving trade relations and people-to-people contacts. Earlier, in mid-February 1966, Chinese Communist officials met in

Hong Kong with a Philippine trade official, offered to sell 20,000 to 50,000 tons of rice on a private basis, and then made a separate offer to sell 200,000 tons on a quasi-government basis. The latter offer contained the condition that the Philippines establish a trade mission in Peking and accept a Chinese trade mission in Manila --an arrangement similar to the Sino-Japanese trade mission exchange. This was not acceptable to Philippine leaders. Nevertheless, political figures are still encouraged to visit the mainland, but only as private individuals, as was the case with three Philippine congressmen in August 1967.*

On the other hand, Peking began to revolutionize its policy toward Manila, a key element in the decision apparently having been the desire to warn government leaders to avoid direct support of the U.S. effort in Vietnam. In mid-February 1966, Peking Radio's Philippine section sharply increased its Filipino program broadcasts to the islands, attacking President Marcos' Vietnam aid bill. During the mid-March 1966 visit to the mainland of Senator Katigbak, a Chinese spokesman pledged "support for the Philippine people in their just struggle against U.S. efforts to induce or force the Philippines to send troops to South Vietnam." (NCNA report of 14 March 1966)

Propaganda support for the insurgents allegedly working with the Communist Party of the Philippines (PKP) seems to have been the Chinese leaders' way of trying to

*The three congressmen were kept cooling their heels in Hong Kong and were eventually informed that they could enter only "in unofficial capacity," leaving them with the impression that the Chinese leaders were wary of Manila's recognition of Taipei, recognition which would create a two-Chinas situation if the trio had been permitted to visit as an official mission. It is also likely that the Chinese leaders preferred that they should not be permitted to report on the turbulence in some mainland cities at the time.

create difficulties for Manila at a time when it was increasing its support for Saigon and Washington. By late 1966, Peking began to depict, with considerable exaggeration, the Philippines as an area of increasing "armed struggles," expanding its list beyond Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, Laos, and South Vietnam. In the spring of 1967, the Chinese leaders went beyond this to suggest that their opposition to Manila's policy would take an organizational form, i.e., support for some guerrilla fighters in the islands. In early May 1967, two representatives of the militant front--Movement for the Advancement of Nationalism--were in Peking, apparently consulting on the method of announcing what was claimed to be the PKP's new action program. On 21 May, NCNA claimed that the PKP had set forth its program on 1 May in which the party pledged itself to the "development of rural bases and armed struggles," to a "life-and-death struggle" against the U.S. and its "local reactionary allies"--i.e, the central government--and to anti-CPSU positions in the Sino-Soviet dispute. On 29 May, NCNA claimed that the "Philippines People's Liberation Army" was in existence and tried to create the impression that it was "led by" the PKP. On 30 May, a People's Daily article stated that this army had started new battles against the U.S. and "the Philippine reactionaries" and that "the Philippine revolutionary people" will win final victory

> ...after protracted arduous struggles if, armed with Mao Tse-tung's thought, they fight a people's war, establish revolutionary base areas, and encircle the cities from the countryside.

By the end of May 1967, the Chinese leaders had dropped the line Chou had been expressing in 1964 on non-support of insurgents in the Philippines, applied Mao's road to the islands in the most explicit language they had used since 1952, and in effect declared open support for subversive guerrilla action against Manila by publishing the "PKI's" 1 May 1967 program. The degree of control which Peking-oriented members of the PKP maintain over the Huks is unclear. The Huks (i.e., the old name for pro-Communist insurgents whose activities are focused on central

Luzon) as a body, or in part, may be resisting the imposition of any "PKP" controls, as is suggested by the 1 May 1967 PKP program, which hinted that the Communists were trying to impose control by "reorganizing the party in the entire country" and that the party anticipated disputes between itself and "any revisionist faction" still active.

The prospect seems to be for continued overt declarations of support for the insurgents allegedly "led by the Philippine Communist Party" (Peking Review item of 15 September 1967), but Peking is greatly exaggerating the size of these small forces, which suffer from lack of overland contact with the Chinese.

IV. Imperialist Colonies: Macao and Hong Kong

Although Mao at an earlier time had complained about foreign control of Macao and Hong Kong, he had been unwilling to fight to seize the colonies with the PLA or to begin a political-subversive struggle to impose local Communist control on their governments.* Practical reasons--namely, the prospect of losing Hong Kong's foreign earnings (economic) and of losing a major war with the UK and the U.S. (military)--have deterred him from moving against the British colony with the PLA, despite his view of himself as the leader of all world "liberation" struggles.** Regarding Macao, it has not been worth much to

*In the original version of his essay, The Chinese Revolution and the CCP (December 1939), Mao had complained that: "in defeating China in war, the imperailistic powers had taken away many Chinese dependent states and a part of her territories. Japan took Korea, Taiwan, the Ryukyu Islands, the Pescadores Islands, and Port Arthur; England seized Burma, Bhutan, Nepal, and Hong Kong; France occupied Annam; and even an insignificant country like Portugal took Macao."

The 1951 version of this essay removed two embarrassments: the implication that China had been, and could again become, an imperialistic country dictating to "dependent states;" the reference to Portugal as an "insignificant" country able to maintain a colony on the mainland.

However, he retained his complaint about Hong Kong: "After defeating China in war, they not only occupied many neighboring countries formerly under her protection, but seized or 'leased' part of her territories. For instance, Japan occupied Taiwan and the Penghu Islands and 'leased' the port of Lushun, Britain seized Hong Kong, and France 'leased' Kwangchowwan."

**Hong Kong has been Peking's largest source of foreign exchange earnings, which totaled more than $550 million in 1966.

Peking economically and, if Mao had decided to use the PLA to seize it, the colony would have been an insignificant risk militarily; but a move against Macao alone would have glaringly revealed Mao's unwillingness to seize Hong Kong. The preferred course was to avoid extensive publicity and to tolerate the status quo in both.

The Chinese leaders were impelled to depict their acquisecence in this foreign presence on the mainland as a matter of Peking's tacit approval rather than of any fear of war or of loss of economic benefits. They portrayed the Hong Kong and Macao situations as minor matters low on their list of foreign policy problems. However, two developments moved the colonies higher on the list--viz., Khrushchev's public jibes in 1962 and the revolutionary fanaticism of Mao's purge in 1966-67.

Khrushchev gave the colonies unprecedented international publicity in his speech of 12 December 1962 to the Supreme Soviet, and in defending himself against Peking's charge that he had appeased the U.S. in retreating during the Cuban missile crisis, he sarcastically praised the Chinese leaders for appeasing Lisbon and London by avoiding "premature" actions for "good reasons."* Mao and his advisers apparently were uncertain on how to proceed to answer this jibe and apparently continued to believe that, if agitation were started, the British would

*Implying that in taking Goa, even New Delhi was more revolutionary than Peking, Khrushchev sarcastically stated: "But does anyone accuse China because remnants of colonialism remain untouched on her territory? It would be incorrect to prod China into taking actions that she regards as premature. If the government of the PRC endures Macao and Hong Kong, then there must obviously be good reasons for this. Therefore, it would be stupid to heap accusations on their heads that this supposedly represents concessions to the British and Portuguese colonialists, that it is an act of appeasement on their part." (Speech of 12 December 1962)

not hand them a political victory without a prolonged struggle in Hong Kong and that a victory in Macao alone would not detract from, and might even underscore, continuing British control of Hong Kong. They apparently decided to sustain the policy of avoiding a political struggle or a military seizure, absorb as well as they could the derisive implication that Mao--a revolutionary "liberator"--was deterred by practical reasons from acting like one regarding the colonies, and continue to depict the Portuguese and British presence as a matter of Peking's benevolent tolerance.

To demonstrate that Hong Kong was continuing in its colonial status only because Peking preferred not to change it, the Chinese leaders harassed Hong Kong government authorities in a low-key and controlled way. In January 1963, they impelled the authorities to postpone a planned urban renewal project in the Kowloon walled city (actually located outside of Kowloon).* At the same time, they annoyed them with complaints about Chinese Nationalist operations in the colony, but publicly justified their unwillingness to take any forceful action to seize either

*Although the slum clearance plan had been publicized since March 1961, the Chinese leaders had not protested until demolition was about to start and, more importantly, until after Khrushchev's December 1962 taunt. On 17 January 1963, they were impelled to follow up an unpublicized and informal protest (of 1 January) with a publicized and formal protest to the Brtiish charge in Peking, reacting partly to the jibe appearing in the CPUSA organ Daily Worker on 13 January regarding their timidity in enduring the colonial presence. The British on 23 January reportedly rejected Peking's claim to "sovereignty" over the walled city but retreated and postponed the project --a minor victory for Mao.

of the colonies.* The January 1963 protest was carefully handled by the Chinese leaders; it was not made a major issue and it was not extensively publicized. More importantly, they had chosen an area in the colony--the Kowloon walled city--where there was the appearance (but only the appearance) of a legally valid claim and where they would not have to confront the British with an issue regarding their jurisdiction over the entire colony.** In this way they maintained the policy of avoiding a direct confrontation over British control.

This policy seems to have been sanctioned by Mao himself. On 11 September 1964, Mao told Ambassador Paye and a French delegation that he had, at an earlier time, discussed the colonies with Khrushchev and that Khrushchev had asked him a question.

> Why, he said, does China not want to get back Hong Kong and Macao? I answered: We have more important problems than Hong Kong and Macao.

This exchange, as reported by Mao, was put in the context of a discussion which took place before Chou's trip to

*The justification appeared in a published response to the American Communists and it contained a reference to Kowloon (where Peking had gained a minor victory): "With regard to the outstanding issues, which are a legacy from the past, we have always held that, when conditions are ripe, they should be settled peacefully through negotiations and that, pending a settlement, the status quo should be maintained. Within this category are the questions of Hong Kong, Kowloon, and Macao and the question of all those boundaries which have not been formally delimited in each case by the parties concerned." (People's Daily editorial of 8 March 1963) (emphasis supplied) This editorial raised the issue of disputed Sino-Soviet territorial claims as a further political counter to CPSU and C USA jibes.

**Actually, the Chinese leaders did not have a good case for claiming "sovereignty" over the walled city because (continued on page 158)

Moscow in January 1957, and presumably when Khrushchev was in Peking in September 1954. Mao did not indicate to Paye whether he had changed his position, but he implied that he had not and that he would not be provoked by Soviet taunts into launching a political struggle to wrest jurisdiction of the colonies from Lisbon and London. This attitude was reflected in the remarks of other leaders. Chen Yi stated privately on 15 March 1965 that Peking had done "nothing" about Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan, but that Hong Kong would be just a walkover if the Chinese wanted to take it.

The definitive statements of the Chinese leaders' attitude toward Hong Kong were made in July 1965 by Chou En-lai, Chen Yi, and Tao Chu. They apparently reflected Mao's continued desire to avoid a showdown with the colonial authorities. They were set forth to Hong Kong leftists almost certainly with the intention of having them conveyed to the British in order to inform the UK of the ground rules for maintaining the status quo, the implication having been that Peking preferred to avoid situations which required that it act vigorously to champion the cause of local Chinese.

Chou, in a speech in Canton on 17 July 1965, is reported by the British to have told a group of Hong Kong film and press circles representatives that the people in Hong Kong were living in difficult circumstances in being "forced to live and abide by the laws of the colony." He went on to say that Hong Kong was an integral part of China and would sooner or later be returned to it, but it would not be in China's interest if Hong Kong were taken back "now." That would be "the responsibility of the younger generation," and he personally would not see it happen--implying that he was too old to see it. Chen Yi was reported as saying to the same group in Canton that it would probably be 20 or 30 years before Hong Kong was

footnote continued from page 157
among other things, they had not disputed the dicision of Hong Kong courts in 1959 reaffirming police jurisdiction over it.

liberated. Chou and Chen apparently were stating indirectly that the U.S. buildup in South Vietnam and airstrikes against North Vietnam did not require the Chinese Communist leaders to retaliate by using PLA troops against targets on the mainland's periphery.

Tao Chu made this point explicit in a private discussion with a leftwing Hong Kong newspaper assistant editor in late July 1965. While still knowledgeable of the Chinese leadership's thinking, Tao, then the first secretary of the CCP's Central-South Bureau, stated that if the Vietnamese war were expanded, the status of Hong Kong would not be affected. He reportedly said that Peking would take no action provided that (1) the UK did not engage in "aggression against China," (2) the UK did not "permit Hong Kong to be used as a base by the U.S. for aggression against China," and (3) the British authorities did not "persecute patriotic workers and organizations in Hong Kong." Tao said that these remarks need not be kept secret and could be conveyed to the British in Hong Kong. The Chinese leaders were in effect appealing to the Hong Kong authorities to avoid embarrassing Peking--i.e., to act to curtail visits by U.S. warships to the colony and to avoid any police action against Chinese labor union leaders. They were convinced that regular visits by U.S. warships would expose Peking to further Soviet taunts and the disparagement of international opinion as a regime fearful of supporting Hanoi by challenging Western military power in the Far East. In short, as of late July 1965, Mao and his advisers apparently were still unwilling to start a political struggle against Hong Kong (or Macao) and wanted to indicate to the British that Peking would not agitate if Hong Kong authorities would only act to curtail the visits of U.S. warships.

The Chinese leaders felt impelled to apply pressure to the British whenever the U.S. presence was publicized and international opinion was stimulated. For example, on 26 August 1965, the British charge in Peking was given a "serious warning" ostensibly regarding the sending to Taiwan of four Nationalist survivors of a Communist-Nationalist naval skirmish, but actually as additional indirect pressure on the Hong Kong authorities regarding the crash

of a U.S. military plane in the area on 24 August. On 1 September, the real reason for the pressure was indicated in a note of protest handed to the British charge, demanding in effect that the colony authorities curtail U.S. warships' visits to the area. On 1 February 1966, the Chinese again formally protested to the charge regarding visits by navy ships involved in the Vietnam war. Mao and his advisers, however, apparently were still unwilling to change the policy of avoiding a major political showdown with the British or Portuguese.

Only after Mao intensified the purge of certain of his lieutenants in the spring of 1966 and only after he adopted an increasingly revolutionary attitude on various matters of foreign policy was he apparently willing to reconsider his policy of non-revolutionary restraint toward the colonies. Partly to increase pressure on Hong Kong authorities regarding the visits of American naval ships and partly to establish a more revolutionary attitude toward the colonies, Mao and his aides apparently permitted and encouraged Red Guards to express their fanatical views, which in turn stimulated young leftists in Hong Kong and Macao. On 10 September 1966, Red Guards in Canton were reported circulating posters demanding a change in Hong Kong's name to "Bannish Imperialism City"--a demand similar to the one encouraged in late August among Red Guards in Peking who were demanding a change in the name of the street adjacent to the USSR embassy to "Anti-Revisionism Street". On 15 September, Red Guards at a mass rally in Canton went even further, demanding that Hong Kong and Macao should be "returned" to the Peking regime and claiming that the continued existence of the colonies would damage Peking's new revolutionary image.

A. Macao

In the course of his purge, Mao seems to have permitted a new openness in discussing the colonial presence, and it was in the context of the new publicity and the general fanatic revolutionary attitude on the mainland that the leaders in Peking, on the one hand, and the Communists and leftists in Macao, on the other hand, reacted

to the Portuguese physical suppression of leftist building workers on Taipa Island (Macao) on 15 November 1966. He and his advisers may have decided to exploit the incident, ostensibly as a clear example of Portuguese colonial brutality, but actually as a relatively easy way to attain a foreign policy victory in which "revolutionaries" subjugate imperialists. Between 15 and 30 November 1966, the Chinese leaders apparently were moving carefully to exploit the situation, and the avoidance of open agitation in that period provided some cover for their planning of covert moves with local Communists. It was to be made to appear as a local Communist "struggle."

During the above-mentioned quiet interval, Chinese from the mainland apparently played an important behind-the-scenes guiding role in expanding the incident into a major foreign policy effort to humiliate the Portuguese colonial authorities. on 18 November a Chinese entered Macao from Canton to direct the confrontation. On 22 November, local Communist leaders held a "denunciation conference." Ho Yin, the unofficial Chinese Communist spokesman for many years in the colony, arrived back from the mainland on the 17th, led a leftist boycott of welcoming ceremonies for the new governor on the 25th, protested to him about the use of riot police during the Taipa Island incident, and reportedly "under instructions from Canton," demanded on the 29th that he guarantee that such an incident (at which 34 Chinese were injured) would not occur again and that he dismiss the officials responsible for the physical suppression. He also threatened to start a strike to gain compliance with these demands. On the 30th, the new governor refused to meet with a leftist delegation to receive their demands.

At this point, the Chinese leaders apparently decided to increase the pressure on him by openly indicating their support for the leftists. On 30 November, an NCNA dispatch from Hong Kong (repeated by Radio Peking) denounced the Portuguese police action of the 15th as "bloody fascist behavior" and expressed support for the "firm demands" of local Chinese. However, this support was still short of a total commitment and of the usual

political support--i.e., it did not yet include a People's Daily editorial or a formal protest. The Chinese leaders apparently were still apprehensive about making a more authoritative commitment because of uncertainty regarding the determination of the new governor to continue to resist the demands. Having encouraged the local Communists and leftists--i.e., the Left--to organize demonstrations, they apparently preferred to sustain the impression of a spontaneous and completely local initiative, providing themselves with leeway to keep Peking's prestige disengaged as much as possible.

Their calculation seems to have been that a series of demonstrations and threats of a strike (and then a strike if necessary) would be a safe way to probe the governor's will to resist. They apparently did not plan violent demonstrations for the early stage of the struggle. However, following some concessions made by the governor on 1 December, the Macao Left, in trying to wrest more concessions, staged small demonstrations in the city hall on the 2nd and 3rd. The police tried to disperse the group with fire hoses, but the participation of hooligans in the fray led to a riot on the 3rd. Eight Chinese were killed, apparently during the curfew period, and the local organizers, including Ho Yin, showed alarm, presumably because they were aware that Peking had preferred low-key and non-violent action in the early stage of the pressure campaign. Ho reportedly departed for a short time, possibly to Canton for instructions, and upon his return stated that the affair was out of his hands and beyond his personal control. The governor reacted to the post-riot situation by capitulating, accepting the demands to dismiss the police chief and the district officer of Taipa Island, apologize, pay compensation, and promise not to permit another such incident as took place on the island.

However, the Chinese leaders, recognizing his capitulation as a sign of weakness and fear, apparently decided to wrest further, more degrading, and more significant concessions from him. Exploiting the incident of the 3rd, they demanded retribution, and for the first time came close to editorializing on the Macao situation. An NCNA

dispatch datelined Hong Kong on 5 December declared that the "intensification of brutality" indicates Portuguese "hostility" to Macao Chinese. On the 6th, a Macao students association's open letter was used to raise new demands (adding "punishment" of the Macao Police Commandant); on the 7th, NCNA quoted the Vice Governor of Kwangtung Province as telling a Red Guard rally in Canton on that date that the Portuguese "must immediately and unconditionally" meet the new demands: "We will resolutely backup our compatriots in Macao." This rally was timed by the Chinese leaders for its psychological effect on the governor (who had capitulated to demands on the 1st and the 4th) and who was considering at the time new and additional demands. The rally on the 7th was also used to imply a military threat; Red Guard speakers were used to "warn" the Portuguese to accept the new demands "without reservations," because the Red Guards were the "strong reserves of the PLA." The Red Guards also sent a telegram threatening the Portuguese authorities with having their "backs broken" and "blood debts repaid."

This rally reflected the apparent estimate of the Chinese leaders that they were on safe ground and that the political risk of such a direct commitment from the mainland was a small one. That is, they believed that the new governor was on the run and that he could be bullied into surrendering Portuguese control over certain aspects of the colony's life.

The Chinese leaders, who do not have diplomatic relations with Lisbon, made the situation a place-to-place rather than a government-to-government confrontation. As of 7 December, Peking had not issued an official protest or commented editorially. Although the Chinese communicated with Lisbon through a third country, France, this was not publicized. Publicly, they used the Canton authorities. On 9 December, the "Director of the Foreign Affairs Bureau of the Kwangtung Provincial People's Council" made the first official and formal Chinese Communist move by issuing a statement which set forth its (the Bureau's) four demands, including endorsement of earlier demands (of the Macao students on the 6th) and new demands for a ban on Chinese Nationalist activities and the return

of seven Nationalist agents picked up in June 1963. The bullying aspect appeared in the form of positioning PLA troops at several points on the border (where they had not been before) and close-in patrolling of the harbor by Chinese Communist frigates. On 11 December, Ho Yin met with the governor and insisted on immediate surrender to all demands, and a People's Daily Commentator article on the same day, reflecting the Chinese leaders' apparent belief that they could not now detract from the image of a local initiative on the part of Macao leftists, declared that the demands of the Kwangtung authorities were an expression of the "Chinese people's" position. The governor capitulated in separate statements on 12 and 13 December, turned over the seven Nationalist agents on the 20th, and was imeplled to conclude a Macao government protocol with the "Kwangtung Provincial People's Council" representative. The protocol in effect yielded Portuguese sovereignty to the Chinese Communists on several matters: in the banishing of specific Chinese Nationalist individuals and organizations in Macao and in complying with the demand to send back any refugee named by the Chinese Communists.

The Macao success was the only advance which the Chinese Communist leaders could portray as a major foreign policy victory in contrast to a series of major defeats since the summer of 1965. It took some of the wind from Moscow's sails.* It was also used privately to reassure some Overseas Chinese that they need not fear persecution

*But the Soviets were adaptable, ignored the abject Portuguese capitulation, and hammered away at the continued existence of the colony. Professing inability to understand why "Peking did not use this opportunity to put an end to Portuguese rule in Macao," they referred to the protocol as "conciliation" with the Portuguese colonialists. (Izvestiya article of 23 December 1966)

in Burma.* Moreover, they touted it as partly a Red Guard victory, that is, as a revolutionary victory for Mao in the course of his purge.** More importantly, it provided the Chinese leaders with a new confidence in reviewing their policy of sporadic, low-key harassment of the British authorities on the issue of visits to Hong Kong of American warships involved in the Vietnam war.

B. Hong Kong

The Chinese undoubtedly calculated that the British could not easily be cowed down, and they proceeded cautiously. They tied Macao for the first time to Hong Kong in a complaint about the latter colony on 29 December 1966 when an NCNA dispatch declared that the Chinese and their compatriots in Hong Kong and Macao "resolutely opposed" the U.S. turning the British colony into a "military base" and warned that if the British government persists in "such suicidal foolishness," it is "courting its own disaster." They were aware that the Macao success was still fresh in the minds of the Hong Kong authorities, and they hoped to use psychological pressure to impell the British to place greater restrictions on U.S. Navy visits. The Macao success was also encouraging to the Hong Kong Left, and by February 1967, the Hong Kong Communist seamen's

*Chinese embassy officials told Overseas Chinese leftists in Rangoon on 20 December 1966 that they would be supported against any local persecution by Peking, just as in Macao.

**The role of the Macao leftists was mentioned last in order: acceptance of the Kwangtung and Macao Chinese demands "resulted from the angry denunciation of the masses and the Red Guards of the great socialist motherland and the great pressure of the unremitting struggles against violence carried out by the Chinese compatriots in Macao." (NCNA Peking report of 20 December 1966)

union was pressing charges and making "demands" (roughly similar to those made in Macao) in complaining about the master of a Dutch ship who had shot and wounded disorderly members of his crew. In the same month, some Hong Kong officials were wary of Macao developments as a prelude to similar pressures in their colony. A formal note of protest was handed to the British charge in Peking on 20 March, accusing London of permitting the U.S. to use Hong Kong as a "war base." When the colony authorities recognized that this note buttressed a campaign in the pro-Communist press in Hong Kong claiming that crewmen from the USS Enterprise visiting the colony at the time had insulted and attacked local Chinese, they tried to avoid providing the Communists with a pretext to begin active demonstrations, asking the U.S. to cancel the proposed visit of the USS Canberra.

Moscow, which had been for some time publishing taunts about Peking's restraint regarding the colony, seized upon the 20 March protest note and derisively noted that, after all, the Indians "without wasting much time on anathematizing the imperialists" had taken over Goa, the situation of which had been very much the same as that of Hong Kong. (Moscow Radio comment of 29 March 1967) They tried to turn the protest note against Peking, declaring that it officially confirmed that the U.S. "with the direct connivance of the Chinese government" is using Hong Kong in the war against Vietnam. (Literaturnaya Gazeta article of 29 March 1967) The effect of this Soviet campaign almost certainly was to increase the determination of Mac and his aides to seize on an issue to prove that Hong Kong existed only on their sufferance by making the British concede the point.

The Hong Kong Left continued to receive indoctrination in Mao's "thought" and on developments related to his purge on the mainland. Their spirit of struggle was further stimulated; their labor disputes were increasingly viewed as practical applications of Mao's "thought." Following the settlement on 21 March 1967 of the protracted dispute between the Communist seamen's union and the Dutch shipping firm--a dispute which began on 6 December 1966 and finally led to an abject public apology and the payment

of the involved seamen's back wages--an NCNA dispatch of 22 March claimed that the settlement was a victory for Mao's "thought." The spirit of struggle was applied by other unions in smaller labor disputes, but the Chinese leaders, who were not confronted with a major colony dispute, continued to cooperate with the British on matters of food shipments and a telecommunications link between the Hong Kong and Canton airports.

The attitude of Communist union leaders became more aggressive under the influence of initial strike successes (small versions, in their view, of the Macao victory), mainland developments, and continued indoctrination in Mao's view of struggle. By early May 1967, the British authorities seemed to feel that they were living in a tinder box. When, on 6 May, riot police clashed with workers (who were wearing Mao buttons and shouting Maoist slogans) outside a Kowloon plastic factory and arrested 21 workers, the spark was struck which led to a major confrontation between Peking and London.

Evidence suggests that the decision to escalate the 6 May incident into a major confrontation with the Hong Kong authorities was made by the Chinese leaders and was passed on to some senior members of the local Communist apparatus while they were on the mainland. Thus while Peking had not yet become involved openly, organizers had arrived from the mainland with instructions as early as 7 May. On the 12th, posters in Canton were noted declaring support for "Hong Kong compatriots" in their struggle against Chinese capitalists. By that time, Hong Kong Communist newspapers had already bee noted making a black-white distinction and polarizing the two sides, alleging that the"British authorities in Hong Kong" had started a showdown with the "Chinese nationals of Hong Kong." The Chinese leaders apparently had permitted officials of the Hong Kong NCNA office (who had returned to the colony from the mainland on 9 May) to indicate a degree of mainland involvement by meeting with Governor Trench on the 12th, but they were met by his aide, to whom they read three demands and several quotations from Mao's doctrines in unison. The British refused to comply with these demands or the demands of 13 May issued by local Communists.

The Chinese leaders apparently decided to intervene more openly on the 15th, and their intervention was quicker, more direct, and more forceful than it had been in the Macao showdown. Deputy Foreign Minister Lo Kuei-po handed charge Hopson a protest "statement" which demanded "immediate and unconditional" acceptance of five stipulations.* (This was part of a major coordinated pressure campaign, and on the same day, a People's Daily editorial attacked the Hong Kong authorities; by the afternoon, Red Guards were used to sustain the new crisis atmosphere by pasting their posters to the walls of the British compound in Peking.) The protest "statement" indicated the support of the "Chinese people" for the Hong Kong Left and probably reflected Mao's personal pique with the authorities for "attempting to exclude the great influence of China's great proletarian cultural revolution" and to "restrict the influence of Mao Tse-tung's thought." The policy of many years of restraint toward Hong Kong was abandoned. The Chinese leaders had escalated the situation from a place-to-place showdown (as in the Macao crisis) to a government-to-government confrontation between Peking and London.

Although they were aware that the discipline and perseverance of the Hong Kong authorities were far greater than that displayed by the Macao authorities, the Chinese leaders seem to have overestimated the probable combined effect of their threats to British officials as well as the capability of the Hong Kong Left to mobilize local support. They quickly hit some of their targets in order to gain an immediate Hong Kong capitulation: on 16 May in Shanghai, the British consulate there was invaded for

*These were: "Immediately accept all the just demands of the Chinese workers and residents in Hong Kong; immediately stop all fascist measures; immediately set free all the arrested persons (including workers, journalists and cameramen); punish the culprits responsible for these sanguinary atrocities, offer apologies to the victims, and compensate for all their loses; guarantee against the occurrence of similar incidents."

a short time; on 16 May in Peking, the British charge, Hopson, was besieged in his office in the embassy, and Reuters correspondent, Anthony Grey, who was trying to photograph Red Guards pasting anti-British slogans on his residence, was driven off from his terrace by a volly of stones; on 17 May in Peking, at an evening reception given by the Norwegian ambassador, Deputy Foreign Minister Lo Kuei-po refused to listen to Hopson's protest concerning the invasion and sacking of the residence of the Shanghai consul, Peter Hewitt, by Red Guards on the 16th;* at the same reception, Chen Yi deliberately snubbed Hopson by avoiding a mutual toast and a proffered handshake; also on the evening of the 17th in Peking, Hopson had to abandon his car to push his way into the embassy past an effigy of Prime Minister Wilson and past loudspeakers at the gate which had been showering abuse on British "imperialism" since the 15th. To sustain pressure at a high government (official) level, Chou En-lai attended the anti-British rally on 18 May; Hsieh Fu-chih, the main speaker, implied that the leaders were out to get "great victories," and he placed considerable emphasis on the idea that the British were trying to exclude from the colony the "influence" of Mao's "cultural" revolution and his doctrines. Hsieh's emphasis suggested that Mao and his aides believed that a major victory (in Hong Kong) would help to demonstrate that export of his "thought" alone was a valuable revolutionary contribution to Peking's anti-imperialistic foreign policy.

However, the speech of Hsieh Fu-chih did not repeat the specific demands of the 15 May protest "statement,"

*Foreign Ministry officials apparently were acting on oral orders (or even a written directive) to respond to British demarches with displays of Maoist contempt. On 16 May, a Foreign Ministry official reportedly threw to the floor a written protest against the invasion of the consulate and the residence occupied by Hewitt in Shanghai. First Secretary Blishen, who delivered the protest, was impelled to leave it, unaccepted, on a desk in the Ministry.

suggesting, for the first time, that the Chinese leaders believed the British could not be forced to comply with the five demands quickly.* Subsequent pressures on British officials on the mainland, in London, and in Hong Kong apparently were intended to get something less than total compliance with the demands, namely, a "speedy reply" (as the Chinese said in their demarche to Hopson on 22 May).

It is not within the scope of this paper to relate all the details of the Chinese pressure campaign. The main lines seem to reflect a sequence of moves, with an initial surge (i.e., 15-17 May) followed by a marching in place and an apparent realization that British perseverance had been underestimated. The Chinese picked up the attack again on 24 May, and two British diplomats, who had been ordered to leave the Shanghai consulate on 22 May, were turned over to the Red Guards to be subjected to various forms of Maoist abuse. New demonstrations were staged outside the embassy in Peking.

This return to more pressure on the 24th may have reflected Mao's personal decision. The important People's Daily Commentator article of 25 May may have carried his own views (if not his own words) in certain sections. The article was used to thunder at Foreign Secretary Brown (who had complained about the mistreatment of his diplomats and an abusive personal demarche from the Chinese charge in London on the 19th): "Shut your mouth" and "admit your guilt" as we demanded in the 15 May protest issued by "our" Foreign Ministry. Whether Mao drafted these lines is conjectural, but they seem to reflect a basic decision to prepare for a protracted struggle and for an escalation

*Hsieh indirectly conceded this when he complained that the Hong Kong authorities had "failed to apologize openly and immediately accept all the just demands put forward in the statement of our government." He did not repeat the specific demands, and his warning to London and Hong Kong was followed by an appeal to "admit your responsibility for these crimes", which were not detailed.

of the confrontation. Mao apparently refused to retreat down the hill he had climbed. The article contains a key quotation from Mao, which in effect became a directive to the Hong Kong Left: "The only course is to organize forces and struggle against them [i.e., the British]."

A protracted struggle was necessary because of (1) the British strategy to remain firm (but not provocative) and (2) the basic miscalculation (made by the Hong Kong Left and by the Chinese leaders in Peking) regarding the ability of the local Left to mobilize large groups for the showdown in the colony. As the realization that they had overestimated the Left's organizational capability deepened, the Chinese leaders apparently tried to shift all of the blame onto the Hong Kong agitators. On 30 May, the Hong Kong Bank of China manager stated privately that it had proved to be impossible to attain a Macao situation in Hong Kong and that Peking had complained that the regime had been placed in a very awkward position by the showdown. This was typical of Mao: having failed to gain a quick, cheap, and what would have been important foreign policy victory, he blamed lesser officials for the miscalculation.

It was also typical of Mao to persist in an image-damaging course which a more reasonable and less stubborn leader (Chou, for example) would have discarded when confronted with clear signs of failure. Rather than accept the clear and recalcitrant fact that the British could not be cowed down, Mao apparently took no nonsense from the fact, and insisted on a protracted struggle. In early June, when the Hong Kong authorities had restored order and the morale of the Left in the colony had been shaken--they seem to have had their fill of struggle--a People's Daily editorial of 3 June demanded that Hong Kong Chinese organize and prepare for more struggle--for the overthrow of British rule (at some unspecified future time). This editorial and the Commentator article of 2 June strongly recommitted Peking's prestige at a time when the situation was simmering down. The editorial reflected an apparent new obsession of Mao's, namely, that a large-scale struggle would force the British to surrender. Typically Maoist was the advice to the Hong Kong Left to (1) "do a big job of exposure" of alleged British atrocities, carrying

the campaign "to every household," (2) rely mainly on the working class as the "main revolutionary force" but to arouse "student masses" more fully and integrate their movement with that of the workers, and above all (3) "mobilize and organize still further and courageously" so as to form an unbreakable "revolutionary bastion." This was a program which probably reflected Mao's dissatisfaction with the performance of the Left thus far and, more importantly, his determination to project further into the future the timetable for final victory.

In this new directive, Mao apparently made another major blunder by calculating that better organization and more time would surely be decisive against British discipline. He was impelled to recognize that short-term pressures on the British would not lead him from success to success, but rather from failure to dismal failure. Nevertheless, he persisted, demanding that the Left should unite and organize "more effectively." (People's Daily Commentator article of 13 June 1967) Having failed at a major attempt to gain a quick decision, he apparently insisted on trying to get a delayed decision by prolonged struggle. Local Communists had to shift their ground and explain to their supporters that "Quick battle and quick decision is an old magic weapon of imperialism...Quick victory does not apply to the anti-persecution struggle of Hong Kong compatriots." (Editorial of 14 June 1967 in the Communist-owned Hong Kong Ching Po)

The Soviet leaders were provided with additional opportunities to taunt Mao for failing to seize control of Hong Kong. A 17 June 1967 Izvestiya article depicted the Chinese leaders as "cowards": instead of using the Hong Kong workers' protests as a means of "liquidating the remains of colonalism on their soil...the Peking leaders adopted a cowardly hypocritical position, saying one thing and doing another." The article added that the British had quickly seen through the "political clamour" of the Chinese leaders. "That is why they have begun to behave so brazenly in Hong Kong." That is, Moscow shifted its attack from a taunt about Peking's acquiescence in the status quo of Hong Kong to a taunt about an ineffective attempt, by proxy and "political clamour," to disgrace

the British. Chou En-lai moved to devise a position which did not commit Peking to intervene to the extent of trying to force the British out of the colony. He tried to make it clear that Peking's role of support did not require direct participation--actually, the Chinese leaders' role was somewhat more than mere support, as they were providing guidance on the main trends of the struggle--and he stated that the Hong Kong Chinese were "organizing a mighty army" while the mainland Chinese, by contrast, were helping only "in accordance with the needs of the situation." (Chou's speech of 24 June 1967) This position not only excluded the need for Peking's intervention, but also was intended to deflect the Hong Kong militants' grumbling over the failure of the Chinese leaders to weigh in with the full force of the PLA.* On the other hand, he had to convince international opinion that Peking's failure to humiliate the Hong Kong government authorities was not due to any unwillingness to support the local Communists, but rather a matter of long-term planning, and he told Malian officials on 9 August that Peking would settle the matter once and for all "within a year or two;" that is, Peking is definitely prepared to make the British capitulate--definitely, but not now.

Chou's 24 June statement that Peking would help only "in accordance with the needs of the situation" implied political help. Military help was kept down to the level of border security. That the PLA's role on this border was even more restricted than its role on the Indian border was made clear by developments during the July 1967 crisis. Mao and his aides could have used,

*Red Guards and other fanatics on the mainland apparently were also complaining about the failure of the Chinese leaders to use the PLA against the colony, and Chou later criticized people who would like to "send a division of the PLA against the British imperialists," reasoning that if we had listened to everybody's advice along such lines, we would have been obliged to "take up weapons in our hands against the revisionists of a certain country." (Chou's speech in Peking on 1 September 1967)

as a pretext for a major attack, the firefight which took place on 8 July at the border town of Sha-kau-tok, involving local militia and the PLA, on the Chinese side, and police and Gurkhas, on the British side. However, although additional PLA units were moved up quickly to the border, the Chinese leaders were careful to avoid using them to escalate the military incident. Nevertheless, there was a shift to more aggressive tactics beyond the use of the strike (in May and June) to seizures of border police stations and bomb attacks (in July and thereafter); the shift had been preceded by a warning from Peking that "the proper punishment" will fall on the head of anyone who has "killed our compatriots" in Hong Kong. (People's Daily editorial of 5 July 1967) Peking's protests over the border incident of 8 July at Sha-kau-tok and the use of troops to support police (for the first time on 12 July) were ineffectual, and the Hong Kong authorities continued to act vigorously against the rioters. Peking's Foreign Ministry note of protest of 11 July 1967 demanding the release of 3 NCNA men arrested in Hong Kong did not compel the British to retreat. The Chinese leaders had to resort to political retaliation (by launching small demonstrations in front of the British embassy and by placing under house arrest Reuters correspondent Anthony Grey on 21 July) after one NCNA man was sentenced for his political agitation to two years in prison on 19 July. By the end of July, the Hong Kong authorities had demoralized elements of the local Communist apparatus and had frustrated the desire of the Chinese leaders to attain a Macao-like capitulation of the British. The Chinese leaders were unwilling to use military methods to gain their capitulation, and PLA Acting Chief of Staff Yang Cheng-wu provided the Hong Kong Left with only routine support by the end of July: "We give resolute support and aid to our patriotic countrymen in Hong Kong and Kowloon in their heroic struggle against fascist atrocities perpetuated by the British authorities." (Speech of 31 July 1967 on the eve of the 40th anniversary of the founding of the PLA) In the context, "we" seemed to refer to the PLA, but the support implied seems to have been political.

Encouragement of the local Communist apparatus to sustain their effort continued into August, at which time

small-scale border violations by fanatics on the Chinese side apparently exceeded the intention of the Chinese leaders, and PLA troops at various times during the month had to intervene on the mainland-colony border to keep aroused young militants from expanding their border violations into full-scale military skirmishes. The determination of the Hong Kong authorities to combat vigorously the violent actions of the local Left, and the effectiveness of the police on the streets of the colony increased the demoralization of some elements of the Left and the frustrations of the Chinese leaders in Peking. They were to meet with new frustrations in August.

After militant Chinese workers and some Red Guards crossed the border at Man-kam-to, seized the British sentries' weapons, and forced them to sign an agreement to remove barbed wire barriers and after the Hong Kong authorities repudiated this agreement and temporarily closed the border (except at Lo-wu and Sha-kau-tok), the Chinese leaders protested (Foreign Ministry note of 14 August 1967). They were rebuffed in the British rejection of the protest note. When, on 17 August the colony authorities suspended the publishing permits of three major pro-Communist newspapers and arrested important staff members, the Chinese leaders were confronted with new evidence that they had failed to cow down the "imperialists." Mao personally may have been infuriated when the whip he was using to beat his British opponent (that is, the continuation of Communist pressure in Hong Kong and diplomatic pressure in Pkeing) began to break in his hand. On 19 August, Hong Kong government police searched the offices of the three papers under ban. Mao and his aides apparently decided to use a heavier instrument--the government-to-government ultimatum. On 20 August, the British charge Hopson was summoned to the Foreign Ministry and handed a protest note containing an ultimatum to London and the Hong Kong government demanding cancelling of the ban and dropping of the lawsuits "within 48 hours." The Chinese leaders tried to attain a quick British capitulation by increasing the pressure within the deadline period, and on 21 August, they used "200 revolutionary journalists in Peking" to demonstrate in front of Hopson's office after having cut the telephone of the Reuters correspondent,

who was still under their orders to remain in his house. They then made the point clear that the British embassy was their target of first priority by reducing the size and the virulence of the demonstrations in front of the Ceylon, Mongolia, and Kenya embassies.* The British rejected the ultimatum note and began prosecuting the arrested staff members. Mao and his aides almost certainly had been prepared to take some form of action beyond mere verbal threats and Red Guard demonstrations in front of the British embassy if the ultimatum was rejected. This is suggested by the very act of establishing a deadline. Not to have taken an abusive form of action, not to have engaged in some political retaliation would have confronted them with a defeat more specific, and therefore more obvious, than the defeats they had had to face since May 1967. Shortly after the expiration of the 48 hour deadline at 10:00 PM on 22 August, they turned the Red Guards loose to carry out the threat of "serious consequences." (Foreign Ministry note of 20 August 1967)

The Chinese leaders acted to commit a diplomatic abomination and then acted to deny their own responsibility for it. The Red Guards broke into the mission compound, burned the charge's office, and then manhandled Hopson and certain other members of his staff. In the course of this outrage, they tried to force Hopson to accept the personal humiliation (and the humiliation that would have been reflected on the British government) of complying with their demands that he must bow his head in complete submission to them. It would have been a "revolutionary"

*That certain embassies were being deliberately targeted at various times during the violations of diplomatic immunity in the spring and summer of 1967 was indicated by Chou En-lai. In his discussion on 14 September 1967 with the Cambodian ambassador, Chou said that "Mass manifestations against certain embassies had their reasons and were comprehensible acts because the Chinese people know who is their enemy and who is their friend." (Cited in Sihanouk's speech of 18 September 1967)

victory if Hopson had submitted; he courageously refused, performing more heroically than did the Indonesian charge, who admitted that on 5 August Red Guards had forced him and other embassy staff personnel to kneel on the ground at the foot of a "people's court." (Darwoto interview of 2 November 1967) Having administered other "serious consequences" to the mission and mission personnel, the Chinese leaders moved immediately to deter London from using the incident as sufficient reason to break diplomatic relations.* They began a major effort to deny that they had committed the outrage. Posters in Peking in early September 1967 claimed that "at the time of the burning of the British Office," Madame Mao and Chen Po-ta had issued a directive by telephone that the action taken against the embassy should not "overstep international norms." But it was not clear when this alleged directive was issued and precisely what international norms the Chinese leaders, who had been committing outrages against diplomatic immunity since the spring of 1967, would have been indicating.

Chou En-lai, reported by the posters to have condemned the sacking of the office, issued a five-point directive on 1 September which included prohibitions against the manhandling of diplomats, damaging of buildings, and

*Fear of a diplomatic break, threatened by Indonesia's Foreign Minister Malik on 14 August regarding treatment of diplomats in the Indonesian embassy, was clearly indicated in their quick action on 15 August to lift the virtual blockade from around the embassy in Peking, after which Indonesian diplomats were allowed to enter and leave without obstruction. That is, they were able to control the situation around the Indonesian embassy in mid-August (following the 5 August demolition on one embassy building and the burning of all embassy cars) when the consequences were clearly to be a break in Sino-Indonesian relations.

the "burning" of offices and cars.* The Chinese leaders used a Chinese servant of a member of the charge's staff to relay a story further absolving them of complicity: when Madame Mao, Chen Po-ta, and Hsieh Fu-chih arrived on the scene in a large car during the attack on the office, they had to intervene personally to prevent Red Guards from going on to burn the two British blocks of flats in the diplomatic compound. The major responsibility for the incident was placed on Yao Teng-shan, the fanatical former charge to Indonesia, who is said to have been encouraged by Wang Li, former member of the Cultural Revolutionary Group, to seize power in the Foreign Ministry after Wang's anti-Chou speech of 7 August 1967.** Although

*Following the 1 September 1967 meeting of the enlarged Peking Municipal Revolutionary Committee, wall posters in Peking carried Chou's "five prohibitions," which were (1) do not beat diplomats, (2) do not stone embassies, (3) do not burn embassies, (4) do not enter diplomats' houses, and (5) do not violate the boundaries of the diplomatic missions. Madame Mao, at the same time, claimed that "Last year when I was setting up the Red Guard Headquarters, I said that it was not permitted to make attacks at...foreign embassies. If you are going to oppose foreigners, you have to do it on the street. What do you mean by entering foreign embassies?" (Speech of 1 September 1967)

**"The speech of Wang X caused an upheaval in the foreign affairs department for 15 days...Inspired by the 'August 7' speech, an insignificant man like Yao Teng-shan, deputy head of the Foreign Ministry General Service Department, became 'foreign minister' for 14 days...." (Peking Red Guard Newspaper editorial of 18 October 1967) The major complaints against Yao were that he (1) "wrested power from the Foreign Ministry's Party Center" and (2) "sent cables to the embassies in foreign countries without permission of Chairman Mao and Premier Chou..." He was also disparaged as "an embassy burner."

Peking claims that Chou re-captured this power on 23 August--the day after the mission office was burned--it is not clear that Chou lost control of all aspects of foreign policy decision-making. On the contrary, he seems to have had his way during the Hong Kong confrontation in rejecting "advice" to send the PLA against the colony (Chou's speech of 1 September 1967) and in defending certain embassies, such as Cambodia's after anti-Chinese actions had been taken by Sihanouk. On balance, it may be conjectured that Chou and members of the Cultural Revolutionary Group (i.e., Chen Po-ta, Madame Mao, and Kang Sheng) were aware of the strategy to attack the embassy and sanctioned the attack but not the burning of the charge's office, which may have been the point at which Red Guard action exceeded the plan.

The Chinese leaders were clearly aware that after the extreme "left" action of burning the charge's office they would have to create the impression among the British embassy staff and elsewhere that Red Guard outrages against embassy property and personnel were entirely the work of fanatics (which was apparently only part of the whole story). At a later date, they specifically claimed that the office burning was contrary to a direct order. In late December 1967, Chou told an Afro-Asian writers conference in Peking that he, Chen Po-ta, Madame Mao, and Kang Sheng, learning in advance of Red Guard plans "to set fire" to the embassy office, "ordered" that it not be done, but one element of the Red Guards defied the order. In any case, the Chinese leaders apparently have been careful to omit the crucial matter of the 48-hour ultimatum, in post facto explanations, as well as the "serious consequences" they had pledged in it.

The burning of the charge's office on 22 August marked the high-tide of wild and irrational actions against the British in Peking. Various aspects of the confrontation were sustained, such as restrictions on the travel of British personnel, detention of Anthony Grey, and bomb terrorism and border incidents in Hong Kong; these actions reflected the Chinese leaders' reluctance to de-escalate quickly. They were concerned about any appearance of weakness; as a result, they continued to be nasty in their public and private statements to the British. They had to cover a gradual retreat from the high point of the confrontation and they were particularly sensitive concerning the arrest of the NCNA officials (still being held by the colony authorities) as well as their image among the Left in Hong Kong. Nevertheless, they apparently directed local senior Communists in late September 1967 to explain and justify to their apparatus subordinates the new and less intense phase of the struggle.* Moreover, Chinese officials in London stated privately on 1 October that Sino-British relations would not deteriorate into a break, and a series of actions, including the agreement on 25 November settling the border dispute which erupted in October and the raising of travel restrictions on British diplomats (excluding the Reuters correspondent who is being held in reprisal for detention of the NCNA men) eased the situation in the colony. The Foreign Ministry protest of 6 December regarding the closing of a local Chinese school, raids on other schools, and the arrest of one headmaster as well as two film directors indicated that although the protracted political

*The new low-boil phase reduced the morale of the Hong Kong Communist apparatus, and in an effort to refurbish sagging spirits, the Chinese leaders established on 27 October 1967 the "Support Hong Kong Compatriots' Committee" in Canton. When, on 3 November 1967 Chou En-lai warned militant Red Guards in Canton to keep hands off of Chen Yu because he was the head of the Committee, the Chinese premier was indirectly indicating that Chen and his Committee were directly subordinate to Peking.

struggle in Hong Kong will proceed at a lower boil, the Chinese leaders will continue to view the colony situation as "the nub of Sino-British relations which could not be improved or normalized until the Hong Kong problem was solved." (Foreign Ministry official's statement to Hopson on 6 December 1967)

The prospect would seem to be for a protracted political struggle. British determination and the failure of the Hong Kong Communist apparatus to acquire widespread local support have made Peking's demands for capitulation merely matters for the record which eventually may be dropped. However, the Chinese leaders may well intensify the struggle to counter specific British actions against the colony's Left or to comply with any future intensification of Mao's purge on the mainland.