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THE SINO-SOVIET STRUGGLE IN THE WORLD COMMUNIST MOVEMENT SINCE KHRUSHCHEV'S FALL

This working paper of the DD/I Research Staff examines in detail the evolving relationship of the Soviet and Chinese Communist parties to the world Communist movement from the time of Khrushchev's fall in October 1964 through the end of May 1967. The paper attempts to describe the principal public and private dealings between the CPSU and the CCP throughout this period; the dealings of each of the two antagonists with the most important parties of the world movement; the dealings of many of those other parties with each other, and the effect of their interests on the policies of the Soviet and Chinese parties; the role played by the evolution of Soviet policy toward the United States in the Sino-Soviet struggle for influence over the Communist movement; and the role played by the internal life of the Soviet and Chinese parties on the course the Sino-Soviet struggle has followed since Khrushchev's fall.

The paper is organized in three parts, published separately as ESAU XXXIV, XXXV, and XXXVI. Part I describes the shift in the emphasis of CPSU policy in the first six months after Khrushchev's fall toward a more vigorous appeal to the interests of all those parties--such as the North Vietnamese--hitherto inclined toward the Chinese and having a special, private vested interest in militant struggle against the United States. Part II traces the growing CPSU success in 1965 and early 1966 in neutralizing these militant former supporters of the Chinese by advocating "unity of action" in support of North Vietnam against the United States and by capitalizing on Mao Tse-tung's refusal to cooperate and Mao's arrogant attitude toward all who would not obey him completely. Part III discusses the flow of events beginning with Mao's refusal to attend the 23rd CPSU Congress in the spring of 1966 and his simultaneous surfacing of the gigantic purge known as the "great cultural revolution," describes the subsequent rapid decay of Sino-Soviet state relations and the resumption of direct Soviet attacks on Mao to take advantage of China's increasing isolation,

and concludes with an appraisal of the policy lines toward the Communist militants, toward the United States, and toward the Chinese Communist regime which the dominant majority in the CPSU leadership may be expected to follow in the future.

A chronological list of secret Sino-Soviet correspondence since Khrushchev's fall precedes Part I. An index follows each of Parts I and II and a cumulative index of all three parts follows Part III.

This paper presents a working thesis against which other analysts may test their own theses and conclusions; it does not, therefore, reflect an official position of the Directorate of Intelligence. It has benefited from the advice and comments of [redacted] of the Office of Current Intelligence, [redacted] of the Office of Economic Research, and officers of the Clandestine Services. The conclusions expressed--some of which are controversial--are solely those of the author, Harry Gelman. Comments on any aspect of the paper are solicited and may be addressed to the author or the Chief and Deputy Chief of the DDI Special Research Staff, [redacted]

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PART III

THE SINO-SOVIET STRUGGLE IN THE WORLD COMMUNIST MOVEMENT SINCE KHRUSHCHEV'S FALL

Summary and Conclusions

In the two and a half years from Khrushchev's fall in October 1964 to May 1967 the men who overthrew and replaced Khrushchev in the CPSU leadership have witnessed an astonishing change in the contest between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Communist Party of China for predominant influence over the world Communist movement. The Communist Chinese in 1964 were still gaining strength at the expense of the CPSU's following in many parts of the world and had gathered around them a solid phalanx of important Far Eastern parties--including North Vietnam and North Korea--whose relations with the Soviets were all becoming increasingly hostile. In 1967, the CCP's offensive within the Communist movement has been halted almost everywhere, the leading Far Eastern parties have all been neutralized by the CPSU, and it is the Chinese whose relations with most of those parties have become hostile. In more than a decade of Sino-Soviet struggle, never have Chinese Communist political fortunes sunk so low.

This momentous reversal of the tide has been caused by the interaction of Soviet and Chinese policy, each of which has been equally important. On the Soviet side, the decisive factor has been the inclination of a majority of the new Soviet leadership to reverse Khrushchev's order of priorities and to cultivate the most militant, anti-American parties of the world Communist movement--particularly those of the Far East--eventually accepting as a necessary and tolerable price for this effort a worsening of the atmosphere of Soviet relations with the United States all along the line. This reorientation of Soviet policy began in confused fashion well before the U.S. bombing of North Vietnam started in February 1965, but was greatly accelerated thereafter. Along with this change went a temporary shelving of Khrushchev's project of a world Communist conference without the Chinese, a

project which in practice had been leading toward a formal Soviet rupture not only with the Chinese but also with the Far Eastern and other militant parties whom Khrushchev's successors wished to conciliate. The principal Soviet endeavor henceforth was to demonstrate support for the North Vietnamese against the United States and on this basis seek both to win back the respect and sympathy of hard-line Communist militants everywhere and to enforce a greater degree of conformity with Soviet policy among the Communists of Europe.

The success of this main thrust of Soviet policy was enormously facilitated by Mao Tse-tung's violent rejection of the Soviet calls for "unity of action" against the United States, Mao's increasingly far-fetched insistence that the USSR was colluding with the United States against Hanoi, and Mao's incredible arrogance toward all the parties formerly on good terms with him that would not follow him down the road to a break with the CPSU. The same arrogance was simultaneously contributing to successive Chinese defeats in relations with the non-Communist world and to a general growth in Chinese Communist isolation. Added to all this has been the hostile foreign reaction engendered by the events of Mao's "great cultural revolution," by the unprecedented lengths to which Mao's cult has been carried, and by the attempts made by the CCP to export cultural revolution propaganda to other countries.

The events since the fall of 1964 have confirmed again and again the power of nationalism in the world and the continued growth in the relative importance of parochial national interest as one of the motives for the actions of an increasing number of Communist parties. Mao Tse-tung has lost ground almost everywhere, among Communists and non-Communists alike, because of his repeated displays of contempt for the national interests and national pride of others. The CPSU has regained a measure of the influence Khrushchev had lost in an important section of the world Communist movement--the most militant

parties of the Far East and elsewhere--by deliberately modifying Soviet policy to appeal to the interests of those parties in a manner that Khrushchev had felt to be undesirable for Soviet national interests.

At the same time, the present ideologically inclined majority of the Soviet leadership continues to yearn nostalgically for its lost universal hegemony over the Communist movement, and continues to strive as best it can to maximize CPSU authority over as many Communist parties and states as possible. In Europe, this effort brings the Soviets into continuing conflict with the interests of several important Communist parties, and in Latin America, it has brought the Soviets into a direct clash with Castro over the question of who is to lead there. Yet over-all, the Soviets continue to be aided by the fact that for a majority of the Communist parties of the world, the virus of nationalism for the time being still remains less important than the traditional ties of those parties with the CPSU and their continued heavy dependence on Soviet financial subsidies.

Part I

Khrushchev and the Anti-US Communist Militants

When Khrushchev fell in October 1964, the balance of opinion in the Soviet leadership shifted toward the views of those of his former colleagues and subordinates who had long wanted a higher priority to be given to the promotion of Soviet influence at Chinese expense in the most militant and vehemently anti-American sections of the world Communist movement.

At the moment of Khrushchev's fall, important Communist parties and other radical movements with a private vested interest in hostility toward the United States--and a long-standing desire for a tougher Soviet posture toward the U.S.--existed in several parts of the world. In the Far East, these included most notably the ruling parties of North Vietnam and North Korea and the Communist parties of Indonesia and Japan. These four key parties were not obedient retainers of the Chinese but rather their voluntary allies, whose anti-Khrushchev position had derived in large part from what they regarded as his soft line toward the United States. A considerable modification of Soviet policy toward the United States was therefore one of the obvious prerequisites (there were others) for the improvement of CPSU relations with these parties. Much of the militant, pro-Chinese wing of the large Indian Communist party could also be reasonably expected to be more susceptible to CPSU influence after such a change in the Soviet posture toward the United States.

In Latin America, a vehement hostility to the United States remained central to the policy of the Cuban regime, which believed that its power at home could be secure only after it had helped to establish other Communist regimes to the south. From the point of view of a majority of the men who replaced Khrushchev, a toughening of the Soviet line toward the United States offered the promise of rewards for Soviet relations with Castro, and might well be used as a bargaining counter to extract concessions from him in other matters, such as the question of his relations with pro-Chinese forces in Latin America.

Even among the Communist parties of Western Europe, there were surprisingly few ardent defenders of good relations between the Soviet Union and the United States, and growing pressure from some for more vigorous Soviet efforts to outbid the Chinese for the support of the anti-U.S. radicals of the underdeveloped world. It was noteworthy that such Western European Communist pressure for a harder Soviet line toward the United States came particularly from some of the parties which were most "revisionist" in domestic politics, most persistent in resisting Soviet authority and criticizing Stalinist aspects of Soviet life, and most obstinate in obstructing Khrushchev's plans to coerce the Chinese. The Italian Communist party (PCI) was the leader in this regard, and a striking feature of the "Togliatti Memorandum" published by the Italian party a month before Khrushchev's fall was its outspoken demand for a reappraisal of Soviet policy toward the United States.

In short, on the eve of Khrushchev's fall, the vested interests of many Communists and radicals in different parts of the world held out a strong incentive for a toughening of Soviet policy toward the United States to those of the Soviet leaders who assigned a higher priority than had Khrushchev to the value of enhancing Soviet influence among such Communists as opposed to the value to the Soviet state of good relations with the United States.

The other side of the coin was the question of the tactics to be used by the CPSU in the struggle against Peking. Without exception, every Communist party that had been demanding a harsher Soviet line toward the United States was also adamantly opposed to Khrushchev's efforts in 1963 and 1964 to bring about a showdown with the Chinese party. The two questions, for most Communist leaders, were completely interwoven.

Thus the North Vietnamese, North Koreans, Indonesians and Japanese Communists had been opposed to Khrushchev's attempts in his last two years to convene a world Communist conference without the Chinese, both because they feared the consequences for themselves of a formal schism and because they saw

the motivation for Khrushchev's campaign as closely connected with his policy toward the United States. These parties were inclined to agree with Chinese charges that Khrushchev's restrained posture toward the United States was discouraging revolutionary struggles throughout the world, and they were convinced in particular that this aspect of Khrushchev's foreign policy was harmful to their own national interests. They were thus all the less inclined to agree to CPSU claims to an authority which was to be used for such purposes, or to participate in an international Communist conference which Khrushchev evidently intended to use to try to strengthen CPSU authority in support of his policies. This view of Khrushchev's real intentions received apparent confirmation from the increasingly intransigent Soviet posture toward the North Vietnamese, North Koreans, Indonesians and Japanese parties in 1963 and 1964, and from Khrushchev's increased willingness to accept public estrangement from all these anti-American militant parties as a necessary consequence of his effort to force a definite break with the Chinese.

Fidel Castro, who agreed with the Far Eastern radical Communists regarding Soviet dealings with the United States, also shared their disapproval of Khrushchev's moves to bring about a formal split with the Chinese. Unlike the Asians, Castro was not disposed to align himself with Peking in direct opposition with Moscow, and tried to maintain a neutral posture; but Castro's attitude toward Khrushchev's project of a world Communist conference without the Chinese was bound to cause anxiety for the CPSU. If Cuba were to join the Far Eastern parties in declining to attend such a conference, this would be a severe blow to the Soviets, with grave repercussions in many quarters.

In addition to the general question of Cuban participation in a hypothetical world Communist conference as yet unscheduled, there was a more pressing issue: whether the Cubans would agree to take part in the smaller, 26-party preparatory meeting which Khrushchev had called to meet in Moscow on 15 December to organize a world conference. By demanding Cuban attendance at a specific gathering on a specific date, Khrushchev

had placed unwelcome pressure on Castro to commit an overt act that would violate his neutrality. Castro had still not committed himself when Khrushchev fell in mid-October. The men who replaced Khrushchev understood that if it became necessary after all to hold the preparatory meeting in some form, a price would have to be paid for Castro's participation. Here again, some modification of the Soviet line toward the United States would pay dividends.

Finally, Khrushchev's plan for a world Communist conference without the Chinese, and his immediate project of a 15 December 26-party preparatory meeting in Moscow, had encountered stubborn opposition from certain of the most important parties in both Western and Eastern Europe. In Western Europe, the leader in opposing Khrushchev's plans, once again, was the Italian Communist party. This party's overriding motive for opposing Khrushchev's tactics toward the Chinese and in seeking to stave off as long as possible a formalization of the split in the movement was neither concern for the fate of the movement nor fear of an allegedly growing threat to peace from the United States--the reasons the PCI publicly adduced--but rather determination to prevent the CPSU from using a formal schism as the occasion for the restoration of stronger Soviet control over the PCI. The British Communist party took a similar stand. In Eastern Europe, the Rumanian and Yugoslav parties were adamantly opposed to Khrushchev's plans, and the Poles and Hungarians were less than completely enthusiastic.

From the point of view of most of the men who succeeded Khrushchev, therefore, his enterprise appeared more and more foolhardy. On the one hand, he was in effect writing off CPSU influence in the Far East, abandoning to the Chinese parties and regimes for which the CPSU had long competed with Peking and which under other circumstances--with fundamental changes in Soviet tactics toward both Peking and Washington--might take a more forthcoming attitude toward the CPSU. On the other hand, in view of the attitude of important parties in the Soviet camp it seemed increasingly unlikely that Khrushchev would succeed in extracting sufficient advantages in the

remainder of the Communist world to compensate for the surrender of the Communist Far East.

The Post-Khrushchev Balance

While the new Soviet leadership was probably united from the outset on the need to slow down Khrushchev's drive for a world Communist conference, it was divided into majority and minority tendencies on the other, related foreign policy issues. In the first weeks after Khrushchev's removal Soviet policy frequently gave the appearance of trying to ride off in several directions at once, as the USSR strove to promote goals simultaneously which obviously were incompatible: to advance trade and improve contacts with the United States, and also to try to improve relations with the Chinese; to claim publicly that money was being saved through cuts in the military budget reciprocal with U.S. cuts, and also to appeal to the interests of militant Communists in physical conflict with the United States; to reassure the Yugoslavs, and also to conciliate the Cubans and the radical parties of the Far East who all detested everything the Yugoslavs stood for.

The unusually great contradictions in Soviet behavior in the first three months of the post-Khrushchev regime resulted from the simultaneous pursuit of separate lines of policy especially favored by different members of the new leadership both because of personal inclination and functional responsibility. As time went on--by December and January--the proportions of "soft" and "hard" elements in the Soviet foreign policy "mix" began gradually to shift, with the harsher view of policy toward the United States slowly gaining as the inevitable consequence of decisions and actions already taken by an ideologically-oriented majority of the CPSU presidium.

The most economically-oriented members of the new Soviet leadership, represented by Kosygin and Mikoyan, believed the reduction of tensions and a reasonably calm Soviet-American relationship essential to the interests of the Soviet state, both because they valued the possibility of expanded

economic ties with the United States for their own sake, and, more important, because they resented the strains placed upon the Soviet economy and the limitations on a rise in the standard of living imposed by the demands of the arms race and by the pressures for still greater military and heavy industry expenditures generated whenever the cold war was intensified.

A policy of seeking a relaxed public atmosphere in relations with the United States, however, was at direct loggerheads with a policy of aggressively courting radical regimes and parties in underdeveloped areas which were violently hostile to the United States. Decisive in this respect were the massive reallocations of power within the new Soviet leadership as the result of Khrushchev's removal, which greatly strengthened the relative position of those elements in the leadership who had long been unimpressed by the necessity for or the desirability of an atmosphere of detente with the United States government. These leaders were particularly sensitive to the reception given the long-reiterated Chinese charges of Soviet-U.S. collusion, and were from the first prepared--for the sake of the new Soviet drive among the anti-U.S. radicals--to take actions likely to impair relations with the United States.

Thus of the three leading economically-oriented figures in the CPSU presidium in October 1964, the first (Khrushchev) was swept away, the second (Mikoyan) suffered a decisive setback in political power leading inevitably to his removal a year later, and the third (Kosygin) was promoted to be Premier but was forced to conform to the decisions of a presidium majority whose foreign policy leanings ran counter to his own.

On the other hand, the strengthening of the ideologically-oriented trend in the presidium was demonstrated by the effect of the Khrushchev ouster upon the position of three other leaders: Suslov, Shelepin, and Brezhnev. The super-ideologue Suslov, overseer of CPSU relations with the foreign Communist world, now received vindication after years of struggle with Khrushchev over the emphasis of CPSU foreign policies and the direction of CPSU

tactics. Khrushchev's fall also catapulted Shelepin into full membership in the presidium, rewarding him for the important role he played in the coup itself. Since then Shelepin has displayed savage hostility toward the United States, publicly and privately, more consistently than any other member of the leadership, including even Suslov. It is fairly likely that Shelepin was one of that "part" of the Soviet leadership to which the militant Japanese and Indonesian Communists kept referring in late 1964 and early 1965 as favoring their foreign policy views, and there is evidence that the Chinese Communists thought this was the case.

Finally, Khrushchev's fall brought Brezhnev the post of party first secretary, inherently the most important position in the Soviet Union, which Brezhnev has since used gradually to expand his power. There is evidence suggesting that during Khrushchev's last year Brezhnev had used his position and his relations with the secret police to seek to obstruct first Khrushchev's policy toward the United States and then his policy toward West Germany. These same relations with the KGB were used in October 1964 to guarantee Khrushchev's removal. Since then, Brezhnev has taken a line toward the United States Government which, while varying from one period to another, has generally been considerably more harsh than Kosygin's, although not quite as harsh as that of Shelepin or Suslov. He has shown a consistent desire to cultivate and avoid offense to the militant wing of the world Communist movement. He appears to be the leading force behind the steady push to halt Khrushchev's process of deStalinization and to restore a "balanced," fairly favorable picture of Stalin. Brezhnev has from the first gone far out of his way to court the Soviet military and to champion their interests; his consistent stress on the long-term and world-wide dangers of "U.S. imperialist aggression" and on the general rise in international tension has thus served to justify a greater share of the pie for military expenditures than Kosygin favored, just as it has also justified the conciliation of foreign militants, the Soviet posture of public hostility toward the United States, and sporadic efforts to cow heretical writers at home.

Despite important differences within the ideologically-oriented majority wing of the Soviet leadership itself--notably between Brezhnev and the ambitious extremist Shelepin--the over-all shift in the balance of opinion within the leadership regarding the priorities of Soviet foreign policy was the key fact, and this change eventually became widely noted in the world Communist movement. An important North Vietnamese official in April 1966 was to tell assembled Viet Cong leaders that the new Soviet leadership was on balance not as revisionist as the leadership under Khrushchev had been. He added that the Soviet leadership "still contains some revisionists, some indecisive elements, and also some active elements." At about the same time on the other side of the world, a Hungarian party official was to state privately that "previously (i.e., under Khrushchev) the main line and principal stress" of his party had been centered on peaceful coexistence, but that this "former position" of the Hungarian party had been too "one-sided" and that peaceful coexistence was "not now central" to Hungarian policy. Instead, it was now essential to place "a new stress" on aid to "liberation movements" around the world. This Hungarian change in emphasis reflected the basic shift in Soviet policy which began when Khrushchev was removed.

However, the change in the balance of forces in the Soviet leadership and the consequent shift in the emphasis of policy toward the United States did not mean a greater willingness to run a serious risk of direct military conflict with the United States. On the contrary, there is every indication that there has been little difference on this life-or-death matter between the minority of Soviet leaders that has wanted good relations with the United States and the majority that has been willing to sacrifice such relations to other Soviet interests. All of the Soviet leaders (with the possible exception of Shelepin) appear to remain deeply impressed by the outcome of the Caribbean crisis of 1962. The Cuban lesson has been clearly reflected in what the Soviets have not done with regard to North Vietnam. Despite Chinese private and public taunts, they have apparently not yet risked shipping sophisticated weapons or ammunition to the DRV by sea. The Soviets have also

rejected--as designed to provoke a war between the USSR and the United States--repeated Chinese demands that the Soviet Union do something in Europe to divert United States strength from Vietnam.

The Soviet Bargain with Castro

Meanwhile, in the six months following the fall of Khrushchev, the outline of a new set of Soviet policies toward the most militant anti-American forces of the Communist world took shape. First, the CPSU attempted to reach a modus vivendi with Castro. After negotiations between the Soviets and Cubans in Moscow in early November, a secret conference was held later in the month in Havana between the Cubans and representatives of virtually all the pro-Soviet Latin American Communist parties. In return for a Cuban promise to limit Cuban support in the future to revolutionary groups in Latin America approved by the pro-Soviet Communist party concerned, the CPSU apparently promised the Cubans--both directly in Moscow and indirectly through Soviet adherents at the Havana meeting--a more positive Soviet attitude toward the role of armed struggle in Latin America generally, and gave the Cubans to understand that in certain specified countries armed struggle would be supported as the dominant line by the local Communist party and the Soviet Union. This agreement helped isolate pro-Chinese groups in Latin America from Castro's followers. In some countries such as Guatemala the Havana agreement gave encouragement to the advocates of armed violence in their internal arguments with more cautious comrades.

The CPSU's November 1964 deal with Castro on Latin America was eventually to break down when both sides reneged on some of their commitments. The point for the moment, however, was that the new Soviet leadership soon after taking power did make a strong effort to conciliate Castro, and that in return for favors received it went further toward meeting his militant views than Khrushchev had ever been willing to go.

Almost simultaneously, the Soviet Union sought to take advantage of the events in the Leopoldville

Congo in the last two months of 1964 to strengthen the Soviet position among radical African leaders in competition with the Chinese but at the direct expense of the United States. Soviet measures in support of an airlift aiding Congo rebels in this period were supplemented by other gestures intended to impress a radical audience. Most notable was a demonstration staged before the United States Embassy in Moscow on 28 November. A TASS account the same day duly recorded with approval the hurling of ink bottles at the U.S. Embassy building. The decision of the new Soviet leadership to organize this demonstration was particularly striking in that this was the first such demonstration to be held at the U.S. Embassy since the Cuban crisis of October 1962. Throughout the last two years of Khrushchev's tenure in office he had refrained from such hostile actions against the United States, even following the Gulf of Tonkin incidents of August and September 1964 involving a member of the "socialist camp."

The Decision to Court Ho Chi Minh

Of all the objectives sought by the new Soviet leadership through a shift in the emphasis of Khrushchev's foreign policy, the recovery of a significant degree of influence over the North Vietnamese party was probably the single most important.

Throughout the first nine months of 1964, Soviet-DRV relations had continued slowly to deteriorate as the result of the great caution and coolness displayed by Khrushchev in matters considered by the North Vietnamese to be vital to their national interests. The absolute nadir was reached in September when TASS made the first and only explicit criticism of the conduct of a DRV representative ever published by Soviet propaganda. This steady decay of relations between the two parties came to a halt with Khrushchev's fall, and matters began gradually to improve thereafter. During a visit to Moscow in November 1964 DRV Premier Pham Van Dong received sufficient indications of an evolution in CPSU policy toward both the DRV and the United States to encourage Hanoi to maintain a conciliatory posture toward the USSR over the next two months despite increasing Chinese pressure to abandon it.

The decisive watershed in Soviet-North Vietnamese relations was the visit of a Soviet delegation led by Premier Kosygin to Hanoi in early February 1965. Kosygin offered the DRV an important package of economic and military assistance, including most notably MIG fighter planes and SA-2 missiles for air defense. In return the Soviets expected and the North Vietnamese were prepared to offer certain minimal political concessions. One of these was a DRV promise to abstain--regardless of what the Chinese did--from all criticism of the forthcoming Moscow preparatory meeting for a world Communist conference, a meeting which the Soviets had by now postponed from December until March.

In addition, the North Vietnamese accepted a Kosygin suggestion to urge upon the Chinese a joint statement by North Vietnam, Communist China, and the Soviet Union to serve as a "warning" to the United States. When in late February Hanoi prepared and forwarded a draft proposal to this effect, the Soviets of course accepted it, while the Chinese predictably rejected it, since acceptance would tend to undermine the effort they were by then engaged in throughout the world to depict the USSR as a perfidious lackey of imperialism. Gratified by the success of this ploy in exposing Chinese recalcitrance to the North Vietnamese, the Soviets were to repeat it and expand it in the future.

The Soviet Union meanwhile made two concrete military proposals to Communist China soon after Kosygin's return from Hanoi. On 25 February, the USSR requested the CPR to grant it an "air corridor" to North Vietnam--that is, blanket authorization for large numbers of Soviet transport aircraft to overfly China back and forth over a given route ferrying military equipment to the DRV. Shortly thereafter, the USSR asked for the use of one or more air bases in South China, near the Vietnamese border, to be manned by Soviet personnel and apparently to be used for the assembly of MIG fighter planes shipped by rail from the Soviet Union. Both requests were adamantly refused by the Chinese, and these refusals were probably helpful to the CPSU in its political struggle with the CCP for Hanoi's sympathies. Also of some

help to the Soviets in this regard was Mao's obstinacy in temporarily obstructing and delaying rail transit through China, from March until June 1965, of Soviet SAM technicians and SAM components for North Vietnamese air defense.

On another subject, however, the Soviets simultaneously lost a point to the Chinese in Vietnamese eyes. Immediately after Kosygin's return to Moscow, the Soviet Government formally proposed to Hanoi and Peking the convening of an international conference on Vietnam, and meanwhile made contacts with the French toward this end. The Soviets apparently took this action because the North Vietnamese had previously been toying with the notion that the United States might be willing to use such a conference as a face-saving device to cover a U.S. withdrawal from South Vietnam and the establishment of some mechanism which would assure the gradual advent to power there of the National Liberation Front. The DRV had evidently not yet completely abandoned this notion when Kosygin left Hanoi. By March, however, the DRV leadership had concluded from the U.S. bombings of North Vietnam and other U.S. actions that the United States had no intention of capitulating to their wishes, either openly or tacitly. Without such a prior U.S. intention, the North Vietnamese saw no purpose in any conference, and moreover came to agree with the Chinese that Soviet soundings for a conference were themselves positively harmful as tending to create political pressures on the DRV itself for concessions. Chastened by DRV criticism, the Soviet Union ever since this experience has been at pains to remain within the bounds of North Vietnamese policy on this issue.

In sum, in their first six months in power the new Soviet leaders had made considerable progress in their dealings with the North Vietnamese. The worsening of party relations had been halted, high-level contacts had taken place, and a foothold for Soviet influence had been obtained. On the other hand, the USSR had had two unpleasant surprises in February and March: first, the U.S. bombing of North Vietnam--which suggested that a long and possibly dangerous war rather than an imminent victory was in prospect;

second, the hostile DRV reaction to Soviet initiatives on negotiations--which warned the Soviets that they would henceforth be prisoners of DRV policy on this issue. Never before had the Soviet Union engaged its prestige so far in support of a belligerent over whose decisions the USSR had so little control.

Since February 1965, although the Soviets may well have preferred (on balance) that the war and its associated military risks be ended, they have taken no serious political risks to try to make it end. Moscow has concentrated primarily on a very successful effort to utilize the war and Soviet professions of support for the North Vietnamese to reduce the influence of both the Chinese Communists and the United States throughout the world. Ever since the Soviets burned their fingers in February 1965, there has been no credible evidence that the Soviets have at any time been willing to endanger their credit in Hanoi by seeking through pressure to compel the North Vietnamese to do something they did not wish to do regarding negotiations. On the other hand, there is abundant evidence that the CPSU has several times sought to draw on the credit thus preserved to get Hanoi to take part in Communist anti-U.S. gatherings boycotted by the Chinese.

Soviet Conciliation of North Korea

During the same six-month period following Khrushchev's fall the CPSU took its first steps to improve relations with the North Koreans, who had previously gone considerably further than the North Vietnamese in outspoken support of the Chinese position and in waging open polemics with Khrushchev. The Korean Communists were delighted at Khrushchev's removal and were privately hopeful of an evolution of Soviet policy in the militant, anti-United States direction they favored. Kosygin's visit to North Korea in February 1965, like his visit to North Vietnam on the same journey, marked a turning point for the CPSU. One outcome of Kosygin's talks with Kim Il-sung was a mutual understanding that there would be no further public attacks exchanged between the two parties. Kosygin also apparently discussed with Kim the resumption of both Soviet economic aid and

the Soviet deliveries of advanced weapons to North Korea which Khrushchev had halted in December 1962, although no concrete agreement was yet reached. Subsequent North Korean private statements confirmed that Pyongyang had already shifted its position a considerable distance away from the obdurate Chinese attitude toward the USSR. The North Korean party was subsequently to move much further as the Soviet aid program to North Korea was indeed restored and as Chinese obstruction of unity of action over Vietnam was further illuminated by events.

In the same initial six-month period, the CPSU began efforts to neutralize the three leading non-bloc supporters of the CCP in Asia: the Japanese and Indonesian Communist parties and the schismatic left wing of the Indian Communist party. Leaders of all three parties showed awareness and appreciation of some improvement in (i.e., some toughening of) the Soviet attitude toward the United States. But immediate CPSU progress in these three cases was hindered because in each case, at the moment of Khrushchev's fall, the Soviets were engaged in organizational activities hostile to the party concerned which the CPSU subsequently was reluctant or unable to give up completely. In the case of the Japanese party, this was CPSU support for dissident Japanese "revisionist" leaders expelled from the JCP. In the case of the Indonesian party, it was covert Soviet financial support of Indonesian moderate leftists hostile to the PKI. And in the case of the pro-Chinese left wing of the Indian party, it was CPSU identification with the Dange right-wing leadership of the party at a time when the left wing was in the process of formally seceding to form a separate party. The Soviets initially made the least progress with the Japanese and the most progress with the Indians.

The Chou Visit and the Mao-Kosygin Talks

As for relations between the Soviets and the Chinese themselves, it would appear that both major antagonists were temporarily misled by false hopes as to the other party's intentions following the ouster

of Khrushchev. Judging by the conduct of Chou En-lai during the talks he held with the new Soviet leaders in Moscow in November 1964, the CCP seems really to have thought that the new CPSU leaders might be so desperate for a relaxation of Chinese pressure against them as to be willing to buy Peking off with humiliating public concessions of a fundamental nature--concessions which would in effect acknowledge that the Chinese had been right all along and the Soviets wrong, and would thus constitute a long step toward abdication of leadership of the Communist movement to Peking. At least some of the new Soviet leaders, for their part, seem to have overestimated the relative importance of Mao's personal hatred of Khrushchev as a factor in Chinese conduct (intense though that hatred was), and underestimated the relative importance and permanence of Mao's pretensions to lead the revolutionary world and his ambition to be universally recognized as that leader.

When in the Moscow November talks the Soviets refused to make the fundamental concessions Chou demanded, Chou reportedly was taken aback, asked why the CPSU had then purged Khrushchev, and refused to consider Brezhnev's request for discussion of a permanent cessation of polemics and a halt to "factional activities" in the world Communist movement. The Soviets later said that they offered Chou "concrete suggestions on the expansion of Soviet-Chinese trade" and on "scientific-technical and cultural cooperation" which the Chinese leadership subsequently rejected. Despite this offer, and despite indications from the Soviets that they (unlike Khrushchev) were now prepared to make concessions regarding the agenda, timing, and participation in a preparatory meeting for a world Communist conference, Chou refused to discuss Chinese participation in any such gathering, and warned the Soviets not to hold the meeting. Chou lectured the Soviets on their iniquities at some length, and warned the new leaders that they faced the same fate as that of Khrushchev. After Chou had returned home, the CCP resumed the polemical attacks on Moscow that it had temporarily suspended after Khrushchev's ouster.

The final evidence of Chinese intransigence was provided by the talks Kosygin had in Peking with Mao Tse-tung in February 1965. It is clear from the

reliable and detailed accounts of these talks which have become available that Mao was supremely arrogant, sarcastic, and absolutely implacable. Kosygin, for the record, repeatedly asked, as in November, that differences be put aside, polemics halted, and unity against "imperialism" established. Kosygin asked the Chinese to discuss conditions for a world Communist conference, and offered to open up the Soviet-controlled international journal Problems of Peace and Socialism to both sides.

Mao's response to all Kosygin's efforts was to announce that "we are now raising the price," and that the polemic would continue for 10,000 years. He refused to discuss a world meeting. He ignored the suggestion regarding Problems of Peace and Socialism. He asserted that "you must state that everything was a mistake;" and in short, he would accept nothing less than complete self-abasement by the CPSU.

Mao predicted that within 10 to 15 years tension would further increase, the United States would attack the USSR and the CPR, and only then would the Soviets and Chinese possibly unite. Mao also implied that a change in the world balance of power would occur within this period as the result of coming Chinese progress in advanced weapons technology, and that these Chinese advances would help to bring about a showdown with the United States.

The February Mao-Kosygin interview played an important role in clearing the way for the meeting of Communist parties in Moscow, which the CPSU had postponed from 15 December to 1 March. The record of the interview served as evidence to show wavering foreign Communists at the Moscow meeting, to bolster the CPSU leadership's contention that it was being more conciliatory than Khrushchev had been while Mao was not.

The March 1965 Moscow Meeting

Throughout the 1-5 March meeting attended by 19 parties, the main point at issue was whether anything concrete should be done to bring closer an all-party world conference: specificially, whether or not to

send out to all the 81 parties a draft letter the CPSU had prepared for this purpose. The private speeches at the March meeting show that the Italian and British parties were adamantly opposed to sending the letter, that the Cubans were completely noncommittal, and that all others favored the letter. After a considerable struggle, the CPSU had to yield to the Italian and British recalcitrants, and the letter was scrapped.

The outcome of the Moscow meeting showed the CPSU clearly that a world Communist conference for the time being remained, as it had been for Khrushchev, impossible to organize without unacceptable defections and political losses. For the next few months the CPSU therefore desisted from further efforts to promote a 1957 or 1960-type conference to lay down general guidelines for the world Communist movement.

Part II

The March Moscow Demonstration

Meanwhile, early in March, while the 19-party meeting was still going on in Moscow, the Chinese regime organized an unprecedented provocation against the Soviet Union, designed to create a dramatic impression of Soviet perfidy upon the radical anti-U.S. Communists, and particularly upon the Vietnamese. The CCP decided, in effect, to call the CPSU bluff on the question of hostile demonstrations at the U.S. embassy in Moscow.

On 4 March 1965, the Soviet government, after momentary hesitation, appears to have authorized another demonstration at the U.S. embassy to protest the resumption of bombing of North Vietnam the day before. The Chinese embassy usurped control of this demonstration, which was carried out by some 2,000 Asian students, chiefly Chinese and Vietnamese. Although the Soviets had reluctantly authorized the demonstration (apparently to appease the North Vietnamese), they had anticipated the possibility of unauthorized actions. In fact, after the demonstrators had pelted the embassy building with ink and stones, they broke through the barriers in an effort to get at the building, and were then repulsed by the Soviet police, with considerable difficulty, in a wild melee in which there were a number of injured on both sides and in which Soviet troops were eventually brought on the scene. Several demonstrators were arrested.

A comic-opera propaganda battle ensued over the next few weeks. The Chinese emphasized the contrast between Soviet professions of support for North Vietnam against the United States and Soviet suppression of this demonstration. The whole affair was on balance a CCP tactical political victory over the CPSU, albeit a minor and temporary one. Both sides were playing to an audience, the radical Asian Communists, particularly the North Vietnamese--and the Chinese were on the offensive and the Soviets on the defensive throughout.

However, the most lasting effect of the episode was to bring home to the Soviet leaders the realization that Soviet anti-U.S. demagoguery, while still immensely useful and necessary to Soviet policy, must have more sharply defined limits to prevent unforeseen and possibly dangerous consequences. The CPSU leadership discovered that Khrushchev's ban against demonstrations at the U.S. embassy in recent years had not been such a bad idea after all. Since March 1965, there have been no more such demonstrations before the embassy, although there have been plenty of "spontaneous" meetings elsewhere in Moscow to protest U.S. policies.

The key to the entire Soviet effort to isolate the Chinese from now on was the issue of "unity of action" in support of North Vietnam against the United States. This issue gradually became the most important single vehicle for the restoration of CPSU influence and diminution of CCP influence among all the radical anti-U.S. forces of the Communist world. At the same time, in Eastern Europe, the issue of unity of action was to be a bludgeon in the hands of the CPSU with which the Soviets sought to impose a greater uniformity of line, to shore up Soviet authority, and in particular, to force a reduction in East European contacts with the United States.

The 1965 Sino-Soviet Correspondence

In an exchange of secret party letters between the Soviets and the Chinese in the spring and summer of 1965, the CPSU twice revived the North Vietnamese proposal for a tripartite statement to warn the United States, demanded a tripartite meeting to discuss aid to the DRV, and charged the Chinese with responsibility for the delay of deliveries of Soviet weapons to Vietnam. The Chinese replied with a violent denunciation of the Soviet diplomatic activities in February intended to bring about negotiations on Vietnam, and charged the USSR with continuing collusion with the United States "to find a way out for the American aggressors." The CCP concluded by reiterating that any Sino-Soviet-Vietnamese meeting would only be harmful, and by insisting that "united action" of

any kind with the Soviets would be impossible until the CPSU formally abandoned all its innumerable treacherous activities as well as all the revisionist conclusions of its party program and party congresses of the last decade.

The Chinese were subsequently to distribute copies of this letter to other parties around the world and then to repeat most of its details in editorials published in the fall. In so doing, the CCP was obstinately entrenching itself in a weak position: the Chinese charges of Soviet collusion with the United States, the belittling of Soviet aid to North Vietnam, and the excuse given for refusing a tripartite meeting all were to appear less and less credible to Communists everywhere as time went on. The over-all Chinese position was of great help to the CPSU and was harmful to the CCP in the struggle between the two for influence in North Vietnam and among radical Communists elsewhere. Evidence of this fact, however, did not prevent the Chinese party under Mao from taking a more and more extreme position in condemnation of both unity of action with the Soviets and of all who favored such unity.

The Disastrous Chinese Autumn of 1965

In July 1965, at the Ninth Rumanian party congress, Brezhnev and Teng Hsiao-ping are reported to have held private talks, marked by violent disagreement; and these were the last personal contacts between leaders of the Soviet and Chinese parties to date. It is probable that these will be the last such contacts ever to be held between the two parties while Mao lives, for in the fall of 1965 Mao began to accelerate a process which was to lead to a virtual rupture of party relations with the CPSU the following spring. In the same period Mao began to draw ever firmer lines of demarcation between himself and all of erring humanity, and the Chinese party became increasingly estranged from all its former Communist allies and all the Communist neutrals who insisted on maintaining or improving relations with the CPSU and who thereby refused to demonstrate obedience to Mao's will. At the same time, Mao began to turn on the Chinese Communist party itself, and slowly unfolded an unprecedented campaign--still expanding 18 months later--to

terrorize and purge in stages all CCP leaders at every level similarly suspected of being insufficiently obedient to his will.

A steady succession of major Chinese disasters in dealings with the outside world appear to have not discouraged, but to have confirmed Mao in this increasingly paranoid approach to the universe. The three most important of these defeats in the fall of 1965 were the deflation of Chinese threats to intervene in the India-Pakistan war in September, the disastrous 30 September coup attempt in Indonesia and the subsequent decimation of the PKI, and the abandonment of the Second Bandung Conference in November as the result of Chinese inability to secure the exclusion of the USSR from participation. In each case, the Soviets exploited the Chinese setback to further isolate Mao.

In the case of the India-Pakistan war, after the Chinese sought to intervene by sending the Indians an ultimatum demanding withdrawal from alleged fortifications on the Sino-Indian border, the Soviets sent Peking an urgent secret party letter deploring the Chinese action and (according to the Chinese reply) "attempting to make us afraid with a threat about the United States." The Chinese thereupon first extended their ultimatum deadline and then--when Pakistan to their dismay accepted a ceasefire--were obliged to allow the ultimatum to fade away ingloriously, attempting to cover their discomfiture with a dubious claim that the Indians had stealthily complied with their demands. The net effect was to make Peking look somewhat ridiculous, and the widespread impression was created that the Chinese had been forced to back down.

Hard on the heels of this misadventure came the greatest disaster ever to befall Chinese Communist foreign policy and the greatest single loss ever suffered by the CCP in the Sino-Soviet struggle. This was the failure of the 30 September coup in Djakarta and all its eventual consequences. These included the undermining and destruction of Sukarno's power by the Indonesian military leaders, the virtual liquidation of the central apparatus of the Indonesian Communist party and much of the party's membership, and the eradication of the PKI's overt

influence on Indonesian political life. The largest non-bloc party in the world--and the most important such party to have sided with the CCP against the CPSU--was thus driven deep underground, its voice in international Communist councils silenced, and many of its surviving cadres now increasingly susceptible to Soviet anti-CCP propaganda. The Peking-Djakarta axis was destroyed and Indonesian foreign policy totally reoriented, transforming this nation of one hundred million--the CPR's most valuable ally--into another member of the ring of hostile states surrounding Communist China. Indonesia was lost as the most valuable base for Chinese-run international front organizations. The Chinese Communist crusade against the United Nations lost its most important recruit, and the Indonesian campaign to "crush" Malaysia was ended.

From the Soviet point of view, the most helpful side-effect of all was the fact that many Communist leaders, in Asia and elsewhere, needed no Soviet urging to leap to the conclusion that the Chinese had instigated the PKI's attempted coup. The Soviets did their best in their private comments around the world to encourage this view of the PKI's disaster and to point the moral that this was a fate which could envelop any party that listened to the Chinese.

The third great Chinese defeat in the fall of 1965 was the total collapse of Chinese efforts to promote the isolation of the Soviet Union and the condemnation of the United States through the vehicle of a Second Bandung Conference, a second general summit meeting of Asian and African heads of state from which the USSR would be excluded. When the Algerian leader Ben Bella was overthrown on the eve of the scheduled opening of this conference in Algiers in June 1965, the Chinese offended many states by applying heavy pressure and insults in a vain effort to prevent the conference from being postponed until November. By the fall of 1965, however, when the Chinese discovered that they would be unable to keep the USSR from attending the conference, they reversed their position completely. The insults that Chinese representatives had heaped on those who in June had opposed holding the conference at that time were far exceeded by the private vituperation, threats, and boycott warnings used in

October against those who wished to hold it. In the end, the conference was cancelled, and the Chinese thus saved from the final disaster of a Second Bandung meeting held without them and with the Soviets.

Meanwhile, in September and October 1965, while all these unprecedented foreign defeats were being suffered, a high-level meeting of Chinese Communist leaders was taking place in which CPR Chairman Liu Shao-chi and party general secretary Teng Hsiao-ping evidently took positions on Mao's plans for a domestic "cultural revolution" that were unsatisfactory to Mao. Foreign events may conceivably have played an indirect role at this meeting by reinforcing the domestic views of Lo Jui-ching, the PLA Chief of Staff and central committee secretariat member who was to be the first great purge victim in late November. Subsequent charges have implied that Lo, among other things, had sought to minimize the disruption of army combat training caused by lengthy political indoctrination in Mao's writings and by productive labor. The danger of direct confrontation with the United States created by the Vietnam war could easily have made differences over this domestic policy question more acute. And if the foreign policy setbacks played any role at all in generating opposition to Mao's wishes at the September-October meetings, it is most likely to have done so indirectly by intensifying Lo's views on PLA training.

However, despite subsequent Chinese Red Guard insinuations and Soviet and Chinese Nationalist fabrications, no credible evidence has yet been received to indicate that Lo or any other top Chinese leader since Peng Te-huai in 1959 has intrigued with the Soviets against Mao's power or policies or had unauthorized or unreported dealings with the Soviet Union. Moreover, there are as yet no solid grounds for concluding that any leaders at the September-October meeting, with or without Soviet encouragement, directly raised the issue of the massive foreign policy reverses that were being fostered by Mao's policies. Yet those foreign setbacks may well have played another role at this time: that of aggravating Mao's paranoid tendencies, and of increasing his already growing suspicion and anger at real or fancied

domestic recalcitrance. External frustrations and humiliations may have helped impel an aging Mao to decide finally to take drastic action, while time was still left to him, in the internal field where he could make his will felt--that is, to remake China and the Chinese Communist party in the image being rejected by an ungrateful world.

The Chinese Editorial and the Abortive Soviet Conference

In a landmark editorial published on 11 November 1965, the Chinese for the first time publicly refused to attend any joint meeting with the Soviets and North Vietnamese, told the Soviets that "there are things that divide us and nothing that unites us," and announced that a "clear line of demarcation both politically and organizationally" must be drawn between themselves and their friends on the one hand, and the Soviets and their friends on the other hand.

The Soviets reacted to this by attempting to exploit Chinese self-isolation to organize an aid-to-Vietnam conference without the Chinese. Using the Poles as intermediaries, the CPSU had secret invitations sent to all bloc countries (including Albania and the CPR) requesting attendance at a meeting to coordinate Vietnam aid which the CPSU planned to hold immediately following the 23rd CPSU Congress in Moscow in April 1966. A number of important non-bloc parties--including the Italians and Japanese--were also to be invited to this conference. The North Vietnamese decision was crucial in determining whether this meeting could be held in the face of the expected Chinese refusal to attend. Although Shelepin apparently lobbied hard for North Vietnamese acceptance of the invitation during his visit to Hanoi in January 1966, the DRV felt obliged to decline rather than affront the Chinese so directly. This effectively killed the conference for the time being. Shelepin received a consolation prize, however, when the North Vietnamese in a joint communiqué with the Soviets publicly announced their intention to attend the 23rd CPSU Congress itself despite signs that Mao was contemplating a boycott of the congress.

Meanwhile, the CPSU had sent a secret letter to the Chinese party protesting the statements made in

the 11 November Chinese editorial, and Mao responded in early January with a secret letter mocking the Soviets, and offering the most authoritative statement to date of the Chinese view of the Sino-Soviet treaty of alliance: the view that this treaty would be of no value to Communist China in the event of a Sino-U.S. war.

At just about the same time, in January 1966, the Soviets disseminated to many parties throughout the world--and then internally throughout the CPSU--a long letter setting forth in detail Soviet grievances accumulated against the Chinese since the new Soviet leadership succeeded Khrushchev. This letter read as if its drafters had decided that Chinese progressive estrangement from the Communist movement because of Mao's obstinacy had now gone sufficiently far to make it politically safe for the CPSU to resume through private channels the sort of direct, across-the-board attacks on the CCP that had characterized most of Khrushchev's last 18 months. The one important difference remaining at this point was that Soviet public propaganda had not yet resumed the vituperative denunciations of the Chinese heard in 1963 and 1964. In the coming year Mao was to make this possible and profitable, too.

Mao Draws Some Lines

In the first months of 1966, Mao Tse-tung (a) clashed personally and dramatically with the leaders of the Japanese Communist party, converting the CCP-JCP relationship from one of growing friction to one of open hostility almost overnight; (b) thereby greatly worsened the already cool Chinese relationship to the Korean party; (c) entered into public polemics with the Cubans for the first time; (d) forced Chou En-lai to pick a fight with the neutral Rumanians; (e) publicly refused to send a CCP representative to the 23rd CPSU congress despite the fact that the North Vietnamese and North Koreans were attending, thus breaking the chief remaining strand of Sino-Soviet party relations at a time when former Chinese allies were maintaining or improving their relations with the CPSU; and (f)

arrested Peking first secretary Peng Chen amidst a mammoth press campaign, and thus brought into the open the long-drawn-out purge of the Chinese Communist leadership and apparatus which was still in progress a year later. Having threatened the universe in November 1965, Mao now began to implement his threat.

The Alliance of Independent Communist Militants

Throughout 1966, as the North Korean, Japanese, and Cuban parties each became more and more estranged from the Chinese, an informal political alliance among these three leading radicals became more and more overt. A fourth member of this radical group--the North Vietnamese party--shared fully the views of the other three, but differed in one important respect: it was unable to speak out publicly as unequivocally as the others on most issues because of its dependence upon the Soviet Union and Communist China for assistance in the war. The North Koreans, Japanese, and Cubans have more than made up for the North Vietnamese reticence.

These three independent radicals (and their relatively silent partner, the North Vietnamese) have a common outlook on these two basic points:

1) Uncompromising opposition to pretensions by either the CPSU or the CCP to have the right to give orders or guidance to the world movement, and particularly to them.

2) Uncompromising hostility to the United States, deriving primarily from a direct clash of the private interests of each of these parties with those of the United States. A corollary has been a constant clamor against any actions of either omission or commission, by either the Soviet Union or Communist China, which appeared to injure the cause of the struggle against "U.S. imperialism."

Because Communist China has virtually written off all of them but the North Vietnamese as parties with which the CCP wishes to have anything like friendly dealings, and because the Soviets, on the contrary, have actively courted them all, the leverage

of these parties on CPSU policy is now much greater than their leverage on Chinese policy. Because of the direction in which this leverage is exerted, the independence of these parties is not a factor helpful to the United States.

Part III

The North Vietnamese Quarrels With Mao

For the North Vietnamese, constrained by their continuing dependence on Chinese support for their war effort, 1966 saw an aggravation of several specific grievances against the CCP.

The first of these was Mao's hostile attitude toward the "unity of action" line. To the unwelcome Chinese action in 1965--the obstruction of Soviet aid to Vietnam, the refusals to sign a tripartite statement or attend a tripartite or bloc conference on aid to Vietnam--worse actions were now added. These included the Chinese virtual break in party relations with the CPSU and its friends, public and private pressure on Hanoi to do likewise, and repeated threats to the continuation of Sino-Soviet state relations which must have alarmed Hanoi considerably because of the implied menace to the Soviet military aid supply line through China.

A second continuing grievance was the Chinese claim to have furnished precept and model--in Mao's writings and Chinese Communist experience--for the North Vietnamese struggle against the United States. Despite Chinese awareness of North Vietnamese sensitivity on this issue--which goes to the heart of the cherished autonomy of the North Vietnamese party--Mao's arrogance has continued to create friction. The ever-mounting claims made for Mao and the continued expansion of Mao's cult in connection with the "great cultural revolution" in the fall and winter of 1966 brought the Chinese into further conflict with the North Vietnamese, as with virtually everyone else, and a Chinese attempt to export cultural revolution propaganda to North Vietnam appears to have been one of the offenses that evoked a thinly-veiled personal attack on Mao by a North Vietnamese party journal in May 1967.

Furthermore, the Chinese have not hesitated to give the North Vietnamese repeated unwelcome advice on how to run their war, and to change that advice when they felt it necessary. There is evidence that in 1966 there were differences of view between Peking and Hanoi

on several issues of tactics and strategy. The Chinese, whose territory was not being bombed, were less in a hurry than the DRV, and viewed with greater equanimity the prospect of North Vietnam fighting indefinitely on the strategic defensive to "bog down" the United States in South Vietnam for many years. The Chinese wished the Viet Cong main forces to take fewer risks than some North Vietnamese leaders wished to take in accepting large-scale direct encounters with U.S. units under unfavorable circumstances. And the Chinese wished the Viet Cong when confronted with superior force to abandon temporarily strongholds which in some cases the DRV felt it necessary to defend. "

A further major grievance was the Chinese presumption in attempting to dictate to Hanoi what tactical stand to take or not to take on the question of negotiations. The North Vietnamese, increasingly influenced by the damage wrought by U.S. bombing, had become increasingly sympathetic to Soviet efforts through diplomacy and propaganda to secure termination of the bombing by merely holding out the prospect of peace talks. In early 1967, the DRV removed some of its earlier ambiguity to indicate more strongly than ever before that a permanent bombing halt could bring talks. This reduction of ambiguity alarmed and infuriated the Chinese, despite the fact that the central DRV position had not changed nor was likely to change: while by now quite eager, even anxious to obtain a cessation of bombing without significant cost, the North Vietnamese remained completely unwilling to halt their effort to conquer South Vietnam as the price of such a cessation; and they were determined, if they entered talks in exchange for a bombing halt, to continue their war effort simultaneous with long, protracted negotiations, while the United States remained bound to continue to abstain from bombing.

Mao's persisting fears about a North Vietnamese entry into talks with the United States even on these terms appear to be based partly on indications that the North Vietnamese, after fighting while talking for a certain period, might sign an agreement halting the fighting at least temporarily in exchange for something less than immediate total U.S. withdrawal. Mao appears to harbor unwarranted suspicions that Hanoi might then

in fact acquiesce in the presence of Americans and U.S. bases in Vietnam indefinitely.

The "Cultural Revolution" and the Renewed Soviet Offensive

Meanwhile, on 23 March 1966, the CCP released a letter they had just sent to the CPSU refusing to attend the 23rd CPSU Congress, and thus breaking the principal remaining strand of Sino-Soviet party relations. Since that time, there has been no intelligence evidence whatever of personal contacts between representatives of the two parties (as distinguished from govermental diplomatic contacts) or of letters exchanged between the two parties (as distinguished from the many fiery Foreign Ministry notes soon to fly back and forth). While it is conceivable that secret meetings have been held or letters sent which have gone totally unreported, the picture presented by the evidence to date is one of a total break in party relations since March 1966--the organizational "clear line of demarcation" that Mao had prophesied in November.

At the same time, Mao began in the spring his long-drawn-out purge of the party apparatus. Then, at the Eleventh Plenum of the Chinese party's central committee in early August, Mao cast down as unsatisfactory the two chief managers of the party machine: his heir apparent, the senior vice chairman Liu Shao-chi, and the party secretary general Teng Hsiao-ping. In the violent ordeal which has gone on in many waves since then, most other central and provincial leaders have been subjected to unprecedented public pressure from student fanatics organized as Red Guards. Again and again, the apparatus of the party and government has been subjected to public humiliation, has been tested, and purged.

These events offered too good an opportunity for exploitation against the Chinese for the Soviets to pass up, and gradually in the fall of 1966 the CPSU resumed and expanded the direct public attacks on the Chinese regime which the Soviet leadership had muffled ever since Khrushchev was overthrown. The Soviets wept copious crocodile tears for the central figures under attack (naming Liu as one of them in late September), and for

the provincial party organizations beleaguered by the Red Guards, and depicted the resistance to the Red Guards organized by some of the party functionaries as a spontaneous outpouring of popular support for the noble Chinese party against Mao's "hooligans." The Soviets soon began to stress that only naked military force--the PLA--was behind the Red Guards in their conflict with the wisely anti-Maoist Chinese party and people. This line was transparently designed to appeal to the sympathies of foreign party functionaries.

Thus the Soviets had begun once more, after a two-year halt, to attack Mao publicly by name, and within a few weeks added Mao's new heir Lin Piao as well. In addition to the public propaganda attacks, one closely guarded CPSU letter on the cultural revolution was dispatched to bloc parties in December, and another to many non-bloc parties. After a CPSU Central Committee plenum was held in mid-December to discuss the China question, unprecedented briefings of the Soviet party and army were conducted by the entire Soviet leadership in January 1967, and the rank-and-file was warned of the possibility that Chinese provocations might force a rupture of diplomatic relations between the two countries.

The Siege of the Soviet Embassy

These Soviet measures were taken after state relations between the Soviet Union and Communist China had grown steadily worse throughout the fall, with worse yet to come. In August and again in early November the Chinese conducted noisy demonstrations before the Soviet Embassy in Peking, each time rejecting Soviet government protests. Then, in late January 1967, the Chinese initiated the most serious threat they had ever made to the continued existence of Sino-Soviet diplomatic relations--and to the Soviet overland supply route to Hanoi. An incident involving Chinese students in Moscow was used as a pretext for the imposition of a violent two-and-a-half week siege of the Soviet Embassy in Peking. There is evidence suggesting that the initial incident and the siege and demonstrations that followed were deliberately planned, provoked and coordinated. The Soviet reaction to all this was to resolve to hold on in Peking as long as they could. The Soviets were well aware why the Chinese might wish to force them out, and the Chinese were

well aware why the Soviets were determined to stay. A formal break in diplomatic relations would serve as a legal pretext to sever permanently the Soviet land and air transportation routes across China, and thereby present the USSR with the dilemma of either accepting an end to their military aid to North Vietnam--a political disaster--or of shipping their sensitive military equipment to the DRV by sea and running a serious risk of confrontation with the United States.

There is some evidence to suggest that Chinese obstruction of the passage of Soviet aid to North Vietnam through China may have been temporarily reimposed in January shortly before the siege of the Soviet embassy was begun. It is possible that one purpose of the Chinese pressures against the Soviet presence in China in late January and early February was to suggest forcibly to the Vietnamese that the Chinese might cut off the Soviet supply line permanently if the DRV agreed to enter into peace negotiations with the United States. The siege of the Soviet embassy was halted when a North Vietnamese delegation flew to Peking immediately after receipt of a letter from President Johnson to Ho Chi Minh proposing peace talks on terms which Ho subsequently rejected.

Separate agreements were apparently subsequently reached between the North Vietnamese and Chinese and the Chinese and Soviets on the question of Soviet aid transit; these agreements may have involved renewal of a 30 March 1965 two-year Sino-Soviet rail transportation agreement on aid to Vietnam. The new agreements evidently ratified the practice of having the North Vietnamese accept the Soviet military aid shipments at the Sino-Soviet border and ride with them through China to North Vietnam; but contrary to some Soviet reports, there is reason to believe that this practice was begun not in 1967 but months before, in the fall of 1966. There is no reason to believe that the new agreements will in themselves prevent Mao from reimposing obstacles to the passage of Soviet aid at any time in the future when he may feel it politically desirable to do so.

The cessation of the siege of the Soviet embassy and the relaxation of pressure on the Soviet supply line to Vietnam removed for the time being the threat of a complete break in Sino-Soviet state relations, but did not halt the continued deterioration of those relations, the build-up of Soviet military defenses along the Sino-Soviet border and in Mongolia, or the steady outpouring of mutual vituperation. By now Mao was depicted in Soviet propaganda as a madman, a racist, a Hitler, a militarist, a friend of Chinese capitalists and enemy of Chinese Communists, an ally of American "imperialism," and a would-be conqueror of all neighboring peoples, including the Vietnamese.

A salient feature of the CPSU's anti-Mao propaganda has been the thorough way in which it has been combined with the anti-American theme. Soviet propaganda has depicted two terrible extremes--U.S. "imperialism" and the Chinese renegades--in tacit alliance at the expense of the suffering Vietnamese and in opposition to the forces of peace and freedom the world over led by the Soviet Union.

This Soviet line entailed a remarkable change from the Soviet posture in Khrushchev's time toward forces in the United States desirous of improving U.S. relations with Mao's regime. Whereas in earlier years the Soviets had welcomed statements made by such Americans (because any improvement in Sino-U.S. relations might bring a relaxation of Chinese pressures on Khrushchev's policies), now they cited them as sinister evidence of Sino-U.S. collaboration. And whereas in the Khrushchev era the Soviets had eagerly greeted any U.S. voices urging Chinese Communist admission to the U.N., now some Soviet commentaries actually reacted to such suggestions with heavy suspicion as to the motives with which they were offered.

Meanwhile, throughout the fall of 1966 and early 1967, while the Chinese cultural revolution was proceeding, while Sino-Soviet state relations were deteriorating, while the relations of the Communist neutrals with the CCP were growing increasingly bad and the closest remaining friends of the CCP were becoming increasingly worried, the Chinese presence in the Soviet-run international front organizations,

where so many past battles had taken place, was being gradually thinned out. As a result of a combination of voluntary Chinese withdrawals and Soviet evictions, there was an over-all trend toward Chinese departure from most of the fronts in which they still participated.

The New Soviet Push for a World Conference

Finally, the CPSU in the fall of 1966 took advantage of all the multiple phenomena working toward Chinese isolation to press again for a world Communist conference. The CPSU was again eager for a conference because it considered that the low state of Chinese fortunes--a possible temporary circumstance--might have rendered feasible for the time being the convocation of a meeting with an agenda and participants that would permit an expansion of Soviet authority and influence in the world movement. When the Soviets began to press for a conference once more late in 1966, they were pointing toward an event which they hoped to be able to bring off--or bring a step closer--a year later, at the October Revolution's fiftieth anniversary celebrations in Moscow in November 1967. The Soviets were well aware of the extent of the opposition they had to face, and they intended to use the interval to reduce that opposition, bringing pressure on those parties susceptible to pressure and cajoling the others. And indeed, two key parties that had consistently opposed the Soviet will regarding the conference began finally to retreat under CPSU pressure early in 1967. These were the Italians and the British, the two chief recalcitrants at the March 1965 Moscow meeting.

In contemplating a conference, the Soviets have two extreme alternatives. The "minimal program" for which they might settle is a world Communist conference organized and run by the CPSU in Moscow but pegged and limited to the question of aid to Vietnam alone. This is the lowest common denominator, the kind of meeting the maximum number of parties would attend without the Chinese. This is the only sort of world meeting the British party has endorsed yet, and the only one the North Koreans, Japanese, Cubans, and North Vietnamese might attend (the North Vietnamese

being unlikely even so). This is also the sort of meeting most absentees would be least likely to attack afterward.

At the other extreme is the "maximal program": a world Communist conference to prepare a detailed "general line," to write a 1960-type statement minus the ambiguities and self-contradictions imposed on that statement by Chinese participation, to hand down both generalizations and specific guidelines for Communist parties in every region of the world, to impose on the movement a universal viewpoint conforming in detail to all the exigencies of Soviet foreign policy, and to endorse CPSU authority as well.

It seems likely that what the Soviets hope to do is to choose a suitable approach from a point on a spectrum between these two extremes. The CPSU may wish to use the aid-to-Vietnam, anti-American issue as the central theme around which to build the conference and attract participants, while attempting at the same time to preserve the broader features of the conference to which Brezhnev and his friends have publicly referred--the evaluation of the past and the setting of a general line for the future.

If absolutely necessary, the Soviets may settle for using the November 1967 ceremonies merely for some preliminary step to bring about a conference in 1968. At all events, however, the November ceremonies present a fortuitous and unique opportunity to the CPSU: an accidental circumstance providing the CPSU, at just the moment when the Chinese have virtually withdrawn from the movement, with a legitimate occasion for an impressive display of the CPSU's historic credentials to lead the movement and a complete roster of parties obliged to be present. The CPSU may never again have quite such an occasion. It is unlikely that the CPSU will let this opportunity pass without some major organizational move to enhance CPSU influence and authority.

1964-1967: The Chinese World Challenge to Moscow

In the period since Khrushchev's fall, the Chinese organizational challenge to the CPSU and its

followers has not been destroyed, but for the time being it has been either held or beaten back in all parts of the world. Over-all, there has been a considerable retreat from the Chinese high tide of 1963-1964--the years when most of the CCP-backed splinter parties now in existence were formed, and when a strong Chinese alliance with the anti-Khrushchev independent radical Communists became overt.

The great change has of course been in Asia, because of the defection (or destruction) of the most important of the independent Asian parties. In Europe, despite the addition of one or two splinter parties to the roster, very small beginnings have remained very small, with no progress made. In the Communist movement of Africa and the Middle East, Chinese assets have from the start been even weaker in comparison with those of the CPSU, and this has not changed. On the other hand, in Latin America the Chinese offensive of 1963-1964 had made considerable progress, but here again the tide has either halted or somewhat receded: the most important pro-CCP parties have either barely held on to what they had originally achieved (as in Peru) or have lost some of their original gains (as in Ecuador and Colombia). In most parts of the world, at the time of Khrushchev's fall Chinese organizational efforts had presented a real danger of further subversion of cadres of many important pro-CPSU parties, and although a potential for this still exists in some cases (three notable cases being Italy, Brazil, and Chile), the over-all trend for the time being is not running in this direction. And throughout the world, wherever pro-Chinese splinter groups exist, the CCP and its agents are plagued by incessant internal bickering among rival leaders of these splinters.

The New Cuban Challenge

Thus, the most serious threat to the authority and influence of the CPSU in the international movement (authority over some parties, influence over others) today comes not from the Chinese Communist party, but from the independent militant Far Eastern parties with which the CPSU has resumed relations and from disruptive forces within the Soviet-oriented

movement itself: from the Rumanians, from the Yugoslavs, and above all, from Fidel Castro's Cuba.

The November 1964 Havana deal between the CPSU and Castro could not and did not last, if only because of the ultimate incompatibility of two competing centers of authority for the Latin America Communist movement, neither of which was really reconciled to deferring even partially to the other. Today, Castro is presenting a direct organizational challenge to CPSU authority among Latin American Communists, is openly polemicizing with the pro-Soviet leaders of the Venezuelan Communist party, and has openly avowed his intention of splitting all those parties where--as in Venezuela--the party leadership is unwilling to follow his dictates on the question of armed revolution. At the same time, Castro has taken the place of the disappearing Chinese as the chief recalcitrant at meetings of international front organizations, and has continued--in alliance with the Far Eastern parties--to bring pressure on the Soviets to take what the Soviets consider undesirable risks in Vietnam and elsewhere. This was most recently demonstrated by the thinly-veiled Cuban criticism of Soviet caution during the Middle East crisis of June 1967.

Soviet Policy Toward the United States

As the result of that crisis, the Soviet leadership was sharply reminded once more of the real dangers of direct conflict with the United States latent in Soviet demagogic appeals to the interests of radical anti-U.S. forces inside and outside of the Communist movement. There is reason to believe that the CPSU leaders during and after the crisis week were particularly sobered by the implications of the radical Arab attempt (supported by the radical Communists such as Castro) to draw the Soviet Union into a direct clash with the United States by manufacturing a claim of U.S.-British air attacks on the Arab states. Thereafter the Soviets soon showed that they had no intention of abandoning their policy of cultivation of the radical Arabs; but they are probably well aware that the potential risk to themselves has not completely disappeared.

Nevertheless, there is no evidence of a change in the over-all Soviet public posture of hostility

toward the United States. The Soviet posture of denunciation of the United States serves purposes which the present politburo majority centering around Brezhnev evidently continues to consider deeply grounded in Soviet national interests. A tough, vituperative Soviet anti-American line is still absolutely indispensable for Soviet attempts to deal with the Communist radicals, particularly to offset the adverse effect of any negotiations involving the United States into which the USSR may feel it advantageous to its national interests to enter. Even with this offsetting vituperation the Soviets have been highly defensive about such negotiations in the face of direct attacks on them by such parties as the North Koreans and Cubans. Moreover, the tough Soviet public line toward the United States is an essential part of the continuing CPSU efforts to use the aid-to-Vietnam issue as the focus of attempts to convene some form of world Communist gathering that would strengthen CPSU influence and authority. Without the issue of united action over Vietnam, Soviet chances of enticing such parties as the North Koreans, Japanese, North Vietnamese and Cubans to such a meeting would be much poorer even than they are at present.

Soviet Calculations Regarding the Chinese

Regarding their other great rival, Communist China, the Soviet attitude now appears to be one of satisfaction mingled with slight apprehension. The present over-all military disparity between the two powers is so great that the Soviets are reasonably confident that near-term Chinese aggression against them is quite unlikely. The Soviets are likely, however, to be planning now against the contingency that a real Chinese danger to their security will have been created within the next decade. The Soviets are likely to be at least as well informed about Chinese advanced weapons developments as is the United States, and there are reasons why they may well be considerably better informed.

The Soviets appear to recognize that there is nothing at all that they can do about the Chinese leadership at present, and they are not overly hopeful about the future. Contrary to what Soviet propaganda has sometimes suggested, CPSU and East European confidential documents leave little doubt that the

Soviets and their friends have from the first regarded the "cultural revolution" as a purge instigated and directed by Mao. And contrary to the hopes Soviet propaganda has sometimes held out for Mao's "opposition," the confidential documents have been quite pessimistic about the prospects for Chinese opponents of Mao's policies. Moreover, Soviet representatives have privately admitted that Liu Shao-chi has always been as anti-Soviet as Mao.

The Soviets have always had hopes for Chou En-lai, whom they regard as the chief moderate in the Chinese leadership. If Mao were to die at this moment, Chou might become an important factor working for some moderation in Chinese extreme hostility toward the Soviet Union. The Soviets, however, cannot even be sure that Chou would try to do this, they cannot be sure that he will not fall victim to a purge by Mao, and they cannot be sure that he will survive a possible struggle for power after Mao's death. From the point of view of Soviet calculations, Chou is therefore only an outside possibility as a factor for a future improvement in CCP policy toward the CPSU. And the Soviets probably have little hope that Lin Piao--Mao's heir-apparent who will probably become the single most important leader in China on Mao's death--will then disappoint Mao's hopes and seek such a change in Chinese policy. During the last year the Soviets have frequently attacked Lin publicly.

For the foreseeable future, the CPSU has burnt its bridges with the present Chinese regime and with most of the persons likely to be dominant immediately after Mao's death. The CPSU must calculate, however, that once Mao is gone any successor regime, even if it retains a considerable degree of hostility to the USSR (as is likely, because of fundamental conflicting national interests), is also likely quickly to modify some of Mao's more paranoid tactics toward the Communist world which have been recognized by everyone but Mao to be counterproductive for the Chinese competition with the CPSU: Mao's hostile attitude toward the Japanese Communist Party, to take one example. The present situation of virtually complete CCP isolation even from the radical Communist neutrals is not likely to survive Mao's death,

therefore. This is an additional reason for the CPSU to make every effort to exploit its current fragile advantage while it lasts and take some tangible organizational step in November 1967 which can afterward be used to shore up CPSU influence and authority.

Sino-Soviet Secret Correspondence and Conversations Since Khrushchev's Fall

	Date	Sender and Recipient	Gist
1.	Late Oct. 1964	CCP letter to CPSU.	Said CCP would welcome CPSU invitation to send delegation to Moscow for October Revolution anniversary; such delegation would be led by Chou En-lai.
2.	Late Oct. 1964	CPSU letter to CCP.	Extended the invitation.
3.	November 1964	(Chou talks with CPSU in Moscow.)	Stalemate because of CCP obstinate insistence on CPSU public rejection of all past positions.
4.	Late Nov. 1964	CPSU letter to CCP (also sent to many other parties through early December.)	"Proposed" postponement of 15 December Moscow meeting to 1 March; gave rundown on latest stand of 26 prospective participants in meeting.
5.	February 1965	(Mao-Kosygin talks in Peking.)	Stalemate; Mao supremely arrogant, rejected minor CPSU concessions, demanded CPSU self-humiliation.
6.	16 Feb. 1965	CPSU (or possibly Soviet government, or both) letter to Chinese. (Similar letter simultaneously sent to DRV.)	Sent immediately after Kosygin return from Far East; proposed "new international conference" for negotiations on Vietnam.
7.	27 Feb. 1965	Chinese reply to Soviets.	Rejected this proposal. (Date and exact nature of DRV reply uncertain.)

	Date	Sender and Recipient	Gist
8.	22 Feb. 1965	North Vietnamese letter to CPSU and CCP.	Sent at Kosygin suggestion; proposed tripartite public statement on Vietnam to warn United States, and furnished draft.
9.	Late Feb. 1965	CPSU reply to North Vietnam.	Accepted this proposal.
10.	Late Feb. 1965	CCP reply to North Vietnam.	Rejected this proposal.
11.	25 Feb. 1965	CPSU letter to CCP.	Requested air corridor across China for military airlift to DRV.
12.	28 Feb. 1965	CCP reply to CPSU.	Rejected this request.
13.	March 1965	CPSU (or Soviet government) message to Chinese.	Requested use of air bases in south China (to assemble MIGs shipped by rail from USSR for DRV).
14.	March 1965	CCP (or Chinese government) reply to Soviets.	Rejected this request.
15.	7 March 1965	Communiqué of 1-5 March Moscow 19-party "consultative meeting" sent to CCP (and many other parties) with short covering note, prior to publication.	Professed desire for unity, took no concrete step toward world Communist conference. CCP privately indicated scorn, later publicly attacked communiqué and meeting.
16.	30 March 1965	Two-year Sino-Soviet rail transportation agreement on Soviet aid to DRV signed.	Chinese nevertheless continue to obstruct shipment of Soviet SAM components and personnel to DRV from March until June 1965.

	Date	Sender and Recipient	Gist
17.	3 April 1965	CPSU letter to CCP.	Proposed tripartite Sino-Soviet-North Vietnamese meeting on measures "to defend security" of DRV.
18.	11 April 1965	CCP reply to CPSU.	Rejected this proposal as unnecessary; attacked Soviet aid as insignificant.
19.	17 April 1965	CPSU letter to CCP.	Renewed demand for tripartite meeting and for tripartite public statement; attacked CCP for obstruction of Soviet aid and for rejection of unity. Draft of this letter probably shown to Le Duan, visiting in Moscow, before being sent.
20.	14 July 1965	CCP reply to CPSU.	Denounced Soviet past diplomatic activities regarding Vietnam negotiations; charged USSR with continuing collusion with United States; insisted tripartite meeting therefore could only harm DRV; rejected united action of any kind with Soviets.
21.	July 1965	(Brezhnev-Teng Hsiao-ping talks at Ninth Rumanian party congress.)	Violent mutual accusations ending in complete disagreement.
22.	18 Sept. 1965	CPSU letter to CCP.	Rebuked Chinese for their inflammatory stand on India-Pakistan war and for their ultimatum to India.
23.	18 Oct. 1965	CCP reply to CPSU.	Rebuked Soviets in turn for siding with India and for trying to frighten Chinese with threat of U.S. action. Termed CPSU letter's demand for united action against United States hypocritical.

	Date	Sender and Recipient	Gist
24.	23 Oct. 1965	CPSU letter to CCP.	Complained of new Chinese obstruction of a Soviet military rail shipment to DRV.
25.	5 Nov. 1965	CCP letter to CPSU.	In effect admitted refusal to pass this shipment; blamed it on Soviet delay in signing new documentation CCP considered necessary.
26.	28 Nov. 1965	CPSU letter to CCP.	Attacked 11 November Chinese editorial that had publicly ruled out any joint meeting or unity of action with Soviets.
27.	7 Jan. 1966	CCP reply to CPSU.	Scornfully reiterated 11 November statements, and added that Sino-Soviet treaty of alliance was worthless; USSR would be a "negative factor" in a Sino-U.S. war.
28.	28 Dec 1965 (received 4 January)	Polish party letter to CCP. (Similar letters sent to all other bloc parties.)	Sent at Soviet instigation; invited CCP to bloc conference on aid to Vietnam; Soviets were hoping to hold conference at conclusion of 23rd CPSU Congress in Moscow.
29.	7 Feb. 1966	CCP reply to Poles.	Sarcastic rejection of invitation. Conference had already been scuttled because DRV declined.
30.	January-February 1966	CPSU letter circulated to many parties, one version circulated within CPSU. Portions deliberately leaked to Western press.	Reviewed at length and assailed record of Chinese actions since Khrushchev's fall; attacked Mao by name.

	Date	Sender and Recipient	Gist
31.	24 Feb. 1966	CPSU letter to CCP.	Terse invitation to 23rd CPSU Congress opening in late March.
32.	22 March 1966	CCP reply to CPSU.	Refused invitation; published by Chinese together with CPSU invitation.

NOTE: This is the last item of Sino-Soviet secret party correspondence (or party contacts of any kind) of which we have had any information as of late May 1967. Government correspondence, including many Foreign Ministry protest notes on both sides, has continued; and all such notes of which we have any knowledge have been published by the Soviets or Chinese. However, there have apparently been CPSU and CCP letters distributed to other parties concerning the opponent; versions of one such CPSU letter dealing with the Chinese "cultural revolution" were shown to representatives of bloc and non-bloc parties in December 1966.

TABLE OF ILLUSTRATIONS

THE SINO-SOVIET STRUGGLE IN THE WORLD COMMUNIST MOVEMENT SINCE KHRUSHCHEV'S FALL

PART I

I. The Shift in the Emphasis of CPSU Policy

A. The Anti-U.S. Vested Interests in the Communist World

When Khrushchev fell in October 1964, the balance of opinion in the Soviet leadership shifted toward the views of those of his former colleagues and subordinates who had long wanted a higher priority to be given to the promotion of Soviet influence at Chinese expense in the most militant and vehemently anti-American sections of the world Communist movement. This change from the start implied both acceptance of the likelihood of a worsening of relations with the United States and a revision of Khrushchev's tactics in the struggle with the Chinese.

At the moment of Khrushchev's fall, Communist parties and other radical movements with a special vested interest in hostility toward the United States--and a long-standing desire for a tougher Soviet posture toward the U.S.--existed in several parts of the world:

In the Far East, these included most notably the ruling parties of North Vietnam and North Korea, whose desire to dominate all of Vietnam and all of Korea had been or was being blocked by the United States; the Communist party of Indonesia which was apparently consolidating its influence at home as that of the United States was being eliminated; and the Communist Party of Japan, which wished to do the same. These four key parties were not obedient retainers of the Chinese but rather their voluntary allies, whose anti-Khrushchev position had derived in large part from what they regarded as his soft line toward the United States. A considerable modification of Soviet policy toward the United States was therefore one of the obvious prerequisites (there were others) for the improvement of CPSU relations with these parties. Much of the militant, pro-Chinese wing of the Indian

Communist party could also be reasonably expected to be more susceptible to CPSU influence after such a change in the Soviet posture toward the United States.

In Latin America, a vehement hostility to the United States remained central to the policy of the Cuban regime, which believed that its power at home could be secure only after it had helped to establish other Communist regimes to the south. A Castroite following throughout Latin America shared this hostility toward the U.S., and had long been encouraged by Cuba to put unwelcome pressure upon local Communist parties to adopt militant tactics against governments friendly to or supported by the United States, whether or not such tactics were thought appropriate by the Communists or Moscow. Castro had embarrassed Khrushchev by refusing to sign the Soviet-U.S. partial test-ban agreement in the summer of 1963, and had then publicly called attention to the discrepancy between his policy toward the United States and Khrushchev's, insisting that peaceful coexistence with the U.S. was not possible for him. From the point of view of the men who replaced Khrushchev, therefore, a toughening of the Soviet line toward the United States offered the promise of rewards for Soviet relations with Castro, and might well be used as a bargaining counter to extract concessions from him in other matters, such as the question of his relations with pro-Chinese forces in Latin America.

In Africa, a potential reward had similarly been created for more vigorous Soviet gestures of opposition to the United States, because of the hostile radical African reaction to U.S. support for the Tshombe regime in the Congo (Leopoldville), which was employing white South African mercenaries. Ever since 1960, the Soviets had been embarrassed by Chinese propaganda exploitation of the original Soviet position of support for the 1960 UN resolution on the Congo. The new Soviet leadership could only welcome an opportunity to do something, at reasonably low risk, to counter Chinese use of this issue as an example of Soviet "betrayal." By coincidence an opportunity was soon forthcoming, in connection with the Stanleyville airlift of November 1964.

Finally, it had become apparent to the Soviets that even among the Communist parties of Western Europe, there were few ardent defenders of good relations between the Soviet Union and the United States, and growing pressure from some for more vigorous Soviet efforts to outbid the Chinese for the support of the anti-U.S. radicals of the underdeveloped world. It was noteworthy that such Western European Communist pressure for a harder Soviet line toward the United States came chiefly from some of the parties which were most "revisionist" in domestic politics, most persistent in resisting Soviet authority and criticizing Stalinist aspects of Soviet life, and most obstinate in obstructing Khrushchev's plans to coerce the Chinese. The Italian Communist Party was the leader in this regard, and a striking feature of the "Togliatti Memorandum" published by the Italian party a month before Khrushchev's fall was its outspoken demand for a reappraisal of Soviet policy toward the United States. Later Italian party statements were even more explicit. (In contrast, Khrushchev's moderate stand regarding the United States was defended, and the Italian position explicitly rebutted, by relatively "conservative" parties anxious to uphold Soviet authority and to outlaw the Chinese, such as the Communist party of the United States.)*

To sum up: on the eve of Khrushchev's fall, the vested interests of many Communists and radicals in different parts of the world posed a strong incentive for a toughening of Soviet policy toward the United States for those Soviet leaders who assigned a higher priority than had Khrushchev to the value of enhancing Soviet influence among such Communists as opposed to the value to the Soviet state of good relations with the United States.

B. The Opposition to Khrushchev's Tactics Toward Peking

The other side of the coin was the question of the tactics to be used by the CPSU in the struggle

**The Italian party stand and its motivation are examined in detail on pages 11-14; the violent CPUSA attack on the Italians is recounted on pages 65-66.*

against Peking. Without exception, every Communist party that had been demanding a harsher Soviet line toward the United States was also adamantly opposed to Khrushchev's efforts in 1963 and 1964 to bring about a showdown with the Chinese party. The two questions, for most Communist leaders were completely interwoven.

1. The Far Eastern Parties

In the Far East, where CCP influence because of factors of geography, race, and culture was particularly strong, the four most important Communist parties (North Vietnam, North Korea, Indonesia and Japan) had steadfastly refused to assist Soviet efforts to coerce Peking since the Moscow conference of November 1960. At that conference, and consistently thereafter, these four Far Eastern parties had in effect sided with Peking on the key question of authority by refusing to accept the Soviet contention that the will of the Soviet-dominated majority of the international movement should prevail. These parties instead agreed with the Chinese that decisions of the Communist movement must be unanimous. The North Vietnamese party in particular sought to mediate between the CPSU and the CCP on occasions (notably November 1960 and January 1962) when the Soviets were campaigning to have the world movement condemn Peking, and on each occasion helped to induce the Soviets to halt their campaign temporarily. Each such mediation effort thus dealt another blow to Soviet pretensions to supreme authority.

In rejecting what were in essence Soviet attempts to reassert the CPSU's right to formulate policy for the international movement unilaterally (as Stalin had done), the North Vietnamese, North Koreans, Indonesians and Japanese were strongly influenced by the content of Soviet policy. These parties were inclined to agree with Chinese charges that Soviet dealings with the United States were discouraging revolutionary struggles throughout the world, and they were convinced in particular that these aspects of Khrushchev's foreign policy were harmful to their own national interests. They were thus all the less inclined to agree to CPSU claims to an authority which was to be used for such purposes. Conversely, in advocating "unanimity" rather than "majority rule"

these parties were in fact also demanding that the Soviets and their followers join with the Chinese and themselves in unanimous and consistent struggle against the United States.*

The North Vietnamese, North Koreans, Indonesians and Japanese therefore were opposed to Khrushchev's attempts in 1963 and 1964 to convene a world Communist conference without the Chinese, both because they feared the consequences for them of a formal schism and because they saw the motivation for Khrushchev's campaign as closely connected with his current policy toward the United States. Following his July 1963 signing of the test-ban treaty with the U.S.--which flouted the opinions of the Far Eastern parties--Khrushchev seemed to have adopted more clearly than before a "better fewer but better" line toward the Communist movement. Despite all his protestations to the contrary, it appeared that Khrushchev was striving to organize a conference that would formalize a split in the world movement, in the hope that those parties which kept their ties with the CPSU after such a conference would be more vulnerable to Soviet pressure and less capable or inclined to make trouble for Soviet policy, including Soviet dealings with the United States. The truly incorrigible troublemakers, according to this scheme, would be cast off with the Chinese.

**It should be added that in the background, in addition to opposition to Soviet policies toward the United States and Communist China, most of the radical Communist parties had a third reason to oppose Khrushchev's plans: resentment at past or present Soviet interference in their internal affairs. This was true, to one degree or another, of the North Koreans, the Japanese, the left wing of the Indians, the Indonesians, and even the Cubans. As will be seen, this grievance against the Soviets in some cases assumed greater relative importance when the other grievances against Soviet policy were partially satisfied by the post-Khrushchev CPSU leadership.*

This view of Khrushchev's aims received apparent confirmation from the increasingly intransigent Soviet posture toward the North Vietnamese, North Koreans, Indonesians and Japanese parties in 1963 and 1964. Following the punitive cutoff of Soviet military aid to North Korea late in 1962, the first public Soviet criticism of the North Korean party was made at an East German party congress in January 1963, and other attacks followed, together with direct replies from Pyongyang. Increasing Soviet support for Japanese party dissidents was discussed in an angry exchange of private correspondence between the CPSU and the JCP in 1963, and this became a savage public polemic in 1964.

[redacted] reports in 1961 and 1962 had indicated that the Soviet leadership retained at the time considerable hopes for the North Vietnamese and Indonesian parties, and significant concessions were made to appease them;* but this came to an end in 1963. As for Indonesia, relations between the CPSU and the PKI grew steadily more icy, and Khrushchev is credibly reported to have attacked the PKI during conversations with Sukarno and Nasution in Moscow. As for North Vietnam, the signing of the test-ban treaty with the United States--and the CPSU campaign for a world Communist conference without the Chinese--together induced Hanoi to take a position much more openly sympathetic to the Chinese then before. This North Vietnamese tendency was reinforced by Khrushchev's emphatic refusal to become involved in support of the DRV's enterprise in South Vietnam. Khrushchev is alleged [redacted] to have reneged in 1964 on an earlier promise to supply the DRV with fighter aircraft. Soviet conduct following the Gulf of Tonkin incidents of August and September 1964--in implicitly accepting the U.S. account of the events, and in agreeing to the suggestion that the matter be brought before the United Nations, contrary to DRV wishes--is reported to have brought a protest from Hanoi to Moscow. Finally, in September,

**One such concession has already been noted: the Soviet agreement, in February 1962, to halt the worldwide polemical campaign the CPSU was then conducting against the Chinese and Albanians, in response to a North Vietnamese request.*

a month before Khrushchev's fall, Soviet propaganda published the first explicit Soviet criticism ever made of the North Vietnamese, in connection with the DRV representative's support of the Chinese at a meeting in Moscow.

Thus the single most important new characteristic of Khrushchev's line toward the international Communist movement in the last two years of his power were his increased willingness to accept public estrangement from the leading Far Eastern parties as a necessary consequence of his effort to force a definitive break with the Chinese. Khrushchev was replaced before he could carry his campaign to its logical culmination, and the majority of his successors did not share his view of the priorities of Soviet interests, on this as on other matters.

2. Castro and the Latin American Radicals

Fidel Castro, who agreed with the Far Eastern radical Communists regarding Soviet dealings with the United States, also shared their disapproval of Khrushchev's moves to bring about a formal split with the Chinese; but unlike the Asians, Castro was not disposed therefore to align himself with Peking in opposition to Moscow. Castro made his position public for the first time in January 1963, at a moment when he was disillusioned and angry with both the Soviets and the Chinese--the former for their "betrayal" in the Cuban missile crisis, and the latter for what Castro regarded (mistakenly) as their opportunistic and selfish seizure of the occasion for an invasion of India rather than for some tangible assistance to him.* Castro declared, and later reiterated, his

*Castro was wrong in attributing the timing of the Chinese attack on Indian border positions to opportunistic use of the Cuban missile crisis, inasmuch as Indian provocation in early October 1962 had been sufficient cause for PLA retaliation in late October. See POLO XVI-64 of 5 May 1964, "The Sino-Indian Border Dispute, Section 3: 1961-62,"

perfect neutrality; he deplored and condemned mutual polemical attacks (such as both the Soviets and the Chinese were then engaged in), and appealed for unity in militant opposition to the United States.

Thenceforth, until Khrushchev fell in October 1964, different aspects of Castro's policy continued to offend both the Chinese and the Soviets. After Castro's visit to the Soviet Union in April 1963 and a television address he subsequently gave lauding Khrushchev in extravagant terms, the Chinese grew very cool toward Fidel personally, and avoided mentioning his name (although this was not true of their attitude toward Che Guevara). The Soviets, on the other hand, had their own reasons for dissatisfaction. As already noted, Castro refused to sign the test-ban treaty, and publicly called attention to the discrepancy between his national interests and those of the Soviet Union regarding dealings with the United States. Moreover, despite the Chinese disenchantment with Castro personally, the line he continued to press for Latin America (and indeed, for other parts of the world) remained far more harmonious with Chinese world strategy than with that of the CPSU.* (This fact was dramatized when the Chinese eagerly seized upon a Guevara article on Latin America printed in Cuba Socialista in the fall of 1963 for wide dissemination in their own propaganda.)

Despite attempts made in the spring of 1963, during Castro's visit to the USSR, to induce him to reconcile his differences with the pro-Soviet Latin

*Indeed, this statement remains true even today, despite the fact that violent polemics have now occurred between Havana and Peking, despite the personal insults which Castro has heaped on Mao and which the Chinese camp has returned to Castro, despite the disappearance of Guevara and despite the hardening of the Soviet line toward the United States. See Part III, pages 99-116, for a discussion of the many aspects of Cuban policy which continue, willy-nilly, to run parallel with Chinese policy and counter to Soviet desires.

American Communist parties, Castro's subsequent conduct continued to embarrass the CPSU and its adherents in several countries. Most pernicious of all, from Khrushchev's point of view, was Castro's influence on the Venezuelan CP, which at the East German party congress in January 1963 had been the only Latin American party to follow the Cuban example in refusing to sign a joint Latin American statement endorsing Soviet policy aims. By the summer and fall of 1964, a public tug-of-war had developed between the CPSU and Castro for predominant influence over the policy of the Venezuelan party, with Pravda publishing material attacking the violent tactics which Castro continued to demand.*

Against this background, Castro's attitude toward Khrushchev's project of a world Communist conference without the Chinese was bound to cause anxiety for the CPSU. If Cuba were to join the Far Eastern parties in declining to attend such a conference, this would be a severe blow to the Soviets: the Venezuelan CP (and other waverers elsewhere in the world) might be led to imitate the Cubans, and Castro would appear to the world to be siding with the Chinese rather than with the Soviets at the decisive showdown Khrushchev himself had created. This in turn would inevitably have a harmful effect upon Soviet influence and authority among many of the radicals of Latin America.

In addition to the general question of Cuban participation in a hypothetical world Communist conference as yet unscheduled, there was a more pressing issue: whether the Cubans would agree to take part in the smaller, 26-party preparatory meeting which Khrushchev had called to meet in Moscow on 15 December to organize a world conference. The Chinese and several of their friends had made it known that they would not participate in this preparatory

*Venezuelan party leaders susceptible to Castro's influence went so far as to attempt to punish the Venezuelan party member who had written the Pravda articles in question.

meeting, and opposition to the project was known to exist among several of the European invitees. Cuban presence was therefore all the more essential, but Castro had still not committed himself when Khrushchev fell in mid-October, only two months before the scheduled meeting. By demanding Cuban attendance at a specific gathering on a specific date, Khrushchev had placed unwelcome pressure on Castro to commit an overt act that would violate his professed neutrality in the Sino-Soviet conflict--that would in effect force him to become a Soviet agent in the struggle with the Chinese rather than a lofty onlooker scolding both sides. Castro was thus being asked to give up a measure of his independence and freedom of maneuver, for no tangible reward.

The men who replaced Khrushchev understood that if it became necessary after all to hold the preparatory meeting in some form, a price would have to be paid for Castro's participation. Here again, some modification of the Soviet line toward the United States would pay dividends. A compromise involving selected concessions to Castro regarding revolutionary policy toward Latin America might also be necessary. On both counts, the price to be paid could be held within acceptable limits if what was being asked of Castro were also reduced--that is, if overt Soviet polemical propaganda against the Chinese were halted, if gestures professing a desire for reconciliation with Peking were made, if active pressure for a world Communist conference were discontinued, and if the scheduled preparatory meeting were thus transformed from a mechanism for securing organizational action against the Chinese into a forum for the profession of unity against the United States.

To sum up: As in the Far East, so also with Cuba and Latin America, there were powerful incentives for the new Soviet leadership to revise radically Khrushchev's tactics in the continuing struggle with the Chinese. Once again, the revision of these tactics was intricately bound up with and clearly implied a deliberate worsening of Soviet relations with the United States.

3. The European Opposition

Khrushchev's plan for a world Communist conference without the Chinese, and his immediate project of a 15 December 26-party preparatory meeting in Moscow, had encountered stubborn opposition from certain of the most important parties in both Western and Eastern Europe. This recalcitrance in Europe--the very heartland of CPSU influence in the world Communist movement--was probably the single most important factor impelling Khrushchev's successors to abandon his tactics.

a. In Western Europe, the leader in opposing Khrushchev's plans, once again, was the Italian Communist Party. This was the largest and most important pro-Soviet party outside the bloc, with influence over many other parties, and as such exercised (and still exercises) considerable leverage on Soviet policy. The PCI in 1963 had opposed both Khrushchev's decision to conduct vituperative polemics in reply to the Chinese and his plan to organize a world conference without Peking's participation. When after a winter hiatus both aspects of Khrushchev's policy were revived by the CPSU in the spring of 1964, PCI opposition was reiterated. In August 1964, PCI Secretary General Togliatti, visiting the Soviet Union, composed a confidential memorandum to the CPSU setting forth the views of his party in response to a CPSU invitation to the 15 December preparatory meeting. Togliatti recalled his past opposition to CPSU tactics, and expressed regret that his advice had not been followed. While he agreed to attend the 15 December meeting, he made it clear that the PCI at that meeting would continue to fight tooth and nail against efforts to organize a world Communist conference. Twice in his memorandum he expressed the PCI's dismay at the split which had already occurred in the world Communist movement and the organizational efforts of the Chinese to create their own parallel Communist parties in many countries around the world. Although he did not say so explicitly, Togliatti clearly implied that erroneous CPSU tactics were partly responsible for these Chinese actions.

As already noted, Togliatti now retroactively invoked the bogey of a new "imperialist" threat from

the United States to justify the line he had already been urging upon Moscow. He professed to have discovered the basis for this threat in a massive swing to the right in the entire U.S. political spectrum in 1964 as a result of the Goldwater candidacy.* (Ironically, the PCI was to the left of the Chinese on this point: Chou En-lai, talking to a Japanese Socialist delegation one month before, said that Goldwater's platform would have some effect on U.S. policy but that most public opinion and even much of U.S. "monopoly capital" did not approve his views, and that therefore the possibility was "small" that the U.S. would become adventurous.) Togliatti held up this alleged new international threat as an overriding reason for the abandonment of Khrushchev's tactics toward the Chinese and for CPSU adoption of a "unity of action" line to enlist all Communists, including the Chinese, against the common danger.

Togliatti professed to believe that the Chinese might respond to such an appeal, and that the Chinese might then desist from formalizing their "fractionist efforts" throughout the world with the creation of a new Chinese "International" with "sections in all countries." In any case, Togliatti thought that better "collaboration" between the pro-Soviet camp and the "liberation movements" of former colonial areas struggling against "imperialism"--i.e., a more activist Soviet policy toward anti-U.S. radicals around the world--was essential to take the wind out of the Chinese sails.

In much of this argument, Togliatti was being less than frank. The PCI's overriding motive for opposing Khrushchev's tactics toward the Chinese and in seeking to stave off as long as possible a formalization of the split in the movement was neither concern for the fate of the movement nor

**Togliatti did not explain how this supposed recent radical change in U.S. political life justified similar earlier PCI opposition to Khrushchev's plans in 1963, before the alleged swing to the right in the United States had taken place and before the death of President Kennedy.*

fear of the alleged U.S. threat, but rather determination to prevent the CPSU from using a formal schism as the occasion for the restoration of stronger Soviet control over the PCI.* It was for this reason that Togliatti in his memorandum explicitly warned the Soviets that "we would be against any proposal to create once again a centralized international organization." Togliatti was apparently reluctant to accept at face value public assurances by Soviet spokesmen that the CPSU had no such intention.

Togliatti, however, apparently did not intend his memorandum to be published, and thought he was communicating privately with the CPSU rather than attacking it publicly. When Togliatti died in the Soviet Union in August 1964, his heirs in the PCI leadership seized upon the occasion to publish the memorandum, and thereby used Togliatti's name and influence for a purpose Togliatti had been unwilling to sanction himself.** The attacks in the memorandum

The PCI was also, of course, concerned, then and subsequently, to demonstrate publicly opposition to Soviet wishes on the subject of international party meetings in order to enhance the PCI's reputation at home as an autonomous party unresponsive to Soviet control. This was not, however, one of Togliatti's motives in composing his memorandum, which he did not intend to be published, although it was probably one of the important reasons why Togliatti's heirs published the memorandum after his death. In any case, the CPSU was all too well aware that the Italian party was indeed being obstructionist, and was not merely pretending to be so. The CPSU, then and now, has had strong reasons to wish to exert greater control over PCI actions, even if this cost the PCI something in terms of its image in Italy; and the PCI knows this and has good reason to resist.

**Togliatti's death at this moment was thus a stroke of bad luck for the CPSU; but this did not prevent some foreign Communist leaders--including the North Vietnamese party leadership for one--from suspecting the Soviets of having had a hand in his death.*

upon Khrushchev's line toward the Chinese, upon Soviet policy toward the international front organizations, and upon Stalinist tendencies in the Soviet Union met with a widespread response among the Communist parties of Western Europe and dealt a considerable blow to Khrushchev's authority there. As will be seen, after Khrushchev's fall the new Soviet leadership adopted in its entirety Togliatti's prescription for tactics toward the Chinese--eventually including also the harsher line he was urging toward the United States--but completely rejected the liberal anti-Stalin line he had urged for Soviet domestic life. In consequence, the new PCI leaders were kept busy for a long time denying that they had helped pull Khrushchev down to the benefit of Stalinist forces in the Soviet Union.

The PCI's opposition to Khrushchev's plans was shared by one other West European party invited to the 15 December preparatory meeting, the British CP. This small party, of some importance chiefly because of its influence on radical movements in former British colonial areas, was preoccupied with a considerable pro-Chinese minority within its ranks, and had still not indicated whether or not it would attend the 15 December meeting when Khrushchev fell in October.

In addition, several other West European parties not invited to the 15 December meeting agreed in whole or in part with the PCI arguments against Khrushchev's tactics toward the Chinese. The most outspoken in this regard were the Swedish and Dutch CPs--at the extreme right and extreme left of the West European Communist movement, respectively--both of which had indicated for different reasons that they would not attend any world Communist conference without the Chinese. The Swedish party, under its new revisionist chairman Hermansson, was concerned above all with strengthening its domestic position in Sweden through public demonstration of its supposed total independence of the CPSU. The Dutch party, under its old Stalinist chairman De Groot, had carried on a feud with Khrushchev for several years because of Khrushchev's anti-Stalinist domestic policy and revisionist foreign policy, and by 1964 had broken virtually all communications with the CPSU.

b. In Eastern Europe, Khrushchev had to deal with four troublemakers on the conference issue, two of which (Poland and Hungary) were amenable to persuasion and two of which (Yugoslavia and Rumania) were not.*

The Yugoslav party, while not endorsing the Italian party's call for CPSU unity of action with the Chinese against the United States threat, nevertheless shared the PCI's opposition to Khrushchev's plans. The Yugoslavs had long-standing objections to any Soviet ploy designed to tighten CPSU authority over the European Communist movement, and like the Italians, they viewed the projected world conference without the Chinese as such a Soviet effort. While the League of Yugoslav Communists was not one of the invitees to the 15 December preparatory meeting, it vigorously exerted such influence as it had upon those who were invited--particularly in Eastern Europe--to frustrate the CPSU's intentions. It was an open question whether the Yugoslavs would be invited to any subsequent world Communist conference (a matter which had been a subject of Sino-Soviet controversy in 1962 and 1963), and it was now also an open question whether they would accept if invited.

The Rumanian party was asked to attend the 26-party December preparatory meeting, and by the eve of Khrushchev's fall it was clear that the Rumanians would refuse. This regime in 1963 and 1964 had taken increasing advantage of the damage done to Soviet authority by the Sino-Soviet dispute in order to assert its economic and political independence of the Soviet Union. To this end, the Rumanians had formally announced their neutrality in the Sino-Soviet conflict. Yet on most of the larger substantive issues, such as the question of the line to be taken toward the United States, the Rumanians were not in fact neutral, but continued generally to agree with Khrushchev and disagree with Mao. Their neutrality was primarily a

Albania is of course totally removed from the discussion in this context; it was taken for granted by the CPSU that Hoxha would boycott any party meeting organized by the Soviets.

refusal to take part in polemics or coercive actions of one side against the other. This stand enhanced their international position and their capacity to resist Soviet bilateral pressures. It was therefore contrary to Rumanian national interests to affront the Chinese by attending the December meeting, particularly if, as they suspected, this meeting was intended to enhance Soviet authority over such dissidents as themselves.

The Polish and Hungarian parties were another matter. Both had a history of opposition to Soviet desires to create some new organizational framework to enhance CPSU international authority, and the Poles particularly had helped to block such a Soviet endeavor in 1957 and 1958. In the fall of 1963, probably for this reason, the Polish and Hungarian regimes had displayed great coolness to Khrushchev's project of an international Communist conference. By the spring of 1964, however, when Khrushchev renewed this project, the Polish party was induced to go along with it; and although the Hungarian party had not yet committed itself publicly by the fall of 1964, it would probably also have yielded to the CPSU, despite Tito's efforts to dissuade Kadar. Both the Poles and Hungarians, however, could be counted on to resist strongly any Soviet attempt to use a world conference for the creation of some new international party mechanism in which the Chinese and their friends would not participate.

To sum up: Of the European invitees from the CPSU camp to the 15 December preparatory meeting, the Rumanians would probably not attend, the Italians and British would fight to prevent the preparatory meeting from convening a world conference, and the Poles and Hungarians would fight to prevent a world conference from conferring additional authority on the CPSU, and thus from achieving Khrushchev's ultimate purpose. Of the Latin American invitees, the Cubans were doubtful as to the December preparatory meeting, still more doubtful as to a world conference, and likely to side with the Poles and Hungarians in obstructing Soviet purposes even if they attended such a conference. Several other vaguely "pro-Soviet" parties--including the Venezuelans in Latin America, and the Yugoslavs, Dutch, Swedes and Norwegians in

Europe--would either be absent from a world conference or would oppose Soviet desires there.

From the point of view of the men who succeeded Khrushchev, therefore, his enterprise appeared more and more foolhardy. On the one hand, he was in effect writing off CPSU influence in the Far East, abandoning to the Chinese parties for which the CPSU had long competed with Peking and which under other circumstances--with a fundamental change in Soviet tactics toward Peking and Washington--might take a more forthcoming attitude toward the CPSU. On the other hand, in view of the attitude of important parties in the Soviet camp it seemed increasingly unlikely that Khrushchev would succeed in extracting sufficient advantages for the CPSU in the remainder of the Communist world to compensate for the surrender of the Communist Far East.

II. The New Soviet Line: The First Six Months

In the six months between the fall of Khrushchev in mid-October 1964 and the holding of the Moscow "consultative" conference of Communist parties in early March 1965 the outline of a new set of Soviet policies toward the Communist world--and consequently, toward the United States--gradually took shape. As a first step, almost immediately after Khrushchev's ouster, the new leadership began to take actions intended to improve the CPSU position with Communist anti-U.S. "radicals" around the world.

A. The CPSU's November 1964 Bargain with Castro

In the last week of November, representatives of virtually all the orthodox, pro-Soviet Communist parties of Latin America assembled in Havana for a confrontation with the Cubans. Although it had been reported that such a meeting was being considered as early as 10 October--i.e., shortly before Khrushchev's ouster--active preparations were made for the meeting during the first three weeks of November during conversations in Moscow between CPSU officials (chiefly Suslov and Ponomarev), Che Guevara, on behalf of the Cubans, and the leaders of certain key Latin American parties. The commitments entered into by the CPSU in these preliminary talks thus reflected the policy views of the new post-Khrushchev leadership.

In the Havana talks which followed, the Cubans are reported by several Latin American parties to have made one substantial private concession to the CPSU and its Latin American followers: a promise to limit Cuban support in the future to revolutionary groups approved by the pro-Soviet Communist party of the country concerned. In addition, the Cubans agreed to a statement in the conference communique eventually published condemning "factional activities, no matter what their source or nature"--a statement extremely useful to the CPSU in combatting Chinese factional activities both in the Latin American Communist movement and elsewhere in the world.

In return, the CPSU apparently promised the Cubans--both directly in Moscow and indirectly through Soviet

adherents at the Havana meeting--a more positive Soviet attitude toward the role of armed struggle in Latin America generally, and gave the Cubans to understand that in certain specified countries armed struggle would be supported as the dominant line by the local Communist party and the Soviet Union. Castro was evidently expected to reciprocate by relaxing his pressure upon the Communist parties of other countries where, contrary to the Cuban view, armed struggle was not considered desirable.

In the next few months, the Soviets took certain concrete steps in the direction desired by Castro. Late in December, Moscow radio for the first time began broadcasts in Quechua to the Indian peasant populations of Bolivia, Peru and Ecuador, urging armed revolt in crude and unambiguous terms. Early the next year, a CPSU central committee official told leaders of a European party privately that armed struggle, while not possible in Europe, was still likely to be necessary in some situations in Latin America. When the Havana conference communique was finally published in Pravda on 14 January 1965, an accompanying Pravda editorial took an unusually explicit position in praise of the "just struggle of patriots, arms in hand, in Venezuela, Guatemala, and a number of other countries," and pledged Soviet support for such "patriots."

In at least one Latin American Communist party, these CPSU concessions to Castro had a drastic effect. As a direct consequence of the shift in emphasis of the CPSU line, a militant Castroite faction of the Guatemalan Labor (Communist) party allied with the guerrilla leader Luis Turcios Lima, which had long been struggling against the reluctance of more moderate party leaders to commit the party entirely to armed struggle, made significant gains in the factional struggle. By the late spring of 1965 this Communist party was involved not only in guerrilla warfare in the hills but also terrorism in the cities, and an attempt was presently made to assassinate the head of the local U.S. military mission. In much of all this, the Castroite faction both inside and closely allied to the Guatemalan Communist organization was imitating the practice of Castroites who in past years had similarly gained predominant influence in the Venezuelan

Communist party at the expense of older leaders long responsive to the CPSU. One paradoxical result was that in Guatemala as in Venezuela previously, the encouragement of violent tactics by the CPSU was producing a tendency toward weakening CPSU authority over the Communists of the country and toward strengthening Castro's influence over them.

As will be seen later, the CPSU's November 1964 deal with Castro on Latin America eventually broke down as both sides began to renege on some of their commitments. The point for the moment, however, is that the new Soviet leadership soon after taking power did make a strong effort to conciliate Castro, that in return for favors received it went further toward meeting his views than Khrushchev had ever been willing to go, and that the stronger public and private Soviet endorsements of violence as one appropriate means of "anti-imperialist struggle" in Latin America were bound, over the long term, to lead to actions likely to complicate or exacerbate Soviet relations with the United States. The CPSU was here not responding to anything the United States had done--certainly not to the U.S. air offensive against North Vietnam, which did not begin until three months later. The CPSU leadership was rather taking the initiative, and making a choice which Khrushchev over the last two years had been unwilling to make, choosing to appease an important anti-U.S. "radical" in the Communist movement and to accept the consequences.

B. The Congo Episode, November-December 1964

At about the same time, the Soviet Union took the opportunity offered by the events in the Leopoldville Congo in the last two months of 1964 to attempt to strengthen the Soviet position among radical African leaders, in competition with the Chinese but at the direct expense of the United States. Following the 24 November U.S. airlift of Belgian paratroops to the rebel-held city of Stanleyville,

East Europeans began privately to leak--and the Cairo press to publish--reports that the Soviets would replace arms and equipment supplied to the rebels and would also pay part of the costs of an airlift. Meanwhile, flights of Soviet-built Algerian and UAR transports--many reportedly manned by Soviet crews--were begun in early December and continued for several weeks ferrying arms to the Sudan for Congolese rebel use.

Such use of Soviet personnel to assist even to this extent the rebel side of a foreign civil war was most unusual for the Soviet Union, and was evidently undertaken by the new CPSU leadership in recognition of a heaven-sent opportunity to disassociate themselves--at virtually no risk--from an unfortunate episode in Khrushchev's past Congo policy. For several years, the Chinese had been everywhere exploiting against the CPSU, to considerable effect, the Soviet mistake in having voted for the original 1960 United Nations resolution on the Congo and having supplied aircraft to transport UN forces at that time. The Chinese berated Khrushchev as bearing partial responsibility for Lumumba's death at Tshombe's hands, and recalled this Congo "Munich" at the time of Khrushchev's Cuban crisis retreat. Now, four years after the original visit of Soviet transports to the Congo, transports and pilots furnished by the Soviet Union were being used to help the side opposing Tshombe. The Soviets followed this up in December by expelling Tshombe's diplomatic representative in Mosocw.

Regardless of whether the rebels prospered or failed, the USSR hoped through its actions to gain at U.S. expense in the eyes of the many African leaders, radical and moderate, who disliked Tshombe, disapproved of U.S. support for him, and were angered at the U.S. airlift to Stanleyville. The Soviets also hoped to

impress radicals elsewhere in the Communist world.* At the same time, the risk of a direct military confrontation with the United States in the Congo could be kept minimal by ensuring that the Soviet assistance was not mentioned in Soviet overt propaganda, that the transport flights were conducted under African auspices, and that no Soviet personnel actually set foot in the Congo.

While avoiding military danger, however, the new Soviet leadership was entirely willing to jeopardize Soviet-U.S. political relations to impress its radical audience--in connection with the Congo as on other matters. On 28 November, the Soviets staged a demonstration, protesting the Stanleyville airdrop of 24 November, by foreign students before the U.S. Embassy in Moscow (and then the Belgian, Congolese, and British Embassies as well). A TASS account the same day duly recorded with approval the hurling of ink bottles at the U.S. Embassy building. The decision of the new Soviet leadership to organize this demonstration was particularly striking in that this was the first such demonstration to be held at the U.S. Embassy since the Cuban crisis of October 1962. Throughout the last two years of Khrushchev's tenure in office he had refrained from such gestures against the United States, even following the Gulf of Tonkin incidents of August and September 1964 involving a member of the "socialist camp."

*In February 1965, in the course of Kosygin's talks in Peking with the Chinese leaders, he engaged in a heated private debate with Chou En-lai in Mao's presence over these transport flights to aid the Congo's rebels, with each side claiming the credit and denying that the other had done anything. The Soviets furnished accounts of these talks to many of their foreign supporters.

C. The CPSU Reversal of Line on North Vietnam

Of all the objectives sought by the new Soviet leadership through a shift in the emphasis of Khrushchev's foreign policy, the recovery of a significant degree of influence over the North Vietnamese party was probably the single most important. The progress the CPSU has made in this effort is impressive in view of the degree to which its relations with the Lao Dong party had deteriorated in 1963 and 1964, in large part because of continued Soviet adherence to policies of caution and limited detente toward the United States at a time when the DRV intended to expand its struggle against the United States in South Vietnam.

North Vietnamese agreement with Chinese policies toward the U.S. and objections to the Soviet attitude were given their most formal expression in a communique issued by the Ninth Session of the central committee of the North Vietnamese party, held in December 1963. This communique took quite a strong position in denunciation of the forces of "revisionism" in the world Communist movement, although it also specified that the Vietnamese party drew a "clear political distinction" between Tito--a lackey of imperialism--and unnamed others (the Soviets) who had merely committed the "error of revisionism." The North Vietnamese thus declined to follow the Chinese the last mile in associating the CPSU with the Yugoslavs as traitors to the world Communist movement; instead, they announced that they would "struggle for the sake of unity" with these "mistaken people," and reiterated a plea for further bilateral negotiations between the Chinese and the Soviets.

[redacted] has provided details of a training course on the Sino-Soviet dispute given in Hanoi for party cadres, also in December 1963, which expressed a similar attitude more frankly: after an extensive review and condemnation of Khrushchev's actions and endorsement of the Chinese position, it was nevertheless asserted that the Vietnamese party would formally support neither the Soviet Union nor China; would regard both as "intimate brothers," and would await the reunification of the

world movement following the coming collapse of "the revisionist clique of Khrushchev and Tito." Ten months before Khrushchev's ouster, the North Vietnamese party was thus privately intimating that his fall, if it occurred, would bring both a change in Soviet foreign policy and an improvement in Soviet relations with the DRV.

Despite these qualifications attached by the North Vietnamese to their public and private condemnations of Soviet policy at the end of 1963, and despite the dispatch of a Vietnamese party mission to Moscow early in 1964 to explain the central committee decisions to the CPSU, North Vietnamese relations with the Soviets continued slowly to deteriorate during the remainder of the Khrushchev regime. The December training course had alluded to "preventive measures" which were being taken against any party members who might have "reactionary sentiments"; and [redacted] has stated that the December central committee plenum saw two alternate members of the central committee censured for the expression of anti-Chinese or excessively pro-Soviet views at the plenum.* "Rightist" tendencies within the North Vietnamese party were publicly attacked by party spokesmen both at the plenum and subsequently.

Throughout the first nine months of 1964, Soviet relations with North Vietnam continued to be embittered by the great caution and coolness displayed by the Soviets in matters considered by the North Vietnamese to be vital to their national interests. In April, the [redacted] on the Vietnamese International Control Commission privately admitted [redacted] that aggression was being carried out in South Vietnam by the North; [redacted] characterized recent relations between members of the Polish ICC delegation and North Vietnamese officials as "cold,"

*[redacted] *has also claimed that sometime in 1963 a colonel in the North Vietnamese Army and a second secretary of the Hanoi city party committee defected to the Soviet Union while students at a party school in Moscow. This claim has not been confirmed by any other source.*

and noted that within the ICC, the Poles had not been pressing complaints presented by the North Vietnamese Army. This Polish attitude almost certainly reflected the current Soviet posture toward the DRV. In August the cautious Soviet reaction to the first Tonkin Gulf incident caused further difficulties, when TASS carried an account of the event at variance with the DRV (and Chinese) version, and when the USSR agreed to carry the matter to the UN contrary to DRV wishes and without consulting Hanoi.

In September, [redacted] reported that Soviet newspapers and periodicals, except for scientific and technological journals, had been withdrawn from general circulation there--in contrast to the increase in circulation of Chinese Communist publications--and that North Vietnamese students returning from Moscow were being given political re-education courses. At a September exhibit at the Marx-Lenin museum in Moscow to celebrate the centenary of the First International, Ho Chi Minh's portrait was not among those of the leaders of the world movement displayed, while Tito's was. The absolute nadir of CPSU-Lao Dong relations came on 18 September, when--according to a Chinese account--a DRV delegate to a World Youth Forum in Moscow protested the "undemocratic" way in which the Soviets were running the sessions and defended the Chinese against Soviet-sponsored attack. A TASS account of this incident the same day asserted that "despite the protest of the chairman...the representative of the DRV occupied the speaker's platform and wasted a lot of time of the assembly with procedural questions." This was the first (and only) explicit criticism of the DRV or its representatives ever published by Soviet propaganda.

Effect of Khrushchev Ouster: This steady decay of relations between the two parties came to a halt with Khrushchev's fall, and matters began gradually to improve thereafter. A few days after Khrushchev's overthrow, the chief of the DRV commercial mission in Paris, [redacted] equivocated when asked where Hanoi stood in the Sino-Soviet dispute, asserted that North

Vietnam was close "geographically" to China, and added that Moscow had been leaving the field open to the Chinese in Southeast Asia. It would appear that the North Vietnamese were now fervently hoping for a change in Soviet policies toward the United States favorable to Hanoi's interests; the DRV had, in fact, a more pressing need for such a Soviet change than any other member of the old anti-Khrushchev Chinese coalition, in view of the military dangers demonstrated by the U.S. Gulf of Tonkin attacks.

One aspect of the revised DRV strategy to fit the "new situation" was the suppression of North Vietnamese propaganda directly critical of the Soviet Union. On 3 November, a North Vietnamese party and government delegation led by Premier Pham Van Dong left Hanoi for Moscow to attend the Soviet revolutionary anniversary and sound out the new CPSU leadership. Immediately after Pham Van Dong's return from Moscow, the party journal Hoc Tap recalled copies of the November issue which had already been distributed in order to replace an article highly offensive to the CPSU with a nonpolemical article. Along the same line, the North Vietnamese are said to have compelled the Chinese to agree to revision of the original list of invitees to a Vietnam Solidarity Conference in Hanoi in November to add Soviet and East European representatives to an overwhelmingly pro-Chinese gathering.

The North Vietnamese attitude toward the USSR at the end of November, after Pham's return home, was reflected in comments at the time by a DRV Deputy Foreign Minister [redacted] The DRV official stated that although his government had "areas of agreement" with the Chinese, it also "certainly had differences" with them, and that North Vietnam wanted to cultivate good relations with the

Soviet Union.* (The Chinese by then had made it clear that they did not.) The deputy minister added, however, that even after Pham's visit the Soviet position was still not clear to the DRV, and that "further observations" were needed badly. He expressed puzzlement at claims by Brezhnev and Kosygin that there would be no change in Soviet policy, and hypothesized that such statements were a "domestic political move for the transition period, since Khrushchev's policies have taken root for ten years, and it is difficult to make radical changes quickly."** As will be noted,

**The North Vietnamese were probably all the more anxious for a rapprochement with the USSR because of the degree to which their past isolation from the Soviets had made them vulnerable to uncompensated Chinese pressures. In August and September 1964 DRV representatives were concerned to assert the independence and originality of North Vietnamese theory and practice (implicitly, independence from Maoist doctrine), and in December the Chinese were to reassert Mao's claim to exclusive originality in revolutionary theory. This dispute over CCP pretensions to have provided the decisive guidelines and inspiration for the Lao Dong party--as for everyone else--has gone on ever since. (See DD/I Intelligence Memorandum, "Peiping-Hanoi Differences over Doctrine and Strategy for the Viet Cong," RSS No. 0006/65, 2 April 1965.)*

***Seventeen months later, in April 1966, an important DRV official told a high-level Viet Cong gathering that "we do not hold the view"--which he explicitly attributed to the Chinese--"that the Soviet leadership is as revisionist as the leadership under Khrushchev, or that it is somewhat more dangerous than Khrushchev." It was the North Vietnamese view, instead, "that the Soviet leadership still contains some revisionists, some indecisive elements, and also active elements."*

very similar surmises were voiced privately by the North Koreans and publicly by Indonesian and Japanese party leaders in late 1964 and early 1965, raising the possibility that some CPSU representatives had been passing private assurances to this effect.

In any event, Pham Van Dong evidently received sufficient indication in Moscow of an evolution in CPSU policy toward both the DRV and the United States to encourage Hanoi to maintain a conciliatory posture toward the USSR over the next two months despite increasing Chinese pressure to abandon it. (On 10, 11 and 12 January 1965, for example, Radio Peking rebroadcast in Vietnamese the text of the CCP's November Red Flag editorial "Why Khrushchev Fell" which contained Peking's first great attack on "Khrushchevism without Khrushchev.") By that time, the new Soviet leadership had gratified Hanoi by announcing that a permanent office of the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam would be opened in the USSR in early 1965. In January, the first concrete evidence of new Soviet military aid was forthcoming, when photography revealed the presence of Soviet self-propelled antiaircraft guns in North Vietnam for the first time. These weapons may have been delivered by a Soviet cargo ship which arrived in Haiphong on 22 December. Soviet propaganda meanwhile reminded Hanoi that it was "the allied forces of the socialist community" which "assure with certainty the security of each socialist country in the face of the plots of the imperialist reactionaries," as a Moscow broadcast in Vietnamese put it on 5 January.

To recapitulate: the change in the Soviet posture toward the DRV which was well under way by the turn of the year appears to have had two basic causes. First, a consensus of the new Soviet leadership--perhaps not all the new Soviet leaders, but surely a dominant majority among them--had a view of the value to the Soviet state of the good will of the DRV--and of all the Communist "radicals" who could be impressed by Soviet support for the DRV--which was fundamentally different from that held by Khrushchev, particularly in his last two years. The point is not that Khrushchev was stupid and his successors were intelligent, but rather that different sets of

values and priorities were involved. A majority of the new Soviet leaders wished to regain influence in Hanoi and elsewhere among the anti-U.S. radicals in general because they regarded the recapture of such influence as an intrinsic good sufficiently valuable in itself to be worth the modifications of Soviet posture toward the United States--and the associated risks, which they hoped would be minimal--that this might entail. Khrushchev had not felt this to be so. One of the reasons why he was removed was precisely because he did not think so. The decision to cultivate Ho Chi Minh--with all the consequences that have followed--thus rested at bottom on a difference of world-view: it was an ideological decision.

Secondly, it seems likely that this decision was made more easily because its consequences were not fully foreseen. It is probable that the Soviet Union at the end of 1964 estimated that the North Vietnamese enterprise in South Vietnam was entering its final phase leading to complete victory, and the USSR may well have hoped that the United States would not increase its commitment to seek to reverse this trend (as it in fact was to do), but instead would reconcile itself to the prospect of eventual Communist domination of the south and seek a graceful way out. It is possible that there was a minority in the Soviet leadership (including Kosygin, for example) who nevertheless retained something of Khrushchev's reluctance to become involved in Vietnam at all--because of the possible risks, because of the possible long-term effect on relations with the United States, and because of the possible eventual effect on the Soviet allocation of resources.* If so, those in the leadership majority who in any case took a more complacent view of a deterioration of Soviet-American relations (such as Brezhnev and Shelepin),

**Some of the contrasting views of Kosygin, Brezhnev, and some of the other Soviet leaders are discussed below, pages 80-101. A forthcoming CAESAR study will examine in greater detail differences between Kosygin and Brezhnev on Vietnam, relations with the United States, and other matters.*

and who were particularly eager to win North Vietnamese favor, would have been able to argue to waverers that the USSR could gain credit cheaply in Vietnam and among all the Communist radicals without military or political risk of any kind because the U.S. was about to accede to a DRV victory. Once the Soviet Union was indeed involved, and the United States refused to withdraw but on the contrary began bombing the north and multiplying its forces in the south, the relative weight within the Soviet leadership of those who wished to cultivate the Communist anti-U.S. radicals at the expense of Soviet-American relations became more and more predominant. From now on it seemed impossible to draw back, and in any case the rewards for going on, as will be seen, were to become more and more enticing.

The Kosygin February Visit: The decisive watershed in Soviet - North Vietnamese relations was the visit of a Soviet delegation led by Premier Kosygin to Hanoi in early February 1965. Kosygin came prepared to offer the DRV an important package of economic and military assistance, including most notably MIG fighter planes and SA-2 missiles for air defense. In return, the Soviets expected and the North Vietnamese were prepared to offer certain minimal political concessions.

The first of these pertained to Khrushchev's scheduled 26-party Moscow preparatory meeting for a world Communist conference, a meeting which the Soviets by now had postponed from December until March. Unlike other parties in the anti-Khrushchev alliance, the North Vietnamese had never committed themselves publicly to boycott this meeting, and after its postponement, in December and January, they apparently gave some Soviet supporters grounds to hope that they might agree to attend. Kosygin was informed in Hanoi, however, that the Lao Dong party could not go that far in offending the Chinese, but that it would promise to abstain from all criticism of the March meeting, regardless of Chinese behavior. This was probably as much of a concession as the CPSU had expected to obtain.

The First "Unity of Action" Proposal: A second immediate concession to Soviet desires--which also coincided with DRV interests--was North Vietnamese agreement to join in urging upon the Chinese a plan

for a joint statement by North Vietnam, Communist China, and the Soviet Union, to serve as a "warning" to the United States. According to subsequent Soviet private statements, the North Vietnamese welcomed this idea when it was put forward by Kosygin in Hanoi, and on 22 February themselves prepared and forwarded a draft statement to Moscow and Peking. The Soviets of course accepted the statement, while the Chinese predictably rejected it, since acceptance would tend to undermine the effort they were by then engaged in throughout the world to depict the USSR as a perfidious lackey of imperialism. Gratified by the success of this ploy in exposing Chinese recalcitrance to the North Vietnamese, the Soviets were to revive it in April--with similar results. By the fall of 1965, the CPSU had expanded on this proposal, and was floating a suggestion for a meeting of all bloc countries to coordinate aid for North Vietnam. The Soviets publicly and privately exploited the Chinese refusal of all such proposals to weaken the Chinese position and strengthen that of the CPSU in the eyes of all the Communist "radicals" with a vested interest in unity of action against the United States: most notably, North Vietnam, North Korea, the Communist Party of Japan, the pro-Chinese Communist Party of India (Leftist), and Cuba.

Abortive Soviet Military Proposals: In addition, the Soviet Union made two concrete military proposals to Communist China soon after Kosygin's return from Hanoi. On 25 February, the USSR requested the CPR to grant it an "air corridor" to North Vietnam--that is, blanket authorization for large numbers of Soviet transport aircraft to overfly China back and forth over a given route ferrying military equipment to the DRV. Shortly thereafter, the USSR asked for the use of one or more air bases in South China, near the Vietnamese border, to be manned by Soviet personnel and apparently to be used for the assembly of MIG fighters shipped by rail from the Soviet Union. Both requests were adamantly refused by the Chinese, and these refusals were probably helpful to the CPSU in its political struggle with the CCP for Hanoi's sympathies. Also of some help to the Soviets in this regard was Chinese obstinacy in temporarily obstructing and delaying rail transit through China, from March through June 1965, of

Soviet SAM technicians and SAM components for North Vietnamese air defense. On the other side of the ledger, however, the Chinese soon drew DRV attention to the Soviet reluctance to ship weapons to North Vietnam by sea because of Moscow's desire to avoid a confrontation with the United States.

Soviets Burn Fingers on Negotiations: On the whole, the Soviets clearly had the better of the Chinese in the mutual recriminations over Soviet military assistance to Hanoi in the spring of 1965. On another subject, however, the Soviets simultaneously lost a point to the Chinese in Vietnamese eyes. According to Chinese assertions which the Soviets have not denied, immediately after Kosygin's return to Moscow the Soviet Government formally proposed to the DRV and CPR the convening of an international conference on Vietnam, and meanwhile made contacts with the French toward this end. The Soviets apparently took this action because the North Vietnamese had previously been toying with the notion that the United States might be willing to use such a conference as a face-saving device to cover a U.S. withdrawal from South Vietnam and the establishment of some mechanism which would assure the gradual advent to power there of the National Liberation Front. The North Vietnamese had evidently not yet completely abandoned this notion by the time Kosygin left Hanoi, since the USSR would not have taken the position it did in the face of unambiguous DRV opposition, at a time when it was ardently courting the Lao Dong party in other ways. By March, however, the DRV leadership had concluded from the U.S. bombings of North Vietnam and other U.S. actions that the United States had no intention of capitulating to their wishes, either openly or tacitly. Without such a prior U.S. intention, the North Vietnamese saw no purpose in any conference, and moreover came to agree with the Chinese that Soviet soundings for a conference were themselves

positively harmful as tending to create political pressures on the DRV itself for concessions. In March, Vietnamese Communist representatives therefore criticized the Soviet initiatives for a Vietnam settlement. Chastened by this experience, the Soviet Union has ever since been at pains to remain within the bounds of North Vietnamese policy on this issue and to take no independent initiatives on Vietnam negotiations in contacts with the West.

To sum up: In their first six months in power the new Soviet leaders had made considerable progress in their dealings with the North Vietnamese. The worsening of party relations had been halted, high-level contacts had taken place in Moscow and Hanoi, and a foothold for Soviet influence had been obtained which might be improved as the promised Soviet military equipment and technicians arrived and as the North Vietnamese became dependent upon the continued flow of such help. The DRV would not attend the Moscow preparatory meeting of Communist parties in March, but it had promised not to criticize it. The CPSU had scored off the Chinese by exposing CCP unwillingness to cooperate with Soviet political and military proposals ostensibly intended to aid the DRV, and the reiteration of such "unity of action" proposals promised to be a useful avenue for the expansion of Soviet influence among Communist anti-U.S. radicals in several countries.

On the other hand, the USSR had had two unpleasant surprises in February and March: first, the U.S. bombing of North Vietnam--which suggested that a long and possibly dangerous war rather than an imminent victory was in prospect; second, the hostile DRV reaction to Soviet initiatives on negotiations--which warned the Soviets that they would

henceforth be prisoners of DRV policy on this issue. Never before had the Soviet Union engaged its prestige so far in support of a belligerent over whose decisions the USSR had so little control.

Ever since February 1965, although the Soviets may well have preferred (on balance) that the war and its associated military risks be ended, they have taken no serious political risks to try to make it end (particularly since they have had no assurance that they would succeed if they did try), and have therefore concentrated primarily on a very successful effort to utilize the war to reduce the influence of both the Chinese Communists and the United States throughout the world.*

D. Initial Soviet Efforts to Neutralize North Koreans

During the same six-month period between Khrushchev's fall and the March meeting the CPSU took

*However, even the degree of support for the idea of negotiations which the USSR has periodically allowed itself cautiously to display (notably in February 1965, January 1966, and January 1967) has encouraged some scepticism among the Lao Dong leadership about the sincerity of CPSU devotion to the North Vietnamese cause. This North Vietnamese attitude persisted despite the fact that the DRV itself eventually became more forthcoming in holding out the possibility of negotiations in exchange for a U.S. bombing cessation.

its first steps to improve relations with the North Koreans, who had gone considerably further than the North Vietnamese in outspoken support of the Chinese position and in waging open polemics with Moscow. The Korean Communists were delighted at Khrushchev's removal, and according to one report, Kim Il-sung is said to have summoned the Soviet Ambassador shortly thereafter to urge that the CPSU seize the occasion to repudiate publicly the errors of Khrushchev's policies and to seek agreement with the Chinese. While the North Koreans may well have urged this, they did not expect such drastic action; they were instead privately hopeful of an eventual evolution of Soviet policy in the direction they favored.

On 2 November, the leaders of the Chosen Soren--the Korean Communist organization in Japan directly controlled by the North Korean central committee--adopted a private policy decision reflecting judgments apparently passed to them by Pyongyang the week before. The Chosen Soren held that Khrushchev's ouster "may" bring better Soviet relations with the Chinese, but that a drastic change in the Soviet stand should not be expected "for there is the problem of Soviet prestige and the attitudes of the European Communist Parties." Nevertheless, the Chosen Soren did expect eventual change, which probably would be a "gradual process leading to correction of revisionist errors." This view thus agreed with that expressed by the DRV Deputy Foreign Minister a few weeks later.

In early November, a North Korean party delegation went to Moscow for talks with the CPSU during the Soviet anniversary celebrations. North Korean public statements during this period made it clear that they were holding fast to the two principal demands they had been making of the CPSU for several

years: a fundamental revision of Soviet policies toward the United States to expedite a world-wide "anti-imperialist struggle," and an end to all Soviet attempts to dictate to the North Korean party or to interfere in its internal affairs. A Nodong Sinmun editorial on 7 November thus asserted that "the objective situation demands that the anti-imperialist revolutionary forces unite close and wage a stauncher struggle against the U.S. imperialists' schemes of aggression and war provocation." At the same time, Nodong Sinmun emphasized "noninterference in each other's internal affairs" as a principle which must be observed by Communists as a prerequisite for bloc unity. The same points were made in a 6 November Soviet anniversary speech in Pyongyang by a vice chairman of the North Korean party, in which an audience including the Soviet Ambassador was told of the need for a "more resolute" fight and for "heavier" blows against the United States.

On 3 December, after the North Korean delegation had returned from Moscow, another Nodong Sinmun editorial indicated some dissatisfaction with what it apparently considered the continuing ambiguity of the CPSU position, warning that "the indiscrete act of clinging to the old line which has gone bankrupt in life and egging on others to follow it must be resolutely rejected." The North Korean party organ insisted that "we cannot talk about the victory of the cause of all peoples for peace, national independence, and social progress apart from the struggle against imperialism led by U.S. imperialism," and demanded that the bloc and all revolutionary forces "put pressure on and deal blows to the imperialists from all directions."

Other North Korean editorials in December 1964 praised the Japanese Communist party's expulsion of "revisionist" leaders (who in fact were being backed by the CPSU), praised Stalin, and denounced revisionism repeatedly; but Khrushchev-era direct attacks on the CPSU were not resumed, and Pyongyang continued to hold the door open for a "strengthening of the unity of the socialist camp" upon further improvement of CPSU behavior. In late December, a North Korean trade official told a visiting Japanese businessman that North Korea and China did not necessarily agree on all matters, and added that the North Korean party leadership, though sympathetic toward China's "general position" in the Sino-Soviet dispute, was critical of the fact that the Chinese had helped expand the dispute into the sphere of state relations.

Soviet Premier Kosygin's visit to North Korea in February 1965, like his visit to North Vietnam on the same journey, marked a turning point for the CPSU. One outcome of Kosygin's talks with Kim Il-sung was a mutual understanding that there would be no further public attacks exchanged between the two parties. Specifically, the North Koreans promised not to criticize the 26-party Moscow March meeting, although they, like the North Vietnamese, would not attend. Bloc diplomats in Pyongyang later asserted that Kosygin discussed with Kim the resumption of both Soviet economic aid and the Soviet deliveries of advanced weapons to North Korea which Khrushchev had halted in December 1962, and it seems likely that Kosygin did hold out the prospect of some such military aid, although no concrete agreement was yet reached. North Korean editorials during the visit discovered once again the "moral and material support" the Soviets had given North Korea in the past. Soon after the visit, on 19 February, Han Tok-su, the

chairman of the Chosen Soren, addressing a meeting of his central committee in Tokyo, strongly called for renewed solidarity between North Korea and the Soviet Union, termed the USSR "North Korea's brother," and added that the Soviet Union, as well as Communist China, had common objectives with North Korea. A few weeks later, Han remarked privately that North Korea would follow a policy independent from that of China. Han's statements represented a considerable advance from the cautious position the Chosen Soren had taken in November 1964, and almost certainly reflected the modification in opinion in Pyongyang in the interval. The North Korean party by March 1965 had thus already shifted its position a great deal, although it was subsequently to move much further.

E. Soviet Temporizing with the Japanese, Indonesians, Indians

In the same initial six-month period, the CPSU found the going slower in its efforts to neutralize the three leading non-bloc supporters of the CCP in Asia: the Japanese and Indonesian Communist parties and the schismatic left wing of the Indian Communist party. CPSU progress was hindered in these three cases largely because in each case, at the moment of Khrushchev's fall, the Soviets were engaged in organizational activities hostile to the party concerned which the CPSU subsequently was reluctant or unable to give up completely. In the case of the Japanese party, this was CPSU support for dissident Japanese "revisionist" leaders expelled from the JCP; in the case of the Indonesian party, it was covert Soviet financial support of Indonesian moderate leftists hostile to the PKI; and in the case of the pro-Chinese left wing of the Indian party, it was CPSU identification with the Dange right-wing leadership of the party at a time when the left wing was in the process of formally seceding to form a separate party. As

will be seen, the Soviets initially made the least progress with the Japanese and the most progress with the Indians.

1. The Japanese Communists from the moment of Khrushchev's ouster began to make repeated public statements presenting their demands upon the new CPSU leadership: a fundamental change in the CPSU international line and a cessation of Soviet interference in Japanese Communist affairs. At the same time, they made a number of statements referring to divisions within the Soviet leadership and suggesting--at times fairly explicitly--that some of the new CPSU leaders were more sympathetic to their viewpoint than others.

On 16 October, party secretary general Miyamoto (whom the Soviets had attacked personally in August) announced that the CPSU leaders must now "fundamentally review their attitude not only toward our party but also toward other questions both at home and abroad," and demanded an "over-all revision of Khrushchev's course," including "a basic change in the Soviet attitude toward the United States and Britain." On 25 October, in apparent reaction to the initial CPSU blanket public assertions that previous Soviet policies would not be abandoned, the JCP organ Akahata published statements by its chief editor, Doki, to the effect that the CPSU would not "all at once turn its revisionist course over to the correct one," since "some of the Soviet leaders led by Khrushchev" agreed with his line. (Emphasis added.) Nevertheless, he expressed hope that the CPSU would now reexamine its revisionist line, and would cease its intervention in the affairs of the JCP.

On 5 November, JCP Chairman Sanzo Nosaka made an unusual statement alluding to a difference of opinion within the Chinese camp--and probably, within the JCP itself--over the new Soviet leadership. Praising Khrushchev's removal and denouncing his policies, Nosaka "hoped that new leaders of the CPSU would learn from Khrushchev's failure and return to the road of genuine Marxism-Leninism," and urged his audience "to wait and see which road the new leaders of the Soviet Union will follow." Nosaka also stated:

> Both extremist views were wrong--the one considering that Khrushchev's stepping down would have no effect on the current revisionist trend, the other considering that the struggle against revisionism was over and there would be plain sailing in the future.

Nosaka's description of the first "extremist view" corresponded to the position taken by Albania, which had already explicitly denied that the hold of revisionism on the CPSU leadership had been shaken by Khrushchev's fall and had made clear its great displeasure at the momentary Chinese halt in attacks on the CPSU and the Chou En-lai exploratory visit to Moscow for talks from which the Albanians would be excluded.

It is also likely, however, that Nosaka was alluding to forces within his own party which were opposed to a rapprochement with the CPSU on any terms. Such extremist forces--which emerged into the open when the JCP changed its position dramatically in 1966--were mentioned [redacted] in 1964 and 1965 as being strongly represented both in the central party apparatus and in certain of the party provincial committees. In particular, the Yamaguchi Prefectural Committee--which was to be purged in 1966--appears to have sought unsuccessfully at the Ninth JCP Congress, in late November 1964, to push the party line further to the left than the party leadership was willing to permit.

By December, however, even less extreme JCP leaders such as Nosaka and Miyamoto appeared to be losing hope that the CPSU would make important concessions to the JCP, and Japanese Communist statements implied that persons in the CPSU leadership upon whom the JCP was counting had not been able to influence CPSU policy sufficiently. On 18 December, Miyamoto declared, according to NCNA, that "there are some people" in the CPSU "who, as time goes on, have come out to say that they attach importance to our party's proposal for prompt concerted action against imperialism," but added that continued CPSU insistence on participation contradicted these professions. On 28 December, an Akahata article cited

post-Khrushchev Soviet press attacks on the JCP as reflecting the views of "the new CPSU leadership, or at least part of it," and repeatedly attacked the Soviets by criticizing the position taken by "certain members of the CPSU" or "a part of the leadership of the CPSU." (Emphasis added.)

The major disappointment for the JCP was apparently the decision of the post-Khrushchev CPSU leadership not to abandon the Japanese Communist dissident movement outright to appease the JCP. Not only the JCP, but the dissidents themselves had thought the CPSU might do this, and dissident leader Yoshio Shiga in early November went to the Soviet Union to attempt to forestall such action. On the day Shiga departed, Akahata took public and angry notice of the Shiga mission, terming it a "desperate attempt to show off the existence of their antiparty renegade group and to gain continued support from abroad." Akahata threatened the CPSU: "If any foreigner thinks that there is still some use for these wretched party-selling revisionists, he will also be subjected to severe historical censure."

This threat was published five days after the Soviet trade union newspaper Trud on 30 October had published explicit praise for "the Communists Shiga and Suzuki" as well as an open attack upon "the present leadership" of the JCP. Although such direct attacks on the JCP were not repeated by Moscow, the Soviet radio continued to praise the Japanese dissident leaders--who had already been expelled from the party--as Communists in good standing. Meanwhile, the Soviets through their local friends began organization of a new Japanese bookstore and a new Japan-Soviet Friendship Society to substitute for corresponding propaganda organizations controlled by the JCP.

The JCP responded by excluding the CPSU--and even Soviet correspondents--from the Ninth JCP Congress in late November, which duly ratified the expulsion from the party of Shiga and other pro-CPSU dissidents. Although Shiga and other dissidents thereupon wished to form a rival Communist party, the Soviets apparently sought to dissuade them; rather than commit itself formally to a splinter

party, the CPSU reportedly wished the dissidents to unify on an informal basis, acquire strength, and build up the maximum possible pressure on the JCP leadership to force concessions to the CPSU. When the Shiga group nevertheless gave itself the title of a Communist party,* the CPSU and its friends did not recognize it as such, although the Soviets continued to finance Shiga. At the same time, the CPSU greatly increased its cultivation of the Japanese Socialist party and the Socialist-controlled trade union federation Sohyo, hoping both to increase Soviet influence within the Japanese left generally and to exert pressure on the JCP from a second direction.

By the time of the March 1965 Communist preparatory meeting in Moscow, the JCP was making frequent, direct attacks on the CPSU for its subversive activity, and was even seeking covertly to influence the Korean Chosen Soren organization in Japan against taking a softer line toward the CPSU in response to the evolution of the North Korean policy. In contrast to CPSU practice under Khrushchev, however, the Soviets were not attacking the JCP in kind, and instead had begun to appeal for JCP unity with the CPSU in support of the North Vietnamese war effort.** Meanwhile, one of the Japanese dissident leaders, Shigeo Kamiyama, was nominated in March to oppose JCP Chairman Sanzo Nosaka in the June elections to the Japanese Diet. This election contest was intended to frighten and impress the JCP. Its outcome was just the opposite, and was to have an important effect upon CPSU tactics toward the Japanese party.

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*The "Communist Party of Japan (Voice of Japan)." Shiga's publication was entitled Voice of Japan.

**Since the CPSU would not respond directly, the JCP in the spring of 1965 began to print polemical responses to old Soviet anti-JCP articles published during the Khrushchev regime.

2. The Indonesian Communist party (PKI) was a much more serious problem for the CPSU, both before and after Khrushchev's ouster, because it was far more important in its own country and much closer to total power than was the JCP. By the time Khrushchev fell, the Soviets had long since begun to regard the advance of the PKI toward power as a real danger to Soviet interests, and the CPSU was seeking, rather futilely, to prevent the PKI from further increasing its influence over Sukarno.

Before Sukarno left home for his last talks with Khrushchev in late September 1964, the PKI reportedly "made it clear" to him that the CPSU was intensely hostile to the PKI and meant to do it harm. This prophecy was well borne out during Khrushchev's conversations with Sukarno, when, according to several sources, the Soviet leader vigorously protested PKI influence on Indonesian foreign policy and charged that the PKI was now putting "lies" into the mouths of some Indonesian government leaders.

In short, at the moment of Khrushchev's fall Sukarno and the Indonesian regime, in part because of PKI influence, were moving increasingly closer to Communist China and away from the Soviet Union, despite the huge Soviet military investment in Indonesia. The Soviets were seeking, thus far vainly, to halt this trend through attacks on the main source of PKI power, its alliance with Sukarno; and the PKI knew this. Since Sukarno was unpredictable, the PKI could never be certain that continued Soviet pressure of this kind might not eventually win concessions harmful to its interests. After Khrushchev fell, the Indonesian Communists therefore had good objective reasons to desire that Sino-Soviet relations improve, that Soviet foreign policy be modified to coincide with the violently anti-American Chinese and PKI line, and that PKI-CPSU interests be harmonized.

For these reasons, the PKI mixed joy at Khrushchev's removal with insistence that the CPSU reverse its policies, and also initially showed slightly greater optimism than did the Japanese party that real concessions might be forthcoming. On 16 October, PKI Chairman Aidit briefly expressed

pleasure at Khrushchev's removal, and on 25 October, followed this up with a complaint that "difficult barriers hindering a fresh approach between the Soviet Union and the Chinese" still existed "because the CPSU still adhered to the principles adopted at the 20th, 21st, and 22nd congresses"--that is, still said it did. Aidit immediately added, however, that the Soviet reaffirmation of the decisions of these congresses could be explained by the fact that a new party congress would be needed to repeal them formally. Here he took the same line as that used privately by the North Vietnamese and North Koreans, and appeared to be hinting that the old symbols could be retained for the time being, if the CPSU wished to save face, provided that the reality of policy was changed.

On 3 November, Aidit held a discussion with the Chinese Ambassador to Indonesia, Yao Chung-ming, in which Yao is reported to have told Aidit that there was still doubt that relations between the USSR and China would improve. As a result of this conversation, the PKI is said to have instructed its cadres soon afterward to withhold any pronouncements of faith in the new Soviet leadership until its policies were made known--and were known to be in agreement with PKI policies.

Aidit, however, appears to have had difficulty holding his own public pronouncements within these guidelines, and continued frequently to display more optimism regarding the Soviets than the Chinese would have wished. It is likely that he was given private assurances by the CPSU in this period to whet his expectations. A Soviet "friendship" delegation arrived in Indonesia in early November for contacts with "political leaders and executives of mass and youth organizations," and hard on its heels came a Soviet trade union delegation for talks with SOBSI, the PKI's trade union federation. On 11 November, Aidit received Soviet Ambassador Mikhaylov, who had just returned from the USSR, and who presumably conveyed to him a message from the CPSU. The PKI released a public version of statements said to have been made by Aidit to Mikhaylov, in which Aidit again praised the CPSU's removal of Khrushchev from office, called

for a "new approach" between Communist parties, demanded the postponement of the December 1964 preparatory conference, and expressed the "conviction" that the change in Soviet leadership would help Indonesian-Soviet relations.

On the following day, Aidit made a public speech in which he attempted to put further pressure upon the CPSU. Aidit said that his party warmly welcomed the "praiseworthy action" of the CPSU in removing Khrushchev; that obviously this had been done not because of Khrushchev's age or sickness but because of "the bankruptcy of his domestic and foreign policies"; that the PKI had not yet received "sufficient materials regarding Khrushchev's mistakes," but that obviously these included his cult of the individual, his befriending of the imperialists, and his quarreling "with the socialist states and Marxist-Leninist parties."

Aidit now made an unusual attempt to counter publicly the pressure then being placed upon the CPSU by the European parties of the Soviet camp. He declared that "revisionist leaders in various Communist parties are attempting to blame the CPSU for removing Khrushchev in an undemocratic and improper manner by its central committee." He stated that "we hope that revisionist leaders will cease blaming the CPSU," and warned that those leaders would experience the same fate as Khrushchev unless they made "self-criticism regarding their past mistakes" and followed "the revolutionary Marxist-Leninist way." He also indicated that such self-criticism was "expected from the CPSU." He then declared that the removal of Khrushchev constituted merely "a thirty percent victory" over modern revisionism, that the struggle to crush revisionism would have to be continued, and that he hoped "that this struggle will be carried out together with the CPSU."

On the day after this, 13 November, Aidit made still another statement reiterating pressure upon the CPSU and expressing hope in the rehabilitation of the Soviet party. In an address on the anniversary of the Soviet revolution, he emphasized that "there are 13 socialist states,...not 14, because

Yugoslavia is not a socialist state"--contradicting a point which the Soviets had reiterated since Khrushchev's fall. Aidit insisted that the end of the Khrushchev era had brought about a "new situation" for which Indonesian Communists "must swiftly adjust their thoughts" by preparing to take advantage of "new opportunities in the Communist movement." Finally, he hinted strongly that these "opportunities" would develop as the result of further upheavals within the CPSU itself: only the CPSU, he said, could amend the resolutions of the 20th, 21st, and 22nd CPSU congresses, yet the world revolutionary movement was "demanding changes,"

> and they feel that the praiseworthy step taken by the Central Committee of the CPSU in removing Khrushchev is the start of larger and better changes, which certainly will take place.*

The "larger and better changes" by the CPSU which Aidit had in mind were both policy and personnel changes. In late October, [redacted] had

**The original version of this passage in Aidit's speech, altered in the official text as subsequently released by the PKI, expressed considerably more impatience with the CPSU for failing thus far to deliver these changes. In this version, as reported by NCNA back to Peking, Aidit noted that "the new leadership" of the CPSU had declared "that they would persist in the line laid down at the 20th, 21st, and 22nd congresses," added that the world's revolutionaries "demand that the line should be changed," and then asked plaintively: "Otherwise, why was it necessary to remove Khrushchev?" This version, which betrayed Aidit's uneasiness at the possibility that the Soviet line in fact would not be changed, was apparently subsequently replaced for public release by one expressing revolutionary optimism in the inevitability of changes by the CPSU or within the CPSU.*

reported that it was anticipated within the PKI central committee that there would be a gradual shift by the CPSU, carefully timed in stages so as to avert strong reaction, away from Khrushchev's line and back toward Stalinist policies. In the final stage the reversal of the decisions of the 22nd CPSU Congress was expected. The PKI was also said to see a "strong possibility" that in the process both Brezhnev and Kosygin would be replaced by "a single stronger leader." Who this Soviet leader was, on whom the PKI--like the Japanese party--was counting, was not spelled out. In late November, however, when Chinese Foreign Minister Chen Yi visited Indonesia, he is reported to have told Sukarno that the Soviet leadership was weak because of differences between Brezhnev and Kosygin, and that the strongest man on the scene was the "youngest man in the leadership group." Ten days before Chen Yi said this, Shelepin was elevated to full membership in the CPSU Presidium, bypassing the customary stage of candidate membership, and indeed became the youngest full member of the Presidium. It seems quite possible, in the light of other evidence to be discussed later, that Shelepin was one of the Soviet leaders upon whom the PKI and other Far Eastern radical Communist parties were relying to bring about an eventual return to Stalinist policies and a hard line toward the United States.

If so, the PKI was from the start much more sanguine about Shelepin and those who shared his views than were the Chinese--naturally so, since the PKI was primarily interested in a change in the substance of Soviet policies toward the United States, while the CCP was at least as interested also in obtaining humiliating Soviet concessions to Chinese aspirations to lead the world Communist movement which no Soviet leader was likely to grant. On 10 November--two days after Pravda had published the decisions of the Central Committee plenum including Shelepin's elevation--the PKI carried optimism regarding future CPSU policy to its most extraordinary length in the party organ Harian Rakjat, which published an article by a second-level PKI leader recently returned from Moscow that portrayed the CPSU as on the verge of (and even in the process of) renouncing Khrushchev's revisionist policies. Harian Rakjat claimed that the changes "at the top" had

been accompanied by "immediately tangible" changes in Soviet life, changes demanded by "the Soviet people themselves," who opposed Khrushchev's "trend of reversing the Great October Revolution." The article made the almost certainly false assertion that "twist and similar music" imported from the West and from Yugoslavia had been eradicated from "the Moscow air" since Khrushchev's fall. Harian Rakjat interpreted editorials published in the Soviet press since the ouster dealing with "the need for ideological education...and the mastery of revolutionary theories" as a "significant sign that promises new developments in Soviet life." The article emphasized that "since 19 October" the Soviet and Chinese parties had published no criticisms of each other (literally true in the sense of an absence of attacks by name, but misleading in failing to recognize the restatements of opposing positions by the two sides). All these "optimistic impressions," said the PKI writer, "strengthened my confidence in the creation of a new atmosphere in the interest of a glorious future." The tone of this article was in remarkable contrast to that of the Chinese Red Flag editorial "Why Khrushchev Fell" published two days later.

At about this time--on 17 and 18 November--the PKI leadership held policy discussions at which it was reportedly decided, among other things, that a new international Communist meeting was now "thinkable" but that it would have to await the completion of the "rehabilitation" of the Soviet party following changes in leadership. On 2 December, the CPSU formally invited the PKI to attend the Moscow preparatory conference rescheduled from 15 December to 1 March. On 18 December, Aidit handed Soviet Ambassador Mikhaylov a reply dated the 14th declining the invitation on the grounds that adequate preparations had not been made and that not all bloc countries would be present at the conference, but abstaining from further criticism. At the same time, Aidit accepted an invitation to visit the USSR for talks with the CPSU at a later date.

In mid-January, Aidit publicly repeated his party's position on the March meeting word for word, going no further. On 19 February, the CPSU sent another secret letter to the PKI renewing the appeal

to attend the meeting; this the PKI rejected in similar fashion five days later. When in March the meeting was actually convened, Harian Rakjat ran two remarkably mild editorials while it was in progress (declaring on 5 March that "real unity is best, and since real unity is not yet possible, formal unity must be maintained to the extent possible"). On 13 March, Harian Rakjat criticized the meeting's communique for not having attacked President Johnson by name, warned that relations with Albania must be "normalized" and those with Yugoslavia discontinued, and insisted that no subsequent world Communist conference could be held "without the assurance that everybody will attend." Even here, however, the PKI reaction was much more restrained than that of the Chinese party. On one point, Harian Rakjat specifically contradicted the Chinese position, by implying that an open Sino-Soviet polemic, while still essential, should nevertheless be "friendly and unhumiliating."

Meanwhile, the PKI did not resist CPSU efforts to increase contacts at many levels; particularly notable was a Harian Rakjat 6 March item describing the visit of another Soviet trade union delegation to SOBSI headquarters, discussing, as Harian Rakjat put it, "the effort to strengthen unity in WFTU within the framework of the common struggle against the imperialists." The Soviets at the Moscow March meeting encouraged the pro-CPSU Australian Communist Party to increase its own ties with the PKI; for unlike the Chinese, the Indonesian Communists had all along maintained relations with both Australian Communist organizations, the orthodox pro-CPSU one as well as the splinter party affiliated with Peking.

Finally, the Soviet propaganda now began to appeal to PKI interests by depicting the United States as becoming directly involved in Malaysia. Whereas previously Moscow had pictured Malaysia as a British neocolonialist project to which the U.S. gave only moral support, on 14 January Pravda charged "American politicians" with a desire to "turn Malaysia into a base for their venture in South Vietnam." On 11 March, the Soviet radio charged that the U.S. was "openly intervening with

its armed forces in the conflict between Malaysia and Indonesia" (after U.S. fighter planes had participated in exercises over Malaysian territory), and three days later claimed that "the Pentagon is doing everything to turn Malaysia into a stepping stone for aggression" in hopes of "intimidating Indonesia, which firmly denounces the U.S. aggression against the Vietnamese people."

Despite all the CPSU's efforts to propitiate the PKI, however, and despite the PKI's remarkably cautious and restrained posture toward the new CPSU leadership, all through this period there remained no doubt of the PKI's continued alliance with the Chinese party. PKI-controlled representatives at international Communist front meetings supported the Chinese and voted against the Soviets as before and Aidit and other PKI leaders continued to demand the prosecution of the international struggle against "modern revisionism" until complete victory. Aidit is said to have upbraided the Soviet ambassador on 31 December 1964 for the Soviet failure to prevent Malaysia from being chosen a UN Security Council member, and the PKI, like the Chinese, strongly supported Sukarno's subsequent withdrawal from the UN, which caused great Soviet unhappiness. PKI members in the fall of 1964 were required to submit written reports on all contacts with "revisionists"--i.e., Soviet bloc citizens--and "modern revisionism" was one of the "evils" PKI front organizations were privately instructed to fight early in 1965. The PKI maintained outspoken hostility to the Indian government--which the Soviets continued to cultivate--to the CPSU-backed Dange wing of the Indian Communist movement, and to the Yugoslavs, with whom the Soviets remained on fairly good terms. As already noted, the PKI publicly demanded that the CPSU conciliate Albania, and privately PKI leaders asserted, like the Chinese, that the CPSU should apologize to Hoxha.

Against this background, the CPSU had an extremely difficult task in seeking to conciliate the PKI, and in the months following the Moscow March meeting the Soviets were to lose some ground again. In part this reflected the influence of the harsher Chinese attacks upon the CPSU, to which the PKI was

sensitive. Such incidents as the Soviet police suppression of the Chinese-led March demonstration at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow also evoked a hostile response from Aidit and the PKI, since Indonesian Communist students in Moscow were involved in this demonstration. Sukarno's continued personal drift toward the Chinese and away from the Soviets was also an important consideration for the PKI.

Probably most important of all, however, was Indonesian Communist receipt, by the spring of 1965, of documentary evidence of past CPSU duplicity toward the PKI. For the Soviets in the fall of 1964, while making overtures to the PKI, had simultaneously been furnishing covert financial support to Adam Malik and other leaders of the leftist Murba Party who at the time were conducting a violent public campaign against the PKI, using an anti-Communist front known as the Committee for the Support of Sukarnoism (BPS).* This Soviet activity was initiated under Khrushchev, but was continued under the new Soviet leadership. By November and early December 1964 the PKI was very much on the defensive against this anti-Communist campaign, and was considerably alarmed. The PKI was rescued in mid-December by Sukarno, who banned the BPS; it has been reported without confirmation that Chen Yi, during his visit to Djakarta in late November, at PKI request urged Sukarno to do this. While the PKI was aware all along of past Murba Party ties with the Soviet Union, the Indonesian party leadership is reported [redacted] to have received documentary proof of Soviet treachery only many weeks after the event. It is conceivable that this evidence was given the PKI by the Chinese Communists. The charge that the CPSU had been intriguing with Indonesian "Trotskyites" (the usual PKI way of referring to the Murba Party) against the PKI was publicly mentioned for the first time by the Albanians in late February, was surfaced in a Chinese major editorial on 24 March, and was to be reiterated many times thereafter.

**The PKI may well have believed that the United States was also covertly supporting this movement, and may conceivably have gone on from this assumption to draw the erroneous conclusion that here was a case of direct Soviet-U.S. collusion against the PKI.*

3. The Indian Communists offered the CPSU a problem of a totally different nature, and here the Soviets made considerable progress. At the moment Khrushchev fell, the two warring halves of the Indian Communist Party (CPI) were in the final stages of a long-drawn-out process of formal separation. The left wing of the party, long close to the Chinese and vehemently anti-Khrushchev, held a congress in Calcutta two weeks after the fall of the CPSU first secretary to formalize its organization as a separate party and to assert its claim to the party name. Because Khrushchev had just been ousted, and because many of the most extreme leaders of the CPI left wing were arrested by the Indian Government immediately before the Calcutta congress convened and were therefore unable to control the congress decisions, the new CPI/Leftist (CPI/L)* from the start took a much more cautious and moderate line toward the CPSU than might otherwise have been expected. The CPI/L leaders were jubilant at Khrushchev's fall, and some privately predicted that sooner or later Khrushchev's successors would themselves be replaced by men upholding the "correct Marxist-Leninist line." Immediately after the congress, the new CPI/L Central Committee dispatched a message to the CPSU appealing for recognition as the official Indian Communist party and demanding the CPI seat at any world Communist meeting that might be arranged. The CPI/L followed this up by sending politburo members to visit the Soviet and East European embassies in New Delhi. While the Soviets could not grant the CPI/L the formal recognition it craved, the Soviet and Chinese attitudes were both affected by the conciliatory CPI/L approach to the CPSU.

If the CPI leftists were overjoyed at Khrushchev's removal, the right wing of the party, led by CPI Chairman Dange, was alarmed and infuriated, and soon began peppering the CPSU with public statements begging the Soviets to prove that Khrushchev's

**After their split was formalized, the leftist and rightist Communist organizations each called themselves the Communist Party of India. To avoid confusion, Western observers began referring to them as the CPI/Leftist and CPI/Rightist, titles not used by the Communists themselves.*

ouster was not a "concession to the dogmatic, adventurist and chauvinist line of the Chinese Government" and warning the CPSU that "it would be a serious error to underline only [Khrushchev's] mistakes and keep silent about his achievements." The right-wing leadership of the CPI had committed itself inextricably, in the eyes of both the Indian public and the rank-and-file of the party, to Khrushchev personally, to Khrushchev's policies, and to a line of relentless hostility to the Chinese party. The Dange leadership of the CPI/R had isolated itself completely from all the radical Communist parties of the Far East whom the CPSU now seemed to wish to conciliate; the North Vietnamese, North Koreans, Indonesians, and Japanese were all at one with the Chinese in publicly excoriating "the Dange clique" as a group of traitors who were forever beyond the pale. The Dange leadership, like that of other seriously split pro-Soviet parties elsewhere in the world, had a vested interest in the formal world schism toward which Khrushchev had been heading, which would have separated the CPSU permanently from the foreign and domestic Communist enemies of the CPI rightists and would thus have assured the latter of continued unwavering CPSU backing.

Instead, it gradually became evident that the new Soviet leadership was anxious to appease most of Dange's enemies, and to that end would gladly get rid of Dange himself if this were to become feasible. On 30 October, Dange had a talk about Khrushchev's fall with CPSU Secretary Ponomarev in Moscow, and the brief TASS account of this discussion spoke of "frankness" and "mutual understanding," in this case euphemisms for sharp and unresolved disagreement. S. G. Sardosai, a Dange henchman, meanwhile circulated within the Indian party a secret document highly critical of the Khrushchev ouster. Two weeks later, there were heated arguments between Soviet and CPI/R representatives behind the scenes at an international conference on peace in New Delhi; CPSU interests required that there be no criticism of the Chinese by the conference, particularly since Chou En-lai was at that moment in Moscow, while CPI/R interests required exactly the opposite. Throughout the fall and winter of 1964, CPI/R party organs continued to

attack Peking directly, in marked contrast to the new CPSU line. In December, references to the Chinese were excised from the Pravda account of a resolution adopted by the CPI/R Seventh Party Congress.

This Congress, however, was organized by the Dange leadership as the CPI/R counterpart of the CPI/L Congress held the month before, and the Rightist Communists were anxious that it receive the maximum international recognition as the meeting of the legitimate Communist Party of India; consequently, Dange was obliged to conciliate the CPSU by suppressing all further attacks on the Khrushchev ouster. In return, the Congress was attended by Ponomarev and delegates from many pro-Soviet European parties; but the pro-Soviet Ceylonese party (itself the product of a major split and therefore in a similar position to the CPI/R) was the only Far Eastern party willing to attend. At the Congress, the Soviets made it clear that they wished the CPI/R to adopt a conciliatory posture toward the Indian "parallel party," and that they wanted a somewhat harsher line toward the Indian bourgeoisie than the one Khrushchev had sanctioned for the Indian Communists.

From the Soviet point of view, Dange remained an impediment in every way, and his tenure in office a continued advantage for the Chinese. He was anathema to parties like the North Vietnamese;* he was utterly unacceptable to leaders of the CPI/L now otherwise more favorably disposed to the CPSU; he was disliked by several other leaders of the CPI/R eager to conciliate the CPI/L; he was under a cloud because of allegations of treachery in his youth; and even now, his close ties with the Indian Government made it questionable how faithfully he would apply the harder domestic line being urged upon the CPI/R by the CPSU. Dange went to Moscow

*There is evidence that at some time prior to May 1965--perhaps either during Kosygin's February visit to Hanoi or during Le Duan's April visit to Moscow--North Vietnamese party leaders in private conversations with the CPSU attacked both the CPI/R and the conciliatory Soviet policy toward the Indian Government.

again after his party's December Congress, and returned in January despondent at his cool reception. Soviet diplomats in India in mid-January made several scathing remarks about him in private.

Despite all this, the Soviets could not get rid of him against his will without precipitating another major split in the Indian party, particularly inasmuch as Dange personally controlled the major Communist asset in India, the All-India Trade Union Confederation (AITUC). They could, however, put him on short rations, and this they did: the World Federation of Trade Unions in 1966 sharply reduced its regular subsidy to Dange's AITUC, claiming a need to retrench because of the Chinese failure to pay dues to WFTU. In fact, the Chinese had ceased paying WFTU since 1962, but it was not until after Khrushchev's fall that the Soviets discovered a need therefore to restrict the flow of funds into Dange's hands.

Meanwhile, in the spring of 1965 Soviet and East European personnel in India greatly expanded their covert contacts with representatives of the CPI/L. Although it is likely that a majority of the rank-and-file of the Left Communists remained more sympathetic to the Chinese than to the Soviets, the widespread arrest of CPI/L leaders left day-to-day control of the party in the hands of men like E.M.S. Namboodiripad and Jyoti Basu who were inclined to be responsive to the harsher Soviet line toward the United States, the Soviet "nonpolemical" pose toward the Chinese, and the Soviet public demands for "unity of action" against the United States. This view was shared even by some of the imprisoned Left Communist leaders. The central CPI/L leadership therefore did not follow the Chinese in attacking Moscow, although this caused dissension and protest in provinces such as West Bengal, where pro-Chinese sentiment was strong among local Communists.

Soviet progress in neutralizing the CPI/L was apparently facilitated by the peculiar Chinese attitude toward it. The CCP sent neither representatives nor a message of greeting to the founding CPI/L Congress in early November 1964, and indeed

made no propaganda mention whatever of this event until mid-January, when a brief account of it was published together with a description of Ponomarev's visit to the CPI/R Congress of the "Dange clique" in December. This belated Chinese dual account was apparently intended to demonstrate to the North Vietnamese and North Koreans, on the eve of Kosygin's visit to Hanoi and Pyongyang, that it was the CPSU and not the CCP which was conducting factional activities among the Indian Communists, and at that, was backing the Indian revisionists. Mao made this point to Kosygin during their February talks in Peking.

Aside from this Chinese ploy, however, there is every reason to suspect that the Chinese were annoyed at the overtures of the CPI/L to the CPSU, and it is conceivable--although there is no firm evidence--that Chinese financial support of the CPI/L was reduced in consequence in the spring of 1965. Previously, the left wing of the Indian Communist Party had received money from the Chinese through a variety of channels (the Bank of China, the North Korean and North Vietnamese embassies, and Chinese facilities in Pakistan). Throughout the spring of 1965, [redacted] reflected a dire shortage of funds in the CPI/L, and the original first issue of the new central organ of the CPI/L was not published because of the failure of expected funds to arrive "from outside." There is also evidence that Left Communist General Secretary Sundaraya early in 1965 wrote a letter to the Chinese party, although the contents of the latter are not known. When a year later Sundaraya himself visited the Soviet Union for talks with Suslov he returned with a somewhat more friendly attitude toward the CPSU. Meanwhile, the East German Embassy in New Delhi was reported to have offered funds to the CPI/L.

While cultivating the Left Communists and pressing CPI/R leaders to renew contacts with them, the CPSU continued to recognize the CPI/R publicly as the Communist Party of India. Dange duly attended the March meeting of Communist parties in Moscow as leader of the CPI delegation, and there predictably took a stand with those who pressed--unsuccessfully--for concrete action to hasten a world Communist

conference with or without the Chinese. While in Moscow, Dange received bad news from home: early March elections in the Indian state of Kerala resulted in the bulk of the Communist vote going to the CPI/L rather than the CPI/R. This was the first direct electoral test between the two parties since the formal schism, and the CPSU--which had poured a good deal of money into the CPI/R electoral campaign in Kerala--could not help drawing conclusions unwelcome to Dange. The Kerala result was loudly trumpeted by the Chinese, and was also hailed by radical Communists less hostile to the CPSU. The PKI organ Harian Rakjat, for example, stated that:

> It is not yet too late for the revisionists, who have found fallow land in Asia, to draw a lesson from the experience in Kerala if they wish to learn.

The CPSU was thus reinforced in its impression of the strength of the radical wing of the Indian Communist movement, and in its determination to maintain contact with those radicals and to seek to reestablish CPSU influence among them.

To sum up: in the initial six months after Khrushchev's ouster, the new Soviet leadership, faced with the hostility of the Japanese, Indonesian, and left-wing Indian Communists inherited from the Khrushchev era, had made varying progress in each case in neutralizing that hostility--considerable in the case of the Indians, moderate in the case of the Indonesians and very slight in the case of the Japanese. In each case--as with the North Vietnamese, North Koreans and Cubans--the CPSU had found the appeal for unity of action of all Communists against the United States to be the essential starting point in attempting to draw these radical Communists away from the Chinese.

F. The CPSU Problems With the Old Pro-Soviet Camp

The CPSU faced a totally different set of problems in the same period in dealing with the more or less revisionist parties of Europe and North America--the "basket of crabs," as the Albanians had put it. In attempting to maintain Soviet influence with these parties while simultaneously appealing to the interests

of the radical Communists of the Far East, the CPSU was in some respects seeking incompatible goals, and actions likely to be helpful with parties of one area were also likely to be harmful with some of the others.

Four sets of interrelated CPSU problems will be mentioned: the effect of the ouster of Khrushchev itself; the effect of the new CPSU attitude toward Khrushchev's world Communist conference; the effect of the evolution of a harsher Soviet line toward the United States; and the effect of the threat of a return to Stalinist practices in the Soviet Union.

1. The Khrushchev Ouster

If the radical Far Eastern parties were generally delighted at Khrushchev's removal and inclined to be hopeful about the CPSU, the Western Communist parties reacted in the opposite direction. In the general uproar which followed, different European parties had several differing motives for expressing their dismay publicly, but there was at least one common denominator. The CPSU had done it again: as with destalinization in 1956 and the suppression of the Hungarian revolution later that year, the Soviets had taken a major unilateral action affecting everyone for which the leaderships of pro-Soviet foreign parties were unprepared. To the degree that each European Communist party was identified with the Soviet Union and the Khrushchev regime, it was embarrassed by the crude nature of the Soviet coup, and a new problem was suddenly created for each party leadership in dealing both with its own rank-and-file and with other political forces in its own country.

In the past few years, a number of the European parties had taken increasing advantage of the gradual dilution of CPSU authority resulting from the Sino-Soviet dispute and other factors to assert varying degrees of independence from the CPSU in working out both their domestic and international lines, and thus to improve, at the expense of the CPSU, their ability to compete in their own environments. This tendency had been particularly noticeable in certain of the parties competing with and seeking to influence strong Socialist parties, such as the Communist party of Italy. Upon Khrushchev's fall, the Italian party now loudly

led the chorus of complaint, and was joined, to one degree or another, not merely by other parties with autonomous tendencies such as the Swedish and British parties, but by a multitude of others, including even such pillars of CPSU authority as the French and United States Communist parties. To one degree or another, each protesting party leadership sought to demonstrate agreement with rank-and-file indignation at the way Khrushchev was treated. In addition, those parties which had previously had differences with the CPSU seized the occasion to dissociate themselves publicly from the Soviet action and thus to reinforce for the benefit of the non-Communist world their claims to be independent of Soviet control.

Having done this, delegations from the European parties visited Moscow, registered their formal complaints, and in virtually all cases allowed themselves to be mollified. Central committees thereupon adopted resolutions accepting the CPSU "explanations" with greater or fewer reservations, and the public furor gradually died down. Although the CPSU thus weathered this storm with no difficulty, foreign Communist leaders had been given another demonstration of the political hazards of too close identification with the current CPSU leadership. They were all the more likely to remember this since, like the Far Eastern Communists, many of the Europeans had little confidence in the stability of the new Soviet leadership (and in some cases reportedly told the Soviets so to their faces). Over the long run, therefore, the Khrushchev ouster made another contribution to the slow erosion of CPSU authority among the parties closest to the CPSU.

2. The World Conference and the Line Toward China

Moreover, after the public clamor had died down, substantive differences between some Western parties and the new CPSU leadership remained. One of these concerned the new Soviet attitude toward Khrushchev's project of a world Communist conference without the Chinese.

As already noted, at the moment of Khrushchev's fall the pro-Soviet Communist world was

divided between those parties which strongly opposed Khrushchev's scheme, those which had a vested interest in it and were pressing strongly for it, and a third, larger group which had no strong views but were willing to go along with the CPSU's wishes.

The line gradually adopted by the new CPSU leadership regarding the world meeting and policy toward the Chinese was a victory for the views of the first group, the "autonomists" led by the Italian Communist party. The Soviets made overtures to the pro-Chinese radicals of the Communist world and to the Chinese themselves, muted their polemical replies even when the Chinese resumed violent anti-CPSU propaganda, postponed the Moscow preparatory meeting from December to March and then finally, in the face of adamant Italian and British party opposition, deferred indefinitely the world Communist conference. In short, bit by bit the CPSU adopted the foreign policy advice (although not the domestic policy advice) set forth in the Togliatti Memorandum, advice which Togliatti said had been offered to Khrushchev in 1963 and spurned. (See pages 11-14.) The Italian party was naturally gratified, and pressed in its propaganda for more of the same.

Others were less happy. The Czechoslovak party, the leading advocate of the Khrushchev line toward the Chinese in Eastern Europe, and the French party, the strongest proponent of the "better fewer but better" thesis in Western Europe, did not cease pressing for an international conference without the Chinese when the new Soviet leadership vacillated and retreated on this issue. On the contrary, both kept making sporadic public allusions to the desirability of such a conference, and behind the scenes exerted pressure on the CPSU to counteract the pressure of the Italians and the enticement of the Far Eastern parties, the two forces working in tandem to induce the CPSU to abandon Khrushchev's scheme. The tug-of-war between the French and Italian parties on this issue of a conference was particularly fierce at the Moscow March meeting itself, where the French representative was sarcastic in his references to the attitude of the Italians and in alluding to the concessions the CPSU was making to the Italians.

The views of the French and Czech parties were shared by a considerable group of Western parties which felt that they had a pressing need for a formal Soviet break with the Chinese. Two of these parties were the Communist Party of Canada and the CPUSA, both of which saw a future danger to themselves from Chinese organizational efforts in their countries, saw no likelihood that the Chinese could be persuaded to desist, and thought the Soviets were playing into CCP hands by hesitating to convene a world conference.

In September 1964, a month before Khrushchev's fall, Chairman Gus Hall of the CPUSA delivered a speech* which was essentially a rebuttal to the Togliatti memorandum and a philippic against the Italian party, unnamed but clearly indicated. Hall denounced as opportunists people who had been suggesting that the struggle against the Chinese "somehow is a personal feud between Khrushchev and Mao Tse-tung," who wanted to muffle their criticism of the Chinese "so that the Chinese leaders will keep focusing their attacks on the Soviet Union," and who in effect "apologize for the Chinese position" by attributing the split to the "diversity of circumstances" between the USSR and the CPR. Hall attacked certain of the "larger, older parties," which because of "an over-emphasis on autonomy" wanted to stay aloof from the struggle against the Chinese while parties with a "smaller, weaker, working-class base" suffered from Chinese efforts to build "a world organizational structure consisting of groups in different countries." Hall made it clear that his party was one of the

*Published in issue #27, 1964 of Information Bulletin, the serial annex containing "Documents of the Communist and Workers Parties' Articles and Speeches" issued separately by the staff of the international journal Problems of Peace and Socialism in Prague.

small sufferers, and said that the Chinese had attempted "to invade our autonomy by setting up and supporting "antiparty cliques" in the CPUSA. The Chinese, he said, were the only "real threat" to anybody's autonomy, and therefore an international conference was urgently needed, to find some way of "establishing better coordination...within the world movement."

CPUSA views had not changed by the time of the Moscow March 1965 meeting, where the CPUSA representative's speech again alluded to the Italian party's position in rather violent fashion, this time explicitly.

Finally, most of the split parties of the Soviet camp--the parties already contending with sizable pro-Chinese counterparts in their own countries--found the new conciliatory, "nonpolemical" CPSU pose regarding the Chinese most inconvenient and awkward to imitate. In many cases, such parties had been engaged in furious struggles with their local pro-Chinese rivals for the allegiance of their own cadres, front organizations, and leftist allies. Such desperate organizational battles did not end because the CPSU wished to use new tactics, and the party leaderships engaged in these local struggles felt they could not cease attacking their pro-Chinese enemies and their sponsors in Peking without weakening their own position. As already noted, this was initially the case with Dange's version of the Communist Party of India; it was also applicable to such pro-Soviet Communist parties as those of Ceylon, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru, split parties facing especially serious challenges from pro-Chinese counterparts. All such parties had a vested interest in a formalization of the worldwide Soviet split with the Chinese, which they hoped would weaken the position of their own competitors.

By the time of the March 1965 meeting the CPSU was evolving a formula to answer partly the objections and the needs of such parties; and by the time of the 23rd CPSU Congress, a year later, this had become a stock Soviet reply to all complaints. In brief, if pro-CPSU Communist parties desired for

reasons of their own to attack the Chinese, in most cases (with a few exceptions) the Soviets would not seek to prevent this, but such parties should not expect polemical support from the CPSU. The Soviets found, through trial and error, that they could get away with this compromise without paying an exorbitant price in terms of loss of influence with the North Vietnamese, North Koreans, or Japanese; and the whole problem, of course, became much simpler for the Soviets as each of the latter parties themselves eventually came to have increasing difficulties with the Chinese.

After the March meeting the pressure on the CPSU from the "Communist royalists" for an early convocation of a world conference also eased somewhat, as it gradually became clear to everyone that the Soviet "unity of action" line was in fact paying off, so that because of this line (and because of Chinese intransigence) Chinese influence was being effectively whittled down all around the world. Thus the dangers to many parties arising from Chinese organizational efforts throughout the world--which Gus Hall had cited in September 1964 as the most pressing reason for holding a world conference soon--seemed less imposing. Moreover, with Thorez and Togliatti dead, relations between even the French and Italian Communist parties gradually improved, although wide differences remained on the question of a world conference.

Finally, advocates of a conference were disarmed when the CPSU in the fall and winter of 1965-66 had proposals floated for a more limited, bloc conference on aid to Vietnam, was apparently willing to hold this conference without the Chinese, but evidently abandoned the idea when the North Vietnamese declined to participate on those terms. With the Vietnamese war in progress, the CPSU could easily defend the necessity of deferring to DRV views on any large-scale conference.

3. The Shift in Line Toward the United States

The CPSU had far less difficulty in inducing its supporters in the international movement to follow it in hardening the line toward the United States.

Such resistance as the CPSU encountered on this issue came chiefly from Eastern Europe, particularly at first, and particularly from Yugoslavia and Rumania; and even this resistance was gradually reduced as time (and the war in Vietnam) went on. For the majority of the parties not in power, a more vigorous Soviet anti-American line could only be welcomed; rarely could it hurt their domestic position, and often it could help.

One of the most striking developments of the post-Khrushchev period was its demonstration of how few of even the most "revisionist" of the pro-Soviet parties had reasons of their own to desire good Soviet-U.S. relations. This is not to say that any of those parties--any more than the USSR itself--wished Soviet-U.S. tensions to rise to the point of threatening to bring on a general war, but rather that many parties found a thoroughgoing anti-U.S. line useful in advancing their own interests in their own countries, had been inhibited to some degree in using such a line by aspects of Khrushchev's policy, and now were glad to be freed from such restraints. Most Western Communist parties had little difficulty with reconciling a vituperative line toward the United States Government with occasional continued lip-service to the 20th CPSU Congress and the general principle of peaceful coexistence, particularly since the Soviet Union, while hardening its line toward the United States, simultaneously intensified its cultivation of many other Western governments in an effort to isolate the United States.

The last strong defense of the Khrushchev policy toward the United States by a foreign Communist leader was made a month before Khrushchev fell by CPUSA chairman Gus Hall, in the September 1964 speech already cited. Hall attacked point-blank the contention in the Togliatti memorandum that "the entire American political front" was being moved "increasingly to the right" by the Goldwater candidacy, that U.S. policy was therefore becoming increasingly "aggressive," that the general situation was therefore becoming "somewhat dangerous," and that a more vigorous anti-U.S. line calculated to appeal to Communist radicals and to conciliate the Chinese was therefore justified. Hall flatly

denied that such a general "shift to the right" was inevitable "or even probable," and asserted that "to make policy on the basis of an inevitable or already existing shift to the right is wrong and uncalled for." Hall was here alluding to Soviet policy--and the change in that policy for which the Italian CP was pressing.

Hall declared that "related to this erroneous conception" about trends in the United States "is the idea that the crisis of US imperialism can lead American ruling circles in only one direction--reaction and war." If so, said Hall, "then war is inevitable." He asked the Italians rather plaintively:

> What has happened to the positive estimates of the balance of world forces in the minds of people who now make these negative estimates of world development? Are they only operative as phrases in public resolutions, or are they factual estimates of present reality?

At an Italian party central committee plenum held a few days before Khrushchev's fall, party secretary Berlinguer's report alluded to comments on the Togliatti memorandum which held that Togliatti had been "a little too pessimistic in his analysis," and brushed such objections aside. Berlinguer insisted that Togliatti had made a "very correct and precise evaluation," and emphasized that for the Communist movement "the external front, the... struggle against imperialism, must be the primary fighting front." The United States, not Communist China, was the primary enemy.

After Khrushchev's ouster, with the gradual shift in the Soviet position, forces in the Italian party long hostile to Khrushchev's actions grew much bolder. At a central committee meeting in February 1965, Berlinguer is reported to have called for the views of those who in past years had silently disapproved of Khrushchev's foreign policies, and at least one party leader responded with attacks on Khrushchev's restrained reaction to the Gulf of Tonkin crisis of August 1964. In March, Achille Occhetto, the general secretary of the Italian Communist Youth Federation, published an article in the

youth organ La Citta Futura which brought everything out in the open. Occhetto declared that "the strategy of peaceful coexistence...has in the long run deteriorated and been made sterile," and attacked "the Khrushchevian...unilateral view of the East-West dialogue, which stressed as an obsession the summit meeting between the United States and the Soviet Union," and which was responsible for "a series of errors," including failure to reach agreement with the Chinese. The Soviets under Khrushchev were said to have lost sight of the fact that "it was not sufficient to live on the income from 'the spirit of Camp David,'" and that "coexistence is a process of conquests, agreements and ruptures, in which the front of anti-imperialist struggle in its various forms must determine everything." Occhetto recommended

> the Leninist method,...the capability of denouncing agreements when they appear to be antiquated with regard to the development of events, and especially never to discourage, even in the framework of international agreements between states, the revolutionary movement...

While Occhetto represented the extreme left of the Italian party, and his views thus did not represent a consensus of party opinion or the official party line, the fact that he now dared to express himself publicly in this way was indicative of a change in the climate of opinion in the PCI. Although party leaders subsequently took steps to prevent the publication of further direct attacks on the USSR by Occhetto and his friends, the foreign policy line of the party as a whole had shifted several degrees to the left.

A PCI delegation (including Occhetto) visited Hanoi in early May to cultivate the Lao Dong party, and in private talks there made a rather halfhearted response to attacks by Le Duan on Khrushchev's belief in the "Camp David spirit" and in the preservation of peace through conversations "between heads of state, and the same two heads of state." While the PCI defended most aspects of the 20th CPSU Congress

against Le Duan's criticism, it admitted Soviet "opportunistic mistakes" in having implied that Soviet economic development would suffice to defeat imperialism, and in misreading "the relationship between coexistence and...the problem of the liberation movement." When this delegation returned home, the delegation leader Pajetta told a Rome press conference of North Vietnamese approval of the Indonesian "example" in confiscating U.S. property and in contemplating a boycott of American goods "and even the possibility of breaking off diplomatic relations with Washington." Another PCI delegation the next month made its first formal visit to another of the Communist "radicals," the Communist Party of Cuba, and signed a joint communiqué notable for its aggressive and militant "anti-imperialist" tone. The leader of this delegation, party secretary Alicata, in July delivered a report to the party central committee which for the first time openly stated that Khrushchev had "committed serious errors" not only in domestic policy, but also in foreign policy. By the end of the year, the PCI had published "theses" in preparation for a coming party congress that warned against reducing coexistence to a matter of a dialogue between the USSR and the United States.

All this time, the PCI endeavored to use the issue of U.S. involvement in the Vietnamese war as a vehicle for the extension of PCI influence and anti-U.S. sentiment among both the Socialists and the left wing of the Christian Democratic party. Other pro-Soviet Western Communist parties made similar efforts, with greatly varying degrees of success. One of the parties which has been most adept at using for its own ends anti-U.S. sentiment resulting from the Vietnam war has been the most revisionist party in Europe, the Communist Party of Sweden under its chairman Hermansson.* The Swedish Communists have played

**The Swedish Communist Party was one of the very few Communist parties in the world that gave all-out enthusiastic support to the Trotskyite-dominated Bertrand Russell "tribunal" on Vietnam when it finally convened in Stockholm in the spring of 1967. (The other two chief enthusiasts were the Lao Dong party--naturally--and the Cubans.)*

in particular upon hostility to U.S. policy within the left wing of the Swedish Social Democratic party, while simultaneously seeking to emphasize their own independence from Soviet control through sporadic criticism of aspects of Soviet policy and calculated public slights to the CPSU and other European Communist parties. The combination has considerably enhanced the position of the Swedish Communists as a "respectable" political party and has increased pressures among the leftist Social Democrats for better party relations with the Communists.

Even the CPUSA--despite Gus Hall's vehement repudiation in September 1964 of Togliatti's "pessimistic" appraisal of the trend in the United States--adjusted with little difficulty to the harsher post-Khrushchev Soviet line toward the U.S. which seemed to justify that appraisal. By 1966, Hall was able to boast during a lengthy tour of Eastern Europe of the gains his party had allegedly made through participation in the "mass struggle" against administration Vietnam policies, and went so far as to claim that the CPUSA was the leading force in that struggle. Unlike the Swede Hermansson--whose party was using very similar tactics and issues to improve its position--Hall remained a "Communist royalist" aggressively loyal to the CPSU, and there is good evidence that unlike Hermansson, Hall continued high in the esteem of the new CPSU leadership. Thus the Soviet anti-American "unity of action" line on Vietnam was usable domestically both by those parties of the Soviet camp desirous of retaining and expanding CPSU authority and by those parties determined to limit or reject it.

4. The Fear of a Return to Stalinism

A different sort of problem for the new Soviet leaders was the very strong concern among the parties of both Eastern and Western Europe about an eventual return to Stalinist practices by the post-Khrushchev leadership, and the continuing pressures on Soviet policy--foreign and domestic--generated as a result. As we have seen, it was the hopeful estimate of the pro-Chinese Indonesian party leadership immediately after Khrushchev's ouster that such a return to Stalinism would now slowly come about,

by stages. Only one European Communist party--the Dutch CP under de Groot--is known to have shared the Indonesian view of this prospect. Among all others, Khrushchev's fall occasioned various degrees of alarm, and much of the Soviet activity in the first few weeks thereafter--such as the repeated private messages of reassurance to individual parties and the repeated blanket assertions of fidelity to policy decisions of the past decade--was intended in large part to assuage this anxiety within the pro-Soviet camp.

As we have seen, these pious Soviet professions of renewed faith in all the policies of the 20th, 21st, and 22nd CPSU Congresses did not prevent the CPSU from beginning almost immediately to shift the practical emphasis of those policies as they applied to foreign affairs to suit the interests of radical Communists whom the new Soviet leadership wished to court. Yet the very Soviet public reaffirmations of policy necessary to protect the Soviet position among the European Communists (and in the West generally), caused perplexity and annoyance among all the radical Far Eastern Communists, and as we have noted, in November 1964 Aidit was moved to protest publicly the pressures which the European "revisionists" were bringing upon the CPSU.

There is good evidence that one point upon which many of the European parties united their efforts was to induce the new Soviet leadership to forebear attacking Khrushchev publicly by name. These efforts succeeded. During the first few days after Khrushchev's fall Western correspondents in Moscow were quoting "informed" Soviet sources to the effect that the CPSU intended to publish a formal condemnation of Khrushchev--apparently, either Suslov's report to the central committee on behalf of the presidium attacking Khrushchev, the secret resolution adopted by the central committee, or an article drawing on these sources. By early November, these informed Soviet sources were denying such an intention, and on 3 November the Soviets gave good evidence of their sensitivity on the subject by issuing a formal TASS denial of an Italian newspaper summary of what TASS termed "some kind of 'Suslov report.'" Direct criticism of Khrushchev by name was thereafter

confined to the private explanations of the ouster given foreign parties by the CPSU, while public Soviet criticism of Khrushchev was perforce always indirect, however unmistakable.

The restraint thus enforced upon the CPSU was in contrast not merely with Stalinist practice but also with previous post-Stalin practice in the cases of Beria and the Molotov-Malenkov-Kaganovich "antiparty group." The immediate practical effects of this small victory of the European parties was to save their leaders from the further embarrassment which Khrushchev's public humiliation would have meant for them. In the long run, it brought home to the competing factions in the CPSU leadership the intensity of feeling among the European Communists opposing any Soviet retreat from the policies of destalinization which Khrushchev symbolized for the Europeans. This realization in turn added a factor of national interest to the arguments of those Soviets who opposed the plans of CPSU conservatives a) to bring about a gradual rehabilitation of Stalin and b) to return to the use of some of his police methods.

The leverage exerted by the European parties on Soviet behavior in these matters was to be dramatically demonstrated in February and March 1966 in connection with the trial of the writers Sinyavsky and Daniel and the 23rd CPSU Congress six weeks later. In the period between the two events, a great many leading members of the Soviet scientific and artistic intelligentsia signed individual or joint letters to Brezhnev, the CPSU central committee or the 23rd Congress either protesting the trial as a return to Stalinist methods or warning against the apparent intention of the Soviet leadership to use the Congress as an occasion for the partial rehabilitation of Stalin. On both subjects the protesting Soviet intellectuals made explicit use of the strong public protests already registered by a considerable number of Western Communist parties, and were able to argue that the dogmatic forces they were opposing were indifferent to the interests of the "world revolutionary movement." The most important of these letters, one addressed to the 23rd Congress

and signed by twenty five leaders of Soviet intellectual life, asserted that

> the question of the rehabilitation of Stalin is not only an internal political question but also an international one. Any step whatever in the direction of his rehabilitation would undoubtedly create a threat of a new split in the ranks of the world Communist movement, this time between us and the Communists of the West. Such a step would be evaluated by them above all as our capitulation to the Chinese, a step which the Communists of the West will in no case follow. This is a factor of exceptional significance which we cannot leave out of our calculations. At a time when we are being threatened on the one hand by the American imperialists and West German revanchists, who are growing more active, and on the other hand by the leaders of the CCP, to take the risk of a split or even of complications with the fraternal parties of the West would be criminally irrational.

Besides being an unprecedented insult to the estimative prowess of the two international sections of the central committee apparatus supervised by Suslov, Ponomarev, and Andropov, and an unprecedented intrusion upon the policy-making authority of the CPSU politburo, this statement exaggerated the danger of a "split" with the parties of the West as the result of a cautious, partial rehabilitation of Stalin. This is demonstrated by the fact that when later, beginning in the fall and winter of 1966, the Soviet leadership took a series of very careful, slow, quiet steps in this direction, there was no general outcry. Yet there is good reason to believe--as the Soviet intellectuals contended--that the CPSU was contemplating some more formal action regarding Stalin at the 23rd party congress, and such action was indeed apparently averted by strong pressure from abroad reinforcing the domestic protests.

Such pressure was evidently brought to bear on the CPSU by the Italian party, the Yugoslavs, and a number of others, but above all by the Poles, whom the post-Khrushchev leadership has many times gone to great lengths to placate. The Polish party in February 1966 made its feelings quite plain by publishing in the party organ Tribuna Ludu, on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the 20th CPSU Congress (which the CPSU virtually ignored), a fervent endorsement of the congress decisions and a thinly-veiled warning not to tamper with them. It is credibly reported that Gomulka followed this up with personal remonstrances in Moscow on the eve of the 23rd congress.

During the party congress itself, the writer Mihail Sholokhov and several subordinate CPSU leaders voiced the venemous resentment of party conservatives at the pressures brought by liberal writers and foreigners over the Sinyavsky-Daniel case. The press of several leading European Communist parties--including the French, the Italians, the Czechs and the Yugoslavs--made explicit hostile comments about Sholokhov and the viewpoint in the CPSU he represented. Moreover, several of these foreign Communist commentaries on the 23rd congress went so far as to single out Podgornyy's speech at the congress for special praise and to state or suggest an invidious comparison between his speech and that of other CPSU leaders--the distinction being that Podgornyy had indeed taken a far more liberal stand on the issues related to destalinization and the 20th CPSU congress than any other speaker.

Thus since Khrushchev's ouster the course of internal Soviet developments has continued to influence and be influenced by the complex pattern of CPSU relationships with the foreign Communist world. European parties have not hesitated to voice opinions, sometimes strenuously, on domestic Soviet issues with sensitive implications for themselves, and on at least two occasions their united efforts have succeeded in exerting some leverage on Soviet domestic decisions.

(They have long exerted much greater leverage on Soviet foreign policy maneuvers.) On the other hand, Asian Communist leaders typified by North Korea's Kim Il-sung and North Vietnam's Le Duan have continued to make private scathing remarks on Soviet "revisionist" domestic practices and to hope for formal Soviet changes in the 20th CPSU Congress doctrines. To the degree that opposition from the European parties has helped to minimize changes the CPSU would otherwise have made, it has thus also helped to preserve areas of Soviet friction in the otherwise improving CPSU relationship with Stalinist-minded Asian Communists.

G. Power in the CPSU and Policy Toward the U.S.

1. The Soviet Dilemma

Khrushchev was overthrown by a coalition of leaders who had different grievances against him and who disagreed among themselves on the emphasis of the policies they wished the Soviet Union to adopt. One of the most important areas of subsequent contention was the question of the appropriate Soviet posture toward the United States. In the first weeks after Khrushchev's removal Soviet policy very frequently gave the appearance of trying to ride off in several directions at once, as the USSR strove with strange vigor to promote goals simultaneously which obviously were incompatible: to advance trade and improve contacts with the United States, and also to improve relations with the Chinese; to announce that money was being saved through cuts in the military budget reciprocal with U.S. cuts, and also to appeal to the interests of militant Communists in physical conflict with the United States; to reassure the Yugoslavs and other European "revisionists," and also to conciliate the Cubans and the radical parties of the Far East who all detested everything the Yugoslavs stood for.

The unusually great contradictions in Soviet behavior in the first three months of the post-Khrushchev regime resulted from the simultaneous pursuit of separate lines of policy especially favored by different members of the new leadership both because of personal inclination and functional responsibility.

As time went on--by December and January--the proportions of "soft" and "hard" elements in the Soviet foreign policy "mix" began gradually to shift, with the harsher view of policy toward the United States slowly gaining as the inevitable consequence of other actions already taken by the presidium majority.

It seems clear that from the outset the new head of the government, the technocrat Kosygin, was the member of the new leadership who gave the highest priority to the maintenance of good relations with the United States, largely for economic reasons, and that his principal supporter in this regard was Mikoyan, who had similar interests and who had taken a similar position under Khrushchev. Soon after Khrushchev's fall, Kosygin and Mikoyan took a highly cordial line toward a group of visiting U.S. businessmen, going so far as to raise hopes of a settlement of U.S. Lend-Lease claims against the Soviet Union, and even suggesting that new negotiations to that end could be begun early in 1965.

During a 7 November anniversary Kremlin diplomatic reception, after Defense Minister Malinovsky (at Brezhnev's suggestion) had delivered a violent toast extremely offensive to the United States, it was Kosygin who hastened over to the U.S. ambassador to counteract the impression left by his speech. This in turn led to the first dramatic demonstration of the fundamental contradiction between the desires of those members of the new regime (the dominant majority) who wished to conciliate the Chinese if possible and the anti-U.S. radicals in any case, and the wishes of those other leaders (the minority) who gave greater emphasis toward conciliation of the United States.

Chou En-lai, who was in Moscow for talks with the CPSU, was at the reception. (See Figure A.) Chou saw Kosygin chatting amiably and clinking glasses with the U.S. ambassador, and is reported to have hastened over to Mikoyan, angrily pointing first to Kosygin and then to some African and Asian diplomats--evidently asking if the new Soviet regime intended to convey to the "anti-imperialist" world an

impression of Soviet cordiality with "U.S. imperialism."* Mikoyan, who had earlier delivered a toast to peaceful coexistence for which Chou showed no enthusiasm, was seen responding at length to Chou in a manner which was quite agitated. A Chinese "ideological expert" in Chou's entourage--perhaps Kang Sheng or Wu Hsiu-chuan--joined the group and the argument, which now began to attract onlookers from among the foreign diplomats. Brezhnev therefore now hurried over to break up the discussion with a smiling word to Chou. Mikoyan then drew Brezhnev aside to make some emphatic remarks, and Brezhnev made a wry face.

This vignette illustrated and symbolized the central dilemma of Soviet foreign policy. The most economically-oriented members of the Soviet leadership, represented by Kosygin and Mikoyan,** believed the reduction of tensions and a reasonably calm Soviet-American relationship essential to the interests of the Soviet state, both because they valued the possibility of expanded economic ties with the U.S.

In his private talks with the CPSU leaders, Chou was to complain again about Kosygin's display of an overly friendly attitude toward the American Ambassador at the reception.

***The terms "economically-oriented" and "ideologically-oriented" are used in this paper to categorize leaders such as Khrushchev, Kosygin and Mikoyan, on the one hand, and Suslov and Shelepin, on the other hand. Obviously, only a few Soviet leaders tend toward one extreme or the other, with many taking positions at some point along a spectrum in between. Mr. Carl Linden has suggested a similar distinction between those Soviet leaders who are primarily "internally-oriented" and those who are "externally-oriented;" but this may be less useful, since some hard-line Soviet leaders, because of their parochial responsibilities, have not had much occasion to express foreign policy views (e.g., the Georgian Mzhavanadze).*

Figure A

Chou En-lai and Ho Lung talking with Marshal Malinovskiy at the 7 November 1964 Kremlin reception, shortly before Chou's argument with Mikoyan.

for their own sake and, more important, because they resented the strains placed upon the Soviet economy and the limitations on a rise in the standard of living imposed by the demands of the arms race and by the pressures for still greater military and heavy industry expenditures generated whenever the cold war was intensified.

This policy emphasis obviously clashed head-on with Chinese wishes, as Chou demonstrated anew: a fact which in itself was not too serious, since no Soviet leader was willing to make important modifications of policy merely to appease the Chinese themselves. More important, a policy of seeking a relaxed public atmosphere in relations with the United States was not consistent with a policy of aggressively courting radical regimes and parties in underdeveloped areas which were violently hostile to the United States. It was to this fact that Chou En-lai was implicitly alluding when he gestured first to Kosygin and Ambassador Kohler and then to the Africans and Asians watching. And the past Chinese pressures upon Soviet policy symbolized by Chou's gesture have indeed exerted leverage upon that policy--to some extent even under Khrushchev, and much more so since his fall. For while no CPSU leader wished to alter Soviet policy solely to satisfy the Chinese, a majority of the new CPSU leadership was indeed sensitive to the reception given the long-reiterated Chinese charges of Soviet-U.S. collusion and was from the first prepared--for the sake of the new Soviet drive among the anti-U.S. radicals--to take actions (symbolized by the December demonstrations at the U.S. embassy in Moscow) likely to impair relations with the United States.

2. Khrushchev and the Communist Radicals

Khrushchev had also been sensitive to those charges--or rather, sensitive to the political danger to him of the concern of certain of his colleagues at the effect of these charges around the world. Khrushchev had reacted defensively over the years in a variety of ways. In May 1960, a month after the initial great Chinese onslaught against Soviet policy in the "Long Live Leninism" articles, the CPSU decided

that it would be too costly politically in view of this challenge within the world Communist movement, and in view of the Powers U-2 incident, for Khrushchev to attend the scheduled summit meeting with Western leaders--particularly since that conference evidently would produce no demonstrable concessions to the Soviet Union that might have served in the eyes of the radical Communists to excuse Khrushchev's attendance. Accordingly, after a vain effort to induce Mao Tse-tung to come to Moscow for talks which would take the pressure off the CPSU, Khrushchev used the U-2 incident as a device with which to torpedo the summit conference and also to destroy the relations with the Eisenhower Administration he had been at such pains to establish the previous year.

Next, in October 1960, while the 1960 Moscow world Communist conference was being organized and the CPSU was vainly trying to line up certain militant Asian parties for the coming confrontation with the Chinese, Khrushchev was pounding his shoe in the U.N. General Assembly, using braggadocio as an inexpensive substitute for action in an effort to convince the radicals of the underdeveloped world of his ferocious militancy. At the conference itself in November, Khrushchev delivered a speech (repeated and published in edited form in January 1961) which took a step forward in the conciliation of those Communists with a vested interest in "national liberation wars," praising the legitimacy of such wars and admitting that some of them must inevitably continue to occur.

However, at the same time and through the following years it was the task of Soviet propaganda to defend and seek to justify to the radicals of the underdeveloped world the Khrushchev "peaceful coexistence" line in all its ramifications: the stress on the unspeakable horrors of nuclear war and the consequent absolute necessity of preventing local direct clashes between the United States and the Soviet Union which would inevitably spread; the stress on the allegedly growing opportunities for a "peaceful" advent of Communists to power, and even in many cases for "peaceful" acquisition of independence by colonies; the stress on economics as the prime field

of battle against imperialism, and the consequent necessity to concentrate above all on building up the economic potential of the Soviet Union; the assertion that there were both "madmen" and "sober circles" in the leaderships of the West in general and of the United States in particular, with the "sober circles" prevailing; and the associated claim that sober-minded "imperialism" could be prevented or "paralyzed" by Soviet nuclear might from attacking other countries.

In 1961 and 1962, it became increasingly difficult for Khrushchev to persuade radical Communist leaders in direct conflict with the United States--such as Ho Chi Minh--that these tenets were helpful to or even compatible with their interests. One of the major apparent purposes of the Soviet introduction of missiles into Cuba in 1962 was to try to close part of the gap between Soviet pretensions and reality, and to demonstrate to various sceptics that Soviet nuclear power could win significant political concessions from the United States (e.g., in Berlin). The humiliating failure of this effort was followed, in 1963 and 1964, (1) by a violent escalation of the Sino-Soviet conflict, (2) by an improvement in the atmosphere of Soviet-U.S. relations, and (3)--as we have seen--by a steady worsening of CPSU relations with all the radical Communist parties of the Far East as Khrushchev pushed toward a final break not only with the Chinese, but more important, with all who supported and agreed with them.

In essence, Khrushchev was attempting to escape from the pressures which the Chinese had been exerting on him for five years through the leverage of the radical Communist states and parties whose good will some of Khrushchev's colleagues continued to covet. But the CPSU in 1964 was not strong enough to accomplish Khrushchev's purpose without enormous losses, and Khrushchev's position within the CPSU was not strong enough to withstand the prospect of such losses. While domestic issues were undoubtedly more important than foreign policy as precipitating causes of the anti-Khrushchev coup, the fact that foreign policy nevertheless played a vital role

is demonstrated by the alacrity with which the new presidium majority reversed Khrushchev's line toward the pro-Chinese Communist radicals.* Despite all the Soviet public assurances that no change whatever was being made, this was in fact a major shift in the emphasis of Soviet foreign policy, and one which before long necessitated corresponding modifications in the Soviet posture toward the United States. This shift reflected a choice of different priorities of Soviet national interest from those Khrushchev had chosen, and this different choice was made, in the last analysis, for ideological reasons.

3. Effects of the 1964 CPSU Power Shifts

Decisive in this respect were the massive reallocations of power within the leadership resulting from Khrushchev's disappearance. For Soviet foreign policy, these were the relevant changes of personal fortune among the senior figures in the CPSU presidium that accompanied or shortly followed Khrushchev's fall:

In addition, there is good evidence that a second foreign policy disagreement existed between Khrushchev and some of his senior colleagues over Khrushchev's 1963-1964 German policy. See DD/I Intelligence Memorandum, "Strains in Soviet-East German Relations: 1962-1967," RSS No. 0019, 24 February 1967 (Reference Title: CAESAR XXIX).

There has also been some speculation in the West that one of Khrushchev's "hare-brained schemes" opposed by other Soviet leaders may have been some plan to attack or sabotage the Chinese nuclear weapons program. At a September 1964 Pugwash meeting a month before Khrushchev's fall, the Soviet military theoretician General Talenskiy--one of the most authoritative exponents of Khrushchev's views--is alleged to have stated privately that the major Soviet problem was Communist China and that the USSR "is eager to have the Chinese Communist nuclear potential smashed." There is no other shred of evidence, however, to support the speculation on this matter.

a) The vanishing of Khrushchev himself, which removed from the Soviet political equation the strongest and ablest force opposed to the ideologues in the leadership.

b) The consequent immediate drastic weakening of the political position of Anastas Mikoyan. Mikoyan over the past decade on most issues had been the most liberal member of the Soviet leadership. It was he who had led the attack on Stalin at the 20th CPSU Congress, forcing the issue and paving the way for Khrushchev's secret speech, and who contributed another very strong assault on Stalin at the 22nd CPSU Congress. It was Mikoyan who had made the exploratory visit to the United States in January 1959, helping to pave the way for Khrushchev's subsequent visit later that year, and who indicated in his speech to the 21st CPSU Congress that his visit had been a matter of controversy in the CPSU. Mikoyan was a strong advocate of expanded Soviet contacts with the United States and with the West generally, and of patient Soviet cultivation of the national bourgeoisie of underdeveloped newly-independent countries. Mikoyan was also a strong advocate of consumer goods production in domestic battles over allocation of resources. Finally, it was he who in 1956 had defended and recommended to Khrushchev Dudintsev's heretical novel Not By Bread Alone; and Yevtushenko, at least, has described Mikoyan as the Soviet leader most sympathetic to the liberal writers. Although in recent years Mikoyan did not support Khrushchev in everything (e.g., he apparently opposed Khrushchev's long effort to have the defeated "anti-party group" expelled from the party and brought to trial), he was nevertheless Khrushchev's closest friend and ally within the leadership. Lacking an important power base of his own, he derived his importance in later years chiefly from his relationship with Khrushchev and the special responsibilities given him by Khrushchev. For this very reason, it appears that Mikoyan was not consulted by the anti-Khrushchev conspirators until the very last moment,

and with Khrushchev's removal Mikoyan necessarily lost most of his influence in the Presidium. It was now only a matter of time until Brezhnev would succeed in easing him out, using his age and health as a convenient excuse. The Chinese ambassador in April 1965 began prematurely to spread the story--doubtless with satisfaction, for Mikoyan had long been anathema to the CCP--that Mikoyan would soon be replaced as Chairman of the Supreme Soviet. This actually came to pass by the end of that year.

c) The elevation of Mikoyan's former close colleague Kosygin to the embattled position of premier. Regarding internal economic policy, Kosygin had apparently differed with Khrushchev not on the goal of increasing the relative share of consumer goods production (for which Kosygin continued to fight in his new post), but rather over what Kosygin regarded as the economic irrationality and irresponsibility of some of Khrushchev's measures and plans. As already noted, the new Premier clearly desired good relations with the United States for economic reasons; and for similar reasons--in apparent contrast to the new first secretary Brezhnev--wished to reduce the weight of military expenditures.

On 7 November 1964, Kosygin told the U.S. Ambassador that the Soviet government would be very happy to see its armed forces reduced to ten percent of present strength and eventually eliminated--a bit of hyperbole that Malinovskiy (and Brezhnev) would have found in bad taste. In December, Kosygin was able to announce at a Supreme Soviet session a small reduction in the overt defense budget to be reciprocal with a reduction promised him by the United States. During Kosygin's February 1965 talks with Mao in Peking, Mao criticized the Soviets vigorously regarding this purported budget cut, with Kosygin protesting defensively (and rather feebly) that "we are doing everything to arm ourselves" and that "the share of our budget for the armed forces is great." Mao was here again applying pressure against the CPSU on an issue over which the Soviets (and Kosygin in particular) were now to become increasingly vulnerable: since regardless of whether or not the cut in the overt defense budget reflected the actual trend of Soviet defense expenditures (which

may, in fact, have increased), for the Soviets to say that arms expenses were being reduced in agreement with the United States was to make a political gesture toward the U.S. that could only affront radical Communist states.

The subsequent evolution of the Soviet public posture on this issue was therefore symbolic of the fate of Kosygin's foreign policy preference for good relations with the United States. Under the dual pressure of external events (the Vietnam war) and the leaning of the ideologically-oriented presidium majority, the Soviets in December 1965 were to announce restoration of the alleged arms budget cut, and a year later were to announce a further increase. Similarly, in late January 1965, on the eve of Kosygin's visit to the Far East, the presidium was persuaded to hold open Soviet lines to the United States by modifying a previously hostile press reaction to President Johnson's State of the Union message: but the Vietnam war was subsequently to offer the presidium majority overwhelming pressures--and, more importantly, rewards--for establishment and indefinite retention of a public posture of loud hostility toward the United States government.

Thus of the three leading economically-oriented figures in the CPSU presidium, the first (Khrushchev) had been swept away, the second (Mikoyan) had suffered a decisive setback in political power leading to his removal a year later, and the third (Kosygin) had been promoted to be Premier but was forced to conform to the decisions of a presidium majority whose foreign policy leanings ran counter to his own.

On the other hand, the strengthening of the ideologically-oriented forces in the presidium was demonstrated by the effect of the Khrushchev ouster upon the position of three other leaders: Suslov, Shelepin, and Brezhnev. (See Figure B.)

a) The super-ideologue Suslov, overseer of CPSU relations with the foreign Communist world,* now received vindication after years of struggle with Khrushchev over the emphasis of CPSU foreign policies and the direction of CPSU tactics. In terms of function, experience, and habits of thought, Suslov was at the opposite pole from Mikoyan. Mikoyan's career was wholly on the government side, Suslov's wholly within the party apparatus. Mikoyan under Stalin had dealt with matters of industry, trade and supply; Suslov, to take one example, after World War II had supervised the Soviet reabsorption of the Baltic republics and the arrest and exiling to Siberia of thousands of Latvians, Lithuanians, and Estonians. In the years after Stalin's death Mikoyan had favored some of the Soviet liberal writers; Suslov emphatically did not, and in 1957 publicly called them "right opportunists." Mikoyan had supported the cause of consumer goods; Suslov had sided with Kozlov in opposing Khrushchev on this issue and insisting on continued priority for heavy industry and especially the steel industry. In the last decade, both Mikoyan and Suslov had concentrated more and more on foreign affairs, but from opposite angles: Mikoyan dealt primarily with the bourgeois governmental and commercial leaders of the capitalist and underdeveloped world, while Suslov dealt almost exclusively with Communists, both bloc and nonbloc, and indeed from one year to another hardly ever even talked with a non-Communist. From the Soviet point of view, there was nothing strange or sinister about this sharp dichotomy of functions;

*This phrase is not intended to suggest that Suslov today creates CPSU policy toward the foreign Communist world (it is created by the CPSU politburo as a whole, led by Brezhnev) or that other senior politburo members do not deal extensively with senior foreign Communists (nearly all of them do, and Brezhnev particularly has been quite active in this field). Suslov is the senior secretary and politburo member, however, who specializes, spending nearly full time in this work, and directly supervising Ponomarev and Andropov, the next-ranking specialists.

Figure B

ECONOMICS VERSUS IDEOLOGY
THE SHIFTING BALANCE OF THE FALL OF 1964

Khrushchev: Gone

Brezhnev: Gathering Power

Mikoyan: Going

Suslov: Vindicated



Kosygin: Minority Premier



Shelepin: Promoted

yet in fact it further encouraged a dichotomy of viewpoint between these two men which had long been well developed.

In recent years, Suslov's primary responsibility as a senior secretary of the CPSU was to guide the chief "vestiges of the Comintern,"* that is, the two large CPSU central committee sections for bloc and nonbloc affairs supervised by Andropov and Ponomarev respectively.** To appreciate Suslov's worldview, and because these sections will reappear many times in this paper, a few words about them may be helpful. Each of the two sections was (and is) a sizable bureaucratic apparatus, geographically organized, and with sub-sections and sub-sub-sections, engaged in daily receipt and collation of information; in political analysis (apparently involving intramural give-and-take with KGB analysis, as in the U.S. intelligence community)***; also in directing, advising, cajoling, and arguing with foreign Communist leaders (as the case may be); probably, in

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**Khrushchev once described Ponomarev thus to a foreigner.*

***A third international section--the Information Section under Shevlyagin--was established in 1966, and presumably also reports to Suslov. Little is yet known of it, but it appears to have taken over from the other two sections dealings with other parties on "problems of ideological work and propaganda."*

****Classified research is evidently performed and expertise provided for the two central committee international sections by the Academy of Science's Institute for World Economics and International Relations, and presumably also by the newly-formed Institute for Study of the International Workers Movement. Moderate, pragmatic, economically-oriented and less fanatical people, sympathetic to the viewpoints of Mikoyan and Kosygin, have long been strongly represented in the former Institute, and could conceivably exert some slight leavening influence through this channel on the views of the ideologues in the central committee apparatus.*

making policy recommendations concerning individual parties; possibly, in supervising the covert training of foreign Communists in CPSU schools; certainly, in receiving secret letters from foreign parties and drafting the many CPSU letters constantly being sent abroad; and in guidance of Soviet-run international front organizations.

Ponomarev's nonbloc section, in particular, obviously also has kept tabs on the clandestine political and military activities of underground parties around the world (work which necessarily would require coordination and liaison with the KGB); and in order to watch and help foreign parties has at times even stationed its own officers abroad temporarily under diplomatic or TASS cover, entirely separate from and additional to RIS officers. Finally, it is probably Ponomarev's section which budgets the allocation of vital subsidies to (and withholds subsidies from) different nonbloc Communist parties, using, in part, money from the so-called International Solidarity Fund to which other pro-Soviet bloc states are compelled to contribute. Both central committee sections are much more important, much closer to the center of power, than the USSR Foreign Ministry; and it has been credibly alleged that these sections have estimative responsibility--senior to that of the Foreign Ministry or the KGB--for all matters pertaining to Soviet foreign policy.

Among other things, the dual empire presided over by Suslov thus supervises and coordinates that important part of the Soviet cold war against the United States and its world-wide interests waged through the medium of those Communist parties and states amenable to Soviet direction or sensitive to Soviet pressures: and years continually spent in this fashion are not likely to have mellowed Suslov's

dogmatic convictions.* At the same time, Suslov, through Ponomarev and Andropov, has been directly responsible for the world-wide CPSU struggle against the Chinese party for primacy in the world Communist movement. There is no doubt that Suslov has been as unwilling as Khrushchev or any other Soviet leader to make concessions to Peking on this central issue of CPSU authority and influence. Yet there is also good reason to believe that Suslov had many times differed from Khrushchev both on the tactics to be used against the Chinese and on the closely related matter of the content of Soviet foreign policy affecting CPSU fortunes in the contest with the CCP.

To be specific: first, it seems likely that Suslov was never happy with the extremely soft line toward the United States taken by Khrushchev in the fall of 1959--particularly because of the vulnerabilities this created for the CPSU--and that he was one of the Soviet leaders who combined in May 1960 after the U-2 incident to force Khrushchev to break

There is no evidence of significant differences between Suslov and the apparatchiks he supervises in the matter of fanatical hostility toward the United States. There has been some evidence since Khrushchev's fall, however, of differences between Suslov and Ponomarev--and even more, between Suslov and some of Ponomarev's underlings--over the question of encouraging forces in West European Communist parties that wish to improve their position in their own countries and their relations with local Socialist parties by claiming publicly to have renounced some traditional Leninist dogmas (such as the necessity for a dictatorship of the proletariat). Perhaps because of justified misgivings about the ultimate effect of such public concessions upon CPSU authority within the parties concerned, Suslov has seemed slower and more reluctant to encourage this trend than have Ponomarev and his deputies, who seem to have relied upon support from above--i.e., from a politburo majority on this issue possibly led by Brezhnev--for authorization to execute this line.

violently and publicly with the Eisenhower Administration in order to protect the CPSU flank in the coming confrontation with the Chinese.*

*It should never be forgotten that the Powers U-2 flight was publicized into a significant incident by the Soviet Union, not the United States, and that the Soviets broke their own precedents in doing so. Previous successful overflights were of course never publicized by the USSR; more important, they did not seriously affect the Soviet public posture toward the United States--as demonstrated by the fact that they did not prevent Khrushchev from having his love-feast with the United States Government in the fall of 1959.

The failure of the Powers mission on May 1, 1960 was thus the new political event, rather than the mission itself; and Khrushchev's political position would ironically have been considerably better had Powers not been shot down at all. In view of the Chinese attacks on Soviet policy toward the United States the month before, to which Suslov and Kozlov were particularly sensitive, and in view of the related dissension going on simultaneously in the Soviet military and political leadership over Khrushchev's January 1960 troop cut, the Powers shoot-down came at the worst possible moment for Khrushchev, and provided a fortuitous opportunity for forces led by Kozlov and Suslov to press for a hardening of line toward the United States Government.

Khrushchev would probably have been forced to move in this direction in any case, but the sequence of events set in motion by the Powers incident undoubtedly compelled him to go much further than he would have otherwise had to do. In early May Khrushchev's public statements made it clear that he was desperately hoping that the U.S. would not now make matters worse, but President Eisenhower's decision to announce public responsibility for the U-2 flights provided the coup-de-grace. Mao Tse-tung soon thereafter issued a personal public statement mocking the credulity of those who had naively trusted the imperialists. Thanks partly to this unwitting Sino-U.S. collaboration, Chinese Communist pressures against the detente line had gained their initial victory.

Secondly, it seems likely that Suslov was never happy with the extreme to which Khrushchev carried the theme of the "peaceful" or "parliamentary" path for the advent of Communists to power, and the degree to which the use of armed struggle was downgraded. While Suslov undoubtedly agreed that armed uprising was not a realistic alternative in Europe for the foreseeable future, he apparently was uncomfortable at the extraordinary emphasis placed by many Western parties upon "parliamentary struggle," particularly after the 20th CPSU Congress, and the unmilitant, "revisionist" tendencies promoted by this emphasis. There is evidence that the Italian party, in particular, for years found him and Ponomarev hidebound and dogmatic on this score; and since Khrushchev's ouster, the leader of the right wing of the PCI (Amendola) has once been openly attacked by Kommunist, while a leader of the Italian party's extreme left wing (Occhetto) in 1965 came back from Moscow privately claiming the support of Suslov and Ponomarev in denunciation of the "revisionism" fostered both by Khrushchev and by the Italian party leadership.*

Elsewhere in the world, Suslov has apparently tried to insist that pro-Soviet parties hold open armed struggle as a viable alternative. There is evidence, for example, that throughout the 1950s Suslov personally attempted repeatedly to compel the Communist party of India to construct a clandestine paramilitary apparatus against a future day of reckoning in India; but despite all his badgering comparatively little was done because of the monumental revisionist sloth and bitter squabbling of the Indian party leaders. It is possible that Suslov was responsible for the sharp Yudin article rebutting Nehru on the subject of Communist violence in the December 1958 World Marxist Review, which

**There is little doubt that Occhetto was exaggerating what he had been told in Moscow for his own purposes; but it also seems likely that there was a germ of truth in his account of Suslov's views.*

contrasted notably with the line taken toward Nehru by Khrushchev and Mukhitdinov the next month at the 21st CPSU Congress.

In short, it is likely that Suslov was uncomfortable at the Chinese private and public attacks upon Khrushchev's emphasis on the "peaceful path," and was quite ready to retreat on this issue. Suslov was the chief CPSU negotiator haggling with the Chinese over the drafts of the joint documents eventually adopted by the Moscow world Communist meetings both in 1957 and in 1960. We have been told by Chinese editorials that the CPSU delegation made important concessions to Mao in November 1957 on this very subject of the "peaceful" versus "non-peaceful" path. We have also been told by the Chinese press that the CPSU negotiators (headed by Suslov) in October 1960 made unspecified concessions to the Chinese viewpoint in compiling the 1960 draft statement--while Khrushchev was absent from the Soviet Union--which Khrushchev was unwilling to ratify when he returned.

Thirdly, and closely related to the second point, there is a good deal of evidence to suggest that Suslov and the Yugoslavs detest each other. It is an astonishing fact that as far as is known, Suslov has never been to Yugoslavia, although he has visited every other East European country, some many times. Suslov's special coolness toward the Yugoslavs apparently stems: (a) from their various revisionist practices and tenets (particularly the one holding that is is possible for some countries to build socialism without a Communist party being in power); (b) from the pernicious influence (from the point of view of doctrine or CPSU authority or both) their views have had on several European parties, notably the Rumanians, Italians and Swedes; and (c) most of all in recent years, from the fact that Soviet relations with Yugoslavia have been harmful to the preservation of CPSU influence with the anti-American radical Communist parties of the world (e.g., those of Cuba, North Vietnam, North Korea, Japan and Indonesia), all of whom have publicly clashed with Belgrade primarily because of the "soft" Yugoslav attitude toward the United States and toward armed struggle and because of their fears of Yugoslav

influence on Soviet policy. Although Khrushchev had originally shared certain of these objections with Suslov and voiced some of them vigorously as late as the 21st CPSU Congress in January 1959--they seemed to grow less important in his mind in subsequent years, and the growing divergence between the two men on this subject became a logical corollary to their apparent divergence on the precise line to be taken toward the United States and toward the parliamentary road to power.

Furthermore, by 1962 and 1963 the Yugoslav question became the focal point of alternative CPSU courses in combatting the Chinese. The CCP in its letters to the CPSU in those years, sparring over conditions for the convocation of a new world conference made the ostracizing of the Yugoslavs a central issue. For their part, the Yugoslavs and various Western parties sympathetic to them made it plain that they expected any document drawn up by a new world conference to eliminate, among other things, the harsh strictures against Yugoslavia and against the "revisionist" danger in general retained in both the 1957 and 1960 documents. A CPSU promise to make these and other liberalizing changes might reduce the reluctance of many Western parties to support a conference showdown with the Chinese; on the other hand, such a promise would inevitably further alienate the radical, anti-U.S., anti-Yugoslav parties of the Far East. Thus the CPSU choice of tactics in this matter was intimately bound up with the question of the Soviet attitude toward detente with the United States and toward the armed struggles of the anti-U.S. radicals.

There is some evidence to suggest that in the spring of 1963, as the Chinese for the first time began to attack the CPSU publicly by name, differences between Suslov and Kozlov on one hand and Khrushchev on the other became particularly acute over this central symbolic issue of Yugoslavia. A Pravda editorial of 10 February 1963, defending the CPSU against Chinese attacks over the Yugoslav issue and condescendingly claiming that Belgrade was repenting its errors, took a line on Yugoslav "mistakes" which was considerably harsher, more explicit, and more offensive to Belgrade than Khrushchev's Supreme Soviet remarks on

this subject two months before.* In April 1963, there occurred the dramatic episode of the unprecedented public replacement of a CPSU May Day slogan concerning Yugoslavia--which did not credit Yugoslavia with building socialism, and which evidently was approved by Suslov and Kozlov in Moscow in the absence of Khrushchev--with another slogan which mirrored Khrushchev's position that Yugoslavia was indeed building socialism.

Fourth, and finally, all these differences apparently grew in 1963 and 1964 into a major schism between Khrushchev and Suslov on the tactical line to be pursued in fighting the Chinese. By the summer of 1963, Khrushchev had evidently become convinced that the only solution to his multiple problems in the Communist world was an all-out anti-Chinese campaign, like those in 1960 and the winter of 1961-1962, but culminating this time in a world meeting which would break not only with the Chinese but with all who supported them.** Suslov was opposed to such action not because he was unwilling to break with the CCP if this ever became profitable for the CPSU, but because in his view it would be grossly unprofitable: Suslov was flatly unwilling to write off forever to the Chinese the other radical Far Eastern parties and states, when they might conceivably be won back by modifications in foreign policies which Suslov himself desired anyway. It is evident that Kozlov (before his incapacitation) agreed with Suslov, and it appears likely from later

** In November 1962, a few weeks before Khrushchev welcomed Tito to the Soviet Union, Suslov's lieutenant Ponomarev had written an article which reemphasized that revisionism was the movement's "main danger" and which criticized Yugoslavia as the main bulwark of revisionism--both statements highly unusual in the context of the time.*

***A memorable passage in one of Teng Hsiao-ping's speeches at the November 1960 Moscow meeting had explicitly dared the CPSU to consummate a break with the CCP; and the CPSU had backed down from the challenge, in large part because of the unacceptable losses this would have incurred among the Asian parties.*

events that Brezhnev, and probably others, did as well. This sensitivity of an important part of the CPSU presidium to the opposition of the Far Eastern (and some European) parties to Khrushchev's plans for a showdown conference is probably the explanation for the curiously erratic, hesitant, indecisive CPSU course in 1963-1964, in which the CPSU several times marched up the hill to administer a "decisive rebuff" to Mso Tse-tung, only to march down again.

There are various items of evidence to support this interpretation of events. One, already mentioned, was the apparent conflict within the presidium in the spring of 1963 over Yugoslavia. Khrushchev's victory on this matter in April, coupled with Kozlov's simultaneous incapacitation with a stroke, strengthened Khrushchev's position momentarily and apparently enabled him to win approval at a June central committee plenum for the July CPSU Open Letter assailing the Chinese and for the associated anti-Chinese moves to follow, and probably also for the Soviet reversal of position on the test-ban treaty, which similarly infuriated the Far Eastern anti-U.S. radicals. This did not end Khrushchev's problems, however. In July, Khrushchev made highly emotional references in one speech to the efforts of the Chinese to unseat him in his own party. [redacted] stated in a report to his government late in the summer that a majority of Soviet party officials in Moscow believed that the Sino-Soviet conflict had become uncontrollable, and were concerned about the final outcome; he added that a growing anti-Khrushchev faction existed in the Soviet party and that its attacks were becoming more critical. Khrushchev in August reportedly told the Yugoslavs that it was only two weeks before that he had been able to secure support for his policies toward the Chinese from the CPSU central committee--i.e., from the presidium.

In the fall, Suslov fell ill, and Khrushchev apparently seized the occasion to try to bring pressure against him: during the November anniversary celebrations in Moscow, Suslov's picture was downgraded in position in certain of the displays of leaders' portraits, and in December articles were published in the Soviet press on Voznesenskiy which

seemed implicitly harmful to Suslov.* In the same period Ilya Ehrenburg--a man with good contacts in the Soviet leadership--privately remarked that Suslov did not see eye to eye with Khrushchev regarding the dispute with China, and added that Khrushchev was "quite nervous" at the moment because of strong opposition to his "soft" policies within the leadership.

In January 1964, Suslov's health was improved, and he was charged with preparing a report on relations with the Chinese for presentation to a central committee plenum in February. The draft report was first circulated within the presidium and is alleged, by one subsequent account, to have come back from Khrushchev drastically toughened up. Suslov is then said to have taken the report to Kozlov in the hospital and asked for his views. Kozlov is said to have replied that this was to be expected from Khrushchev, and that intelligent leadership would never be obtained as long as he was there. The two men are said to have agreed that Khrushchev would have to go, but that the time was not yet ripe.**

After Suslov had duly delivered the report at the February plenum, it was withheld from publication for the time being but apparently circulated within the CPSU and to certain bloc states. In April, the report was published; and six months later, at the showdown which ousted Khrushchev in October, Suslov is said to have charged that it had been Khrushchev who had obstinately insisted on the publication of the February report over the opposition of other

See the FBIS Radio Propaganda Report CD.238 of 6 December 1963, "Soviet Press Articles on Voznesenskiy Appear Aimed at Suslov."

***After Khrushchev's fall, Suslov attempted to have this account carried to the Chinese through indirect channels, in an effort to remove himself from the odium the Chinese attached to his February Plenum report. This effort by Suslov was itself revealing of Suslov's personal view during 1964 of appropriate CPSU tactics toward the CCP. His account of the genesis of the February report, although self-serving, is credible.*

presidium members. Suslov in fact had every reason to have opposed publication of this violently polemical document bearing his name; not only did publication further antagonize various Communist parties and states other than the Chinese whom Suslov wished to conciliate, but he himself became irreparably branded because of the grievously insulting personal attacks on Mao in the report. [redacted] evidence show a special Chinese detestation of Suslov after this; he was the "main theoretician of revisionism." It seems likely that here had been one of Khrushchev's purposes in forcing Suslov to deliver the report and in then insisting on publication of the report thus identified with Suslov. So far did Suslov become persona non grata with Mao that he could not even be included as usual in the CPSU delegation which held talks with Chou En-lai in Moscow in November 1964, after Khrushchev's ouster. The creation of such extraordinary CCP rancor toward Suslov in particular was ironical, since he was (and remains) that senior member of the CPSU leadership whose views on most substantive issues are the least far from those of the CCP.

b) Shelepin: Khrushchev's fall, which terminated his dispute with Suslov, also catapulted Alexander Shelepin into full membership in the CPSU presidium, bypassing the customary stage of candidate membership. Shelepin was thus rewarded for the important role he is known to have played in the coup itself. In the two years since then, Shelepin has displayed savage hostility toward the United States Government, publicly and privately, more consistently than any other member of the leadership, including even Suslov. Typical was his performance at a Cairo press conference in late December 1964, which was in sharp contrast to Kosygin's remarks before the Supreme Soviet two weeks before. Asked about "obstacles" to peaceful coexistence between the USSR and the United States, he replied that there were "many obstacles," but that the most significant one was "U.S. imperialism's interference in the affairs of other peoples," including those of Vietnam, Cuba, and the Congo. He gratuitously added that the United States "believes that we are afraid of war," and that "this is not true... we do not fear war, and this...the United States should understand also." Shelepin may have consciously

intended to contradict Khrushchev's well-known 1959 polemical statement that "in our days only a fool does not fear war." In May 1965, attacking President Johnson in private conversation with a Western ambassador after the outbreak of the Dominican Republic crisis, Shelepin said that it was possible that the President had in mind some "babbling" (unspecified) by Khrushchev but that the present Soviet leadership was not bound by this. A few minutes later, he repeated this to another ambassador, adding that the Soviets would answer the President's words and deeds, specifying, however, that he was talking personally and not for the government.

These "personal" attitudes of Shelepin toward the United States and Khrushchev were probably solidified during his earlier assignments in command first of the Komsomol and then of the KGB--both breeding-grounds for dogmatic ideologues. Khrushchev's advancement of Shelepin up the party ladder was an egregious example of Khrushchev's many mistakes in cadre selection, and proved in the end both personally disastrous for Khrushchev and harmful to the policies he favored. It also once again demonstrated the danger of assuming that all of the people beholden to Khrushchev were therefore Khrushchevites.

As already noted, Chen Yi while visiting Indonesia in late November 1964 alluded to Shelepin (without directly naming him) as the "most able" member of the Soviet leadership; and it is barely conceivable that the CCP in the immediate aftermath of the Khrushchev ouster and Shelepin's spectacular subsequent promotion--two obviously connected events--had harbored some vague hopes regarding him. If so, these were soon disappointed, for Shelepin no more than any other CPSU leader could even consider the public CPSU abasement before the CCP and public disavowal of previous Soviet policies which Mao was demanding. The other Far Eastern radicals, however, were another matter: it is fairly likely that Shelepin was one of that "part" of the Soviet leadership to which the Japanese Communists and the Indonesian Aidit kept alluding in late 1964 and early

1965 as favoring their foreign policy views.* Shelepin's favorable reputation among the Asian militants--which his public speeches certainly did nothing to destroy--may well have had something to do with his selection for delicate missions to Pyongyang in the summer of 1965 and to Hanoi in January 1966. He is known to have retained a close connection with Soviet dealings with North Vietnam and North Korea up to the present time.

c) Brezhnev: Finally, Khrushchev's fall brought Brezhnev--who was probably the central figure in the coup plotting--the post of party first secretary, inherently the most important position in the Soviet Union, which Brezhnev has since used gradually to expand his power. Although Brezhnev, a former member of Khrushchev's Ukrainian apparatus elevated by Khrushchev, had previously been assumed by many, on the basis of past public statements, to have remained a faithful supporter both of Khrushchev and his policies, it has turned out otherwise: not only did he betray Khrushchev, but he set out, as soon as Khrushchev was out of the way, to reverse some of Khrushchev's policies and to greatly modify the emphasis of most others.

**In December 1965--a year after Chen Yi made the remark cited above--NCNA correspondent [redacted] stated [redacted] that the Chinese believed that the new Soviet tactic of giving priority to an attempt to influence the Japanese Communist Party from within was inspired largely by Shelepin.*

Khrushchev's greatest single cadre mistake appears to have been his decision (or agreement) to return Brezhnev to the secretariat in July 1963, following Kozlov's incapacitation. There is good evidence to indicate that one of Brezhnev's tasks in the secretariat involved responsibility for supervision of the KGB; and at least two celebrated foreign policy incidents involving the KGB in the fifteen months ensuing until Khrushchev's ouster shed some light on the criteria Brezhnev used in exercising this responsibility. In both cases Khrushchev was afterward concerned with attempting to eliminate consequences harmful to his foreign policy objectives flowing from KGB actions taken under Brezhnev's aegis. The first case was that of the KGB provocation against and arrest of Professor Barghorn in the fall of 1963. While KGB interests may have required an operation against some U.S. citizen to secure a hostage to force the exchange of an arrested Soviet agent, the crude action taken against Professor Barghorn ran directly counter to the moderate line toward the United States being pursued by Khrushchev in the wake of the test-ban treaty, evoked public clamor and direct public intervention by President Kennedy and necessitated a public retreat on the issue by Khrushchev himself. It would be strange indeed if Brezhnev had not foreseen, if not the President's action, at least the public reaction in the United States to this provocation, and the consequent injury to the policy Khrushchev wished to follow.

The second case was that of the KGB mustard gas attack on a West German technician on 6 September 1964, which occasioned a West German protest, a Soviet denial, and then a Soviet semi-apology. This action, too, had as ostensible intelligence objective, yet was bound also to greatly embarrass a Khrushchev policy line--in this case, the approach to West Germany which he

(and especially his son-in-law Adzhubey) had been conducting since the summer, looking toward an eventual Khrushchev visit to Bonn. There is ample evidence that this line--and Adzhubey's activities in particular--were highly controversial in the Soviet leadership, and there is good reason to suppose that Brezhnev sanctioned the KGB action in order to undermine a policy which was to be cited by some reports as one of the reasons justifying Khrushchev's overthrow a month later.*

In short, there is evidence suggesting that during Khrushchev's last year Brezhnev used his position and his relations with the secret police to seek to obstruct first Khrushchev's policy toward the United States and then his policy toward West Germany. These same relations with the KGB were used in October 1964 to guarantee Khrushchev's removal. Since then, Brezhnev has taken a line toward the United States Government which, while varying from one period to another, has generally been considerably more harsh than that of Kosygin, although not quite as harsh as that of Shelepin or Suslov.**

**For a detailed discussion of the evolution of Khrushchev's German policy in 1963 and 1964 and the attitude shown toward that policy by other members of the Soviet leadership, see DD/I Intelligence Memorandum, "Strains in Soviet-East German Relations: 1962-1967," RSS No. 0019, 24 February 1967 (Reference Title: CAESAR XXIX).*

***Brezhnev was very probably responsible for--or at least gave direct approval for--the KGB operation in 1966 in which the U.S. citizen Kazan was kidnaped on an Aeroflot flight from Moscow and delivered to the Czech police, a short time after an Aeroflot agreement had been signed with the United States. The operation was primarily designed to--and indeed did--greatly embarrass U.S.-Czechoslovak relations. If the United States had cancelled the*

(continued on next page)

He has shown a consistent desire to cultivate and avoid offense to the militant wing of the world Communist movement. He appears to be the leading force behind the steady push to halt Khrushchev's process of destalinization and to restore a "balanced," fairly favorable picture of Stalin; this process has advanced directly in proportion to Brezhnev's increase in power. The final decision to proceed with the crude, quasi-Stalinist trial of the writers Daniel and Sinyavsky--and then to defend it against European Communist attack--was almost certainly Brezhnev's although it is likely that Suslov and Shelepin had vigorously concurred.

Brezhnev has from the first gone far out of his way to court the Soviet military and to champion their interests; his consistent stress on the long-term and world-wide dangers of "U.S. imperialist aggression" and on the general rise in international tension has thus served to justify a greater share of the pie for military expenditures than Kosygin favored, just as it has also justified the conciliation of foreign militants, the Soviet posture of public hostility toward the United States, and sporadic efforts to cow heretical writers at home. For similar reasons, Brezhnev appears to have supported the cause of heavy industry in a running debate with Kosygin over how far to improve the allocation of resources to consumer goods industries.

To sum up: The Khrushchev removal considerably strengthened the relative weight of ideologically-oriented members of the presidium in relation to economically-oriented members, as exemplified by the cases of Khrushchev, Mikoyan, Kosygin, Suslov, Shelepin, and Brezhnev. There are other personal factors, not dealt with here, which have

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Aeroflot agreement as a result, this would have been accepted cheerfully by Brezhnev, inasmuch as the signing of the agreement at U.S. initiative had already accomplished the main Soviet objective in proposing it years before--to break down resistance by Latin American, African, and Scandinavian governments to the signing of similar agreements with Aeroflot.

also been highly relevant to the evolution of the Soviet foreign policy mix: for example, the changes in Podgorny's position, the different views of the junior presidium members, and the conflicts which appear to have occurred within the ideologically-oriented wing itself (between Brezhnev and Shelepin, between Suslov and Shelepin, and even perhaps between Brezhnev and Suslov.) The conclusion, however, remains that elements in the Soviet leadership who had long been unimpressed by the necessity for or the desirability of an atmosphere of detente with the United States Government were rendered much stronger by Khrushchev's ouster, and that this change occurred independent of any U.S. actions and prior to the initiation of U.S. bombing of North Vietnam, although that bombing did indeed subsequently further strengthen the hand of the CPSU ideologues.*

4. Hedges to Reduce Military Risk

It must be added, however, that the change in the balance of forces in the Soviet leadership and the consequent shift in the emphasis of policy toward the United States did not mean a greater willingness to run a serious risk of direct military conflict with the United States. On the contrary, there is every indication that the new leadership has thus far been more cautious than was Khrushchev in engaging the prestige of the Soviet Union in actions or

As mentioned earlier, an important DRV official in April 1966 told assembled Viet Cong leaders that the new Soviet leadership was on balance not as revisionist as the leadership under Khrushchev had been, and he added that "we hold that the Soviet leadership still contains some revisionists, some indecisive elements, and also some active elements." We may tentatively fill in the blanks with Kosygin, Podgorny, and the by then retired Mikoyan in the first category; Suslov and Shelepin in the third category; and Brezhnev in the middle leaning toward the latter group. The North Vietnamese undoubtedly have firsthand information to make a more concrete appraisal.

ventures which might produce such a military encounter: that is, actions which, in the face of a vigorous U.S. response, would leave the USSR little choice between humiliating retreat or acceptance of a clash.* In this connection, the leadership appears to have been deeply impressed by the outcome of Khrushchev's "harebrained scheme" in Cuba in 1962.

The Cuban lesson has been clearly reflected in what the Soviets have not done with regard to North Vietnam. Despite Chinese private and public taunts, they have apparently not yet risked shipping weapons or ammunition to the DRV by sea. Kosygin in his February 1965 talk with Mao alluded to "fast patrol boats" as one of the items of military aid the USSR was going to give the DRV; but the Soviet Union does not seem to have done so, apparently because of the dangers involved in delivery to Haiphong. The boats rashly promised could have been Komar missile boats, which the USSR has given to a number of bloc and nonbloc recipients around the world. A CCP letter to the CPSU on 5 November 1965 challenged the Soviets to say why they had "not yet sent the naval vessels they promised to the Vietnamese comrades," and added that they "could have sent these direct to the ports of Vietnam but instead want to transfer them to the Vietnamese comrades by Chinese ports."

The Soviets have also rejected--as designed to provoke a war between the USSR and the U.S.--repeated public and private Chinese demands that the Soviet Union do something in Europe to divert United States strength from Vietnam. In this connection,

We should note in this connection, however, that we agree with the view expressed by some other observers that once having inadvertently gotten into such a position, the present Soviet leadership would find it more difficult to accept a humiliating retreat than did Khrushchev, and the danger of a direct clash with the United States would be correspondingly greater.

their failure to renew serious pressures on Berlin is all the more noteworthy.*

Private statements by Soviet officials have also been used to reduce the level of risk created by the Soviet public posture and by certain Soviet actions such as the furnishing of surface-to-air missiles to North Vietnam. Thus, after the missiles were first used in 1965, high-ranking Soviet officers for a time attempted to persuade U.S. and Western attaches that Soviet personnel either were not responsible for the missile firings or would soon be leaving; and other Soviet officials made clear official Soviet disassociation from the fate of Soviet SAM personnel engaged in combat against U.S. aircraft in North Vietnam. Even more striking, along the same line, was Defense Minister Malinovskiy's private toast to the U.S. military attache in Moscow in the fall of 1965: "To your victory in Vietnam" as well as Malinovskiy's follow-up remark to the U.S. attache a year later that he had not been feeling well recently because the United States had not been doing well in Vietnam. These remarks, coming from such a source, were evidently intended to convey to the U.S. Government, in facetious form, a serious message regarding the Soviet attitude toward Vietnam capable of lowering tensions created by Soviet public statements.

**We consider without merit the speculation of some Western observers that the Soviet attitude in the Middle East crisis which began in May 1967 was prompted by such a desire to relieve United States pressure on North Vietnam. Soviet policy in the Middle East, like that regarding Vietnam, has been governed by a demagogic desire to make political gains for the USSR with a specific audience by demonstrating support for the interests of that audience and opposition to the United States, without running serious military risk of direct confrontation with the United States. In the case of the Middle East crisis, against the background of years of Soviet cultivation of radical Arab forces and government, at least until the active Israeli-Arab hostilities began the local political gains thought to be in prospect for the Soviet Union at American expense provided ample motivation for the uncooperative attitude toward the U.S. shown by the Soviet leadership, without reference to American actions elsewhere in the world.*

III. Soviet Dealings With Peking From the Fall of Khrushchev to the March Meeting

A. The Chou En-lai Visit

It would appear that both the Soviets and the Chinese were temporarily misled by false hopes as to the other party's intentions following the ouster of Khrushchev. Judging from Chou En-lai's conduct in Moscow, the CCP seems really to have thought it possible that the new CPSU leaders were so desperate for a relaxation of Chinese pressures against them as to be willing to buy Peking off with humiliating public concessions of a fundamental nature--concessions which would in effect acknowledge that the Chinese had been right all along and the Soviets wrong, and would thus constitute a long step toward abdication of leadership of the Communist movement to Peking. At least some of the new Soviet leaders, for their part, seem to have overestimated the relative importance of Mao's personal hatred of Khrushchev as a factor in Chinese conduct (intense though that hatred was), and underestimated the relative importance and permanence of Mao's pretensions to lead the revolutionary world and his ambition to be universally recognized as that leader. The Soviets therefore apparently hoped that with Khrushchev gone, the Chinese would be willing to call off the anti-Soviet struggle on terms Khrushchev himself had on occasion in the past vainly offered Peking--the restoration of some Soviet economic (and possibly military) aid to China and an end to public polemics without humiliating public self-criticism by either side. Both the CPSU and the CCP were mistaken about their opponent.

After Khrushchev's ouster, the CCP sent a conciliatory telegram of congratulations to Brezhnev and Kosygin on their new appointments, suspended overt polemics, and then privately informed the CPSU that the Chinese party would be receptive to an invitation to send a delegation to Moscow for talks during the October Revolution anniversary celebrations. (Chou En-lai later publicly boasted that "we took the initiative" in bringing about the talks.) Reports deriving from both Soviet and Chinese sources make it clear that in those conversations Chou demanded,

as a price for even discussing the matters the CPSU wanted to discuss (a permanent end to polemics and Chinese participation in a world meeting), that the CPSU commit itself to repudiate publicly the policy lines established by the 20th, 21st and 22nd CPSU Congresses so long attacked by the Chinese. The CPSU representatives refused, and disingenuously told Chou that even if they were willing to do this, pressure from East European leaders would not permit it. (In fact, while Kadar and Gomulka may indeed have warned the CPSU against concessions of this kind to the Chinese, CPSU self-interest alone would prohibit such self-abasement before Mao.) The Chinese later publicly stated that the new Soviet leaders also said on this occasion that they had no quarrel with Khrushchev regarding policy toward China, and the CCP has also privately claimed (somewhat inconsistently) that the Soviets told Chou that now that Khrushchev had been ousted, it was Chou's turn to get rid of Mao.* (See Figure C.)

When the Soviets refused to make the fundamental concessions Chou demanded, Chou reportedly was taken aback, asked why the CPSU had then purged Khrushchev, and refused to consider Brezhnev's request for discussion of a permanent cessation of polemics and a halt to "factional activities" in the world Communist movement. The Soviets later said that they offered Chou "concrete suggestions on the expansion of Soviet-Chinese trade" and on "scientific-technical and cultural cooperation." These guarded phrases may well cover another Soviet effort to buy Chinese political cooperation by holding out the prospect of renewed Soviet economic assistance--like the similar attempts made by Khrushchev in October 1962 and November 1963. It is barely conceivable that some limited military assistance was also included in the

**This episode has been confirmed from the Soviet side.* [redacted] *later remarked privately that he had been told in Moscow that when Chou and his delegation were attending a banquet during their November 1964 Moscow visit, Marshal Malinovskiy made this remark to Chou: whereupon the Chinese delegation reportedly walked out of the banquet.*

Figure C

CHOU EN-LAI IN MOSCOW, NOVEMBER 1964

Chou being greeted by Kosygin at a Moscow airport on arrival 5 November.

Chou listening to a Brezhnev address at the Kremlin Palace of Soviets on 6 November. On Chou's right are Maurer and Zhivkov; on his left are Kosygin and Ulbricht.

Figure C (Continued)

Chou with Mikoyan and Podgornyy on the Lenin Mausoleum viewing the 7 November parade. Chou's clash with Mikoyan at the Kremlin reception occurred a few hours later.

Chou is welcomed home by Mao on his return to Peking. Mao had not seen Chou off on his departure for Moscow.

offer, although almost certainly not nuclear weapons. In any case, once again, this bait proved useless, for while Chou apparently carried the proposal back to Mao, the Soviets have claimed that the Chinese leadership subsequently not only "did not agree to an expansion of economic, technical, and cultural cooperation, but actually undertook additional steps toward their limitations."

Meanwhile, despite this offer, and despite indications from the Soviets that they (unlike Khrushchev) were now prepared to make concessions regarding the agenda, timing, and participants in a preparatory meeting for a world Communist conference, Chou refused to discuss Chinese participation in any such gathering, and warned the Soviets not to hold the meeting scheduled for 15 December. Chou lectured the Soviets on their iniquities at some length, and warned the new leaders that they faced the same fate as that of Khrushchev. He agreed, however, to transmit to Peking a request for a Brezhnev meeting with Mao. But even this eventually came to nothing, for the CPSU subsequently privately lamented that the Chinese central committee "completely ignored the proposals on bilateral meetings at the highest level." It was not the CPSU first secretary but the Soviet Premier--as the Chinese publicly emphasized--who was allowed to see Mao in February.*

Later, some Soviet sources spread reports that Chou had also (a) made enormous territorial demands upon the USSR for the return of the "Siberian territories" acquired by Russia one or two centuries before, or (b) vainly demanded nuclear weapons from the Soviets. Neither of these assertions is supported by the most authoritative Soviet and Chinese versions

**On both stops in Peking, Kosygin was met and seen off by government officials but no Chinese party apparatus officials (despite the presence of CPSU secretary Andropov in his delegation), and Kosygin's party rank was never mentioned by Chinese propaganda.*

of the talks, and both appear improbable. While Chinese propaganda (and Mao himself) has in the past publicly attacked old "unjust treaties" by which the Tsars took huge areas now comprising much of Soviet Siberia from China, there is no evidence that the Chinese ever formally presented a claim of this kind to the Soviet Union even when Khrushchev was in power; and the more concrete issue has appeared to be that of the comparatively small areas where local Sino-Soviet boundaries (as shown on conflicting maps) are in dispute. While the Chinese are likely to keep the more general question of their pretensions to the whole Soviet Far East and other Siberian territories alive vaguely in the background as long as the Sino-Soviet political struggle continues, it would have been obviously counterproductive to Chinese purposes for Chou at this time formally and seriously to present a fantastic claim of this nature. The Soviets, however, have many times sought to exploit covertly the general subject of Chinese territorial claims and border aggression to win foreign sympathies.

It is also, in our view, unlikely that Mao's regime in late 1964 would have requested again from the Soviets the nuclear weapons Mao had been so enraged to be denied five or six years before. The humiliating nature of such a request, given the likelihood of Soviet refusal; the long distance relations between the two powers had travelled since the definitive Soviet refusal in 1959; the heavy stress Mao had placed ever since on Chinese military self-reliance; the battles Mao had fought with Chinese military leaders willing to conciliate the USSR for the sake of Soviet advanced weapons; the progress the Chinese had made toward developing their own weapons, including the first Chinese nuclear explosion only a month before Chou came to Moscow; and most important, Mao's colossal arrogance--all make such a request improbable.

B. Subsequent Jockeying for Position

Within a week of Chou's return to Peking and after high-level consultations among the Chinese leaders, the Chinese party returned to the attack against the CPSU, to the great relief of the Albanians and certain of the pro-Chinese splinter parties abroad

which had evidenced alarm before and during the Sino-Soviet conversations. On 21 November, the CCP journal Red Flag published an article entitled "Why Khrushchev Fell" which set forth in public the diatribe Chou had delivered in private, listing Khrushchev's alleged errors and crimes in systematic detail and warning the new Soviet leaders--clearly indicated although not yet directly named--that they would suffer Khrushchev's fate unless they surrendered to Mao's demands all along the line. The Chinese now resumed their usual obstreperous conduct at international front meetings, resumed lobbying against Soviet participation in the projected Second Bandung Conference (as already noted, Chen Yi made a hasty visit to Indonesia in late November for this purpose), began passing pessimistic appraisals of the new Soviet leadership to their friends in the Communist movement, and began publishing news accounts designed to demonstrate--for the benefit of such parties as the North Vietnamese and North Koreans--that the Soviets had themselves hypocritically violated the ban on polemics the CPSU had been demanding.

After late October, however, the Soviets in fact confined themselves in foreign propaganda to restatements of those of their old substantive positions which they felt it still appropriate to endorse, and avoided direct attacks on Peking. (This was not the case with internal party education courses, which continued to use Khrushchev-era documents denouncing the CCP.)

Meanwhile, after digesting the results of their talks with Chou and sounding the views of other party representatives in Moscow through mid-November, the CPSU in late November and early December began to send letters out to various parties "proposing"--that is, announcing--postponement of the 15 December Moscow preparatory meeting until 1 March. These letters were sent to the 25 parties which had originally been invited to participate with the CPSU, asking their views; but they were also apparently sent to a great many other parties as well, including some whose views the CPSU had not concerned itself with for a long time.

The CPSU in these missives gave the recipient its version of the current stand of the 26 parties regarding the Moscow meeting. Nineteen parties--the CPSU plus the parties of Australia, Argentina, Bulgaria, Brazil, Britain, Hungary, the GDR, West Germany, India, Italy, Cuba, Mongolia, Poland, Syria, the USA, Finland, France, and Czechoslovakia--were said to be "in favor of the meeting." The CPSU was being rather optimistic regarding Cuba and Britain, who as of late November were by no means firmly committed to attend; but in the end, these 19 were the parties which actually did meet in Moscow. Three parties--China, Korea, and Vietnam--had "let it be known that they do not wish to participate," presumably all reaffirming this in their recent talks with the CPSU in Moscow. Two parties--Indonesia and Japan--had, according to the CPSU, "requested additional information on the subject." Presumably, this meant that both (in mid-November) had wanted to know what Chou's visit to Moscow would bring and what the subsequent Chinese stand would be. And one party--the Rumanians--had said that they would not participate unless all 26 parties were present. (The reaction of the twenty sixth party, Albania, was tactfully not mentioned by the CPSU.)

Shortly before the 15 December deadline, the CPSU duly issued a short public announcement of the postponement until 1 March, and set about using the interval--as several clandestine reports indicated--to try to persuade recalcitrants to attend. In the meantime, Soviet propaganda remained rather reticent about the meeting, to preserve CPSU freedom of maneuver.

The Japanese: As already related, and as the Soviets undoubtedly anticipated, the Japanese and Indonesian Communists each formally refused the new 1 March invitation in December, after the Chinese attitude had become clear. The Japanese party's first refusal, on 10 December, was followed by a more detailed reply on 16 January, in which the JCP acknowledged that the CPSU was "partially, on the installment plan, accepting out party's proposal regarding the content of an international meeting" (i.e., that any such general conference should only be concerned with uniting Communist efforts against the United States, and not with Soviet covert attempts to exert

authority over other parties or to write rules for the world movement), and that the Soviets were therefore "beginning to advocate agreement in deciding upon concrete unified action in the common struggle against imperialism with America at its head." These acknowledgements again demonstrated that a discernible gap between the Chinese and Japanese positions had already been opened up by January 1965. The JCP letter vehemently insisted, however, that the Soviets must give up completely their efforts to convene the preparatory meeting unilaterally (i.e., without Chinese consent). The JCP objected especially to continued Soviet efforts to use the unilaterally-summoned 1 March meeting as a "drafting committee" to write basic documents for a subsequent world conference. The CPSU did not answer this 16 January JCP letter, but at the last minute--on 26 February--informed the JCP "orally" that the March gathering would not constitute the proceedings of a "drafting committee" but only of a "consultative meeting."* In other words, the CPSU in effect surrendered to the second Japanese objection, but not to the first. It will be seen that subsequent JCP comment on the March meeting took note of this concession, and that while the Japanese party was still harshly critical of the Soviets (for other reasons), its position remained different from that of the Chinese.

The Indonesians: The CPSU evidently thought (as we have already suggested) that its relationship with the PKI was slightly less cool than that with the JCP, and the Soviets tried a bit harder to induce the Indonesians to come to the March meeting. After the PKI on 14 December had laconically rejected the CPSU letter of invitation, the Soviets waited two months, and then on 19 February sent the Indonesians another letter pleading for PKI participation, and specifying as an inducement (apparently for the first time to anyone) that the meeting would

On the same day, a New Zealand party representative was summoned to the Soviet Legation in Wellington, New Zealand to receive a similar oral message from the CPSU.

not be a "drafting committee" session to prepare documents for a future conference. Instead, the CPSU said that the March meeting (1) should merely serve to appeal to all 81 parties that had met in 1960 to meet again as a "consultative conference" (2) which in turn would discuss the time, methods, participants, and agenda of a subsequent "new international conference" proper. Even this concession, however, did not satisfy the PKI, which on 24 February replied to the CPSU reiterating its refusal to participate in the March meeting since the Chinese would not take part.

North Vietnam and North Korea: The position taken by these two Asian bloc regimes tipped the balance regarding the holding of the March meeting. The CPSU by February 1965 probably had little real hope that the North Vietnamese and North Koreans could be persuaded to reverse their positions and attend despite the Chinese boycott, although Kosygin meant to try when he visited them. At any rate, Kosygin hoped to persuade Hanoi and Pyongyang not to attack the meeting if it were held. When, as noted, he did in fact win this promise from the two most important former allies of the Chinese against Khrushchev, the biggest single reason for the CPSU to abandon the meeting had been removed.

The Cubans: At the same time, the CPSU took steps to nail down Cuban participation in the March meeting, and the Chinese leadership was of great assistance in this endeavor. In the first stage, a delegation was sent to China from the November 1964 Havana Conference of Latin American Communist parties, ostensibly intended to inform the Chinese of the conferences's pious endorsement of unity and of a cessation of polemics and "fractionalism" in the world Communist movement and to ask the CCP to adhere to these noble principles. This delegation was composed of representatives of certain of the pro-Soviet parties that had attended the conference, and was headed by the veteran Cuban Communist Carlos Rafael Rodriguez. When the delegation arrived in Peking in early December, it was received by Mao Tse-tung and Liu Shao-chi with open hostility, contempt, and arrogance, as the Soviets had probably anticipated. Mao told Rodriguez that his delegation came as emissaries from the revisionists, said that the Havana Conference had

been organized by the Soviets to isolate the "Marxist-Leninists" and the Chinese in Latin America, intimated that Castro had sold out to the CPSU, berated Castro for refusing to disseminate Chinese propaganda in Cuba, mocked and belittled the importance of the 22 pro-Soviet Latin American parties which had participated in the Havana Conference, and defended the splitting of Communist parties by "true revolutionaries" aligned with the Chinese.

This episode was probably of decisive importance in getting Castro to agree to send a representative to the March meeting, and from this point on Cuban relations with the Chinese, already fairly strained, became worse and worse. In January, Castro reportedly received a letter from the CCP expressing bitter disappointment over Cuban concessions to the CPSU, and in early February, Castro made a last try to do business with the Chinese party, sending to Peking Che Guevara, whose views on many subjects were not far from those of the Chinese and who might have been thought to be better suited than any other Cuban leader to conciliate them. Guevara, however, received much the same treatment as Rodriguez, and found the CCP adamant.

Shortly thereafter, in mid-February, another meeting was held in Havana between the Cubans and an undetermined number of pro-Soviet Latin American parties, to coordinate policy in preparation for the March meeting in Moscow. The February Havana gathering--which unlike the one in November was never publicized in any form--reportedly heard Castro declare that he could never agree with the Chinese because they wanted everyone to subordinate himself to them. Next month, the Argentinian party delegate to the Moscow March meeting told the assembled delegates including Cuba's Raul Castro that the Latin American parties' position had been recently coordinated with the Cubans.

The Rumanians: The CPSU also tried very hard to persuade the Rumanian party to attend, but was rebuffed each time. On 4 January, Bucharest sent a letter to the Soviets in response to the CPSU letter rescheduling the meeting until March. The Rumanians set forth their reasons for continuing to refuse, reviewing in detail the difficulties they had had with Khrushchev in the past and implying that the new Soviet leaders had not greatly improved on his overbearing conduct. The Rumanian party letter reportedly asked the Soviets why they still insisted on calling the March meeting, and warned the CPSU that "no single party" was entitled to advance a claim to superiority in the movement. As in the case of the PKI, in the third week of February the Soviets tried again with another letter to Bucharest pleading for Rumanian participation. The CPSU now declared that the meeting would be only "consultative," that there would be no "ideological discussions" and that no party would be condemned, and that the character of the meeting thus had been changed (an implicit admission that previous Soviet public statements under Khrushchev about the innocuous nature of Khrushchev's projected meeting had been false). The Rumanian party responded that the meeting was still being convoked illegally, and that the only proper solution for the CPSU would be to cancel it. The Rumanians also charged, inter alia, that the CPSU had given a cold reception to the Chinese delegation to Moscow in November, despite the allegedly conciliatory intentions with which the Chinese had come. The Rumanians were to elaborate on this charge later in 1965.

The Italians and British: The two remaining problems for the CPSU were the Italian and British parties. The Italian party had already committed itself (in the Togliatti memorandum and elsewhere) to attend the originally-scheduled December preparatory meeting, although not necessarily the world conference this meeting was intended to arrange. After the Soviets postponed the preparatory meeting until March, the Italian party wrote to the CPSU proposing another postponement, and followed up this helpful suggestion with exhortations to this effect in personal contacts with Soviet leaders. The CPSU ultimately refused, however, and succeeded in holding

the PCI to its commitment. The British party, which had not committed itself at all, was more difficult. It has been reported that in initial meetings in November between British CP representatives and the new CPSU leadership, the British refused to take part in any meeting at which it was planned to discuss the international situation without Chinese presence. In January, the British party publicly went on record in favor of another postponement of the scheduled March meeting, and in late January British Communist leaders again held talks with the CPSU in Moscow which were described in the Soviet press as "frank"--that is, acrimonious. In the end, the Soviets finally obtained British Communist presence at the March meeting after changing the designation of the meeting from "preparatory" to "consultative"--i.e., after eliminating the suggestion that it was presupposed that the meeting would produce a subsequent world Communist conference.

To sum up: Thus the Soviets, who to avoid a humiliating loss of face wanted to hold the March meeting in some form if this could possibly be done without unacceptable political losses, had achieved at least the minimum necessary for this purpose in the maneuvering between November and March. Nineteen parties--including the doubtful and recalcitrant Cubans, Italians and British--had been lined up to attend. The North Vietnamese and North Koreans would not attend, but would not attack the meeting; and the CPSU could be reasonably confident that the neutral Rumanians, who would not attend either, would also refrain from public condemnation of the meeting. The absent Indonesians and Japanese would be critical to some degree; but the CPSU could hope that Indonesian criticism would be tempered because of recent Soviet overtures to the PKI (as we have seen, this is what happened), and the CPSU sought to appease the JCP to some extent (with less success) by failing to invite the Shiga group to participate in its stead, as Khrushchev may have originally wished to do. Of the 26 invitees, only the Chinese and Albanians could be counted on for all-out, violent denunciation of the March meeting. This was a considerable initial achievement for the new CPSU leadership, and demonstrates the degree to which the Soviets had already succeeded in introducing fissures in the old anti-Khrushchev coalition.

Part of the price the Soviets paid for this achievement was the abandonment of the original CPSU hope to have the March meeting directly organize a world Communist conference and prepare policy documents for it. Before the March meeting began, the Soviets had already committed themselves to interpose at least one additional stage on the road to a world conference--namely, an 81-party "consultative meeting" which would make all decisions about the hypothetical future world conference. Since the CPSU had made this concession in advance, the major issue before the March meeting inevitably became whether or not to do anything concrete to bring about this 81-party consultative meeting. As will be seen, the Soviets were forced to yield on this issue as well.

C. The Mao-Kosygin Interview

In the meantime, Premier Kosygin in the second week of February 1965 held conversations with Mao Tse-tung, Liu Shao-chi, and Chou En-lai. (Figure D.) It is clear from the [redacted] accounts of these talks which have become available that Mao Tse-tung was supremely arrogant, sarcastic, and absolutely implacable. Chou and Liu vied with each other in arguing with Kosygin and contradicting him, and Mao amused himself by egging them on. Mao told Kosygin that Chou and Foreign Minister Chen Yi (whom Mao sardonically called "your supporters"--an allusion to past Soviet hopes for Chou) had predicted that the Soviets would not call the 1 March meeting, but that he (Mao) had said they would, and he sarcastically urged them to do so. Mao went so far as to chide the CPSU ironically for faulty tactics in coping with him, Mao, and implied that he himself would have played the Soviet hand against Mao better: the Soviets should not have postponed the 15 December meeting, he said, since this was detrimental to their prestige.

Kosygin, for the record (which was subsequently used by the Soviets for the edification of many Communist parties) repeatedly asked, as in November, that differences be put aside, polemics halted, and unity against "imperialism" established. Kosygin asked the

Figure D

Mao and Kosygin meet in Peking, February 1965.

Chinese to discuss conditions for a world Communist conference, and offered to open up the Soviet-controlled international journal Problems of Peace and Socialism to both sides. (This suggestion was taken up by the Poles at the March meeting in Moscow.) Kosygin also claimed that the Soviets had made overtures to the Albanians which had been unreasonably rebuffed; and for many months afterward Albanian editorials contained angry allusions to somebody's claims that they were being unreasonable.

Mao's response to all Kosygin's efforts was to announce that "we are now raising the price." He reminded Kosygin that he had told the Rumanians (in early 1964) that the polemic might end in 15 years; but now he felt that it would have to go on for 10,000 years. He refused to discuss a world meeting. He ignored the suggestion regarding Problems of Peace and Socialism. He asserted that "you must state that everything was a mistake," including specifically the CPSU open letter of 14 July 1963, the Suslov report at the February 1964 CPSU Central Committee plenum, and the program approved by the 22nd CPSU Congress. In short, he would accept nothing less than complete self-abasement by the CPSU.

Mao attacked the Soviets for having announced a reduction in the military budget in December 1964 and he and Liu insisted that the Soviets were doing little to help the Vietnamese because they were "afraid" of the United States. Kosygin asked in turn why the Chinese did not help the North Vietnamese "with aviation," and Mao evasively responded that the North Vietnamese were suffering only "a few victims" (from U.S. bombing), and that this was "nothing serious." In a more general context, Mao declared that "a situation of revolutionary war must be created," and in response to Kosygin's rejoinder that this was for each country and party to determine, Mao insisted: "We must stimulate."

Mao predicted that within 10 to 15 years tension would further increase, the United States would attack the USSR and the CPR, and only then could the Soviets and Chinese unite. The reasoning behind Mao's suggestion that tension would radically increase and war become likely after a decade was illuminated

when Kosygin remarked that the United States and the Soviet Union "decide the destiny of the peace," and Mao responded that "in ten years it will not be so." Mao's implication was that a change in the world balance of power would occur within 10 to 15 years as a result of coming Chinese progress in advanced weapons technology, and that these Chinese advances would help bring about a showdown with the United States.

Mao's assertion that Sino-Soviet unity would only become possible as the result of a third world war was to be alluded to subsequently and attacked in many public statements by Soviet and East European leaders. Even Mao's suggestion that the USSR would then fight on the side of the Chinese, however, was later to be retracted and denied in several CCP public and private statements beginning in the fall of 1965, as the Chinese came increasingly to maintain that the real U.S. threat was directed at them, not at all at the Soviet Union, and that the USSR could not be counted on to support them when the final Chinese clash came with the United States.

D. The March Meeting

The Mao-Kosygin interview played an important role in clearing the way for the March meeting in Moscow. It served to clarify matters for any members of the Soviet leadership who may still have had illusions about the degree of Chinese intransigence, and who may have throught (a) that the CCP could be cajoled into participation in this meeting (or some later variation) through limited Soviet concessions, or (b) that the CCP could itself be induced to offer concessions in return for Soviet abandonment of the meeting. At the same time, the record of the interview could and did serve as evidence to show wavering foreign Communists at the Moscow meeting, to bolster the CPSU leadership's contention that it was being more conciliatory than Khrushchev had been while Mao was not. The CCP's sabotage of Communist unity was also demonstrated to visiting Communists in Moscow by showing them documentation regarding Chinese obstruction of Soviet military assistance to North Vietnam.

The Communist leaders who were shown these exhibits included not only the delegates of the 18 parties

visiting the Soviet Union to attend the March meeting proper, but representatives of a good many other parties--particularly from Latin America--who were in Moscow concurrently to take part in private discussions and receive briefings. Many of these parties--including some of the invitees to the March meeting--came to Moscow as much as a week before 1 March for preliminary negotiations with the Soviets--and with each other--over what was to be done at the meeting.

By the time the meeting formally opened on 1 March, Suslov, Ponomarev, and the CPSU central committee's two international sections had put together three draft documents for consideration: a communique, a letter to be sent to the 81 parties that had participated in the 1960 conference, and a statement on Vietnam.

The statement on Vietnam--which condemned the United States without committing anybody to any specific action--caused comparatively little difficulty, before or during the meeting. The only opposition to this statement appears to have come from the Polish delegation, which stated during the conference that "we at first experienced certain doubts as to whether it would be in order" but that they were talked out of these doubts by the Cubans in private conversations on 28 February. Although the Polish representative claimed that his doubts arose solely because Vietnam was not a matter listed on the conference agenda, in fact the Polish party seems at this time to have been reluctant to deal with Vietnam (an attitude which later changed), and the Polish delegate's speech was much more cursory on this subject than were the speeches of most of the other delegates. In contrast, Raul Castro's speech was particularly vehement about Vietnam, and as will be seen, the Cuban attitude later was to grow more and more harsh and outspoken in criticism of both Chinese and Soviet caution in opposing the United States in Vietnam.

The draft communique and draft letter by 1 March had already incorporated the views of many parties, notably the Cubans and Poles, and had been the object of much haggling between those parties in the Soviet camp, led by the French CP, which wanted a tougher

line toward the Chinese and a firmer commitment for a new general international Communist conference, and those others in the Soviet camp, led by the Italian CP, which wanted neither. The CPSU was apparently in the middle, attempting to deal with both sides.

Throughout the formal 1-5 March meeting, the main point at issue was whether anything concrete should be done to bring closer an all-party conference: specifically, whether or not to send out the draft letlet to the 81 parties suggesting the convocation of a "consultative preparatory conference" which in turn would "consider" whether to convene the all-party meeting proper. The speeches at the March meeting show that the Italian and British parties were adamantly opposed to sending the letter, that the Cubans were completely noncommittal, and that all others favored the letter.

However, the 15 parties which supported the CPSU's draft letter were themselves divided--depending on their attitude toward the Chinese--in what they wanted the letter to include and to accomplish. A few parties--notably the Poles--while supporting the draft as it stood (and as they had helped to write it) were opposed to the addition of anything that would tend to rush the preparations for the all-party conference. The Poles still professed to be hopeful that the Chinese could eventually be induced to soften their stand, despite the attitude shown in the Mao-Kosygin talks, and to this end proposed (as Kosygin had proposed to Mao) that the journal Problems of Peace and Socialism be opened to all parties--including the Chinese and their supporters--for the airing of differences in nonvituperative form.*

**Although this proposal was endorsed by a few others at the meeting, it is not known to have been pursued subsequently by the Soviets, even in covert propaganda to other parties. As a practical matter, the issue was moot, since the Chinese would not cooperate.*

In contrast, a sizable bloc of parties were pressing for action, and some expressed bitterness and frustration at the delays which had already occurred. The French representative was sarcastic, and the CPUSA man rather violent, in their references to the attitude of the Italians and in their allusions to the concessions the CPSU had already made to the Italians.

Eight parties--those of Finland, Bulgaria, France, the United States, Argentina, Hungary, India, and Australia--explicitly stated or clearly implied that the "consultative" conference of 81 parties proposed in the draft letter must be held whether or not the Chinese and their friends agreed to attend. Several (including, surprisingly, the Hungarians, who in past years had sided with the Poles) advocated the amendment of the letter to specify a time period within which answers must be received and the conference organized.

The CPSU appears to have rigged the order of the speakers to bring the maximum pressure to bear upon the Italians and British. The first two plenary debates--on the morning and afternoon of 2 March--were devoted entirely to supporters of the CPSU draft letter and critics of the Italian position. At the third debate, on the morning of 3 March, the troublemakers (the Italians, British, and neutral Cubans) were allowed to speak, with others following to rebut them. The Hungarians, who spoke immediately after the Italians, were evidently prompted by the CPSU to urge the Italians to consult with their central committee concerning the views expressed by the majority and to consider revising their views and agreeing to sign the letter. This was an old CPSU tactic, and had been used by the Soviets to bring pressure on the Chinese at the November 1960 Moscow conference--in vain.

The tactic did not work this time, either. The Italians and British remained adamantly opposed, as the Italians put it, "to the organizational machine being put into gear before the political conditions are ripe for it"--that is, before the Chinese were willing to cooperate. Both parties reiterated that

under no circumstances would they sign any letter. They intimated, however, that they were willing to have a brief reference to the possibility of an 81-party consultative conference at some unspecified date included in the draft communique. In the end, this was done, and the draft letter over which the CPSU had expended so much effort was apparently scrapped. Instead, the communique, signed by all 19 participants in the March meeting, was sent out to all the parties with a covering note before publication on 10 March. Because the communique mentioned the possibility of a conference, the British CP representative, Palme Dutt, was reportedly reprimanded by his party leadership for signing even the communique; and the British party subsequently felt it necessary to issue a public statement again opposing any general conference without the Chinese.

Along with the draft letter a Soviet plan was dropped which would have set up a permanent commission in Moscow to handle correspondence with various parties concerning proposals relating to an all-party conference. The Albanians in February had charged publicly that the Soviets were hoping to make this commission into "a centralized body, an almost permanent forum of the Communist movement, to which they would impart the so-called function of watching over the unity of the movement" and which the CPSU could use to dictate its line to other parties. The possibility that the Soviets would indeed try to do this struck too many raw nerves at the Moscow meeting for the commission proposal to be acceptable.

The outcome of the Moscow meeting showed the CPSU clearly that a world Communist conference for the time being remained, as it had been for Khrushchev, impossible to organize without unacceptable defections and political losses. For the next few months the CPSU therefore desisted from further efforts to promote a 1957 or 1960-type conference to lay down general guidelines for the world Communist

movement.* Instead, the CPSU took a different tack, concentrating upon efforts to isolate the Chinese by exposing Chinese rejection of appeals for "unity of action" to assist the North Vietnamese. To this end, among other things, the Soviets fostered a steady stream of proposals--at first secretly, later publicly--for multilateral meetings of various types with the Chinese (at first tripartite, then bloc-wide) on the specific subject of coordination of support for the DRV. These proposals were advanced with the full knowledge and expectation that they would be rejected by the Chinese, and each successive rejection further reduced Chinese influence. It was only in the fall of 1965, when the combined effect of Soviet and Chinese policies in this and other matters had gone a considerable distance toward isolating the CCP, that the CPSU again began cautiously to advance the world conference issue.

**As already noted, this was far from the universal view among the "Communist loyalist" parties around the CPSU, some of whom continued for some time to put pressure upon the Soviets to push for a general conference. The French party, for example--in dramatic contrast to the reaction of the British party--published the March meeting's communique under a headline, "For a New International Communist Conference," and ran a Humanite article interpreting the communique as an endorsement of French views on the urgent need for a conference.*

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