



National Transportation Safety Board

Washington, D. C. 20594

Safety Recommendation

Log 2114

Date: January 9, 1988

In reply refer to : A-88-160 through -162

Honorable T. Allan McArtor
Administrator
Federal Aviation Administration
Washington, D.C. 20591

The National Transportation Safety Board has investigated two accidents that involved an in-flight loss of engine power. The first accident occurred in Oshtemo Township, Michigan, on October 23, 1987,¹ and involved a Ted Smith Aerostar 600 (Piper PA-60) airplane that had a total loss of power in the right engine while cruising at 9,000 feet msl. As a result of the crash and postcrash fire, the pilot, who was the sole occupant, was fatally injured, and the airplane was destroyed. The second accident occurred near Mansfield, Ohio, on December 3, 1987,² and involved a Piper PA 60-600 airplane that had a total loss of power in the right engine in instrument flight rules and icing conditions. During the crash, the pilot, who was the sole occupant, sustained serious injuries, and the airplane was destroyed.

The investigation revealed that, for both accidents, the in-flight loss of engine power was precipitated by the separation of a cylinder from the engine case. The investigation also revealed that both airplanes used Lycoming IO-540-K1 engines and that both of the engines that lost power had been repaired by the same company. The engine involved in the Oshtemo Township accident had been weld-repaired 321 hours before the accident. The engine involved in the Mansfield accident had been weld-repaired about 300 hours before the accident.

The engine case halves, through bolts, and cylinder hold-down studs from the engines, were the subject of a metallurgical examination at the Safety Board's Materials Laboratory. This examination revealed extensive fatigue cracking in the hold-down studs associated with the separated cylinders and to a lesser extent, in the two through bolts associated with the separated cylinders. The fatigue cracking associated with the cylinders on both engines appeared to initiate at or near the hold-down stud at the 10 o'clock position on the cylinder deck. Metallographic sections through the stud hole at the 10 o'clock position revealed that extensive weld-repair had been performed through the entire thickness of the case at this location. Hardness measurements on the section cut from the engine case from the Mansfield accident showed that the welded areas were much softer than the areas

¹For more detailed information, read Field Accident Report No. CHI 88-F-A010 (attached).

²For more detailed information, read Field Accident Report No. ATL 88-F-A052 (attached).

that had not been welded. Fire damage on the engine case from the Oshtemo Township accident had melted portions of the case and had softened all the remaining portions of the case.

Fatigue cracking in a hold-down stud can initiate when the torque on the stud is less than the required amount. The Safety Board believes that current Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)-approved procedures allow softer, welded material to be introduced around the hold-down stud holes and that the presence of this softer material can cause partial release of the torque on the hold-down stud and can result in precipitation of fatigue cracking in the stud from that hole. Fatigue cracking in one stud can lead to fatigue cracking in additional studs and in the through bolts, and it can eventually result in separation of the cylinder from the case, loss of engine power, destructive damage to the airplane, and serious or fatal personal injuries as demonstrated by the accidents in Oshtemo Township and Mansfield. The Safety Board is also concerned that engine case weld repairs, when performed according to FAA-approved procedures, do not take into account the possible large number and sometimes critical locations of these welds.


Therefore, the National Transportation Safety Board recommends that the Federal Aviation Administration:

Prohibit engine case weld repairs around the cylinder hold-down stud holes and through bolt holes and in other critically stressed areas, unless the welded areas can be rehardened without excessive warpage of the case. (Class II, Priority Action) (A-88-160)

Amend engine case weld-repair procedures to provide guidelines for the maximum number of welds or amount of welding that can be allowed in noncritical areas. (Class II, Priority Action) (A-88-161)

Issue a General Aviation Airworthiness Alert (Advisory Circular 43-16) informing owners, operators, and maintenance personnel of the potential problems associated with weld-repair of small engine cases and urge them to have repeated inspections of cylinder hold-down studs and engine through bolts for proper torque on engine cases that have been weld-repaired in critical areas. (Class II, Priority Action) (A-88-162)

KOLSTAD, Acting Chairman, and BURNETT, LAUBER, NALL, and DICKINSON, Members, concurred in these recommendations.



By: James L. Kolstad
Acting Chairman

National Transportation Safety Board
Washington, D.C. 20594

Brief of Accident

File No. - 2155 12/03/87 MANSFIELD, OH A/C Reg. No. N50015 Time (Lcl) - 2159 EST

Basic Information

Type Operating Certificate - ON-DEMAND AIR TAXI
Name of Carrier - AIR CONTINENTAL, INC.
Type of Operation - NON SCHED. DOMESTIC, CARGO
Flight Conducted Under - 14 CFR 135
Accident Occurred During - APPROACH

Aircraft Damage
Fire DESTROYED
Crew Pass
Injuries Serious Minor None
Fatal 0 0 0
0 0 0 0

Aircraft Information

Make/Model - PIPER PA-60-600
Landing Gear - TRICYCLE-RETRACTABLE
Max Gross Wt - 5500
No. of Seats - 2
Eng Make/Model - LYCOMING IO-540-R1J5
Number Engines - 2
Engine Type - RFCIP-FUEL INJECTED
Rated Power - 290 HP

ELT Installed/Activated - YES/YES
Stall Warning System - YES

Environment/Operations Information

Weather Data
W: Briefing - FSS
Method - TELEPHONE
Completeness - FULL
Basic Weather - IMC
Wind Dir/Speed - 310/004 KTS
Visibility - .250 SM
Lowest Sky/Clouds - UNK/NR
Lowest Ceiling - OBSCURED
Obstructions to Vision - FOG
Precipitation - NONE
Condition of Light - NIGHT(DARK)

Itinerary
Last Departure Point
CINCINNATI, OH
Destination
CLEVELAND, OH

Airport Proximity
OFF AIRPORT/STRIP
Airport Data
MANSFIELD LAHM MUNICIPAL
Runway Ident - 23
Runway Lth/Wid - 4795/ 150
Runway Surface - ASPHALT
Runway Status - DRY

Personnel Information

Pilot-In-Command
Certificate(s)/Rating(s)
COMMERCIAL
SE LAND, ME LAND
Age - 49
Biennial Flight Review - YES
Current - YES
Months Since - 4
Aircraft Type - PA-60
Medical Certificate - VALID MEDICAL-NO WAIVERS/LIMIT
Flight Time (Hours)
Total - 6870
Make/Model - 1170
Instrument - 640
Multi-Eng - 2020
Last 24 Hrs - 7
Last 30 Days - UNK/NR
Last 90 Days - 337

Instrument Rating(s) - AIRPLANE

Narrative

THE PILOT DEPARTED LOUISVILLE, KY REPORTEDLY WITH A KNOWN OIL LEAK IN THE RIGHT ENGINE AND WAS ON THE SECOND LEG OF AN ON-DEMAND AIR TAXI CARGO FLIGHT, ABOUT 14 MINUTES AFTER ENTERING MANSFIELD APPROACH CONTROL AIRSPACE, THE PILOT REQUESTED AND RECEIVED AN ALTITUDE CHANGE FROM 5,000 TO 3,000 FT BECAUSE HE WAS PICKING UP A LOT OF ICE. AFTER ENTERING CLEVELAND APPROACH AIRSPACE HE REPORTED THE RIGHT ENGINE HAD FAILED AND REQUESTED TO RETURN TO MANSFIELD. THE PILOT WAS INFORMED OF MANSFIELD WEATHER. HE THEN INDICATED HE WANTED TO TRY CLEVELAND, THEN REPORTED HE COULD NOT MAINTAIN ALTITUDE AND WANTED TO GO TO MANSFIELD. THE PILOT WAS RECEIVING VECTORS FROM MANSFIELD FOR AN ASR APPROACH TO RUNWAY 23 AND AT ABOUT 1 1/2 MILES FROM THE THRESHOLD THE PILOT REPORTED HF WAS LOWERING THE LANDING GEAR. THE AIRCRAFT THEN DISAPPEARED FROM THE RADAR SCOPE. INVESTIGATION REVEALED IMPROPER WELD REPAIRS TO THE RIGHT ENGINE CASE AND SEPARATION OF THE NUMBER SIX CYLINDER FROM THE CASE DUE TO FATIGUE CRACKING IN THE THROUGH BOLTS AND STUDS.

Brief of Accident (Continued)

File No. - 2155 12/03/87 WARDFIELD, OH A/C Reg. No. N100TS Time (Lcl) - 2159 EST

Occurrence #1 LOSS OF ENGINE POWER(TOTAL) MECU FAILURE/MALF
Phase of Operation CRUISE -- NORMAL

Findings(s)

1. ENGINE FAILURE, TOTAL
2. ENGINE ASSEMBLY, CRANKCASE CRACKED
3. MAINTENANCE, MAJOR REPAIR IMPROPER -- OTHER MAINTENANCE FSPL
4. ENGINE ASSEMBLY, OTHER FATIGUE
5. ENGINE ASSEMBLY, CYLINDER SEPARATION
6. OPERATION WITH KNOWN DEFICIENCIES IN EQUIPMENT -- CONTINUED -- PILOT IN COMMAND
7. COMPANY-INDUCED PRESSURE -- PILOT IN COMMAND

Occurrence #2 IN FLIGHT COLLISION WITH OBJECT

Phase of Operation APPROACH -- FAF/OUTER MARKER TO THRESHOLD (IFR)

Findings(s)

8. OBJECT -- TREE(S)
9. WEATHER CONDITION -- ICING CONDITIONS
10. WEATHER CONDITION -- BELOW APPROACH MINIMUMS
11. LIGHT CONDITION -- DARK NIGHT
12. IN-FLIGHT PLANNING/DECISION -- DELAYED -- PILOT IN COMMAND

Occurrence #3 IN FLIGHT COLLISION WITH TERRAIN/WATER

Phase of Operation DESCENT -- UNCONTROLLED

-----Probable Cause-----

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the Probable Cause(s) of this accident is/are finding(s) 3,4,5,12

Factor(s) relating to this accident is/are finding(s) 6,7,8,9,10,11

Report of Accident

File No. 2444 10/23/87 850110 TORONTO, ONTARIO AIRPORT No. 055440 Time (Local) 072100

Basic Information

Type Operating Certificate - AIR CARRIER ALL CARGO Aircraft Designation
 Name of Carrier - AIR CONTINENTAL INC. DESTROYED
 Type of Operation - SCHEDULED DOMESTIC CARGO
 Flight Conducted Under - 14 CFR 135
 Accident Occurred During - LANDING

Aircraft Information

Make/Model - TED SMITH AEROSTAR 600
 Landing Gear - TRICYCLE-RETRACTABLE
 Max. Gross Wt - 5500
 No. of Seats - 2

Environment/Operations Information

Weather Data
 Method - FSS
 Completeness - WEATHER NOT PERTINENT
 Basic Weather - VMC
 Wind Dir/Speed - 230/005 KTS
 Visibility - 10.0 SM
 Lowest Sky/Clouds - CLEAR
 Obstructions to Vision - NONE
 Precipitation - NONE
 Condition of Light - NIGHT (BRIGHT)

Personnel Information

Pilot-In-Command Age - 47
 Certificate(s)/Rating(s) - Medical Certificate - VALID MEDICAL-NO WAIVERS/LIMIT
 ATP, CFI Flight Time (Hours) - 3290
 SE LAND, ME LAND Last 24 Hrs - UNK/NR
 HELICOPTER Instrument - 352 Last 30 Days - 26
 Multi-End - 868 Last 90 Days - 173
 Rotorcraft - 422

Instrument Rating(s) - AIRPLANE

Narrative

THE AIRCRAFT WAS AT CRUISE ALTITUDE (9,000 FEET) FOR APPROXIMATELY 20 MINUTES WHEN THE PILOT REPORTED THE LOSS OF RIGHT ENGINE POWER. CHICAGO ARTCC REPORTED THE CLOSEST AIRPORT WAS KALAMAZOO, 28 MILES WEST. THE AIRCRAFT BEGAN TO DESCEND AND AT 0330:53 CHICAGO ARTCC REPORTED N554AC WAS APPROXIMATELY 6 MILES FROM KALAMAZOO AIRPORT. THE PILOT REPORTED "MY RIGHT ENGINE COWLING IS GONE... I DON'T KNOW IF I'M GOING TO MAKE IT." WITNESSES OBSERVED THE AIRCRAFT AT "TREE TOP LEVEL" AND IMPACT IN A HEAVILY WOODED AREA NEAR INTERSTATE 94, 5 MILES FROM THE AIRPORT. INVESTIGATION REVEALED IMPROPER WELD REPAIRS TO THE RIGHT ENGINE CASE AND SEPARATION OF THE NUMBER 2 CYLINDER FROM THE CASE DUE TO FATIGUE CRACKING IN THE THROUGH BOLTS AND STUDS. THE TOP SECTION OF THE ENGINE COWLING SEPARATED DUE TO THE FORCE OF THE CYLINDER SEPARATION.

Airport Proximity

OFF AIRPORT/STRIP
 Airport Data
 KALAMAZOO
 Runway Ident - N/A
 Runway Lth/Wid - N/A
 Runway Surface - N/A
 Runway Status - N/A

Itinerary

Last Departure Point
 MILWAUKEE, WI
 Destination
 CLEVELAND, OH
 ATC/Airspace
 Type of Flight Plan - IFR
 Type of Clearance - IFR
 Type Appch/Lndy - STRAIGHT-IN
 FORCED LANDING

ELT Installed/Activated - YES/NO
 Stall Warning System - YES

Fatal 1
 Serious 0
 Minor 0
 Injured 0
 Crew 0
 Pass 0

End Make/Model LYCOMING IO 540-N1J5
 Number Engine 2
 Engine Type - RECIP-FUEL INJECTED
 Rated Power - 290 HP

Brief of Accident (Continued)

File No. - 2444 10/23/87 OSHTMO TOWNSHIP, MI A/C Reg. No. N5548C Time (LcI) - 0732 EDT

Occurrence #1 LOSS OF ENGINE POWER(TOTAL) -- MECH FAILURE/MAI
Phase of Operation CRUISE -- NORMAL

Findings(s)

1. ENGINE -- FAILURE, TOTAL
2. ENGINE ASSEMBLY, CRANKCASE -- CRACKED
3. MAINTENANCE, MAJOR REPAIR -- IMPROPER -- OTHER MAINTENANCE PSNL
4. ENGINE ASSEMBLY, OTHER -- FATIGUE
5. ENGINE ASSEMBLY, CYLINDER -- SEPARATION
5. COOLING SYSTEM, COWLING -- SEPARATION

Occurrence #2 FORCED LANDING
Phase of Operation DESCENT -- EMERGENCY

Findings(s)

7. LIGHT CONDITION -- BRIGHT NIGHT
8. UNSUITABLE TERRAIN -- SELECTED -- PILOT IN COMMAND

Occurrence #3 IN FLIGHT COLLISION WITH OBJECT
Phase of Operation DESCENT -- UNCONTROLLED

Findings(s)

9. OBJECT -- TREE(S)

-----Probable Cause-----

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the Probable Cause(s) of this accident is/are finding(s) 3,4,5,6

Factor(s) relating to this accident is/are finding(s) 7,8,9