

United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Possibilities and Limitations

Ambassador Richard S. Williamson
before
House Committee on Foreign Relations
U.S. Congress
Washington, DC
July 29, 2009

I want to thank Chairman Howard Berman, Ranking Member Ileana Ros-Lehtinen and the other members of the House Committee on Foreign Relations for inviting me to share some of my views on United Nations Peacekeeping Operations. In making my observations I will draw upon, among other things, my experiences dealing with UN Peacekeeping Operations while I served as Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs, Ambassador to the United Nations for Special Political Affairs and, most recently, as the President's Special Envoy to Sudan.

I have seen the value of the United Nations on the ground. In countless situations it has helped make the world a better place. In Central America and Africa I've seen small children inoculated against disease in UN health clinics. In Mitrovica, Kosovo, I met with a doctor who talked about the importance of the United Nations presence in helping her family and others rebuild after brutal ethnic cleansing. In Ethiopia, I've visited a UN clinic helping equip children with prosthetics for lost limbs due to exploded ordnances. In Freetown, I heard many stories of hope for restorative justice and reconciliation due to the United Nation's sponsored Sierra Leone Special Court. In Kabal I listened to President Hamid Karzai talk about the successful Loya Jirga and the pride he felt that this UN-supported process included women for the first time in Afghanistan's history. I've visited refugee camps and internally displaced person camps in Africa, the Middle East and Asia where UN relief agencies were keeping people alive. In these

and so many other cases, the United Nations is working effectively to realize the dreams for it of the United States and other founding countries.

But, the United Nations, like all organizations, is imperfect. It suffers due to structural and procedural problems. While some progress has been made, the UN continues to suffer from waste, fraud and abuse. In some areas the bureaucracy is bloated and inefficient. And it suffers because it too often is given assignments that exceed its resources or capacity to achieve acceptable results.

Let me be clear, some critical problems are a direct result of mischief, bad behavior and carelessness of member states intent on scoring short-term political gain, indulging in rhetorical excess with wanton disregard for the integrity of the institution and the values for which it stands, and, on occasion, seeking to off load political problems onto the UN without providing the resources and political support to effectively deal with those problems. Unfortunately, this later dynamic is sometimes at play in the creation of and uneven support for some United Nations Peacekeeping Operations.

UN Peacekeeping Organizations are Useful

The United States has unequalled global reach in military might, economic strength and cultural reach. It has the capacity to project its power and influence to every corner of the globe. But our might, strength and reach are not boundless, America also has vast interests, desires, preferences and strategic requirements that girdle the globe. There are limits to America's blood, treasury and political support to protect those interests. Competing considerations must be weighed. Priorities must be set. Decisions must be made. And, in such circumstances, burden sharing can be very useful, indeed.

Furthermore, there are situations around the world in which the United States has legitimate interests and concerns but where American intervention diplomatically or otherwise is unwelcome and may prove counter-productive. In some such circumstances America working in concert with other nations may be more effective. And, in some, other countries acting with quieter American support politically, financially or otherwise may be the preferred prescription. Furthermore, in many places around the world the United Nations has a special legitimacy, an acceptability, that any country alone does not.

Therefore, it is useful to American interests that one means of burden sharing, one useful implement in America's vast foreign policy tool box is United Nations Peacekeeping Operations. And UNPKOs also, in certain circumstances, can be more effective mechanisms to advance U.S. interests.

Clearly, America has the ability to act alone, arguable on a wider range of issues than any other nation. Just as clearly, America should reserve its right to act alone if it must to protect vital interests, especially vital security interests. But history, logic and common sense suggest just as clearly that it is often in America's interest to work with others to protect our security, advance our interests and project our values.

UNPKOs: Background

There have been 63 United Nations Peacekeeping Operations. During the UN's first 45 years, armed conflicts, even in remote corners of the world, were viewed through the prism of the Cold War confrontation. Most often the two superpowers did not want UN meddling. UN peacekeeping missions were few and, generally, served only as interpositional forces to police ceasefires agreed to by the warring parties in order to give the combatants time and space to find and implement a political solution. Sometimes it worked, as in helping with the Namibia

settlement. Sometimes it failed, as in the Congo in the early 1960s. And some UN Peacekeeping Operations go on and on, helping to prevent renewed hostilities in areas where a final settlement remains elusive such as Cyprus and the Western Sahara.

A review of UN peacekeeping during the Cold War suggests a number of factors which helped determine the effectiveness of any operation in relation to the cost and effort put into it. UN peacekeeping involvement should: (1) be accepted by all the parties to the conflict; (2) receive the acceptance and cooperation of the Security Council members; (3) have a clear and realistic mandate; and (4) be established in a way that clearly defines the authority of the Security Council, but allows the Secretary-General to have broad latitude for the initiative's operational direction and administration.

Whether by bridging a gulf of remaining differences, or by merely providing a graceful exit or political justification that the respective governments could use with their situations at home, the UN had a role. It did not impose peace. It acted as a midwife, a facilitator, a promoter of peace. This was a limited role, but often an enormously important one.

An official UN publication around the time of the end of the Cold War, *The Blue Helmets*, states among the characteristics of a successful peacekeeping operation, "The military observers are not armed and while the soldiers of United Nations peacekeeping forces are provided with light defensive weapons, they are not authorized to use force except in self-defense. A further key principle is that operations must not interfere in the internal affairs of the host country and must not be used in any way to favor one party against another in internal conflicts affecting Member States. ...The United Nations operations cannot take sides or use force without becoming part of the problems at the root of the dispute." All this changed with the end of the Cold War.

In 1988-89, while I was Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs, we launched a UN Peace Operation not to observe a ceasefire but to facilitate the political transition in Namibia. The UN helped organize and monitor Namibia's first free and fair election and the withdrawal of foreign forces. There would be other such UN operations, most notably the massive UN effort in Cambodia.

In a sense, with the end of the Cold War, the UN was liberated. The bipolar standoff between Washington and Moscow that often created gridlock within the Security Council was lifted. The new dynamic created new opportunities for cooperation to replace confrontation within the UN Security Council. However, the lifting of Cold War constraints also created new and different disorders.

The Cold War had provided an organizing principle and structure to global affairs. As Richard Haas wrote in his book *Intervention: The Use of American Force in the Post-Cold War*, "In the U.S.-Soviet relationship competition was structured and circumscribed." With the end of the Cold War that system of political control was lost. Ancient ethnic hatreds flashed. Irrational people with evil intent "revived their tradition of slaughtering their neighbors." Some nation states disintegrated. At the same time, advances in information technology made it impossible for governments to regulate and manipulate information. And new actors have emerged who operate across national borders and threaten peace and international security: organized crime, narcotics syndicates, regional warlords and terrorist organizations. In a number of regions pandemonium broke out. In the early 1990s Leslie Gelb pointed out the difficulty of a growing number of "teacup wars"; "wars of debilitation, a steady run of uncivil civil wars sundering fragile, but functioning nation-states and gnawing at the well-being of stable nations."

Without the bipolar ballast of the Cold War and the discipline imposed by the Washington-Moscow standoff, the types of conflicts around the world changed. Traditional warfare took place between two nations with organized armies clashing across defined boundaries. In the post-Cold War era, increasingly armed conflicts are internal struggles fought by irregular forces. Often guerrilla tactics are the means and light weapons the tools of destruction. Wars take place within failed states. Since political power and legitimacy within a country are difficult to determine, these new wars are much harder to resolve.

These conflicts seldom pose a threat to the strategic interests of Security Council members, but they often involve great human suffering. The outbreak of ethnic conflict, civil unrest and humanitarian suffering have often made international intervention more necessary. And the witnessing of that suffering by the world through the mass media, makes action more desired.

Since these wars usually did not take place within countries where the major powers had vital interests, often the preferred response was UN intervention. As Professor David Hendrickson observed in an essay entitled, "The Ethics of Collective Security", the end of Cold War tensions "persuaded many observers that we stand today at a critical juncture, one at which the promise of collective security, working through the mechanism of the United Nations might at last be realized."

Quickly, UN Peacekeeping became a growth industry. In 1987, there were five active UN Peacekeeping Operations with a combined annual budget of \$233 million and approximately 10,000 troops. By 1995, the UN had 17 active peacekeeping operations with an annual budget of \$3.6 billion and over 75,000 troops. By the time I arrived in New York to assume my duties as Ambassador to the UN for Special Political Affairs, there had been 54 UN Peacekeeping

Operations launched since the UN's founding in 1945, 41 of these begun since 1989. Today there are 15 active UN Peacekeeping Operations with 116,413 peacekeepers deployed from 118 countries at a cost of nearly \$7.8 billion a year. Unfortunately, these new UN Peacekeeping Operations have not always been successful. UN member states, sometimes including the United States, have pushed the United Nations beyond its capacity and operational reach.

In recent years UN peacekeepers were sent out with varied mandates ranging from preventive diplomacy, the ending of civil wars, confidence-building measures, verification of arms limitation agreements, law and order assistance, humanitarian relief and drug interdiction to combating terrorism. Old guidelines for successful UN peacekeeping operations were left behind. The past principles of “consent, impartiality, and the use of force only in self-defense” failed.

The early fast pace of growth in UN Peacekeeping Operations led UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali to say that “Peacekeeping has to be reinvented every day. There are as many types of peacekeeping as there are confrontations. Every major operation provokes a new question.”

As UN Peacekeeping Operations grew, missions in Somalia, Bosnia, Haiti and Rwanda were given Chapter VII authority to use military force to carry out UN Security Council decisions. Some UN experts, such as former UN Under Secretary-General Brian Ugeux, felt early on as UN Peacekeeping Missions exploded in number and varied mandates that there needed to be a reconsideration of the UN peacekeeping principles and that changes needed to be systematically considered and agreed upon. This was not done as UN Peacekeeping missions continued to grow in number, variety, robustness and old rules of impartiality and state sovereignty faded.

As a former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright wrote in her memoir, *Madam Secretary*, “‘Let the UN do it’ had become the operative phrase in Washington and other capitals. This shift was partly due to the hope that the UN would finally fulfill the dreams of its founders. But it was due as well to the desire of many national governments, including the United States, not to take on the hard tasks themselves.”

Some new peacekeeping missions were successful such as those in Namibia, El Salvador, Cambodia and Mozambique. However, not all were. Some had tragic results. Many member states failed to understand the inherent problems in the expanding mandates assigned to UN peacekeepers. And few were willing to accept the inherent limitations of the United Nations capabilities. The setbacks in Somalia, Rwanda, Bosnia and Kosovo shook confidence in UN peacekeeping.

As Sarah Sewall, a Clinton administration official “who initially argued that the UN should be able to assume a peace enforcement role,” wrote in the volume *Multilateralism and U.S. Foreign Policy, Ambivalent Engagement*, “Washington fundamentally underestimated the difficulty of the new peace enforcement operations. ...Today it is obvious that operations in which significant combat can be anticipated are beyond the UN’s reach and likely to remain so.”

Sudan

While serving as the President’s Special Envoy to Sudan, I witnessed two large, complex United Nations Peacekeeping Operations up close: UNMIS and UNAMID. The challenges each faced were significant and numerous. Their success has been uneven. In their mandate and execution; successes and failures; achievements and disappointments there are lessons to be learned.

UNMIS, the United Nations Mission in Sudan, was authorized by the United Nations Security Council in 2005 right after the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed ending Africa's longest civil war. Like many peace deals to end long, savage, brutal, bloody wars, the agreement ended the worst killing but it is imperfect. In the case of the CPA there is a 6 year implementation phase leading up to a 2011 scheduled referendum in which the people of the South will decide whether to remain as part of Sudan or to become independent. That was a six year window during which each side has sought to "renegotiate" the terms by changing facts on the ground. This provided ample time for mischief and malice to play out, which it has.

The most difficult flashpoint between the North and the South has been and remains the Abyei area. Home of the Ngok Dinka, it lies in a contested border area rich with oil reserves. The CPA was unable to delineate an acceptable border in Abyei and created an independent mechanism, the Abyei Border Commission (ABC), to demarcate the border. Both sides agreed to accept the ABC decision. However, when the ABC announced its demarcation, Khartoum refused to accept it. Tensions rose. Strains were heightened further because the Arab Messeryia nomadic tribe has traditionally migrated across this area annually to water their herds. That this was the most explosive place along the entire Sudan North/South border was well known and well understood. Nonetheless, UNMIS with a force size of 10,000 had only a small garrison in Abyei, a town of nearly 50,000 people. And in May, 2005, during the tragic flare up in Abyei during which the entire town was burnt to the ground in a few days of horrific violence, UNMIS was missing in action despite a mandate to protect innocent civilians. In fact, on the day the violence spun out of control UNMIS had only 95 armed peacekeepers in Abyei including two cooks. And the order was given to keep all UNMIS personnel inside the garrison, as civilians were terrorized and their homes destroyed.

A few days later I traveled to Abyei to survey the carnaged remains. It was awful, a ghost town. 50,000 innocent people had fled and migrated one day's walk to Agok where they would desperately cling to life under temporary shelters of plastic sheets to weather Southern Sudan's rainy season during which up to 47 inches of rain falls. Moving down Abyei's dirt roads there were smoldering ruins as far as I could see in every direction. The remnants of hut homes with smoke still rising, scraps of clothing, melted plastic water bottles, contorted black bed frames. I even saw what looked like a child's bicycle blackened and bent by heat almost unrecognizable, a symbol of hope lost. 50,000 innocent lives ruined, some killed, and UNMIS, a UN Peacekeeping Operation of 10,000 with an annual budget of \$1 billion, had done nothing to help. It was shameful.

At UNMIS headquarters up north in Khartoum, the 19 UN press people went into overdrive to try to exculpate UNMIS of any responsibility for the Abyei decimation. Fortunately, the new leadership of UNPKO, Under Secretary-General Alain Le Roy refused to be complicit in this shameful reinvention of history. An investigation was conducted, UNMIS mistakes uncovered, a report made, and some changes took place. Yet the same Special Representative of Secretary-General, who was in charge of UNMIS at the time of the Abyei tragedy and the UNPKO failure, remains at post today. So accountability has been limited for UNMIS' failures that contributed to Abyei's devastation.

Also, for a variety of reasons, CPA stipulations for disarmament of the Arab militia sponsored by Khartoum has not occurred. Nor have the militias disbanded, been reintegrated, or adequate reconstruction taken place. Clearly these failures are not solely due to UNMIS. However, UNMIS is not blameless.

Hopefully with the recent Abyei border decision of the Permanent Arbitrator Tribunal in The Hague, which has been accepted rhetorically by Khartoum and Juba, the CPA implementation can proceed. Yet many questions regarding cooperation, capacity and competence remain with respect to the 2010 election, viability of the Government of Southern Sudan, economic development and the 2011 referendum. The challenges are substantial and the role of UNAMIS is consequential if CPA full implementation is to be achieved.

The United Nations Peacekeeping Operation in Darfur has been even more problematic. The conflict in Darfur flashed in 2003. A small rebel attack on a Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) airfield in Darfur destroyed some aircraft and killed a few SAF soldiers. Rather than a targeted proportional response, Khartoum “opened the gates of Hell.” The Sudan government armed Arab militia known as the Janjaweed, the Devils on Horseback and Camel. Then in coordinated attacks against innocent African Darfuris they brought destruction, devastation, death and deep despair. The United Nation estimates that over 300,000 innocents have died and 2.7 million have been displaced in Darfur. The UN has labeled Darfur as the world’s worst humanitarian crisis.

In 2004, the African Union agreed to send a regional peacekeeping mission to Darfur. The United States and many others encouraged and supported this regional response. However, the mandate for the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) was limited. The AU peacekeepers were to monitor and report on violence, not try to stop it. And the African Union’s resources in men, equipment and logistics were sorely challenged.

The United States was the most generous country supporting AMIS. In the end, the U.S. government spent approximately \$400 million on a private contractor to build the camps around Darfur required for deployment of the African peacekeepers. However, as vicious violence

continued in Darfur, it soon became apparent that in Darfur, a vast area the size of France, that 3,200 African Union peacekeepers were too few, and their mandate too weak to stabilize the situation.

An intense period followed of growing diplomatic pressure on Khartoum to accept United Nations Peacekeepers. For many months, the Government of Sudan rebuffed the UN charging that UN Peacekeepers were really an effort by Europeans to recolonize their country. Phony government orchestrated demonstrations in the streets of Khartoum protested against UN infringement of Sudan's sovereignty. Finally, in the summer of 2007, the impasse was broken when the United States and others agreed to compromise language for the UNPKO that the force would be "predominantly African." There is disagreement on what precisely that language means. Khartoum has claimed that it gave the Sudan government power to approve proposed troop contributing countries to UNAMID. This asserted veto power by Khartoum has contributed to the excruciatingly slow deployment of UNAMID to full strength as proposed peacekeepers from Nepal and Thailand were repeatedly disallowed.

During my tenure as the President's Special Envoy to Sudan, a great deal of my time and attention was focused on UNAMID. I recognized that even at UNAMID's full strength of 27,000 peacekeepers, this UN mission will be inadequate to impose peace on an area of arid desert the size of Darfur. However, it was my belief that full deployment of UNAMID could create a larger security footprint. Thereby critical international humanitarian assistance could flow to more Darfuris. Some of the predatory violence of militias, rebels and bandits could be crowded out. It would contribute to a more stable situation that might contribute to meaningful peace talks and a return of displaced Darfuris. But accelerating UNAMID deployment proved

enormously difficult. As we meet today it is 18 months since UNAMID was launched and it still is not at full strength. There is plenty of culpability to spread around.

Khartoum has been the major impediment to UNAMID's full deployment. Unlike most UNPKOs in places like Timor Lieste, Sierra Leone, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sudan does not have a weak government unable to project power throughout its territory. Indeed, the Khartoum government is strong, discipline, and, history has demonstrated, willing to engage in extreme and quite ruthless acts to stay in power. Khartoum has freely wielded its sovereign prerogatives, strength, and ample capacities to impede UNAMID: slowing UNAMID cargo at the Port of Sudan, limiting access to land with water for UNAMID camps, delaying issuing visas, and so on and so forth. The UN Secretariat, especially in the earlier months, proved inept at consultations with the sovereign government of Sudan, anemic in pressing its case, inflexible and very risk adverse. The result was a real botch of it.

The United States was not the only UN member state greatly disappointed and highly frustrated by the glacial pace of UNAMID deployment. We sought out Canada to join us as co-leaders of an ad hoc group we called "Friends of UNAMID." Its mission was to prioritize and coordinate the efforts of donor countries in concert with the UNPKO Secretariat and the African Union to accelerate UNAMID deployment and to support UNAMID politically and materially. It was the first such group in the history of the United Nations. After consulting with UN Secretary General Ban Ki moon and gaining his public support, our new mechanism was launched with over a dozen donor countries participating in the weekly meetings and in providing various extraordinary material support for UNAMID. After a slow start, once Alain Le Roy became the new Under Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operations and Susana Malcorra the new Under Secretary General for Field Support, the Friends of UNAMID really

took off and gradually the pace of deployment accelerated. I cannot say enough good things about the leadership and innovation brought to their tasks by Under Secretaries General Le Roy and Malcorra. They have demonstrated repeatedly how personalities, energy and innovation can empower leaders and improve performance.

Meanwhile, in addition to launching the Friends of UNAMID, the United States has been very active on other fronts to accelerate deployment. The United States' built African peacekeeper camps in Darfur have become UNAMID camps. The United States spent \$100 million to train and equip peacekeepers for UNAMID from Rwanda, Senegal and other African countries. The United States has supplied transportation lift to get some of the peacekeepers to Darfur. And the United States, in coordination with the UN Secretariat, has been relentless in pressuring Khartoum to lift their many impediments to UNAMID deployment and operations.

Is UNMIS *the* answer to Sudan North/South peace and full implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement? Is UNAMID *the* answer to the tragic genocide in slow motion in Darfur? Absolutely NOT! But UNMIS and UNAMID are each *an* answer. Each of these UNPKOs are making the situations better. Each is contributing to an improved situation on the ground and contributing to some improved stability for peace to have a chance. Are they worth the cost, the personnel, the risks they assume? That's a difficult decision which with UNMIS and UNAMID, as in all UNPKOs, is a case by case decision that warrants reconsideration as events unfold.

General Observations

United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, like all mechanisms of foreign and security policy, are imperfect. There are times UNPKOs are very useful in advancing United States interests. In general UNPKOs deserve our support. However, there is ample room for

improvement and the United States as a Permanent Member of the UN Security Council and as the largest financial contributor to UN Peacekeeping budgets must be a leader and forward leaning in working to reform and improve UN Peacekeeping Operations.

One, the United States must be realistic about what a UNPKO can do, the limits of its capacity. There are limits of available peacekeepers from Troop Contributing Countries. There are limits of available equipment such as helicopters with night vision. There are limits to the political leverage and influence of the United Nations, especially when dealing with deeply entrenched sovereign governments. These limits and others must be understood, acknowledged, and be part of the analysis of whether or not to support authorization of any new UNPKO.

Two, the United States must be steely-eyed and crystal clear in assessing the real support within the UN Security Council for any new UNPKO. Both political will and material support is required not only at the launch of a new UNPKO but it must be sustained throughout. Especially if one or more of the Security Council Permanent Members have direct interests in a conflict or with one party of a conflict, the effectiveness of the UNPKO will be compromised on various fronts. In such situations the likelihood of success is substantially compromised.

Three, the United States should not be so anxious to launch a UNPKO that it accepts inadequate mandates or too small a force size to get the job done. Nor can it accept infringement on UNPKO's composition, freedom of movement and so on. Better not to approve a UNPKO than to launch one inadequate to the assignment.

Four, UNPKOs ought not be immortal. Some UNPKO interpositional forces such as in Cypress and Western Sahara were deployed in acute situations that, over time, have calmed down. The dispute is resolvable but the pain on either side is not acute enough to compel compromise. The status quo may not be preferable, but it is acceptable. The UNPKO allows a

comfort to set in. Unresolved issues remain unresolved because, due to the UNPKO, they don't need to be resolved. That's rubbish. The parties should be forced to resolve their problems and move on. UNPKOs ought not become nannies allowing complacency to set in and issues to remain indefinitely unresolved.

Five, UNPKOs must be more flexible. They must be better at adapting to the situation and adjusting. For example, helicopters with night vision might be preferable to transport UNPKO equipment and personnel and to aid peacekeepers under attack. However, if unavailable, helicopter without night vision are better than no helicopters. For example, tragically last year some UNAMID peacekeepers were attacked and some killed. Attack helicopters without night vision had been available for months, but UNAMID's position was they did not meet specifications, so they refused the offer. For the UNAMID peacekeepers under attack during daylight, the available helicopters certainly would have been welcome.

Six, recognize that in difficult environments a lead dog can be very helpful. The United Kingdom played that lead role with peacekeeping in Sierra Leone and France in Cote D'Ivoire.

Seven, there needs to be reform of the work program of the UN's Fifth Committee. That body spends the entire year on the UN Regular Budget of approximately \$3 billion. However, it devotes only the month of May to the UN Peacekeeping budget of almost \$8 billion.

Eight, UN Peacekeeping Operations, like other UN bodies and mechanisms, should conform to the highest standards of procurement and management. Unfortunately, such standards have not always been met. To insure appropriate oversight and accountability, the UN Office of Internal Oversight Service (OIOS) should be supported politically and financially. It should be urged to deal appropriately and expeditiously with the cases referred by the

Procurement Task Force and a permanent appointment should be made for the person in charge of investigations.

Nine, progress must be made to “standardize” UNPKO equipment, especially common communications equipment system wide.

Ten, often the most important determinant of a successful UNPKO is the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) and the Deputy SRSG. The personality, energy, drive, political skill, commitment, innovation and overall talent of the SRSG and Deputy SRSG are absolutely critical. Nonetheless, the capabilities of SRSG range from outstanding personalities like Laktar Brahimi and Sergio Vieira de Mello to the merely adequate to the buffoonish. Geographic consideration, cronyism, and a general lack of rigor in the selection of SRSGs and Deputy SRSGs must end. Both the Secretary General and the Security Council must change past sloppy, haphazard selection practices and slack accountability and reform to provide the sort of selection process and oversight of these posts warranted by their importance and the seriousness of their mission.

Eleven, similarly UNPKO Force Commanders often are picked because of nationality and politics, not competence. This too must end. It’s a deadly serious business and should be treated as such.

Twelve, there should be common training for UNPKOs whatever their country of origin: a common procedure, manual and practice.

Thirteen, progress has been made but more is required for UNPKO activity to be integrated with the World Food Program and other important UN humanitarian agencies active in conflict and post-conflict arenas.

Fourteen, there needs to be better training and monitoring of UNPKOs on human rights – especially exploitation of women and children, and HIV-AIDS.

Let me note that under the supervision of United Nations Under Secretaries General Alain Le Roy and Susana Malcorra the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support this month published an excellent 46 page Non-Paper titled *A New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping*. It contains some of the recommendations I have mentioned and others to improve UN Peacekeeping Operations. Many critical issues are raised. I commend it to the members of this Committee and your staff.

Conclusion

I close where I began my testimony. United Nations Peacekeeping Operations can be very useful in advancing United States interests and in helping make the world safer and more secure. UNPKOs deserve support. But, at the same time, reform is needed to improve their operations. And, most important, hard eyed realism is required of the United States in the Security Council and discrimination is necessary on whether or not to approve UNPKOs. It is not the place to off load problems. It is not the place to overload the mechanism's capacity. It is not the place to approve missions for which our or other's political will equivocates or toward which inadequate resources will be deployed. The most critical UNPKO mistakes are often in their inception and launch. Passing a problem to a UNPKO is *not* solving a problem. It is only a beginning of a solution that requires political and material support and efficient, effective, and persistent leadership and very hard work on the ground.

Thank you.