

Committee on Foreign Affairs Hearing

New Challenges for International Peacekeeping Operations

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Testimony of:

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## GENERAL

Seven decades after peacekeeping began and ten years after the Brahimi report the world is facing increasing demands to engage and bring stability to regions where fragile governance is endemic. Global peacekeeping is at an all time high. The number of troops deployed in UN operations alone has risen 600% in the past six years. The number and sophistication of the spoilers have increased as has the demands on the international community to act. Peace building has become a part of most missions and has proved not only complicated and difficult but also dangerous. Security is at the heart of these conflicts. The challenge is how to establish a safe and secure environment so that the peace process and peace building can succeed.

The new USIP Book soon to be published, *Guidelines on Reconstruction and Stabilization*, states that in its broadest sense, security is an “all encompassing condition” that takes freedom, safety, governance, human rights, public health, and access to resources into account. This is commonly known as “human security.” USIP defines security as the physical security which permits the freedom necessary to pursue a permanent peace.

Security rests the four following elements: information, management of spoilers, reform of the security sector and protection of human rights.

### **Information:**

Sharing timely information about threats and potential threats to the peace process or the population is vital to security. It requires developing deep links with and an understanding of the population.

### **Management of spoilers**

Spoilers are individuals or parties who believe that the peace process threatens their power and interests and will therefore work to undermine it. The peacekeeping mission should understand what gives power brokers power, including their financing, their roles in the previous regime and their standing in the community. It should recognize that they exist in the economic, political, and security arenas, both at the local and national level. They may have fed off the conflict or emerged in the wake of defeat as new spoilers. If reconcilable, spoilers should be encouraged to change their behavior over time. Depending on their motives and capacity at state and local levels, spoilers may need to be dealt with militarily, or through political or economic negotiations.

### **Reform of the security sector**

Control of the security apparatus is the basic source of state power and its use will likely have been one of the major drivers of conflict. Its reform therefore is a priority. Security sector reform touches every aspect of an S&R mission: actors directly involved in protecting civilians and the state from violence (e.g., police and military forces and internal intelligence agencies), institutions that govern these actors and manage their funding (e.g., ministries of interior, defense, and justice; and national security councils),

and oversight bodies (legislative and non-governmental). Reform aims to create a professional security sector that is legitimate, impartial and accountable to the population.

## **Protection of human rights**

A human rights-based approach, where all actions uphold human rights, is required to establish the necessary conditions for each and every end state selected. This involves a mandate to protect and promote human rights and ensure that the host nation has the will and capacity to do so on its own. Rights protected under international law include life, liberty and security of person; the highest attainable standard of health; a fair trial; just and favorable working conditions; adequate food, housing and social security; education; equal protection of the law; and a nationality. These also include freedom from arbitrary interference with privacy, family, home or correspondence; arbitrary arrest or detention; torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; slavery; and freedom of association, expression, assembly and movement.

Below is the status of the US and UN attempts to address the issues of security since the operations in the Balkans and Rwanda. There has been some progress at least in recognizing that this is an issue that must be addressed. This reflects my personal assessment and not that of DOD.

## **1. Policy and Direction**

- a. **National Security Strategy 2006**: The national security policy contains some key phrases that deal with the issue of human security and civilian protection but this direction was not echoed in any of the following documents that provided guidance to the Department of Defense. Here are the two mentions of Genocide and civilian protection in the NSS:
  - i. In Darfur, the people of an impoverished region are the victims of genocide arising from a civil war that pits a murderous militia, backed by the Sudanese Government, against a collection of rebel groups.
  - ii. Genocide: Patient efforts to end conflicts should not be mistaken for tolerance of the intolerable. Genocide is the intent to destroy in whole or in part a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group. The world needs to start honoring a principle that many believe has lost its force in parts of the international community in recent years: genocide must not be tolerated. It is a moral imperative that states take action to prevent and punish genocide. History teaches that sometimes other states will not act unless America does its part. We must refine United States Government efforts – economic, diplomatic, and law-enforcement – so that they target those individuals responsible for genocide and not the innocent citizens they rule. Where perpetrators of mass killing defy all attempts at peaceful intervention, armed intervention may be required, preferably by the forces of several nations working together under appropriate regional or international auspices. We must not allow

the legal debate over the technical definition of “genocide” to excuse inaction. The world must act in cases of mass atrocities and mass killing that will eventually lead to genocide even if the local parties are not prepared for peace.

- iii. **National Defense Strategy 2008**: This document contains neither Genocide nor Mass Atrocities nor Human Rights Violations nor any other code word for Genocide or anything about civilian protection.
- iv. **National Military Strategy 2005**: This document contains neither Genocide nor Mass Atrocities nor Human Rights Violations nor any other code word for Genocide.

## 2. Concepts and Doctrine

### a. UN Concepts and Doctrine

- i. The UN made great strides with the publication of their capstone doctrine in 2008, **UN Principles and Guidelines** that provided overarching guidance. It states that one of the core business of UN peacekeeping is to “create a secure and stable environment while strengthening the State’s ability to provide security, with full respect for the rule of law and human rights.”
- ii. The UN doctrine goes on to address the issue of civilian protection without mentioning genocide or mass atrocities. The following is an extract from the document:
  - 1. “In situations of internal armed conflict, civilians account for the vast majority of casualties. Many civilians are forcibly uprooted within their own countries and have specific vulnerabilities arising from their displacement. As a result, most multi-dimensional United Nations peacekeeping operations are now mandated by the Security Council to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence. The protection of civilians requires concerted and coordinated action among the military, police and civilian components of a United Nations peacekeeping operation and must be mainstreamed into the planning and conduct of its core activities. United Nations humanitarian agencies and non-governmental organization (NGO) partners also undertake a broad range of activities in support of the protection of civilians.”
  - 2. Although this guidance is essential, there is still a need for subordinate guidance to assist the Mission Commanders

and the SRSG. For example, what guidance does a mission commander have in doctrine on how to establish a safe and secure environment that includes the protection of civilians? What guidance do the police have? The Challenges Forum is addressing this gap:

- iii. **Challenges Forum and Future Doctrine and Concept Development for 2008-2009.** The International Forum for the Challenges of Peace Operations is currently comprised of 16 partner nations and seeks to promote and broaden the international dialogue between key stakeholders addressing peace operations issues in a timely, effective and inclusive manner. In January 2009, PKSOI hosted a workshop that brought together military and civilian partners from governments and international organizations to plan and initiate a series of workshops and engagements designed to “operationalize” the three “core businesses of peacekeeping operations” as stated in the UN Peacekeeping Operations: **Principles and Guidelines** document. The series consists of three parallel workshop strands, the results of which will be presented at the International Forum for the Challenges of Peace Operations in Australia in April 2010. These work strands are:

1. Working Group One: “Create a secure and stable environment while strengthening the State’s ability to provide security, with full respect for the rule of law and human rights.” Lead Pakistan; assist United States (PKSOI). The key questions that this group must answer are:
  - a. What is a secure and stable environment?
  - b. What are the short term immediate requirements?
  - c. What are the long term requirements?
  - d. What are the recurring operational tradeoffs?
  - e. How to determine the proper prioritization and sequencing of mandate’s tasks as related to their functional relationships in a balanced manner to include Military, Police, etc
    - A. Identified the points of friction/gaps
    - B. Synchronize the relationships
    - C. Consider capability and capacity limitations

## D. Where will risk be assumed or tolerated

2. Working Group Two: “Facilitate the political process by promoting dialogue and reconciliation and supporting the establishment of legitimate and effective institutions of governance.” Lead Canada (Pearson Peacekeeping), assist India.
  3. Working Group Three: “Provide a framework for ensuring that all United Nations and other international actors pursue their activities at the country-level in a coherent and coordinated manner.” Lead South Africa, assist Australia.
- iv. **SPU Training Mission Essential Task List Development 2009**  
Police are an essential part of providing for a safe and secure environment and ensuring human security. PKSOI is working with the UN on Police Training and Certification to develop a Formed Police Unit FPU Mission Essential Task List (METL) and Training Certification Standards. The results of this are being published now July 2009.
- v. **Center of Excellence for Standing Police Units (CoESPU) G-8 Action Plan June 2004:** This center was established as “...international training center that would serve as a Center of Excellence to provide training and skills for peace support operations. The center will build on the experience and expertise of the Carabinieri, Gendarmerie and other similar forces to develop carabinieri/gendarme-like units of interested nations, including those in Africa, for peace support operations.” CoESPU commits itself to train 3000 Officers and Non-Commissioned Officers, who will, following the principle of train-the-trainer, return to their countries. It has trained 1,932 stability police trainers from 29 countries and plans to complete the training of at least 4,500 additional personnel before the end of 2010. US has provided financial, technical, and staffing support to COESPU.

## b. US Concepts and Doctrine

- i. **US Government Counterinsurgency Guide 2009** This is the only multi-agency doctrinal guide that the US Government possesses. It emphasizes that the central focus of COIN is on the people of the country and their needs. Neither genocide nor requirement to protect civilians or peoples is mentioned specifically but it is implied by the sections on security and security sector reform. Here is the section on Security: “Security operations, conducted in support of a political strategy, coordinated with economic development activity

and integrated with an information campaign, will provide human security to the population and improve the political and economic situation at the local level. This should increase society's acceptance of the government and, in turn, popular support for the COIN campaign. COIN functions therefore include informational, security, political and economic components, all of which are designed to support the overall objective of establishing and consolidating control over the environment, then transferring it to effective and legitimate local authorities."

**i. USIP Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction:**

USIP goal in writing this document was to develop guiding principles based on the collective experience of multiple actors to guide strategic-level, whole-of-government planning for stabilization and reconstruction. USIP, with support from the U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI), conducted a comprehensive review of existing documents produced by international and U.S. actors to identify shared principles and to present them in a user-friendly format for policymakers and practitioners. This is to be published by the end of July 09. One of the key sections is "establishing a safe and secure environment." This provides key concepts and approaches to be followed.

**1.** "A safe and secure environment is one in which the population has the freedom to pursue daily activities without fear of politically motivated, persistent or large-scale violence. Such an environment is characterized by an end to large-scale fighting, an adequate level of public order, the subordination of accountable security forces to legitimate state authority, the protection of key individuals, communities, sites, and infrastructure, and the freedom for people and goods to move about the country and across borders without fear of undue harm to life and limb. The document has identified the following as the key components of a Safe and Secure environment in addition to addressing gaps and measurers of success. The constituents of a safe and secure environment are:

- a.** Cessation of large-scale violence
- b.** Establishment of public order
- c.** Legitimate state monopoly over the means of violence
- d.** Physical security

e. Territorial security”

2. The document then identifies the following operational tradeoffs that the senior leadership in a mission must consider:

- a. **“Prioritizing short-term stability vs. confronting impunity** Dealing with groups or individuals who prosecuted the conflict may be necessary early on to bring certain factions into the fold or to mitigate tensions. But turning a blind eye to continued use of political violence against rivals or exploitation of criminal networks to generate illicit revenue will enshrine a culture of impunity that threatens sustainable peace.
- b. **Using local security forces to enhance legitimacy vs. using international security forces to ensure effectiveness** While international security forces may be more effective in performing security functions, having local security forces assume these responsibilities would enhance legitimacy. But local forces often lack the capacity to perform effectively and may have a reputation for corruption and grave human rights abuses. Balancing this tradeoff involves training and mentoring local forces and gradually transitioning responsibilities from international actors.
- c. **Applying force vs. maintaining mission legitimacy** Public order operations may require the use of force, especially where spoilers and a culture of impunity are widespread. Assertive action ensures credibility, but excessive force can also jeopardize the legitimacy of the mission, especially early on when a mission is under public scrutiny. Finding a way to balance this tradeoff is essential and should involve international stability police who are proficient in the use of non-lethal force.
- d. **Public order functions performed by the military vs. the police** Achieving public order in these environments often presents a difficult dilemma as to which institution – military or police – should perform public order functions. While the military has training and experience in the use of force against violent spoilers, they lack the requisite skills in investigations,



forensics and other critical law enforcement functions. Traditional police units, on the other hand, are trained in nuanced use of force and non-lethal means. Meshing the capabilities of both these organizations is critical to meet public order needs.

- e. **Short-term security imperatives vs. investments in broader security reform** With limited resources to work with, it may be difficult to balance short- and long-term requirements. The need for immediate security (i.e., protection for elections) may divert donor resources and energy from long-term SSR efforts. Demonstrating quick wins can build credibility, but may jeopardize the development of a foundation for deeper reform of the security sector. A proper balance must be struck.”

## ii. US Military Doctrine and Concepts

- 3. **Army Doctrine:** The Army has adopted the concept of “Full Spectrum Operations” that directs that the military must continuously address tasks dealing with the population of a region. The Army must “shape the civil situation” as all future conflicts will most likely be “among the people.” There can be no lasting peace unless the Army supports all of the instruments of power to gain a sustain peace after major combat operations have succeeded.
  - a. **FM 3-0 2008** States that the nature of “land power is to gain, sustain and exploit control over land, resources, and peoples.” This will be accomplished through the following campaign Themes: Peace Time Engagement, Peace Operations, Limited Interventions, and Irregular Warfare. The objective is to create a “secure environment” so that a viable peace can be achieved through the use of the other instruments of power.
  - b. FM 3-0 does provide a provision for removing a government but not for violation of human rights or Genocide. The document states: “On the president’s order, Army forces support insurgencies that oppose regimes that threaten US interests or regional stability.”

- c. FM3-0 does provide adequate guidance at the operational level to accomplish any mission related to the prevention and response to Genocide or civilian protection. However, there is a lack of discussion or direct recognition concerning the protection of vulnerable or affected populations. The thrust of the doctrine is broad toward achieving viable peace. Limited Interventions include noncombatant evacuation operations, strike, raid, show of force, foreign humanitarian assistance, consequence management, and sanction enforcement. Several of these operations would be applicable in a limited response to Genocide. In the case that a government is the cause of the Genocide the document is silent.
- d. **FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency 2006** The US ARMY and USMC manual is the only manual written that uses the word Genocide when describing the environment. This is how it is used: "A society is not easily created or destroyed, but it is possible to do so through genocide or war." Beyond that general statement the word is not used in the manual again.
- e. The basis for COIN is to build local capacity and address the drivers of conflict to control the insurgency. Civilian security is key and essential. The manual states: "The cornerstone of any COIN effort is establishing security for the civilian populace." It does not address the complicating issues associated with the requirement to protect populations. It does however go into some detail on the requirement to protect military contractors.
- f. The manual does recognize some international law that applies. It states: "Fundamental human rights. The United Nations Declaration on Human Rights and the International Convention for Civil and Political Rights provide a guide for applicable human rights. The latter provides for derogation from certain rights, however, during a state of emergency. Respect for the full panoply of human rights should be the goal of the host nation...In conventional conflicts, balancing competing responsibilities of mission accomplishment with protection of noncombatants is difficult enough. Complex COIN operations place the toughest of

ethical demands on Soldiers, Marines, and their leaders.”

- g. The manual does recognize that the host nation security forces may be a problem and need to be reformed: “During any period of instability, people’s primary interest is physical security for themselves and their families. When HN forces fail to provide security or threaten the security of civilians, the population is likely to seek security guarantees from insurgents, militias, or other armed groups. This situation can feed support for an insurgency. However, when HN forces provide physical security, people are more likely to support the government. Commanders therefore identify the following: Whether the population is safe from harm. Whether there is a functioning police and judiciary system. Whether the police and courts are fair and nondiscriminatory. Who provides security for each group when no effective, fair government security apparatus exists? The provision of security by the HN government must occur in conjunction with political and economic reform.”
- h. The manual provides some tools that will assist the commander in identifying issue related to civilian concerns such as a significant section on culture and another on civilian considerations.
- i. This manual still assumes that there is a host nation government that has legitimacy and the problem is with insurgent forces trying to undermine that legitimacy. In that situation this manual provides enough guidance for a military force to address Genocide or mass atrocity caused by forces not associated with the host nation government. It does come up short on addressing the problems associated with defining what civilian protection might entail. However, if the host nation government itself is the cause of the Genocide then that situation is not covered by this document.
- j. **FM 3-07 Stability 2008:** This document provides capstone guidance. “FM 3-07 Stability” has a chapter about Security Sector Reform and talks about military support to a comprehensive approach to increasing

local capacity to provide security. In the aftermath of conflict or disaster, conditions often create a significant security vacuum within the state. The government institutions are either unwilling or unable to provide security. In many cases, these institutions do not operate within internationally accepted norms. They are rife with corruption, abusing the power entrusted to them by the state. Sometimes these institutions actually embody the greatest threat to the populace. These conditions only serve to ebb away at the very foundation of the host nation's stability. The following is an extract from that manual:

- k. "Security is the most immediate concern of the military force, a concern typically shared by the local populace. A safe and secure environment is one in which these civilians can live their day-to-day lives without fear of being drawn into violent conflict or victimized by criminals. Achieving this condition requires extensive collaboration with civil authorities, the trust and confidence of the people, and strength of perseverance.
  - l. The most immediate threat to a safe and secure environment is generally a return to fighting by former warring parties. However, insurgent forces, criminal elements, and terrorists also significantly threaten the safety and security of the local populace. The following objectives support a safe and secure environment:
    - A. Cessation of large-scale violence enforced.
    - B. Public security established.
    - C. Legitimate monopoly over means of violence established.
    - D. Physical protection established.
    - E. Territorial security established"
4. **Joint Doctrine:** JP 3-0 is the Joint Forces Capstone Doctrine. The following are taken from the current manual written 17 September 2006

- a. Genocide or mass atrocity is not mentioned in this manual. There is limited guidance in this document concerning the protection of civilians. The only discussion of protection aside from protecting the force is the following: “protection extends to civil infrastructure of friendly nations and non-military participants (NGO, IO).” “Protection may involve the security of host national authorities and OGA, IGO, and NGO members if authorized by higher authority.” “Limited contingency operations may involve a requirement to protect nonmilitary personnel. In the absence of the rule of law, the JFC must address when, how, and to what extent he will extend force protection to civilians and what that protection means.” There is no discussion about any requirement to protect populations at risk.
- b. The general guidance for Stability Operations in this document states: “Of particular importance will be Civil Military Operations (CMO); initially conducted to secure and safeguard the populace, reestablishing civil law and order, protect or rebuild key infrastructure, and restore public services. US military forces should be prepared to lead the activities necessary to accomplish these tasks when indigenous civil, USG, multinational or international capacity does not exist or is incapable of assuming responsibility. Once legitimate civil authority is prepared to conduct such tasks, US military forces may support such activities as required/necessary.”
- c. Again JP 3-0 does provide adequate guidance at the operational level to accomplish any mission related to the prevention and response to Genocide and civilian protection. However, there is still a lack of any in-depth discussion or direct recognition concerning the protection of vulnerable or affected populations. It does cover the support to an insurgency to overthrow a government but there is no mention of dealing with a government who is perpetrating Genocide.
- d. The joint staff has directed that a joint manual on stability be developed based on Army FM 3-07. This manual should expand on the work already started in the Army manual. JFCOM has developed a handbook “The Rule of Law and Security Sector Reform

Handbook: A Practical Guide for Operational Planners and Commanders” as an immediate guide that will form the basis for future doctrine.

## 5. **The Mass Atrocity Response Operations (MARO)**

**Project:** Based on the paucity of doctrinal writing on the topic of protection, mass atrocities and genocide, the MARO project was started. MARO is a partnership between PKSOI and the Carr Center at the Kennedy School of Government, Harvard. The Director of the Carr Center, Professor Sarah Sewall, envisioned the project’s objective as developing a military concept of operations to guide intervention in a mass atrocity. An Annotated Planning Framework, was developed in August 2008. It is generically written to serve as a guide and tool for combatant command-level planners in modifying their planning methods to better fit this mission. The framework was developed in concert with several military and civil planners and was considered May 09 by Unified Quest the US Army Title 10 War Game and will be examined at the International Experts Workshop Sep 09 in UK. Despite a National Security Strategy (2006) that declares “...genocide must not be tolerated. It is a moral imperative that states take action to prevent and punish genocide.... We must refine United States Government efforts – economic, diplomatic, and law-enforcement – so that they target those individuals responsible for genocide... Where perpetrators of mass killing defy all attempts at peaceful intervention, armed intervention may be required...” This has as of yet not found its way into the Defense directives that would drive defense planning. MARO is an attempt to gain awareness so that the QDR and guidance from the DOD will address these issues.

### **c. Assessing the Situation for the Whole of Government**

- i. Addressing the causes and consequences of weak and failed states has become an urgent priority for the U.S. Government (USG). To address the issues of mass atrocities and human security understanding must occur. Conflict both contributes to and results from state fragility. To effectively prevent or resolve violent conflict, the USG needs tools and approaches that enable coordination of U.S. diplomatic, development and military efforts in support of local institutions and actors seeking to resolve their disputes peacefully.

- ii. A first step toward a more effective and coordinated response to help states prevent, mitigate and recover from violent conflict is the development of shared understanding among USG agencies about the sources of violent conflict or civil strife. Achieving this shared understanding of the dynamics of a particular crisis requires both a joint interagency process for conducting the assessment and a common conceptual framework to guide the collection and analysis of information.
- iii. ICAF (Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework) ICAF is an NSC approved assessment tool to develop a commonly held understanding across relevant USG Departments and Agencies of the dynamics driving and mitigating violent conflict within a country that informs US policy and planning decisions. It may also include steps to establish a strategic baseline against which USG engagement can be evaluated.
- iv. ICAF is now a part of Army doctrine FM 3-07 and is taught to the USMC at their training centers as a tool to begin to understand the dynamics of the situation.

## d. Education and Training

- i. **United Nations:** UN has just posted the Core Pre-deployment Training Materials (CPTMs), which are based primarily on the Capstone doctrine and the DPKO/DFS Policy on Authority, Command and Control. The Core Pre-deployment Training Materials are now posted on a new website, the Peacekeeping Resource Hub ([peacekeepingresourcehub.unlb.org](http://peacekeepingresourcehub.unlb.org)) and DPKO is starting to work with training centers on integrating them into their pre-deployment training programs.
  - 1. The finalization of the CPTMs has been a huge step forward in the improvement of the new UN Peacekeeping Pre-deployment Training Standards, are unfortunately still not quite complete. Following a positive response from the C-34, ITS has begun the process of issuing formal UN Peacekeeping Pre-deployment Training Standards for specific categories of staff (individual police officers, military experts on mission, staff officers, etc.). This is an authoritative document transmitted to Member States which outlines the objective of pre-deployment training for those personnel, and the required course specifications. It is through this Standards document that DPKO are making it clear to Member States that the Core Pre-deployment Training Materials (and the relevant Specialized Training

Materials, where they exist) must be covered during pre-deployment training. This should hopefully start to rectify the problem of certain topics in the old SGTMs being left out by Member States who may not have felt that topic was important.

2. By the end of the year, we intend to have a set UN Peacekeeping Pre-deployment Training Standards for:
  - a. - Individual police officers
  - b. - Formed Police Units (FPUs)
  - c. - Military experts on mission (military observers, liaison officers etc.)
  - d. - Military staff officers
  - e. - Civilians
- ii. **United States:** The US military has taken several initiatives to address the educational issues.
  1. POTI (Peace Operations Training Initiative): POTI is an extensive on line course that allows individuals to become familiar with how the UN plans and conducts operations as well as key issues such as protection of civilian and populations at risk. It is available with little or no charge to Africa, Latin America and Canada and some other allies but not to US personnel. PKSOI is coordinating with OSD to pay for a certificate that allows DOD personnel to take this online education. PKSOI is also coordinating with SCRS through the training and education sub-PCC to make this distance learning available to the Civilian Stabilization Initiative.
  2. US Army War College: PKSOI facilitated the participation of UN DPKO officials in the US Army War College run Joint Force Land Component Commander (JFLCC) Courses, Elective Courses, and Strategists Courses. The UN DPKO Military Advisor, Former Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG), and planners from the UNDPKO have participated annually in support of these educational opportunities.
  3. US Army Combined Arms Center (CAC), Ft Leavenworth: PKSOI conducts UN training and awareness for the C&GSC class every year and collaborates with UN DPKO to ensure



currency. CAC is expanding its education this year to support the new FM 3-07 Stability Operations doctrine and will be looking to raise awareness Army-wide on the UN and its operations.

4. Joint Knowledge on Line: PKSOI on behalf of SOUTHCOM working with US Joint Forces Command is developing an on-line instructional package on the UN Integrated Mission Planning Process to be completed in Aug 2009. PKSOI is coordinating through UN DPET which will review the contents for possible use in a UN context. This supports the needs of the COCOM as well as DPKO.

## **5. Army Training**

- a. CTC Realistic Challenges: CTCs have shifted from their traditional focus to train on stability tasks using the population as the center of gravity. They have contracted for role players to replicate not only local actors but also members of the other agencies of government. Security of civilians is one of the issues that are addressed. It is always a challenge to obtain the correct role players and members of the current other agencies of government to insure valid portrayals of the issues.
- b. Training Advisors: Significant efforts are underway to prepare US forces to train others. The Field Manual that supports this effort does discuss civilian protection based on FM 3-07. The Army Universal Task List does contain tasks on commander's obligations to civilian populations. This was just published this year so the concepts are working their way through the system but needs monitoring. The FMs that deal directly with advising and training are silent on any issue dealing with civilian protection so more work needs to be done.