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GAO-09-527R: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

April 30, 2009: 

Congressional Requesters: 

Subject: Nuclear Forensics: Comprehensive Interagency Plan Needed to 
Address Human Capital Issues: 

The detonation of a nuclear weapon or radiological dispersal device 
(RDD) in the United States or elsewhere would cause decision makers to 
immediately demand information on the nature of the device--including 
its design, the materials used to build it, and the materials' source-
-as well as the identification of the perpetrators. Technical nuclear 
forensics--the analysis of nuclear or radiological materials that are 
intercepted or the radioactive debris and prompt output signals (such 
as gamma rays) produced by a nuclear event--can contribute to the 
identification of the sources of these materials and the processes used 
to create them. Analytical techniques developed to determine the nature 
of nuclear tests can be used if terrorists were to detonate a nuclear 
device or RDD and radioactive debris samples were recovered (known as 
"postdetonation" nuclear forensics). Nuclear forensic techniques also 
could potentially be used to determine the origin of nuclear or 
radiological materials or devices seized prior to their use in a weapon 
(known as "predetonation" nuclear forensics). The U.S. government's 
predetonation nuclear forensics capabilities have been demonstrated in 
investigations on seized nuclear material from illicit smuggling 
operations. In addition, it is important to note that nuclear forensics 
represents a key piece of the overall effort to identify specific 
perpetrators of a nuclear event, in a process known as attribution. The 
combination of nuclear forensics conclusions, law enforcement findings 
(e.g., traditional forensics, such as fingerprint analysis), and 
intelligence information can be used to attribute an event to specific 
perpetrators. 

The departments of Defense (DOD), Energy (DOE), Homeland Security 
(DHS), and State (State), as well as the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) and the intelligence community, would play key 
roles in a nuclear forensics investigation. The specific roles these 
agencies would play were established in August 2007 through a 
presidential decision directive. This directive also formally 
established the National Technical Nuclear Forensics Center (NTNFC) 
within DHS's Domestic Nuclear Detection Office to coordinate planning, 
integration, assessment, and stewardship of the U.S. government's 
nuclear forensics capabilities. NTNFC has chartered a number of 
interagency groups to guide policy making for the National Technical 
Nuclear Forensics (NTNF) program and has led the development of key 
interagency documents such as the NTNF strategic plan. 

In this context, you asked us to assess the (1) challenges the U.S. 
government faces in developing and maintaining a comprehensive nuclear 
forensics capability and (2) current and future costs associated with 
the U.S. government's nuclear forensics efforts. In February 2009, we 
reported to you on the results of our work in a classified report. 
[Footnote 1] This letter summarizes certain aspects of our classified 
report. 

To address these objectives, we reviewed program documents and 
interviewed officials from DOD; DOE; DHS; State; FBI; the Office of the 
Director of National Intelligence; the Executive Office of the 
President and, within that office, the Homeland Security Council and 
the Office of Science and Technology Policy; the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission (NRC); the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); and 
eight DOE national laboratories that support the NTNF program. We 
visited four of these national laboratories: Lawrence Livermore, Los 
Alamos, Pacific Northwest, and Savannah River--as well as a DOD 
facility involved in nuclear forensics. In addition, we observed part 
of the October 2008 interagency nuclear forensics exercise at Ft. 
Bragg, North Carolina. Regarding our examination of challenges facing 
the NTNF program, we reviewed program documentation, including a report 
from NTNFC's 2008 workshop on the national laboratories' human capital 
requirements for nuclear forensics and surveys on the NTNF program's 
manpower needs. We also reviewed documents from and had discussions 
with six professors from five universities that award Ph.D. degrees for 
study in radiochemistry. To select those professors, we used a 
judgmental sample of academicians from major university programs that 
grant Ph.D. degrees in radiochemistry. To assess the current and 
expected budget for nuclear forensics activities, we met with officials 
from DOD, DOE, DHS, State, and FBI to review budget information from 
the NTNF program. We discussed and reviewed these data with budget and 
program analysts at these agencies. In addition, we interviewed 
knowledgeable officials on the reliability of these data, including 
issues such as data entry, access, quality control procedures, and the 
accuracy and completeness of the data. We determined that these data 
were sufficiently reliable for purposes of this review. 

We conducted the work for the classified report between January 2008 
through February 2009 in accordance with generally accepted government 
auditing standards, and we conducted our work for the unclassified 
report in accordance with the same standards between March 2009 and 
April 2009. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit 
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable 
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 
We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for 
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

Summary: 

Agencies implementing the NTNF program face challenges in reducing the 
time needed to arrive at nuclear forensics conclusions and addressing 
human capital shortages in key disciplines--such as radiochemistry-- 
needed for nuclear forensics. Agencies are working to significantly 
reduce the time needed to collect, transport, and analyze nuclear 
forensics samples after an event. For example, DOD has supported a 
variety of research and development efforts to make sample collection 
more efficient. In addition, DOE national laboratories are engaged in 
research and development initiatives to automate laboratory techniques 
used to analyze radioactive samples and to modernize aging equipment. 
With regard to human capital challenges, agencies lack a comprehensive 
interagency plan to guide their efforts. DHS has led interagency 
efforts to promote the development of trained nuclear forensics 
experts, including funding summer schools and internships. However, the 
agency has not fully assessed the demand for these specialists from 
competing areas outside the NTNF program, such as private industry. In 
addition, DHS-led efforts to promote radiochemistry have not been well 
coordinated with similar programs at DOE and NRC. To address the human 
capital challenges facing the program, we are recommending that DHS 
work with other agencies to develop a comprehensive interagency plan. 

According to DHS, agencies implementing the NTNF program planned to 
spend about $60 million and $59 million in fiscal years 2008 and 2009, 
respectively, but the future budgetary needs to support the program are 
unknown. Regarding current program costs, the projected spending total 
DHS provided underestimates the program's true costs because it does 
not include costs associated with many DOD, DOE, and State programs 
that are critical to supporting nuclear forensics. The long-term future 
budget for the NTNF program is undetermined, in part, because agencies 
have not developed a plan to mitigate any possible reductions in the 
funding streams for activities that currently pay for the 
infrastructure, equipment, and personnel upon which the nation's 
nuclear forensics capabilities depend. We are recommending that 
agencies more fully account for the amounts spent on other DOD, DOE, 
and State efforts that the NTNF program relies upon and take steps to 
mitigate potential effects of budget reductions for these efforts. 

We provided a draft of our classified report to DOD, DOE, DHS, FBI, 
NRC, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, State, and 
the Executive Office of the President. DOD and NRC provided written 
comments, the unclassified portions of which can be found in enclosures 
I and II, respectively. The Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence and State also provided classified written comments, which 
cannot be included in this report. As discussed in our classified 
report, DOD and State concurred with our recommendations and NRC and 
the Office of the Director of National Intelligence did not comment on 
our recommendations. DOD, DOE, FBI, and the Office of the Director of 
National Intelligence also provided classified technical comments, 
which we incorporated as appropriate. DHS and the Executive Office of 
the President did not comment on the draft of our classified report. 

Background: 

The scientific expertise and skills needed for predetonation and 
postdetonation nuclear forensics can be found across a wide variety of 
academic disciplines, such as radiochemistry, nuclear engineering and 
physics, isotope geochemistry, materials science, and analytical 
chemistry.[Footnote 2] In particular, radiochemistry forms the basis 
for many of the techniques used to analyze radioactive debris from a 
nuclear event. Concerns have been raised by academicians and experts 
from nongovernmental organizations about the limited pool of 
specialists in these areas at the national laboratories, which would be 
called upon to perform critical analyses in a nuclear forensics 
investigation. For example, NTNFC conducted a survey in 2008 that found 
247 individuals at eight national laboratories are directly involved in 
nuclear forensics activities. In addition, the survey showed that these 
individuals spent an average of 10 percent of their time working on 
nuclear forensics. Partly because the United States conducted its last 
nuclear test in 1992, few scientists remain at the national 
laboratories with hands-on experience in using radiochemistry 
techniques on debris from a nuclear event and analyzing the results. 
Those few experienced scientists are rapidly approaching, or have 
already reached, retirement age. In February 2008, the American 
Association for the Advancement of Science and the American Physical 
Society reported that the difficulty in replacing these aging 
scientists is exacerbated by a precipitous decline in the number of 
advanced degree programs in radiochemistry at U.S. academic 
institutions.[Footnote 3] 

Many of the skills and techniques used in postdetonation nuclear 
forensics were developed to support the U.S. government's nuclear test 
program. Scientists at the national laboratories examined radioactive 
debris and other information from these tests to determine nuclear 
weapon characteristics, such as the explosive yield (i.e., the amount 
of energy discharged when a nuclear weapon is detonated). Regarding 
postdetonation nuclear forensics, DOD and national laboratory officials 
told us the following activities would occur after an event: 

* detecting the event and notifying decision makers; 

* evaluating prompt output data, such as gamma, neutron, optical, radio 
frequency, and electromagnetic pulse emissions; 

* collecting air and ground samples; 

* conducting analysis and screening procedures at the collection site 
to try to ensure that the samples sent to the laboratories are of high 
quality and contain the elements needed to perform nuclear forensics 
work; 

* transporting the samples from the site to the laboratories; 

* chemical processing, including dissolution, separations, 
radiochemical measurements, and data interpretation; and: 

* reporting results and conclusions to decision makers. 

Furthermore, the amount of time needed for these activities depends on 
many variables, such as the type of event (i.e., whether the explosion 
is a nuclear device or RDD) and the number and composition of the air 
and ground samples taken. In addition, the answers to these types of 
questions may not necessarily emerge sequentially or simultaneously, or 
at all. 

Predetonation nuclear forensics plays an important role in determining 
the sources of illicitly trafficked nuclear and radiological materials. 
[Footnote 4] According to IAEA, between 1993 and 2007, there were 1,340 
confirmed incidents of illicit trafficking and unauthorized activities 
involving nuclear and radiological materials worldwide. Eighteen of 
these reported incidents involved nuclear material that could be used 
to produce a nuclear weapon. Past confirmed incidents of illicit 
trafficking involved seizures of kilogram quantities of weapons-usable 
nuclear material, but most cases have involved very small quantities. 
In some of these cases, it is possible that the seized material was a 
sample of larger quantities available for illegal purchase. Among these 
incidents were a number of high-profile seizures of smuggled nuclear 
material in Europe in the early-and mid-1990s, which led to the further 
development of predetonation nuclear forensics. These early nuclear 
forensics efforts were led, in part, by an international group of 
analytical laboratories known as the International Technical Working 
Group on Nuclear Smuggling (ITWG). This group began in 1995 as an 
informal association of nuclear forensics experts working with law 
enforcement officers, first responders, and regulatory professionals. 
Since the group's founding, approximately 30 member states and 
organizations have participated in 13 ITWG annual meetings. In 
addition, ITWG has sponsored two round-robin exercises testing 
international predetonation nuclear forensics capabilities. The group 
also works closely with IAEA to provide IAEA member states with support 
for nuclear forensics analyses. To that end, ITWG developed a "model 
action plan" for nuclear forensics, which was subsequently adopted by 
IAEA in 2006 and serves as that agency's technical guidance on nuclear 
forensics. 

Agencies Face Challenges in Developing the NTNF Program: 

Rapid nuclear forensics work is essential to ensure that decision 
makers can promptly receive information that scientists are highly 
confident is accurate. DOD and DOE national laboratories have begun 
efforts to significantly reduce the amount of time needed to reach 
nuclear forensics conclusions in a postdetonation scenario. However, 
the agencies implementing the NTNF program face significant human 
capital challenges. Despite this fact, DOE, NTNFC, and national 
laboratory officials told us that no comprehensive interagency plan 
exists to guide efforts to address these challenges. 

Agencies Are Considering Ways to Shorten the Time Needed to Collect, 
Transport, and Analyze Radioactive Debris Samples after a Nuclear or 
Radiological Event: 

In a postdetonation scenario, rapid nuclear forensics work is essential 
so that decision makers can promptly receive information that 
scientists are highly confident is accurate. DOD and DOE national 
laboratories have begun efforts to significantly reduce the amount of 
time needed to reach nuclear forensics conclusions in a postdetonation 
scenario. For example, DOD is supporting a number of research and 
development efforts, such as: 

* rapid debris collection, dissolution, and chemical separations 
techniques; 

* innovative radionuclide assay and mass spectrometry approaches to 
reduce timelines; and: 

* the development of a new type of debris sampling pod. 

Similarly, DOE funds a number of research and development efforts, 
coordinated with DOD and other agencies, to improve the quality of 
reported data and shorten the time required to provide nuclear 
forensics information to decision makers. For example: 

* Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory has an initiative to develop 
new technology for more quickly conducting chemical analysis on samples 
collected after an event. Using this new technology, scientists would 
be able to eliminate the process of chemical separation for parts of 
their sample analysis. In addition, the laboratory has an initiative to 
modernize and improve the efficiency of equipment used to conduct 
chemical analyses. 

* Pacific Northwest National Laboratory has initiatives to speed up 
chemical analysis and is gradually acquiring faster analytical 
instruments to analyze radioactive elements. It also is seeking to 
automate some of the analysis performed during nuclear forensics 
investigations. According to laboratory officials, performing chemical 
analysis of samples from an event generates massive amounts of data 
that currently require the full-time work of an experienced 
radiochemist. Automation of some processes could shorten the time 
required to complete this analysis. 

Lack of a Comprehensive Interagency Plan Hinders Efforts to Ensure an 
Adequate Supply of Trained Personnel for the NTNF Program: 

As part of its interagency coordination and stewardship role, NTNFC 
officials told us their organization is responsible for assuming a 
leadership role in addressing the human capital challenges facing the 
NTNF program. However, DOE, NTNFC, and national laboratory officials 
told us that no comprehensive interagency plan exists to guide efforts 
to address these challenges. Nonetheless, NTNFC has taken some steps to 
analyze the current and future personnel needs for nuclear forensics 
work at the national laboratories. Specifically: 

* In the fall of 2008, NTNFC conducted a survey of manpower 
requirements for the NTNF program and convened a workshop to discuss 
human capital issues. The workshop was attended by academicians who 
collaborate with the NTNF program on personnel issues and DOE 
laboratory scientists. The survey and workshop discussions found that 
the availability of Ph.D. radiochemists at the national laboratories is 
in short supply for both the present and the near future. Furthermore, 
the workshop participants concluded there is a clear need to recruit in 
this area. DOE national laboratory officials told us that although 
graduates of related nuclear sciences have been successfully trained at 
the national laboratories to do radiochemistry work for nuclear 
forensics, Ph.D. training in radiochemistry itself provides the most 
suitable preparation for this work.[Footnote 5] 

* The Nuclear Forensics Science Panel, Education Sub-Panel--a group of 
active and retired national laboratory scientists and professors who 
advise the NTNF program on human capital issues--wrote a paper in 
October 2008 about strengthening the nuclear forensics workforce. 
[Footnote 6] The leader of the group told us this paper was designed to 
focus attention toward developing a plan to address shortages of Ph.D. 
radiochemists in the NTNF program. 

The Education Sub-Panel estimated that about 35 new nuclear forensics 
scientists are needed for the NTNF program over the next 10 years, 
primarily to replace those expected to retire. This includes scientists 
hired into the general nuclear forensics area and the traditional 
radiochemistry area. However, neither NTNFC's survey nor the Education 
Sub-Panel's study fully assessed the short-or long-term supply and 
demand for these newly graduated Ph.D. scientists, and the leader of 
the study told us the NTNF program's actual future needs could be 
significantly different than the panel's estimate. He said there will 
be a shortage of Ph.D. radiochemists under any set of future 
circumstances, although the shortage would probably be less acute if 
analytical equipment at the national laboratories were modernized. 

Additional factors could affect the adequacy of the supply of new Ph.D. 
graduates who are qualified to work as nuclear forensics scientists. 
For example, the Education Sub-Panel assumed that half of all these new 
Ph.D. graduates would work as nuclear forensics scientists at the 
national laboratories, while the other half would work in industry and 
academia. However, the leader of the study told us this assumption may 
require additional scrutiny because private companies, such as nuclear 
energy firms, have become a very attractive and lucrative alternative 
to working at DOE national laboratories. For example, he noted that at 
one university, the last nine Ph.D. radiochemistry graduates have gone 
to work in the nuclear energy industry. However, NTNFC has not 
determined the effect of demand for Ph.D. radiochemists from the 
nuclear energy industry or other areas on the human capital challenges 
facing the NTNF program. 

On December 18, 2008, after reviewing an early draft of our classified 
report, NTNFC officials informed us they had begun to develop a 
framework to guide their efforts. However, they noted these initial 
steps have not been finalized. NTNFC officials acknowledged there is no 
interagency plan to address this issue, and the agency has not yet 
fully assessed the supply and demand needs for key disciplines that 
support nuclear forensics. NTNFC officials also told us that in fiscal 
year 2009 they intend to form an interagency committee to formally 
coordinate activities to address human capital challenges facing the 
NTNF program. 

NTNFC also has led interagency efforts to promote the development of 
trained radiochemists, including funding summer schools and 
internships. For example, in fiscal year 2008, NTNFC provided $150,000 
to fund a summer internship program in nuclear forensics for eight 
students at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. However, NTNFC 
officials told us their efforts to address these challenges have been 
ad hoc and have not been guided by a comprehensive interagency plan. 
Furthermore, NTNFC's efforts to promote the development of trained 
radiochemists have not been well coordinated with some existing efforts 
at DOE and NRC. For example: 

* Through the American Chemical Society, DOE has funded and 
administered undergraduate summer school programs at two universities 
to interest students in going on to graduate study in radiochemistry. 
However, according to the DOE manager for these summer schools, NTNFC 
has not coordinated its nuclear forensics education efforts with the 
DOE-funded radiochemistry summer school program. 

* NRC has targeted radiochemistry as an area of national need through 
its Nuclear Education Program, which received $15 million in fiscal 
year 2008. Specifically, NRC awarded a 3-year faculty development grant 
for $450,000 per year to a radiochemistry professor at Washington State 
University in 2008. NTNFC officials told us they plan to promote 
radiochemistry faculty development in the near future. However, NRC 
officials told us there has been no coordination between the two 
agencies' efforts. 

Agencies Planned to Spend About $119 Million on Nuclear Forensics 
Activities in Fiscal Years 2008 and 2009, but Future Costs Are Largely 
Unknown: 

According to NTNFC, DOD, DOE, DHS, and FBI planned to spend about $60 
million and $59 million in fiscal years 2008 and 2009, respectively, to 
implement the NTNF program. However, this amount underestimates the 
program's true costs because it does not include costs associated with 
many DOD, DOE, and State efforts that are critical to support nuclear 
forensics. NTNFC officials noted that the NTNF Budget Crosscut--an 
interagency planning document that displays the nuclear forensics 
budgets of the agencies implementing the NTNF program--only covers the 
budgets of the agencies and programs responsible for developing and 
maintaining the operational capabilities needed to conduct nuclear 
forensics investigations (see table 1). However, the document does not 
include costs of related efforts that the program relies upon. For 
example, NTNFC officials noted that the NTNF Budget Crosscut does not 
include State spending on nuclear forensics outreach, which NTNFC does 
not consider to be operational support for the NTNF program. State 
officials told us the department planned to spend $450,000 in fiscal 
year 2008 on nuclear forensics outreach, including promoting the IAEA 
model action plan for nuclear forensics, conducting international 
nuclear forensics workshops, and supporting ITWG, which promotes best 
practices and builds networks among laboratory experts in nuclear 
forensics. 

Table 1: NTNF Budget Crosscut, Fiscal Years 2008-2009 (Dollars in 
millions): 

Agency: DOD; 
Fiscal Year 2008: $14.8; 
Fiscal Year 2009: $15.5. 

Agency: DOE[A]; 
Fiscal Year 2008: $22.3; 
Fiscal Year 2009: $18.4. 

Agency: DHS; 
Fiscal Year 2008: $15.0; 
Fiscal Year 2009: $16.9. 

Agency: FBI; 
Fiscal Year 2008: $7.9; 
Fiscal Year 2009: $8.2. 

Agency: Total; 
Fiscal Year 2008: $60.0; 
Fiscal Year 2009: $59.0. 

Source: NTNFC. 

[A] DOE total does not include spending on nuclear-forensics-related 
capabilities and readiness of facilities funded by DOE's Nuclear 
Materials Information Program, Defense Programs, and Defense Nuclear 
Nonproliferation Program. 

[End of table] 

Interagency program managers meet biannually to discuss their agencies' 
planned budgets for nuclear forensics activities. NTNFC officials told 
us the process used to create the budget crosscut has been helpful in 
identifying funding gaps, eliminating overlaps, and promoting 
interagency collaboration. However, while NTNFC has the lead for 
interagency coordination and planning for nuclear forensics, it has no 
authority over the budgets for the other agencies' efforts that are 
part of the NTNF program. As a result, NTNFC officials told us that, if 
needed, they would have to "cajole and pressure" other agencies to make 
changes to certain aspects of their nuclear forensics budgets. 

The long-term resource needs for the NTNF program are undetermined, in 
part, because the nation's nuclear forensics capabilities depend 
heavily on the continued funding of equipment, infrastructure, and 
personnel currently paid for by other programs, particularly those 
associated with the maintenance of U.S. nuclear weapons. The agencies 
implementing the NTNF program have not fully assessed the degree to 
which the nation's nuclear forensics capabilities depend on the 
continuation of funding for assets currently supplied by other 
programs.[Footnote 7] As a result, the nation's ability to carry out 
nuclear forensics investigations may be affected by reductions in the 
budgets of programs that implementing agencies rely upon to carry out 
their nuclear forensics missions. In particular, DOD, DOE, DHS, and 
national laboratory officials told us that the NTNF program relies 
heavily on the infrastructure, equipment, and personnel at the national 
laboratories used to support the continued operation of U.S. nuclear 
weapons. For example, Los Alamos National Laboratory officials told us 
that most of the operation and maintenance costs for analytical 
equipment and other infrastructure are paid for by DOE's Office of 
Defense Programs--which supports the department's nuclear weapons 
complex--and not by the NTNF program. 

A senior DOE official told us the department faces an enormous 
challenge in convincing the Congress that reducing funding for the 
activities of the U.S. nuclear weapons complex directly damages the 
national laboratories' ability to conduct nuclear forensics 
investigations. DOE has proposed downsizing its nuclear weapons complex 
and has proposed reductions to the budgets for related activities, but 
these efforts may have the unintended consequence of harming the U.S. 
government's nuclear forensics capabilities. For example, due to fiscal 
constraints and the expectation of reduced budgets in the future, 
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory had a reduction in force in May 
2008 of about 500 technical staff, including 9 scientists and 
technicians who worked on nuclear forensics. While these scientists 
worked only part time on nuclear forensics issues, their primary 
responsibilities were to support the nuclear-weapons-related activities 
of the laboratory, such as maintenance of the U.S. nuclear weapons 
stockpile. The agencies implementing the NTNF program have not 
developed a plan to mitigate the effects of planned budgetary 
reductions for the nuclear weapons complex. As a result, the agencies 
may face difficulties in ensuring they can effectively carry out their 
nuclear forensics missions. 

Conclusions: 

The potential consequences of a terrorist attack using a nuclear or 
radiological device are so severe that the U.S. government must 
recognize the seriousness of these threats and take appropriate actions 
to counter or reduce them. Therefore, a comprehensive and responsive 
nuclear forensics capability is critical to the national security of 
the United States because it provides a deterrent to other countries 
that may provide nuclear materials to terrorists and can help attribute 
a nuclear or radiological event to specific perpetrators. While DHS and 
other implementing agencies have taken some initial steps to address 
the human capital challenges facing the NTNF program, these efforts 
have been limited in scope and, with respect to radiochemistry in 
particular, not well coordinated with other existing U.S. government 
efforts. Furthermore, the implementing agencies lack both a 
comprehensive interagency plan to address this challenge and an 
understanding of the demand for trained personnel in key disciplines 
needed to support U.S. nuclear forensics capabilities. 

Many of the capabilities used to support the NTNF program depend, in 
large part, on the continued funding of infrastructure and personnel 
that have historically been funded by other programs. As a result, the 
nation's ability to carry out nuclear forensic investigations could be 
severely affected by reductions or disruptions in support for these 
efforts. Without a comprehensive assessment of the extent and impact of 
these leveraged assets on the NTNF program, implementing agencies will 
face uncertainties in determining their future budgetary needs to 
support nuclear forensics. 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

To improve the effectiveness of U.S. government efforts to address 
challenges facing the NTNF program, we recommend that the Secretary of 
Homeland Security, working with the Secretaries of Energy, Defense, and 
State, and the Director of the FBI, take the following three actions: 

* capital deficiencies affecting the NTNF program. This plan should 
include estimates of the long-term demand, from both the U.S. 
government and private industry, for trained personnel in key 
disciplines, such as radiochemistry, that support the NTNF program. The 
plan should be linked with program requirements, address coordination 
issues with existing federal efforts to promote radiochemistry, and 
include cost estimates for each aspect of the plan. 

* More fully account for the indirect costs borne by DOD, DOE, State, 
and other agencies that are not currently reflected in the NTNF program 
budget. 

* Assess the potential impact of projected reductions in the budgets 
for programs that the agencies rely upon to conduct their nuclear 
forensics missions and take steps to mitigate any negative impacts. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

We provided a draft of our classified report to DOD, DOE, DHS, FBI, 
NRC, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, State, and 
the Executive Office of the President. DOD and NRC provided written 
comments, the unclassified portions of which can be found in enclosures 
I and II, respectively. The Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence and State also provided classified written comments, which 
cannot be included in this report. As discussed in our classified 
report, DOD and State concurred with our recommendations and NRC and 
the Office of the Director of National Intelligence did not comment on 
our recommendations. DOD, DOE, FBI, and the Office of the Director of 
National Intelligence also provided classified technical comments, 
which we incorporated as appropriate. DHS and the Executive Office of 
the President did not comment on the draft of our classified report. 

As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce its contents 
earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days 
after its issuance date. At that time, we will send copies of this 
report to the Secretaries of Defense, Energy, Homeland Security, and 
State; the Director, FBI; the Administrator, National Nuclear Security 
Administration; the Chairman, Nuclear Regulatory Commission; the 
Director, Office of Management and Budget; and other interested 
parties. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the 
GAO Web site at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. 

If you or your staffs have any questions about this report, please 
contact me at (202) 512-3841 or aloisee@gao.gov. Contact points for our 
Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on 
the last page of this report. Major contributors to this report were 
Glen Levis (Assistant Director), R. Stockton Butler, and Franklyn Yao. 
Additional assistance was provided by Dr. Timothy Persons (GAO's Chief 
Scientist), Rebecca Shea, and Carol Herrnstadt Shulman. 

Signed by: 

Gene Aloise:
Director, Natural Resources and Environment: 

Enclosures: 

List of Congressional Requesters:
The Honorable Daniel K. Akaka:
Chairman:
Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the Federal 
Workforce, and the District of Columbia:
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs:
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson:
Chairman:
The Honorable Peter T. King:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Homeland Security:
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Yvette D. Clarke:
Chairwoman:
The Honorable Daniel E. Lungren:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Emerging Threats, Cybersecurity, and Science and 
Technology:
Committee on Homeland Security:
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable James R. Langevin:
The Honorable Michael T. McCaul:
House of Representatives: 

[End of section] 

Enclosure I: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Secret: 
Assistant To The Secretary Of Defense: 
Nuclear And Chemical And Biological Defense Programs: 
3050 Defense Pentagon: 
Washington, DC 20301-3050: 

February 19, 2009: 

Mr. Gene Aloise: 
Director, Natural Resources and Environment: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20548: 

Dear Mr. Aloise: 

This is the Department of Defense's response to the GAO Draft Report, 
GAO-09-276C, "Nuclear Forensics: U.S. Efforts Hampered by Equipment, 
Infrastructure, and Personnel Issues, and a Lack of Baseline Program 
Requirements," dated January 16, 2009 (GAO Code 360921). The Department 
concurs with the GAO recommendations. Detailed comments on the report 
are enclosed. 

If you need additional information, please do not hesitate to call me 
at 703-697-1771. The point of contact for this action is Mr. Arthur 
Beasley, Defense Threat Reduction Agency, 703-767-4833, 
arthur.beasley@dtra.mil. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

Fred S. Celec: 

Enclosure: As stated: 

Secret: Unclassified Upon Removal of Attachment. 

[End of section] 

Enclosure II: Comments from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission: 

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission: 
Washington, D.C. 20555-0001: 

February 4, 2009: 

Mr. Gene Aloise: 
Director: 
Natural Resources and Environment: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, N.W. 
Washington, DC 20548: 

Dear Mr. Aloise: 

Thank you for the opportunity to review GAO draft report, GAO-09-276C. 
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) conducted a review of the 
portion of the draft report that relates to NRC programs associated 
with the educating and training of sufficient radio-chemists to meet 
future national needs. The NRC has no comments regarding that portion 
of the draft report. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

R. W. Borchardt: 
Executive Director for Operations: 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] GAO, (U) Nuclear Forensics: U.S. Efforts Hampered by Equipment, 
Infrastructure, and Personnel Deficiencies, and a Lack of Baseline 
Program Requirements, GAO-09-276C (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 25, 2009). 

[2] For purposes of this report, the term "nuclear sciences" is used to 
refer to these and other disciplines that support nuclear forensics. In 
addition, the term "radiochemistry" refers to both nuclear chemistry in 
general and radiochemistry, which is a specific area of study within 
nuclear chemistry focusing on the chemistry of radioactive materials. 

[3] Joint Working Group of the American Association for the Advancement 
of Science and the American Physical Society, Nuclear Forensics: Role, 
State of the Art, Program Needs (Washington, D.C., February 2008). 

[4] Since 2002, we have issued several reports analyzing U.S. efforts 
to combat nuclear smuggling in other countries. For example, GAO, 
Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Corruption, Maintenance, and Coordination 
Problems Challenge U.S. Efforts to Provide Radiation Detection 
Equipment to Other Countries, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-311] (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 14, 
2006). 

[5] For purposes of this report, scientists with doctoral degrees in 
other disciplines who have been trained to perform radiochemistry work 
for nuclear forensics and those with doctoral degrees in radiochemistry 
may both be referred to as Ph.D. radiochemists. 

[6] Nuclear Forensics Science Panel, Education Sub-Panel, A Plan for 
Augmenting the Nuclear Forensics Workforce, Oct. 27, 2008. 

[7] For purposes of this report, the term "assets" is used to refer to 
the equipment and infrastructure needed to detect, collect, and analyze 
radioactive debris samples and other data needed for nuclear forensics 
investigations. 

[End of section] 

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