U.S. Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530
Redacted Version
Department of Justice ("Department") and the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") during the fifty-one day stand-off at the Branch Davidians' Mt. Carmel compound near Waco, Texas which ended on April 19, 1993 when fire consumed the compound, killing David Koresh and most of his followers. To make this evaluation, I have reviewed the procedures followed by the Department and the FBI, giving particular attention to the means employed, the alternatives considered and the decisions made in attempting to resolve the stand-off. factual report is being prepared by the Department and the FBI. I have primarily relied upon the record gathered by the Department as the basis for the conclusions in this Report, supplemented by a number of follow-up interviews. However, I am satisfied that the factual inquiry by the Department was conducted in a thorough and objective manner. and gathered pertinent documentation. They continued to gather documents and conduct interviews thereafter. I have been afforded access to documents gathered in that effort and to the reports of interviews conducted for the factual investigation. In addition, since my appointment I participated in a number of Department interviews. I have also conducted independent interviews of some witnesses. I have not been asked to evaluate and I make no judgments about the activities of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms ("ATF") leading up to the February 28, 1993 gun battle at Mount Carmel. I have been assisted in my investigation and writing of this Report by Ms. Suzan E. DeBusk, Esq. whose invaluable contribution, I gratefully acknowledge. the conception, approval and implementation of the tear gas plan on April 19, 1993, this Report concludes as follows. not started by the FBI's tear gas insertion operations. It is not certain, however, whether a substantial number of the persons who died in the compound on April 19 remained inside voluntarily, were being held in the compound against their will or were shot in order to prevent their escape from the fire. Preliminary medical reports are that a substantial number of individuals had died of gunshot wounds. Among those shot were young children. Koresh's body was found with a gunshot wound to the forehead. The FBI did not fire on the compound during the tear gas operation, although shots were fired at the FBI from the compound. The FBI did not fire on the compound at any time during the fifty-one day stand-off. contradictory. Koresh and his followers repeatedly assured the negotiators that they did not intend to commit suicide. On several occasions agents were told that suicide was against the Davidians' religious beliefs. However, one released member said there was a suicide plan. Other released members denied there was a suicide plan. In any event, the risk of suicide was taken into account during the negotiations and in the development of the gas plan. the negotiators had strong objections to pressure tactics they felt were counterproductive. The use of pressure tactics immediately after Koresh sent out Davidians from the compound may have undermined the negotiators' credibility and blunted their efforts to gain the Davidians' trust and to discredit Koresh in the eyes of his followers. Nevertheless, tactical actions designed to increase the safety margin for agents were appropriately given priority over negotiating considerations. I conclude that the events of April 19 were the result of David Koresh's determined efforts to choreograph his own death and the deaths of his followers in a confrontation with federal authorities to fulfill Koresh's apocalyptic prophesy. The deaths of Koresh, his followers and their children on April 19th were not the result of a flaw in the gas plan or the negotiation strategy. evaluate Koresh. Their assessments were thorough and many proved quite accurate. REDACTED FROM PUBLIC REPORT PENDING RELEASE OF informed of the options, and was given a realistic appraisal of the risks. All reasonable alternatives were considered and the decision to insert CS gas was a reasonable one. I conclude that an indefinite siege was not a realistic option. According to the plan, gas would be inserted in stages and the FBI would wait 48 hours for it to have an effect. As the plan was being implemented, the tanks were ordered to enlarge openings in the compound to provide escape routes for the Davidians. was not kept close to the scene because the heavy weaponry used by Koresh and his followers presented unacceptable risks to fire fighters. In any event, the independent arson experts concluded that the fire spread so quickly in the poorly constructed compound that even prompt fire fighting efforts would have been ineffective. to serve an arrest and search warrant on the Branch Davidian Compound. Four ATF agents were killed, 20 agents wounded and an unknown number of Davidians were killed and wounded in the ensuing gun battle. Incident Negotiations Team ("CINT"). The FBI's behavioral experts from its National Center for the Analysis of Violent Crime ("NCAVC") were assigned to assess the behavior of Koresh and his followers. ATF specifically requested the assistance of the FBI's Hostage Rescue Team ("HRT"), a highly trained and rigorously selected counter terrorist unit designed for high threat tactical assignments. FBI SWAT teams were deployed along with a full crisis management team consisting of three SACs and four ASACs supervising two command posts with full technical support. The FBI arrived at Mt. Carmel on February 28, set up its command posts and began telephone negotiations with the people inside the compound. It was estimated that over 100 men, women and children with nearly 250 weapons were inside the compound. The compound was stocked with a year's supply of food rations and was otherwise prepared to withstand an extended siege. David Koresh, the group's charismatic leader, had been wounded in the gun battle with ATF. the compound during the first six days of the stand-off. On the evening of February 28, 1993 Koresh promised that if a recorded message from him were played on a certain radio station, children would be released from the compound two-by-two. The message was played for the first time at approximately 7:30 that evening. About an hour later two children, Angelica and Crystal Sonobe, were escorted out of the compound by their mother, who went back in. The message was rebroadcast and two more children, Rene Fagan and Nehara Fagan, were released. The next morning at 6:30 two more children were released; at 10:30 two more were released; at 4:00 two more were released; at 8:30 two more were released and at 11:00 two more were released. suicide and he replied "I'm not going to commit suicide." He also stated "if I wanted to commit suicide, I would have done it already." The negotiator asked Koresh, "Are you going to let any of your other people kill themselves or die in there?" Koresh replied "I'm not going to do that." were played on the radio. On the morning of March 2, 1993 detailed arrangements were made for the surrender of Koresh and the other Davidians upon the playing of the tape. Koresh agreed he would be carried out on a stretcher and would go to a Bradley ambulance with three of the children, while everyone else would go to a waiting bus. Koresh was to exit first while Steve Schneider1 was to remain in the compound to coordinate the release of the remaining members at one minute intervals. Emergency and transport vehicles were positioned. promise to surrender. During the day of March 2, two elderly women, Katherine Matteson and Margaret Lawson, and four children exited the compound. Koresh was questioned about suicide and stated, "I dont think anyone's going to commit suicide." then advised that they were moving Koresh down the stairs on the stretcher, but that he was in pain from his gunshot wounds suffered in the February 28 shoot-out. Progress was delayed when Koresh began a prayer session. Then Schneider began to preach to the negotiators. Finally, Schneider informed the negotiators that "God had told Koresh to wait". By the evening of March 2, other Davidians had come to the phone and advised the negotiators that "God had told Koresh to wait." Koresh would not come to the phone.2 women who had exited the compound with conspiracy to commit murder. On March 3, 1993 the Davidians heard a broadcast on CNN reporting the arrests. The FBI consolidated log reflects concern by the negotiators that if the Davidians heard of the arrest it would have a "devastating effect" on the negotiations. The FBI immediately persuaded the United States Attorney's office to drop the charges and hold the women as material witnesses instead. The compound was immediately notified of that fact. the advice of some of the negotiators and behavioral scientists, who advised that threatening activities would not be effective against Koresh and his followers and would likely draw them closer together. Steve Schneider complained that the tanks were running over the guard shacks and stated that it is "part of a program of intimidation." then the child Mark Jones would be released. The study was given and Jones was promptly released. His brother Kevin was also released the next day and his sister Heather was released on March 5. Heather Jones would be the last child released. continued to use the children as a shield against FBI efforts to resolve the stand-off. Koresh threatened to fire on FBI positions and to blow up government vehicles. The bulk of Koresh's contact with FBI consisted of proselytizing the negotiators in marathon sermons of rambling exhortations. Koresh claimed to be Christ and to have knowledge of the seven seals of the apocalypse. Twelve more adults would exit the compound over the next eighteen days, but Koresh would refuse to leave claiming that his followers were free to make their own decisions whether to, remain in the compound with him. More than seventy would perish with Koresh on April 19th. and six gallons of milk for the children within the compound. All of these requests were granted. The Davidians began requesting that Peter Gent's body be removed. Gent had been killed in the February 28 shoot-out with the ATF and his body remained outside the compound.
They also demanded a line to the media and asked that the Bradley military vehicles be removed from the These requests were denied. an ATF undercover agent, then he would send Melissa Morrison, a six year old girl, out of the compound. Melissa came to the phone and said she would like to leave. Her mother gave instructions for family members to care for her. The negotiators told Koresh that the agent was not in Waco. Melissa Morrison was not released and presumably died in the April 19, 1993 fire. apocalypse, then he would release some children. The negotiator attempted to discuss the seal, but Koresh stated that the negotiator had "failed" and refused to release anyone. Davidian member Wayne Martin 3 then came to the phone and demanded a line to the media so that they could find a lawyer to file a lawsuit against the government. Juliette Martinez over the telephone told the negotiators that if she came out they would separate her from her children and put her in jail. This day there were 42 separate conversations lasting eleven and a half hours. Waco Sheriff Jack Harwell was allowed to speak with Koresh as a negotiator. Koresh told the sheriff not to worry because they were not going to commit suicide. He asked for milk and told the sheriff that he had sent out money to pay for those necessities. Shortly after that conversation 6 gallons of milk were sent in. That night the Davidians sent out a videotape of the children in the compound. The negotiators' log shows that when the tape was reviewed there was concern that if the tape were released to the media Koresh would gain much sympathy. two public address speakers with 100 watt amplifiers were set up. Koresh stated that if the FBI did not turn the power back on, he would not communicate. Power was restored about 10:30 that morning, so that the Davidians could listen to the daily press conference. Later that afternoon the Davidians displayed a banner from the compound reading "God help us, we want the press." Rachel Koresh,4 both of whom wanted a doctor to be sent in to treat Judy's finger, which had been wounded in the shoot-out. The negotiator refused and told Judy to come out to be treated. halogen lights pointing out to the perimeter or power would again be cut off. There was concern about the Davidians using the lights to monitor FBI movements around the perimeter. The Davidians delivered another videotape out of the compound that night. to have been turned back on later in the day. Some clearing of the grounds must have occurred that day as well, because that evening Schneider complained about the destruction of a Harley Davidson motorcycle. might be coming out the next day. There was conversation throughout the day about who would be coming out and what would happen to them if they came out. Also that day Schneider told the negotiators that they had heard a radio broadcast about a shooting star called the "guitar nebula," and that Koresh had taken it as a sign. The negotiators felt encouraged that this "sign" could be a face saving action allowing Koresh to surrender peacefully. At Schneider's request, the negotiators read Koresh a newspaper article about the nebula. However, Koresh said it was not the sign he was waiting for. be reunited with her four children who had already been released. Her reunion with her youngest child was filmed and sent back into the compound. She asked to be allowed to call back into the compound in order to give the other members some confidence in the system because they were afraid, not knowing what to expect, and she was allowed to do so. In her interview immediately after her exit Schroeder stated that God had told Koresh not to commit suicide. She also said that there were people inside who wanted to come out, but that Koresh had a "total hold" on them. She said many would come out if Koresh told them to, but he would not. of the transcript of Kiri Jewell's 6 television appearance, contact with the media, contact with attorneys and a radio personality to serve as the Davidians' press representative. After these demands the negotiators were unable to get through to the compound for five hours. During this time 6 gallons of milk were delivered into the compound. Schneider finally answered the phone, claimed that there had been mechanical difficulties, and reported that Koresh was very upset about a radio broadcast that his mother had received $75,000 for the movie rights to her story. That evening Oliver Gyarfas exited the compound. Judy Schneider was allowed to speak to a physician on the phone about her injured hand. After Schroeder and Gyarfas left the compound, the on scene commander decided that power to the compound would be turned off that night. The negotiators advised against cutting off the power that night after two people had come out and more were anticipated to come out. They argued that, it would hurt the negotiations effort and would cause them a set back at a crucial time in the negotiations. The justification for cutting the power was that it was going to be a very cold night and maximum effect would be gained in making the Davidians uncomfortable inside the compound. Also, cutting the power was designed to challenge Koresh's control of the situation and to raise the level of stress within the compound to force more departures. the negotiators that people had changed their minds about coming out because of the power shut off. Schneider stated that the power shut off was a "huge, huge set-back," and that he had been considering coming out himself, but had changed his mind because of it. The power remained out that night and the FBI began using the loudspeakers and shining the lights on the compound. It was determined that the negotiators would not call into the compound, but would only answer when they were called. The negotiators were not able to get through to the compound most of the time on March 13. the authorities were treating him well and that he had access to the press. Kathy Schroeder also spoke to them and said she was treated well and had access to a phone, but she would not speak to the press until they all came out to tell their story. She urged Schneider to come out peacefully and told him that time was not on his side. During the night of March 14 and early morning hours of March 15 additional lights were directed toward the compound. negotiator Byron Sage, Steve Schneider and Wayne Martin. The negotiators believed that the meeting had been productive and another face-to-face meeting was scheduled for March 17. On March 16 Schneider demanded a copy of the ATF search warrant, which was ultimately sent in on the 19th. Five audio tapes from relatives were sent in. Schneider then requested that Phil Arnold or another religious scholar be allowed to discuss the Book of Revelations with them. He suggested that if a theologian could convince the people that Koresh was
wrong, maybe some 40 to 50 people would come out. The log reflects that Arnold had contacted the FBI early in the stand-off and offered to assist them. A tape of Arnold was later sent into the compound. On March 17 tapes of released members with positive comments about their release were played over the loudspeakers. Busses were brought within view of the compound. The loudspeakers addressed the Davidians telling them the busses were to transport them after their exit. FBI negotiator Byron Sage went out for the planned face-to-face meeting but no one came out. pile, a dump truck and some fuel tanks. Koresh came to the phone on March 19, assured the negotiators that he was not going to kill himself and asked them not to destroy any more of the Davidians' property. He stated that a "new moon" was coming and that they would be coming out, but they needed more time. Certain documents requested by the Davidians were sent in that day, including copies of news articles about the stand-off, the ATF search and arrest warrants, a copy of the firearms act, letters from their attorneys and an audio tape of theologian Phil Arnold. At 10:00 that night Brad Branch and Kevin Whitcliffe exited the compound. These two men had been mentioned as people who were leaving the compound on March 12 before the power had been turned off. Sabbath. Schneider told the negotiators the afternoon of the 20th that a lot of people might be coming out. That night Koresh was allowed to speak with Branch and Whitcliffe who had left the compound and to give them a Bible study over the phone. Shortly after midnight Victorine Hollingsworth and Anetta Richard exited the compound. Schneider requested that a female agent search women who left the compound and that request was granted. Later that afternoon Sheila Martin (wife of David Martin) and Ofelia Santoyo came out. Sheila Martin was allowed to call back in and speak with her husband. That night Judy Schneider told the negotiators to give a message to her family telling them to take care of her daughter Maynah because she will be "detained," suggesting that she was planning to come out with her daughter. allow clearing of vehicles around the compound. The negotiators opposed this decision, arguing that as on March 12, it would harm the negotiations to have negative actions taken when many people had come out and there was talk of others coming out the next day. The night of March 21 and the early morning hours of March 22 the FBI cleared vehicles around the compound, played loud Tibetan chants on the loudspeakers and used the external floodlights. Schneider complained to the negotiators that the last time people came out the power was cut off and this time they were rewarded with the loud music. pound promising the Davidians access to Koresh's teachings while they were in custody and promising them access to the media. The offer was conditioned upon the release of all Davidians by noon of March 23. Koresh reportedly threw the letter away and said he did not believe any of it. Additionally, a letter from the Christian Broadcast Network promising to air an interview with Koresh if he came out was sent in. The loudspeakers and lights were turned on again that night. of the negotiating, tactical and behavioral science elements to assess whether there was any possibility of getting a large number of people out in the near future. The negotiating team submitted a memo which stated that "there is no clear indication that a large number of individuals will depart shortly from the compound." They did state however, that "the long term prospect for a peaceful resolution remains good." They recommended escalating the "stress" within the compound, first by demanding the release of all parties by a certain time, with all vehicles around the compound being removed if the demand was not met. If that tactic did not work, then the memo recommended that non-lethal tear gas be introduced. Davidian to exit during the standoff. Schneider demanded to speak with Fagan after his release, but Fagan refused to call back into the compound. Schneider told the negotiators that if their "bosses" had not done all of the negative things, such as cutting the power, shining bright lights and playing loud music, twenty people would have been out, but now "you may have to come in and take his carcass out of here." the negotiations were played and the lights were on. On the morning of March 24 Schneider informed the negotiators that this day was a Sabbath and they would not negotiate that day. At the daily press briefing on March 24 Koresh was verbally attacked as a liar and a coward who hides behind children. entered the compound. The negotiators asked Schneider to send him out, but Schneider refused. gade agency." He also complained about the FBI vehicles running over the children's motorcycles. He complained that bibles were taken from the released persons and about the "broken promise" because Livingstone Fagan did not call back in. by 4:00. No one was released by the deadline so the FBI cleared motorcycles and go-carts from the grounds. The negotiators then demanded that 10 people be released. There was a discussion of exactly who these people would be. The names Julie Martinez, Cliff Sellars, Clive Doyle, Pablo Cohen, David Thibodeau, Sherry Doyle, David Jones, Scott Sonobe and Livingstone Malcolm were discussed. The negotiators were allowed to speak directly to several members about coming out. The negotiators' log reflects that Schneider became angry and said that "These people don't care! You can kill us whatever, these people fear God (not you)." The log reflects on March 25 an interview with Lisa Gent, mother of Peter and Nicole, in which she reported that Peter may have known of plans for a mass suicide. On March 26 Dr. Bruce Perry, a psychiatrist from Baylor University who interviewed the released children, reported that he suspected the children may have heard talk about suicide from adults. people but no one wanted to come out. In response the FBI cleared vehicles and trees from around the compound. The negotiators told Schneider that no one would be allowed to come outside the compound. Previously the Davidians had been allowed to come out and feed the chickens. The negotiators were unable to contact the Davidians by telephone from 5:00 the afternoon of the 26th until the next morning, when the Davidians hung a banner out reading that the "tanks broke phone line." On March 26 Jesse Amen penetrated the perimeter and entered the compound, and the negotiators' log reflects an exit interview with a Davidian in which a plan was reported for a mass suicide by explosives on March 2 when Koresh had promised to come out. tapes,two batteries for the video camera and a letter from Bill Austin, Chaplain at Baylor, stating that Koresh had a Biblical obligation to come out peacefully. After that day's press briefing, Schneider expressed hatred of the ATF and displeasure over the ATF's continued involvement in the daily press conferences. The ATF spokesman had referred to drugs in the compound, which had outraged Schneider. It was also reported in that day's press conference that Kathy Schroeder was going to be charged with conspiracy to commit murder. Previously she had been held only as a material witness. by a deadline. The deadline was not met and the FBI bulldozed the front fence. Schneider spent most of that day on the telephone with the negotiators. He told them the property damage did not matter because he was going "beyond this world." Schneider threatened that if the Davidians wanted to kill the FBI agents they could do so and said the FBI could burn the compound down or kill them. He expressed concern that if he came out he would be charged, concern about what would happen to him in jail and fear of the other inmates. He also stated that he knew Koresh would be executed if he came out. He said because Kathy Schroeder was charged with murder, he does not think anyone else will come out. However, Schneider affirmed that he was not going to commit suicide. Schneider asked if he could speak with an FBI chaplain and suggested a face-to -face meeting with his attorney, Jack Zimmerman, Sheriff Harwell and the chaplain from Baylor who had sent in the letter. Schneider told the negotiator that what would work would be to "throw a match to the building, people will have to come out." Koresh had not come to the phone for days, despite repeated requests by the negotiators. Schneider said he was sick. he said "Oh, of course not. If I did I'd be lost eternally." On March 28, 1993 Koresh told the negotiator that "if we was going to commit suicide, we'd have been dead a long time ago." was not met. Koresh finally came to the telephone that afternoon and told the negotiators he knew his life would be over once he went into their hands. He said he knew he would be charged with murder when he came out. He requested six gallons of milk and they were sent in. On that day several people tried to enter the compound but were apprehended. Concern is reflected on the log that they might use the children as shields if fighting broke out. That night Koresh was allowed a privileged telephone conversation with Dick DeGuerin, the attorney his mother hired to represent him. The FBI cleared out the ATF trucks and horse trailers. reported his opinion that the children were frightened of Koresh and that Koresh was following a deliberate plan of deception and had his own plan for ending the standoff in an apocalyptic way. Dr. Perry expressed the belief that Koresh was stalling for a final battle and wanted law enforcement to go into the compound so he could take some of them with him. This opinion is reflected in the negotiators' log on April 1. conversation with Koresh. to Waco. They were briefed by the FBI commanders on scene and viewed the compound. They met with representatives of the U.S. Attorneys' office and the Texas Rangers. On April 1 they returned to Washington and reported to the Attorney General and Associate Attorney General Webster Hubbell on their assessment of the situation. As a result of that trip changes were made in the prosecutive team to improve coordination among the investigative agencies and the prosecutors. on April 2 Ray Jahn, a senior Assistant U.S. Attorney in San Antonio, was designated to head the prosecutive team. DeGuerin was allowed to go in with attorney Jack Zimmerman, who was hired by Schneider's family. When the attorneys were debriefed on April 1 they reported that Koresh said he would come out after Passover. They said that they advised the members not to speak with law enforce- ment. There were few conversations between the negotiators and the Davidians during this period. The Davidians refused to allow the attorneys to come in on April 3 because of their Sabbath, but the attorneys went in again on April 4. The attorneys reported after that meeting that they still had no date for Koresh's Passover, but that a plan had been discussed in which Koresh would come out first, followed by the women and children and Schneider would come out last. On April 4 Jesse Amen, an individual who had sneaked in during the stand-off, exited the compound. would last 7 days. He later complained of the loudspeakers being on during Passover. Several individuals came out of the compound and into the courtyard several times over the next few days and were "flash-banged" by the FBI. 7 and held a meeting of the leadership of all of the agencies involved in the Branch Davidian matter, including the FBI, the ATF, the Texas Rangers, the U.S. Attorney's office and the Texas Department of Public Safety. They returned from their trip on April 9 and reported to the Attorney General that the FBI had raised the possibility of utilizing tear gas to resolve the standoff at the compound. for religious reasons. When he came out he dropped off a letter from Koresh. There was little phone contact over these days, but Schneider did complain that the Bradleys were running over Peter Gent's grave, that the agents were "flipping the finger" at them and that people were being flashbanged. negotiators that they never gave the attorneys a specific time when they would come out. He brought a second letter from Koresh out of the compound. On April 12 Schneider requested a copy of a book about the "Koreshians" that he heard about from the negotiators. managing attorneys in the Criminal Division, received a general briefing from FBI officials of the proposed plan to introduce CS gas into the compound if the Davidians did not come out by the end of Passover. Later that same day a briefing was held at the FBI Command Center for the Attorney General and the Associate Attorney General on the proposed plan. The plan was presented not as an all out assault, but as a tactic whereby gas would be inserted in stages, initially into only one small area of the compound. The goal was to allow exit through uncontam- inated portions of the compound. The Attorney General requested that she be provided with more information on the effects of CS gas on pregnant women and children, a military second opinion on the plan and information on whether it would be possible to cut off the water supply to the compound. him for a while. Schneider advised that this was the last day of Passover. Koresh agreed to speak with the attorneys on the phone on April 14 and at that time advised them that he only intended to leave the compound when he finished a manuscript on the Seven Seals referred to in the Book of Revelations. Koresh estimated it would take him 14 days. Koresh came on the phone unexpectedly at midday and preached to the negotiators for five hours nonstop. Several banners were displayed that day reading "Read Proverbs 1,2,3,4. We Come to Love, Not War", "Let's Have A Beer When This Is Over", "My Name Is Vega I'm From Hawaii", "Media and FBI Don't Know the Truth. You You Can't Accept the Truth. We Can Still Have a Few Beers Together", "I'm an American, I Love America, But BATF Killed My Family and Friends." General and Associate Attorney General were briefed on military and medical aspects of the proposed plan. United States military commanders were present and evaluated the plan from a military perspective. They reported that rather than a stop and start insertion of the gas, they would go in full force and gas the whole compound at once. They also reported their opinion that the HRT had to be pulled out soon because they had been on full alert too long. A medical doctor reported to the Attorney General on studies of the effects of CS gas on children, pregnant women and the elderly. The Attorney General directed that a detailed statement of the plan with supporting documentation be put together. on April 16 Schneider reported that Koresh was writing the second seal, but that Schneider had not edited the first seal yet. On April 17 Louis Alaniz, one of the persons who had entered during the stand-off, exited the compound. to gas the compound on Monday, April 19, 1993. She advised the President of her decision on Sunday, April 18. Koresh's prized automobile. Koresh became very upset about his car. Milk was delivered into the compound on the 18th along with typewriter equipment. Sage telephoned the compound and notified Steve Schneider that the FBI would be inserting tear gas, but that it was not a lethal assault and they should all come out peacefully. Schneider responded by ripping out the phone and throwing it out the door. Sage continued to announce over the loudspeaker that this was not a lethal assault and to instruct the people on how to exit and receive medical care. The Davidians fired on the vehicles as they approached the compound. but the openings in the building appeared to provide a means of escape. Only nine Davidians survived the fire. They were Renos Avraam, Jamie Castillo, Graeme Craddock, Clive Doyle, Misty Ferguson, Derek Lovelock, Ruth Ottman Riddle, David Thibodeau and Marjorie Thomas. A total of 35 people left the compound during the stand-off. Twenty-one children were released from the compound beginning on February 28, 1993, but no children were released after March 5, 1993. Thus, all of the children were released in the first 6 days of the 51-day stand-off. A total of 14 adults exited the compound during the standoff. Two adults entered the compound during the stand-off. Both exited before April 19. No Davidian members exited the compound after March 23, 1993 until April 19. deliberately by persons inside the compound. The medical examiner found the remains of seventy five individuals in the debris. Thirteen adult bodies had fatal gunshot wounds. Most of these wounds were gunshot wounds to the head. Several adults died of gunshot wounds to the chest and face. Two adults were fatally shot in the back. Three young children were shot to death and one three year old boy was fatally stabbed in the chest. Two other minors suffered fatal blows to the head. Koresh died of a gunshot to the mid-forehead. Schneider died of a gunshot wound of the mouth. The bodies of Koresh and Schneider were found in the communication room of the compound. A.
that the fire was deliberately set from within the compound. It is not clear whether the decision to set the fire was a unanimous decision of the entire group, or whether some people were held hostage or were shot to prevent their escape from the fire. A number of children were shot to death.
This fire was caused by the intentional act(s) of a person or persons inside the compound. the spread of the fire was enhanced because the compound was constructed with no consideration for fire safety, the strong wind from the south intensified the spread and the building contained highly combustible materials, such as baled hay. deliberately set. In a statement given to the Texas Rangers on April 20, 1993 a Davidian stated that the fire was started with Coleman fuel which had been distributed throughout the compound in specific locations. Another surviving Davidian was interviewed by the Texas Rangers on April 19, 1993 and stated that he was in the chapel with several other people when the armored vehicle drove through the front door and he heard the word passed to "start the fires" or "light the fire," and heard someone else say "make sure." Agent Lloyd Sigler, who spoke with him immediately upon his exit from the compound, reported him saying that Koresh had previously spoken of burning the compound if confronted by police. In a May 7 interview that same Davidian confirmed hearing a conversation about lighting a fire and stated that he thought there was some plan to burn the building and that he recalled seeing someone deliberately splashing, pouring or dousing the Chapel area with lantern fuel.8 REDACTED FROM PUBLIC REPORT PENDING RELEASE REDACTED FROM PUBLIC REPORT PENDING RELEASE of heat erupting in different spots in the compound at almost the same time. These locations were too far removed from each other to have been ignited by the same source. In addition, many of the HRT personnel who were within sight of the compound when the fire started report that they saw flames erupt almost simultaneously in different locations in the compound. and not by the activities of the FBI vehicles. "We are of the opinion that these [tear gassing] operations did not contribute to the ignition or spread of the fire." The report does not rule out the possibility that the spread of the fire could have been enhanced by spillage of flammables caused by the FBI breaching activities. However, given the significant evidence that the Davidians were deliberately spreading fuel around the compound, there is no reason to believe that any such spillage would have been a primary factor in the spread of the fire. The Arson Report also states that the law enforcement breaching operation opened holes in the compound that allowed the wind into the compound, possibly enhancing spreading, but it recognizes that at the same time the fresh air may have also given people more time to escape before they were overcome with fumes from the burning compound. who died in the compound on April 19, did not die from the fire, but died from gunshot wounds. It is not known whether these individuals committed suicide or were shot by others. after the fire, that Koresh's biggest fear was that someone would take his wives away and that he felt that rather than letting someone take his wife, the wife should kill herself and if she could not do so one of the "mighty men"10 should do it, since this was one of their duties. Therefore, if people were shot within the compound it may have been in accordance with the above plan. It is also possible that some people were shot to prevent their escape from the compound. We may never know what really happened.11 were stationed within range of the compound's weaponry. Investigation by the ATF revealed that by February 28, 1993 Koresh and his associates had at least 243 total firearms, including two 50 caliber semi-automatic rifles, numerous assault rifles, shotguns, revolvers and pistols. The Davidians also purchased hundreds of grenades and 39 "full auto sears" devices used to convert semi-automatic weapons into automatic weapons. On February 28 shots were fired from over forty different positions within the compound. The Davidians were trained in the use of these weapons. Moreover, there was concern that the Davidians had dug tunnels fanning out from the compound and planned to place explosives in the tunnels under FBI positions. after the cease fire on February 28, 1993.12 We have reviewed the statements of the agents who participated in the tear gas assault on April 19, 1993 and none of them claim to have fired their weapons on April 19. SAC Jamar and ASAC Rogers both state that the FBI did not fire on the compound that day. However, rounds were being fired from the compound at the FBI on April 19th. Also, agents reported hearing gunfire within the compound. being provoked into a gun battle with the Davidians. Outside agencies present on April 19 praised the FBI's professionalism in their execution of the gas assault. of the final assault. For example, cyanide poisoning was thought to be a major risk and there- fore cyanide antidote kits were available on the scene along with an emergency medical facility. The Attorney General asked about the possibility of a mass suicide. dated March 8 FBI behavioral scientists reported: (emphasis added). Expert Park Dietz reported that he informed SAC Ricks that Koresh was suicidal and may have made a suicide pact with other members. 1993 the FBI interviewed Kiri Jewell, a young teenager who lived in the compound with her mother until shortly before the stand-off. Kiri reported that the Davidians had discussed mass suicide by cyanide and shooting themselves. She reported that she believed the mass suicide would occur on a Friday at 1:00 because that is when Koresh believes Jesus died. Rangers four times from March 24 to March 27 and reported that the Davidians had planned mass suicide on March 2, 1993, when Koresh had promised to come out of the compound with all his followers. Koresh planned to exit the compound with Greg Summers, who would have an explosive device strapped around his waist so that they would blow themselves up in front of the FBI. In addition, the people, inside the compound planned to blow themselves up so that "We would all go to heaven that day". responding that she had an injection that would put him to sleep before the explosion. The Davidian reported that the plan was not implemented because God, told Koresh to wait since God had more work for Koresh to do. Vaega pinned a note to her daughter's coat in which she said that the adults would die after the children were released. The note was intended for Vaega's sister. heard discussions of suicide and that some children believed they would never see their parents again in this life. Dana Okimoto, Jeanine Bunds and Robyn Bunds, reported that Koresh's teaching was that law enforcement officers have to be the vehicle for his death in order for his prophesy to come true and that he cannot kill himself to fulfill his prophesy. Mark Breault, a former Davidian, told that Koresh taught that the United States government is out to crucify him and that his group would be killed but they would rise again. Karen Doyle, a follower of Koresh who lived outside the compound, reported in an interview during the stand-off that Koresh prophesied his own martyr- dom and that of the group. She stated that to be "exalted" one had to die with Koresh and stated that she wished she were there at the compound. and his followers whether they were going to commit suicide and they were always reassured that this was against Koresh's teachings.13 An agent who interviewed some of the individuals who left the compound reported that none of them indicated that suicide was a potential possibility and in fact indicated that such an act would be against their religion. B. "secure the surrender and arrest of all adult occupants of the compound while providing the maximum possible security for the children within the compound." (Tab B, p. 4). The negotiators knew they were faced with religious group fanatically devoted to Koresh and his teachings. It was not certain, however, whether Koresh truly believed his own religious message
or whether he was exploiting his control over his followers for personal gain. Koresh the standoff was not the apocalyptic event he had prophesied. Evidently Koresh was the only "expert" in his branch of Branch Davidianism, and so even with advice from religious scholars, the FBI was unable to influence Koresh's unique interpretation of scripture. The frustration of working within Koresh's religious framework became apparent when on March 2, after promising to leave the compound, Koresh said that God had told him to wait. Koresh was improvising his own theology and was completely beyond the influence of religious arguments or religious scholars. ATF agents. Koresh and others in the compound were acutely aware of the secular consequences of their acts. Texas has the death penalty by lethal injection. At one point in the negotiations Koresh joked, "When they give me the lethal injection, give me the cheap stuff, huh?". Efforts were aimed at convincing Koresh that if he and the others exited the compound they would be treated well and that they might "beat the rap." Needless to say this tactic was not popular since it implicitly criticized ATF and could be viewed as disparaging of the four dead ATF agents. However, the tactic was completely proper in the context of negotiating a nonviolent end to the standoff.14 the "trickle, flow, gush" strategy. The objective was to undermine the devotion of individual members to Koresh. The FBI began speaking to the other members on the phone, playing tapes of the negotiations and the statements of released members and family members back into the compound over loud speakers, sending videotapes and pictures of the released children into the compound and sending in messages from family members. For example, a taped passage from the negotiations in which Special Agent Byron Sage outwitted Koresh was played over the loudspeakers for this purpose. The objective was to move the pace of the exodus from the compound from a trickle to a flow to a mass desertion of Koresh by his followers. the compound slowed rather than accelerated and the exit of members from the compound stopped altogether after March 23rd, nearly a month before the final assault. There is evidence that Koresh was purging his group and therefore these departures from the compound did not represent defections from Koresh's ranks. Many of the adults leaving the compound appeared to remain loyal to Koresh. significantly increase. Koresh had promised to come out on March 2nd if the government played his tape. The government complied and Koresh reneged. Koresh said he was waiting for a sign from God. On March 12 he considered the guitar nebula as a possible sign, but decided it was not the sign he was waiting for. Koresh told his lawyers he would come out after Passover, but when Passover ended, Koresh said he had not committed to a specific date to come out.15 Koresh continued to make excuses to stay in the compound thus reinforcing the view that he was not devout, only manipulative.16 of California, was consulted by the FBI. Dr. Dietz is under contract with the FBI as a forensic psychiatrist. The FBI flew Dr. Dietz to Mt. Carmel to give his assessment of Koresh. March 2nd Dr. Dietz expressed the opinion that Koresh would not voluntarily leave the compound. He considered Koresh to be suicidal and stated that Koresh might have made a suicide pact with his followers. Dr. Dietz described Koresh's personality as manipulative. negotiations up to that point. He recommended that the FBI distance itself from ATF and express sympathy with Koresh's anti-BATF views. Dr. Dietz expressed the opinion that Koresh would choose death over losing power, and therefore the negotiation strategy should create the illusion that Koresh would not go to prison but would emerge with more followers than he had before. strategy to be used with the Davidians.17 On several occasions tactical pressure was exerted on the Davidians either without consulting the negotiators or over the negotiators' objections. The negotiators believed the timing of these tactical activities disrupted the progress of the negotiations unnecessarily. Additionally, negotiators complained that the HRT engaged in tactical maneuvers before the negotiators had an opportunity to use the maneuvers to further the bargaining process. Koresh. The negotiators specifically recommended that the Bradley vehicles should not be brought up to the compound. Despite the negotiators' advice, the Bradleys were run up and down in front of the compound in what negotiators believed was a show of force. the electricity in the compound. The negotiators objected to the decision arguing that the Davidians should be rewarded for releasing two people. The power was turned off. No one was released for the next seven days. that the Davidian vehicles would be cleared from the left side of the compound. The negotiators opposed this action, pointing out that once again the FBI would be answering a positive move on the part of the Branch Davidians by a negative action. Nonetheless, the bulldozing was implemented. The negotiators received conflicting justifications for the action being told both that the items were being moved as a safety measure and to harass the Davidians. the compound, but contrary to the negotiators' advice the loudspeakers were used to broadcast Tibetan chants, other annoying music and the sounds of dying rabbits. The negotiators objected to playing music as a harassment tactic, advising that such "psychological warfare" would only make the FBI look bad. negotiators had no influence over the decision makers and that the FBI was not trustworthy. Several negotiators and behavioral scientists expressed the opinion that although David Koresh and his core followers may never have come out through negotiation, more people might have exited the compound voluntarily during the stand-off if the negotiation strategy had been followed more rigorously. subject at times through tactical activities choreographed with a more gentle negotiating approach. However, a memorandum dated March 5, 1993 from FBI behavioral scientists stated that "[i]n traditional hostage situations, a strategy which has been successful has been negotiations coupled with ever increasing tactical presence. In this situation however, it is believed this strategy, if carried to excess, could eventually be counter productive and could result in loss of life." (emphasis added) the negotiating strategy had been followed more rigorously. Even though in hindsight the behavioral assessment of Koresh proved extremely accurate, the most compelling evidence of the resolve of the Davidians to follow Koresh was their willingness to take their own lives and the lives of their children in obedience to Koresh. It is this total allegiance to Koresh that was unpredictable. Even those who left the compound before the fire seemed to remain committed to him. Several expressed regret that they could not join him in death. Koresh could not be pressured into leaving the compound, and whatever bound Koresh and his followers was apparently stronger than either force or reason. spoke to them on a one to one basis. However, some negotiators believe that joint strategy meetings of tactical, negotiating, and command elements were held too infrequently. According to negotiators the first joint strategy meeting was held on March 22. The negotiators were miles away from the forward command post and rarely came into direct contact with the tactical commanders. reported that there were communications problems in the command post and that it seemed one component did not know what the other was doing. He reported feeling as the service contingent for the other components the TTA's were often "in the middle," receiving conflicting instructions or inquiries. flowing from the tactical components to the negotiators. The negotiators complained that the tactical representative in the command center did not use the RAPID START system, but generally reported information orally and the negotiators rarely received any written intelligence information generated by the tactical teams unless they actively sought it out. about the negotiations, although they believed that the quality of information they were sending up from the field was very good. Some of the negotiators realized during the stand-off that their information was not getting out of the command post and making it to the tactical troops, even though the negotiators all agreed that the information flow out of the negotiation cell was excellent. HRT members complained of being "starved for information".
BRANCH DAVIDIANS?
IMPLEMENTATION ADEQUATE
TO RESOLVE THE
CONFRONTATION WITH THE BRANCH DAVIDIANS?
APPROVAL, AND
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PLAN FOR THE TEAR
GAS INSERTION ADEQUATE?
IMPOUNDED MATERIAL.
The Arson Report states:
Fires were set in three separate areas of the structure identified as points of origin 1, 2
and 3. This investigation establishes that these fires occurred in areas significantly distant
from each other and in a time frame that precludes any assumption of a single ignition source
or accidental cause....Investigative findings further confirm that flammable liquids
were used to accelerate the spread and intensity of the fire.
OF IMPOUNDED MATERIAL.
OF IMPOUNDED MATERIAL.
KORESH always talks about the "end", suggesting to his followers that "it is closer than
you
think". If KORESH dies before his followers, the women are to kill themselves and
the children. If
the women are unable, the men are to help them. KORESH teaches his
followers that they must
follow him to the "end", even if that means killing themselves....
KORESH realizes that in an
environment outside of the compound, without his control
over the followers, he would lose his
status as the Messiah, thus a mass suicide ordered
by KORESH cannot be discounted. His order
for a mass suicide would be his effort to
maintain the ultimate control over his group, in the event
of his death.