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Author: Colleen Kadleck, Ph.D.; Lawrence F. Travis, III, Ph.D.

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Police Department and Police Officer Association Leaders' Perceptions of Community Policing: Describing the Nature and Extent of Agreement

Final Report

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by

Colleen Kadleck, Ph.D.
University of Nebraska at Omaha
Department of Criminal Justice
1100 Neihardt Hall
Lincoln, NE 68588-0630

Lawrence F. Travis, III, Ph.D.
University of Cincinnati
Division of Criminal Justice
P.O. Box 210389
Cincinnati, OH 45221-0389

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Introduction

Police unions have long been seen as obstacles to police chiefs and to policy implementation. More recently, police unions have been identified as an obstacle to the implementation of community policing. In an effort to better understand police unions and their impact, if any, on the implementation of community policing, this report explores the nature and extent of agreement between police chiefs and police union leaders concerning community policing. Specifically, we estimate the level of agreement between police chief and police employee association leader ratings of the importance of community policing components and correlates of agreement. We seek to answer the questions: do police department and employee association leaders agree about community policing, and what factors seem to influence levels of agreement?

Literature Review

The idea that police unions hamper or prevent the implementation of new policies in police departments is not new (International Association of Chiefs of Police 1971). Unions have also been identified as adversaries of police chiefs (International Association of Chiefs of Police 1971; May 1978). It could be expected then, that community policing, as a new policy or set of policies, would be a potential problem area for police chiefs and police unions.

In order to place the discussion of police unions and community policing in proper context, we review the description of police unions as obstacles to policy implementation generally, and as adversaries of police chiefs. Next we review the

literature concerning police union resistance to the implementation of community policing.

It is important to note that the literature on police unions is primarily qualitative. Most discussions of police unions and their influence focus attention on case studies of widely publicized clashes between police unions and police chiefs (Burpo 1971; Levi 1977). These case studies provide the “data” for most discussions of police unions generally. In many ways, the focus on case studies in studying police-labor relationships can be considered an example of the way that “[t]he big departments dominate public thinking about the police,” (Walker 1999). The case studies in the literature on police unions almost exclusively focus on the labor experiences of large departments. The experiences of smaller departments have not been examined systematically in the literature. We add to the literature on police unions by including both large and small departments as part of the study sample.

Many authors caution that police unions can be an obstacle to policy implementation generally. For the most part, these authors speak in general terms about the power of police unions to disrupt the delivery of services (Bouza 1985), the organizational and bargaining pressures that discourage unions from promoting professionalism (DeCotiis and Kochan 1978), the informal influence unions exert in the department and the community (Magenau and Hunt 1996), the intrusions that unions have made into areas previously considered to be managerial prerogatives (More 1992), and the fact that unions are an obstacle to change (Penegor and Peak 1992). Walker (1984:27) summarizes this literature saying,

As late as the mid-1960s police chiefs had virtually unlimited power to run their departments. Police reform constituted a dynamic chief producing sweeping changes from the top down. Today, police chiefs are severely constrained. Not only are many important issues subject to collective bargaining, but police unions exert enormous informal influence both within the department and in the community at large.

Several researchers have described union resistance to specific policy changes.

Table 1 provides a list of different policies unions have resisted or opposed. It is clear from the table that some unions have resisted or opposed a wide range of policy changes from organizational change, to the style of policing, to the allocation of officers. In addition to resisting specific policy changes (one officer cars, a fourth shift, and lateral entry), police union resistance has been described more broadly as an obstacle to more substantive changes to police departments. Organizational changes, alterations in the style of policing and professionalization attempts have been resisted. This resistance by police employee associations illustrates the worst fears of police executives: frustrating attempts to alter the nature of policing and the police role. The case studies of police-labor relations (Burpo 1971; Levi 1977) provide a history of union-management clashes mainly over union recognition and the establishment of the unions, and present in “play by play” fashion union reaction to policy changes, actions taken, and the subsequent actions of police department and municipal administrators.

Table 1: Policies Unions Have Opposed or Resisted

Policy	Cited In
professionalization attempts	(DeCotiis and Kochan 1978)
civilian review boards	(Bouza 1985); (Randall 1978)
promotion procedures	(Randall 1978)
organizational change	(Goldstein 1979)
lateral entry	(Guyot 1979)

move from watchman to legalistic style (Wilson 1980)

Table 1: Policies Unions Have Opposed or Resisted (continued)

manpower allocation	(Eltzeroth 1980)
disciplinary procedures	(Eltzeroth 1980)
recruitment and selection procedures	(Eltzeroth 1980)
one officer cars	(Mastrofski 1990)
changes in department directives	(Carter and Barker 1994)
changes in overtime provisions	(Bayley and Worden 1998)
a fourth shift	(Walker 1999)

In addition to being perceived as obstacles to policy implementation, unions have been described as adversaries of police chiefs. Clearly, if unions are opposing policy implementation, they are resisting changes in the department designed or at least approved by the chief. Some researchers argue that unions interfere with the management of the department in other ways. Table 2 provides a list of several different problems that unions are said to create for chiefs.

Table 2: Headaches Unions Create for Chiefs

Headache	Cited In
threatening management authority of chiefs	(May 1978; Bell 1981; Fraser 1985)
bargaining multilaterally	(May 1978)
attempting to influence the operations of the department	(Bairstow 1967; International Association of Chiefs of Police 1971; Fraser 1985)
interfering in areas usually considered to be managerial prerogatives	(Andrews 1985; Bouza 1985)
engaging management in bitter and prolonged fights over changes	(Goldstein 1979)
reducing the power of chiefs	(Walker 1993)
constraining policy making	(O'Brien 1978; Andrews 1985; Carter 1988)
resisting professionalization efforts	(Regoli, Culbertson et al. 1990)
influencing political races & therefore the appointment/tenure of chief	(Hudnut 1985)

Just as unions have opposed a wide range of policies, unions appear to cause a wide variety of problems for police chiefs. But, a careful inspection of the table reveals

that these problems all revolve around a central issue in the police-labor literature: the idea that police unions attempt to influence the direction of policies implemented by police departments and therefore limit the power of the police chief to manage the department as he or she sees fit. For this reason, some members of police management even described police unions as treasonous (International Association of Chiefs of Police 1971).

The police labor literature appears to clearly show that police unions are perceived as being analogous to a mutinous crew on a ship (see Fogelson 1977 for a different point of view). At every turn, they thwart the will of the captain, resist changes, demand the ability to chart the course of the ship, request constant improvements to the working conditions on the ship, and destroy the ability of the captain to steer. It is not surprising then, to find that police unions have also been identified as an obstacle to implementing community policing.

Several researchers have discussed the role that unions play in preventing, delaying, or otherwise frustrating attempts at community policing. Unions have been described as part of the internal resistance to change found in many police organizations (Zhao and Thurman 1997; Zhao, Lovrich et al. 1999). Partly because of the power unions are thought to possess, Skolnick and Bayley (1988: 23) argue that what unions think about community policing is important and that unions are not enthusiastic advocates of community policing for three reasons. Unions see community policing as (a) “a threat to the proper role of police in society,” (b) “a threat to police professionalism,” and (c) “a threat if it means or appears to mean that fewer police will be necessary.”

In a like vein, Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux (1990) noted the importance of labor relations and police officer union support of community policing to successful implementation. They suggested that community policing will be more successful in agencies where labor and management relations are not characterized by continual conflict and argue that police employee organizations must change: “Police unions must change to accommodate the increasing professionalization of the police role. They must become active partners in the process of enhancing the flexibility that officers need to become community problem solvers” (Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux, 1990 p. 368). Comments such as these indicate that labor/management relations in police organizations impinge on efforts to develop and implement community policing.

Unions have also been described as affecting how community policing reforms are implemented. In New York City, police officer assignments to the Special Operations Unit (SOU) had to be voluntary because of union regulations relating to tour charts (Pate and Shtull 1994).

While maintaining the integrity of contractual agreements may explain the type of union resistance described by Pate & Shtull (1994), several other reasons for union resistance to community policing reforms have been identified. Sadd and Grinc (1996) report that unions disliked community policing for three major reasons. First, union-management tension and a general distrust of management make officers suspicious of community policing reforms. Second, officers dislike what they see as heavy-handed implementation of community policing. Third, and perhaps most important, unions describe a lack of involvement in the decision-making concerning community policing programs, and see these reforms as happening *to* them (Sadd and Grinc 1996).

Envisioned as a basic change in organizational mission and philosophy, community policing is expected to involve line level police officers in the identification of problems and the development of solutions. Yet, researchers report the perception that line officers are not consulted in departmental community policing initiatives. LeClair and Sullivan (1997) reported on a national survey of police chiefs concerning community policing. The chiefs emphasized the need to listen to and involve the community in the implementation of community policing, yet, “the police chiefs did not emphasize involving officers in the implementation of community policing other than to require them to undergo training...Furthermore, fifty-six percent of the police chiefs anticipated that rank and file officers would resist efforts to initiate community policing” (LeClair and Sullivan 1997: 3).

A conflict between line officers and police administrators over community policing seems, at first glance, incongruous. Community policing empowers police officers, granting them broader discretion and authority, and giving officer more control over day to day activities. Still, there is a persistent theme in the literature that patrol officers (and their unions or associations) resist efforts to expand and change the role of the police. Despite the fact that officers involved in community policing initiatives often report satisfaction with their jobs and support the initiatives, there seems to be a sense that police officer employee associations oppose community policing.

The research reported here describes the current level of agreement on community policing initiatives between local police department administrators and police employee association leaders. We surveyed department and police employee association/union

leaders for each of the departments contacted in the 1993 Law Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics survey to answer the following research questions:

- 1. How do police agency and employee association/union executives perceive community oriented policing programs and components?**
- 2. Do agency and employee association/union executives agree in their perceptions of community oriented policing?**
- 3. Are there particular areas or types of community policing programs or components on which agency and employee organization leaders are most likely to agree?**
- 4. What are the correlates of agreement among agency and association/union leaders?**
- 5. What characteristics of police agencies or police employee associations/unions explain variation in agreement?**

The report is divided into several sections. First, the methods used to conduct the study are described, including the sample used, the survey questionnaires, and the response rates for the two surveys. Second, the basic characteristics of the chief respondents are presented and discussed. Third, the basic characteristics of the police employee association/union leaders are presented and discussed. These two sections include the perceptions of community policing initiatives and address the first research question outlined above. In the fourth section, the police chief respondents and police employee association/union leaders are matched and the remaining research questions are addressed. This section includes a brief discussion of different methods of measuring agreement. The final section contains a discussion of the results as well as recommendations for future research.

Summary

Police unions have been identified as general obstacles to police management in terms of implementing policies, frustrating the attempts of chiefs to manage their agencies, and most recently, as roadblocks to the implementation of community policing. Unions have been identified as resisting a wide range of policies and attempting to influence the direction of policies implemented by police departments. These efforts are perceived as limiting the power of police chiefs to act unilaterally to manage their departments.

It is not surprising to find that unions have been perceived as offering resistance to community policing. They are seen as part of the internal resistance to community policing generally as well as to specific initiatives. Successful implementation of community policing is thought to require union support and it has been argued that unions are not likely to offer this support for several reasons. The distrust of management, the perception of heavy-handed implementation of community policing, and a lack of involvement in the decision making regarding implementation are thought to contribute to union resistance and dislike for community policing.

The research reported here describes the current state of local police department administrators' and police employee association leaders' level of agreement on community policing initiatives.

Methods

To examine how police chiefs and police employee association/union leaders perceive community policing, we conducted two surveys: one of police chiefs and one of police employee association/union leaders. We begin by describing the police chief survey: the sample used, the development of the questionnaire, the distribution of the questionnaire and follow-ups, and the response rate. Next we describe the methods used to locate the police employee association/union leaders. The police association survey development and distribution mirrors that of the chief survey with the exception of a “one-shot” (i.e., no follow-up) survey sent to nonrespondent chiefs in an effort to locate additional police associations. We report the response rate for the police association survey and the last section how we matched the two sets of survey responses and the characteristics of the matched sample.

Police Chief Sample

Using the 1993 Law Enforcement Management and Statistics study sample of police agencies, we sent surveys to the chiefs of 1779 municipal police departments¹. The actual number of municipal agencies reported in the 1993 LEMAS sample is 1833. Closer inspection identified two problems. First, some agencies were listed as municipal agencies when they were better classified as special police. For example, the following agencies were coded as municipal in nature: Los Angeles Port Police, Baltimore School Police, Long Island Railroad Police, New York City Transit Police, New York City Fire Department—Investigations, and a variety of sheriff’s departments which did not have patrol or first response responsibilities. We excluded these agencies

because they did not meet our definition of municipal police. Another 20 agencies were missing from the Directory of Law Enforcement Agencies, 1996 collected by the Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics. This data set provided the mailing address and other contact information needed to send a survey to the agencies in the sample.

Development of the Survey Questionnaires

The development of the survey questionnaires consisted of several stages. In the first stage we reviewed the literature concerning both community policing and police employee associations. An initial instrument was developed and distributed to an Advisory Board created for this project. The Board consisted of the following members: Jody Hedeman (National Association of Police Organizations), Steve Young and David Simpson (Fraternal Order of Police), John Firman (International Association of Chiefs of Police), and a consultant to the project Dr. Robert Langworthy (University of Alaska at Anchorage). The suggestions (additions, deletions, modifications) concerning the construction of the questionnaire and the questions contained within it were then incorporated into the final instruments.

The final survey instruments consisted of three main sections: the first “demographic” section asked about characteristics of the police agency and chief or about characteristics of the police employee association and association leader; the second section contained questions about the relationship of employee organizations and police management; and the third had questions concerning community policing. Each

¹ The first wave of surveys was sent January 1999.

section is described in detail below. (The police chief survey is included as Appendix A and the police employee association leader survey is included as Appendix B).

Demographic Sections

Because the surveys were being sent to two different populations, separate sections were developed to tap into the characteristics of each group. These sections are the only ones which differ based on the respondent group.

Chief “Demographic” Questions

This section contains questions concerning the political environment of the police agency, the chief’s career path, the types of police employee associations to which department employees belong, if any, and the characteristics of any contracts and negotiations between the police agency and employee organizations.

The career path questions inquired about several aspects of the chief’s career and experience. We asked: (a) the years of sworn experience the chief had before becoming chief, (b) the years of nonsworn experience before becoming chief, (c) whether the chief had held the position of chief at another agency, (d) how long the chief had held the position at another agency, (e) how the chief obtained his/her current position (appointed from outside or promoted from within the agency), and (f) tenure at current chief position.

We asked a series of questions concerning police employee associations. First, we asked if there were any associations to which department employees belonged as members. For each police employee association, we asked for the following information: (a) the name of the organization, (b) the contact person at that association, (c) whether or not the association engages in collective bargaining with the police agency, (d) the nature

of the relationship between the association and the department (ranging from uncooperative to cooperative), and (e) the level of affiliation of the association (local, county, state or national).

The contract section of the chief survey also contains a series of questions. First, a screening question concerning whether or not the agency has a contract with any police employee associations. If there was a contract in place, we asked for the following information: (a) the length of the contract, (b) how long it took to negotiate the current contract, (c) when the negotiations for the next contract begin, (d) whether the chief is involved in negotiations, (e) how the chief sees his/her role in these negotiations, and (f) a list of people who are involved in negotiations from the police department and other city agencies. We also asked if the police agency had a special unit to deal with police employee association relations and contract negotiations/administration.

Union “Demographic” Questions

In order to get a better picture of the nature of police employee associations, we asked several types of questions to describe the size, age, contract characteristics, membership requirements, and leader characteristics. We asked for the following information: (a) the number of members in the police employee association, (b) the date the association was founded, (c) whether there was a contract in place, (d) the length of the contract, (e) when negotiations start for the next contract, (f) the affiliation of the police employee association (local, county, state, or national), (g) whether the leader of the association was a sworn officer, (h) how many years of sworn experience the president had as an officer before becoming president, (i) tenure as president, (j) how the president is selected, (k) whether the police employee association has a dues check-off

system in place and if so, when it was instituted, and (1) membership requirements, limitations, and whether membership was mandatory.

Relationship of Employee Organizations and Police Agencies

This section was included in identical format in both surveys. The questions in this section focus on how the two groups perceive each other generally and ask them to describe any conflicts between the police agency and employees/employee organizations over the last three years. The perception questions asked the respondents whether they strongly agreed, agreed, disagreed, or strongly disagreed with a series of statements found in the literature concerning police unions. These questions are provided in Table 3 below along with the references used to develop the questions. The references are listed below the table and are assigned numbers. The reference numbers found in Table 3 correspond

Table 3 : Perception Questions

Question	Found in Reference Number
1. Police employee organizations seek to limit the power of management.	5, 6, 10, 12, 18, 19, 20
2. Police employee organizations have too much influence over policy related issues.	1, 2, 4, 11, 12, 13, 23, 24
3. When changes in policy are considered, it is important to consider the reaction of the police employee organization(s).	12
4. Both police management and police employee organizations should have a voice in new policy decisions relating to employee issues.	4, 6, 8, 9, 12, 18
5. Both police management and police employee organizations should have a voice in new policy decisions relating to policies and procedures of the police department.	14

Table 3 (Continued)

Question	Found in Reference Number
6. Police employee organizations and unions are not accountable to the public.	6, 11, 13, 16, 17, 25
7. Police employees and their organizations generally trust management to make good decisions.	2, 3, 7, 10, 13, 15, 21, 22
8. Police employees in this department have a voice in decisions regarding new policies.	7, 10, 26

1 (Andrews 1985), 2 (Bell 1981), 3 (Bolinger 1981), 4 (Bouza 1985), 5 (Bowers 1974), 6 (Burpo 1971), 7 (Carter 1988), 8 (DeCotiis and Kochan 1978), 9 (Fogelson 1977), 10 (International Association of Chiefs of Police 1977), 11 (International Association of Chiefs of Police 1971), 12 (Juris and Feuille 1972), 13 (Kearney 1995), 14 (Kelling and Kliesmet 1995), 15 (Kliesmet 1989), 16 (Levi 1977), 17 (Lewin, Feuille et al. 1988), 18 (Maddox 1975), 19 (Moloney 1977), 20 (Rynecki, Cairns et al. 1978), 21 (Sadd and Grinc 1996), 22 (Sirene 1985), 23 (Stephens 1992), 24 (Walker 1984), 25 (Zeidler 1967), 26 (Zhao and Lovrich 1997)

to these numbers. For example, perception question three has one reference listed (number 12) this corresponds to (Juris and Feuille 1972).

The conflict section of the survey contained several sections. First, we used a screening question which asked whether or not the police agency and its employees/associations had experienced any type of conflict over the last three years. Then we provided a list of different types of conflicts (provided below) and asked for each one: (a) whether the agency had experienced that type of conflict, (b) whether the conflict was related to community policing, (c) the date of the conflict, (d) the impact, if any, of the conflict on the implementation of community policing. We included the following different types of conflict: strike, “blue flu”, work slowdowns, work speed ups, vote of no confidence, citations of city vehicles, grievances, lawsuits, fact-finding, picketing by officers, referenda, mass resignation, lobbying state legislature, lobbying

city legislature, negative media publicity, arbitration, mediation, arbitration-mediation, conflict/dispute resolution as well as threats to use any of the types of conflict/resolution.

On a separate page, we asked for details concerning up to three different conflicts between the agency and employees. We asked: what type of conflict (strike, blue flu, etc.), what the issue was that caused the conflict, whether the issue was resolved, and if so, how the issue was resolved. Respondents were encouraged to use extra pages to describe other conflicts if needed.

Community Policing Initiatives

This section included a list of community policing initiatives and for each one we asked respondents to tell us: (a) whether they thought the initiative was an important part of community policing, (b) whether or not the initiative had been implemented in their agency, and for selected components/initiatives, (c) whether the implementation of the initiative was negotiable (requiring negotiation with the police employee organization) or a managerial prerogative (the right of management to implement without consulting the police employee organization prior to implementation). The list of community policing components/initiatives was based on that used by Wycoff (1996) and the advisory board added several initiatives. These questions form the basis for the measurement of agreement concerning community policing between the two groups.

Survey Method

We followed the Dillman method of sending the mail survey (Dillman 1978). In order to make the survey more “personal” we contacted the International Association of Chiefs of Police and obtained their most recent membership listing. For each police department in the sample, we attempted to locate the name of the chief and include it in

our database. The mailing list was several months old at the time we obtained it (another one was in the preparation stages). Adding the chief name to the letters had unexpected consequences. While intended to increase the response rate, for quite a few departments, the chief had changed and we were informed that the chief would fill out the survey if it were addressed to him/her specifically, but not if it had the old chief's name on it.

The Dillman (1978) technique for mail surveys consists of several steps. The initial mailing consists of a letter introducing the research, its importance, the need for each respondent to participate, grateful acknowledgment of the contribution provided by participation, and contact information in the event of any questions or concerns, as well as the survey instrument. The first follow-up mailing is a postcard sent one week later. The postcard thanks those respondents who have participated and reminds those that have not participated to do so. The second follow-up occurs three weeks after the initial mailing and consists of sending another letter/survey packet to all nonrespondents. The last follow-up consists of a third letter/survey packet sent certified mail seven weeks after the initial mailing to all remaining non-respondents. Each letter sent out contains a stronger request to complete the survey and Dillman (1978) outlines in great detail the construction of each letter. For the chiefs, we received 1165 surveys for a response rate of 66 percent.

Police Employee Association Sample

There is no national database of police employee associations. We used several strategies to locate the police employee associations that matched the police departments in our sample. First, we asked the chiefs in their survey to identify the police employee associations in which their employees were members. We enlisted the assistance of the

Fraternal Order of Police and the National Association of Police Organizations in locating police employee associations related to our sample of police agencies. The National Association of Police Organizations provided a letter of introduction and support for the survey for addition to the initial mailing for their members. We also searched for associations on the Internet. In addition, we conducted a “one-shot” survey (described below) to identify additional police employee associations. It is important to recognize that not all police departments have police employee associations. Indeed, 33 percent of our respondent chiefs indicated this in their surveys. We identified 1117 police employee associations affiliated with the police departments in our sample and received responses from 648 associations for a response rate of about 58 percent².

One Shot Survey

As police chiefs would be expected to be the most knowledgeable source concerning the existence of police employee associations, we sent a “one shot” survey to nonrespondent chiefs. In the mailing packet, we included a letter to the chief asking him/her to pass along the enclosed letter and survey to the president/leader of the patrol officer employee association, if any. The letter to the police employee association followed the initial “Dillman” format. We asked that if there were no such associations that the chief return the letter to us. These surveys were not followed up as we had sent them to unknown (and possibly non-existent) respondents.

² The first wave of surveys was sent January 2000.

Matching Responses

After the police chief surveys were entered and cleaned, we created a database containing information concerning the police employee associations related to the agencies in our sample. After obtaining additional information from the sources listed above (the FOP and NAPO searches, the internet search, the one-shot survey), we developed a final listing of police employee associations. Identification or case numbers were assigned that would allow us to match the responses of the chiefs and the police employee associations affiliated with their departments. After the association leader surveys were entered and cleaned, the two sets of survey responses were merged together. The data from the 1993 Law Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics (LEMAS) survey responses were also appended. The matched sample contains a total of 579 responses. This “matched” sample represents police agencies for which we received completed surveys from both the chief and the employee association. It includes 474 separate police agencies.

The final data set is semi-hierarchical in nature. That is, for each police department/chief response we have at least one response from a police employee association leader affiliated with the department. In some cases, we have more than one response. Table 4 below describes the data in more detail.

Table 4 : The Number of Police Employee Association Responses Per Department

Number of Associations	N	(%)
1	383	(80.8)
2	79	(16.7)
3	10	(2.1)
4	2	(0.4)

As the table illustrates, the vast majority of our respondents have a one-to-one relationship: one chief response matched to one police employee association. About 20 percent of the responses are hierarchical (more than one police employee association per chief).

Summary

To examine how police chiefs and police employee association leaders perceive community policing, we conducted two surveys: one of police chiefs and one of police employee association leaders. The self-administered mail surveys were distributed using the techniques described by (Dillman 1978). The chief surveys were sent to the 1779 municipal agencies contained in the 1993 Law Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics sample. We received 1165 surveys for a response rate of 66 percent. The police employee organization leader surveys were sent to those police employee organizations associated with our sample departments identified through the use of the chief responses, mailing lists of two national police employee organizations, and internet searches. We identified 1117 police employee organizations associated with our sample departments and received 648 returned surveys for a response rate of about 58 percent. After matching police chief and police employee organization leader responses, we have a total of 579 paired responses for 474 agencies.

The survey, developed with the assistance of an advisory board, contains three sections. The first section asks questions about the “demographic” characteristics of either police chiefs and their departments or police employee association leaders and their organizations. The second section contains questions concerning the relationship of employee organizations and police departments. This section contains perception questions concerning these relationships and questions concerning conflict between the department and employees. The third section contains questions concerning community policing initiatives. We asked respondents to rate the importance of each initiative to community policing, whether or not the initiative had been implemented, and whether implementation of each initiative was negotiable or a managerial prerogative.

Police Chief Responses

Introduction

This section presents the basic characteristics and responses of the police chiefs in our sample. First, we present a comparison of respondent and nonrespondent chiefs based on data contained in the 1993 Law Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics (LEMAS) survey. Then we examine our response rate by region of the country. The rest of the section follows the structure of the survey instrument introduced in the methods section: “demographic” information, perceptions of police-labor relationships and conflict, and community policing components.

Respondent Characteristics

Table 5 contains a description of police organization characteristics for the total LEMAS sample, the respondent chiefs and nonrespondent chiefs in terms of several variables included in the LEMAS data set. We include variables describing collective bargaining, the existence of police employee associations/unions, and three measures of organizational size/workload: the average number of sworn officers, the population of the jurisdiction, and the total requests for service reported by the agency. We found several statistically significant differences between our respondents and the nonrespondents. First, we were more likely to receive responses from agencies that have collective bargaining authorized for sworn and nonsworn employees. A comparison with the total sample, however, indicates that the respondents appear representative of the total sample. Second, we were more likely to receive responses from departments which reported that there is a formalized police membership organization for sworn officers. Again, a comparison with the total sample indicates that the respondents appear representative of

Table 5 : LEMAS Sample, Respondents, and Nonrespondent Police Chiefs

Variable	Total Sample		Respondents		Non-Respondents	
	N	(%)	N	(%)	N	(%)
Is collective bargaining authorized for sworn employees?*						
Yes	808	(46.1)	562	(48.2)	246	(41.9)
No	946	(53.9)	605	(51.8)	341	(58.1)
Is collective bargaining authorized for nonsworn employees?*						
Yes	509	(29.0)	359	(30.8)	150	(25.6)
No	1245	(71.0)	808	(69.2)	437	(74.4)
Is there a formalized police membership organization for sworn officers in your agency?*						
Yes	1155	(65.8)	795	(68.1)	360	(61.3)
No	599	(34.2)	372	(31.9)	227	(38.7)
Does your agency have a local affiliate of a national police union?						
Yes	109	(9.4)	76	(9.6)	33	(9.2)
No	1046	(90.6)	719	(90.4)	327	(90.8)

*Indicates a statistically significant difference between the respondents & non-respondents.

Table 5: LEMAS Sample, Respondents, & Non-Respondent Police Chiefs

Variable	Total Sample		Respondents		Non-Respondents	
	N	(%)	N	(%)	N	(%)
Does your agency have a national police union?						
Yes	485	(42.0)	341	(42.9)	144	(40.0)
No	670	(58.0)	454	(57.1)	216	(60.0)
Does your agency have a local police union?						
Yes	268	(23.2)	186	(23.4)	82	(22.8)
No	887	(76.8)	609	(76.6)	278	(77.2)
Does your agency have a local unaffiliated union?						
Yes	26	(2.3)	20	(2.5)	6	(1.7)
No	1129	(97.7)	775	(97.5)	354	(98.3)
Does your agency have a local police association?						
Yes	370	(32.0)	256	(32.2)	114	(31.7)
No	785	(68.0)	539	(67.8)	246	(68.3)

*Indicates a statistically significant difference between the respondents & non-respondents.

Table 5: LEMAS Sample, Respondents, & Non-Respondent Police Chiefs

Variable	Total Sample		Respondents		Non-Respondents	
	N	(%)	N	(%)	N	(%)
Does your agency have a state police association?						
Yes	225	(19.5)	157	(19.7)	68	(18.9)
No	930	(80.5)	638	(80.3)	292	(81.1)
Does your agency have a regional police association?						
Yes	81	(7.0)	53	(6.7)	28	(7.8)
No	1074	(93.0)	742	(93.3)	332	(92.2)
Does your agency have any other police association?						
Yes	53	(4.6)	38	(4.8)	15	(4.2)
No	1102	(95.4)	757	(95.2)	345	(95.8)

*Indicates a statistically significant difference between the respondents & non-respondents.

Table 5: LEMAS Sample, Respondents, and Nonrespondent Chiefs

Average Number of Sworn officers*	Total Sample	Respondents	Non-Respondents
Mean	122.87	149.22	70.49
Median	13.00	15.00	9.00
Mode	2.00	2.00	1.00
Skewness	26.54	22.36	7.68
Population of Jurisdiction			
Mean	51,985.22	62,599.38	30,883.49
Median	5,853.00	7,389.00	3,676.00
Mode	950.00	1388.00	571.00
Skewness	20.08	17.25	5.45
Total Requests for Service			
Mean	82,222.73	101,787.24	43,327.03
Median	6,000.00	7,700.00	3,215.00
Mode	1,200.00	1,200.00	1,000.00
Skewness	15.94	13.60	7.52

*Due to the skewed nature of the data, no statistical tests were run to examine differences between respondent & non-respondent agencies. It seems clear (& safe to argue) from the three measures of size presented above that the agencies that responded to the survey were in general the larger agencies.

the total sample. The measures of organizational size/workload are highly skewed, as would be expected. Because of this, we present for each measure, the mean (average value), median (middle case in the distribution), mode (most common value in the distribution), and skewness statistic (measure of asymmetry of the distribution in which a value greater than one represents a distribution which is significantly different from the normal distribution) (Blalock 1979). It seems clear from this table that the respondent agencies tended to be larger in terms of the average number of sworn officers, the population of the jurisdiction served, and the total requests for service. The nonrespondent agencies are noticeably smaller than both the respondent characteristics and total sample characteristics.

Respondents by Region

Many important social and political characteristics vary by region of the country (Bureau of the Census 1994). Collective bargaining, particularly public sector collective bargaining, also varies by region of the country (Lewin, Feuille et al. 1988). Specifically, public sector unions are thought to be strongest in the Northeast and Midwest and weakest in the Sunbelt (Kearney 1995). It is important to keep in mind, however, that even in states without legal authorization for it, collective bargaining can and does take place and “where bargaining does not occur employee organizations are typically on the scene as interest groups and political actors” (Kearney 1995: 181).

Table 6 presents the respondent and nonrespondent chiefs by region of the country. The LEMAS data and Directory of Law Enforcement Agencies data were used in conjunction with the region specifications outlined in the Census Bureau’s (1994)

Table 6: Response Rate of Chiefs by Region of the Country

Region	Respondents		Non-Respondents	
	N	(%)	N	(%)
Northeast	255	(61.6)	159	(38.4)
Midwest	361	(65.2)	193	(34.8)
South	381	(68.2)	178	(31.8)
West	170	(74.9)	57	(25.1)

*Regions defined using coding information provided by the Census Bureau (1994) *Geographic Area Reference Manual* Chapter 6: Statistical Groupings of States & Counties p. 6-24

Geographic Area Reference Manual. Inspection of the table reveals that, when disaggregated by region, we received the highest response rate from police chiefs in the West (74.9 percent), followed by the South (68.2 percent), Midwest (65.2 percent) and Northeast (61.6 percent) respectively.

“Demographic” Characteristics

This section includes a presentation of the characteristics of chiefs, the form of government in the jurisdiction served by the police department, whether or not there are police employee organizations associated with the department, and chief descriptions of the police employee organizations associated with their departments.

Table 7 describes police chiefs who responded to our survey, focusing attention on their career path and career characteristics. In terms of obtaining their current position as chief, 60.5 percent were promoted from within the police department, 38.7 percent were appointed from outside the department, and 0.8 percent were elected to their position. The chiefs in our sample averaged 17.30 years of sworn experience before

Table 7 : Police Chief Characteristics

Variable	N	(%)
How Chief Obtained Current Position		
Promoted From Within Department	700	(60.5)
Appointed From Outside Department	448	(38.7)
Elected	9	(0.8)
Did Chief Hold Position of Chief in Another Jurisdiction Before Current Position		
Yes	176	(15.2)
No	983	(84.8)
Years Spent at Previous Chief Position		
Mean		5.72
Median		4.00
Years of Sworn Experience Before Becoming Chief		
Mean		17.30
Median		18.00
Years at Current Chief Position		
Mean		6.42
Median		5.00

becoming chief. The majority of chiefs (84.8 percent) had not held the position of chief in another agency before their current job. Those chiefs who had previous experience as chief in another agency averaged 5.72 years in their previous job. The average chief reported 6.42 years (median of 5 years) at their current position.

These results are consistent with previous research on police chief tenure and experience in law enforcement before becoming chief. Regoli, Culbertson et al. (1990), reporting results from a national survey of chiefs (N=1120), found the average tenure of

chiefs to be 4 years. Penegor and Peak (1992) found an average tenure of 7.3 years for “insider” chiefs and an average tenure of 5.97 years for “outsider” chiefs. They examined chiefs drawn from 12 states in the Pacific region. Tunnell and Gaines (1992) surveyed Kentucky police chiefs (N=115) and reported an average tenure of 5.5 years as chief. Several studies have examined the amount of law enforcement experience of chiefs. Enter (1986), surveying chiefs serving populations of 100,000 or more (N=117), found that most chiefs spent 19.53 years in law enforcement before becoming chief. Tunnell and Gaines (1992) found that their chiefs had been with their departments on average for 12.1 years. Penegor and Peak (1992) , examining total years in law enforcement, found an average of 22.9 years for “insiders” and 24.5 years for “outsiders.”

Table 8 presents the form of government in the jurisdiction served by the police department as reported by chiefs. Respondents were presented with a list of government types to select from and they were also able to “write-in” answers which were not included in the list. Because the respondents were able to select more than one answer, the percentages provided in the table refer to the percentage of all agencies providing a particular answer, rather than the percentage of all responses. For this reason, the percentages provided do not sum to 100. The table reveals that 57.4 percent of jurisdictions are served by mayors, 47.7 percent by a city manager, 23.8 percent by a city board of supervisors, and 14.1 percent by a city, town, or village council.

Table 8: Form of Government Reported by Chiefs³

Type of Government	N	(%)*
Mayor	666	(57.4)
City Manager	553	(47.7)
City Board of Supervisors (Elected)	276	(23.8)
Council (Town, Village, City)	164	(14.1)
Aldermen	149	(12.8)
Police Commission	70	(6.0)
Commissioner	24	(2.1)
County Supervisors (Elected)	19	(1.6)
City Board of Supervisors (Appointed)	14	(1.2)
County Manager	9	(0.8)
County Supervisors (Appointed)	1	(0.1)

*Respondents were able to specify several answers to describe the form of government in their jurisdiction. The percentage presented is the percentage of all respondents indicating any form of government (N=1160) divided by those indicating that their jurisdiction has the form of government listed. Therefore, the percentages will not sum to 100.

Table 9 contains police chief responses to questions asking whether or not there are any police employee organizations associated with their department as well as the number of police employee organizations, if any. A total of 776 police chiefs (67.0 percent of the respondents) indicated that there were police employee organizations associated with their departments. The majority of departments that have police employee organizations (53.2 percent) have only one such organization. Another 29.0 percent of departments have two police employee organizations. Less than 10 percent of departments have three and fewer than 10 percent of departments have more than three police employee organizations.

³ The survey was sent to agencies identified as municipal by the 1993 LEMAS survey. Some agencies were larger county level agencies that served municipal areas. We included these agencies if they indicated in their LEMAS survey that the agency was responsible for patrol and first response duties.

Table 9: Existence of Police Employee Organizations Associated with Sample Departments

	N	(%)
Are there any police employee organizations?		
Yes	776	(67.0)
No	382	(33.0)
Number of Police Employee Organizations		
1	411	(53.2)
2	224	(29.0)
3	75	(9.7)
4	35	(4.5)
5	18	(2.3)
6+	9	(1.1)

Table 10 presents the chief descriptions of police employee organizations associated with their department. The chiefs report that 61.8 percent of them have an association that engages in collective bargaining with the department. Most chiefs report that they have a somewhat cooperative (21.9 percent) or cooperative (58.7 percent) relationship with the employee association. Very few relationships are characterized as either uncooperative (1.3 percent) or somewhat uncooperative (4.5 percent). Chiefs were also asked to provide the level of affiliation of the police employee organization. The interpretation of this question is somewhat problematic. Many chiefs provided more than one answer to this question for each police employee organization. Conversations with advisory board members led to the discovery that it was indeed possible for a single organization to have multiple affiliations. In the Fraternal Order of Police in particular, local FOP lodges are often members of a state level FOP organization as well as the national FOP organization. The data were coded so that the *lowest* level of affiliation was included as the response when multiple answers were given. The table shows that the

majority of organizations were local ones (53.4 percent), with 5.6 percent affiliated at the county level, 17.4 percent at the state level, and 23.6 percent at the national level.

Table 10: Chief Descriptions of Police Employee Organizations⁴

Does the police employee organization engage in collective bargaining with the department?	N	(%)
Yes	801	(61.8)
No	496	(38.2)
How would you characterize the relationship between the police department & this police employee organization?		
Uncooperative	17	(1.3)
Somewhat uncooperative	58	(4.5)
Neutral	176	(13.6)
Somewhat cooperative	283	(21.9)
Cooperative	758	(58.7)
Is this police employee organization:		
Local	664	(53.4)
County	69	(5.6)
State	217	(17.4)
National	293	(23.6)

We also examined police chief descriptions of police employee organizations by whether or not the police employee organization engages in collective bargaining. This was intended to answer two questions: (1) Are certain types of police employee organizations (local, county, etc.) more likely to engage in collective bargaining? and (2) Are ratings of relationship quality related to whether or not the police employee organization engages in collective bargaining?

Table 11 : Descriptions of Police Employee Organizations by Collective Bargaining Status

	Collective Bargaining			
	Yes N	(%)	No N	(%)
Level of Police Employee Organization*				
Local	460	(60.0)	193	(42.0)
County	29	(3.8)	40	(8.7)
State	111	(14.5)	105	(22.9)
National	167	(21.8)	121	(26.4)
Relationship with Department*				
Uncooperative	6	(0.8)	11	(2.3)
Somewhat uncooperative	45	(5.7)	13	(2.7)
Neutral	73	(9.3)	98	(20.2)
Somewhat cooperative	195	(24.7)	86	(17.8)
Cooperative	469	(59.5)	276	(57.0)

*p<.05, chi-square test

Table 11 seeks to answer this question by presenting the police chief descriptions of level of affiliation and relationship quality for both those police employee organizations that engage in collective bargaining and those which do not. The relationship between collective bargaining status and the level of the police employee organization and the perceived relationship between the department and the organization are statistically significant ($p < .05$). The table reveals that most police employee organizations that collectively bargain are local organizations (60.0 percent). The table also shows that police employee organizations which collectively bargain are somewhat more likely to be seen as somewhat cooperative or cooperative than those that do not.

⁴ While only 776 chiefs report having any police employee organizations associated with their departments, as Table 9 indicates, many chiefs reported having more than one police employee organizations. For this

Table 12 presents the chief’s report of the existence of a police employee organization by region of the country. Kearney (1995) explains that unions are strongest in the Northeast and Midwest and weakest in the Sunbelt. Our findings reveal that in terms of police employee organizations (which may or may not be actual *unions*), chiefs from the Northeast were most likely to report the existence of police employee organizations (85.8 percent), followed by chiefs in the West (83.5 percent), Midwest (59.2 percent), and the South (54.4 percent).

Table 12: Existence of Police Employee Organizations by Region*

	Northeast		Midwest		South		West	
	N	(%)	N	(%)	N	(%)	N	(%)
Yes	217	(85.8)	212	(59.2)	206	(54.4)	142	(83.5)
No	36	(14.2)	146	(40.8)	173	(45.6)	28	(16.5)

Perceptions of Labor-Management Relationships

This section presents the findings concerning police chief perceptions of the relationships between police management and labor. We begin by discussing these perceptions for the entire sample, and then present the perceptions of chiefs who have police employee organizations associated with their departments compared to those who do not. We also discuss the perceptions of chiefs who have experienced conflict between their department and police employees and employee organizations over the last three years compared to those who have not experienced conflict.

Table 13 presents the chief’s responses to the perception questions dealing with police labor-management relationships. The table shows that 63.7 percent of chiefs agree

reason, there are more relationships than responding police chiefs.

Table 13 : Police Chief Perceptions of Police Employee Organizations

Perception Questions	Agree		Disagree	
	N	(%)	N	(%)
PEOs seek to limit the power of management.	706	(63.7)	403	(36.3)
PEOs have too much influence over policy related issues.	442	(40.1)	661	(59.9)
When changes in policies are considered, it is important to consider the reaction of the PEO(s).	899	(81.4)	206	(18.6)
Both police management and PEOs should have a voice in new policy decisions relating to employee issues.	873	(79.4)	227	(20.6)
Both police management and PEOs should have a voice in new policy decisions relating to policies and procedures of the police department.	687	(62.5)	412	(37.5)
PEOs and unions are not accountable to the public.	500	(45.3)	604	(54.7)
Police employees and their organizations generally trust management to make good decisions.	548	(49.8)	553	(50.2)
Police employees in this department have a voice in decisions regarding new policies.	979	(88.9)	122	(11.1)

that police employee organizations seek to limit the power of management. About 40 percent of chiefs agree that police employee organizations have too much influence over policy related issues. More than 80 percent of chiefs agree that when changes in policies are considered, it is important to consider the reaction of police employee organizations.

About the same percentage of chiefs agree that both police management and police employee organizations should have a voice in new policy decisions relating to employee issues. However, only 62.5 percent of chiefs agreed that both police management and police employee organizations should have a voice in new *policy* decisions relating to policies and procedures of the police department. About 45 percent of chiefs agreed that police employee organizations and unions are not accountable to the public. Surprisingly (or perhaps not), only about 50 percent of chiefs agreed that police employees and their organizations generally trust management to make good decisions. When asked about their own department in particular, almost 90 percent of chiefs agreed that their police employees have a voice in decisions regarding new policies. It is interesting to note that this is a higher percentage of agreement than that found for the specific questions relating to either employee issues or new policies and procedures.

It could be expected that chiefs with experience dealing with police employee organizations may perceive them differently than those that do not. Table 14 presents the perception question responses for those chiefs who have a police employee organization associated with their department and those that do not. A comparison of the two groups reveals several statistically significant differences. Police chiefs who have a police employee organization associated with their department were more likely to agree that (a) these organizations attempt to limit the power of management, (b) the police employee

Table 14: Comparison of Perceptions: Chiefs With and Without an Employee Organization

Perception Questions	Has a PEO				No PEO			
	Agree N	(%)	Disagree N	(%)	Agree N	(%)	Disagree N	(%)
PEOs seek to limit the power of management. *	507	(66.1)	260	(33.9)	196	(58.0)	142	(42.0)
PEOs have too much influence over policy related issues. *	272	(35.6)	491	(64.4)	168	(50.0)	168	(50.0)
When changes in policies are considered, it is important to consider the reaction of the PEO(s). *	662	(86.4)	104	(13.6)	235	(70.1)	100	(29.9)
Both police management and PEOs should have a voice in new policy decisions relating to employee issues. *	618	(81.3)	142	(18.7)	251	(74.7)	85	(25.3)
Both police management and PEOs should have a voice in new policy decisions relating to policies and procedures of the police department. *	497	(65.3)	264	(34.7)	187	(56.0)	147	(44.0)
PEOs and unions are not accountable to the public.	346	(45.3)	418	(54.7)	152	(45.2)	184	(54.8)
Police employees and their organizations generally trust management to make good decisions.	383	(50.5)	375	(49.5)	162	(47.8)	177	(52.2)
Police employees in this department have a voice in decisions regarding new policies. *	695	(91.0)	69	(9.0)	282	(84.7)	51	(15.3)

*Fisher's exact test p<.05

organization's reaction ought to be considered when policy changes are made, (c) both management and labor should have a voice in employee issues, and (d) both management and labor should have a voice in new policies and procedures. Interestingly, those chiefs who do not have a police employee organization were more likely to agree (50.0 percent) that police employee organizations have too much influence over policy related issues compared to those chief who actually have police employee organizations associated with their departments (35.6 percent).

It might also be expected that those police chiefs who experienced conflict with employees and their organizations and those that did not may have different perceptions of police labor-management relations. Table 15 presents the perception question responses of chiefs who reported conflict with their employees and those that did not experience conflict over the last three years. There were several statistically significant differences in terms of the perceptions of police labor-management relationships. Chiefs who experienced conflict were more likely to agree that: (a) police employee organizations seek to limit the power of management, (b) such organizations have too much influence over policy related issues, (c) when changes are considered, it is important to consider the reaction of police employee organizations, and (d) that both police management and labor should have a voice in new policy decisions relating to employee issues. It is not possible to disentangle the effects of conflict and relationship perceptions in order to say that one leads to the other or vice versa. It does appear that experiencing conflict and perceiving police employee organizations as adversaries (those who seek to limit the power of management, have too much influence, and whose reaction needs to be considered) are related to each other.

Table 15: Comparison of Perceptions: The Effects of Conflict

Perception Questions	Experienced Conflict				No Conflict			
	Agree		Disagree		Agree		Disagree	
	N	(%)	N	(%)	N	(%)	N	(%)
PEOs seek to limit the power of management. *	218	(79.3)	57	(20.7)	394	(57.4)	292	(42.6)
PEOs have too much influence over policy related issues. *	121	(44.3)	152	(55.7)	255	(37.3)	429	(62.7)
When changes in policies are considered, it is important to consider the reaction of the PEO(s).*	251	(91.3)	24	(8.7)	526	(77.0)	157	(23.0)
Both police management and PEOs should have a voice in new policy decisions relating to employee issues. *	232	(85.3)	40	(14.7)	524	(76.9)	157	(23.1)
Both police management and PEOs should have a voice in new policy decisions relating to policies and procedures of the police department.	190	(69.9)	82	(30.1)	408	(60.0)	272	(40.0)
PEOs and unions are not accountable to the public.	140	(50.9)	135	(49.1)	299	(43.9)	382	(56.1)
Police employees and their organizations generally trust management to make good decisions.	121	(44.6)	150	(55.4)	353	(51.8)	329	(48.2)
Police employees in this department have a voice in decisions regarding new policies.	252	(92.0)	22	(8.0)	602	(88.5)	78	(11.5)

*Fisher's exact test p<.05

Contract Characteristics

This section contains chief responses concerning whether or not the department has a contract, the duration of the contract, the length of negotiations leading up to the most recent contract, when the next round of negotiations start, whether the chief is involved in negotiations, what role the chief plays in negotiations, as well as other “players” in the negotiation process.

Table 16 presents the characteristics of contracts, if any, between police departments and employee organizations. The majority of departments (68.4 percent) have contracts with police employee organizations. The average contract length is three years. Most departments, on average, spent six to nine months negotiating their current contract and began negotiations for the next contract in 1999 or 2000. Police chiefs seem about evenly divided between those who report being involved in negotiations (52.3 percent) and those who are not involved (47.7 percent). Table 17 presents the chiefs’ perceptions of their role in negotiations. Most police departments do not have a special unit to handle union negotiations and police employee organization relations.

Table 16: Characteristics of Contracts

	N	(%)
Does the department have a contract?		
Yes	499	(68.4)
No	231	(31.6)
Duration of Contract (Years)		
1	28	(5.8)
2	97	(20.0)
3	315	(64.8)
4	27	(5.6)
5+	19	(3.9)

Table 16: Characteristics of Contracts (continued)

Duration of Contract

Mean	2.86
Median	3.00
Mode	3.00

Months Spent Negotiating Current Contract

Mean	8.99
Median	6.00
Mode	6.00

Next Negotiations Start

1996	1	(0.2)
1998	6	(1.3)
1999	231	(49.4)
2000	125	(26.7)
2001	76	(16.2)
2002 or later	29	(6.2)

Chief Involved in Negotiations

Yes	330	(52.3)
No	301	(47.7)

Special Unit for Labor Relations

Yes	235	(34.1)
No	454	(65.9)

Table 17 presents the responses chiefs gave when asked what they saw as their role in negotiations between the police department and the police employee organization. It is important to note, however, that only 330 chiefs (52.3 percent of those who answered this question) reported being involved in negotiations. This question was open-ended and many chiefs described several components or elements to their role. Because

of this, the percentages provided in the table refer to the percentage of chiefs who provided a

Table 17: Role Chief Plays in Negotiations

Description of Role	N	(%)*
Advisor	260	(61.8)
Advocate/Speak for Management	128	(30.4)
Deal with Policy & Impacts of Negotiation on Policy	70	(16.6)
Protect Management Rights	59	(14.0)
Advocate/Speak for Employees	42	(10.0)
Behind the Scenes	38	(9.0)
Chief Negotiator/Final Approval of Agreement	29	(6.9)
Offer Proposals or Contract Language	27	(6.4)
Deal with Departmental Needs	26	(6.2)
Mediator	19	(4.5)
Deal with Non-Economic Issues Only	13	(3.1)
Focus on Needs of the Community	9	(2.1)
As Department Head	8	(1.9)
Active Participant (No further detail)	6	(1.4)
Not Allowed to be Involved	2	(0.5)

particular answer and not to the percentage of total responses given. Since multiple answers were given per chief, these percentages do not sum to 100. For example, 61.8 percent of chiefs who answered this question saw their role in negotiations as being an advisor. Another 30.4 percent of chiefs saw their role as an advocate or a voice for management. Almost 17 percent of chiefs saw their role as dealing with policy and the impacts of negotiations on policy. Protecting management rights was the role reported by 14.0 percent of chiefs. While 30.4 percent of chiefs saw themselves as advocates of management, only 10.0 percent reported seeing themselves as advocates for employees.

Table 18 presents the chiefs’ responses to the question: “What members of the department (or other city agencies) participate in collective bargaining or consultation with the police employee organization?” This was an open-ended question. Most chiefs

gave more than one response. The percentages provided in the table refer to the percentage of chiefs who provided a particular response, not to the percentage of total

Table 18: Participants in the Collective Bargaining Process

Individual	N	(%)*
Police Management Representatives	184	(36.6)
Human Resources/Personnel Director	146	(29.0)
Mayor/City Manager or Representative	136	(27.0)
Employee Organization Leader or Representative	108	(21.5)
Members of the Police Employee Organization	99	(19.7)
City Attorney	84	(16.7)
City Council or Representatives	41	(8.2)
Budget or Finance Director	40	(8.0)
City Labor Relations	28	(5.6)
Labor Relations Attorney	22	(4.4)
Consultant Negotiator	17	(3.4)
All/Varies	14	(2.8)
City Entities (No further detail)	12	(2.4)
Director/Board of Public Safety	10	(1.8)
Union Attorney	9	(1.8)
Other Individuals (19 other groups of individuals)	46	(9.1)

*Calculated as a percentage of total number of chief responses (N=503), not as a percentage of the total number of individuals mentioned by chiefs.

responses given. Since multiple responses were given per chief, these percentages do not sum to 100. For example, 36.6 percent of chiefs reported that police management representatives (often assistant or deputy chiefs when chiefs themselves were not involved) participated in collective bargaining. It was also relatively common for chiefs to list the Human Resources/Personnel Director for the city (29.0 percent), Mayor/City Manager or representative (27.0 percent), employee organization leader or representative (21.5 percent), members of the police employee organization (19.7 percent), or the City Attorney (16.7 percent) as participants of the collective bargaining process.

Conflicts Between the Police Agency and Employees

This section includes a description of police chief reports of conflict between the police department and employees and their organizations over the last three years. We also provide an analysis of conflict by type. Table 19 presents the chief reports of conflict between the police department and employees or their organizations. We asked chiefs

Table 19: Conflicts Reported by Chiefs

Type of Conflict	N	(%)*	Related to Community Policing
Strike	1	(0.1)	0
Blue Flu	8	(1.0)	1
Work Slowdowns	21	(2.7)	7
Work Speedups	2	(0.4)	1
Vote of No Confidence	26	(3.3)	3
Citations of City Vehicles	5	(0.6)	0
Grievances	216	(27.5)	18
Lawsuits	79	(10.1)	4
Fact-Finding	19	(2.4)	1
Picketing by Officers	21	(2.7)	0
Referenda	2	(0.3)	0
Mass Resignation	2	(0.3)	0
Lobbying State Legislature	18	(2.3)	0
Lobbying City Legislature	52	(6.6)	4
Negative Media Publicity	69	(8.8)	7
Arbitration	110	(14.0)	5
Mediation	57	(7.3)	5
Mediation-Arbitration	28	(3.6)	1
Conflict/Dispute Resolution	26	(3.3)	1
Threats to Use One of the Above	22	(2.8)	2
Totals	785	(100.0)	60

* (%) calculated as a percentage of the total number of conflicts whether or not they had experienced any conflict. Of the chiefs who responded to this question, 30.8 percent (N=318) indicated that they had.

We also asked whether or not the conflict was related to community policing. The most common conflicts are grievances (N=216, 27.5 percent of total conflicts), arbitration (N=100, 14.0 percent), lawsuits (N=79, 10.1 percent), and negative media publicity (N=69, 8.8 percent). Noticeably less frequent were strikes (N=1, 0.1 percent of total conflicts), blue flu (N=8, 1.0 of total conflicts), and mass resignation (N=2, 0.3 percent). Few conflicts were related to community policing.

Because conflicts are relatively rare events, it is perhaps more helpful to group the conflicts by type to see if particular types of conflicts or conflict resolution are more common. Table 20 presents the conflicts grouped into several types (threats are excluded from this analysis). The first group contains several types of administrative dispute resolution (grievances, fact-finding, arbitration, mediation, mediation-arbitration, conflict resolution) which rely on established administrative structures and processes to resolve differences. The second group contains techniques that could be considered third party appeals or multilateral bargaining (vote of no confidence, lawsuits, referenda, lobbying state legislature, lobbying city legislature, and negative media publicity). Bowers (1974: 37-8) explains that “multilateral bargaining can be defined as the involvement of other groups, in addition to labor and management, in the bargaining process.” Each one of these techniques could be argued to be an attempt to involve either the public, the legislature, or the courts in the bargaining process. The third group contains job actions (work slowdowns, work speedups, citations of city vehicles, picketing by officers) in which officers can engage while working or without the situation necessarily being considered a work stoppage. The fourth group contains various forms of work stoppages (strike, blue flu, and mass resignations). Each has its own particular method or technique,

Table 20: Conflicts Grouped by Type

Administrative Dispute Resolution	N	(%)
Grievances	216	(27.5)
Fact-finding	19	(2.4)
Arbitration	110	(14.0)
Mediation	57	(7.3)
Mediation-Arbitration	28	(3.6)
Conflict Resolution	26	(3.3)
Total	456	(58.1)
Third Party/Multilateral Bargaining		
Vote of No Confidence	26	(3.3)
Lawsuits	79	(10.1)
Referenda	2	(0.3)
Lobbying State Legislature	18	(2.3)
Lobbying City Legislature	52	(6.6)
Negative Media Publicity	69	(8.8)
Total	246	(31.4)
Job Actions		
Work Slowdowns	21	(2.7)
Work Speedups	2	(0.4)
Citations of City Vehicles	5	(0.6)
Picketing by Officers	21	(2.7)
Total	49	(6.4)
Work Stoppages		
Strike	1	(0.1)
Blue Flu	8	(1.0)
Mass Resignation	2	(0.3)
Total	11	(1.4)

but the *result* of each is that work stops. An examination of the total numbers for each of these four types reveals that administrative dispute resolution techniques are most widely used (N=456, 58.1 percent), followed by third party appeals/multilateral bargaining

(N=246, 31.4 percent), job actions (N=49, 6.4 percent) and work stoppages (N=11, 1.4 percent).

Community Policing Components

We asked chiefs to rate several aspects of the community policing components (how important a part of community policing each component is, whether the component had been implemented in their agency, and whether implementing a particular component is negotiable or a managerial prerogative). Rather than present the results of these ratings component by component, we placed the components into eight groups: organizational changes in response/preparation for community policing, programs: officer deployment, programs: civil remedies/working with other agencies, programs: focused on citizen involvement/input, neighborhood focus, crime analysis, use of special units, and problem solving (this grouping includes items also included under other headings). Table 21 presents the groupings and the community policing components/initiatives included under each grouping.

Table 21: Organization of Community Policing Components

Organizational Changes in Response/Preparation for Community Policing

1. Omnibus revised mission statements linking goals & objectives to community policing
2. Academy training concerning policies related to community policing
3. In-service training concerning policies related to community policing
4. Roll call training concerning policies related to community policing
5. Classification & prioritization of calls to increase officer time for other activities
6. Alternative response methods for calls
7. Physical decentralization of field services
8. Physical decentralization of investigations
9. Specific training for problem identification & resolution

Table 21: Organization of Community Policing Components (continued)

Programs: Officer Deployment

1. Foot patrol as a specific assignment
2. Foot patrol as a periodic expectation
3. Bike patrol as a specific assignment
4. Mounted patrol as a specific assignment

Programs: Civil Remedies/Working with Other Agencies

1. Building code enforcement as a means of helping remove crime potential
2. Landlord/manager training programs for order maintenance & drug reduction
3. Use of other regulatory codes to combat drugs & crime
4. Interagency involvement in problem identification & resolution
5. Integration with community corrections
6. Interagency code enforcement
7. Interagency drug task force
8. Multidisciplinary teams to deal with special problems such as child abuse
9. Drug free zones around schools or stations

Programs: Focused on Citizen Involvement/Input

1. Police/youth programs
2. Drug tip hotline or Crime Stoppers
3. Regularly scheduled meetings with community groups
4. Training for citizens in problem identification & resolution
5. Regular radio or tv programs or “spots” to inform the community about crime, criminals, & police activities
6. Drug education programs in schools
7. Citizen surveys to determine community needs & priorities
8. Citizen surveys to evaluate police service

Neighborhood Focus

1. Command or decision-making responsibility tied to neighborhoods or geographically defined a the jurisdiction
2. Beat or patrol boundaries that coincide with neighborhood boundaries
3. Fixed shifts (changing no more than annually)
4. Permanent, neighborhood based offices or stations
5. Mobile, neighborhood based offices or stations
6. Fixed assignment of patrol officers to specific beats or areas

Table 21: Organization of Community Policing Components (continued)

Crime Analysis

1. Geographically based crime analysis made available to officers at the beat level
2. Centralized crime analysis/unit function
3. Decentralized crime analysis/unit function
4. Means of accessing other city or county data bases to analyze community or neighborhood conditions

Use of Special Units

1. Specialized crime solving unit
2. Specialized community relations unit
3. Specialized crime prevention unit
4. Designation of some officers as “community” or “neighborhood” officers, each of whom is responsible for working in areas identified as having special problems or needs
5. Victim assistance programs

Problem Solving (overlaps with others listed above)

1. Citizen surveys to determine community needs & priorities
2. Citizen surveys to evaluate police service
3. Specific training in problem identification & resolution
4. Landlord/manager training programs for order maintenance & drug reduction
5. Geographically based crime analysis made available to officers at the beat level
6. Interagency involvement in problem identification & resolution
7. Means of accessing other city or county data bases to analyze community or neighborhood conditions
8. Multidisciplinary teams to deal with special problems such as child abuse
9. Specific training for citizens in problem identification & resolution

Table 22 presents police chief responses to whether community policing components/initiatives were an important part of community policing as well as whether or not the component had been implemented in their agency.

Organizational Changes

The police chiefs overwhelmingly agree that the organizational components listed are an important part of community policing with two exceptions: physical decentralization of field services and physical decentralization of investigations. About 60 percent of chiefs agree that physical decentralization of field services is an important

part of community policing and only about 50 percent of chiefs agree that physical decentralization of investigations is an important part of community policing. The following components were rated as important by virtually all chiefs: in-service training related to community policing (98.3 percent agreed), specific training for problem identification and resolution (96.5 percent), academy training related to community policing (94.5 percent), and changes in mission statements linking goals and objectives to community policing (91.1 percent).

In terms of implementation, the results suggest that while chiefs tend to agree that these components are important, the components were *not actually in place* in many agencies. The most commonly implemented initiative was in-service training related to community policing (N=713, 74.9 percent reported implementation). Fewer agencies had implemented academy training (N=565, 59.3 percent), changes in mission statements (N=504, 54.2 percent), roll call training (N=491, 52.7 percent), classification and prioritization of calls to increase officer time for other activities (N=493, 52.2 percent), and training for problem identification and resolution (N=469, 49.9 percent).

Programs: Officer Deployment

Roughly 80 percent of chiefs agreed that foot patrol as a specific assignment (78.6 percent), foot patrol as a periodic expectation (88.4 percent), and bike patrol (79.3 percent) are important parts of community policing. Slightly less than half (48.7 percent) of chiefs agreed that mounted patrol was an important part of community policing. In

Table 22: Perceptions and Implementation of Community Policing Components as Reported by Chiefs

Community Policing Component	Agree		Disagree		Implemented	
	N	(%)	N	(%)	N	(%)
Organizational Changes						
Omnibus revised mission statements linking goals & objectives to community policing	985	(91.1)	96	(8.2)	504	(54.2)
Academy training concerning policies related to community policing	1065	(94.5)	62	(5.5)	565	(59.3)
In-service training concerning policies related to community policing	1109	(98.3)	19	(1.7)	713	(74.9)
Roll call training concerning policies related to community policing	967	(87.5)	138	(12.5)	491	(52.7)
Classification & prioritization of calls to increase officer time for other activities	945	(84.3)	176	(15.7)	493	(52.2)
Alternative response methods for calls	903	(81.6)	203	(18.4)	421	(44.9)
Physical decentralization of field services	631	(59.7)	426	(40.3)	163	(18.0)
Physical decentralization of investigations	529	(50.6)	517	(49.4)	112	(12.4)
Specific training for problem identification & resolution	1077	(96.5)	39	(3.5)	469	(49.9)
Programs: Officer Deployment						
Foot patrol as a specific assignment	866	(78.6)	236	(21.4)	387	(41.3)
Foot patrol as a periodic expectation	978	(88.4)	128	(11.6)	527	(55.9)
Bike patrol as a specific assignment	875	(79.3)	229	(20.7)	515	(55.0)
Mounted patrol as a specific assignment	503	(48.7)	529	(51.3)	112	(12.6)

Community Policing Component	Agree		Disagree		Implemented	
	N	(%)	N	(%)	N	(%)
Programs: Civil Remedies/Working with Other Agencies						
Building code enforcement as a means of helping remove crime potential	1051	(94.1)	66	(5.9)	521	(55.1)
Landlord/manager training programs for order maintenance & drug reduction	982	(89.4)	116	(10.6)	248	(26.7)
Use of other regulatory codes to combat drugs & crime	1068	(96.5)	39	(3.5)	446	(47.6)
Interagency involvement in problem identification & resolution	1073	(97.4)	29	(2.6)	491	(52.5)
Integration with community corrections	858	(81.6)	193	(18.4)	192	(21.4)
Interagency code enforcement	844	(78.8)	227	(21.2)	219	(24.1)
Interagency drug task force	1054	(94.5)	61	(5.5)	603	(63.7)
Multidisciplinary teams to deal with special problems such as child abuse	973	(89.8)	111	(10.2)	355	(38.6)
Drug free zones around schools or stations	1047	(93.3)	75	(6.7)	657	(69.2)
Programs: Focused on Citizen Involvement/Input						
Police/youth programs	1095	(97.9)	24	(2.1)	630	(66.3)
Drug tip hotline or Crime Stoppers	1067	(95.9)	46	(4.1)	583	(61.8)
Regularly scheduled meetings with community groups	1070	(96.0)	45	(4.0)	596	(63.1)
Training for citizens in problem identification & resolution	1003	(90.8)	102	(9.2)	296	(31.6)
Regular radio or tv programs or “spots”	961	(88.0)	131	(12.0)	277	(29.9)
Drug education programs in schools	1093	(97.6)	27	(2.4)	779	(81.8)

Community Policing Component	Agree		Disagree		Implemented	
	N	(%)	N	(%)	N	(%)
Citizen surveys to determine community needs & priorities	1026	(91.8)	92	(8.2)	484	(51.2)
Citizen surveys to evaluate police service	988	(88.2)	132	(11.8)	454	(48.1)
Neighborhood Focus						
Command or decision-making responsibility tied to neighborhoods or geographically defined areas of the jurisdiction	896	(82.7)	188	(17.3)	305	(32.9)
Beat or patrol boundaries that coincide with neighborhood boundaries	868	(79.9)	216	(20.1)	316	(34.2)
Fixed shifts (changing no more than annually)	618	(55.4)	497	(44.6)	349	(36.9)
Permanent, neighborhood based offices or stations	776	(71.1)	316	(28.9)	325	(35.1)
Mobile, neighborhood based offices or stations	694	(64.3)	385	(35.7)	200	(21.7)
Fixed assignment of patrol officers to specific beats or areas	891	(81.1)	208	(18.9)	490	(52.2)
Crime Analysis						
Geographically based crime analysis made available to officers at the beat level	1035	(94.8)	57	(5.2)	408	(43.9)
Centralized crime analysis/unit function	918	(85.6)	154	(14.4)	315	(34.7)
Decentralized crime analysis/unit function	347	(34.6)	657	(65.4)	54	(6.3)
Means of accessing other city or county data bases to analyze community or neighborhood conditions	1007	(92.0)	87	(8.0)	277	(29.8)

Community Policing Component	Agree		Disagree		Implemented	
	N	(%)	N	(%)	N	(%)
Use of Special Units						
Specialized crime solving unit	791	(74.0)	278	(26.0)	276	(30.1)
Specialized community relations unit	800	(74.2)	278	(25.8)	303	(33.0)
Specialized crime prevention unit	887	(81.8)	197	(18.2)	394	(42.6)
Designation of some officers as “community” or “neighborhood” officers, each of whom is responsible for working in areas identified as having special problems or needs	863	(78.9)	231	(21.1)	401	(43.0)
Victim assistance programs	1070	(95.5)	51	(4.5)	589	(62.3)
Problem Solving						
Citizen surveys to determine community needs & priorities	1026	(91.8)	92	(8.2)	484	(51.2)
Citizen surveys to evaluate police service	988	(88.2)	132	(11.8)	454	(48.1)
Specific training in problem identification & resolution	1077	(96.5)	39	(3.5)	469	(49.9)
Landlord/manager training programs	982	(89.4)	116	(10.6)	248	(26.7)
Geographically based crime analysis made available to	1035	(94.8)	57	(5.2)	408	(43.9)
Interagency involvement in problem identification & resolution	1073	(97.4)	29	(2.6)	491	(52.5)
Means of accessing other city or county data bases	1007	(92.0)	87	(8.0)	277	(29.8)
Multidisciplinary teams to deal with special problems such as child abuse	973	(89.8)	111	(10.2)	355	(38.6)
Specific training for citizens in problem identification & resolution	1003	(90.8)	102	(9.2)	296	(31.6)

terms of implementation, periodic foot patrol was most widely implemented (55.9 percent), followed by bike patrol (55.0 percent), foot patrol as a specific assignment (41.3 percent), and mounted patrol (12.6 percent).

Programs: Civil Remedies/Working with Other Agencies

The chiefs overwhelmingly agree that the components relating to the use of civil remedies/working with other agencies are important parts of community policing. The following items had the highest level of agreement: interagency involvement in problem identification and resolution (97.4 percent), interagency drug task force (94.5 percent), building code enforcement to reduce crime potential (94.1 percent), and drug free zones around schools (93.3 percent).

The implementation of these components is somewhat uneven. The most widely implemented programs include: drug free zones around schools (69.2 percent), interagency drug task force (63.7 percent), building code enforcement (55.1 percent), interagency problem solving (52.5 percent), and the use of other codes to combat drugs and crime (47.6 percent). The least widely implemented programs include: integration with community corrections (21.4 percent), interagency code enforcement (24.1 percent), and landlord/manager training programs (26.7 percent).

Programs: Focused on Citizen Involvement/Input

All of the components in this section were rated consistently by chiefs as being important components of community policing. Leading in terms of actual agreement are: police youth programs (97.9 percent), drug education programs in schools (97.6 percent), regularly scheduled meetings with community groups (96.0 percent), and drug tip hotline or crimestoppers (95.9 percent).

Again, despite the high level of agreement, the perception that these programs are important components of community policing is not matched by widespread implementation of these components. The most widely implemented components include: drug education programs in schools (81.8 percent), police youth programs (66.3 percent), regularly scheduled meetings with community groups (63.1 percent), and drug tip hotline or crimestoppers (61.8 percent). The least implemented component was training for citizens in problem identification and resolution (31.6 percent).

Neighborhood Focus

In contrast to the components listed under community involvement, chiefs did not consistently agree that all components focusing on neighborhoods were important. Specifically, the chiefs were most likely to agree concerning: command/decision making responsibility tied to neighborhoods (82.7 percent), fixed assignment of officers to specific areas (81.1 percent), beat boundaries that correspond to neighborhoods (79.9 percent), and permanent neighborhood based stations (71.1 percent). There was less agreement that the following components are important: mobile neighborhood based stations (64.3 percent), and year-long fixed shifts (55.4 percent).

With the exception of fixed assignment of officers to specific areas (52.2 percent), few of the other components had been implemented on a widespread basis. The least implemented components included: mobile neighborhood stations (21.7 percent), command/decision making at the neighborhood level (32.9 percent), beat boundaries that correspond with neighborhoods (34.2 percent), and permanent neighborhood stations (35.1 percent).

Crime Analysis

The chiefs tended to agree that crime analysis components were an important part of community policing with one exception. The chiefs agreed that the following components were important: geographically based crime analysis made available to officers at the beat level (94.8 percent), accessing other city/county databases to analyze community or neighborhood conditions (92.0 percent), and a centralized crime analysis function (85.6 percent). In contrast, only 34.6 percent of chiefs agreed that decentralized crime analysis was an important part of community policing.

These components were not widely implemented in the responding agencies. About 44 percent of agencies had implemented geographically based crime analysis. Around 30 percent had implemented centralized crime analysis and accessing other city county databases. A mere 6.3 percent had implemented decentralized crime analysis.

Use of Special Units

The use of special units actually runs counter to the notion that under community policing, officers ought to be generalists. Overall, the chiefs tended to agree that the use of special units was an important part of community policing. The chiefs were most likely to agree concerning: victim assistance programs (95.5 percent), specialized crime prevention units (81.8 percent), and the use of “neighborhood” or “community” officers (78.9 percent).

Victim assistance programs were most likely to have been implemented (62.3 percent). Programs less likely to be implemented include: neighborhood or community officers (43.0 percent), specialized crime prevention unit (42.6 percent), specialized community relations (33.0 percent), and specialized crime solving unit (30.1 percent).

Problem Solving

These items are included as components of other areas, but it seems meaningful to separate out those components related specifically to problem-solving. The components in this group are uniformly rated as being important to community policing. Most receive approximately 90 percent agreement as to their importance.

The table shows that in terms of implementation, these components overall were found in less than 50 percent of agencies. Components implemented in roughly half of all agencies include: interagency involvement in problem-solving (52.5 percent), citizen surveys to determine community needs and priorities (51.2 percent), specific training in problem identification/resolution (49.9 percent), and citizen surveys to evaluate police service (48.1 percent). The least implemented components include: landlord/manager training (26.7 percent), accessing other city/county databases to analyze problems (29.8 percent), and specific training for citizens in problem solving (31.6 percent).

Table 23 presents the chief responses concerning whether or not selected community policing components are negotiable (requiring negotiation with the police employee organization) or managerial prerogatives (the right of management to implement without consulting the police employee organization prior to implementation),

Table 23: "Bargaining Status" and Implementation of Selected Community Policing Components

	Negotiable		Managerial Prerogative		Implemented	
	N	(%)	N	(%)	N	(%)
Organizational Changes						
Omnibus revised mission statements	375	(34.0)	727	(66.0)	504	(54.2)
Academy training concerning policies related to community policing	209	(18.7)	910	(81.3)	565	(59.3)
In-service training concerning policies related to community policing	246	(22.0)	873	(78.0)	713	(74.9)
Roll call training concerning policies related to community policing	233	(21.0)	875	(79.0)	491	(52.7)
Alternative response methods for calls	373	(33.5)	740	(66.5)	421	(44.9)
Physical decentralization of field services	243	(22.0)	861	(78.0)	163	(18.0)
Physical decentralization of investigations	241	(21.8)	864	(78.2)	112	(12.4)
Specific training for problem identification & resolution	260	(23.3)	855	(76.7)	469	(49.9)
Programs: Officer Deployment						
Foot patrol as a specific assignment	309	(27.8)	803	(72.2)	387	(41.3)
Foot patrol as a periodic expectation	268	(24.1)	846	(75.9)	527	(55.9)

	Negotiable		Managerial Prerogative		Implemented	
	N	(%)	N	(%)	N	(%)
Programs: Civil Remedies/Working with Other Agencies						
Interagency involvement in problem identification & resolution	258	(23.2)	856	(76.8)	491	(52.5)
Integration with community corrections	303	(27.5)	797	(72.5)	192	(21.4)
Interagency code enforcement	205	(18.5)	903	(81.5)	219	(24.1)
Interagency drug task force	206	(18.4)	911	(81.6)	603	(63.7)
Multidisciplinary teams to deal with special problems	261	(23.5)	849	(76.5)	355	(38.6)
Programs: Focused on Citizen Involvement/Input						
Regularly scheduled meetings with community groups	330	(29.5)	788	(70.5)	596	(63.1)
Citizen surveys to determine community needs & priorities	335	(29.9)	786	(70.1)	484	(51.2)
Citizen surveys to evaluate police service	320	(28.7)	796	(71.3)	454	(48.1)
Neighborhood Focus						
Command or decision-making responsibility tied to neighborhoods	239	(21.5)	874	(78.5)	305	(32.9)
Beat or patrol boundaries that coincide with neighborhood boundaries	287	(25.8)	827	(74.2)	316	(34.2)
Fixed shifts (changing no more than annually)	684	(57.1)	477	(42.9)	349	(36.9)

Neighborhood Focus (continued)	Negotiable		Managerial Prerogative		Implemented	
	N	(%)	N	(%)	N	(%)
Permanent, neighborhood based offices or stations	335	(30.3)	770	(69.7)	325	(35.1)
Mobile, neighborhood based offices or stations	321	(29.1)	782	(70.9)	200	(21.7)
Fixed assignment of patrol officers to specific beats or areas	370	(33.3)	741	(66.7)	490	(52.2)
Crime Analysis						
Centralized crime analysis/unit function	219	(19.8)	887	(80.2)	315	(34.7)
Decentralized crime analysis/unit function	228	(20.7)	873	(79.3)	54	(6.3)
Means of accessing other city or county data bases to analyze	297	(26.6)	820	(73.4)	277	(29.8)
Use of Special Units						
Specialized crime solving unit	237	(21.3)	875	(78.7)	276	(30.1)
Specialized community relations unit	257	(23.1)	856	(76.9)	303	(33.0)
Specialized crime prevention unit	245	(22.0)	867	(78.0)	394	(42.6)
Designation of some officers as “community” or “neighborhood” officers	371	(33.5)	736	(66.5)	401	(43.0)
Victim assistance programs	284	(25.5)	830	(74.4)	589	(62.3)

Problem Solving	Negotiable		Managerial Prerogative		Implemented	
	N	(%)	N	(%)	N	(%)
Citizen surveys to determine community needs & priorities	335	(29.9)	786	(70.1)	484	(51.2)
Citizen surveys to evaluate police service	320	(28.7)	796	(71.3)	454	(48.1)
Specific training in problem identification & resolution	260	(23.3)	855	(76.7)	469	(49.9)
Interagency involvement in problem identification & resolution	258	(23.2)	856	(76.8)	491	(52.5)
Means of accessing other city or county data bases to analyze community or neighborhood conditions	297	(26.6)	820	(73.4)	277	(29.8)
Multidisciplinary teams to deal with special	261	(23.5)	849	(76.5)	355	(38.6)

as well as whether or not the community policing component has been implemented in the agency. The results for this table are easily summarized. For the most part, chiefs see just about every community policing component's implementation as a managerial prerogative (with ratings at about 70 percent or greater) with the exception of one component: fixed shifts (changing no more than annually). For this item, 57.1 percent of chiefs see the implementation as negotiable.

Summary

This section of the report summarized the police chief survey findings. Several topic areas were covered: respondent characteristics, "demographic" characteristics, perceptions of labor-management relationships, contract characteristics, conflicts between police agencies and employees, and the ratings of community policing components. In order to summarize the findings, we provide a "portrait" of the typical police chief respondent in terms of these characteristics.

Respondent Characteristics

The typical police chief respondent comes from a larger agency that engages in collective bargaining with sworn employees. The agency serves a large population that makes many total requests for service.

Demographic Characteristics

The typical chief comes from the South or the Midwest, was promoted from within the department and has not held the position of chief in another agency. The chief has had about 18 years of law enforcement experience before becoming chief and has been chief for 5 to 6 years. The agency serves a jurisdiction that has a mayor or city

manager. The agency has one police employee organization affiliated with the department which engages in collective bargaining.

Perceptions of Labor-Management Relationships

The typical chief believes that police employee organizations attempt to limit the power of management, however, the chief also believes that these agencies do not have *too* much influence. The average chief believes that it is important to consider the reaction of police employee organizations and that these organizations should have a voice in both employee issues and new policies and procedures of the department. The average chief does not believe that police employee organizations and unions are not accountable to the public. S/he is as likely as not to feel trusted to make good decisions by the employees in the agency. The typical chief believes employees in his/her department have a voice in decisions regarding new policies.

Contract Characteristics

The average chief has a contract of three years with a police employee organization which took approximately 6 to 9 months to negotiate. The next round of negotiations started in 1999-2000. The typical chief is involved in negotiations and sees her/his role as an advisor.

Community Policing Components

The average chief agrees that most components of community policing are important with the exception of: physical decentralization of field services and investigations, mounted patrol, fixed shifts, and decentralized crime analysis units.

The average chief is likely to have implemented the following components in her/his agency: in-service training concerning community policing, interagency drug task

force, drug free zones around schools, police youth programs, drug tip hotline or crimestoppers, regularly scheduled meeting with community groups, drug education programs in schools, victim assistance programs, revised mission statements, academy training relating to community policing, roll call training relating to community policing, classification and prioritization of calls to increase officer time, foot patrol as a periodic expectation, bike patrol, building code enforcement to reduce crime potential, interagency problem solving, citizen surveys to determine community needs and priorities, and fixed assignment of officers to specific areas.

The implementation of most components is considered a managerial prerogative by the chiefs in our sample, with the exception of fixed shifts (changing no more than annually).

Police Employee Association Leader Responses

Introduction

This section presents the basic characteristics and responses of the police employee association leaders following the structure of the survey instrument. First, we present “demographic” characteristics of police employee organizations and their leaders. Next, we describe their perceptions of police labor-management relationships and conflict between the police department and employees. Finally, we present police employee association leaders’ perceptions of community policing initiatives.

“Demographic” Characteristics

Table 24 presents the characteristics of police employee organizations. We asked for the following information: the number of members in the police employee organization, the date the organization was founded, the level of affiliation (local, county, etc.), whether the president of the organization was an officer, the years of sworn experience before becoming president, how the president is selected, if there is a dues check-off in place, whether there are limits on who can become a member, a description of membership requirements, and whether or not membership in the police employee organization is mandatory.

The data concerning the number of members in the organization are skewed. The mean number of members in an organization is 230.36 with the median being 60 members. There was a wide range of organizational sizes (the smallest organization had 2 members and the largest had 11,879 members).

Many police organization leaders (N=125) were uncertain as to the date the organization was founded. For those respondents who provided a date, we recoded the

data into decades for comparison purposes. The table shows that while a small number of police employee organizations have been in existence for a long time, 84.7 percent were formed after 1950, with many being formed after 1970. It is also interesting to note that police employee organizations are still emerging.

In terms of level of affiliation of the police employee organization (see the chiefs section page 33 for a discussion of the measurement of and coding of affiliation levels), most organizations are local (52.4 percent). A small percentage (3.8 percent) are

Table 24 : Police Employee Organization Characteristics

Size of Organization

Mean Number of Members:	230.36
Median Number of Members:	60.00

Decade Organization Founded	N	(%)
1850	1	(0.2)
1870	3	(0.6)
1880	2	(0.4)
1890	3	(0.6)
1900	8	(1.5)
1910	10	(1.9)
1920	7	(1.3)
1930	18	(3.4)
1940	28	(5.4)
1950	44	(8.4)
1960	74	(14.1)
1970	126	(24.1)
1980	110	(21.0)
1990	89	(17.0)

Table 24: Police Employee Organization Characteristics (continued)

Level of Affiliation

Local	304	(52.4)
County	22	(3.8)
State	192	(33.1)
National	62	(10.7)

Is President an Officer?

Yes	617	(96.0)
No	26	(4.0)

Years of Sworn Experience

Mean:	12.41	
Median:	11.50	

How President is Selected

	N	(%)
General Membership Election	579	(92.2)
Board/Committee Election	26	(4.1)
Appointed	6	(1.0)
Seniority	4	(0.6)
Consensus	1	(0.2)
No one else wants it	5	(0.8)
State Organization/No President	6	(1.0)
Officer on Day Shift Negotiates	1	(0.2)

Dues Check-Off in Place?

Yes	460	(73.2)
No	168	(26.8)

Limits on Membership?

Yes	341	(54.4)
No	286	(45.6)

Table 24: Police Employee Organization Characteristics (continued)

Membership Requirements	N	(%)
Patrol officers only	70	(10.9)
Patrol/sgts/supervisors	161	(25.0)
Any sworn member	239	(37.2)
Any police employee	101	(15.7)
Supervisors/sgts only	12	(1.9)
Command staff only	44	(6.8)
Patrol & civilian	2	(0.3)
Civilian only	12	(1.9)
Detectives only	1	(0.2)
Female only	1	(0.2)
Is Membership Mandatory?		
Yes	145	(22.9)
No	487	(77.1)

affiliated at the county level. Another 33.1 percent are affiliated at the state level and 10.7 percent were affiliated at the national level.

Virtually all presidents of police employee organizations are police officers (96.0 percent). The police employee association leaders averaged 12.41 years of sworn experience before being selected as president (median = 11.50 years of sworn experience). The presidents are most often selected through a general membership election (92.2 percent). A small percentage (4.1 percent) report that officers are elected to a board which leads the organization and the board members then select the president.

The majority of police employee organizations have a dues check-off system in place (73.2 percent). This is important for several reasons. Burpo (1971) explains that it is part of the process of being recognized by the police department and city. Once a police employee organization is recognized by the city, the next step is usually to request that dues are deducted automatically from employee paychecks. It can also be considered a measure of union security (Delaney and Feuille 1984). Dues check-off guarantees a

steady income to the police employee organization. This in turn, increases the power of the organization (Bouza 1985; Burpo 1971; Bowers 1974; Juris and Feuille 1972). With greater resources at their disposal, unions are better able to take advantage of filing lawsuits, lobbying actions, supporting local political candidates and issues, and dispute resolution mechanisms such as fact-finding, mediation, and arbitration (Burpo 1971; Juris and Feuille 1972; Bowers 1974).

Most police employee organizations place limits on who can be a member (54.4 percent). It is most common to restrict membership to any sworn member (37.2 percent), patrol officers, sergeants, and supervisors (25.0 percent), or to any police employee (15.7 percent). Other organizations are limited to patrol officers only (10.9 percent), command staff only (6.8 percent), or sergeants and supervisors only (1.9 percent). In most organizations, membership is not mandatory. Only 22.9 percent of police employee organizations report that membership in their organization is mandatory.

Perceptions of Labor-Management Relationships

This section presents the findings concerning police employee association leader perceptions of the relationships between police management and labor. We begin by discussing these perceptions for the entire sample, and then present the perceptions of police employee association leaders from departments that have experienced conflict with their employees compared to those who have not.

Table 25 presents the police employee leader responses to the questions concerning police labor-management relationships. When asked if police employee

Table 25: Employee Association Leader Perceptions of Labor-Management Relationships

Agree

Disagree

	N	(%)	N	(%)
Police employee organizations seek to limit the power of management.	201	(31.8)	432	(68.2)
Police employee organizations have too much influence over policy related issues.	29	(4.6)	607	(95.4)
When changes in policy are considered, it is important to consider the reaction of the police employee organization(s).	583	(91.8)	52	(8.2)
Both police management and police employee organizations should have a voice in new policy decisions relating to employee issues.	615	(96.9)	20	(3.1)
Both police management and police employee organizations should have a voice in new policy decisions relating to policies and procedures of the police department.	559	(88.0)	76	(12.0)
Police employee organizations and unions are not accountable to the public.	76	(12.0)	559	(88.0)
Police employees and their organizations generally trust management to make good decisions.	268	(42.4)	364	(57.6)
Police employees in this department have a voice in decisions regarding new policies.	342	(54.0)	291	(46.0)

organizations seek to limit the power of management, 31.8 percent of leaders agreed.

About 5 percent of leaders believe that police employee organizations have too much influence over policy related issues. Police employee organization leaders

overwhelmingly agree (91.8 percent) that when changes in policies are considered, it is important to consider the reaction of the police employee organization. Roughly 97

percent of the leaders agree that both police management and police employee

organizations should have a voice in new policy decisions relating to employee issues. A

slightly smaller percentage (88.0 percent) agree that both police management and police

employee organizations should have a voice in new policy decisions relating to policies and procedures of the police department. Few leaders (12.0 percent) agreed that police employee organizations and unions are not accountable to the public. Only 42.4 percent of leaders agreed that police employees and their organizations generally trust management to make good decisions. In contrast to the questions regarding whether or not police employee organizations *should* have a voice in policy, significantly fewer police employee organization leaders agreed that the police employees in their department *have a voice* in decisions regarding new policies (54.0 percent agreed).

It could be expected that those police employee organization leaders who experienced conflict with the police department and those that did not may have different perceptions of police labor-management relationships. Table 26 presents the perception question responses of leaders who reported conflict with the police department and those that did not experience conflict over the last three years. There are several statistically significant differences between the two groups of police employee organization leaders. Those who had experienced conflict were more likely to agree that: (a) when changes in policy are considered, it is important to consider the reaction of the police employee organization(s), and (b) both police management and police employee organizations should have a voice in new policy decisions relating to policies and procedures of the department. Those who had not experienced conflict were more likely to agree that: (a) police employees and their organizations generally trust management to make good

Table 26: Comparison of Union Perceptions: The Effects of Conflict on Organization Leader Perceptions

Perception Questions	Experienced Conflict				No Conflict			
	Agree		Disagree		Agree		Disagree	
	N	(%)	N	(%)	N	(%)	N	(%)
PEOs seek to limit the power of management.	114	(34.2)	219	(65.8)	87	(29.0)	213	(71.0)
PEOs have too much influence over policy related issues.	12	(3.6)	321	(96.4)	17	(58.6)	286	(94.4)
When changes in policies are considered, it is important to consider the reaction of the PEO(s). *	316	(95.2)	16	(4.8)	267	(88.1)	36	(11.9)
Both police management and PEOs should have a voice in new policy decisions relating to employee issues.	325	(97.9)	7	(2.1)	290	(95.7)	13	(4.3)
Both police management and PEOs should have a voice in new policy decisions relating to policies and procedures of the police department.*	306	(92.2)	26	(7.8)	253	(83.5)	50	(16.5)
PEOs and unions are not accountable to the public.	39	(11.7)	293	(88.3)	37	(12.2)	266	(87.8)
Police employees and their organizations generally trust management to make good decisions.	130	(39.0)	203	(61.0)	138	(46.2)	161	(53.8)
Police employees in this department have a voice in decisions regarding new policies.*	160	(48.3)	171	(58.8)	182	(60.3)	120	(39.7)

*Fisher's exact test p<.05

decisions, and (b) police employees in this department have a voice in decisions regarding new policies.

Contract Information

Table 27 presents the contract information provided by police employee association leaders. We asked if they have a contract with the department, the duration of the contract, the amount of time spent negotiating the contract, as well as when negotiations for the next contract would begin.

Table 27: Characteristics of Contracts

Does the Organization Have a Contract?	N	(%)
Yes	453	(70.6)
No	189	(29.4)
Duration of Contract (in Years)		
Mean:	2.92	
Median:	3.00	
Number of Months Spent Negotiating		
Mean:	9.03	
Median:	6.00	
Next Negotiations Begin (Year)	N	(%)
1998	4	(0.9)
1999	133	(29.9)
2000	164	(36.9)
2001	95	(21.3)
2002	35	(7.9)
2003	11	(2.5)
2004	3	(0.7)

Most police employee organizations (70.6 percent) reported having a contract with the police department or city. Contracts, on average, were 2.92 years in duration

(with a median of 3.00 years). The average police employee association spent 9.03 months negotiating their contract (median of 6.00 months). This question was open-ended. Responses were overwhelmingly provided in months. All responses were recoded and calculated in terms of how many months the organization spent negotiating. (We assumed 8 hours of negotiations per day, 5 days in a week, 4 weeks in a month, etc. in our calculations).

Conflict Between the Police Agency and Employees

This section includes a description of police employee organization leader reports of conflict between the police department and employees and their organizations over the last three years. We also provide an analysis of conflict by type. Table 28 presents the organization leader reports of conflict between the police department and employees or their organizations. We asked police employee association leaders whether or not they had experienced any conflict. Of the organization leaders who responded to this question,

Table 28: Organization Leader Reports on Conflict

	N	(%)
Any Conflict Reported		
Yes	314	(48.5)
No	334	(51.5)
Number of Conflicts Reported		
None	314	(48.5)
1	90	(13.9)
2	66	(10.2)
3	52	(8.0)
4	27	(4.2)
5	36	(5.6)
6	22	(3.4)
7+	41	(6.3)

48.5 percent (N = 314) reported that they had. This is a larger percentage than that reported by chiefs (30.8 percent), but roughly the same number of agencies (chiefs report conflict in 318 agencies and police association leaders report conflicts in 314 agencies).

Table 29 presents the types of conflict reported by police employee organization leaders.

We also present the number of conflicts which were related to community policing.

Table 29: Types of Conflict Reported by Police Employee Organization Leaders

Type of Conflict	N	(%)	Related to Community Policing
Strike	5	(0.4)	0
Blue Flu	5	(0.4)	1
Work Slowdowns	28	(2.4)	3
Work Speedups	15	(1.3)	5
Vote of No Confidence	55	(4.7)	9
Citations of City Vehicles	10	(0.9)	0
Grievances	227	(19.6)	22
Lawsuits	95	(8.2)	1
Fact-finding	61	(5.3)	3
Picketing by Officers	32	(2.8)	2
Referenda	11	(0.9)	1
Mass Resignation	5	(0.4)	3
Lobbying State Legislature	73	(6.3)	1
Lobbying City Legislature	91	(7.9)	6
Negative Media Publicity	78	(6.7)	7
Arbitration	121	(10.4)	6
Mediation	89	(7.7)	3
Mediation-Arbitration	62	(5.3)	2
Conflict/Dispute Resolution	43	(3.7)	3
Threats	53	(4.6)	4

The most common types of conflict reported include: grievances (N=227, 19.6 percent of all conflicts), arbitration (N=121, 10.4 percent), lawsuits (N=95, 8.2 percent), and mediation (N=89, 7.7 percent). Similar to police chief reports, few of the conflicts are

perceived as being related to community policing. Police employee association leaders report that about 7.1 percent of all conflicts were related to community policing.

As with the police chiefs' reports, we grouped the conflicts by type to see if particular types of conflicts or conflict resolution are more common. Table 30 presents the conflicts grouped into several types (threats are excluded from this analysis). The first

Table 30: Conflicts Grouped by Type

	N	(%)
Administrative Dispute Resolution		
Grievances	227	(19.6)
Fact-finding	61	(5.3)
Arbitration	121	(10.4)
Mediation	89	(7.7)
Mediation-Arbitration	62	(5.3)
Conflict Resolution	43	(3.7)
Total	603	(52.0)
Third Party/Multilateral Bargaining		
Vote of No Confidence	55	(4.7)
Lawsuits	95	(8.2)
Referenda	11	(0.9)
Lobbying State Legislature	73	(6.3)
Lobbying City Legislature	91	(7.9)
Negative Media Publicity	78	(6.7)
Total	403	(34.8)
Job Actions		
Work Slowdowns	28	(2.4)
Work Speedups	15	(1.3)
Citations of City Vehicles	10	(0.9)
Picketing by Officers	32	(2.8)
Total	85	(7.3)
Work Stoppages		
Strike	5	(0.4)
Blue Flu	5	(0.4)
Mass Resignation	5	(0.4)
Total	15	(1.3)

group contains several types of administrative dispute resolution. The second group contains techniques that could be considered third party appeals or multilateral bargaining. The third group contains job actions, and the final group contains various forms of work stoppages. An examination of the total numbers for each of these four types reveals that administrative dispute resolution techniques are most widely used (N=603, 52.0 percent), followed by third party appeals or multilateral bargaining (N=403, 34.8 percent), job actions (N=85, 7.3 percent), and work stoppages (N=15, 1.3 percent). The chief and police employee organization leader accounts of the prevalence of different types of conflict are strikingly similar particularly when it is remembered that unions reported many more *total* conflicts than did chiefs.

Community Policing Components

We asked police employee association leaders to rate several aspects of the community policing components (how important a part of community policing each component is, whether the component has been implemented in their agency, and whether implementing a particular component is negotiable or a managerial prerogative). As with the police chief data, we grouped the components into eight groups: organizational changes in response/preparation for community policing, programs: officer deployment, programs: civil remedies/working with other agencies, programs: focused on citizen involvement/input, neighborhood focus, crime analysis, use of special units, and problem solving (See Table 21, pages 49-51 in the Chief Section).

Table 31 presents police employee association leader responses to whether community policing components/initiatives are an important part of community policing as well as whether or not the component had been implemented in their agency.

Table 31: Perceptions & Implementations of Community Policing Components as Reported by Police Employee Organization Leaders

Community Policing Component	Agree		Disagree		Implemented	
	N	(%)	N	(%)	N	(%)
Organizational Changes						
Omnibus revised mission statements	517	(86.6)	80	(13.4)	314	(53.9)
Academy training concerning policies related to community policing	573	(92.7)	45	(7.3)	290	(48.2)
In-service training concerning policies related to community policing	592	(95.2)	30	(4.8)	348	(57.3)
Roll call training concerning policies related to community policing	521	(80.3)	91	(14.9)	255	(42.7)
Classification & prioritization of calls to increase officer time	530	(85.9)	87	(14.1)	252	(41.8)
Alternative response methods for calls	494	(81.3)	114	(18.8)	210	(35.4)
Physical decentralization of field services	310	(54.2)	262	(45.8)	94	(16.8)
Physical decentralization of investigations	258	(45.5)	309	(54.5)	73	(13.2)
Specific training for problem identification & resolution	578	(95.1)	30	(4.9)	223	(37.5)
Programs: Officer Deployment						
Foot patrol as a specific assignment	436	(71.4)	175	(28.6)	208	(34.9)
Foot patrol as a periodic expectation	474	(78.2)	132	(21.8)	220	(37.2)
Bike patrol as a specific assignment	532	(86.5)	83	(13.5)	384	(63.7)
Mounted patrol as a specific assignment	283	(43.6)	267	(48.5)	94	(17.5)
Community Policing Component	Agree		Disagree		Implemented	

	N	(%)	N	(%)	N	(%)
Programs: Civil Remedies/Working with Other Agencies						
Building code enforcement as a means of helping remove crime potential	568	(92.7)	45	(7.3)	293	(49.1)
Landlord/manager training programs for order maintenance & drug reduction	521	(87.1)	77	(12.9)	134	(23.0)
Use of other regulatory codes to combat drugs & crime	590	(96.2)	23	(3.8)	252	(42.2)
Interagency involvement in problem identification & resolution	590	(97.0)	18	(3.0)	235	(39.7)
Integration with community corrections	463	(77.6)	134	(22.4)	103	(17.7)
Interagency code enforcement	456	(77.0)	136	(23.0)	108	(18.7)
Interagency drug task force	574	(93.0)	43	(7.0)	358	(59.3)
Multidisciplinary teams to deal with special problems such as child abuse	506	(84.1)	96	(14.8)	194	(33.0)
Drug free zones around schools or stations	584	(94.2)	36	(5.8)	380	(62.5)
Programs: Focused on Citizen Involvement/Input						
Police/youth programs	588	(95.1)	30	(4.9)	362	(59.8)
Drug tip hotline or Crime Stoppers	557	(94.9)	30	(5.1)	337	(58.8)
Regularly scheduled meetings with community groups	572	(93.5)	40	(6.5)	342	(57.1)
Training for citizens in problem identification & resolution	534	(87.8)	74	(12.2)	180	(30.4)
Regular radio or tv programs or “spots”	534	(88.4)	70	(11.6)	155	(26.3)
Drug education programs in schools	571	(92.4)	47	(7.6)	468	(77.4)
Citizen surveys to determine community needs & priorities	529	(86.5)	85	(13.8)	247	(41.1)
Citizen surveys to evaluate police service	486	(78.8)	131	(21.2)	232	(38.5)

Community Policing Component	Agree		Disagree		Implemented	
	N	(%)	N	(%)	N	(%)
Neighborhood Focus						
Command or decision-making responsibility tied to neighborhoods or geographically defined areas of the jurisdiction	460	(76.0)	145	(24.0)	133	(22.5)
Beat or patrol boundaries that coincide with neighborhood boundaries	466	(76.6)	142	(23.4)	191	(32.2)
Fixed shifts (changing no more than annually)	409	(67.3)	199	(32.7)	228	(38.5)
Permanent, neighborhood based offices or stations	457	(74.7)	155	(25.3)	258	(43.2)
Mobile, neighborhood based offices or stations	380	(63.2)	221	(36.8)	158	(27.0)
Fixed assignment of patrol officers to specific beats or areas	463	(80.8)	110	(19.2)	301	(53.5)
Crime Analysis						
Geographically based crime analysis made available to officers at the beat level	575	(94.6)	33	(5.4)	228	(38.4)
Centralized crime analysis/unit function	538	(90.0)	60	(10.0)	195	(33.4)
Decentralized crime analysis/unit function	198	(35.0)	368	(65.0)	39	(7.1)
Means of accessing other city or county data bases to analyze community or neighborhood conditions	559	(92.9)	43	(7.1)	136	(23.2)
Use of Special Units						
Specialized crime solving unit	492	(82.4)	105	(17.6)	178	(30.6)
Specialized community relations unit	481	(79.6)	123	(20.4)	236	(40.1)
Specialized crime prevention unit	513	(84.5)	94	(15.5)	267	(45.1)
Designation of some officers as “community” or “neighborhood” officers,	486	(80.2)	120	(19.8)	304	(51.3)
Victim assistance programs	588	(95.3)	29	(4.7)	352	(58.5)

Community Policing Component Problem Solving	Agree		Disagree		Implemented	
	N	(%)	N	(%)	N	(%)
Citizen surveys to determine community needs & priorities	529	(86.2)	85	(13.8)	247	(41.1)
Citizen surveys to evaluate police service	486	(78.8)	131	(21.2)	232	(38.5)
Specific training in problem identification & resolution	578	(95.1)	30	(4.6)	223	(37.5)
Landlord/manager training programs for order maintenance & drug reduction	521	(87.1)	77	(12.9)	134	(23.0)
Geographically based crime analysis made available to officers at the beat level	575	(94.6)	33	(5.4)	228	(38.4)
Interagency involvement in problem identification & resolution	590	(97.0)	18	(3.0)	235	(39.7)
Means of accessing other city or county data bases to analyze community or neighborhood conditions	559	(92.9)	43	(7.1)	136	(23.2)
Multidisciplinary teams to deal with special problems such as child abuse	506	(84.1)	96	(15.9)	194	(33.0)
Specific training for citizens in problem identification & resolution	534	(87.8)	74	(12.2)	180	(30.4)

Organizational Changes

The police employee organization leaders overwhelmingly agree that organizational changes are an important part of community policing with two exceptions: physical decentralization of field services (54.2 percent agreed it was important) and physical decentralization of investigations (45.5 percent). The following components were rated as important by virtually all police employee organization leaders: in-service training regarding community policing (95.2 percent), specific training for problem identification and resolution (95.1 percent), academy training concerning community policing (92.7 percent), changes in mission statements (86.6 percent), and classification and prioritization of calls to increase officer time for other activities (85.9 percent).

In terms of implementation, few of these components had been implemented in more than half of the agencies. The most commonly implemented organizational changes include: in-service training related to community policing (57.3 percent), changes in mission statements (53.9 percent), academy training regarding community policing (48.2 percent), roll call training about community policing (42.7 percent), and classification and prioritization of calls to increase officer time (41.8 percent). The least commonly implemented components include: physical decentralization of investigations (13.2 percent), and physical decentralization of field services (16.8 percent).

Programs: Officer Deployment

More than 70 percent of police employee organization leaders agreed that the following methods of officer deployment are an important part of community policing: foot patrol as a specific assignment (71.4 percent), foot patrol as a periodic expectation

(78.2 percent), and bike patrol (86.5 percent). Police employee organization leaders were much less likely to agree that mounted patrol is an important part of community policing (43.6 percent).

In terms of implementation, bike patrol was most widely implemented (63.7 percent), followed by foot patrol as a periodic expectation (37.2 percent), foot patrol as a specific assignment (34.9 percent), and mounted patrol (17.5 percent).

Programs: Civil Remedies/Working With Other Agencies

The police employee organization leaders generally rated components regarding civil remedies/working with other agencies as an important part of community policing. The following items had the highest levels of agreement: interagency involvement in problem identification and resolution (97.0 percent), use of other regulatory codes to combat drugs and crime (96.2 percent), drug free zones around schools (94.2 percent), interagency drug task force (93.0 percent), and building code enforcement to remove crime potential (92.7 percent). Police employee organization leaders were less likely to agree that the following components are an important part of community policing: interagency code enforcement (77.0 percent), and integration with community corrections (77.6 percent).

Few of these components had been implemented in more than half of agencies. The most widely implemented components include: drug free zones around schools (62.5 percent), interagency drug task force (59.3 percent), building code enforcement (49.1 percent), and use of other regulatory codes as a means to combat drugs and crime (42.2 percent). Agencies were less likely to implement the following components: integration

with community corrections (17.7 percent), interagency code enforcement (18.7 percent), and landlord/manager training (23.0 percent).

Programs: Focused on Citizen Involvement/Input

Police employee organizations clearly support the idea that components related to citizen involvement/input are important parts of community policing. Specifically, the following components were seen as important by the majority of police employee organization leaders: police youth programs (95.1 percent), drug tip hotline or crime stoppers (94.9 percent), regularly scheduled meetings with community groups (93.5 percent), and drug education programs in schools (92.4 percent). Police employee organization leaders were less likely to view the following components as important parts of community policing: citizen surveys to evaluate police service (78.8 percent), citizen surveys to determine community needs and priorities (86.5 percent), and training for citizens in problem identification and resolution (87.8 percent).

In terms of implementation, the following components were most likely to be in place: drug education programs in schools (77.4 percent), police youth programs (59.8 percent), drug tip hotline or crime stoppers (58.8 percent), and regularly scheduled meetings with community groups (57.1 percent). The following components were less likely to be implemented: regular radio or television “spots” about crime (26.3 percent), training for citizens in problem identification and resolution (30.4 percent), and citizen surveys to evaluate police service (38.5 percent).

Neighborhood Focus

In contrast to the components listed under community involvement, police employee association leaders did not consistently agree that all components focusing on neighborhoods are important. Specifically, police employee organization leaders were likely to rate the following components as being an important part of community policing: fixed assignment of patrol officers to specific areas (80.8 percent), beat or patrol boundaries that coincide with neighborhood boundaries (76.6 percent), command or decision making responsibility tied to neighborhoods (76.0 percent), and permanent neighborhood stations (74.7 percent). Police employee organization leaders were less likely to rate the following components as important: mobile neighborhood stations (63.2 percent), and fixed shifts (67.3 percent).

With the exception of fixed assignment of officers to particular areas, (53.5 percent), few of the other components were widely implemented . The least commonly implemented components included: command or decision making at the neighborhood level (22.5 percent), mobile neighborhood stations (27.0 percent), and beat boundaries that coincide with neighborhoods (32.2 percent).

Crime Analysis

The police employee organization leaders tended to agree that crime analysis components are an important part of community policing with one exception. The police employee organizations agreed that the following components are important: geographically based crime analysis made available to officers at the beat level (94.6 percent), means of accessing other city/county databases to analyze community or neighborhood conditions (92.9 percent), and centralized crime analysis (90.0 percent).

Police employee organization leaders were less likely (35.0 percent) to agree that decentralized crime analysis is an important part of community policing.

These components were not widely implemented. The most widely implemented component was geographically based analysis (38.4 percent), followed by centralized crime analysis (33.4 percent), accessing other city/county databases (23.2 percent), and decentralized crime analysis (7.1 percent).

Use of Special Units

Overall, the police employee organization leaders tended to agree that the use of special units is an important part of community policing. Most components were rated as important by more than 80 percent of police employee organization leaders: victim assistance programs (95.3 percent), specialized crime prevention units (84.5 percent), specialized crime solving unit (82.4 percent), and community or neighborhood officers (80.2 percent), and a specialized community relations unit (79.6 percent).

Victim assistance programs were most likely to have been implemented (58.5 percent). The following were less likely to be implemented: specialized crime solving unit (30.6 percent), community relations unit (40.1 percent), crime prevention unit (45.1 percent), and community or neighborhood officers (51.3 percent).

Problem Solving

These items are included as components of other areas, but it seems meaningful to separate out those components related specifically to problem solving. The components in this group are uniformly rated as being important to community policing. Most receive greater than 80 percent agreement as to their importance. Police employee organization

leaders were most likely to agree that the following components are important: interagency involvement in problem identification and resolution (97.0 percent), specific training in problem identification and resolution (95.1 percent), geographically based analysis (94.6 percent), and accessing other city/county databases (92.9 percent). Police employee organization leaders were less likely to agree that the following components are important: citizen surveys to evaluate police service (78.8 percent), and multidisciplinary teams to deal with special problems (84.1 percent).

The table shows these components were found in less than 40 percent of agencies. The most widely implemented components include: citizen surveys to identify community needs and priorities (41.1 percent), interagency problem solving (39.7 percent), geographically based crime analysis (38.4 percent), and specific training in problem solving (37.5 percent). The least frequently implemented components include: landlord/manager training (23.0 percent), and accessing other city/county databases (23.2 percent).

Table 32 presents the police employee organization leader responses concerning whether or not selected community policing components are negotiable (requiring negotiation with the police employee organization) or managerial prerogatives (the right of management to implement without consulting the police employee organization prior to implementation), as well as whether or not the community policing component has been implemented in the agency.

For the most part, police employee organization leaders see the implementation of community policing components as managerial prerogatives, with a few exceptions. Few

Table 32: “Bargaining Status” & Implementation of Selected Community Policing Components as Reported by Organization Leaders

	Negotiable		Managerial Prerogative		Implemented	
	N	(%)	N	(%)	N	(%)
Organizational Changes						
Omnibus revised mission statements	174	(28.6)	435	(71.4)	314	(53.9)
Academy training concerning policies related to community policing	126	(20.4)	491	(79.6)	290	(48.2)
In-service training concerning policies related to community policing	178	(28.9)	438	(71.1)	348	(57.3)
Roll call training concerning policies related to community policing	155	(25.2)	459	(74.8)	255	(42.7)
Alternative response methods for calls	294	(48.1)	317	(51.9)	210	(35.4)
Physical decentralization of field services	199	(33.0)	404	(67.0)	94	(16.8)
Physical decentralization of investigations	201	(33.3)	402	(66.7)	73	(13.2)
Specific training for problem identification & resolution	167	(27.2)	447	(72.8)	223	(37.5)
Programs: Officer Deployment						
Foot patrol as a specific assignment	329	(53.6)	285	(46.4)	208	(34.9)
Foot patrol as a periodic expectation	272	(44.3)	342	(55.7)	220	(37.2)
Programs: Civil Remedies/Working with Other Agencies						
Interagency involvement in problem identification & resolution	133	(21.8)	477	(78.2)	235	(39.7)
Integration with community corrections	149	(24.6)	457	(75.4)	103	(17.7)
Interagency code enforcement	156	(25.5)	455	(74.5)	108	(18.7)
Interagency drug task force	177	(28.8)	437	(67.3)	358	(59.3)
Multidisciplinary teams to deal with special problems such as child abuse	183	(29.8)	431	(70.2)	194	(33.0)

	Negotiable		Managerial Prerogative		Implemented	
	N	(%)	N	(%)	N	(%)
Programs: Focused on Citizen Involvement/Input						
Regularly scheduled meetings with community groups	323	(52.7)	290	(47.3)	342	(57.1)
Citizen surveys to determine community needs & priorities	105	(27.2)	281	(72.8)	247	(41.1)
Citizen surveys to evaluate police service	205	(33.3)	410	(66.7)	232	(38.5)
Neighborhood Focus						
Command or decision-making responsibility tied to neighborhoods or geographically defined areas of the jurisdiction	166	(27.3)	441	(72.7)	133	(22.5)
Beat or patrol boundaries that coincide with neighborhood boundaries	159	(26.0)	452	(74.0)	191	(32.2)
Fixed shifts (changing no more than annually)	197	(32.1)	416	(67.9)	228	(38.5)
Permanent, neighborhood based offices or stations	216	(35.2)	397	(64.8)	258	(43.2)
Mobile, neighborhood based offices or stations	220	(36.1)	389	(63.9)	158	(27.0)
Fixed assignment of patrol officers to specific beats or areas	363	(59.1)	251	(40.9)	301	(53.5)
Crime Analysis						
Centralized crime analysis/unit function	148	(24.3)	460	(75.7)	195	(33.4)
Decentralized crime analysis/unit function	151	(24.8)	458	(75.2)	39	(7.1)
Means of accessing other city or county databases to analyze community or neighborhood conditions	524	(85.3)	90	(14.7)	136	(23.2)

Use of Special Units	Negotiable		Managerial Prerogative		Implemented	
	N	(%)	N	(%)	N	(%)
Specialized crime solving unit	197	(32.0)	418	(68.0)	178	(30.6)
Specialized community relations unit	195	(31.8)	418	(68.2)	236	(40.1)
Specialized crime prevention unit	190	(31.0)	422	(69.0)	267	(45.1)
Designation of some officers as “community” or “neighborhood” officers, each of whom is responsible for working in areas identified as having special problems or needs	320	(52.5)	290	(47.5)	304	(51.3)
Victim assistance programs	91	(14.8)	523	(85.2)	352	(58.5)
Problem Solving						
Citizen surveys to determine community needs & priorities	105	(27.2)	281	(72.8)	247	(41.1)
Citizen surveys to evaluate police service	205	(31.6)	410	(66.7)	232	(38.5)
Specific training in problem identification & resolution	167	(27.2)	447	(72.8)	223	(37.5)
Interagency involvement in problem identification & resolution	133	(21.8)	477	(78.2)	235	(39.7)
Means of accessing other city or county data bases to analyze community or neighborhood conditions	524	(85.3)	90	(14.7)	136	(23.2)
Multidisciplinary teams to deal with special problems such as child abuse	183	(29.8)	431	(70.2)	194	(33.0)

components are rated as negotiable by roughly 50 percent or more of the police employee organization leaders. These components include: accessing other city/county databases (85.3 percent rated this as negotiable), fixed assignment of officers to specific areas (59.1 percent), foot patrol as a specific assignment (53.6 percent), regularly scheduled meetings with community groups (52.7 percent), community or neighborhood officers (52.5 percent), alternative response methods (48.1 percent), and foot patrol as a periodic assignment (44.3 percent).

Summary

The typical police employee organization is a local organization that has between 60 and 230 members and was founded in the 1960s or later. The president is a sworn police officer who had about 12 years of sworn experience before becoming president, was selected by a general membership vote, and has been president for 3 or 4 years. The organization has a dues check-off agreement with the department and has limits on who can be a member of the organization. The membership is likely to be limited to either any sworn member of the department or patrol officers, sergeants, and supervisors.

Membership in the organization is not mandatory.

Perceptions of Labor-Management Relationships

The average police employee organization leader does not agree that: (a) police employee organizations attempt to limit the power of management, (b) police employee organizations have too much influence over policy issues, (c) employee organizations and unions are not accountable to the public, and (d) that police employees and their organizations generally trust management to make good decisions. The typical police employee organization leader does agree that: (a) it is important for management to

consider the reaction of the police employee organization when changes in policy are considered, and (b) that both management and police employee organizations should have a voice in employee issues and policies and procedures of the police department. The average police employee organization leader is as likely as not to agree that employees in their department have a voice in new policy decisions.

Contract Characteristics

The typical police employee organization has a contract of about 3 years which took approximately 6 to 9 months to negotiate. The next round of negotiations started in 1999-2000.

Community Policing Components

The average police employee organization leader agrees that most components of community policing are important with the exception of: physical decentralization of investigations, mounted patrol, and decentralized crime analysis.

The average police employee organization leader is likely to work in an agency that has implemented the following community policing initiatives: revised mission statements, in-service training related to community policing, bike patrol, interagency drug task force, drug free zones around schools, police youth programs, drug tip hotline or crime stoppers, regularly scheduled meetings with community groups, drug education programs in schools, fixed assignments of officers to specific areas, community or neighborhood officers, and victim assistance programs.

The implementation of most components is considered a managerial prerogative by the police employee organization leaders in our sample, with a few exceptions. The typical police employee organization leader sees the following components as negotiable:

foot patrol as a specific assignment, regularly scheduled meetings with community groups, fixed assignment of officers to specific area, accessing other city/county databases, and community or neighborhood officers.

Agreement Between Chiefs and Police Employee Leaders

Introduction

In this section we address the following research questions:

1. How do police agency and employee association/union executives perceive community oriented policing programs and components?
2. Do agency and employee association/union executives agree in their perceptions of community oriented policing?
3. Are there particular areas or types of community policing programs or components on which agency and employee organization leaders are most likely to agree?
4. What are the correlates of agreement among agency and association/union leaders?
5. What characteristics of police agencies or police employee associations/unions explain variation in agreement?

In order to examine these questions in more detail, this section is divided into several parts. The first part answers the initial research question concerning perceptions of police chiefs and police employee organization leaders by describing those components that are seen as important parts of community policing. The second part concerns the measurement of agreement. We define our measures of agreement, explain the interpretation of these measures, and provide a brief discussion of the problems and limitations of the measurement of agreement. The next part addresses the extent of agreement between chiefs and police employee organization leaders by examining the matched responses of these two groups. The fourth part explores whether certain types or areas of community policing have higher levels of agreement than others. The fifth part examines correlates of agreement among agency and association leaders. The last section

identifies characteristics of police agencies and police employee organizations that explain variation in agreement.

Perceptions of Community Policing Components

The two preceding sections of the report describe the survey responses of police chiefs and police employee organization leaders. This section examines their perceptions of community policing components in terms of which components were generally not seen as important as well as those components which were generally seen as an important part of community policing.

Table 33 presents the components that were least likely to be seen as important parts of community policing by police chiefs and police employee organization leaders. It is important to keep in mind that most components were viewed favorably by both chiefs and employee organization leaders. The “least liked” components then, were those that were rated as an important part of community policing by 60 percent or fewer of respondents.

Table 33 : Components Rated as Important by 60 Percent or Fewer Respondents

Police Chiefs	Police Employee Organization Leaders
physical decentralization of field services	
physical decentralization of investigations	physical decentralization of investigations
mounted patrol	mounted patrol
fixed shifts	
decentralized crime analysis	decentralized crime analysis

The table shows that there is significant overlap between the components chiefs do not see as important and the components that police employee organization leaders do not see as important. Specifically, both groups tend to see physical decentralization of investigations, mounted patrol, and decentralized crime analysis as less important.

Chiefs, but not police employee organization leaders, also saw physical decentralization of field services and fixed shifts as less important parts of community policing.

Table 34 presents the components that were most likely to be seen as important parts of community policing by respondents. Again, it is important to keep in mind that most components were viewed favorably by both chiefs and employee organization leaders. These components were rated as important by 90 percent or more of the respondents.

Table 34: Components Seen as Important Parts of Community Policing

Police Chiefs	Police Employee Association Leaders
revised mission statements	
academy training	academy training
in service training	in service training
training for problem solving	training for problem solving
building code enforcement	building code enforcement
use of other regulatory codes	use of other regulatory codes
interagency problem solving	interagency problem solving
interagency drug task force	interagency drug task force
drug free zones	drug free zones
police youth programs	police youth programs
drug tip hotline	drug tip hotline
meetings with community groups	meetings with community groups
training citizens for problem solving	
drug education in schools	drug education in schools
citizen surveys about needs & priorities	
GIS crime analysis	GIS crime analysis
	centralized crime analysis
use of other city/county databases	use of other city/county databases
victim assistance programs	victim assistance programs

Again, the table shows significant overlap between the perceptions of police chiefs and police employee organization leaders. With few exceptions, in the aggregate, chiefs and police employee leaders tend to see the same community policing components as important. Police employee organization leaders were more likely to rate centralized

crime analysis as important than chiefs. Chiefs were more likely than police employee organization leaders to rate as important: citizen surveys to determine community needs and priorities, training for citizens in problem solving, and revised mission statements linked to community policing.

The Measurement of Agreement

Measuring agreement is not a simple task ((Feinstein and Cicchetti 1990; Agresti 1992; Tinsley and Weiss 2000). Part of the complexity of measuring agreement is a result of the fact that there is no single accepted “best” measure of agreement (Agresti 1992). Instead, there are several methods which yield slightly different information concerning the nature and extent of agreement between raters.

This section, as an introduction to the measurement of agreement, provides a brief review of several issues to provide a foundation for the analyses which follow. Several different methods of measuring agreement are discussed and for each type of measure, we describe the information provided by its use, the benefits and limitations, as well as the interpretation of the measure.

Defining Agreement

Rather than provide an extensive discussion of the various methods of measuring agreement for different types of data, we define agreement only in terms of the data we have collected for this research. That is, we collected ratings of the importance of community policing components (e.g., strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree). We then collapsed the measure into two categories (agree, disagree) for several reasons which will become clear later in this discussion.

A comparison of the ratings of police chiefs and police employee organization leaders produces the following cross-classification

Table 35 : Cross-Classification of Police Chief and Police Employee Association Leaders Ratings

		Police Employee Association Leaders	
		Agree	Disagree
Police Chiefs	Agree	A	B
	Disagree	C	D

Police chief and police employee organization leader ratings “agree” if they fall into cell A or cell D of the above table. Agreement then, means that the two raters “each classify the subject in the same category” (Agresti 1992: 203).

It is important to note that “agreement” concerning the importance of a community policing component means that the chief and association leader *either* both agree that a component is important or that the chief and association leader agree that a component is not an important part of community policing. Agreement about the importance of community policing components then is *not necessarily* an indicator that the two groups both *value* a particular component.

Compare this cross-classification with the one provided by the original rating scheme used by survey respondents:

Police Employee Organization Leaders			
Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree

Police Chiefs	Strongly Agree	A	B	C	D
	Agree	E	F	G	H
	Disagree	I	J	K	L
	Strongly Disagree	M	N	O	P

In this classification table, the following cells represent “agreement”: A, F, K & P. All off-diagonal cells represent varying degrees of disagreement because the raters place the importance of the community policing component in different categories. This seems to be a rather narrow definition of agreement in terms of the data being analyzed here. For example, cell B represents a community policing component which the police association leader agrees is important and the police chief strongly agrees is an important part of community policing. Yet, under the definition of agreement commonly used in the literature, these two respondents would “disagree” about the importance of this component. “Disagreement” in this case appears to be more a matter of priority rather than a real difference of opinion concerning the value of a community policing component. The research questions addressed in this report focus on understanding whether chiefs and police employee organization leaders have differences of opinion about community policing that may lead to problems in the implementation of community policing.

For this reason, we collapsed the table (illustrated by the bold lines in the table). Collapsing the categories of ratings provides us with more or less natural groupings of ratings: those who agree (or strongly agree) that a community policing component is important and those who disagree (or strongly disagree) that a community policing component is important. This coding scheme eliminates the problem of the more

elaborate ratings by making meaningful comparisons between respondents. Using the collapsed coding, then, we can compare respondents who value a particular component as an important part of community policing with respondents who do not value a particular component.

Of course, there is a cost to this approach as well. By ignoring the “value” placed on specific community policing components, we may miss disagreements or conflicts over priority. Chiefs and police employee organization leaders may have conflicts over the order in which community policing components are implemented while still agreeing that the components are important.

Measures of Agreement

We have defined “agreement” as the two raters providing the same classification of a particular component. There are three measures of agreement which are commonly used: simple percentage agreement, measures of association, and the kappa statistic. For each measure, we provide a brief discussion of the advantages and disadvantages as well as the interpretation of the measure.

Simple Percentage Agreement

Simple percentage agreement, as the name suggests, entails calculating the proportion of ratings which agree divided by the total number of ratings (Spitzer, Cohen et al. 1967). The percentage agreement measure then represents the number of rating agreements in terms of the total number of ratings. This measure has several advantages. First, it has an intuitive interpretation. Higher values of percentage agreement indicate that a larger proportion of the ratings were in agreement. Second, it captures the relative

amount of agreement in a way that comparisons can be made between pairs of raters or particular items being rated. Third, it is easy to calculate.

This measure has significant disadvantages as well. First, this measure does not account for chance agreement, or equivalently, the base rates at which various ratings are made are not accounted for (Spitzer, Cohen et al. 1967). This is a particularly serious disadvantage. This limitation will be discussed in more detail in the section describing kappa as a chance-corrected measure of agreement.

Second, simple percentage agreement is a measure of agreement, but not a test for agreement (Spitzer, Cohen et al. 1967; Fleiss, Spitzer et al. 1972; Feinstein and Cicchetti 1990). In other words, there is no cut-off point to separate those raters who agree and those who do not. There is no statistical test associated with the use of this measure in capturing agreement. Any cut-off points selected for separating groups into those that agree and those that do not are essentially arbitrary.

Measures of Association

Other measures of agreement that have been used are chi-square based measures of association (Spitzer, Cohen et al. 1967; Fleiss, Spitzer et al. 1972). The advantage of these measures is that they capture whether or not the two ratings are associated. However, the fundamental disadvantage is that they fail to capture agreement as it is usually defined (Spitzer, Cohen et al. 1967; Fleiss, Spitzer et al. 1972). Specifically, the measures of association only reflect “that A’s assignments are *associated* with B’s assignments more than chance, but not that they are in *agreement* more than chance” (Spitzer, Cohen et al. 1967: 83). Since our focus is on levels of agreement, measures of association are not used in this report as measures of agreement.

Kappa

Kappa is a chance-corrected measure of agreement, which means it is an indicator of the level of agreement between two raters after chance agreement has been taken into account (Cohen 1960; Spitzer, Cohen et al. 1967; Fleiss, Spitzer et al. 1972; Feinstein and Cicchetti 1990). This measure is an improvement over simple percentage agreement which does not take chance agreement into account-it is included with agreement beyond that expected by chance. A series of examples illustrate the reasons why chance-corrected measures of agreement are important.

Consider Table 36 presented below which presents a cross classification of police employee organization leader and police chief ratings of a particular component.

Table 36: Chance Agreement Example

		Police Employee Organization Leaders		
		Agree	Disagree	
Police Chiefs	Agree	a	b	g ₁
	Disagree	c	d	g ₂
		f ₁	f ₂	N

Using the formula provided in (Feinstein and Cicchetti 1990: 554), the index percentage of observed total agreement (simple percentage agreement) is calculated as:

$$p_o = \frac{(a + d)}{N}$$

The number of instances for which agreement is expected by chance is determined as f_1g_1/N in cell a and f_2g_2/N in cell d of the table.

$$p_e = \frac{(f_1g_1 + f_2g_2)}{N^2}$$

is the proportion of agreement that would be expected by chance. As an example, let us assume that a chief and a police employee association leader both had a fifty percent chance of agreeing to any particular component (f_1, f_2, g_1, g_2 are all equal to 50). In this example, then, the percentage of agreement expected by chance is equal to:

$$p_e = \frac{(50^2)(50^2)}{100^2} = 0.50$$

So while there may be a large number of ratings in which the two raters provide the same rating or “agree,” some of this agreement is due to the base rates for individual raters. A more extreme example illustrates this point more forcefully. Consider two raters to have the following base rates: f_1 and $g_1=90$ and f_2 and $g_2=10$. In this example, chance agreement is equal to:

$$p_e = \frac{(90 * 90) + (10 * 10)}{100^2} = 0.82$$

Several important points should be clear from these examples. First, percentage agreement measures, while they capture the proportion of cases for which there is agreement, are not adjusted for the amount of agreement due to chance. Second, the examples illustrate that the level of chance agreement is heavily dependent on the marginal distributions of the contingency table which are used to calculate chance agreement (Feinstein and Cicchetti 1990). This is a limitation of chance-corrected measures. Third, the amount of agreement due to chance can be substantial, particularly when the marginal distributions take on particular characteristics⁵ (Feinstein and Cicchetti 1990).

⁵ This principle is illustrated in the movie *Best in Show* when a wife explains the many things she and her much older, much wealthier husband have in common and why they are meant for each other. She explains

Chance-corrected measures of agreement provide several advantages. First, as the name suggests, these measures adjust for the amount of agreement expected by chance. This is important in the context of this study. If a chief and a police employee organization leader both view community policing favorably, they are more likely to agree about any particular component because of this underlying tendency in their ratings (i.e., they are likely to rate many components as important). Second, chance-corrected measures provide both a measure and a statistical test, or cut-off point to divide pairs of raters into those that agree beyond that expected by chance and those who do not agree beyond that expected by chance.

In this study, we use the kappa measure of agreement. It is “the proportion of agreement *after* chance agreement is removed from consideration”(Cohen 1960:40). Kappa values are easily interpreted: a value of zero indicates that the observed agreement is equal to the chance or expected agreement; greater than chance agreement results in positive values; and negative values of kappa indicate that the observed agreement was less than expected by chance (Cohen 1960).

The research questions we address focus on different kinds of agreement. For example, the second research question is: Do agency and employee association/union executives agree in their perceptions of community-oriented policing? In order to answer this question, we used the matched responses of chiefs and union leaders concerning their ratings of community policing components. In other words, over all 45 components, do the chief/union dyads agree in their perceptions of community policing? This research

“We both like soup”. While certainly evidence of agreement, it seems questionable that this agreement

question examines a different sort of agreement than the third research question: Are there particular areas or types of community policing programs or components on which agency and employee organization leaders are most likely to agree? This type of question requires an examination of the responses of police chiefs and police employee organization leaders in the aggregate. In other words, for each question or component, we compared the chief ratings of that component to the police employee organization leaders' ratings of that component.


Agreement Between Police Chief and Police Employee Organization Leader Dyads

We used two different measures to capture the extent of agreement between police chief-police association leader dyads concerning community policing components. We calculated cross-classification tables for each of the matched dyads and the kappa statistic. These analyses revealed that 38.9 percent (N=187) of the dyads agreed more than expected by chance and that 61.1 percent (N=294) of dyads agreed at levels either expected by chance or less than expected by chance. This finding alone suggests that there is substantial disagreement between police chiefs and police employee association leaders concerning community policing components.

The second measure of agreement, simple percentage agreement, provides a somewhat different picture. Figure 1 presents a bar chart of the distribution of the observed simple percentage agreement for the chief-union dyads.

Figure 1 : Police Chief-Union Dyads Observed Percentage Agreement


signifies destiny, rather than chance agreement.



For each dyad, we calculated the observed percentage of agreement. This observed agreement was used to place the cases into eleven groups: group one being those dyads that had 0-9 percent observed agreement, those that had 10-19 percent observed agreement, etc. The figure above, then shows the percentage of cases which fall into each of those categories. This figure shows that most dyads (77.2 percent) agreed on 70 percent or more of their ratings of the importance of community policing components. The simple percentage agreement measure, then, indicates that there is a relatively high level of agreement for the dyads. It seems then, that the two measures provide very different pictures of the level of agreement between chiefs and police employee organization leaders.

The earlier discussion of the differences between simple percentage agreement and chance-corrected measures of agreement can shed some light on why these two measures indicate different levels of agreement. The chance-corrected measure (kappa measure) indicates that there are lower levels of agreement than the simple percentage agreement measure, which is not corrected for chance levels of agreement. Figure 2 presents an illustration of how this is so.

Figure 2: Simple Percentage Agreement and Expected Agreement



This figure includes two bar charts: one that illustrates the number of “agree” dyads if percentage agreement is used to determine group membership⁶ and one that illustrates the number of “agree” dyads if chance-corrected agreement is used to determine group membership⁷. This figure illustrates that while simple percentage agreement is relatively large for many cases in the sample, the *expected* agreement is also rather large. Since chance-corrected measures take expected agreement into account, this figure shows why there are differences between these two measures of agreement. In other words, a great deal of the observed agreement is agreement “by chance” meaning that it is due in part to the fact that the community policing components were rated as important by a large percentage of all respondents.

⁶ Dyads are placed in the “agree” group if the two respondents agree for 70 percent or more of their ratings.

⁷ Dyads are placed in the “agree” group if the rating on all community policing components is greater than expected by chance. Individual analyses were performed for each dyad and the results were entered as a separate variable.

Areas of Agreement

The third research question addressed in this research concerns whether or not there are particular areas or types of community policing programs or components on which police chiefs and police employee organization leaders are likely to agree. To answer this question, we compared chief and police employee organization leader responses by item to see if there were higher levels of aggregate agreement for some community policing components.

We examined this question in several ways. First, we explored the percentage of agreement. The first table (Table 37) presents the percentage of agreement, positive agreement, and negative agreement. These last two measures are included to disaggregate the two types of agreement contained within percentage agreement. The percentage of positive agreement represents the percentage of cases which fall into cell A (see Table 35 page 103), the percentage of cases in which the chief and the police employee organization leader rated a particular component as an important part of community policing. The percentage of negative agreement represents the percentage of cases which fall in cell D, the percentage of cases in which the chief and the police employee

Table 37 :Community Policing Components: Percentage of Agreement Measure

Organization Changes for Community Policing	(%) Agreement	(%) (+) Agreement	(%) (--) Agreement
Revised mission statements	81.8	97.6	2.4
academy training	88.1	100.0	0.0
in service training	94.1	100.0	0.0
roll call training	82.7	98.6	1.4
Classify & prioritize call	77.1	97.8	2.2
alternative response for calls	73.3	96.4	3.6
physical decentralization of field services	59.2	63.0	37.0
physical decentralization of investigations	57.7	45.7	54.3
Training for problem identification &	92.7	99.8	0.2

resolution

Programs: Officer Deployment

foot patrol→specific assignment	69.4	86.1	13.9
foot patrol→periodic expectation	77.1	94.3	5.7
bike patrol	78.2	96.4	3.6
horse patrol	56.0	51.0	49.0

Programs: Civil Remedies/Working with Other Agencies

building code enforcement	90.4	98.6	1.4
landlord/manager training	81.5	97.8	2.2
other regulatory codes	95.3	99.8	0.2
interagency involvement in problem solving	95.2	100.0	0.0
integration with community corrections	73.8	94.0	6.0
interagency code enforcement	67.2	92.2	7.8
drug task force	83.2	99.4	0.6
multidisciplinary teams	77.2	97.7	2.3
drug free zones	85.8	99.1	0.9

Programs: Citizen Involvement/Input

police/youth programs	93.1	100.0	0.0
drug tip hotline	91.7	99.3	0.7
meetings with community groups	92.5	99.6	0.4
Training for citizens	85.6	98.2	1.8
“spots” on tv/radio	82.1	97.2	2.8
DARE	90.1	99.8	0.2
Surveys about priorities & needs	81.4	99.3	0.7
Surveys about police service	74.9	97.5	2.5

Table 37: (Continued)

	(%) Agreement	(%) Positive Agreement	(%) Negative Agreement
Neighborhood Focus			
Decision making at neighborhood level	72.3	96.0	4.0
beats are neighborhoods	70.3	94.2	5.8
fixed shifts for officers	66.7	69.8	30.2
Permanent neighborhood stations	66.9	83.8	16.2
mobile neighborhood stations	58.8	73.5	26.5
fixed beats for officers	79.0	93.0	7.0

Crime Analysis

Geographic information systems	92.3	99.8	0.2
Centralized crime analysis	81.4	97.8	2.2
decentralized crime analysis	57.6	19.2	80.8
other city/county databases	86.3	98.9	1.1
Use of Special Units			
crime solving unit	63.7	90.6	9.4
Community relations	64.2	88.0	12.0
crime prevention	74.2	92.9	7.1
Community policing officers	69.1	89.4	10.6
victim assistance program	90.7	99.8	0.2
Problem Solving			
citizen surveys about needs & priorities	81.4	99.3	0.7
citizen surveys about police service	74.9	97.5	2.5
Training in problem identification & resolution	92.7	99.8	0.2
landlord/manager training	81.5	97.8	2.2
GIS crime analysis	92.3	99.8	0.2
interagency involvement in problem solving	95.2	100.0	0.0
city/county databases	86.3	98.9	1.1
multidisciplinary teams	77.2	97.7	2.3
Training for citizens in problem id & resolution	85.6	98.2	1.8

organization leader rated a particular component as not being an important part of community policing.

This table shows that there are several items which had high levels of agreement as measured by the simple percentage of agreement. Specifically, the following components had the highest levels of agreement (90 percent or higher): use of other regulatory codes (95.3 percent), interagency problem solving (95.2 percent), inservice training (94.1 percent), police-youth programs (93.1 percent), training for problem identification and resolution (92.7 percent), meetings with community groups (92.5 percent), geographic information systems (92.3 percent), drug tip hotline (91.7 percent), victim assistance programs (90.7 percent), building code enforcement (90.4 percent), and

drug education programs in schools (90.1 percent). These programs tend to be more traditional policing strategies. With the exception of meetings with community groups, most of these components focus on police initiatives. It is interesting to note that for these items, virtually all of the agreement is “positive.” That is, the chiefs and police employee organization leaders both agreed that these components are an important part of community policing.

Some of the items had lower levels of agreement. Specifically, the following items had the lowest (60 percent or less) levels of agreement: physical decentralization of field services (59.2 percent), mobile neighborhood stations (58.8 percent), physical decentralization of investigations (57.7 percent), decentralized crime analysis (57.6 percent), and horse patrol (56.0 percent). These components focus primarily on the decentralization of police operations. In contrast to the high agreement items, these items had mixed agreement types. That is, a significant portion of the agreement for these components reflected chiefs and union leaders agreeing that these components were not an important part of community policing.

In addition to describing agreement by item, we also examined whether there were particular areas or types of community policing programs or components which had higher levels of agreement. We calculated the average level of agreement for each of the eight groups of community policing components. Table 38 presents the average level of agreement for the groups of community policing components.

Table 38: Average Agreement by Component Groups

Component Group	Average Agreement
Citizen Involvement	86.4
Problem Solving	85.2

Civil Remedies	83.3
Crime Analysis	79.4
Organizational Changes	78.5
Special Units	72.4
Neighborhood Focus	69.0
Officer Deployment	56.1

The table shows that components dealing with citizen involvement had the highest average level of agreement (86.4 percent), followed by problem solving components (85.2 percent), and civil remedies (83.3 percent). Slightly lower levels of average agreement are associated with the following component groups: crime analysis (79.4 percent), organizational changes (78.5 percent), and special units (72.4 percent). The component groups with the lowest levels of average agreement are: neighborhood focus (69.0 percent) and officer deployment (56.1 percent).

Percentage Agreement and Improvement Over Chance

As discussed earlier in this section, simple percentage agreement is composed of chance agreement and agreement beyond that expected by chance alone. For each community policing component, we calculated the amount of agreement expected due to chance (actually due to the distribution of the marginal totals on the cross-classification tables). Table 39 presents the simple percentage agreement, the percentage of agreement expected by chance and the improvement over chance for each community policing component. Improvement over chance was calculated by subtracting chance agreement from simple percentage agreement. Positive values of improvement over chance indicate that the observed agreement was larger than the expected agreement. Negative values of improvement over chance indicate that the observed agreement was smaller than the expected agreement.

This table shows that most of the agreement captured by the simple percentage agreement measure is actually chance agreement, or due to the base rates of chiefs and police employee organization leaders. Most of the agreement is expected. Because of this,

Table 39: Percentage of Agreement and Improvement over Chance

Organizational Changes for Community Policing	(%) Agreement	(%) of Chance Agreement	Improvement over Chance
revised mission statements	81.8	80.2	1.6
academy training	88.1	88.7	-0.6
in service training	94.1	94.2	-0.1
roll call training	82.7	82.0	0.7
classify & prioritize call	77.1	77.2	-0.1
Alternative response for calls	73.3	73.1	0.2
physical decentralization of field services	59.2	51.0	8.2
physical decentralization of investigations	57.7	50.1	7.6
training for problem identification & resolution	92.7	92.6	0.1
Programs: Officer Deployment			
foot patrol→specific assignment	69.4	62.4	7.0
foot patrol→periodic expectation	77.1	72.7	4.4
bike patrol	78.2	76.3	1.9
horse patrol	56.0	49.7	6.3

Table 39: (Continued)

Programs: Civil Remedies/Working with Other Agencies	(%) Agreement	(%) of Chance Agreement	Improvement over Chance
building code enforcement	90.4	88.5	1.9
landlord/manager training	81.5	80.4	1.1
other regulatory codes	95.3	95.0	0.3
interagency involvement in problem solving	95.2	95.3	-0.1
integration with community corrections	73.8	77.7	-3.9
interagency code enforcement	67.2	66.1	1.1
drug task force	83.2	78.7	4.5
multidisciplinary teams	77.2	77.0	0.2

drug free zones	85.8	85.4	0.4
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Programs: Focused on Citizen Involvement/Input

police/youth programs	93.1	93.3	-0.2
drug tip hotline	91.7	91.0	0.7
meetings with community groups	92.5	92.0	0.5
training for citizens	85.6	83.9	1.7
“spots” on tv/radio	82.1	80.0	2.1
DARE	90.1	90.1	0.0
surveys about priorities & needs	81.4	82.4	-1.0
surveys about police service	74.9	74.7	0.2

Neighborhood Focus

decision making at neighborhood level	72.3	71.6	0.7
beats are neighborhoods	70.3	69.1	1.2
fixed shifts for officers	66.7	53.2	13.5
permanent neighborhood stations	66.9	60.1	6.8
mobile neighborhood stations	58.8	53.8	5.0
fixed beats for officers	79.0	73.1	5.9

Crime Analysis

geographic information systems	92.3	92.2	0.1
centralized crime analysis	81.4	80.3	1.1
decentralized crime analysis	57.6	56.3	1.3
other city/county databases	86.3	85.6	0.7

Table 39: (Continued)

	(%)	(%) of	
Use of Special Units	Agreement	Chance Agreement	Improvement over Chance
crime solving unit	63.7	62.3	1.4
community relations	64.2	61.3	2.9
crime prevention	74.2	70.0	4.2
community policing officers	69.1	64.7	4.4
victim assistance program	90.7	90.8	-0.1

Problem Solving

citizen surveys about needs & priorities	81.4	82.4	-1.0
citizen surveys about police service	74.9	74.7	0.2

training in problem identification & resolution	92.7	92.6	0.1
landlord/manager training	81.5	80.4	1.1
GIS crime analysis	92.3	92.2	0.1
interagency involvement in problem solving	95.2	95.3	-0.1
city/county databases	86.3	85.6	0.7
multidisciplinary teams	77.2	77.0	0.2
training for citizens in problem id & resolution	85.6	83.9	1.7

the improvement over chance measures listed in the third column are not large. In some cases, there is less agreement than would be expected by chance. In fact, very few items have more than a 5 percent improvement over chance. The implications from the kappa measures of agreement are clear: there is little agreement beyond chance for most of these items, so we can expect that the kappa measures of agreement will not be statistically significant, indicating that there is not much chance-corrected agreement for these items.

Kappa Measures of Agreement

Table 40 presents the kappa measures of agreement and significance level for the community policing components as well as the simple percentage agreement measures. The table, as expected, shows that few items have significant kappa values, indicating that there is more agreement than expected by chance. Specifically, the following components had significant kappa values: physical decentralization of field services, physical decentralization of investigations, foot patrol as a specific assignment, foot patrol as a periodic expectation, horse patrol, building code enforcement, training for citizens in problem identification and resolution, fixed shifts for officers, permanent neighborhood stations, mobile neighborhood stations, fixed beats for officers, crime prevention, spots on tv/radio, and community policing officers. It is interesting to note that these items do not have the highest simple percentage agreement. Indeed, many of

the components with statistically significant kappa values have the lowest percentage agreement values. Again, this is due to the way kappa conditions the simple percentage agreement measure by taking chance agreement into account.

Table 40: Kappa Measures of Agreement by Community Policing Component

Organizational Changes for Community Policing	Kappa Value	Sig. Level	(%) Agreement
revised mission statements	.078	.070	81.8
academy training	-.058	.160	88.1
in service training	-.023	.541	94.1
roll call training	.037	.327	82.7
classify & prioritize call	-.005	.912	77.1
alternative response for calls	.009	.842	73.3
physical decentralization of field services	.166	.000	59.2
physical decentralization of investigations	.153	.001	57.7
training for problem identification & resolution	.014	.746	92.7

Programs: Officer Deployment

foot patrol→specific assignment	.186	.000	69.4
foot patrol→periodic expectation	.162	.000	77.1
bike patrol	.078	.070	78.2
horse patrol	.125	.008	56.0

Programs: Civil Remedies/Other Agencies

building code enforcement	.167	.000	90.4
landlord/manager training	.058	.189	81.5
other regulatory codes	.054	.170	95.3
interagency involvement in problem solving	-.022	.592	95.2
integration with community corrections	.009	.842	73.8
interagency code enforcement	.033	.460	67.2
drug task force	.022	.614	83.2
multidisciplinary teams	.008	.847	77.2
drug free zones	.027	.507	85.8

Programs: Focused on Citizen Involvement/Input

police/youth programs	-.032	.431	93.1
drug tip hotline	.081	.067	91.7
meetings with community groups	.062	.096	92.5
training for citizens	.106	.010	85.6
“spots” on tv/radio	.105	.017	82.1
DARE	-.001	.984	90.1
surveys about priorities & needs	-.040	.325	81.4
surveys about police service	.007	.845	74.9

Table 40 (Continued)

	Kappa Value	Sig. Level	(%) Agreement
Neighborhood Focus			
decision making at neighborhood level	.023	.574	72.3
beats are neighborhoods	.040	.344	70.3
fixed shifts for officers	.289	.000	66.7
permanent neighborhood stations	.171	.000	66.9
mobile neighborhood stations	.108	.015	58.8
fixed beats for officers	.220	.000	79.0
Crime Analysis			
geographic information systems	.008	.848	92.3

centralized crime analysis	.057	.194	81.4
decentralized crime analysis	.030	.529	57.6
other city/county databases	.052	.240	86.3

Use of Special Units

crime solving unit	.038	.358	63.7
community relations	.075	.077	64.2
crime prevention	.141	.001	74.2
community policing officers	.126	.004	69.1
victim assistance program	-.009	.828	90.7

Problem Solving

citizen surveys about needs & priorities	-.040	.325	81.4
citizen surveys about police service	.007	.845	74.9
training in problem identification & resolution	.014	.746	92.7
landlord/manager training	.058	.189	81.5
GIS crime analysis	.008	.848	92.3
interagency involvement in problem solving	-.022	.592	95.2
city/county databases	.052	.240	86.3
multidisciplinary teams	.008	.847	77.2
training for citizens in problem id & resolution	.106	.010	85.6

Correlates of Agreement

The fourth research question addressed in this research is: What are the correlates of agreement among agency and association/union leaders? In order to address this question, we divided our matched respondents into two groups: those who agree more than would be expected by chance alone and those who did not agree more than would be expected by chance. These groups will be referred to as the “Agree” and “Disagree” groups respectively. The labels are somewhat misleading: falling into the “Disagree” group does not necessarily mean that the police chief and the police employee organization leader dyad actually disagrees on the majority of the community policing components. The “Disagree” group does not have a statistically significant amount of

agreement once chance agreement has been taken into account. We used this method to divide our respondents because the other alternative (arbitrarily selecting a level of simple percentage agreement as a cut-off point to divide the groups) is less meaningful and thus more difficult to interpret.

Comparisons were then made between the “Agree” and “Disagree” groups on police chief characteristics, union leader characteristics, union organization characteristics, responses to the questions concerning perceptions of police labor relationships provided by the chiefs, responses to the questions concerning perceptions of police labor relationships provided by the police employee organization leaders, and organization level characteristics. These comparisons were made to determine if the dyads which agree had different characteristics than those which did not agree.

Table 41 presents the bivariate results for comparisons made concerning police chief characteristics. The two groups were compared on the career path of the chief (whether the chief was promoted from within the police department, appointed from outside the department, or elected), the years of sworn experience the chief had when selected as chief, and the chief’s tenure. There were no statistically significant differences between the “Agree” and “Disagree” groups based on these variables.

Table 41: Police Chief Characteristics and Agreement

Chief Characteristic	Agree		Disagree	
	N	(%)	N	(%)
Career Path	109	(58.6)	183	(62.9)
Promoted from Within	76	(40.9)	105	(36.1)
Appointed from Outside	1	(0.5)	3	(1.0)
Elected				
	Mean		Mean	

Years of Sworn Experience	20.81	19.95
Years as Chief	6.17	5.66

Table 42 presents the bivariate results for comparisons made concerning union organizational characteristics. The two groups were compared on the level of union affiliation (local, county, state, or national affiliation), whether the organization has a dues check-off agreement, whether or not membership in the police employee organization is mandatory, and the average number of members. There were no statistically significant differences between the “Agree” and “Disagree” groups based on these variables.

Table 42: Union Organization Characteristics and Agreement

Union Characteristic	Agree		Disagree	
	N	(%)	N	(%)
Union Affiliation				
Local	79	(47.9)	140	(54.5)
County	5	(3.0)	8	(3.1)
State	61	(37.0)	82	(31.9)
National	20	(12.1)	27	(10.5)
Dues Check-off				
Yes	133	(73.1)	205	(72.3)

No	49	(26.9)	75	(26.7)
Mandatory Membership				
Yes	50	(27.5)	61	(21.3)
No	132	(72.5)	225	(78.7)
		Mean		Mean
Number of Members		166.09		248.26

Table 43 presents the bivariate results for comparisons made concerning union leader characteristics. The two groups were compared on whether or not the police employee organization leader is an officer, the years of sworn experience the leader had when selected, and the police employee organization leader’s tenure. There were no statistically significant differences between the “Agree” and “Disagree” groups based on these variables.

Table 43: Union Leader Characteristics and Agreement

	Agree		Disagree	
	N	(%)	N	(%)
Is Leader an Officer?				
Yes	175	(95.1)	277	(95.8)
No	9	(4.9)	12	(4.2)
		Mean		Mean
Years as Officer Before Being Leader		12.93		12.24
Years as President		3.96		3.65

Table 44 presents the bivariate results for comparisons made concerning the police chiefs’ perceptions of police labor relationships. There was one statistically

significant difference between the groups. Those chiefs in the “Agree” group were more likely to agree with the following statement: “Police employees and their organizations generally trust management to make good decisions” than those chiefs in the “Disagree” group. The difference between the two groups (13.2 percent) is modest, however.

Table 44: Police Chief Perceptions of Labor Relationships and Agreement

Perception Question	Agree		Disagree	
	N	(%)	N	(%)
Police employee organizations seek to limit the power of management.	125	(67.2)	212	(72.6)
Police employee organizations have too much influence over policy related issues.	65	(34.9)	106	(36.6)
When changes in policy are considered, it is important to consider the reaction of the police employee organization(s).	171	(91.9)	261	(89.4)
Both police management and police employee organizations should have a voice in new policy decisions relating to employee issues.	154	(83.2)	246	(84.5)

Table 44 (Continued)

Perception Question	Agree		Disagree	
	N	(%)	N	(%)
Both police management and police employee organizations should have a voice in new policy decisions relating to policies and procedures of the police department.	131	(71.2)	192	(65.8)
Police employee organizations and unions are not accountable to the public.	93	(50.3)	139	(47.6)
Police employees and their organizations generally trust management to make good decisions.*	110	(59.8)	136	(46.6)
Police employees in this department have a voice in decisions regarding new policies.	173	(94.0)	268	(91.8)

Table 45 presents the bivariate results for comparisons made concerning the police employee organization leaders' perceptions of police labor relationships. There were two statistically significant differences between the "Agree" and "Disagree" groups. The police employee organization leaders in the "Agree" group were more likely to agree that police employees and their organizations generally trust management to make good decisions than those police employee organization leaders in the "Disagree" group.

Table 45: Police Union Perceptions of Labor Relations and Agreement

Perception Question	Agree		Disagree	
	N	(%)	N	(%)
Police employee organizations seek to limit the power of management.	50	(26.9)	92	(31.6)
Police employee organizations have too much influence over policy related issues.	13	(7.0)	10	(3.4)
When changes in policy are considered, it is important to consider the reaction of the police employee organization(s).	172	(92.5)	263	(91.0)

Table 45 (Continued)

Perception Question	Agree		Disagree	
	N	(%)	N	(%)
Both police management and police employee organizations should have a voice in new policy decisions relating to employee issues.	182	(97.3)	280	(96.9)
Both police management and police employee organizations should have a voice in new policy decisions relating to policies and procedures of the police department.	163	(87.2)	251	(86.9)
Police employee organizations and unions are not accountable to the public.	25	(13.4)	31	(10.7)
Police employees and their organizations generally trust management to make good decisions.*	85	(45.9)	103	(35.6)

Police employees in this department have a voice in decisions regarding new policies.* 113 (60.4) 137 (47.6)

Again, the difference between the two groups (10.3 percent) is modest. It is noteworthy that both the chiefs and the police employee organization leaders in the “Agree” group perceive more trust in their relationships. The police employee organization leaders in the “Agree” group were also more likely to agree that police employees in their department have a voice in decisions regarding new policies than the police employee organization leaders in the “Disagree” group. The difference between the two groups (12.8 percent) is also modest.

Table 46 presents the bivariate results for comparisons made concerning the organization level characteristics. The two groups were compared on whether or not the police employee organization had a contract, whether the chief reported conflict in the last three years, whether the police employee organization leader reported conflict in the last three years, the average number of sworn officers, the population of the jurisdiction served by the police agency, and the total number of citizen requests for police service. There were three statistically significant differences between the “Agree” and “Disagree” groups. The police employee organizations leaders in the “Agree” groups were more likely to report conflict over the last three years (61.0 percent reported conflict) than the police employee organization leaders in the “Disagree” group (50.7 percent reported conflict). Again, this difference is modest. Organizations in the “Disagree” group have more sworn officers and received more citizen requests for service.

It is interesting to note, that in this matched analysis, there were two differences between the police chief and police employee organization leader reports of conflict.

First, a higher percentage of chiefs reported conflict than did the police employee organization leaders. Second, while police employee organization leaders in the “Agree” group reported more conflict than the police employee organization leaders in the “Disagree” group, this finding was not mirrored in the chief responses. Since the chief and police employee organization leaders are matched (belong to the same police agency), these two findings taken together suggest that chiefs and police employee organization leaders have different perceptions (or memories) of conflict.

Table 46: Organization Level Characteristics and Agreement

Organization Characteristic	Agree		Disagree	
	N	(%)	N	(%)
Contract (Union Leader Response)				
Yes	132	(71.7)	198	(69.2)
No	52	(28.3)	88	(30.8)
Conflict? (Chief Response)				
Yes	85	(48.9)	144	(52.9)
No	89	(51.1)	128	(47.1)
Conflict? (Union Response)*				
Yes	114	(61.0)	149	(50.7)
No	173	(39.0)	145	(49.3)
	Mean		Mean	
Average Number of Sworn Officers*	172.60		319.67	

Population of the Jurisdiction	97,753.31	126,879.10
Total Citizen Requests for Service*	114,813.56	249,359.56

Summary of Bivariate Agreement Findings

Overall, we found very few correlates of agreement in the variables we examined. None of the police chief characteristics, police employee organization characteristics, and union organizational characteristics were related to whether or not the dyads fell into the “Agree” or “Disagree” group.

The differences we did find can be summarized as follows:

Agree Group

- ❑ The chiefs in this group were more likely to report that employees and their organizations generally trust management to make good decisions
- ❑ The police employee organization leaders in this group were more likely to report that employees and their organizations generally trust management to make good decisions.
- ❑ The police employee organization leaders in this group were more likely to report that employees in their department have a voice in new policies and procedures.
- ❑ The police employee organization leaders in this group were more likely to report the existence of conflict between the department and the employees in the last three years.

Disagree Group

- ❑ The departments in this group have a larger average number of sworn officers.

- The departments in this group have a larger number of citizen requests for police service.

These differences between the two groups are the foundation for the multivariate analyses that follow.

Multivariate Analyses Predicting Agreement Between Police Chiefs and Police Employee Organization Leaders

The fifth research question addressed in this research is: What characteristics of police agencies or police employee associations/unions explain variation in agreement? We used the same two groupings of dyads as in the bivariate analyses: those dyads who agree more than would be expected by chance alone and those who did not agree more than would be expected by chance. We used this grouping as a dependent variable and included the variables with significant bivariate relationships with agreement as independent variables in a logistic regression analysis. Table 47 presents the resulting model.

Table 47 : Model Predicting Agreement

Model Statistics

Model Chi-Square	27.559
Significance	.0000
Goodness of Fit	462.072
Cox Snell R ²	0.057
Nagelkerke R ²	0.078

Variable Statistics

Variable	B	Significance Level	Odds Ratio
Union—Employees Trust Management	-.3524	.0785	.7030
Union—Employees Have a Voice	-.5099	.0107	.6005
Union—Conflict in Last Three Years	.5506	.0062	1.7343

Average Number of Sworn Officers	-.0003	.1514	.9997
Chief—Employees Trust Management	-.4963	.0115	.6088
Constant	1.3400	.0067	

The model used to predict agreement is statistically significant. The use of the independent variables as predictors of group membership helps us make better predictions of group membership (Menard 1995). The model itself, however, does not explain much of the variation in agreement.

The model contains three variables that are associated with whether the police chief-police employee organization leader dyad falls in the “Agree” versus the “Disagree” group. Those dyads in which the police employee organization leader agreed that employees in their department have a voice in new policies and procedures were more likely to be in the “Agree” group. Those dyads in which the chief agreed that police employees and their organizations generally trust management to make good decisions were more likely to be in the “Agree” group. Interestingly, the dyads in which the police employee association leader reported conflict in the last three years were more likely to be in the “Agree” group.

In order to examine the effects of these variables, we calculated a series of equations. We calculated the predicted probabilities (using the modal or mean values for most variables in the equation) and varying only the factor or variable of interest. All else being equal, the dyads in which the union leader agreed that employees in their department have a voice in new policies had a 52 percent chance of being in the “Agree” group compared to those who disagreed with this statement (39 percent chance of being in the “Agree” group). All else being equal, those dyads in which the police employee organization leader reported no conflict over the last three years had a 38 percent chance

of being in the “Agree” group, while those police employee organization leaders who reported conflict over the last three years had a 52 percent chance of being in the “Agree” group. All else being equal, those dyads that had a chief who agreed that employees trust management to make good decisions had a 52 percent chance of being in the “Agree” group and those dyads whose chiefs disagreed had a 40 percent chance of being in the “Agree” group.

Taken together, these findings suggest that the characteristics of the relationship between the police chief and the police employee organization leader impact the level of agreement concerning community policing. Specifically, when the chief feels trusted, when the police employee organization feels that employees have a voice in how the department works, there is a higher likelihood that the dyad will agree (beyond that expected by chance). A somewhat unexpected finding is that dyads in which police employee organization leaders report conflict over the last three years are more likely to be found in the “Agree” group. This could be explained, however, by the idea that those agencies that have had conflict may have a better understanding of their relationship with each other *because* of the conflict.

Summary

Overall, chiefs and police employee organization leaders agreed that most of the community policing components were important parts of community policing. There were certain components that both chiefs and police employee organization leaders were less likely to rate as important parts of community policing: physical decentralization of field services, mounted patrol, and decentralized crime analysis. Some components were likely to be rated as important parts of community policing by both groups: academy

training, in-service training, training in problem identification and resolution, building code enforcement, use of other regulatory codes, interagency problem solving, interagency drug task forces, drug free zones, police youth programs, drug tip hotlines, meetings with community groups, drug education in schools, GIS crime analysis, use of other city/county databases, and victim assistance programs.

For the most part, agency and police employee organization leader perceptions of community policing overlap to a large extent. They tend to agree concerning whether community policing components are important parts of community policing. However, the analysis also indicated that much of the agreement seemed to be due to the tendencies of chiefs and police employee organization leaders to rate most components as important, which increased their likelihood of agreeing on any particular component.

Regardless of the source of the large simple percentage agreement concerning community policing components, this level of agreement needs to be put into context. Even if most of the agreement may be due to chance, the agreement still exists and still has consequences for the agency. The higher the level of agreement, the less likely that the two groups will have conflicts over the *idea* of community policing. However, the two groups only have to disagree about one component for there to be problems. It is important then to remember that these disagreements happen in the context of ongoing relationships between chiefs and police employee organizations. The nature of those relationships can have an effect on whether a disagreement turns into a conflict or a compromise. In short, it is important to see the level of agreement concerning the idea of community policing as one factor that can influence the implementation of community policing.

The analysis which examined average levels of agreement for groups of community policing components reveals that some groups had higher levels of agreement than others. The groups with the highest average agreement dealt with citizen involvement, problem solving and civil remedies/working with other agencies. There was less agreement concerning crime analysis, organizational changes and special units. The components with the lowest levels of agreement dealt with neighborhood focus and officer deployment.

It seems then, that there is more agreement concerning working with the community and other agencies and problem solving, rather than the techniques of crime analysis and special units. The organizational changes (which many policing scholars argue are essential for the success of community policing) were relatively high in terms of agreement with the exception of two components referring to the decentralization of services. Removing these two components from this group substantially raises the mean level of agreement to 84 percent. The components dealing with neighborhood focus (which also includes components capturing decentralization of police services) also had lower levels of agreement.

Several factors are related to whether a chief-police employee organization leader dyad falls into the “Agree” versus “Disagree” group. These factors do not generally have very strong relationships with agreement, however. Aspects of the relationship between the agency and the police employee organization and organizational characteristics are related to agreement. Relationships in which the chief feels trusted by the employees and the employees report the chief is trusted to make good decisions were more likely to be in the “Agree” group. Dyads that had police employee organization leaders who felt that

employees in their department have a voice in new policies were more likely to be in the “Agree” group. “Agree” group dyads were more likely to have police employee organization leaders who reported conflict than those in the “Disagree” group. The “Agree” group agencies were smaller in terms of the average number of sworn officers and handled fewer total citizen requests for service.

Taken together, these findings suggest that organizational size and the nature of the relationship between the chief and the police employee organization leader are important factors in understanding agreement. It is important to keep in mind that chief and police employee organization leader characteristics, police employee organization characteristics, and most police department organizational characteristics were not related to agreement. It seems that agreement is in some ways a reflection of the relationship between these two groups.

There were no statistically significant organizational level predictors in the multivariate model predicting agreement. There were, however, three measures of the relationship between chiefs and police employee organization leaders that were related to agreement: the police employee organization leader reporting that the employees in the department have a voice in new policies, the chief agreeing that employees generally trust management to make good decisions, and the police employee organization leader reporting conflict in the last five years. The quality of the relationship appears more important to agreement than organizational characteristics.

Conclusions and Recommendations

The research reported here provides the basis for many conclusions concerning the nature of police labor relationships and the implementation of community policing. It also suggests several directions for future research in this area. This section includes discussion of several issues. First, this section explores conclusions based on comparisons of the responses of police chiefs and police employee organization leaders. Next, we present recommendations for future research, and finally, the policy implications suggested by this research are discussed.

Comparison of Chief and Police Employee Organization Leader Responses

The research questions addressed in this report focus on agreement between chiefs and police employee organization leaders in terms of their perceptions of community policing components. Examining the responses of these two groups across the survey also reveals areas of agreement and disagreement concerning issues other than community policing. Rather than reporting agreement analyses discussed in Section 5, this discussion refers to broad general findings across the responses of both groups.

There were several areas of agreement between the two groups. First, the chiefs and police employee organization leaders tend to think the same components are important (or not important) parts of community policing. This finding challenges the existing literature based on case studies of the implementation of community policing (Sadd and Grinc 1996). When systematically evaluated, chiefs and police employee organization leaders have relatively similar views of community policing. Second, most conflicts between agencies and police employees are not related to community policing

(according to both chief and police employee organization reports). Third, both chiefs and police employee organization leaders report that community policing components are not widely implemented. Few components were implemented in more than 50 percent of agencies surveyed. Fourth, for both chiefs and police employee organization leaders, the existence of conflict between the agency and employees in the last three years was related to different perceptions of police labor relationships.

There were also several areas of disagreement between the two groups. First, with few exceptions, chiefs and police employee organization leaders have different perceptions of police labor relationships. Specifically, chiefs were more likely than police employee organization leaders to agree that: police employee organizations attempt to limit the power of management, police employee organizations have too much influence, police employee organizations and unions are not accountable to the public, and that employees in their department have a voice in decisions regarding new policies. In contrast, police employee organization leaders were more likely than chiefs to agree that: when changes in policy are contemplated, it is important to consider the reaction of the police employee organization, employees should have a voice in new policies regarding employee issues and new policies and procedures. Both groups had roughly the same level of agreement concerning the following statement: Police employees and their organizations generally trust management to make good decisions. Both groups were about evenly split in their agreement with this statement.

Second, police chiefs and police employee organization leaders report different amounts of conflict. In the aggregate, chiefs report less conflict than police employee organization leaders. This is particularly striking when it is remembered that there are

about twice as many chiefs as police employee organization leaders in our study. Even when chiefs and police employee organization leaders are matched by department, they do not report the same amount or types of conflict⁸. While some of the discrepancy likely relates to somewhat different reporting periods, the differences are substantial. This suggests that chiefs and police employee organization leaders have different perceptions/memories of conflict.

Third, chiefs and police employee organization leaders had differing opinions concerning whether the implementation of community policing components were negotiable or managerial prerogatives. With the exception of fixed shifts for officers (57.1 percent of chiefs said this was negotiable), police chiefs generally rated the implementation of community policing components as managerial prerogatives. Police employee organization leaders, on the other hand, perceived the implementation of several community policing components as negotiable. More than 50 percent of the police employee organization leaders saw the following components as “negotiable:” foot patrol as a specific assignment, regularly scheduled meetings with community groups, fixed assignment of officers to specific beats or areas, the use of other city or county databases, and community or neighborhood officers. In contrast to the chiefs, only 32.1 percent of police employee organization leaders saw fixed shifts as negotiable. It may be then, the difference of opinion concerning the bargaining status (whether implementation of a particular program is negotiable or a managerial prerogative), and the way the

⁸ When only matched responses are examined, the numbers and types of conflict reported by police chiefs and police employee organizations are not identical. Police employee organizations tend to report about twice as much conflict as police chiefs.

community policing programs are implemented are the source of the disputes rather than ideological differences concerning community policing per se.

Recommendations

The recommendations are split into two parts. The first set of recommendations address implications of this research for future studies in this area. The second set addresses the implications for policies dealing with police labor relationships and the implementation of community policing.

Recommendations for Research

The recommendations for research focus on three general areas: research on police employee organizations, research dealing with police labor relationships, and research concerning the implementation of community policing. Each set of recommendations is discussed separately.

Research on Police Employee Organizations

Recommendation 1: The establishment and maintenance of a systematic data collection that captures the existence and characteristics of police employee organizations.

Because there is no national census of these organizations and because these organizations tend to be locally based, it is a relatively difficult process to obtain information concerning the mere existence of these organizations, not to mention the appropriate contact and address information. The existence of a sampling frame for further research in this area would greatly facilitate improving the knowledge base concerning police employee organizations.

The recommended data could be collected as part of the Law Enforcement Management and Administration Statistics (LEMAS) survey. This survey has contained questions concerning collective bargaining. The addition of a few questions would enable researchers to find and study police employee organizations much more extensively and systematically than has been done in the past. While adding these questions to LEMAS would not provide for a sampling frame that would include the *population* of these organizations, it would nonetheless provide a sample that would be representative in the same sense as the other data collected.

Recommendation 2: Future research on police employee organizations ought to examine more positive aspects of these organizations.

Because this research was based on the existing literature on police labor relations and because this literature as a whole tends to focus on the problems caused by these organizations, we cannot speak to the beneficial aspects of police employee organizations. We don't know whether or how police employee organizations partner with management to implement innovations in police agencies. We don't know (with the exception of some respondents who voluntarily provided such information) how the police employee organization can help the chief and the department weather controversy, accusations, and scandals. We don't know the extent to which the knowledge of police employee organization members is tapped in the process of developing innovative policing techniques or policies. Future research should investigate the potential benefits of these organizations.

Recommendation 3: Future research should address the nature and extent of police employee organization influence and power.⁹

As mentioned earlier in this report, chiefs claim to be limited by these organizations. The actual influence of police employee organizations is not clear. A study examining police employee organization influence would have to use multiple measures. The financial resources of the police employee organization are one aspect of influence. More money means the union can engage in a wider variety of tactics to obtain their goals. Another aspect of influence concerns the range of tactics that police employee organizations actually can use or have access to in their jurisdiction. Yet another is the perception of police employee organization influence. If the chief believes the union will oppose a policy (independent of whether or not they actually would), and alters his/her behavior because of it, then the perception of influence may also be a factor. The last issue to be addressed would be quantifying limits placed on management behavior by collective bargaining agreements. This would capture the policy related limitations actually created by these agreements and allow for comparisons across departments. While previous research has examined collective bargaining agreements ((Rynecki, Cairns et al. 1978; Carter and Sapp 1992), these studies were primarily descriptive in nature and do not delve into other aspects of police employee organization power.

Research on Police Labor Relationships

Recommendation 1: Future research on police labor relationships could focus on the “life course” of police labor relationships and how these relationships develop (and possibly) change over time.

⁹ The authors are grateful to Sam Walker for this overall suggestion as well as several of the strategies outlined below.

While we can document that chiefs and police employee organization leaders have different views concerning police labor relationships, the research design used in this study does not allow us to explain these differences or explore how they developed. The literature on police employee organizations and public sector unions suggests that these relationships move through a relatively predictable series of stages (Lewin, Feuille et al. 1988). Future research could document how police labor relationships are formed and altered over time.

Recommendation 2: Future research examining chief and police employee organization leader accounts should include as many “objective” or outside measures of events as possible.

While this study focused on agreement concerning community policing, we asked questions in several areas that relate to police labor relationships. These responses could be “matched” by examining the chief and police employee organization leader response. Preliminary analyses of these responses indicate that there are disagreements concerning the type and number of conflicts reported as well as whether or not community policing components are implemented. Because it is not possible to determine which report is “correct,” it would be helpful to have other accounts of these events or circumstances to compare with respondent accounts. This could result in a better understanding of the sources of different perceptions, memories, or awareness between the two groups.

Recommendation 3: Future research concerning police labor relationships should include all of the relevant “players,” not just police chiefs and police employee organization leaders.

The chief responses concerning their involvement in negotiations as well as other departmental and city officials who engage in negotiations with the police employee organization clearly indicate that there are other actors who impact the nature of police

labor relationships. Chiefs in some cases provided written comments on the survey which indicated that the involvement of other actors in the negotiation process created problems for them. One chief complained that the city manager was willing to trade managerial prerogatives to save money on economic issues with the union. Future research could examine the role these other actors play, the impacts of their actions, and the effects on police labor relationships.

Research on the Implementation of Community Policing

Recommendation 1: Future research should examine how community policing programs and components are implemented and how different methods and approaches to implementation may be related to different levels of resistance from employees.

This research indicates that the *idea* of community policing is not a major source of conflict between chiefs and employees and that there is substantial agreement concerning community policing. It appears from our study that resistance to community policing may be more procedural than substantive. Future research could address the extent to which this is so by systematically examining the resistance that is ideological (related to employees disliking the overall idea of community policing or a particular component or program of community policing) and resistance that is due to the way community policing is implemented (how policies are developed, disseminated, implemented, and altered in police agencies).

Recommendations for Policies Dealing with Police Labor Relationships

Recommendation 1: Chiefs and police management need to provide more attention to labor relationships generally.

Our research revealed that only 52.3 percent of chiefs were involved in negotiations between the police employee organization and the department/city. In addition, some of the perception questions suggest that chiefs are not entirely happy with police labor relationships in their department. Chiefs also believe that they are free to make virtually any changes in policy without consulting the police employee organization. It seems that many chiefs deal with police labor relationships by ignoring them and acting as they see fit independent of the input (if any) of employees. This can only lead to further problems. We would suggest that chiefs spend more time considering police labor relationships and ways in which to improve them.

Recommendation 2: Efforts need to be made to improve communication between management and employees.

We are not the first researchers to suggest that management employees and rank-and-file employees have different opinions (Reuss-Ianni 1983). Our research found that chiefs and police employee organization leaders viewed the bargaining status of community policing components differently and that chiefs say employees have a voice in new policies while police employee organization leaders say that employees do not have a voice. Clearly there are differences between chiefs and police employee organization leaders that could be improved (or reduced) if there was better communication between these two groups.

Recommendation 3: Chiefs who want to implement aspects of community policing in their agencies should be aware that *how* they implement policies may be more important than *which* policies are implemented, in terms of whether or not there is conflict with employees.

Our research suggests that it is not the ideology of community policing that police employees are opposed to as much as perhaps the way policies are implemented. There

are not great differences of opinion concerning which components of community policing are important, but there are notable differences of opinion concerning whether the implementation of components is negotiable or managerial prerogatives. It may be this difference that causes problems. If the employees believe that they ought to be consulted before a policy is implemented and they are not, this can cause problems. This can be true even if they favor the implementation of the policy.

Overall, our research suggests two fundamental conclusions concerning police labor relations generally and the influence of police labor relations on the implementation of community policing. The first conclusion is that is important to consider the overall relationship “context” when examining policy changes. While it may be true to say that police agencies and police employee organizations have disagreed or suffered conflict because of the implementation of community policing strategies, this disagreement may be more of a reflection of the overall quality of the relationship between the two parties, rather than an indication that there is substantive disagreement about the idea of community policing. The second conclusion is that differing notions about the substance of community policing and what components of community policing are important do not seem to be at the heart of any disagreements between these groups. Rather, the two groups seem to be at odds about the *implementation* of community policing as well as whether the employees ought to have or actually do have a voice in formulating these policies.

Glossary of Police Labor Terms

Arbitration (various forms)

Advisory Arbitration

If in the course of negotiating a new (or first) agreement the parties find themselves unable to reach a mutually satisfactory arrangement, they may proceed to advisory arbitration. Advisory arbitration refers to the process whereby a neutral third party holds a public hearing & recommends what the new terms & conditions of employment should be. His recommendations are not binding on either party. (Juris and Feuille 1972: 393)

Arbitration

The process of legislated arbitration resembles fact-finding in that the proceedings may be conducted by a single neutral or by a tripartite panel. Many arbitrators prefer informal hearings although there may be a tendency toward formality in some cases. Testimony and evidence are collected, but, in legislated arbitration this information is used as the basis for a final and bilaterally-binding award which terminates a dispute. (Bowers 1974: 39)

Arbitration

As I use the term, it is a process of adjudication involving the investigation of facts and the application of rational, predetermined standards to those facts to produce a binding decision. (Arthurs 1967: 140)

Binding Arbitration

Binding arbitration requires the submission of the unresolved issues to a neutral third party or panel for settlement. The arbitrator will sift through the facts and make an award, which is binding on both parties. (Maddox 1975: 80)

Compulsory Arbitration

If in the course of negotiating a new (or first) agreement the parties find themselves unable to reach a mutually satisfactory arrangement, they may be required to proceed with compulsory arbitration. Compulsory arbitration differs from advisory arbitration in that (1) the parties must participate and (2) the decision of the neutral third party is binding on both sides. (Juris and Feuille 1972: 395)

Bargaining Unit

A particular group of employees which has been recognized by the city as an appropriate group to be represented by a single employee organization. There may be more than one bargaining unit in the agency. (Juris and Feuille 1972: 393)

Blue Flu

A particular job action which consists of mass sick calls by members of the bargaining unit. (Juris and Feuille 1972: 394)

Collective Bargaining

The process in which representatives of employees and representatives of the employer meet and confer and negotiate to determine to their mutual satisfaction the new terms and conditions of employment. The agreement is usually reduced to writing in the form of a contract, resolution, or ordinance. (Juris and Feuille 1972: 394)

Collective bargaining is the process by which labor and management representatives negotiate the wages and working conditions for a given employment entity. (Bowers 1974: 33)

The term “collective bargaining” may be defined as the process in which representatives of the employees and representatives of the employer meet, confer, and negotiate to determine to their mutual satisfaction the terms and conditions of employment. (Bolinger 1981: 167)

To express in a simplified manner, collective bargaining is a method of joint decision making, within agreed upon limitations, between labor and management. (Eltzeroth 1980: 261)

In one sense, bargaining between employers and employees means no more than that employees are given some opportunity, however slight, to participate in discussions with their employer regarding decisions affecting their welfare; the decision in the ultimate analysis being made unilaterally by the employer. (Finkelman 1967: 116-7)

Collective bargaining has been defined as bargaining by an organization, or a group of workmen in behalf of its members, with the employer. This presupposes someone with authority to bargain and something for which to bargain. (International Association of Chiefs of Police 1971: 7)

But collective bargaining means that *appointed* officials (personnel directors, city managers, budget officers, and the like) negotiate terms and conditions of employment with union representatives, who are neither elected by the voting public nor appointed by political officeholders. (Kearney 1995: 181)

Dues Check-Off

A union security clause whereby employee organization dues are automatically “checked off” by payroll deduction & remitted to the employee organization by the employer. (Juris and Feuille 1972: 395)

Fact-finding

If in the course of negotiating a new (or first) agreement the parties find themselves unable to reach a mutually satisfactory arrangement, they may proceed to fact-finding. Fact-finding refers to the process whereby a neutral third party holds a hearing and after due consideration of the facts makes public his recommendations as to what the new terms & conditions of employment should be. His recommendations are not binding on either party. (Juris and Feuille 1972: 395)

Fact-finding is a device where a third party or a board is assigned to uncover data on the issues in question that will break the deadlock. A fact-finder is an investigator whose job is to sift through the facts and issues and come up with information. (Maddox 1975: 78)

Fact-finding (also known as advisory arbitration) proceedings may be conducted by a single neutral or by a tripartite panel. Hearings are held and are usually conducted in an informal manner. Testimony and other evidence are collected and used as the basis for nonbinding recommendations for settling a dispute. (Bowers 1974: 39)

Good Faith Bargaining

Good faith underscores a duty to bargain—an obligation to actively participate in deliberations in order to find a common ground for agreement. (Maddox 1975: 5)

Grievances

An employee complaint that his rights have been violated. The complaint usually refers to a violation of the collective bargaining agreement, a violation of an applicable ordinance or resolution, a violation of departmental rules, etc. How many of these violations will be subject to your grievance procedure will depend on how you define a grievance in the grievance procedure. Management may also file a grievance against an employee who has violated one of the above. (Juris and Feuille 1972: 395-6)

Impasse Resolution Machinery

The essence of impasse resolution machinery is the insertion of a neutral third party into the controversy who can bring a fresh perspective and an unbiased frame of reference to the situation. (Maddox 1975: 77)

Job Action

A phrase used to describe any of a variety of actions which involve a departure from normal work practices by a group of employees for the purpose of expressing their dissatisfaction over one or more issues in the employment relationship. (Juris and Feuille 1972: 397)

Lobbying State/City Legislature

Public safety employees have also used their political skills and influence to obtain additional benefits from the legislative body which their representatives were unable to secure at the bargaining table. This tactic is commonly known as the “legislative end run” or as “double-deck bargaining.” (Bowers 1974: 38)

Mass Resignation

In the mass resignation, participating officers tender their resignation. (Burpo 1971: 32)

Mediation

If in the process of negotiating a new (or first) agreement the parties are unable to reach a mutually satisfactory arrangement, they may go to mediation. Mediation is the process whereby a neutral third party is called in to meet with the employee and employer representatives together and individually in order to help find some common ground. The mediator always works in private; he exercises no power except moral persuasion and his own skills of explanation and exhortation. If he is unable to bring the parties together in an agreement he drops out of the picture. (Juris and Feuille 1972: 397)

Mediation is an attempt to resolve a deadlock by inserting a neutral third party into negotiations. The mediator’s first tactic is usually to contract each party privately and listen to its explanation of the cause of the impasse. (Maddox 1975: 78)

Mediation involves the intervention of a third party neutral who relies solely upon his ability to persuade and to suggest new ways of solving problems as a means of achieving a settlement. (Bowers 1974: 39)

Slowdown

A particular job action which consists of a deliberate reduction of output by a group of employees in an attempt to put pressure on the employer, e.g., refusing to issue traffic citations or issuing warnings in lieu of citations. (Juris and Feuille 1972: 398)

In a work slowdown, officers will perform all the tasks required of them, but in such a deliberate way and so slowly that the work begins piling up. (Maddox 1975: 125-6)

Speedup

A particular job action which consists of a deliberate increase in output in an attempt to put pressure on the employer, e.g., issuing an unusually large number of citations for dirty license plates or exceeding the speed limit by one mile per hour. (Juris and Feuille 1972: 398)

A work speedup, as the term denotes, is the acceleration of a particular type of work. Again, the type of work is almost always traffic tickets. (Maddox 1975: 126)

Strike

A particular job action which consists of a total withdrawal of services by part or all of the members of the bargaining unit. (Juris and Feuille 1972: 398)

A strike is the total withdrawal of labor by officers. (Maddox 1975: 123)

Vote of No Confidence

The leadership [of the police employee organization] will simply schedule a vote of their membership on whether or not they have confidence in the chief. The outcome is almost always a forgone conclusion: no confidence in the chief. Following the vote, and the press releases by management decrying it and labor embracing it, the rank and file will make certain demands: (1) that the chief resign, retire, or be fired; (2) that departmental policies be modified; (3) that the employee organization be given a greater voice in the affairs of the agency. (Maddox 1975: 126)

Work Stoppage

A work stoppage is a variation of the strike. It involves the disruption of work on a selective basis. (Maddox 1975: 125)

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