EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Does Crime Just Move Around the Corner?
A Study of Displacement and Diffusion in Jersey City, NJ

David Weisburd
Laura A. Wyckoff
Justin Ready
John E. Eck
Josh Hinkle
Frank Gajewski

POLICE FOUNDATION

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Introduction

Over the last decade there have been a substantial number of research studies on hot spots and hot spots policing efforts (Weisburd and Braga, 2003). Overall, these studies show that hot spots policing approaches have strong impacts upon crime in targeted sites (Weisburd and Eck, 2004). However, there is often concern that focusing police resources on hot spots will simply displace the crime to non-targeted areas. In turn, when immediate spatial displacement has been examined, the findings generally support the position that displacement is small and that diffusion of crime control benefits is more likely. However, studies that are designed to measure direct program impacts are often flawed when they are used to examine displacement and diffusion. This study was designed to overcome such methodological flaws by focusing the intervention and data collection on the possibility and characteristics of displacement and diffusion, rather than on evaluating the direct impacts of the program on targeted crimes/areas.

Thus the main focus of this study was immediate spatial displacement or diffusion to areas near the targeted sites of intervention. Do focused prevention efforts "simply move crime around the corner?" Or conversely, have the hot spots policing efforts that were brought in unusually high dosage to the target areas "diffused" to areas immediately surrounding the direct focus of the policing efforts? To answer these questions, two study sites were selected in Jersey City, New Jersey. One was an area plagued with drugs and violent crime, and the other had a high level of prostitution.

Methodology

In each site, small target areas were selected to receive intensive police enforcement. To capture any displacement or diffusion effects, two catchment areas

surrounding the targeted areas were also defined for each site. To allow us to distinguish between movement to a block immediately adjacent to the target area and one more distant, we divided the catchment area into an area immediately next to the target area (1st catchment area) and an area more removed (2nd catchment area). These catchment areas received no extra police attention, with the assumption that displacement and diffusion would most likely be evidenced in these locations that were both close to the targeted sites and offered new potential opportunities for continued criminal involvement. Figures 1 and 2 present maps of both sites depicting the target and catchment areas for each.

Figure 1



Figure 2



To assess displacement and diffusion at each site, we used multiple measures including systematic social and physical observations, arrestee interviews, ethnographic observations, and official crime data. Social observations of social disorder, crime, and various social behaviors were collected by a team of carefully trained research assistants who were randomly assigned to the study sites' street segments during the study period. Physical observations were conducted before, at the mid-point, and after the intervention. These observations involved carefully coding the signs and severity of physical disorder, including items like broken glass in the street, as well as indicators of targeted crimes through condoms/condom wrappers and needles and other drug paraphernalia on the street. For our qualitative data collection, members of the research team conducted

interviews with individuals arrested in the target areas of both sites, and an independent ethnographer was hired to conduct field interviews and observations in and around the prostitution target site. With regard to official crime data, police call for service data was provided by the Jersey City Police Department. We use these measures both to evaluate the magnitude and types of displacement and diffusion that can be expected to result from place-focused policing interventions, and to assess the validity and the reliability of different measures of displacement and diffusion.[1]

Effect of the Intervention

For there to be any reason to suspect possible displacement or diffusion of benefits, it is necessary for the intervention to have a strong impact on crime in the targeted areas. Our data show that the police implemented intensive and targeted crime prevention initiatives at both of the sites examined in our study. An analysis of police administrative calls showed an increase in the target areas during the intervention period, and our arrestee and ethnographic interviews showed that offenders were keenly aware that a police crackdown was occurring, as indicated by the following quote from a prostitute interview.

> "In the last three months, [prostitution is] not worth it…too much police activity…definitely more police, now on bikes…never used to be on blocks…more undercover…roadblocks are new, random checkpoints…johns are afraid to stop so they drive around too much, so they are too visible and make things worse for themselves."

The following quote from an individual arrested in the violent crime/drug site illustrates that offenders in that site were also well aware of the increased police activity.

[1] See the full report for more detailed description of the target sites, their selection and the data collection methodology for each data source.

> "…lately Narcotic come around Monday and Thursday and someone is going to get arrested on those days…that is a sure bet. On these days I just stay underground until the cops go home because I'm not stupid. When the cops are around I stay underground until they leave to go home, then I come out. The rest of the days there are just regular cops. They know me and they don't arrest you. As opposed to narcotics that come and rip things up."

In turn, we have multiple data sources that suggest that there was, as expected given the intensity of the treatments, a crime prevention outcome in the target areas of each site.

The strongest evidence of this effect was found in the social observation data, which showed a dramatic and intense reduction of street level prostitution (see Figure 3) and disorder at the Corneilson Avenue prostitution site from the first month of intervention, as well as strong changes in observed drug (see Figure 4) and disorder activity at the Storms Avenue violent crime/drug site.

Figure 3[2]



[2] The start and end of the intervention is indicated on the figures by the vertical blue lines.

Figure 4



Due to the time of the year at which the intervention occurred, it is possible that the reductions were due to a cooling trend in the weather. However, an analysis of temperature showed that the cooling trend did not correspond precisely with the decline in activities, and the decline continued into the post-intervention period when weather was warmer and very similar to the conditions during the pre-intervention period when crime was much higher. Another possible explanation was that the call for service data show that there was a city-wide crime decline during the study period. However, the city-wide decline was not of the magnitude seen in the target sites, suggesting that the intervention had an impact above and beyond any general declining trend.

These findings were supported in observational measures of physical disorder in the target areas, and were reinforced by interviews with arrestees in both sites and ethnographic observations in the Cornelison Avenue prostitution site. Only resident interviews and citizen emergency call for service data failed to show a similar effect at

statistically significant levels. However, the number of residents in the target areas was very small and thus raises questions about the reliability of these data.

Spatial Displacement & Diffusion

Having established that the intervention had an impact on crime in the targeted areas, we then turned our attention to assessing whether the data suggested any displacement of crime or diffusion of crime control benefits to the catchment areas. In this executive summary, the findings from each data source are presented briefly. Please see the full report for a more detailed description of the findings.

The social observations illustrated that there was not a measurable increase in observable street level prostitution, drug activities or disorder in the areas immediately surrounding the target sites—what we term catchment areas—during the intervention period. For prostitution and drug activities in the respective sites, we saw statistically significant declines in the target area and both catchment areas, suggesting a diffusion of benefits from the target areas. With regard to disorder, we see statistically significant declines in both target areas, with no significant changes in the catchment areas of the prostitution site and significant declines in both catchment areas in the violent crime/drug site, suggesting a possible diffusion of benefits from the violent crime/drug target area.

The physical observations data provided mixed results regarding spatial displacement and diffusion of benefits. In the prostitution site we saw possible evidence of diffusion in catchment area one, evidenced by a reduction in the number of condoms and condom wrappers on the street and the amount of broken glass on the street from pre-intervention to the middle of the intervention. However, there was evidence of displacement into the second catchment area for both of these measures as well as

needles and other drug paraphernalia on the street. In the violent crime/drug site there was possible evidence of diffusion of benefits in the measures of broken windows and the number of condoms and condom wrappers on the street. The only possible evidence of displacement in this site was an increase in the percentage of buildings with structural damage in catchment area 1 from pre- to post-intervention.

The resident interviews and call for service data do not provide any meaningful evidence of displacement or diffusion. We think it likely that these data sources are not sensitive to changes in the street level behavior the police interventions were likely to impact. The target areas were not residential areas, thus there were not many individuals to interview within them, and as such not many people residing there to call the police to report crimes. Limiting this further is the fact that it appears that citizens may simply be poor observers of crime and disorder in their neighborhood. This will be discussed later in the executive summary, and is discussed in more detail in the full report.

Thus, overall our quantitative measures offer strong support for prior studies that show that focused crime prevention efforts are not likely to have large displacement effects to areas nearby. In this sense, crime does not seem to simply "move around the corner" as a result of hot spots policing efforts. Explanation for this finding can be found in our qualitative data collection. Both our interviews with arrestees in both sites and the field observations and interviews conducted by the independent ethnographer in the prostitution site showed strong evidence that offenders resist movement away from the target areas. A main reason is simply that they are familiar with those areas. Most of the offenders we examined live close to their "work" in the targeted sites, and they feel "comfortable" with these locations. They resist movement to other sites both because of

a natural tendency to stay with what is familiar, and because movement would demand that they encounter new and less familiar circumstances. Just as law abiding citizens will tend to stay close to home, our ethnographic and interview data suggest that offenders here are strongly attached to their home turf. The following quote from a prostitute illustrates this reasoning.

> "…I will always go into an area I know. This way, if I need help, I know that somehow I can find someone or get someone's attention. But, in the same way, I don't go into an area that would give away what I am doing and get me arrested…"

Their resistance to movement however, also has a strongly rational component. They are not only comfortable in the target sites; they are part of established business and social networks. Other areas that may offer similar opportunities for prostitution or drug selling in the city already have established networks. Some prostitutes told us that another prostitution site was "too fast" for them. But clearly both for the prostitutes at Cornelison Avenue and for the drug-involved offenders in the Storm Avenue site, moving to another established location would potentially put them in conflict with other established actors in those areas. This was particularly true of the Storm Avenue interviewees who noted that movement to another area with an established drug trade was likely to lead to violence. One arrestee elaborates, "you really can't deal in areas you aren't living in, it ain't your turf. That's how people get themselves killed." Additionally, offenders in these areas have built up established clientele who may not be easily "displaced" to other areas. With these considerations in mind, our arrestee interviews, not surprisingly, showed only a few examples of movement away from established locations; only three prostitutes (9.7%) and six drug arrestees (11.8%) reported moving the location of their criminal activities.

The independent ethnographer found more examples of spatial displacement to the catchment areas and to areas close by, but outside the catchment areas. In turn in the prostitution site physical observation of condoms and condom wrappers, needles and drug paraphernalia, and sidewalks covered with broken glass also reflected an increase in the catchment area 2 in the pre-to-intervention period. This catchment area also witnessed a spike in prostitution activities in the January wave of the social observations. This is not necessarily inconsistent with our other findings. We think it clear that established prostitution or drug locations were not shifted to the catchment areas, and thus it was not likely that social observations or other data sources would identify sharp increases in these areas. Rather the displacement activity tended to be somewhat random, moving to a few other sites that never achieved very high levels of activity. Both the ethnographic interviews and the physical observations point to evidence of possible displacement in the pre-to-intervention period which did not remain stable across sites into the post intervention period. Indeed, the social observations suggest that the complex patterns may have been restricted to a sporadic period and did not persist across the intervention period.

It is also important to note that the ethnographic work provided evidence of desistence among a non-trivial number of the prostitutes, and the interviews suggest that many of the individuals involved in criminal activity in both sites were removed from the streets for substantial periods. This would suggest that the overall level of problem behavior likely decreased during the intervention period, and thus though some spatial displacement to the catchment areas may have occurred, it may have been based on a much lower offender population overall.

The qualitative data do not allow for a clear assessment of diffusion since interviews were only conducted with individuals arrested in the target areas and the ethnographer primarily interviewed prostitutes around the Cornelison Avenue target site. However, the data do allow us to speculate on why a more general trend of reduction in street level activity would have occurred nearby the targeted sites. The offenders did not have a clear view of the limits of the police interventions or the reason for their intensity in the intervention period. This is not surprising, as the offenders in these areas only had limited information about police activities. As was noted in chapters 9 and 10 of the full report, offenders were not sure of the time constraints of the intervention, and adapted their behavior in a number of ways that reflected what they "thought" was occurring rather than what was the actual strategy used by the police. We might assume a similar reaction in terms of the physical boundaries of the intervention. From the perspective of offenders in these areas, it would have been reasonable to conclude that intensive police interventions brought on one block would be added to blocks immediately adjacent. While we might wonder why they did not adapt to this knowledge later on when it was clear that the police were not entering the catchment areas, it is reasonable to suspect that the crackdowns were assumed to include areas nearby to the target area.

Other Forms of Displacement

Our qualitative data offer an advantage in that they allow us to examine other forms of displacement which are unable to be detected in the quantitative data sources. While our study confirms prior investigations based on studies of main intervention effects that found that immediate spatial diffusion is more likely than immediate spatial displacement, we do find in our qualitative analyses that other types of displacement are

likely to be common as a result of hot spots policing efforts. This suggests that the crime control benefits of targeted interventions may be offset in part by adaptations other than spatial displacement. The other types of displacement we observed were method, temporal, and crime type (though the latter was extremely rare). Method displacement involves the offenders altering the ways they carry out their criminal activity in order to continue offending in the targeted areas without being caught. Temporal displacement occurs when offenders change the times they carry out their criminal activities in the target area. Lastly, crime type displacement involves an offender shifting to a completely different type of crime.

The most common type of displacement observed in our qualitative data was method displacement. It appears in this regard that there is a kind of hierarchy to displacement adaptations. Immediate spatial displacement, which has often been the focus of investigation, and thought to be the most serious threat to crime prevention efforts, appears less serious in our investigation than changes, for example, in the way offenders carry out their illegal activities. The reason for this, as noted earlier, is likely the resistance of offenders to spatial displacement because of issues of familiarity and difficulty of moving to other locations.

We found that six (19.4%) prostitutes and 13 (25.5%) of the drug arrestees interviewed exhibited evidence of changing their methods in response to the intervention. The ethnographic interviews suggested an even larger degree of method displacement in the data. In general, method displacement involved the use of a new approach to drug sales or prostitution. In the case of prostitution, it often involved making “dates” with clients. This usually involved having johns call them and arrange a time for them to pick

them up at the prostitute's home. In a number of cases, the behavior was moved off the street to avoid police detection.

Importantly, these changes in method may reflect an overall crime prevention benefit. It is well known that increasing "effort" in crime prevention is likely to lead to lower levels of crime and disorder activity (Braga, 2001). Having to make appointments with clients clearly makes the process of committing law violating acts more difficult, and is thus likely to reduce the number of events over time that offenders carry out. Moreover, from the perspective of the police and the public, movement of behavior "indoors" reflects in the case of street level crime and disorders, a benefit for the community.

Temporal displacement was also observed in the interviews with prostitutes. Several mentioned shifting their work hours to very late at night, thinking that the police were off the streets after 11 p.m. or so. One mentioned switching her work to the early morning hours and catching johns on their way to work. Lastly, we found little evidence of displacement across crime types. For instance, one would expect that drug-using prostitutes would be likely to try to get into the drug trade, but only one prostitute we interviewed mentioned attempting to do so and she had a negative experience due to her addiction (using the product rather than selling it), which led her to a conflict with her supplier.

Measuring Displacement and Diffusion

Having multiple data sources also allowed us to assess which types of measures are best suited to capture displacement and diffusion effects. As we expected at the outset of our investigation, social observations produced the most sensitive database for

identifying street level activity in the two sites we studied. The social observation data in turn were confirmed by arrestee interviews and ethnographic observations that suggested large-scale treatment effects at the target site. Social observations allowed us to assess both the direct effects of the intervention on street level activity and overall displacement and diffusion to the catchment areas. However, it is important to note that social observations did not allow for accurate investigation of other types of displacement, such as method displacement, and missed elements of spatial displacement that were captured in the arrestee interviews and ethnographic field observations.

Interestingly, physical observations provided a number of direct indications of displacement and diffusion. It is generally argued that observations of the physical characteristics are unlikely to be affected in the short run from crime prevention initiatives, unless they are directed at improving such characteristics directly (e.g. see Green-Mazzerole, 1995). However, our data suggest that physical observations can provide important indications of changes in the level of certain types of criminal activity. In particular, observation of such offense-related disorder as condoms or drug paraphernalia on the street can provide an independent assessment of whether crime prevention programs are effective in reducing drug or prostitution activities.

While observational measures showed strong utility in our study, resident surveys, which are expensive and difficult to conduct, added little useful information about displacement and diffusion. This was the case for two reasons that we believe are likely to be relevant to other studies. First, in our study, places with high levels of street level crime like prostitution were likely to include fewer residential addresses and thus our data were not robust for assessing crime trends. We suspect that this methodological problem

is likely to be present in many types of hot spots locations since offenders (especially in the case of crimes like prostitution) may seek out areas where conventional citizens are unlikely to call the police or otherwise interfere with their activities. This problem may not be a serious one when a large number of hot spots are examined (e.g. see Weisburd and Green, 1995), but it certainly should be an important consideration in the assessment of crime prevention at individual sites.

Second, it does not appear from our study that residents have accurate knowledge of offender patterns on their block. This is perhaps not surprising, since residents may have routine activity patterns that often bring them away from their blocks for good parts of the day. Why should we expect them to have an accurate view of changes in crime in their areas, especially in the catchment sites where levels of street level crime were lower in the first place? Our findings here are consistent with other victim surveys which suggest that citizens do not have accurate perceptions of crime problems in their neighborhoods (Skogan and Maxfield, 1981).

The methodological problems we encountered in our resident survey data were also present in the police emergency call data we utilized in the study. Again, we suspect that there were too few residents in the target sites, and in some catchment areas, to gain a robust view of changes in crime trends. Moreover, there were rarely enough cases of individual crime types in a given month in the small target and catchment areas required to allow for statistical comparison. Thus it was necessary to combine crime types together to get a large enough number of cases, and in doing so we were likely to obscure changes in specific crimes at the targeted sites. This problem may have been overcome with a larger target area; however, this most likely would have diminished the

treatment's intensity, thus reducing the chances of displacement. Again, we think that official data may be more useful in studies that look at a large number of sites.

Our study clearly points to the opportunities of observational methods for understanding displacement and diffusion effects. Where our quantitative analyses revealed little or no evidence of displacement, our offender interviews suggested that spatial displacement, while relatively minor, was present. This is perhaps the case because interviews capture the overall behavior of offenders, which may not be concentrated in any specific area. Indeed, our data suggest that the spatial diffusion is likely to be "dispersed" from target areas to a number of different locations. Such dispersion is unlikely to be detected by other methods.

Moreover, qualitative measures provide a more robust method for identifying the various displacement options, many of which would be hidden either from observation or official data sources. Also, qualitative data allowed us to delve more deeply into the criminal's decision making process during police crackdowns. In contrasting the two types of qualitative data we collected, it is interesting to note that the ethnographer's field interviews revealed more examples of displacement than did our arrestee interviews. We hypothesized that this is likely due to the fact that the arrestees interviewed were arrested in the target area, and thus were not as likely to displace given that they were still working in their regular areas at the time of arrest. Thus, it is likely that ethnographic observations and field interviews with known offenders offer a more valid measure of any displacement effects than arrestee interviews.

Conclusions and Policy Implications

This report provides a group of important findings about displacement and diffusion in geographically focused crime prevention programs, and how to best study these phenomena. Perhaps most important, is our confirmation of earlier studies which reported little evidence of immediate spatial displacement, and strong evidence for diffusion of benefits beyond the targeted areas. This finding, in the context of a controlled study that was designed to directly study displacement and diffusion effects, adds strong support to a policy approach which focuses police resources at crime hot spots. Such concentration on hot spots is likely to lead to strong crime prevention benefits not only in targeted sites but also in areas close to them.

However, our study also suggests some caution to those who have argued that hot spots policing will produce strong crime prevention outcomes without displacement of crime. Our ethnographic field work and arrestee interviews show that while some offenders desist from criminality as a result of hot spots interventions, most seek out adaptations that will allow them to continue offending in the targeted areas. In this regard, we found that method displacement was very common in our study.

Finally, our study suggests the importance of non-official data sources for assessing crime prevention programs. In particular, our data suggest the salience of the use of social and physical observations and qualitative data collection for assessing direct program impacts, as well as displacement. We recognize that social observations, in particular, are expensive and unlikely to be used broadly in evaluations of crime prevention programs, but we think that our study suggests their importance for accurately

identifying street level crime and disorder. We also think our data suggest the rich information that can be gleaned from qualitative data sources.

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Table of Contents

Chapter 1: Introduction

Traditionally research and theory in criminology have focused on two main units of analysis: individuals and communities (Nettler, 1978; Sherman, 1995). In the case of individuals, criminologists have sought to understand why certain people as opposed to others become criminals (e.g. see Akers, 1973; Gottfredson and Hirschi, 1990; Hirschi, 1969; Raine, 1993), or to explain why certain offenders become involved in criminal activity at different stages of the life course or cease involvement at other stages (e.g., see Moffitt, 1993; Sampson and Laub, 1993). In the case of communities, criminologists have often tried to explain why certain types of crime or different levels of criminality are found in some communities as contrasted with others (e.g., see Agnew, 1999; Bursik and Grasmick, 1993; Sampson and Groves, 1989; Shaw and McKay, 1942), or how community-level variables, such as relative deprivation, low socioeconomic status, or lack of economic opportunity may affect individual criminality (e.g. see Agnew, 1992; Cloward and Ohlin, 1960; Merton, 1968; Wolfgang and Ferracuti, 1967). In most cases research on communities has focused on the "macro" level, often studying larger geographic units such as states (Loftin and Hill, 1974), cities (Baumer, Lauritsen, and Rosenfeld, 1998) and neighborhoods (Bursik and Grasmick, 1993; Sampson, 1985).

While the individual and the community have long been a focus of criminological research, only recently have criminologists begun to explore other units of analysis that may contribute to our understanding of the crime equation. An important catalyst for this work came from theoretical perspectives which emphasized the context of crime and the opportunities that are presented to potential offenders (Weisburd, 2002). In a ground breaking article on routine activities and crime, for example, Cohen and Felson (1979) suggest that a fuller understanding of crime must include a recognition that the availability of suitable crime targets and the presence

or absence of capable guardians influence crime events. In a series of studies examining "situational crime prevention" researchers at the British Home Office also challenged the traditional focus on offenders and communities (Clarke and Cornish, 1983). These studies showed that crime situations and opportunities play significant roles in the development of crime events (Clarke, 1983).

One implication of these emerging perspectives is that crime places are an important focus of inquiry (Eck and Weisburd, 1995; Sampson and Groves, 1989; Taylor, 1997). While concern with the relationship between crime and place is not new and indeed goes back to the founding generations of modern criminology (Guerry, 1833; Quetelet, 1842), the "micro" approach to places suggested by recent theories has just begun to be examined by criminologists.[1] Places in this "micro" context are specific locations within the larger social environments of communities and neighborhoods (Eck and Weisburd, 1995). They are sometimes defined as buildings or addresses (e.g. see Green, 1996; Sherman, Gartin and Buerger, 1989), sometimes as block faces or street segments (e.g. see Taylor, 1997), sometimes as clusters of addresses, block faces or street segments (e.g. see Block, Dabdoub, and Fregly, 1995; Sherman and Weisburd, 1995; Weisburd and Green, 1995a). Research in this area began with attempts to identify the relationship between specific aspects of urban design (Jeffrey, 1971) or urban architecture (Newman, 1972) and crime, but broadened to take into account a much larger set of characteristics of physical space and criminal opportunity (e.g. Brantingham and Brantingham, 1975, 1981; Duffala, 1976; Hunter, 1988; LeBeau, 1987; Mayhew, Clarke, Sturman, and Hough, 1976; Rengert, 1980; 1981).

[1] It should be noted that there are earlier approaches which are concerned with the "micro" idea of place as discussed here (e.g. see Shaw, Zorbaugh, McKay, and Cottrell, 1929; Brantingham and Brantingham, 1975).

Recent studies point to the potential theoretical and practical benefits of focusing research on crime places (Eck and Weisburd, 1995; Sherman, 1995; Taylor, 1997; Weisburd, 2002; Weisburd et al., 2004). A number of studies for example suggest that significant clustering of crime at place exists, irrespective of the specific unit of analysis that is defined (Brantingham and Brantingham, 1999; Crow and Bull, 1975; Pierce, Spaar, and Briggs, 1986; Roncek, 2000; Sherman et al., 1989; Weisburd, Maher, and Sherman, 1992; Weisburd and Green, 1994). The concentration of crime at place also suggests significant crime prevention potential for such strategies as hot spots patrol (Sherman and Weisburd, 1995) which focus crime prevention resources tightly at places with large numbers of crime events (Sherman and Rogan, 1995; Sherman et al., 1989; Weisburd and Green, 1995a).

While there is growing evidence that police can impact upon crime at the specific places or areas where police efforts are focused (see Sherman, Gottfredson, MacKenzie, Eck, Reuter, and Bushway, 1997; Weisburd and Eck, 2004), such approaches risk shifting crime or disorder to other places where programs are not in place. This phenomenon is usually termed "spatial displacement," and it has been a major reason for traditional skepticism about the overall crime prevention benefits of place-based prevention efforts (Reppetto, 1976). This is part of more general orthodoxy in criminology prevalent for most of the twentieth century, which held that there was little point in concentrating on specific situations or contexts of crime as offenders will shift the places, times, methods or targets of their offending.

In recent years, however, this prevailing orthodoxy has been the subject of substantial criticism. The assumption that displacement is an inevitable outcome of focused crime prevention efforts has been replaced by a new assumption that displacement is seldom total and often inconsequential (Gabor, 1990; Barr and Pease, 1990; Clarke, 1992; Eck, 1993; Hesseling,

1994). Clarke and Weisburd (1994), moreover, suggest that scholars need to be cognizant of just the reverse of displacement. They point to evidence indicating that situational and place-oriented crime prevention strategies often lead to a "diffusion of benefits" to areas outside the immediate targets of intervention. This spatial diffusion of crime prevention benefits has now been noted in a number of research studies (Weisburd and Green, 1995a; Braga, Weisburd, and Waring, 1999; Hope, 1994; Sherman and Rogan, 1995; and Caeti, 1999).

While much attention has been paid to the idea of displacement, methodological problems associated with its measurement have often been overlooked (Weisburd and Green, 1995a; for exceptions see Barr and Pease, 1990; and Pease, 1993). Indeed there is not a single direct empirical study of this phenomenon that we could identify for review. That is not to say that displacement has not been studied; only that empirical examinations of displacement have been a byproduct of the study of something else. Typically, this means that the authors of an evaluation of a crime prevention effort offer some brief conclusions about the possibility of displacement. However, they often face significant barriers because a research design optimal for measuring direct program effects may not be optimal for measuring displacement or diffusion (Weisburd and Green, 1995b).

The failure of scholars to directly examine displacement and diffusion effects was to some extent understandable when it was assumed that there would be little overall crime control benefit from focused crime prevention initiatives, and when there were few practical crime prevention approaches that concentrated on places or situations. But given the substantial growth of such studies in recent years and the growing controversy over the magnitude and nature of displacement, such focus is now warranted. This study seeks to fill these gaps in our measurement and understanding of displacement and diffusion. Our main focus is on immediate

spatial displacement or diffusion to areas near the targeted sites of an intervention. Do focused crime prevention efforts at places simply result in a movement of offenders to areas nearby targeted areas—"do they simply move crime around the corner?" Or conversely, will a crime prevention focus on specific areas lead to improvement in areas nearby—what has come to be termed a diffusion of crime control benefits?

Though our main focus is on immediate spatial displacement and diffusion, we also collect data on other potential forms of displacement and the ways in which focused place based intervention efforts affect them. For example, we seek to understand whether offenders are more likely to shift the ways in which they offend as opposed to the location or timing of offense behavior at a particular place. We also use these data, which are primarily qualitative, to develop a more nuanced understanding of the ways in which interventions affect offenders and the factors that influence their decisions regarding displacement.

Our specific focus is two crime prevention efforts developed specifically for this controlled study in Jersey City, New Jersey. Two sites were selected to be targeted and were carefully monitored during an experimental period. One site included a clearly focused geographic concentration of violent crime and drug crime, and the other street level prostitution. Two neighboring areas were selected to serve as catchment areas in order to assess immediate spatial displacement or diffusion. For each site, we used multiple measures including systematic social and physical observations, resident interviews, ethnographies and arrestee interviews, and official crime data. We use these measures to compare the types of information gained from different measures of displacement and diffusion, and to evaluate the magnitude and types of displacement and diffusion that can be expected to result from place focused policing interventions.

Displacement and Diffusion

The idea of spatial displacement is not new and indeed can be traced to early work by sociologists, beginning with work that examined criminal opportunities. Sutherland (1947), for example, recognized at the outset the importance of criminal opportunities in the crime equation even as he presented his theory of differential social learning among individuals. He noted in his classic introductory criminology text that "a thief may steal from a fruit stand when the owner is not in sight but refrain when the owner is in sight; a bank burglar may attack a bank which is poorly protected but refrain from attacking a bank protected by watchmen and burglar alarms" (Sutherland, 1947: 5). Nonetheless, Sutherland, as other early criminologists, did not see crime places as a relevant focus of criminological study. This was the case, in part, because crime opportunities provided by places were assumed to be so numerous as to make concentration on specific places of little utility for theory or policy. In turn, criminologists traditionally assumed that situational factors played a relatively minor role in explaining crime as compared with the "driving force of criminal dispositions" (Clarke and Felson, 1993:4; Trasler, 1993). Combining an assumption of a wide array of criminal opportunities, and a view of offenders that saw them as highly motivated to commit crime, it is understandable that criminologists paid little attention to the problem of the development of crime at places. Concentrating crime prevention efforts at places would, given these assumptions, lead to a simple shifting of crime events without any clear long term crime prevention benefit.

Though the possibility that crime prevention might move crime around rather than curtail it is not new, it was not until 1976 that Reppetto provided the first explicit rationale for displacement.

> "The police, however, cannot be everywhere; all houses and commercial establishments cannot be secured with attack-proof doors and windows, and all neighborhood

> environments cannot be altered. A different level of protection between various potential targets, both human and nonhuman, will always exist. Given the differential and no reduction in the offender population, will not the foreclosure of one type of criminal opportunity simply shift the incidence of crime to different forms, times and locales?" (1976:167)

Reppetto (1976) noted in this regard that the types of programs that would be least susceptible to displacement would be those that are the most comprehensive – for example, city-wide rather than neighborhood-wide programs.

The main focus of concern and research about displacement has been on what has come to be termed Spatial displacement or the shifting of crime from one place to another as a result of crime prevention efforts. But other types of displacement have also been identified, and are clearly important in understanding potential shifting of crime in crime prevention efforts. Reppetto (1976) for example, identifies four other types of displacement (Hakim and Rengert [1981] revised the names and we will use these): Temporal displacement--describing shifts in time of offending; Method displacement--here offenders continue offending but change their procedures; Target[2] displacement--involving a switch in what or whom the offender attacks; and Crime type displacement-- involving a change in the crime category (e.g., robbery to burglary). Later, Barr and Pease (1990) added a sixth form of displacement: perpetrator displacement[3].

[2] Target displacement is not looked at in this study as it is not likely that drug dealers or prostitutes will change the targets of their activities. Drug dealers will still be selling to drug addicts and prostitutes will still be selling sexual activities to johns. They may stop offending, change their type of offending, or move their activities to different times or places, thus these forms of displacement will be the focus of this study.

[3] Perpetrator displacement stands apart from the other five forms of displacement, and for this reason is arguably a separate phenomena that should be considered aside from displacement. The first five forms of displacement all involve a behavioral change of the active offenders – they switch places, times, methods, targets and crime types but remain active. Perpetrator displacement changes the offenders themselves, though new offenders' behaviors may be the same as the people they replaced. This broadens the time segment over which displacement can be expected to occur. The first five forms can be expected to begin over a time ranging from immediately upon their detecting the new crime prevention intervention to several months later after they learn how to operate under new conditions. In short, these are quick acting forms of displacement. Perpetrator displacement is likely to start later (though not necessarily significantly so) and last longer. New offenders may replace old offenders years later. These issues suggest that Offender replacement might be better treated as a separate and distinct adjustment to prevention.

This might occur if one (or one type) of offender were removed and replaced by another type of offender.

Displacement, accordingly, is an adaptive response by actual or potential offenders or populations of offenders to crime prevention. Displacement refers to the shift of crime either in terms of space, time or type of offending from the original targets of crime prevention interventions (Reppetto, 1976). While displacement is often seen as a negative consequence of focused crime prevention efforts, harnessing the displacement phenomenon may benefit the community. For example, it may be desirable to move prostitutes from an area near a local school, or shift the time of prostitution later into the night when younger people or commuters are less likely to be present. In turn, if offenders can be displaced from more to less violent crime, the community may benefit. Nonetheless, if displacement is an inevitable result of situational prevention, then the utility of place-based and other focused crime prevention approaches would be limited.

Challenges to Traditional Concern with Displacement Outcomes

Based on assumptions about the large number of crime opportunities available in modern societies, and the highly motivated nature of many offenders, crime prevention scholars have traditionally assumed that most of the crime control benefits of situational prevention strategies would be lost due to displacement. Some early studies of displacement appeared to support this position (e.g. Chaiken, Lawless, and Stevenson, 1974; Mayhew et al., 1976; Lateef, 1974; Press, 1971; Tyrpak, 1975). However, careful review of these findings as well as a series of recent studies of displacement in the 1980s and 90s has led to agreement that displacement of crime prevention benefits is seldom total and often inconsequential (Barr and Pease, 1990; Clarke, 1992; Eck, 1993; Gabor, 1990; Hesseling, 1994).

Evidence suggesting that displacement is much less of a problem than had originally been assumed can be understood only if we abandon simplistic assumptions about opportunity and crime that have been predominant among crime prevention scholars. The idea that criminal opportunities are indiscriminately spread through urban areas has been challenged by a series of studies showing that crime is concentrated in time and space (Brantingham and Brantingham, 1981; Sherman et al., 1989; Weisburd et al., 1992; Weisburd and Green, 1994). Moreover, criminal opportunities are differentially distributed, both in terms of the benefits that they offer and the ease with which such opportunities can be seized.

In one study of situational measures used to prevent bank robberies, for example, little displacement was noted to other types of targets (convenience stores and gas stations) primarily because they did not offer enough financial reward for the criminal gangs that had been targeting the banks (Clarke et al., 1991). Using the example of homes and cars, Clarke (1995: 106) suggests that what appears at first glance as an endless quantity of criminal opportunities, may be bounded both by issues of guardianship and significant variation in the value of goods that can be stolen (see also Hesseling, 1994).

The portrait of offenders as driven to criminality has begun to be replaced by one that recognizes the situational, often serendipitous, character of much offending (Cornish and Clarke, 1986; Weisburd and Waring, 2001). Even for crimes that have been assumed most vulnerable to displacement effects, there is evidence that situational characteristics may lead to a dampening of displacement impacts. For example, an evaluation of a crackdown on prostitution in Finsbury Park, London, Matthews (1990) found little evidence of displacement. He explains this fact by noting that the women involved were not strongly committed to prostitution, but looked at the targeted locations as an easy area from which to solicit.

Perhaps the strongest evidence against the assumption of immediate spatial displacement has come from recent studies of focused interventions at crime hot spots. In the Jersey City Drug Market Analysis Experiment (Weisburd and Green, 1995a) for example, displacement within two block areas around each hot spot was measured. No significant displacement of crime or disorder calls was found. These findings were replicated in a series of other hot spots experiments including the New Jersey Violent Crime Places experiment (Braga et al., 1999), the Beat Health study (Green Mazerolle and Roehl, 1998), and the Kansas City Gun Project (Sherman and Rogan, 1995). Only Hope (1994) reports direct displacement of crime as a result of a focused hot spots intervention, although this occurred only in the area immediate to the treated locations and the displacement effect was much smaller overall than the crime prevention effect.

Further challenge to the displacement hypothesis is found in recent studies that suggest a positive though unanticipated consequence of crime prevention practices. In these cases investigators found improvement in areas close to, but not targeted by, crime prevention efforts (e.g. see Green, 1995; Weisburd and Green, 1995a). Clarke and Weisburd (1994) argue that this phenomenon is general enough to be deserving of a standard term-- "diffusion of crime control benefits." It has been described elsewhere by investigators variously as the "free rider" effect (Miethe, 1991), the "bonus" effect (Sherman, 1990), the "halo" effect (Scherdin, 1986), or the "multiplier effect" (Chaiken, et al., 1974). In essence, diffusion is the reverse of displacement. It refers to the diffusion of crime control benefits to contexts that were not the primary focus of crime prevention initiatives. Diffusion has now been documented in crime prevention strategies as diverse as police crackdowns (e.g. Sherman, 1990; Weisburd and Green, 1995a), book protection systems (e.g. Scherdin, 1986), electronic surveillance (e.g. Poyner and Webb, 1987), and enforcement of civil regulations at nuisance locations (e.g. Green, 1996).

Limitations of Past Research on Displacement

Since 1990 there have been three main reviews of empirical studies that report on displacement: Barr and Pease (1990); Eck (1993); and Hesseling (1994) – unfortunately, to date there have not been similar reviews of diffusion. The three reviews vary in their comprehensiveness. Barr and Pease restricted their review to studies from the United Kingdom. Eck reviewed 33 studies from the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, and other countries printed in English. Hesseling examined 55 studies from North America, Europe and other areas printed in English or Dutch. All three reviews arrived at three basic conclusions. First, there is little evidence of crime prevention strategies that displaced as much crime as was prevented (displacement equal to 100%). Second, displacement, when it occurs, is usually less than the amount of crime prevented (displacement less than 100% but greater than 0%). And third, for crime prevention evaluations that reported on displacement, the most common finding was that there was no evidence of displacement (displacement equal to 0%). In sum, most studies found no, or negligible, displacement of crime.

These results must be taken with three important caveats. First, the amount of displacement depends, in part, on the type of intervention being used. For example, Hesseling (1994) suggests that target hardening may displace more crime than access control. Second, the amount of displacement depends, in part, on the crime or disorder being prevented. Eck (1993) suggests that drug dealing may be more likely to displace than other forms of crime (though see Weisburd and Green, 1995b for the opposite view) and that certain forms of drug markets are particularly susceptible to displacement.

Most important, however, because the studies did not set out to examine displacement, it was rare for the evaluators to be able to use a methodologically sound research design for

detecting it. This is the case in part because researchers must make decisions about the allocation of scarce research funds and resources. If, for example, a researcher is unsure about the direct crime control benefits of a program, it makes sense to invest in assessing the direct target effects rather than outcomes that are important only if a target effect is found. As Sherman and Weisburd (1995) wrote in describing their decision not to measure displacement in the Minneapolis Hot Spots Experiment, the first task is often to show that a program can have the intended impact upon the intended spatial area:

> "The main argument against directing extra resources to the hot spots is that it would simply displace crime problems from one address to another without achieving any overall or lasting reduction in crime. The premise of this argument is that a fixed supply of criminals is seeking outlets for the fixed number of crimes they are predestined to commit. Although that argument may fit some public drug markets, it does not fit all crime or even all vice....In any case, displacement is merely a rival theory explaining *why* crime declines at a specific hot spot, if it declines. The first step is to see whether crime can be reduced at those spots at all, with a research design capable of giving a fair answer to that question." (1995: 629)

Even if resources are available for measuring both direct effects and displacement and diffusion effects, a research design optimal for measuring direct program effects will often be a weak design for measuring displacement and diffusion. For example, Sherman and Weisburd (1995) designed their study with the idea of having a high level of statistical power for detecting the effects of police patrol at targeted locations. However, the sites that provided enough activity to ensure a high enough base rate for the study were often surrounded by high crime areas. Weisburd and Green (1995a) demonstrate that potential displacement in the Minneapolis Hot Spots Experiment was extremely difficult to identify using conventional measurement techniques. While a statistically significant direct program impact was found, in any particular hot spot the actual change in the number of crimes was relatively small. At the same time, the

areas immediately surrounding the hot spots often included large numbers of crimes. Detecting displacement in such cases is a bit like looking for a needle in a haystack.

These problems have been brought up in the past. When first describing the problem of displacement, Reppetto (1976) states, "…to date, no concerted attempts appear to have been made to forecast the forms and dimensions of the displacement problem, this topic seems ripe for comprehensive and quantitative research" (1976:68). Though we have reason to speculate that displacement is not as inevitable as he believes, the type of study he described is still lacking. The consequence is that we cannot address the most basic questions police and community members have about displacement and how they can avoid it. We have even more limited knowledge about the potential for diffusion of crime control benefits, and how communities might take advantage of this phenomenon. Now that we have ample evidence of the effectiveness of spatially focused crime prevention efforts at hot spots (Skogan and Frydl, 2004; Weisburd and Eck, 2004), it is clearly important that we conduct direct study of displacement and diffusion in targeted areas, or hot spots.

Conclusions

In the rest of our report we present the results of a direct study of displacement and diffusion. It is the first direct study of displacement and diffusion that we know of, and as we report in the following chapters, we encountered a number of barriers in trying to provide a comprehensive portrait of the displacement and diffusion processes. Nonetheless, we think our study provides persuasive evidence of the salience of focused crime prevention efforts. Using a controlled research design, and drawing upon a series of data collection efforts, we find little evidence of immediate spatial displacement, while there appears to be strong diffusion of benefits effects to areas surrounding targeted locations. At the same time, our study suggests

that other types of displacement are more likely, and that there is a hierarchy of displacement choices. Our study also suggests that traditional measures of crime may miss significant elements of the displacement and diffusion phenomenon. In the following chapters we describe in detail our research design, data collection methods, and what we learned about displacement and diffusion from each of our methods.

Chapter 2: Study Site Selection and Description

The purpose of this study was to examine crime displacement and diffusion of benefits within a controlled context in Jersey City, New Jersey. Two study sites were selected based on the high volume of crime and the type of crime problem at the site and surrounding areas. The sites were selected carefully to allow for accurate measurement of any displacement or diffusion effects. A team of policing experts provided guidance in identifying the final mix of strategies and target areas. Before describing the specific methodology used to select the target and catchment areas, it is first necessary to provide a brief description of Jersey City as a whole.

Description of Jersey City

The study was conducted in Jersey City, which is the second largest city in New Jersey, after Newark. According to the 2000 Census, the city has a population of 240,055 and contains 14.87 square miles of land. Jersey City is a densely-populated urban center that lies on a peninsula between the Hudson and Hackensack rivers in northeastern New Jersey. New York City is located directly across the Hudson River to the east. The Statue of Liberty National Monument is situated in both Jersey City and New York Harbor.

Jersey City is home to a predominantly working-class population. Renters occupy 68 percent of all households in the city; owners occupy 27 percent of households; and 5 percent of households are vacant. The median price of a single family home in Jersey City is $127,700 – less than half that of New York City. Three out of ten residents are foreign born. In terms of ethnic composition, 33 percent of residents are white, 28 percent of residents are black, 19 percent of residents are Asian, and 28 percent of residents are Hispanic[4].

[4] The Hispanic category in the 2000 Census is not a mutually exclusive race category; rather, it includes people of all races who define themselves as Hispanic in origin.

Jersey City has experienced rapid economic growth in its downtown and central business district in recent years. The strong economy during the 1990s prompted Wall Street investors and large corporations to expand their investments across the Hudson River. For example, three major hotel corporations (e.g., Marriott, Doubletree and Hyatt Regency) finished construction in the Newport Pavonia area in the past decade. The Jersey City Economic Development Corporation, a private non-profit agency, was created in the 1980s to stimulate commercial and industrial growth.

While the downtown and Newport Pavonia areas of Jersey City have been gentrified, the city is still burdened by high levels of unemployment, poverty and low-income housing. The 2000 Census shows that 11 percent of residents are unemployed and 18 percent of residents live below the poverty line. The poverty rate is 35 percent among female-headed households. Many of these impoverished residents live in the 11 public housing sites located throughout the city. Two divergent economic trends are apparent: mobility for the city as a whole (the median family income grew by $16,267 from 1980 to 1990), while a substantial number of urban residents are still disadvantaged and economically isolated.

The crime rates in Jersey City have followed national trends. During the 1990s violent crimes declined across all major categories. For example, homicides dropped from 16 to 7 incidents per 100,000 residents from 1994 to 1997. In the same period, assaults dropped from 848 to 224 per 100,000 residents. The Jersey Journal reported in 2000 that index crimes were at a 28-year low. However, the news media also noted that drug crimes continue to flourish in Jersey City. The city is ranked higher in per capita drug arrests than Cincinnati, Baltimore, Newark, Tampa, and New York City – all among the top 10 cities for drug arrests.

Selecting Crime Sites and Police Strategies

We assembled a team of policing experts to assist in identifying crime sites and police strategies that were optimal for studying displacement and diffusion. The team included some of the leading scholars and practitioners with expertise in community and problem-oriented approaches to policing. The participants who served on this "strategy review team" were Ronald Clarke, Herman Goldstein, Stephen Mastrofski and Jerome Skolnick. During a series of meetings, various high-crime areas of Jersey City were assessed using a number of quantitative and qualitative variables in order to select the most appropriate target and control areas. Some of these measures included crime maps created from crime incidence data, police calls for service data, and observations of potential sites. It was then decided to choose three sites, one for drugs and violent crime, one for prostitution and one for burglary.

The strategy review team originally recommended studying different crime problems because the nature and likelihood of displacement and diffusion may be influenced by how crimes are carried out in a particular setting. For example, predatory offenders (e.g., burglars) who actively search for suitable targets may be more willing to displace to a different neighborhood than offenders who work in an illegal market and depend on regular customers (e.g., drug dealers). In addition, crimes were identified that were thought to be well suited to measure the effects of displacement. Accordingly, crimes were chosen that involved income generation (e.g. drugs or prostitution), with the reasonable assumption that offenders might continue committing theses crimes for financial needs, regardless of police presence.

A number of additional criteria were established for identifying crime sites: 1) the sites would contain sufficient levels of crime and disorder to allow for accurate measurement of displacement and diffusion; 2) they would be isolated from other potentially confounding crime

prevention programs and police operations; and 3) the areas surrounding the sites would contain other potential crime targets so that displacement and diffusion effects could be detected. In regard to baseline levels of crime, we sought to identify sites that consistently showed high levels of activity. This would allow for a more sensitive, statistically powerful research design (see Lipsey, 1990; Weisburd and Green, 1995b). The larger the number of possible crimes that can be deterred, the greater the amount of displacement that can be expected. Nonetheless, it was decided to exclude target areas in which crime in surrounding areas was so high that it would make it more difficult to detect displacement - like trying to find a needle in a haystack.

Twenty locations were identified as possible sites based on the above criteria. Police officers from the Jersey City Police Department provided more detailed information about the crime problems in these sites, which was used to narrow this list down to 12 suitable sites.[5] In narrowing this list down to three, the density of crimes in the target areas and surrounding catchment areas was a major consideration. The research staff used calls for service and crime incident data to create kernel density maps of each site. The maps were used to compare the degree of clustering in the target areas, as well as the three-block radius around the target areas. The strategy review team also discussed the size and location of the prospective crime sites. It was seen as beneficial for the target areas to be geographically small but containing a high concentration of activity, as larger target areas would require the police department to harness more resources into the intervention strategies in order to achieve a sufficient level of intensity. Thus, selecting small target areas was seen as a protection against implementation failure. The strategy review team also tried to space out the locations' target areas to prevent strategies carried out at one target area from contaminating the other target area.

[5] See Appendix D for a list of potential sites, as well as a list of the 12 the list was narrowed down to, and Appendix E for the completed check sheets used to assess the sites

Using this data, three sites were selected. Two of these sites, representing drugs and violent crime problems, and prostitution are described below. A third burglary site was originally selected but then excluded from the study because our observations suggested that there was weak and inconsistent implementation of the crime control strategies in the identified target area. More generally, it should be noted that the burglary site included a very diffuse target area from the outset of the study. This was the case because we found that burglary in contrast to prostitution, or drugs and violent crime, did not evidence a stable hot spot pattern. Rather, there appeared to be short bursts of burglary activity on specific blocks followed by movement to adjacent blocks or areas. This led to the definition of a "burglary hot spot" as including a much larger area than the other types of hot spots examined in the study. This appeared to hinder the police department's ability to focus crime control resources.

Defining Catchment Displacement and Diffusion Areas

An important part of our site selection process was to identify sites that had potential for displacement or diffusion of crime to areas nearby the targeted sites. This meant that a target site could not be bounded for example by a waterway or other physical obstruction to displacement or diffusion. It also meant that target sites must be surrounded by areas that provided potential for offending behavior. The distinction between the target and catchment areas was not a scientific one, but was developed in discussions with the Jersey City Police Department and especially Co-Principal Investigator, Deputy Chief (and later Chief of Police) Frank Gajewski.

The target areas were defined both with the idea of identifying a natural end to the area of most serious offending, but also with the purpose of creating a clear boundary for the activities of the police (see Chapter 4). Whatever the absolute boundary of a problem area, the borders of the target area were to define the extent of the interventions brought by the program. Once the

target area was defined in turn, it was necessary to create a limit for the observation of possible spatial displacement or diffusion. We decided to include a catchment area for the study of at least two city blocks around each of the targeted areas. The assumption here was that displacement and diffusion would most likely be evidenced in these locations which were both close to the targeted sites and offered new potential opportunities for continued criminal involvement. To allow us to distinguish between movement to a block immediately adjacent to the target area and one more distant, we divided the catchment area into an area immediately next to the target area (1st catchment area) and an area more removed (2nd catchment area).

Storms Avenue: Violent Crime and Drug Site

A team of researchers carried out systematic observations to examine the physical layout of this site. The site encompasses a densely populated, urban neighborhood. Half of the 96 buildings in the target area were three-story structures with a business or agency on the ground floor and apartment units on the upper floors. The majority of these commercial establishments were located on Bergen Avenue, which borders the western edge the target area. The eastern side of the target area consisted of multi-family dwellings and a large number of vacant lots and abandoned buildings. Storms Avenue and Reed Street are located to the east of Bergen Avenue. Both streets exhibited signs of physical decay (such as burned out buildings, graffiti, broken glass and drug paraphernalia) at the outset of the study and both were one-way streets. Monticello Avenue is located on the eastern border of the target area and intersects Storms Avenue and Reed Street to the west. The drug markets on these three streets joined together at the intersection of Storms and Monticello Avenues, which made it one of the most violent places in the city. For a visual representation of the violent crime/drug site see Figure 2.1.

Figure 2.1



The area around Storms Avenues has a long history of violent crime and drug activity. It is an open-air drug market area that has been resistant to traditional police crackdowns. During the Drug Market Analysis Program in 1990 the area accounted for five of the 56 drug markets identified in Jersey City (Weisburd and Green, 1995a). In 1993, a study designed to solve problems at violent crime locations also identified this area as containing five of the most violent places in the city (Braga et al., 1999). The target area chosen contains the intersection of Storms Avenue and Monticello Avenue and two adjacent blocks.

We studied the magnitude of the drug problem at the Storms Avenue site using official police data (1997-1998) from the Jersey City CAD system. In 1997, the police department recorded 307 calls for service relating to narcotics activity from 71 addresses in the target area. Arrest reports on offenders who were apprehended in the target area provided details about the arrestees and the crimes for which they were charged. According to arrest reports on drug offenders taken into custody between January 1, 1998 and April 1, 1998, 24 people were arrested for possession of a controlled dangerous substance, and in no case was an offender arrested more than one time. This indicates that a wide range of individuals sold or purchased drugs in the target area, rather than a small group of active offenders.

The police found a large quantity of drugs (e.g., 53 vials of crack cocaine) on two individuals, which suggests that they were more actively involved in the drug trade or more careless about stashing their product than the other offenders. About two-thirds of the arrestees were in possession of more than three vials or bags and therefore charged with intent to distribute. The fact that so few arrestees were caught with a small quantity of drugs could mean that police in the target area were focusing on dealers more than customers. The police confiscated crack or powder cocaine in the vast majority (92 percent) of arrests. Only a few offenders were arrested for possession of marijuana and heroin. The drug-related arrests at this site occurred mostly between 4:00 p.m. and 2:00 a.m.

Cornelison Avenue: Prostitution Site

Cornelison Avenue, a five-block street in a run-down industrial area on the **{**tc "Cornelison Avenue, a five-block street in a run-down industrial area on the " \l 2**}**western edge of Jersey City was chosen as the prostitution target site. Cornelison Avenue was once an area of thriving businesses, industrial warehouses and homes, and was the location of stables for the

Jersey City Police Department's mounted patrols. Now, except for six houses on Westervelt on the street's southern end and Hogar CREA, a substance abuse treatment center at the northern end near Fairmount Avenue, the street is all but abandoned. The street is within one mile of three of the city's largest public housing projects: Booker T. Apartments, Lafayette Gardens and Montgomery Houses. For a visual representation of the prostitution site see Figure 2.2 below.

Figure 2.2



The Cornelison Avenue area has a history of prostitution activity dating back a decade. Given that the area is a largely abandoned industrial area, the prostitutes, their johns and some hangers-on appear to be the only inhabitants-except for the few residents who live on the single residential street noted above. The traffic appears to be primarily johns who circle around the area. Observations of the area revealed that many of the prostitutes are drug addicts and long-time residents of the area who live in apartment buildings or public housing. The prostitutes in this area also work out in the open and didn't appear to take many precautions to avoid police detection at the outset of the study, making the area an ideal location to implement a prostitution-focused police intervention.

During a site selection observation of the Cornelison Avenue area, prostitutes strolled up and down the street looking or waving at cars, and stood on specific corners making eye contact with potential customers and waving at them. Researchers counted six prostitutes working in the area. They appeared one by one from 4:40 to 6 p.m. All of them were African American, about half appeared to be under the influence of drugs and most appeared to be adults rather than teens, and some appeared to be fairly haggard looking. There also appeared to be male hangers-on, including one who walked one of the women out of the area after about an hour. One police informant said the women go back and forth between nearby drug markets and the prostitution site to do drugs and earn more money for drugs. Other police informants said the women are so desperate because of their addictions that they appear not to take precautions to avoid detection from the police. In fact, on one occasion, plain-clothes police in an unmarked car were solicited: the prostitutes were arrested.

Summary

After carefully deciding what criteria should be used to select the sites, and narrowing down the list of areas that possibly met these criteria, it became clear that the sites outlined above were the best choices for our project. From the descriptions of the selected sites above, it is easy to see that they offered the concentration of specific types of crime in a small area, as required by our first criterion. Further analysis showed that they also met our last two criteria; they offered bordering areas with suitable targets that could be used as catchment areas to measure any spatial displacement effects, and they were isolated from other high crime areas. The small areas, and specific crime types, were an aid in implementing an intervention that would have a strong impact. The isolation, combined with similar neighboring areas to use as controls to "catch" any displacement or diffusion effects made these sites ideal for our study.

Chapter 3: Data Collection

It was important in our initial design of this project to include a number of data sources that when placed together would give us a longitudinal image of crime and disorder events in each geographic area in our study design. By comparing this image over time within and across the geographic areas, displacement of crime and diffusion of crime control benefits would be measured. As a result, multiple measures were incorporated into the study in the hopes of triangulating findings and overcoming weaknesses in accurately measuring crime displacement and diffusion in official data sources.

Additionally, using different data sources allowed us to assess which type of data is best able to evaluate crime prevention programs while accounting for any displacement of crime and/or diffusion of crime control benefits. This assessment can be found in the conclusion of this report. Measures included systematic social and physical observations of street segments; arrestee interviews and ethnographic field work; phone interviews of residents; and official data from the police department. In this chapter we review each of these data sources; including, the methodology for their collection, the measures incorporated in the data sources, the barriers and problems encountered while collecting the data, and finally a discussion of the sample collected.

I. Study Design & Unit of Analysis

As described in the previous chapter, Jersey City Police Department calls for service data and observations of potential sites were used to select two specific geographic areas for police interventions; one focusing on prostitution and the other on drugs and violent crime.[6] A Geographic Information System (GIS) was used to define the boundaries for these two target areas as well as two catchment areas outside of each target area. Each of these areas was subject

[6] As mentioned in the previous chapter, a burglary site was also selected, but later discarded from the analysis, as the intervention was found to not be implemented in a uniform manner.

to the multiple types of data collection used in the study; however, the unit of analysis may be slightly different dependent on the data source.

For a number of the data sources, the primary unit of analysis is a street segment with its corresponding intersections nested within the specific geographic areas (target area, catchment area 1, or catchment area 2). A street segment was defined as a block face, including both sides of a street, from one intersection to the next. This included all residential and commercial addresses and public services (i.e., municipal buildings) on both sides of the street. Although most street segments in the study sites were shorter than .10 miles, some street segments, particularly in residential areas, were considerably longer. As it is more difficult to conduct accurate physical and social observations on longer segments we decided to make the street segments a standard length, ranging from .02 to .09 miles. Overall, 58 street segments were .10 miles or longer and thus divided into two segments, while three street segments were combined with a bordering street segment because they were shorter than .02 miles. We realize that each street segment contains one or more intersections, which join each segment to other street segments. It was important to include events falling on intersections, but we had to be careful not to measure the events on the intersections more than once. For each data source we were careful to measure up to the corner of the street segment and not capture events around the corner, which would be in a separate street segment. We will elaborate further on how the intersections were captured within each specific data type. To summarize, Table 3.1 illustrates the number of street segments for each geographic area in the study.

Table 3.1 Street Segments by Research Site and Area

Research Site	Number of Street Segments	Average Length in Miles	Divided Segments (.10 Miles or Longer)
Violent crime/Drug Site	81	.072	20 (25%)
Target Area	12	.071	2 (17%)
Catchment Area 1	34	.071	5 (15%)
Catchment Area 2	35	.074	13 (37%)
Prostitution Site	88	.069	32 (36%)
Target Area	21	.067	6 (29%)
Catchment Area 1	21	.073	9 (43%)
Catchment Area 2	46	.068	17 (37%)

Although the street segment was used to generalize findings to the geographic area some data sources used smaller unites of analysis. For instance, resident interviews involved interviewing a specific number of randomly chosen households on each segment. The results were analyzed at the individual level, which were aggregated to the area, target area or catchment areas. The exact specifics of each data collection methodology will be elaborated on when discussing each data source.

II. Social Observations

Social observations formed a key measure for assessing displacement and diffusion in our study. Both study sites included a good deal of street level activity that was directly related to the crime problems examined. This was especially the case for the Cornelison Avenue prostitution site which was chosen because of the predominance of street level prostitution activity. But it was also true of the Storms Avenue site which included three large open air drug markets and a good deal of street level disorder. We assumed at the outset that a direct measure

of these activities based on systematic social observations would provide a more valid estimate of changes in these behaviors than official police data.

The social observation procedure was designed to record the location, time and duration of individuals involved in specific social disorder and/or crime-related activities occurring in the research sites. We viewed each observation as a snapshot of the social life on a street segment. The observations also offer an opportunity to measure many activities that are not represented in official data as many crimes, and especially social disorder behaviors, are often not reported to the police.

The items on the social observation instrument consisted of criminal activities, social disorders and external conditions (see Table 3.2). These behaviors and crimes were selected as they are the types of social disorder most often described in relevant literature and the types of crime focused on by the police interventions. "External conditions" were also recorded with the assumption that they would have an impact on street level behavior on a given day.

Table 3.2 Social Observation Items

Social Disorders	Criminal Activities	External Conditions
Verbal disorder	Physical assault	Date and time
Loud dispute	Drug activity	Automobile traffic
Panhandling	• Soliciting	Pedestrians
Drinking alcohol	• Transactions	Quality of lighting
Person down	• Drug use	Temperature
Loud music or noise	Prostitution	Weather conditions
Gambling	• Loitering	Reactivity
Unattended dogs	• Soliciting	Police patrols
	• Pick-ups	
	Burglary or theft	
	Vandalism	

The researchers conducted social observations in the Storms Avenue and Cornelison Avenue sites, using the street segment as the unit of analysis. Observers were instructed to only record events to their corner of the intersection. If observers witnessed an event around the corner they would not record the information because it was officially considered part of another street segment. We developed a social observation instrument and codebook (see Appendices F and G respectively), drawing from observation methods used during the Minneapolis hotspots experiment (Sherman and Weisburd, 1995), and check sheets used to catalogue social behavior in clinical settings (Hinde, 1973; Kazdin, 1982). We conducted nine waves of social observations in the drug/violent crime site: one wave before the intervention, six waves during the intervention and two waves after the intervention. We also completed nine waves of observations in the prostitution site: one wave before the intervention, seven waves during the intervention period and one wave after the intervention.

Each wave of social observations was conducted over a seven-day period. The social observation schedule for the violent crime/drug site began on the first day of each month and finished on the seventh, while the social observation schedule for the prostitution site began on the twelfth day of each month and finished on the eighteenth[7]. Any social observations that were not completed during the regular schedule, because of weather conditions or police activities that prevented observers from going into the sites, were made up in the interim period before the next wave. About three percent (N=199) of all social observations were dealt with in this manner[8].

[7] The first two waves of social observations in the violent crime/drug site were scheduled a few days earlier on the 28th. We did this to guard against the possibility of not completing the first wave before the intervention period. We also wanted to provide more time for the police to set up special operations scheduled early in the month. As well in both sites, due to the start dates of the interventions the first few waves had slightly different start and end dates than the remaining waves.

[8] An effort was made to conduct makeup observations at the same time and day of the week as they were originally scheduled.

The social observations were conducted in 20-minute periods. Each 20-minute period was considered one social observation. Fifty-two observations were scheduled in a day and 364 observations were scheduled in a wave. Our researchers completed a total of 3,063 observations in the violent crime/drug site and 3,066 observations in the prostitution site.[9] We thought it was critical to schedule the social observations in a way that optimized our ability to detect changes in the target area at different times of day. Accordingly, we developed a schedule in which one street segment in the target area was randomly selected for observation every hour between 10:00 a.m. and 2:00 a.m.[10] It was also necessary to schedule enough observation time in the catchment areas to measure possible spatial displacement and diffusion effects. One street segment in each catchment area was randomly selected for observation every hour between 12:00 noon and 12:00 midnight, and a second street segment in each catchment area was randomly selected for observation every hour between 4:00 p.m. and 10:00 p.m. as these hours were found to have overall higher levels of crime according to official data. Table 3.3 illustrates the number of social observations scheduled per hour in the treatment and catchment areas of the research sites.

[9] It is important to note that the one wave post intervention in the prostitution site and the one wave pre-intervention in the violent crime/drug site had relatively fewer numbers of observations than the other waves. For instance, in the target area of the prostitution site there were 97 observations in the pre-intervention wave, 112 in the first wave into the intervention, above 100 during all of the intervention waves, and only 90 in the post-intervention wave. In the target area of the violent crime/drug site there were 83 observations in the pre-intervention wave and 114 observations in the first wave into the intervention, with the observations wavering around 100 though the remaining waves.

[10] This is the timeframe in which most crime incidents are reported to the Jersey City Police Department. For example, 85 percent of assaults, 92 percent of drug crimes and 79 percent of prostitution crimes were reported to the police between 10:00 a.m. and 2:00 a.m. according to calls for service for the years 1996 through 2000.

Table 3.3 Number of Social Observations per Hour

	10AM	11AM	12PM	1 PM	2 PM	3 PM	4 PM	5 PM	6 PM	7 PM	8 PM	9 PM	10PM	11PM	12AM	1AM
Target Area	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Catchment Area 1			1	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	1		
Catchment Area 2			1	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	1		

Social Observation Training and Data Collection Procedures

We used SPSS to randomly select street segments for all observation time slots prior to the first wave of data collection. The street segments were grouped into four observation shifts which were then assigned to individual observers. The 12 observers were trained for two weeks before they were assigned observation shifts. The first week of training consisted of a workshop in which the observers were instructed how to use the social observation instrument and codebook. We hired consultants who had expertise in observing street-level activities to assist with the workshop. For instance, the project manager of the Minneapolis hotspots experiment discussed methods for observing street-level activities and problems that observers may experience in the field. Jersey City narcotics officers were consulted on how to detect various types of drug transactions and soliciting behavior (i.e., what to look for).

The second week of training was conducted on the street. The observers were grouped into pairs and three practice shifts were assigned to each pair. Each pair of observers worked on their assigned shifts together, but they did not consult each other during the 20-minute observation periods. They were allowed to compare code sheets between observation periods. All coding inconsistencies in the field were discussed during staff meetings. The field training enabled us to develop procedures for coding ambiguous or confusing situations. Once these procedures were established, we tested the observers using 43 training vignettes (see Appendix

H). The test scores gave us an indication of which observers required more field training and which ones could handle the more difficult shift assignments (see Appendix I).

The observation procedure can be broken down into three stages, which were repeated for every observation period on a shift: 1) traveling to the street segment and positioning, 2) documenting external conditions and 3) observing social disorders and criminal activities.

Researchers were trained to conduct their shift in a systematic fashion. During the first stage of observation, the researcher used a map to locate all of the street segments on his or her schedule and identified the fastest routes for traveling to each location. The researcher was expected to arrive at the first segment on the shift five minutes before the observation was scheduled to begin. The researcher then moved into position at the epicenter of the street segment, which was the location where the greatest amount of social activity could be clearly observed. In residential areas, a building entrance (i.e., staircase) or public bench near the middle of the street segment was often chosen as the epicenter. In commercial areas, where the street segments were shorter, the epicenter was usually not located in the middle of the street segment. Frequently, most of the social activity on a commercial street segment was clustered near a specific corner or storefront where groups of people loitered or where pedestrian traffic flowed. In this situation, the epicenter was located close to where the social activity was concentrated, but not so close that the observation would elicit some type of reaction. The epicenter of each street segment was the same location for all of the observers. The researchers did not move away from this spot during an observation unless something was obstructing their view or they felt as if their personal well being was threatened or endangered, in which case they were instructed to leave the area immediately and call the project director from a safe location.

The second stage of observation involved taking note of external conditions. This was done after the observer was situated at the epicenter of the street segment, just before the observation period. External conditions, such as the weather, time of day and pedestrian traffic, may deter or facilitate street level activities. This is particularly the case in drug markets and prostitution hot spots where the offenders operate in open-air markets to solicit potential customers. It took about two minutes for the observer to take note of all of the relevant external conditions by completing 14 nominal items on the observation instrument.

Once the external conditions were documented, the researcher began observing social disorders and criminal activities on the street segment. The check sheet on page two of the social observation instrument was designed for this purpose (see Appendix F). The observer used a digital watch to monitor how much time passed, and to record the times when individual events began and ended. When the observer first noticed an event taking place, he or she recorded the time in the "event begins" column and then placed a check in the column indicating the type of social activity being observed[11]. The observer recorded the number of people engaged in the activity in the "# of people" column. The time was noted in the "event ends" column when the person(s) discontinued the activity or traveled off the street segment, or when the observation period ended. The observer used behavioral criteria in the codebook in determining when a particular type of social activity was taking place and how it should be coded. The observer strictly avoided recording any events that were confusing enough to require guesswork.

A number of precautions were taken to ensure the safety and well being of the observers. The observers were trained to be as unobtrusive as possible, but not deceptive. They did not

[11] While most events involve one social activity, occasionally an event will involve two or more activities, such as when a person is observed drinking alcohol in public and panhandling at the same time. In these situations, the observer would place a check in two columns indicating both social activities, which resulted in the first primary database with the individual involved in the social activity as the unit of analysis.

interact with citizens unless they were asked a question or spoken to directly. Because 6,129 observations were conducted over nine months, many citizens became familiar with the observers' presence; the observers became part of the urban landscape. The observers were often mistaken for social workers or census officials. It did not take long for prostitutes and drug dealers to realize that the observers did not work for the police department. While it was impossible to remove all reactivity, many offenders in the study sites became assured over time that the observers would not get in their way. When the observers were asked what they were doing, they explained to the citizens that they were counting social activities for a study, and then showed the citizen a copy of the social observation check sheet.

It was important that the police did not react to observers on the street in a way that would call attention to them or disrupt existing patterns of street-level activity. As a precaution, the Police Chief forewarned the study director of specific times and locations of special operations (e.g., reverse stings, raids and buy-busts) scheduled in the target areas. All observations scheduled at the same time and place as special operations were postponed one week to prevent interference or reactivity. The Police Chief also drafted a letter of understanding about the observers that explained their role in the research sites, which was given to police officers who questioned or became suspicious of the observers' presence on the street.

III. Physical Observations

In recent years, criminologists and practitioners have become more concerned with the physical conditions of crime ridden areas. An important source for this attention was a seminal article written in the 1982 by James Q. Wilson and George Kelling which suggested that neighborhoods that allowed social and physical disorder to go unchecked gave a signal to offenders that law abiding citizens did not care. "Broken windows" became a catch word for a

whole series of unchecked incivilities that paved the way for neighborhood disintegration. Because of the growing importance of physical characteristics of neighborhoods in discussion of crime problems we sought to measure such changes directly. We also wanted to use observations of the physical landscape to develop indirect measures of specific crimes and disorder. For example, condoms on the street provided an indirect measure of prostitution activity, and discarded needles an indirect measure of drug use.

Physical observations were conducted on each street segment to assess the level of physical disorder and other environmental variables in each site's target and catchment areas. In order to control for double counts at intersections, the physical observations were conducted to the corners of a street segment. Field researchers systematically observed the physical characteristics of the violent crime/drug and prostitution sites. Because the Jersey City Police Department has conducted physical observations in past studies, such as the NIJ supported Drug Market Analysis Project (Weisburd and Green, 1995a) and an evaluation of problem-oriented policing (POP) in public housing (Green-Mazerolle, Ready, Terrill, and Waring, 2000), we drew from these studies in developing a physical observation instrument and codebook for this project (see Appendices J and K respectively).

The physical observation instrument and codebook we developed contained 40 items pertaining to the street layout, housing conditions, and signs of physical disorder and decline. Our researchers would begin the physical observation by recording the total number of buildings on a street segment. This baseline would be used to calculate the percentage of commercial, residential and public service buildings. Once this baseline was established, abandoned buildings, broken windows, graffiti, and other signs of disrepair were measured using ordinal scales. For example, the number of buildings with structural damage on a street segment was

grouped into one of four categories: 1) less than 10 percent, 2) 10 to 30 percent, 3) 31 to 50 percent or 4) more than 50 percent of all buildings on the street segment. In addition to housing conditions, the instrument also gauged broken glass, litter, drug paraphernalia and used condoms (see Table 3.4).

Table 3.4 Physical Observation Items

Street Layout	Housing Conditions	Disorder & Decline
Number of lanes	Residential or commercial	Abandoned vehicles
One way or two ways	Type of housing or commerce	Used condoms
Quality of lighting	Broken windows	Drug paraphernalia
No trespassing signs	Burned or boarded buildings	Broken glass
Public telephones	Structural damage	Graffiti
Bars or liquor stores	Security gates or windows	Litter or garbage
Bus stations		Vacant lots
Automobile traffic		Grass or shrubbery
Parks or benches		

The physical observations were conducted in three waves: 1) one month before the intervention, 2) after the maximum intervention period (about four months after the first wave) and 3) after the entire intervention (about four months after the second wave). The physical observations were designed to measure changes in the physical environment over time, as well as the relationship between physical disorder and crime displacement. To carry out the physical observations in a systematic manner, it was necessary to divide the sites into equally sized units of analysis. As with most of the data sources, we identified the unit of analysis for the physical observations as the street segment.

The average physical observation took thirty minutes to complete. A team of three field researchers conducted each physical observation. Using the physical observation instrument and

codebook, the researchers observed each street segment at the same time, without consulting with each other. After the researchers finished observing the street segment separately, they compared their responses for each item on the physical observation instrument. If their responses differed on a particular item, they would conduct the observation again, as a group, to determine which response was most accurate. This check for inter-rater reliability allowed them to establish a consensus for contentious items and troublesome areas.

We conducted one physical observation on every street segment in the three separate waves of data collection. Due to a time crunch in collecting the baseline data for the physical observations it was unrealistic to collect all of the physical observations before the start date in the two sites as originally planned. It was decided that collecting the data after the start of the intervention was acceptable under the assumption that physical conditions would have a slight lag in improvement compared to other outcome measures. Approximately 36% of the observations for each site were collected within one to three weeks after the start date of the intervention (38% for the violent crime/drug site and 34% for the prostitution site). To assure that the difficulty with collecting data did not corrupt the findings an analysis was performed with and without the data collected after the start of the intervention and conclusions from the findings were similar. For this reason it was judged that it was acceptable to include the physical observations collected after the start dates in the final analysis. A total of 507 physical observations were conducted during the course of the study: 243 observations in the violent crime/drug site and 264 observations in the prostitution site.

IV. Resident Interview Surveys

A third type of non-police data we collected in the study were resident interviews. A team of research assistants conducted 2,441[12] household surveys during the course of the study: 958 surveys in the violent crime/drug site, 451 surveys in the prostitution site and 1,032 surveys in the burglary site. The household surveys were conducted by telephone in the Center for Crime Prevention Studies at Rutgers University. The household surveys were administered in two waves: one wave before the police interventions and another wave after the intervention period. To ensure that the sample was evenly distributed across all potential displacement areas, we randomly sampled 10 households from each street segment in the study.

The household survey instrument (see Appendix L) was developed after reviewing a wide range of resident surveys and consulting a number of policing scholars.[13] The survey instrument contained 63 questions and took an average of 15 minutes to complete. The telephone surveys were conducted with careful concern for protecting the privacy and confidentiality of the respondents.[14] The survey instrument contained structured and open-ended questions organized in two main sections. The first section included questions relating to the specific crimes targeted by the police in the target areas. The second section examined fear of crime and disorder, as well as the demographic characteristics of the respondents.

A computerized telephone directory (Powerfinder) was used to identify the telephone numbers and addresses of households in the research sites. This directory had been used by the

[12] There were 13 interviews in the prostitution site and 24 interviews in the violent crime/drug site that were conducted after the start data of the intervention. For this reason these interviews were removed from the analysis.

[13] Steven Mastrofski and Roger Parks played an important role in helping us develop the survey instrument by providing community surveys used for a project on policing neighborhoods. Mathematica, Inc. provided assistance in training interviewers and administering telephone interviews. Our dedicated group of research assistants provided critical feedback in making the survey questions precise and conversational.

[14] Special care was taken to protect the confidentiality of households in the sample throughout the data collection and analysis. All research staff signed a privacy certificate agreeing not to divulge any private, project-related information to any person not authorized to have access to such information. Serial numbers were assigned to respondents and all personal identifiers were removed from the dataset prior to analysis.

Police Foundation in previous research and includes all published telephone numbers and a high percentage of unpublished numbers in the United States. It is updated monthly with data from the Direct Marketing Association, National Change of Address (NCOA) reports, credit card companies and warrantee cards of purchase. Using the directory to sample households allowed us to locate the exact addresses of people living in the target and catchment areas. In addition, this approach enabled us to over-sample groups that would have been underrepresented in a non-stratified sample of Jersey City residents (e.g., residents living in target areas). Eligible respondents were identified as the first adult (at least 18 years old) residing in each household available to participate in the survey. We obtained an overall response rate of 72 percent, which is considered "very good" in relation to the 70 percent benchmark set by survey methodologists (see Babbie, 1992; Maxfield and Babbie, 1995).

V. Arrestee Interviews

While social observations provided a measure of street level behavior, and resident interviews a view of the perceptions of citizens, we also wanted to assess how offenders in these areas perceived the changes in police enforcement activities that the project produced. One method we used was to interview offenders who were arrested for targeted crimes in both target areas during the intervention period. Overall, a total of 51 offenders were interviewed from the Storms Avenue target area and 47 offenders from the Cornelison Avenue target area.

Project staff interviewed offenders while they were waiting for trial at the Hudson County Jail. Offenders were chosen to be interviewed from bulletins that were faxed daily to the research office by the Planning and Analysis Unit in Jersey City Police Department. These daily bulletins contained the names and contact information for individuals arrested in the target areas during the previous day. The arrestees who were willing to participate in the jail interviews were

given compensation in the form of a 15-dollar money order. These individuals were interviewed in a private holding cell at the Hudson County Jail on Fridays during the study period (see Appendices M and N for the offender interview instruments). Because we wanted to use the interviews to assess whether the project intervention was recognized by the offenders, and to assess how the interventions influenced them, we only interviewed offenders arrested in the target areas where the increased police presence was focused.

Using the notes on each interview instrument, we developed a systematic approach to categorizing the interviews. After having a basic understanding of the overall content of the interviews, a coding form was generated and placed on each written interview. This form contained a line to place a number for the presence of specific items, such as temporal displacement. Next, a researcher read through each interview carefully while simultaneously marking the coding form when items were found and typing descriptions of specific items of interest into a Microsoft Word document. By placing the information into a Word document, additional patterns emerged. After this work was completed another researcher took the completed interviews, with cover forms and associated word documents, and repeated the process, this time producing an SPSS database to assist in detecting patterns across the interviews.

VI. Report from Independent Ethnographer

We recognized at the outset that interviews with arrested offenders would include an element of bias, in that offenders arrested may not be similar to those who are able to avoid arrest. For this reason we also sought to conduct independent field observations in each of the sites. Because of practical constraints and the difficulty of conducting observations in the violent

crime and drug site (see below), we were in practice only able to collect ethnographic field observations in the Cornelison Avenue prostitution site.

In order to ensure the validity of the ethnographic field observations, it was decided at the outset to have the ethnographer work completely independently of the researchers involved in other data collection efforts. Dr. Regina Brisgone, a Rutgers University graduate student, was employed by the project. She did not work under the direct supervision of project staff. Rather, she was supervised by Professor Mercer Sullivan of Rutgers University, who has extensive ethnographic field work experience. Accordingly, Dr. Brisgone produced an independent report which we draw upon in the work that follows (see Appendix A). The following description of her approach explains how she drew her sample of informants, as well as the specific difficulties that led her to abandon work in the violent crime and drug site, is drawn directly from her report.[15]

"Observations for the most part were in connection with riding around Cornelison to recruit and drop off research subjects on the stroll and environs during the intervention rather than "hanging out" in the target areas. It also included observations – passed along to me -- of my hosts at the HIV outreach agency who were hooked into the network of drug users and prostitutes, and other local outreach persons. This observation strategy was the result of decisions made early on to go with a "host agency" to act as a bridge to this group of research subjects. I did this upon advice of Dr. Mercer Sullivan and based on qualitative literature that suggests using trusted local insiders to gain trust and access to hidden populations, such as offenders and drug users. This was after making headway with informants at the drug site on Storms, and realizing it was going to take a long time to gain trust enough for interviews. In that site I was quizzed often about being a drug enforcement agent; informants were suspicious over my focus on "Storms" and not higher volume areas; and my main informant warned me against trying to recruit the Storms drug dealers at the corner of Monticello because they would laugh, threaten me or try to "mess" with me. In addition, the killing of a drug dealer associated with one of my Storms research subject's in August that occurred at a corner a few blocks away made locals extremely nervous about the police coming down on them. Attempts to interview nearby low-level Monticello dealers resulted in "no shows" and being told to get out by their apparent boss. Bruce Jacobs (1996), in *Crack Dealers and Restrictive Deterrence: Identifying Narcs* encountered similar difficulties with drug dealers and worked for nine months interviewing drug users and hangers on before getting a single dealer to agree to an interview.

[15] For ease of distinguishing our commentary from passages of the ethnographic report, we single spaced sections drawn from Ms. Brisgone's report.

In late August, at the advice of Dr. Sullivan, I switched gears. I elected to seek out local social service agencies to approach the prostitutes on Cornelison Avenue. This was done to get into the field as quickly as possible in light of the impending intervention. On August 6, 1998, in between trying to get Monticello drug dealers to do interviews, I drove to an HIV harm reduction agency, and talked to its director about helping me to recruit prostitutes at the Cornelison site. She agreed, saying such a venture would help her agency reach more of the local prostitute network – especially if I could arrange for stipends. She immediately began the process of getting permission for the joint venture. Stipends were arranged for with the Police Foundation principal investigators. Interviews began on September 3 – delayed a week because events in the site that made the agency wary of allowing me out on the stroll to do interviews. They explained to me that there was an increased police presence on the prostitution site in late August 1998. This was due to a reported homicide of a woman believed to be a prostitute at or near the stroll. They also unhappy about an incident involving police roughing up an HIV outreach worker. Also, my hosts said they had conducted a short survey in conjunction with City Hall with prostitutes earlier in the year and said they often were distracted and stopped the interviews to pursue their clients. My hosts argued that if we could get the women into a quiet office away from the strolls using an incentive (stipend), interviews would be substantially improved. This proved to be correct. Also, the outreach workers simply did not want to be out there on Cornelison for long periods of time. This attitude was tempered with the success of recruiting in the first week of September. Within two weeks, I began accompanying my hosts out to the research site to recruit and observe.

As you can see in Appendix 1 [Appendix A of this report], a timeline of my work activities for the project, there were times when I did not conduct interviews during the study period. These included the American Society of Criminology meetings in November, 1998; a shut-down period in late December, 1998 and into January, 1999 when the host agency moved its offices; and a time in January and February 1999 during which time I shifted to interviews of drug users in response to a request from the principal investigators to help with the drug-assault site. Also there was a period in March 1999 when I became ill and did not conduct interviews. Prior to that time, I typically worked as many hours as I was authorized (about 15-18 per week) and focused on getting as much data as possible in that time period. I worked less in the spring, but have interviews and observations to provide information about the effects of the waning interventions. The Cornelison area became quite devoid of activity at the end of November beginning of December and continued that way through the winter. It became harder to recruit and to find subjects after December, though this was not a universal phenomenon. On February 19, 1999 – the day after a crackdown, a group of four prostitutes were observed on Cornelison; they agreed to interviews. …..Please refer to Appendix 1 (in Appendix A of this report), which provides a schedule of interviews by date for the project and includes absences noted above. With recently acquired knowledge of the actual police "stings," you can see that my interview schedule closely followed the police intervention schedule up to the final sting on February 24, 1999.

In general the interviews and observations chronicle a pattern of high activity at Cornelison prior to the intervention; a chaotic period of crackdowns through the fall; and a gradual lessening of activity in the area late fall early winter. It became more difficult to recruit subjects. The author and her harm reduction agency hosts began to drive around the area more; to stop by subject's homes or calling them if they had their number; to visit hang-out spots; to

use other informants to recruit; and on 6/25/99 they went to the Lafayette public housing projects to recruit on the suggestion of a research subject recruited on the Cornelison stroll."

VII. Official Police Data: Calls for Service

Official police data is often the only data source available to practitioners and researchers when trying to assess the effectiveness of crime prevention activities. However, it is well recognized that official police information is likely to include a good deal of bias both in over and under reporting crime and disorder (Sherman and Weisburd, 1995,; Sherman et al., 1989; and Hope 1994). Because of increased police enforcement activity in the targeted areas we did not think that arrest data would provide an accurate measure of changes in offending behavior. At the same time, there is a long history of using emergency call for service data for assessing crime prevention strategies (e.g. see Weisburd and Green, 1995a; Braga et al., 1999).

Fortunately, for our project, the Jersey City Police Department was one of the first urban police departments in the United States to use computer mapping as a tool in crime control and prevention (Green, Bellucci, and Gajewski, 1997). The Planning and Research Bureau is responsible for archiving emergency calls for service, crime incident reports and arrests. The crime locations are corrected using the computer aided dispatch (CAD) system, which is connected to a centralized MIS system that links the various police data sources. Crime analysts use mapping software (ArcView) to geocode and plot crime data at addresses using geographic mapping files for the entire city. The Planning and Research Bureau provided five years of calls for service data (1996 – 2000) for this study.

The Communications Bureau of the Jersey City Police Department receives the calls for service records information and dispatches police officers to locations where assistance is needed. The call dispatchers are responsible for recording the times when the calls for service are received and dispatched, as well as when the responding officers arrive and depart from the

call locations. The dispatchers also take note of the caller's address, the reason for the call for service and whether a crime is in progress or has resulted in bodily injury. The calls for service data also includes officer-initiated calls in which officer's call in crimes themselves, as well as administrative calls. The police-initiated crime calls are excluded from our analyses of changes in crime and disorder. However, the administrative calls are used as a measure of police presence in the target and catchment areas as an additional way to assess the implementation of the intervention.

We think it important to note that there were specific periods missing from the data provided by the Jersey City Police Department. After checking with the department it was clear that these periods were also missing in their general records, and suggest problems with the Computer-Aided Dispatch (CAD) system. We decided that the loss of these days was not of enough concern to disregard the data altogether. However, we should note that periods including these dates, especially November 22 to December 31st 1998 should be viewed with caution (see Table 3.5).

Table 3.5

Dates Missing
June 15-19, 1998
November 22-30, 1998
December 1-31, 1998
February 24, 1999
May 31, 1999

To begin the analysis the data was cleaned and geocoded to a street center line file supplied by the Jersey City Crime Analysis Unit. The final match rate was respectable with 93% of the data geocoding at an 80-100% match rate, with only 1% matching at less than 80% and only 6% of cases having no match. A large percentage of the unmatched cases did not have street numbers or were specific locations that could not be mapped, including stores and

underpasses. The cases having no match were not included in the analysis because we were unable to determine where these crimes were located. After completing the geocoding process we were able to spatially join a polygon file of each area of the sites (target and catchment areas) to the geocoded calls for service file. One complication was the question of how to handle intersections that bound two or more street segments. In such cases those intersections that fell completely inside a polygon file's area was captured; however, the concern was those intersections that bordered two areas, such as those falling between the target area and catchment area 1. In such cases the intersections were always captured within the inner most polygon, so intersections bordering the target area and catchment area 1 had events that were counted in the target area. Intersections that bordered catchment area 1 and catchment area 2 had events counted in catchment area 1. This process allowed us to identify the calls in our site areas in the database. The final calls for service data were then exported into SPSS where we were able to conduct the remainder of our analyses, which will be explained in further detail in later chapters.

The calls for service database allowed us to examine citizen calls for service, police calls for service (specific crime types), and police administrative calls (including everything from meals to directed patrol activity). It is important to note that 1.4% of the calls for service were not categorized into citizen or police calls, and were excluded from the analysis. Table 3.6 shows the division of the data into police administrative, citizen calls for service, and police calls for service.[16]

[16] These percentages are drawn from data that had a geocoding match rate above 0.

Table 3.6

Call Type	Frequency	Percent
Missing	13,759	1.3
Citizen Crime Calls	872,804	80.8
Police Crime Calls	69,142	6.4
Police Admin Calls	124,132	11.5
Total	1198575	100.0

VIII. Conclusion

In conclusion, there were a number of original and official data sources collected to assesses displacement of crime and diffusion of benefits in our two sites or interest. These different data types (with the exception of the ethnographic field observations) are listed in Table 3.7.

Table 3.7 Summary of Data Collected for Displacement Study

Type of Data	Violent Crime/Drug Site (Waves)	Prostitution Site (Waves)	Total (Waves)
Household Surveys	958 (2)	451 (2)	2,441 (6)
Place Manager Interviews[17]	182 (3)	145 (2)	456 (7)
Social Observations	3,063 (9)	3,066 (9)	6,129 (18)
Physical Observations	243 (3)	264 (3)	507 (6)
Offender Interviews	71 (Weekly)	84 (Weekly)	169 (Weekly)
Official Police Data	1996 – Present	1996 – Present	1996 – Present

[17] Place manager are not used as a data source in the body of this report. However, there is an independent report using this data source and discussing place managers contained in Appendix B.

Chapter 4: Description of the Interventions

The choice of which policing strategies to implement in the target areas was a critical component of the study. In contrast to prior research that had assessed displacement or diffusion, our goal was not to identify new strategies that could impact upon crime or evaluate whether existing strategies "worked." Displacement and diffusion were *not* the secondary interests of our study only to be assessed once we had identified a "treatment" effect. Rather, displacement and diffusion were our primary interests. Accordingly, it was essential that we choose established strategies that would be expected to have strong impacts upon crime and disorder in the target areas. In this chapter we describe how we identified the interventions used in the study and report upon some findings from our data collection that suggest the level of implementation of the interventions during the study period. However, we begin our discussion by describing our efforts to ensure that the treatments would be delivered only in the target areas.

Limiting Interventions to the Target Area

We recognized at the outset that a major threat to our study design was spillover of the interventions into the catchment areas. If such spillover occurred in any appreciable way, the validity of our measurement of displacement and diffusion would be challenged. For example, if there was spillover into the catchment areas we might mistake a crime decline as a diffusion effect, when it was simply the result of a direct intervention outcome improperly applied to the catchment area. Accordingly, we placed strong priority on limiting the application of the proposed strategies to the target areas.

At the start of the study, we met a series of times with Co-Principal Investigator and Deputy Chief Frank Gajewski and the then Chief of Police to develop clearly defined guidelines for ensuring that there would be a minimal spillover into the catchment areas. Officers involved

in the project were given maps of the target areas and instructed of the importance of staying within the areas' boundaries. It was made clear that the only exception for leaving the target areas was to pursue a suspect, fleeing from the target area. There were periodic meetings with officers to discuss the work being performed in the target areas and to assure that the officers were not venturing out of the assigned areas.

Criteria for the Selection of Strategies

The advisory team formed to choose the sites (see Chapter 2) also helped plan the intervention strategies for this project. The first task of the advisory team was to establish criteria to apply in selecting strategies. With their involvement we identified three main criteria: First, the strategies should have strong empirical evidence supporting a high likelihood of direct measurable effects on crime. A review of existing literature on community policing and crime prevention programs conducted by Lawrence Sherman and his colleagues (1997) for the Office of Justice Programs identified a number of strategies that satisfy this criterion. In the report, the authors concluded that strategies that take a focused approach, and that concentrate on specific types of crimes within bounded geographic areas have the largest impacts on crime and disorder (Sherman et al., 1997). Examples of strategies with a proven record for effectiveness include nuisance abatement programs (Green, 1996; Eck and Wartell, 1996), hot spots policing tactics (Sherman and Weisburd, 1995; Weisburd and Green, 1995a; Sherman and Rogan, 1995) and street closures (Atlas and LeBlanc, 1994; Matthews, 1993; Newman, 1996).

The second criterion for selecting strategies specified that it should be feasible for them to be implemented at a level sufficient to ensure the production of measurable treatment effects in the targeted areas. Specifically, the Jersey City Police Department should be capable of implementing the strategies, ensuring sufficient dosage, and avoiding confounding effects of

treatments across the different sites. Regardless of the existing empirical evidence, if the police did not have the capacity to effectively implement a particular strategy and maintain it at full capacity throughout the intervention period, then the strategy was not considered an option. It is also important for the researchers to be able to measure the effects of the strategies with sufficient precision and statistical power.

The last criterion stipulated that the strategies should, as a group, make a contribution to our knowledge about the nature of displacement and diffusion. Assuming that the prospective strategies satisfy the first and second criteria, the research team selected the combination of strategies that would likely impact crime in the target area and produce outcomes that provide the best test of displacement and diffusion effects. The strategies should involve different methods of deterring or apprehending offenders or reducing opportunities to commit crimes, thus giving offenders an incentive to either quit offending or displace their activities to a non-targeted area. It was also considered beneficial to select strategies that had been effectively used by other police departments. Additionally, problem-solving tactics that eliminated all possibility of displacement or diffusion in a particular site would not support a fair test of displacement and diffusion effects. The strategies used were thus expected to aim at reducing crime and crime opportunities in the target area, while not focusing attention on reducing displacement effects or actively attempting to create a diffusion of benefits to surrounding areas.

The final intervention strategies selected for each site included several components that were carried out simultaneously by specialized units assigned to the target areas. The following section contains a description of the interventions employed in both the violent crime site and the prostitution site.

I. Intervention at the Cornelison Avenue Prostitution Site

The intervention strategy in the prostitution site was structured in the following manner. Seven additional officers were made available for the intervention at the target site to implement a three-pronged intervention strategy. The first part of the strategy focused on removing criminal offenders from the target area. Police officers patrolled the area and arrested prostitutes to get the message out that the area was under surveillance. The police also conducted reverse stings to arrest johns as a way to deter customers from 'cruising' the area. Seven stings were conducted during the intervention, occurring on: September 23, October 7 and 14, one in early November, November 30, and February 18 and 24. Before a sting, police would arrest the real prostitutes working on the street, and then send out two undercover, female police officers posing as prostitutes. Any johns who propositioned them were then arrested. Lastly, motor vehicle stops were set up to check for traffic violations and warn drivers that the area was a known prostitution site and that johns were being arrested for solicitation. Recall from chapter 2 that the area was a largely abandoned industrial area and a large portion of the traffic in the area was johns cruising for prostitutes.

The second part of the strategy was to reduce criminal opportunities presented by the physical environment of the area. This was to be accomplished by cleaning up trouble spots in the target area that facilitated prostitution. One strategy planned was to clean up a wooded lot on Cornelison Avenue that contained mattresses, drug paraphernalia and pornographic materials. Another part of this phase of the intervention was to cooperate with Public Works to erect and maintain a fence around this lot. Combined, these would help eliminate one prominent location for prostitution activities in the target area. The last part of this phase of the intervention

involved working with Public Works to close off Cornelison Avenue at Ivy Place and Fairmount Avenue with Cement barriers to make it more difficult for johns to cruise through the area.

The final part of the Prostitution intervention strategy involved working with community groups to help prostitutes solve various problems in their lives. For example, the police worked with Hogar CREA (a substance abuse center on Cornelison Avenue) to help prostitutes cope with their drug problem. As stated earlier, the majority of prostitutes in this area were drug addicts. The police also involved the Summit Avenue Citizens Group in their prevention activities. These efforts were an attempt to get at the root causes of prostitution in the target area. Table 4.1 provides a brief summary of the intervention in the prostitution site.

Table 4.1

Interventions at the Cornelison Avenue Prostitution Site
Sept 1998 – Apr 1999

1. Two full-time officers assigned to target area during intervention period
2. Officers restricted to target area on foot patrol; officers instructed to radio a patrol car whenever prostitutes are seen on the stroll; immediate arrest
3. Six reverse sting operations separated two weeks apart; 30 johns and between 6 and 12 prostitutes arrested during each sting; names of arrestees publicized in Jersey Journal
4. Five-day follow up to sting operations with random traffic stops on Cornelison Avenue
5. Demolished lumberyard and fenced-in wooded area that prostitutes used as a site for work and living

Independent Assessment of the Implementation of the Strategies at the Prostitution Site

During the study, Co-Principal Investigator and Deputy Chief Frank Gajewski monitored the implementation of the strategies and identified departmental efforts for the research team. Nonetheless, given the importance of the implementation of treatment we report below on two independent measures of police activity available in our study. The first consists of comments

from offenders in the area gathered by the independent ethnographer who interviewed prostitutes in the field, as well as the members of the research team who conducted interviews with prostitutes arrested in the target area. The second source is police administrative calls that we use to illustrate general levels of police presence in the target area. It is important to note that we removed observers from the sites when high levels of enforcement were expected, in order to protect them from possible harm. Accordingly, we do not have observational measures of the major police initiatives in the target area.

Ethnographer's Report[18]

In her research, the ethnographer found that the prostitutes were aware of the increased level of police activity in the target areas. Indeed, once the intervention was underway, it became the main topic of conversation between the prostitutes and the ethnographer. For instance, the ethnographer reported that after the beginning of the intervention the "Wednesday stings" and arrests became the "hot topic" in her interviews. Additionally, after the police cleaned up a lumberyard that was a major location for prostitution activity, the ethnographer reported that this action was discussed by the prostitutes for several weeks. From her report, it is clear that the cops were out in force, and that the prostitutes took notice. As Sugartoo, a 34-year-old African-American, noted on 10/22/98**:**

> "Changes as far as the street goes: it's really hard to make money. Cops is out there now and gonna make a sting every Wednesday. They got cops out on motorcycles, and they got bicycle cops out there and the walking cops and the undercover cops in the cars. And you got a take a chance. Johns is afraid to come out 'cause they think you is a cop. They (female decoys) look like they working. There's a big fat girl and a Puerto Rican girl that stand on the corner. I guess they're rookies. They take them (clients) around the corner and that's where the cops are. Then they take them to jail . . . You can't make me go out there. It's just too hot."

[18] All quotes in this section are pulled from the ethnographer's report, which can be found in Appendix A.

The research team's interviews with prostitutes arrested in the target area also show that the prostitutes were well aware of the increased police presence and activities that came with the intervention in the target area. More than 60% (19 of the 31) of the prostitutes interviewed reported being aware of increased police activity during the intervention period. Respondents repeatedly mentioned noticing an increased presence of officers on the streets, a large increase in stings, and an increased 'get tough' attitude by law enforcement. One prostitute explained as follows; "The cops are out there more, they're doing their job for a change. Before they used to give you breaks." Prostitutes saw cops in cars, on foot and posing as prostitutes. One respondent added, "They were never out there before and now they are all out there."

Interestingly, prostitutes tried to explain why there was an increased police presence in the area. One prostitute suggested that it was due to it being election time. While a number of others pointed to a recent violent incident. One respondent explains:

> "Lately there's been a lot of arrests. Recently one of the girls (prostitutes) was with a guy (not a customer) and the guy shot the customer (he lived despite the wound). It was part of a robbery. The guy shot the customer, and the girl she took the wallet, cell phone and beeper. She even called for help from the victim's phone. Now there's a lot of cops. Girls are picked up real quick. It's never been like this before."

Although prostitutes appeared to be inconvenienced by the intervention there are those who saw a need for it. "Lately there's been a lot of cops, undercover during the day…3 to 5 cops at night…lots of police, so business is more difficult…good in a way, a lot of guys were raping girls, now there's only the regulars and less traffic." However, a number of prostitutes did not share this view of the police presence. In fact, a number of the respondents sought to incriminate officers, stating that officers are customers. One prostitute explains "they have no respect. Just because they have authority, they like to belittle you. They are too aggressive and corrupt. They be out there arresting us and then coming back to us for a blow job the next day!" Another respondent elaborates:

> "They are lousy. Some of the officers, they sleep with the prostitutes and don't pay. If you don't do what they tell you then they lock you up. You have to do it. Give them a blow job and they let whatever it is slide. And with the drugs, they take the money from the dealers but don't take the drugs. They lock up a lot of the little dealers and never the big people. The focus should be on the big guys."

Police Administrative Calls

The police calls for service data we received from the Jersey City Police Department contained officer-initiated calls in addition to the citizen calls.[19] Among these officer-initiated calls were police administrative calls. In order to gain a measure of the level of the police intervention in the target area we created a general police administrative measure. This measure included all police administrative calls such as directed patrol, meal break, car wash, and other administrative duties. Ideally, we would expect to see an increase in administrative calls at the start of the intervention in the target area with administrative calls remaining flat in the catchment areas. In addition using the prior year as a base of comparison, it was expected that this increase in police administrative calls in the target area would not be present in the prior year.

To perform the following examination of the police administrative calls, as well as analysis of citizen calls for service presented later in chapter 8, the calls were divided into thirty day waves based on the beginning date of the intervention. As explained in chapter 3 there were a number of days of data missing during the intervention period.[20] To correct for these missing days, the waves which contained fewer than 30 days were weighted by the number of days actually present in the data. For this reason there may be inconsistent trend lines for a portion of November and all of December during the intervention year in both sites. In fact, due to the missing data, there were a few instances in which there were no cases in the wave which contained the end of November and/or the total of December. For these instances, this wave was computed by averaging the wave directly before and after (a note is made below the table for

[19] See chapter 3 on the data collection methodology for further explanation on the Jersey City Police Department calls for service.

[20] As explained in chapter 3 of the data collection chapter, there was over a month of data missing during the intervention period. For this reason there may be inconsistent trend lines for a portion of November and all of December during the intervention period.

when this technique was used). Also, due to the start and end date of the interventions the final wave in each site was not exactly thirty days (40 days in the prostitution site and 23 days in the drug site).[21] For this reason the final wave was constructed by weighting the calls present for this wave to be equal to thirty days. The start and end dates also made it difficult to name the waves in terms of calendar months, more so in the violent crime/drug site. The waves are designated by month of the year; however, because of the beginning and end dates of the intervention there are times when the waves overlap months. In the prostitution site the wave was designated by the month within which the majority of the days fell. In the violent crime/drug site, which will be presented later in this chapter, we labeled the waves with two months (i.e. Nov/Dec), because the wave lies approximately half in one month with the remainder in the following month.

Figures 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, and 4.4 show the trends in police administrative calls in the prostitution site for the intervention year and the previous year broken down by area of the site, as well as a graph of the trend in the whole city minus the entire violent crime and prostitution study sites. Accordingly, we have a comparison of police presence both before and during the intervention, as well as a comparison of the intervention year's trends with the prior year's trends. The beginning and end of the police intervention period is marked by the vertical lines.

[21] For instance, in the prostitution site, the number of calls in each variable in the last wave was divided by 40 to generate the number of calls per day during this period, and this number was then multiplied by 30 to weigh it equivalently to the other waves.

Figure 4.1*



* Because data for December were missing, we computed the December wave by averaging the wave directly before and after.

Figure 4.2*



Figure 4.3*



*Because data for December were missing, we computed the December wave by averaging the wave directly before and after (both figures above)

Figure 4.4*



*Because data for December were missing, we computed the December wave by averaging the wave directly before and after.

These data strongly support the premise that the intervention was characterized by a general increase in police presence in the target area, while the catchment areas experienced little relative change. In the prostitution site we see a sharp increase in the number of police administrative calls in the target area at the beginning of the intervention. This increase was sustained at least through November (though as noted earlier we are missing emergency call data for late December). In catchment area 1 and catchment area 2 we see a decrease at the beginning of the intervention, followed by an increase shortly after the beginning of the intervention. A similar trend is seen in the whole city graph which we include as a measure of general city wide trends.

II. Intervention at the Violent Crime/Drug Site

The intervention at the violent crime/drug site also involved a combination of a series of strategies that sought to reduce opportunities for crime and disorder activities and place pressure on the offenders in the area. Perhaps the most intensive part of the intervention was the introduction of a nine officer narcotics task force (NTF) which targeted drugs and other problem behaviors in the area. It should be remembered that the target area included only 21 street segments and thus the introduction of the task force represented a major increase in police activity in the area. This was supplemented by a commitment by the department to increase police presence. Prior to the intervention the site had two NTF officers assigned to it in addition to normal police patrol, which was standard radio car coverage. The department retained the usual coverage and added 9 NTF officers. As well, in order to assure the target area received increased attention the department assigned a Captain and a Sergeant to work with and supervise the additional officers in the area.

The department also introduced a Violent Offender Removal Program (VORP) which involved the police and prosecutor's office coordinating efforts in order to identify and remove selected chronic offenders from the target area. Or to remove, to quote one of the planning officers from the prosecutor's office, the "bad actors" from what he referred to as the "VORP Zone." The program was not designed to prosecute a large number of offenders but to focus on the chronic violent offenders, particularly the most violent who used handguns, with a secondary focus on drug offenders. The assistant prosecutor, the planning unit, and the NTF officers scheduled meetings to screen potential VORP cases. Once these chronic offender's were arrested the prosecutor's office sought to fast track the prosecution process. Court files were stamped "VORP" to indicate a VORP case and the prosecutors attempted to keep the VORP

offenders in custody. It was hoped that VORP would increase the deterrent value of arrests in the area.

The strategy here, as in the prostitution site, did not involve only traditional enforcement activities in the targeted sites. Because it was assumed that local businesses, especially bars and small groceries and twenty four hour stores, played an important part in the drug trade, police officers used code enforcement to pressure local businesses and residential units to work with them in reducing opportunities for drug involved offenders. NTF officers also reached out to superintendents and owners of apartment buildings. Research notes give an example of one superintendent who cooperated with NTF officers. This superintendent gave the NTF officers copies of his keys in the hopes that the NTF officers could assist with removing a group of tenants who were selling narcotics out of the building**.** The intervention also tried to provide alternative activities for potential offenders by using a neighborhood beautification program to establish a basketball court for local youths in the target area.

Table 4.2 lists the main strategies that were included in the intervention at the Storms Avenue Violent Crime/Drug Site.

Table 4.2

Interventions at Storms Avenue Violent Crime/Drug Site
Sept 1998 – Mar 1999

1. NTF 9, a nine-officer task force, assigned to the target area. Carried out intensive sweeps, roof-top surveillance and closures of problematic buildings
2. 300% increase in police presence
3. NTF 9 restricted from operating outside target area for approximately 6 months
4. Violent Offender Removal Program (VORP) – coordination between prosecutors and police department in vertical prosecution of repeat violent offenders
5. Full bail required for release of all VORP offenders
6. VORP prosecutions are pushed through the system with priority; assistant prosecutor hired with state grant to assist with VORP prosecutions
7. Code Enforcement – health code and housing code violations aggressively enforced in drug market areas
8. Neighborhood beautification program responsible for converting vacant lot on corner of Storms and Monticello into basketball court
9. Safe haven program opened for youths in Monticello area – an after-school program.

Assessment of the Implementation of the Strategies at the Violent Crime/Drug Site

As with the prostitution site, we use data from our study to develop an independent assessment of increased police activity in the target area. The measures follow those discussed above, with the exception of the ethnographic data which were not available for the Violent Crime/Drug Site.

Arrestee Interviews

We found a much lower level of recognition of the increase in police presence in the violent crime/drug site compared to the prostitution site. Of those arrestees interviewed, 27.5% (14 of 51) mentioned examples of police presence that appeared to be above and beyond a normal dosage in our interviews. Nonetheless, these offenders did clearly describe an increase in

police activity. They spoke of increased surveillance, foot patrol, and raids. One drug dealer said that he was being personally investigated by officers and another dealer noted that he had seen nine or so different officers in different cars conducting surveillance. A few respondents mentioned seeing officers every day or almost every day, one dealer noted that police "sweat the block" afternoon to night.

It was a common theme among respondents to try to incriminate or diminish the work of police officers, which was also present in the prostitute interviews. Many respondents described them as corrupt, saying that officers used trickery and planted evidence to make arrests. One respondent explains that police are "never cool…if they can't catch you, they'll set you up."

Police Administrative Calls

As with the prostitution site, we again examine police administrative calls in order to see if they reflect an increased police presence in the target area during the intervention period. Again waves consisted of 30 day intervals which were weighted to correct for the missing data.[22] In the few instances this process was not sufficient to extrapolate the Nov/Dec wave, this wave was constructed by averaging the wave prior and the wave after. Figures 4.5, 4.6, 4.7, and 4.8 show the trends in police administrative calls in the violent crime/drug site for the intervention year and the previous year broken down by area of the site, as well as a graph of the trend in the whole city minus the entire violent crime and prostitution study sites.[23]

[22] For further explanation, see the police administrative calls subsection under the prostitution site analysis earlier in the chapter.

[23] Again, due to missing data the Nov/Dec and Dec/Jan waves for the year of the intervention may be inaccurate.

Figure 4.5*



*Because data for Nov/Dec were missing, we computed the Nov/Dec wave by averaging the wave directly before and after.

Figure 4.6



Figure 4.7



Figure 4.8



From these trend line graphs, we see that there was a fairly sharp increase in police administrative calls at the beginning of the intervention that was a break from the prior year trend (the beginning and ending of the intervention is again marked by the vertical lines on the graphs). In Nov/Dec there was a decrease in police administrative calls for service followed by another increase, once again breaking from the prior year's trend.[24] In catchment area 2 we see a decrease in police administrative calls at the beginning of the intervention, which provides additional evidence that police activity was relatively increased in the target area. However, in catchment area 1, we see an increase in administrative calls at the beginning of the intervention. Nonetheless, we think it important to note that this trend is consistent with the prior year in this area and the increase is not as steep as seen in the target area.

[24] However, it is important to note that the Nov/Dec and Dec/Jan waves had a large amount of missing data and were constructed using the weighting and averaging process outlined above. Thus it is possible that the decline in police administrative calls shown here is simply an artifact of this methodology. This possibility is reinforced by the fact that the calls rise dramatically after these problematic waves.

III. Conclusion

The interventions proposed in the target areas of the study were extremely intensive and included elements of both enforcement and opportunity reduction strategies. Intervention strategies were selected drawing from prior studies that indicated that they would have a strong chance of impacting crime in the target areas. Implementation of the interventions was supervised by one of the project's principle investigators and documented during the course of the study. Importantly, data developed for our study also suggest that offenders in the target areas were aware of an increase in police presence. Administrative police calls also suggest increased levels of police presence in the target areas during the intervention period.

Chapter 5: Social Observations Analysis

We assumed from the outset that the best measure of the effects of the intervention on the targeted sites and catchment areas would be drawn from social observations. Social observations have a rich tradition in criminology (e.g. see Park and Burgess, 1921; Reiss, 1971**;** Sampson and Raudenbush, 1999; Sherman and Weisburd, 1995), though they are seldom used for assessment of criminal justice programs because of the considerable expense involved in developing such observational data. The importance of observational data in this study is reinforced by the nature of the criminal activity that is examined. The two crime sites chosen for this study include by design large numbers of prostitution and drug crimes—crimes that often occur on the street and thus are amenable to measurement by observational methods. Nonetheless, it is important to note that social observations in our study were unlikely to provide accurate measurement of crimes of violence which occur relatively less often and thus are less likely to enter our sampling frame.

The following chapter describes what we learned from social observations collected before, during and after the implementation of the interventions in the target areas. As detailed in Chapter 3, social observations were conducted for twenty-minute periods on a random sample of street segments in each area of each site.[25] These observations were conducted in an approximately seven-day period, normally in the first half of the month. There was one wave of pre-intervention baseline observations collected in each site. Observations were also conducted during each month of the intervention (six waves for the prostitution site and five waves for the

[25] As mentioned in the data collection chapter, the actual number of observations collected in the target area and catchment areas differed by the time of day. One observation was collected for each hour in the target area from 10am to 1am. In both catchment areas there was one observation collected for each hour from 12pm to 3pm and 10pm to 11pm. However, in the catchment areas from 4pm to 9pm, when there were the greatest calls for service, there were two observations collected for each hour. The observations were designed to over sample in the catchment areas during specific time periods in order to better detect spatial displacement. There is no correction for this over sampling in the analysis. Because the chances of observing an event in the catchment areas are higher with the greater number of observations, we consider our findings to be conservative.

drug site). To conclude the social observations a post-intervention measure was collected for each site, but due to the difference in the length of the interventions for each site the post measure was conducted for two months in the Storms Avenue site and for only one month in the Cornelison Avenue site. It is important to note that each wave of the data collection had a different number of social observations, in order to correct for these differences the analysis below presents the average number of events per observation.[26]

Prostitution Site

We measured street level prostitution by collapsing three different mutually exclusive observation categories together; loitering or wandering for the purpose of prostitution, soliciting for the purpose of prostitution, and picked-up for the purpose of prostitution. Accordingly, our main measure of prostitution activity is an average of the number of prostitution activities per wave/month.[27] As Figure 5.1 illustrates there was dramatic reduction in street level prostitution activities in the first month of the intervention, and this reduction is highly significant when compared with the pre-intervention month (see Table 5.1). The average number of events declined by almost seventy percent, from one to three events per observation period. Moreover the reduction in the level of prostitution is sustained in the target area and continues even after the intervention was discontinued and normal police activities were resumed.

[26] The one wave post-intervention in the prostitution site and the one wave pre-intervention in the violent crime/drug site had relatively fewer numbers of observations than the other waves. For instance, in the target area of the prostitution site there were 97 observations in the pre-intervention wave, 112 in the first wave into the intervention, above 100 during all of the intervention waves, and only 90 in the post-intervention wave. In the target area of the violent crime/drug site there were 83 observations in the pre-intervention wave and 114 observations in the first wave into the intervention, with the observations wavering around 100 though the remaining waves

[27] The analyses below are conducted by taking the mean number of events per observation per month (wave) for each of the areas (target, catchment area 1, and catchment area 2) contained within each site. The mean was used rather then the exact number of events due to the slight difference in the number of observations between months/waves (see Chapter 3). We also examined the trends for each of the measures separately. The basic relationships are similar across each measure.

Figure 5.1



Table 5.1

Prostitution Site Target Area: Observed Incident of Prostitution Related Activity				
		Wave 1 – Wave 2	**Pre – During**	**Pre – Post**
t-value (sig)		**t = -6.322 (.001)*** **	**t = -6.334 (.001)*** **	**t = -4.857 (.001)*** **
Mean difference		**-2.039**	**-1.922**	**-1.792**
95% Conf. Int.	**Lower**	**-2.677**	**-2.524**	**-2.520**
	Upper	**-1.401**	**-1.320**	**-1.064**

*p ≤ .10 ** p ≤ .05 *** p ≤ .01 (two-tailed)

The trend lines for catchment area 1 are very similar to the target area (see Figure 5.2). Though the overall frequency of events is much lower, again the differences between the pre-intervention and intervention periods are statistically significant and large with a decline of about 75 percent in the average number of prostitution events. If Figure 5.1 can be seen as suggesting a direct program effect in the target area, then Figure 5.2 suggests a diffusion of crime control benefits into catchment area 1 which did not receive the intervention treatment.

Figure 5.2



Table 5.2

Prostitution Site Catchment Area 1: Observed Incident of Prostitution Related Activity				
		Wave 1 – Wave 2	**Pre – During**	**Pre – Post**
t-value (sig)		**t = -3.580 (.001)*** **	**t = -3.822 (.001)*** **	**t = -3.793 (.001)*** **
Mean difference		**-.740**	**-.754**	**-.770**
95%	**Lower**	**-1.148**	**-1.145**	**-1.172**
Conf. Int.	**Upper**	**-.331**	**-.363**	**-.368**

*p ≤ .10 ** p ≤ .05 *** p ≤ .01 (two-tailed)

The findings in the first two analyses are reinforced when we look at catchment area 2 (see Figure 5.3). With the exception of a spike in January, the trends once more suggest a diffusion of crime control benefits in this case to an area more removed than catchment area 1. And again, though the base rate of events declines, the comparisons to the pre-intervention month are statistically significant and the change is large (Table 5.3).

Figure 5.3



Table 5.3

Prostitution Site Catchment Area 2: Observed Incident of Prostitution Related Activity				
		Wave 1 – Wave 2	**Pre – During**	**Pre – Post**
t-value (sig)		**t = -2.575 (.011)****	**t = -3.045 (.003)*****	**t = -3.361 (.001)*****
Mean difference		**-.239**	**-.257**	**-.295**
95%	**Lower**	**-.422**	**-.424**	**-.469**
Conf. Int.	**Upper**	**-.056**	**-.090**	**-.122**

*p ≤ .10 ** p ≤ .05 *** p ≤ .01 (two-tailed)

Possible Confounding due to Seasonal Trends

One problem in interpreting these data is that "historical" and in particular "seasonal" trends in crime behavior may be affecting the level of prostitution behavior that is observed. We recognized this problem at the outset, and considered employing a control group design for the study. However, we did not think that a single comparison area would offer a clear solution to this problem. Moreover, we could not identify a prostitution site in the city that reflected closely

the problems observed in this area. Finally, social observations represented the most costly data collection strategy for the study, and a very large economic commitment would have had to be made for what was likely to provide a relatively weak comparison for the study. Nonetheless, we thought it important to consider other potential "historical" explanations for the relationships we observe.

One possible alternative explanation for the decline in prostitution events observed is that weather conditions changed in the time between the pre-intervention and intervention period. Figure 5.4 presents observer coding of general weather conditions. As is illustrated, there was a considerable change in the weather conditions in the pre-intervention and intervention periods, with an increase in cold days in the beginning that tapers off toward the end of the intervention. Accordingly, one explanation for the relationships we observe is that street level prostitution behavior declined because weather conditions forced prostitutes off the street.

While we cannot rule out this explanation for the data trends, we think that an overall review of the data on weather conditions suggests that this explanation is unlikely. First, while the weather did get colder in the second month of observations, the number of observations conducted in weather below freezing was still relatively small. Second, the trend of reduction of prostitution events does not follow the same trend as the weather changes, this is notable in the later months of the intervention. Indeed, increases in street level activity are noted in the coldest months of the year. Finally, it is important to note in this regard that the post-intervention period is similar in weather conditions to the pre-intervention period. And our pre-to-post comparisons also show a statistically significant decline between the pre- and post-intervention periods.

More generally this site was chosen because of the high level of street level prostitution found throughout the year. Outside of the pre-intervention month the intensity of street level

prostitution observed was relatively low, again suggesting a treatment effect. As will be discussed in subsequent chapters, other data, in particular our ethnographic observations and interviews, also provide evidence of a change in prostitution activities that is directly related to the intervention.

Figure 5.4



Trends in Social Disorder

Past research has suggested that police crackdowns often have a strong, immediate effect on disorder (Sherman and Weisburd, 1995). To examine this issue, we combined a number of different observational measures of disorder into one general disorder category. These included verbal disorder, loud disputes, physical assault, panhandling, soliciting for a drug sale, being involved in drug transaction, observed using drugs, drunk or high on drugs, drinking alcohol in public, falling down in public, homeless, vandalism, and unattended dogs.

Figure 5.7



Table 5.6

Prostitution Site Target Area: Observed Incidents of Disorder				
		Wave 1 – Wave 2	**Pre – During**	**Pre – Post**
t-value (sig)		**t = -2.587 (.010)*** **	**t = -3.814 (.001)*** **	**T = -2.151 (.033)** **
Mean difference		**-.376**	**-.456**	**-.353**
95% Conf. Int.	**Lower**	**-.663**	**-.693**	**-.678**
	Upper	**-.089**	**-.219**	**-.029**

*p ≤ .10 ** p ≤ .05 *** p ≤ .01 (two-tailed)

As is apparent from Figure 5.7 the general relationships follow those we observed for prostitution events, though seasonal trends are clearly evident here with a large dip in observed disorder in January, which included the coldest weather during observations. Differences between the pre-intervention month and the other comparisons are again statistically significant, and are maintained through the post-intervention period. Once again the catchment areas evidence a similar trend to the target areas, though the differences are not as large, and only one

of the comparisons, that between wave 1 and wave 2, for catchment area 2 is statistically significant.

Figure 5.8



Table 5.7

Prostitution Site Catchment Area 1: Observed Incidents of Disorder				
		Wave 1 – Wave 2	**Pre – During**	**Pre – Post**
t-value (sig)		**t = -1.276 (.207)**	**t = -1.349 (.180)**	**t = -1.026 (.306)**
Mean difference		**-.209**	**-.178**	**-.171**
95% Conf. Int.	**Lower**	**-.535**	**-.438**	**-.500**
	Upper	**.117**	**.083**	**.158**

*p ≤ .10 ** p ≤ .05 *** p ≤ .01 (two-tailed)

Figure 5.9



Table 5.8

Prostitution Site Catchment Area 2: Observed Incidents of Disorder				
		Wave 1 – Wave 2	**Pre – During**	**Pre – Post**
t-value (sig)		**t = -2.333 (.021)****	**t = -1.467 (.144)**	**t = -.258 (.797)**
Mean difference		**-.443**	**-.248**	**-.071**
95% Conf. Int.	**Lower**	**-.818**	**-.582**	**-.609**
	Upper	**-.069**	**.086**	**.468**

*p ≤ .10 ** p ≤ .05 *** p ≤ .01 (two-tailed)

Storms Avenue: Violent Crime and Drug Site

The social observations did not provide a robust measure of violent crime, but they did allow us to measure change in drug crime for the Storms Avenue area. We combined three types of observations of drug related behavior: soliciting for a drug sale, involvement in a drug transaction, and observed use of drugs.

Figure 5.12



Table 5.11

Violent Crime/Drug Site Target Area: Observed Incidents of Drug Activities				
		Wave 1 – Wave 2	**Pre – During**	**Pre – Post**
t-value (sig)		**t = -2.595 (.010)*** **	**t = -4.065 (.001)*** **	**t = -5.262 (.001)*** **
Mean difference		**-.687**	**-.904**	**-1.164**
95% Conf. Int.	**Lower**	**-1.210**	**-1.346**	**-1.603**
	Upper	**-.164**	**-.462**	**-.724**

*p ≤ .10 ** p ≤ .05 *** p ≤ .01 (two-tailed)

Social observations of drug crime in the target area show a reduction that once again begins in the first month of the intervention. However, the overall trend here continues throughout the intervention period and through the post-intervention period, with the level of drug crime falling from 1.3 observed events per observation in the pre intervention month to a

less than .20 in the post intervention period. The differences observed are also statistically significant across each of three comparisons with the pre-intervention period.

Figure 5.13



Table 5.12

Violent Crime/Drug Site Catchment Area 1: Observed Incidents of Drug Activity				
		Wave 1 – Wave 2	**Pre – During**	**Pre – Post**
t-value (sig)		**t = -.718 (.474)**	**t = -1.067 (.289)**	**t = -1.040 (.301)**
Mean difference		**-.084**	**-.117**	**-.117**
95%	**Lower**	**-.315**	**-.336**	**-.340**
Conf. Int.	**Upper**	**.147**	**.101**	**.106**

*p ≤ .10 ** p ≤ .05 *** p ≤ .01 (two-tailed)

Once again we find that the catchment areas do not show evidence of displacement of crime from the target areas. Indeed, as with the prostitution site, the trends in the catchment areas follow those found in the target area, though the trends are erratic in catchment area 1 and

the differences between the pre-intervention month, the intervention period, and the post-intervention comparisons are not statistically significant. The trends in catchment area 2 are more consistent, showing a large decline in the first month of intervention ($p<.10$) and smaller though statistically significant declines ($p<.05$) for each of the other comparisons.

Figure 5.14



Table 5.13

Violent Crime/Drug Site Catchment Area 2: Observed Incidents of Drug Activity				
		Wave 1 – Wave 2	**Pre – During**	**Pre – Post**
t-value (sig)		**t = -1.769 (.080)***	**t = -2.008 (.047)****	**t = -2.234 (.028)****
Mean difference		**-.237**	**-.263**	**-.293**
95% Conf. Int.	**Lower**	**-.502**	**-.523**	**-.553**
	Upper	**.029**	**-.003**	**-.033**

*p ≤ .10 ** p ≤ .05 *** p ≤ .01 (two-tailed)

Possible Limitations due to Seasonal Trends

As with the prostitution site, it is possible that the reductions in crime we see were simply due to seasonal trends. Again, the weather conditions illustrate a cooling period from the beginning of the intervention, until near the middle of the intervention, with it again warming in the latter half (Figure 5.15). In this case we think it significant that crime did not increase in the post-intervention period in which weather conditions, though colder than the pre-intervention period, certainly provided ample possibility for increased street level activity.

Figure 5.15



Analysis of Social Disorder

As in the prostitution site, we felt it important to include disorder as an outcome measure. The disorder variable is similar to that used in the previous analysis of the prostitution site, but includes prostitution as a disorder measure. As illustrated in Figure 5.18, the average number of incidents of disorder dropped more than sixty percent from the pre-intervention wave to the first wave into the intervention. This decline leveled off slightly in the second month into the

intervention and wavered slightly at a low level until the first month of the post-intervention. There is another decline in the post-intervention months from April to May. As shown in the table below the sharp decreases in social disorder are highly significant across all of the periods tested.

Figure 5.18



Table 5.16

Violent Crime/Drug Site Target Area: Observed Incidents of Disorder				
		Wave 1 – Wave 2	**Pre – During**	**Pre – Post**
t-value (sig)		**t = -4.899 (.001)*** **	**t = -6.279 (.001)*** **	**t = -6.511 (.001)*** **
Mean difference		**-2.719**	**-3.190**	**-3.343**
95% Conf. Int.	**Lower**	**-3.818**	**-4.200**	**-4.363**
	Upper	**-1.620**	**-2.180**	**-2.323**

*p ≤ .10 ** p ≤ .05 *** p ≤ .01 (two-tailed)

The trend of social disorder observed in the catchment areas mirror closely those found in the target area. The differences are also statistically significant across the three comparisons with the pre-intervention year. This suggests that rather than displacement from the target area to the catchment areas we observe a diffusion of crime control benefits to areas surrounding the intervention sites.

Figure 5.19



Table 5.17

Violent Crime/Drug Site Catchment Area 1: Observed Incidents of Disorder				
		Wave 1 – Wave 2	**Pre – During**	**Pre – Post**
t-value (sig)		**t = -2.923 (.004)*** **	**t = -4.640 (.001)*** **	**t = -4.980 (.001)*** **
Mean difference		**-1.483**	**-2.007**	**-2.150**
95%	**Lower**	**-2.486**	**-2.867**	**-3.008**
Conf. Int.	**Upper**	**-.481**	**-1.148**	**-1.293**

*p ≤ .10 ** p ≤ .05 *** p ≤ .01 (two-tailed)

Figure 5.20



Table 5.18

Violent Crime/Drug Site Catchment Area 2: Observed Incidents of Disorder				
		Wave 1 – Wave 2	**Pre – During**	**Pre – Post**
t-value (sig)		**t = -4.640 (.001)*** **	**t = -5.383 (.001)*** **	**t = -6.165 (.001)*** **
Mean difference		**-.906**	**-.968**	**-1.112**
95%	**Lower**	**-1.293**	**-1.324**	**-1.470**
Conf. Int.	**Upper**	**-.520**	**-.611**	**-.755**

*p ≤ .10 ** p ≤ .05 *** p ≤ .01 (two-tailed)

Conclusions

For both the prostitution and violent crime/drug site, our analyses suggest the same conclusion. Targeted police interventions with strong crime prevention benefits do not necessarily lead to displacement of crime to areas nearby. Indeed, our results suggest a diffusion

of crime control benefits into the surrounding areas. While our results are consistent and strong across the crime types we examined and across the two test sites, our analyses do not directly control for possible seasonal effects at the sites. We have argued that differences in weather conditions would not explain directly our findings. However, other seasonal and secular trends are not directly controlled in our analysis. In later chapters we will address directly some of these possible threats to the validity of our findings using the other data sources included in our study.

Chapter 6: Physical Observations Analysis

While social observations form the main observational data in our study, we also sought to assess whether changes in the physical environment could provide evidence of displacement or diffusion. This evidence was of two potential types. First, we tried to observe whether there were physical indications of the crime types that were the focus of the targeted intervention: for example, condoms and condom wrappers as a measure of prostitution, or drug paraphernalia as an indication of drug activity. We also tried to assess broader signs of physical disorder, such as burned-out or abandoned buildings. It is important to note in this regard, that some of the intervention strategies tried to have a direct impact on physical disorder. For example, as described in chapter four, police in the prostitution site organized efforts to clean up a vacant lot that was a common site for prostitution transactions.

As was noted in chapter three, the physical observations obtained for this study were gathered by observing all of the street segments three times. The street segments were observed once the month before the police intervention began, once after the maximum intervention period, and once after the entire intervention period. The physical observations for this study totaled 507, with 264 of them being conducted in the prostitution site[28] and 243 of them being conducted in the violent crime/drug site. The variables that were analyzed for this study included abandoned vehicles, used condoms and wrappers found on the street, drug paraphernalia found on the street, broken glass, graffiti, litter, conditions of grass and shrubbery, broken windows, burned buildings, and the number of buildings with structural damage. This

[28] There were two street segments in the prostitution site that did not have physical observations in the first wave. To correct for these two missing cases in the first wave of data we inserted the observations for these two segments from the second wave of data.

data was entered into SPSS and the Wilcoxon Signed-Ranks test was used to compare the street segments before, during, and after the intervention.[29]

Analysis of Prostitution Site

The analysis of data from the prostitution site found no change in several elements of physical disorder either in the targeted areas or the catchment areas. These elements included the conditions of grass and shrubbery, buildings with structural damage, buildings marked with graffiti, and litter found in yards and streets. Because these measures were not found to demonstrate significant changes we opted not to display them visually. Following is a discussion of all of the measures that were found to have some type of significant change in the analysis.

Due to their theoretical similarities, burned, boarded up, and abandoned buildings were captured in one continuous measure which involved counting the presence of this type of physical disorder on each street segment for each wave of the data collection. In order to standardize the findings for an accurate comparison in a graph, Figure 6.1 illustrates the number of burned, boarded up, and abandoned buildings divided by the number of street segments in the area. Looking at this measure in the prostitution site revealed that there was a significant decline in the target area during both periods but no significant changes in the catchment areas (see Table 6.1). Nonetheless, the observed trends in the catchment areas were in the direction of diffusion of crime control benefits rather than displacement of crime from the target area.

[29] The Wilcoxon Signed-Ranks test was used because the number of street segments in the target areas was too few to allow for the parametric assumptions required by a dependent samples t-test. However, we also conducted simple sample t-tests comparing differences in these waves to zero. The t-test results were nearly identical to those gained in the Wilcoxon Signed-Ranks test.

Figure 6.1



Table 6.1

Number of Burned, Boarded up, or Abandoned Buildings with Wilcoxon Signed-Ranks Test		
	Pre-Post	**Pre-During**
Target Area	**Sig.=.007*** **	**Sig.=.058***
Catchment Area 1	**Sig.= .157**	**Sig.=.317**
Catchment Area 2	**Sig.= .473**	**Sig.=.190**

*p ≤ .10 ** p ≤ .05 *** p ≤ .01

A second element of disorder that was found to show reliable differences across the three observation periods was the number of buildings with broken windows. The data show that there was significant improvement in the target area with no statistically significant changes in either catchment area during the pre-to-post time periods. There was however a significant increase in buildings with broken windows in catchment area 2 from the first wave to the intervention wave.

Figure 6.2



Table 6.2

Number of Buildings with Broken Windows with Wilcoxon Signed-Ranks Test		
	Pre-Post	**Pre-During**
Target Area	**Sig.=.005*** **	**Sig.=.149**
Catchment Area 1	**Sig.= .891**	**Sig.=.914**
Catchment Area 2	**Sig.= .810**	**Sig.=.010*** **

*p ≤ .10 ** p ≤ .05 *** p ≤ .01

The measure of the number of condoms and condom wrappers was an important one for the prostitution site. This measure was based on a four-point scale defined as none, light, moderate, and heavy. Observers were trained on specific definitions of each of these terms, and the measures took on numeric quantities (see physical observations instrument and code book in Appendices J and K respectively).

Due to the large police presence in the prostitution site and the findings of our social observations, it is not surprising to find that there was a significant decline in the number of condoms and condom wrappers in the target area from pre- to post-intervention and from pre- to during the intervention. A significant decline is also found in catchment area 1 in the pre- to

during interventions, suggesting a diffusion of the intervention's benefits to this area. However, this significant decline is not mirrored in catchment area 2 from the pre-intervention to intervention period, where we instead see a significant increase in condoms and condom wrappers. This might reflect a displacement of prostitution to the second catchment area. It is interesting to note that the intervention wave of the physical observations was conducted during the same week of January in which social observations found a relatively large spike in observed prostitution activities in catchment area 2 (see chapter 5).[30] However, in both of the catchment areas there is a decline in the condoms/condom wrappers measure between the pre and post periods, although they are not statistically significant. These results can be seen below in Table 6.3. Additionally, the fact that all three areas did not see a decrease makes it unlikely that these changes were being caused by secular or seasonal trends.

Figure 6.3



[30] In Chapter 10 we discuss ethnographic evidence of displacement to the second catchment area.

Table 6.3

Condoms and Condom Wrappers on Sidewalk with Wilcoxon Signed-Ranks Test		
	Pre-Post	**Pre-During**
Target Area	**Sig.=.002*** **	**Sig.=.001*** **
Catchment Area 1	**Sig.= .153**	**Sig.=.025** **
Catchment Area 2	**Sig.= .783**	**Sig.=.043** **

*p ≤ .10 ** p ≤ .05 *** p ≤ .01

Needles and drug paraphernalia found on the sidewalks also showed significant change at the prostitution site. This measure was also based on a four-point scale defined as none, light, moderate, and heavy. The results in Table 6.4 show that there was a significant decline in the number of needles and drug paraphernalia in the target area for both periods tested, demonstrating a possible intervention effect. There was not a significant change in catchment area 1 for either of these periods, providing little evidence for displacement or diffusion of the intervention effect in the target area. As with the condom/condom wrappers measure we find a significant increase in observations of needles/drug paraphernalia from the pre to intervention periods.

Figure 6.4



Table 6.4

Needles and Drug Paraphernalia on the Sidewalk with Wilcoxon Signed-Ranks Test		
	Pre-Post	**Pre-During**
Target Area	**Sig.=.002*** **	**Sig.=.039** **
Catchment Area 1	**Sig.=.793**	**Sig.=.251**
Catchment Area 2	**Sig.= .128**	**Sig.=.021** **

*p ≤ .10 ** p ≤ .05 *** p ≤ .01

The final set of significant findings in the prostitution site concerned the amount of broken glass found on the streets and sidewalk. This measure was again based on a four-point scale categorizing the amount of broken glass on the streets and sidewalks into one of four categories including clean, mostly clean, moderately scattered, or heavily scattered. The results in Table 6.5 show that all three areas saw a significant change in the pre-to-during time period, while catchment area 2 saw a significant change in the pre-to-post period. A significant decrease in broken glass in the pre to intervention wave in the target area and catchment area 1 suggests a direct treatment effect in the target area as well as diffusion of benefits to catchment area 1. Similar to the condoms and drug paraphernalia measures, we find a significant increase in broken glass in catchment area 2 from the pre to intervention waves.

Figure 6.5



Table 6.5

Streets and Sidewalks covered with Broken Glass with Wilcoxon Signed-Ranks Test		
	Pre-Post	**Pre-During**
Target Area	**Sig.=.166**	**Sig.=.019****
Catchment Area 1	**Sig.=.285**	**Sig.=.059***
Catchment Area 2	**Sig.=.095***	**Sig.=.093***

*p ≤ .10 ** p ≤ .05 *** p ≤ .01

Analysis of the Violent Crime/Drug Site

As was the case for the prostitution site, there were several elements of physical disorder which did not evidence significant change during the three observation periods. The elements that did not change significantly included the number of burned, boarded up, or abandoned buildings; the condition of grass and shrubbery; buildings marked with graffiti, streets and sidewalks covered with broken glass, and the amount of litter found in yards and streets. Perhaps surprising given the results of our analyses of social observations, the number of needles and drug paraphernalia found on the street also did not evidence significant declines. One possible

explanation for this is that the Storms Avenue Violent Crime/Drug site was an area where drug sales occurred on the street, but drug use was more likely to occur indoors.

Looking at the number of broken windows we found overall similar trends in the target and catchment areas. This could of course represent secular trends in this area unrelated to the intervention strategies. The only significant changes were significant decreases in the number of buildings with broken windows in the target area and catchment area 1 in the pre-to-post period, suggesting an overall intervention effect in the target area and a possible diffusion effect to catchment area 1. Figure 6.6 and Table 6.6 below shows the findings from this analysis.

Figure 6.6



Table 6.6

Number of Buildings with Broken Windows with Wilcoxon Signed-Ranks Test		
	Pre-Post	**Pre-During**
Target Area	**Sig.=.004*** **	**Sig.=.550**
Catchment Area 1	**Sig.=.000*** **	**Sig.=.258**
Catchment Area 2	**Sig.=.294**	**Sig.=.222**

*p ≤ .10 ** p ≤ .05 *** p ≤ .01

Identical to the prostitution site, the condom and condom wrapper measure was based on a four-point scale. The analysis of the data concerning the number of condoms and condom wrappers found on sidewalks revealed a significant decrease in both the target area and catchment area 1, in the pre-to-post period. This finding represents a possible diffusion of benefits from the target area to catchment area 1. The results of this analysis are shown below in Table 6.7.

Figure 6.7



Table 6.7

Condoms and Condom Wrappers on Sidewalk with Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test		
	Pre-Post	**Pre-During**
Target Area	**Sig.=.024****	**Sig.=.107**
Catchment Area 1	**Sig.=.021****	**Sig.=.035***
Catchment Area 2	**Sig.=.655**	**Sig.=1.000**

*p ≤ .10 ** p ≤ .05 *** p ≤ .01

The measure of buildings on the street with structural damage was based on a four-point scale including less than 10%, 10-30%, 30-50%, and more than 50% of the buildings on the street having structural damage. The results in the graph illustrate the mean score of the scale capturing the measure of buildings on the street with structural damage. The results are shown

below in Table 6.8. The analysis of the data concerning buildings with structural damage revealed that there was significant change in both the target area and in catchment area 1 for the pre-to-post intervention period.

In this study, structural damage was defined as buildings with damaged walls and roofs, missing bricks and boards, or peeling paint. The change seen in the target area is an improvement in the structural condition of buildings. This change can probably be attributed to the enforcement of housing and health codes in the violent crime/drug site as described in Chapter 4. The change in catchment area 1 represents a possible displacement effect.

Figure 6.8



Table 6.8

Buildings with Structural Damage with Wilcoxon Signed-Ranks Test		
	Pre-Post	**Pre-During**
Target Area	**Sig.=.004*** **	**Sig.=.052***
Catchment Area 1	**Sig.=.001*** **	**Sig.=.317**
Catchment Area 2	**Sig.=.188**	**Sig.=.509**

*p ≤ .10 ** p ≤ .05 *** p ≤ .01

Discussion

The findings from this chapter show that some elements of the intervention are reflected in physical observations of the target areas. The results from the prostitution site showed improvement in the target area for the number of burned, boarded up or abandoned buildings; the number of buildings with broken windows; the number of condoms and condom wrappers found on sidewalks; the number of streets with needles or drug paraphernalia; and the number of streets and sidewalks covered with broken glass. The results from the violent crime/drug site revealed that there was an improvement in the number of broken windows, the number of condoms and condom wrappers found in the street, and buildings with structural damage.

The data are less clear regarding displacement and diffusion. In the first catchment area of the prostitution site, possible diffusion effects were observed in the pre to intervention period in the measures for condoms and condom wrappers and sidewalks covered with broken glass. But there was evidence of displacement in the second catchment area during this time period in the measures for condoms, needles and drug paraphernalia found on the sidewalk, and sidewalks covered with broken glass. The only possible sign of displacement in the violent crime/drug site was in the case of the percentage of buildings with structural damage. The results did show an increase in the percentage of buildings with structural damage in catchment area 1 in the pre-to-post period. Analyses of the data also showed that there was a possible diffusion of benefits for both the number of broken windows and the number of condoms found on the street in the pre-to-post period.

Chapter 7: Resident Interviews Analysis

Citizens are often seen as an important source of information about crime and disorder. This is one of the foundations of the community policing literature and has become an important source of legitimacy for police efforts to enlist community support and involvement in crime prevention efforts (Skogan, 1994 and Goldstein, 1987)**.** At the same time, prior research found that citizens often miscalculate the risk of victimization in their communities (e.g. see Skogan and Maxfield, 1981) and in this sense are not accurate observers of crime problems. However, in our study we thought it important to assess whether citizens observed changes in levels of street level criminal activity.

Residents were asked about the level of targeted crimes in the target area as the two catchment areas of both sites.[31] The results are presented below in a series of tables and graphs depicting the change. The graphs represent the change from pre- to post-intervention in two ways. For ordinal and nominal variables, the percent change in responses from the pre-intervention survey to the post-intervention survey is illustrated. For instance, if 50 percent of the respondents reported that drugs were sold on their block "often" before intervention, and 20 percent reported "often" in the post-intervention survey, this would be shown on the graph as a 30 percent decrease in responses of "often." For continuous variables, we simply graphed the before and after means beside each other for each area to allow for easy comparison.

One methodological problem we encountered, which we did not expect at the outset of the study, was the difficulty in identifying a sample from the target areas in the two sites (see Table 7.1 and 7.2). While the target areas included a smaller number of street segments (see Chapter 3) than the catchment areas, if we were able to gain our goal of ten surveys per street

[31] For detailed methods on the data collection of the resident interviews see chapter 3 on the data collection methodology.

segment we would have had sufficient numbers of cases for robust analysis. However, we did not account in our original methodology for the fact that many streets in the target areas included relatively few residents. This was the case in the prostitution site because buildings were abandoned and a park was located in one of the main areas.

Despite efforts to reach every residence and a relatively high response rate as documented in Chapter 3, we were only able to interview 11 people in the pre-intervention period and 17 in the post-intervention period in the prostitution site target area. Accordingly, we recognize that the number of cases in this sample does not allow a statistically reliable estimate of citizen observations regarding the intervention and changes in crime at that site. We were able to gain much larger samples in the violent crime/drug site (see Table 7.2), though still these numbers are not as large as we had originally expected. In this case, there were still relatively fewer residential homes in the target site which was located in good part on a main business thoroughfare. The number of interviews in the catchment areas are much larger, though in catchment area 1 in the prostitution site the numbers are relatively smaller (41 pre intervention and 48 post intervention), again because of the relatively smaller number of occupied residential housing units.

Table 7.1

Prostitution Site: Total number of interviews by wave and area				
	Target Area	**Catchment Area 1**	**Catchment Area 2**	**Total**
N pre-intervention	11	41	151	203
N post-intervention	17	48	170	235
Total	28	89	321	438

Table 7.2

Violent Crime/Drug Site: Total number of interviews by wave and area				
	Target Area	**Catchment Area 1**	**Catchment Area 2**	**Total**
N pre-intervention	39	160	261	460
N post-intervention	66	180	252	498
Total	105	340	513	958

Figure 7.1



Because we recognized at the outset that many of the residents in these areas were native Spanish speakers, we conducted interviews either in Spanish or in English. In Figures 7.1 and 7.2 we show the proportion of interviews in Spanish in each site.

Figure 7.2



Prostitution in the Cornelison Avenue Prostitution Site

We begin by looking at the level and frequency of prostitution in the respondent's neighborhood. Overall the table (see Table 7.3) is suggestive of the changes that observers identified in the social observations. For example, the number of residents in the target area that reported seeing prostitutes everyday dropped from 91 percent to 65 percent. However, as noted above this result was based on very few interviews. There is also a decline in catchment area 1 in the proportion of residents who saw prostitutes daily on their block, though small and not statistically significant, and a larger drop in catchment area 2 which is statistically significant at the .10 level.

Table 7.3a: How often do you see prostitutes on your block?

Area	Target Area		Catchment Area 1		Catchment Area 2	
Wave	***Pre***	***Post***	***Pre***	***Post***	***Pre***	***Post***
Not At All	9.1%	11.8%	39.5%	40.0%	55.0%	66.0%
A Few Times a Year	0%	5.9%	10.5%	4.4%	5.0%	4.3%
About Once a Month	0%	5.9%	0%	4.4%	5.7%	2.1%
About Once a Week	0%	0%	2.6%	13.3%	1.4%	3.5%
A Few Times a Week	0%	11.8%	10.5%	4.4%	5.7%	5.0%
Everyday	90.9%	64.7%	36.8%	33.3%	27.1%	19.1%

Table 7.3b

Prostitution Site: How often do you see prostitutes on your block?			
	Target Area	**Catchment Area 1**	**Catchment Area 2**
N pre-intervention	11	38	140
N post-intervention	17	45	141
Mann-Whitney U P-value	.306	.832	.059**

*p ≤ .10 ** p ≤ .05 *** p ≤ .01

Storms Avenue Violent Crime/Drug Site

Looking at the frequency of observed drug sales by citizens, we again observe a distribution that suggests a decline in behavior in all three areas examined. In the target area, and the two catchment areas, a larger proportion of residents report not seeing drug sales at all during the post-intervention wave than the pre-intervention wave and a smaller proportion report seeing drug sales daily. However, the differences between the pre-intervention distributions are not statistically significant for the target area, and catchment area 1. There is a statistically significant difference for catchment area 2 at the .10 level which is consistent with a diffusion hypothesis.

Table 7.4a: How often do you think drugs are sold on your block?

Area	Target Area		Catchment Area 1		Catchment Area 2	
Wave	***Pre***	***Post***	***Pre***	***Post***	***Pre***	***Post***
Not At All	9.4%	17.3%	25.8%	36.9%	41.7%	46.5%
A Few Times a Year	3.1%	1.9%	8.3%	6.7%	7.0%	9.4%
About Once a Month	0%	7.7%	9.3%	7.7%	6.4%	5.7%
About Once a Week	3.1%	5.8%	3.3%	1.5%	4.8%	3.8%
A Few Times a Week	15.6%	9.6%	14.2%	10.0%	9.1%	10.7%
Everyday	68.8%	57.7%	41.7%	34.6%	31.0%	23.9%

Table 7.4b

Violent Crime/Drug Site: How often do you think drugs are sold on you block?			
	Target Area	**Catchment Area 1**	**Catchment Area 2**
N pre-intervention	32	120	187
N post-intervention	52	130	159
Mann-Whitney U P-value	.212	.067*	.192

*p ≤ .10 ** p ≤ .05 *** p ≤ .01

We also asked residents whether they observed fighting on their block in each wave. Though the proportion who observed fighting "not at all" in the post intervention wave is higher in each area (see Table 7.11a), none of the comparison examined are statistically significant (see Table 7.11b).

Table 7.11a: How often do you see people fighting on your block?

Area	Target Area		Catchment Area 1		Catchment Area 2	
Wave	***Pre***	***Post***	***Pre***	***Post***	***Pre***	***Post***
Not At All	18.9%	30.6%	32.7%	42.1%	48.3%	51.5%
A Few Times a Year	24.3%	35.5%	30.7%	27.5%	26.4%	27.7%
About Once a Month	21.6%	8.1%	14.0%	11.7%	10.3%	11.3%
About Once a Week	13.5%	6.5%	12.7%	7.6%	5.4%	2.6%
A Few Times a Week	16.2%	11.3%	4.7%	6.4%	5.8%	5.2%
Everyday	5.4%	8.1%	5.3%	4.7%	3.7%	1.7%

Table 7.11b

Violent crime/Drug Site: How often does fighting occur on your block?			
	Target Area	**Catchment Area 1**	**Catchment Area 2**
N pre-intervention	37	150	242
N post-intervention	62	171	231
Mann-Whitney U P-value	.106	.118	.279

*p ≤ .10 ** p ≤ .05 *** p ≤ .01

Conclusions

Overall, given the social observation data reported in Chapter 5, it appears that residents are not very sensitive observers for crime changes on their blocks. Residents do not observe the changes in street level behavior that were evident to our observers, though the overall trends in the resident survey follow those in the social observations. It is likely that citizens are simply not accurate observers of crime in their neighborhoods. Studies have been done on the reliability of self-reports of offending and victimization surveys (Mosher, Miethe, and Phillips, 2002; Maxfield, Luntz-Weiler, and Spatz-Widom, 2000), but a review of the literature turns up little on whether citizens are reliable at estimating the overall level of crime in their neighborhood rather than their personal experience with crime. Skogan et al. (1981) address this issue in passing in "Coping with Crime." They compared citizen rankings of crime problems in their neighborhood with victimization reports. The analysis found that citizens tend to overestimate serious personal crimes, and underestimate more minor crimes (especially property crimes). Property offenses were the most common in the victimization surveys, while the more serious crimes were ranked as the biggest problem in the ranking survey.

Overall these data exhibit no evidence of a displacement effect into the catchment areas. There was also consistent, though not generally statistically significant, evidence of a possible diffusion of crime control benefits in the post- intervention period as contrasted with the pre-

intervention period. It is important to note that the small sample sizes of our target areas and catchment area 1 for the prostitution site limit our ability to draw inferences from our observations.

Chapter 8: Calls for Service Analysis

Emergency calls to the police, like our resident interviews, provide a measure of resident perceptions of crime and disorder. In this case, the data capture cases where citizens report a crime to the police or alert the police to problems occurring in their areas.[32] In recent years a number of studies have used emergency calls for service in order to evaluate police interventions (Sherman and Weisburd, 1995; Sherman et al., 1989; and Hope, 1994). Accordingly, we thought it important to assess whether emergency calls for service reflected the trends we observed in other databases. We note at the outset that these data are likely to be sensitive to an overall problem that we encountered in our resident interview data. As reported in Chapter 7, we found that there were relatively few residential units available for surveying in the target area and catchment area 1 in the prostitution site, and in the target area of the violent crime/drug site. The small number of residents in these areas is also likely to strongly affect the reporting of crime in the emergency call data.[33]

The Prostitution Site

We begin our analysis of the calls for service data in the prostitution site by looking at trend line graphs for each area, as well as the whole city minus the entire drug and prostitution sites, over a period spanning six months prior to the start of the program through six months after the end of the intervention, using 30 day waves to symbolize each month.[34] This will allow us to look at the trends over a fairly long period of time and assess whether the data reflect an impact upon crime in these areas. Perhaps reflecting the small number of residents in these areas, we

[32] The data examined in this chapter are only citizen calls for service and do not include police officer calls for service, which we decided were more a representation of police activity rather than observed crime in the community.

[33] As explained in chapter 3 of the data collection chapter there was over a month of data missing during the intervention period. For this reason there may be inconsistent trend lines for a portion of November and all of December during the intervention period.

[34] The start point and end point of the intervention are represented on the charts by vertical lines.

found that there were not enough calls for service for prostitution in the target area (or the catchment areas) to analyze prostitution separately as we have done in earlier chapters. Accordingly we created a general crime variable to account for general levels of reporting behavior.[35] Figures 8.1 through 8.4 show the results. [36]

[35] The general crime variable was composed of the following call codes: prostitution, use/sale of drugs, robbery at residence, robbery at commercial, robbery at financial, robbery of person, Assault w/ weapon, assault w/o weapon, street fighting, prevent breach of peace, disorderly conduct, noise, loud music, loitering, Intoxicated person, fireworks, street games, other public nuisance, lewdness, liquor possession by minor, civil disorder/riot, other public morals offenses, animal complaint, public argument, Sign down/traffic light out, abandoned/apparently stolen car, Damage to public property, damage to commercial property, damage to residential property, damage to motor vehicle, damage to other property, burglary of residential property, burglary of commercial property, burglary from other structure/area, theft of property from vehicle, theft of service, theft of other property, shoplifting/fraud, possession of stolen property, motor vehicle theft, other property crime, tampering with a vehicle, sex assault adult and minor, kidnap, homicide, harassment, neighbor dispute, trespass, prowler, gunshots fired/heard, person screaming/calling for help, person with firearm, and person with weapon.

[36] As explained in chapter 4, to perform the following examination of the citizen calls for service the calls were divided into thirty day waves based on the beginning date of the intervention. As explained in chapter 3 there were a number of days of data missing during the intervention period. To correct for these missing days, the waves which contained fewer than 30 days were weighted by the number of days actually present in the data. For this reason there may be inconsistent trend lines for a portion of November and all of December during the intervention in both sites. In fact, due to the missing data there were a few instances in which there were no cases in the wave which contained the end of November and/or all of December, for these instances this wave was computed by averaging the wave directly before and after (a note is made below the table for when this technique was used).As well, due to the start and end date of the interventions the final wave in each site was not exactly thirty days (40 days in the prostitution site and 23 days in the drug site). For this reason the final wave was constructed by weighting the calls present for this wave to be equal to thirty days. The start and end dates also made it difficult to name the waves sufficiently, more so in the violent crime/drug site. The waves are named by month of the year; however, because of the beginning and end dates of the intervention there are times when the waves overlap months. In the prostitution site the wave was named by the month within which the majority of the days fell. In the violent crime/drug site, which will be presented later in this chapter, we expressed the name as two months, because the wave lies approximately half in one month with the remainder in another month.

Figure 8.1*



*Because data for December were missing, we computed the December wave by averaging the wave directly before and after.

Figure 8.2*



***** Because data for December were missing, we computed the December wave by averaging the wave directly before and after.

Figure 8.3*



*Because data for December were missing, we computed the December wave by averaging the wave directly before and after.

Figure 8.4*



*Because data for December were missing, we computed the December wave by averaging the wave directly before and after.

Looking only at the target site and the catchment areas, it appears that there was a gradual decline in calls in the intervention period and then an increase in calls in the post-intervention period. The increase is particularly large in the target area in the third month after the intervention. Importantly, the pattern here does not reflect the very dramatic declines in street level behavior we observed in the social observation data. But more generally, if we compare these trends to general city wide trends in the call data, we can see that the trends observed in our site are very similar to those in the city as a whole. This suggests that the crime declines observed in these data follow a more general secular trend in the city.

In order to explore this issue more directly, we compared trends during the intervention year to the year prior to intervention for each of three areas. Figures 8.5 through 8.8 show a

comparison of the pre-intervention and intervention years for the three areas examined and the city as whole.

Figure 8.5*



*Because data for December were missing, we computed the December wave by averaging the wave directly before and after.

Figure 8.6*



*Because data for December were missing, we computed the December wave by averaging the wave directly before and after.

Figure 8.7*



*Because data for December were missing, we computed the December wave by averaging the wave directly before and after.

Figure 8.8*



*Because data for December were missing, we computed the December wave by averaging the wave directly before and after.

Looking at the intervention year in comparison to the year prior, it is interesting to note that the trends for the city as a whole are very similar for the pre- intervention and first few months of the intervention period. These trends for the whole city depart only slightly in the second half of the intervention period as compared to the prior year, showing somewhat higher crime trends. However, overall the trends are quite similar (see Figure 8.8). In contrast, the target area shows very different trends consistent with our prior analyses and more generally with activities of police in this area. Although, it is important to note that the numbers are small and the analysis is likely to evidence a degree of instability.

In the target area of the prostitution site, in the first month of the intervention we see a relative decline in general crime calls compared to a slight increase the year prior, coinciding

with the decline in street level prostitution and disorder described in earlier chapters. Additionally, we see a drop around February of the intervention year (when several prostitution stings were conducted) that is coupled with an increase the prior year. Finally, in the first month post-intervention there was a dramatic rise in general crime calls in the year prior, and a decline in the intervention year, again following the crime trends of the social observations noted at the site. Using the year prior as a benchmark both catchment areas appear to follow similar trends in citizen general crime calls for service in the first half of the intervention. Conversely, in the second half of the intervention, beginning in February, it appears that the catchment areas have trend lines breaking from the year prior and following more closely with the target area during the intervention period. In catchment area 2 this break from the prior year's trend continues through the intervention period, while in catchment area 1 the trends seem to fall back in line with the prior year after the break in February. This finding suggests possible diffusion of benefits from the intervention in the target area to the two catchment areas in the second portion of the intervention period.[37]

While these data are suggestive of the trends we observed earlier, it is very difficult to draw any solid conclusions from our analyses because of the limitations we noted at the outset. Most importantly, we have relatively few observations in the target site and catchment area 1. This follows our resident interview data and is the result of the relatively small number of residences in these areas. This fact also precluded us from focusing our analyses on specific types of crime, and in particular we could not analyze changes in the main targeted offense (i.e. prostitution). However, these data more generally alert us to the potential secular trends of crime decline in the city as a whole during the observation period.

[37] It is interesting to note that this increase in calls, combined with the fact that a large sting was carried out in the prostitution site in February, could explain why the large spike in prostitution reported in the social observations in the January wave was not maintained into February.

The Violent Crime/Drug Site

Our analyses in the violent crime/drug site mirror that of the prostitution site. As with prostitution, there were not enough drug calls or assault calls to allow us to analyze these target crimes. As such, the same general crime measure was used here.[38] We begin our analysis by looking at the six-month pre- and post- intervention trend lines for each area of the drug site and the whole city minus the drug and prostitution sites (see Figures 8.9 to 8.12).

Figure 8.9



[38] See footnote 4 for a list of the call codes included in the general crime measure.

Figure 8.10



Figure 8.11



Figure 8.12



Again, general crime in the target and catchment areas follow the overall secular trends in the city, with a continued decrease through the intervention period, and an increase in the post-intervention period. It is interesting to note here that the trend line in the intervention site continues declining through the last month of the intervention period, while the city-wide trend begins to show a crime increase at that juncture.[39] As in the prior section, we compare trends in the prior year to the intervention year to explore more fully the crime trends in these areas.

[39] Note that due to missing data the Nov/Dec and Dec/Jan waves were constructed using a weighting method, See footnote 3, Chapter 3, and Chapter 4 for further explanation on the missing data and the way in which the waves for this analysis were constructed.

Figure 8.13



Figure 8.14



Figure 8.15



Figure 8.16



Comparing the intervention year in the target area to the year prior shows that there may be some intervention effect present, which appears to be more salient at the beginning and end of the intervention period. In the case of the catchment areas, the trends in the prior year and the intervention year provide no evidence either of a displacement or a diffusion effect. The trends for general crime calls accordingly, do not appear to be affected by the intervention. Again, however, we do note a general secular trend during the intervention period in both the catchment areas.

IV. Conclusions

Our analysis of emergency call for service data, like our resident interview study, is limited by the fact that there are relatively few residential buildings in the targeted sites. Moreover, we could not examine the specific crimes that were targeted in the study because of the relatively small number of observations of these crimes available for study. Moreover, while these data do show declining general crime trends in the two sites we examined, such trends are clearly confounded by a more general secular trend in overall crime calls in the city as a whole. Nonetheless, in the prostitution site and at the beginning and end of the intervention in the violent crime/drug site, even accounting for city trends, data trends are suggestive of the interventions brought in the study. Possible diffusion of benefits are only evidenced in the catchment areas of the prostitution site towards the end of the intervention.

These data overall raise a question as to whether earlier data showing a strong effect for the intervention in the targeted area, and diffusion impacts, are reflective of more general secular trends in the city. We think it important to note in this regard that the level of decline in observed behavior in the social observation data is much more dramatic than the declines suggested by the secular trends in the city, and thus while such trends may be confounding the

impact of interventions, such confounding would not explain the extent of change observed. This is particularly the case in the first month of observation which shows relatively small declines in the secular trends observed, but dramatic declines in the social observations. Nonetheless, the findings here suggest the importance of examining more closely the experiences of offenders in these areas. We take this approach in the next two chapters of our report, which help clarify that findings from the social observations are due to forces other than secular trends.

Chapter 9: Qualitative Assessment of Arrestee Interviews

The data we have examined so far have focused primarily on immediate spatial displacement and diffusion. In this chapter we have an opportunity to take a broader approach to possible displacement and diffusion effects through interviews with offenders who were arrested in the targeted areas (see Chapter 3 for a description of the methodology used). Here we can ask directly whether they were influenced by the interventions in the targeted sites and how they responded. Arrestee interviews also allow us to gain a better understanding of the social organization of crime in the target areas and the reasons why displacement and diffusion might or might not occur.

Prostitution Site

A total of 47 interviews were completed in the target area of the prostitution site. Of these 47, there were 31 completed with individuals arrested for prostitution and 16 with people arrested for attempting to pick up a prostitute, who will from here on be referred to as johns. Only two of the prostitutes were male. All of the johns were males. Because these two groups had different structured interviews and because the two groups have different understandings of the issues, we analyze them separately. We remind the reader at the outset that most of the prostitutes were aware of an increase in police activity at the site during the intervention period when they were interviewed (see Chapter 4). We begin with our review of the interviews with the prostitutes themselves.

The Impact of the Intervention

Given our observations of a declining secular trend in general crime calls in the previous chapter it is important to begin by examining the perceptions of the prostitutes of the intervention itself. As noted in Chapter 4, prostitutes were well aware of the increase in police presence in

the areas they worked in. But importantly, it is clear that this increased police activity also impacted upon their behavior in the prostitution target site. One prostitute elaborates:

> "In the last three months, not worth it…too much police activity…definitely more police, now on bikes…never used to be on blocks…more undercover…roadblocks are new, random checkpoints…johns are afraid to stop so they drive around too much, so they are too visible and make things worse for themselves."

One respondent explained that there were a lot of prostitutes that worked the area but they were all picked up due to the increased police presence: "I would say around 50 or so, but right now they are all here (in jail)." Prostitutes noted that everyone knew about the stings and some prostitutes became afraid of being out and getting picked up.

In addition to the increase in police presence and stings, another element of the intervention involved clearing a lot, an abandoned lumberyard, which contained a small building where a number of prostitutes entertained johns and used drugs. One prostitute explained that they used to call this lumberyard the 'honeycomb hideout,' that it had beds and that they used to be able to go there with "dates" or to do drugs. She added that closing the lumberyard made them "mad." Because of this another prostitute explained that they had to find a new place and homeless prostitutes had nowhere to go.

Some prostitutes noticed a decrease in business and some even claimed to have stopped offending for a while. One prostitute explained that she used to have three or four "dates" a day and now she hasn't had any for three weeks because there are so many cops in the area. Others explained that they had to lay low for a while waiting for the police to leave.

The Prostitution Market and Drug Involvement

It is important to note at the outset that drug use was a central fact of life for most of the prostitutes we interviewed. This is important because it suggests that it will be difficult for

prostitutes in the area to desist from crime altogether, since drug involvement generally requires large sums of money to support the drug user's habit. This perspective is reinforced by our data.

Over 90 percent of the respondents indicated former or current involvement with drugs, with most prostitutes indicating that they were currently using drugs. Only 13 percent reported selling drugs at the time of the interview. A number of different drugs were used by the prostitutes, including heroin, cocaine, and marijuana. Many prostitutes expressed needing money to support their severe addiction to heroin or cocaine as a reason for working. One prostitute said that she used heroin five to six times a day, every day. Another respondent explains, "When I need a fix, and have no other money, that is when I go out…just enough to get going. I just need a fix and then I stop." A few of the prostitutes expressed frustration with their situation of addiction and prostitution, which is well summarized in the following quote:

> "The girls aren't doing harm. Kids can't play there when girls are working, but they are just looking for a living. I'm a 7th grade dropout. I have been into drugs for the past 10 years. You get into a cycle and you can't get out. Welfare is only $322 a month. Rent is $500 a month."

Thus, there appears a clear link between the prostitution activity and drug addiction, a cycle that is difficult to break, as illustrated by another prostitute.

> "I usually set a quota for myself if I want to get high. I ask for $20, nothing lower, unless I am dope sick. If that is the case, then I will take lower amounts because I just don't know any better. I don't go chasing out after anyone though. I don't think I have ever been that desperate. After I get money, I get me some drugs and then I go back out again. In and out, in and out."

Because of this cycle, it was surprising to find that few of the prostitutes sold drugs. However, two of the prostitutes indicated that this was because they had tried to sell and ended up using the product, which got them into trouble with their suppliers. This fact may prevent a

specific displacement of changing crime type in which the prostitutes move from prostitution to drug selling.

Factors Working Against Spatial Displacement

A number of elements of the social organization of the prostitution market at Cornelison Avenue inhibited spatial displacement. Interestingly, most of the prostitutes worked alone and did not work for a pimp. In addition, the respondents repeatedly mentioned the importance of their many regular customers, both as a safety issue and to keep steady work. One prostitute gives us a keen sense of working alone and why for safety reasons it is important to have regulars.

> "I always work alone. If we walk together or near each other, no one gets dated…. Usually I deal with regulars whom come to my house… If they aren't regulars, I try to feel them out. I use precautions. I never will get into a car with two men. I always check the doors to make sure I can get out if I need to, like if an emergency arises, like a guy trying to hurt me. I will always go into an area I know. This way, if I need help, I know that somehow I can find someone or get someone's attention. But, in the same way, I don't go into an area that would give away what I am doing and get me arrested. I basically don't let the guys take me where they want to go. If they insist on this, then I make them pay me up front, before the zipper goes down.

Although many of the prostitutes said that they get along with each other, they do admit that there is a specific turf issue when it comes to customers and their area. Most of the girls know to stick to their customers--to their regulars.

> "As long as you stay on your turf with your customers, no one bothers you. The only time girls start with you is if they are on some crazy drugs. I have met a few guys who have thought I was someone else, was looking for someone and turned me down. I didn't really care."

Another respondent explained that going to a different area of town is difficult because other prostitutes got angry and told her "this is our turf, stay away." The prostitutes explained that

they stayed in this area because it takes a while for a market to develop and to find regular customers. Moving would be difficult for their regular customers.

Another reason prostitutes may have stayed in the area, is because of their comfort with the market. One prostitute stated that she stayed in the area because she knew it and felt safe there because of that familiarity. As well, they were used to the atmosphere of the market in the Cornelison Avenue area. A prostitute explained that people work in the area because it is quiet and spaced out enough so that you can work alone or meet up and talk for a few minutes. Moving to another market may have meant challenging this comfort and would have required extra effort to acclimate. Additionally, prostitutes described only one other central prostitution area in Jersey City which one prostitute described as faster, with hotel rooms, fewer regulars, and not as many drugs. This is quite different from the market in the target site which reportedly has plenty of drugs and allows for a more laid-back atmosphere. Only one prostitute, a male, said that he went to the other market where there was more money and he could use the hotels.

Prostitutes may also stay in this area simply because of the short distance it is from their homes. All of the prostitutes who shared with us where they lived explained that they lived in close vicinity to the site, mostly in public housing.

Types of Displacement Reported in the Interviews

Some type of displacement was mentioned in 13 of the interviews. Of the different types of displacement respondents mentioned, the most common was temporal, followed by method, spatial, and crime type. These will be discussed in more detail below. There was no mention of perpetrator or target displacement.

Temporal

Temporal displacement was the most commonly mentioned type of displacement in the interviews, with nine of the respondents mentioning displacing by time. Given our discussion earlier of barriers to spatial displacement and the prostitutes' need for money to support, for example, drug habits, the presence of temporal displacement is not surprising. The majority of temporal displacement consisted of changing times of the day in which the prostitutes were working. Many of them favored going out later at night. One prostitute said that this was the best time to go because "cops are lazy at night." Another respondent said that many of the prostitutes had figured out the police schedule and that is why she was going out later. This is backed up by another prostitute who stated, "I have been coming out later, because I thought the police worked 4-11. I guess I was wrong, since I got arrested late at night."

Only one prostitute stated that she started working early in the morning at 8am, because there was less going on. Some of the prostitutes explained that they tried to watch and if they knew the police were in the area they would come out when they thought they were gone, either at a different time or another day. One prostitute said that they told each other if the police were in a particular area, so they knew to stay low until they were gone.

While temporal displacement was the most common type mentioned in the interviews, still less than one-third of the sample noted it. Of the types of temporal displacement mentioned there was very little variation, with most attempting to figure out the police schedule or checking by word of mouth or sight to see if the police were present.

Method

Method displacement was mentioned in six of the interviews. These prostitutes discussed having the johns call or page them, or having johns come to them or meet them in a particular

place. One prostitute mentioned that she had a phone book an inch thick, which allowed her to keep in touch with her johns. Another prostitute explained, "Now I have people coming to me. They call me on the phone and make an appointment basically, just as if they be going to the dentist. They set up times and dates and they beep for me outside the house."

One prostitute said that girls were taking less money than before, which shows that there was an effect on the price of 'a trick' in the market. This change in method may be to increase the number of customers by appealing to those who may have been afraid to approach the area. Another prostitute said that she now (during the intervention period) has customers park further away, which may be viewed as a type of spatial displacement, but because it is not a large distance may also be considered a change in method. Another avoidance technique is described by a respondent, who explains that if you stop and stand like she used to the cops will tell you to leave, so in order to avoid detection she keeps walking. In sum, there is some evidence of method displacement, most of which involves having the johns call or page instead of working the streets.

Spatial

Spatial displacement was mentioned by only three respondents (9.7% of those interviewed). This is not surprising given the barriers to spatial displacement outlined above. Two prostitutes mentioned that when they knew the police were around they only moved a small distance outside the target area. One moved toward a drug-infested area and another went to an area outside of catchment area 2. Another respondent talked of moving just a few blocks, away from the primary street in the target area. She explains, "I don't really work on the street too much these days, not with all the stings going on. But if I do work on the streets, I am mostly on

Johnston and Grand. I don't go near Cornelison too much because that is where a lot of the girls are arrested these days."

This quote demonstrates both the small movement in activity because of the police presence but also illustrates this prostitute's decrease in activity. Only one prostitute mentioned moving to another market in the city, but was only referring to prostitutes in general and not to herself. In all, there was very little evidence of spatial displacement and, when present, it remained very close to the prostitute's normal working location. Accordingly, one explanation for our failure to detect displacement to the catchment areas is that the prostitutes did not like to shift the location of their work, even to areas nearby. They were familiar with the target area and felt comfortable there. They were more likely to try to adjust their hours, or change the nature of their work than to move either to areas nearby or to other prostitution markets.

Crime Type

There was only one instance of crime type displacement noted by the prostitutes we interviewed, which involved switching from prostitution to drug sales. This one instance was described by a prostitute who said that because of the intervention she tried to deal heroin and reduce her prostitution. However, she explains her own difficulty with this change in crime:

> "…sometimes now, I deal heroin. Not a lot, just enough to get me some goods. If the police be cracking down on the prostitutes, I got to find me ways to make money elsewhere…but the people I work for, well, they really don't like me. I keep trying different people, but word is out on me. I am running out of people to try. Basically what I do wrong is that the dealers give me drugs, but instead of selling them, I leave with them and don't pay up. Then they come and look for me."

Another prostitute said something similar about her attempt to enter drug sales years earlier, stating that she kept using it and getting into trouble. It appears that these prostitutes' own

addiction may cut their chances of breaking into sales in the drug market, thereby reducing the chances of prostitutes moving from prostitution to drug sales.

Johns Arrested in the Target Area

There were 16 johns interviewed from the target area of the prostitution site. Only one john mentioned he was a drug user. All of these johns were male and only four were familiar with the area. Many of the johns claimed that they were only driving through the area when they were waived down by a woman and arrested. The johns were much more likely to claim that they were not involved in the crime they were charged with compared to the prostitutes. In fact two johns said they would not have stopped if they had not seen the "hot girl" or girl who looked "good," in this case an undercover cop. One john explained that he was driving through the area and that he was not very familiar with the girls but this was the first time he had seen a "hot girl" who looked more attractive than the usual girls, otherwise he would not have stopped.

Overall, interviews with the johns provided little knowledge of the prostitution market and did not indicate elements of displacement in their behavior. There are a variety of potential explanations for this. First, it may be that many of the johns usually drove through and were genuinely unfamiliar with the area or the market itself. Second, it may be that many of the regulars were not picked up in the arrests due to knowledge of the area and learning of the police presence from their prostitutes, and thus our sample reflects the people who did not adjust to the realities created by the intensive interventions. Third, because the johns were in jail they may not have been as open to talking or may have been more likely to lie than the prostitutes. Finally, the johns were more likely to have steady jobs, families, and stronger social bonds that would prevent them from comfortably admitting or sharing openly their knowledge of a known prostitution area.

Violent Crime/Drug Site

There were a total of 51 interviews of individuals arrested in the violent crime/drug target area. The majority of arrestees interviewed were arrested on drug-related charges and with nearly half the sample being arrested for selling drugs, forty percent arrested for buying drugs, possessing drugs, or having a prior warrant on a drug charge. One interviewee was arrested for prostitution, three for assault, and finally one for evading an officer. We decided that the entire sample could be categorized and considered together because it did not appear as if the respondents' answers were sufficiently incompatible to warrant grouping the sample into categories. The decision to lump all of the interviews into one group was further supported by the finding that 46 of 51 of respondents mentioned a familiarity with the target ***area.***

The Impact of the Intervention

As discussed in Chapter 4, respondents in this site were less likely to have discussed the interventions in their interviews than those at the prostitution site. Nonetheless, as described earlier, a number did note that police activity had become more intense at the targeted site and that offenders had begun to become aware of the increased police activity. Some for example explained that they tended to stay off the streets, though the fact they were arrested suggests that they continued to deal drugs in the area. One respondent explained:

> "…lately Narcotic come around Monday and Thursday and someone is going to get arrested on those days…that is a sure bet. On these days I just stay underground until the cops go home because I'm not stupid. When the cops are around I stay underground until they leave to go home, then I come out. The rest of the days there are just regular cops. They know me and they don't arrest you. As opposed to narcotics that come and rip things up."

This increase in police presence was also described as having a negative effect on business. As one dealer noted: "lately it has been chilling because the cops are around a lot."

Rational Components of the Drug Market at the Site

Overall the nature of drug activity in the target area suggests an environment similar to a business model. In fact over 80 percent of respondents who stated that they sold drugs mentioned that they work with or for someone else. In a review of the types of work situations in the drug market it appears that some work in medium to large size groups, others work in small groups and still others work alone. The interviewees described numerous types of drugs being sold in the target area, including cocaine, heroin, and marijuana.

Respondents described the drug work group as a hierarchical system in which dealers either get a base salary or take home whatever money is left after paying a certain amount to their immediate boss. One respondent explains that the boss is only present for an hour or so in the afternoon, but the boss is the most trusted member of the work group. There are many different positions in the workgroup. One respondent explains that he is a seller and there are about five sellers on his team and they all work for three Lieutenants and one Captain. Another respondent explains that after you sell a specified amount of drugs the Lieutenant brings you more. Still another respondent illustrates the division of labor and distribution of drugs and money in a workgroup,

> "You have someone who goes to get the drugs. Then you have someone who brings it back, someone who gives it out, the people who deal it on the street, then someone who comes to collect the money. The one who gives it out is the same person who comes to collect the money that is made. Usually each person is given a bundle, which equals 10 bags with a street value of $15 per bag. Sometimes we might sell it for cheaper but in any case the man gets $115 either way and we keep the rest. If we are good, we can sell all 10 bags in about half an hour. Then the guy will come to collect and give us some more drugs."

Respondents noted that different individuals from the groups work in different shifts around the clock. As well, two respondents mentioned that a certain percentage of the money earned through sales goes into a "kitty" for bail money. One dealer explains that the "main

man's" girlfriend usually holds the kitty for when it is needed. In essence, the collection of bail money shows a specific degree of forethought and rational thinking on the part of the dealers, similar to the collection of insurance in a sanctioned business.

Factors Discouraging Spatial Displacement

When thinking of drug activity in the target area as a business model, it is not surprising that there are elements of the market that inhibit spatial displacement. Dealers' intimacy with the area in which they work is one of the primary mechanisms preventing spatial displacement. A number of dealers explained that you work near where you live because that is your "turf." One arrestee elaborates, "you really can't deal in areas you aren't living in, it ain't your turf. That's how people get themselves killed."

As well, it was a common theme to hear that it is safer to stay in one place because other groups do not adapt well to individuals encroaching on their territory. One respondent explains that different blocks are controlled by different groups, which promotes competition. It is the nature of this competition that reduces the amount of movement of groups. However, this does not mean that groups do not attempt to encroach on each other's territory. One dealer states that there are fights a few times a month "if one block is booming and the other isn't." In fact, movement by groups into another group's turf seems to differ by group size. One respondent explained that there are more fights for turf between the smaller groups because they have little respect for each other.

Two respondents worked as what those in the drug dealing business term "floaters." These are people who work alone and move from team to team. It appears that people working solo are not perceived to pose a financial or physical threat to an existing work group, and as such they may go unnoticed by other groups. They can easily move because they are less likely

to have a centralized market, and they have less conflict because they can easily cooperate with different teams. So, in sum, it appears that the small teams are more likely to attempt moving and create conflict than large teams or groups, while individuals who work alone move more easily between markets and without creating conflict. As such there is a rivalry between groups and a protection of turf which forms a barrier to spatial displacement that is more likely to deter movement of large groups than smaller groups or individuals working alone.

Another barrier to spatial displacement is the time and effort placed into building a business (i.e. getting "turf" and established customers). One respondent explains that it is difficult to move because the "money won't be the same…would have to start from scratch…takes time to build up customers." He continues to explain that the smaller groups have the hardest time setting up shop in new areas. The importance of regulars in these areas makes it more difficult to move a market as respondents repeatedly stated that the majority of clients are regulars. In fact, if a buyer is new they have to be recommended by a regular customer. Even buyers said they go to the same dealers because they know them and trust their product is good.

Evidence of Displacement

It was not common for arrestees in the Storms Avenue violent crime/drug site to speak about displacement, though it is important to note that only one third of them mentioned an increase in police activity during the intervention period in their interviews (see Chapter 4). Out of the 51 interviews only 16 of them mentioned some type of displacement. The majority of displacement described was a change in methods, which was mentioned in 13 interviews. Spatial displacement was mentioned in six interviews and temporal displacement was mentioned in three interviews. There was no mention of target, crime type or perpetrator displacement.

Method Displacement

The most common mention of method displacement was placing a drug stash in a new place and sending the buyer to this place after receipt of the money. In essence, this can cause buying/selling to take place over a slightly larger geographic distance. One dealer explained that it is important to move your stash frequently. A similar method was mentioned by a few dealers, explaining that when the police put the heat on a "Lieutenant," a partner will stay on the dealer's corner and send the buyer to another location (i.e., halfway down the block, on the basketball court, or at an apartment) for the purchase from the dealer. In this case there is spatial and method displacement; however, it is important to note that the examples of spatial displacement given were of a very small distance and often meant that offenders remained in the target area.

Other examples of method displacement took place in order to avoid changing the location of sale, but still incorporate some spatial elements. Many of them talk of walking a particular "beat" down specific streets and returning after the police have left to resume dealing. This isn't a case of spatial displacement as the dealer is still selling drugs at the same location. He simply alters his methods by walking a "beat" for a while until the cops were gone. Thus it better fits the description of method displacement.

Other dealers talk about using different types of communications technology to avoid the police, including using cell phones, two-way mikes, or walkie-talkies to communicate with others about the presence of police, including one offender who mentioned having a lookout on the roof with a walkie-talkie. One dealer described specific codes that were used in this communication such as "yellow" being called out for a narcotics officer/squad and "blue" for a line officer in uniform. Other dealers mentioned that they had recently started using pagers so that their customers could beep them and schedule a sale on the corner. One dealer who has

begun using a pager said that he even home delivers drugs if the price is right. This is an example of method displacement; however, it may have elements of spatial displacement as the sales may end up taking place in a location different than the targeted area.

A final example of method displacement was mentioned in one interview and involved the use of different couriers to avoid police detection. This example may be labeled as perpetrator displacement if we knew these different couriers were new to the market and were replacements due to the intervention. However, the interview did not point to this fact but only to the use of different curriers, so we have placed it as a type of method change under the assumption that the curriers are only changed and were not new to the business.

Spatial Displacement

Following our findings regarding the prostitution site, only six respondents mentioned some type of spatial displacement. The majority of spatial displacement mentioned involved small geographic movement within an individual group's own territory, and thus generally movement within the target area. One dealer explained that the groups may change corners every few months because of the police. Another dealer said that they just moved over a couple blocks or avenues due to police presence, which would indicate in certain circumstances movement to the catchment areas. One of the respondents who worked alone mentioned that he mainly changed areas rather than times. He explained that large groups are more likely to change the time they work rather than areas, but since he works alone it is easier for him to move. As mentioned earlier, it may be easier for dealers who work alone to move geographically because "'floaters' are not a large threat to other dealers."

Temporal Displacement

There were only three respondents who mentioned some type of temporal displacement. All of the examples mentioned involved alternating shifts or changing times of work to avoid the police. One respondent explained that when he saw the police around he would stash his drugs in the trash and go home or to his girlfriend's, returning two hours later to resume selling after the officers had left. Overall, there were few specific examples of temporal displacement.

Conclusions

Our interviews with offenders arrested in the target areas during the intervention period help us to understand the patterns observed in the data we described in earlier chapters. Importantly, they reinforce our findings in the social observations chapter that the interventions had strong impacts on the lives of offenders and on their behaviors at the sites. Importantly, these interviews also provide context to our finding of little displacement to the catchment areas and provide explanation for why offenders may not simply "move around the corner," or to other locations farther away. Nonetheless, we recognize that these interviewees are by definition conducted with individuals less likely to be displaced by police activity, since they were arrested in the target areas after the interventions had begun.

The discussion of barriers to displacement is most clearly stated for prostitutes arrested at the Cornelison Avenue site, where arrestees were generally well aware of the increased intensity of police interventions. Here prostitutes described the difficulty of moving to new areas both because they felt "comfortable" in the target site, and because they often had regular clients who came to the area. For the Storms Avenue site, where the drug trade was a major factor, offenders were also unlikely to displace to other areas both because of the established nature of

"businesses" at the site, and the fact that drug dealers at other sites would protect their turf. Nonetheless, there was relatively more talk about spatial displacement in this area.

The interviews also allow us to gain a preliminary view of other types of displacement. It is clear from our data that the intervention in the prostitution site did cause some prostitutes to change the way they worked, for example through the use of appointments with regular customers. The Storms Avenue site also provided evidence of other types of displacement again with method displacement most likely. Importantly, these findings suggest that spatial displacement may not be the first choice of offenders who are the subject of police interventions and indeed a number of factors work consistently against the displacement of offenders to other areas.

Chapter 10: Ethnographic Analysis of the Cornelison Avenue Prostitution Site

A full report of the ethnographic work conducted by Regina Brisgone at the Cornelison Avenue prostitution site is provided in Appendix A. In this chapter we want to highlight relevant sections that shed light on the direct intervention effects of the study, and on possible displacement and diffusion impacts of the intervention. We refer the reader to the Appendix for details about the approach used and the more general observations made.[40] In this chapter we want to focus on three main questions:

1) Do the ethnographic observations support our earlier social observations, and interview data, that suggest a strong impact of treatment at the target site on the behavior of the prostitutes working there?

2) Is there evidence of displacement, and if so, what are the main types of displacement observed?

3) Do the ethnographic observations support the general finding that there are significant barriers to spatial displacement?

We think the ethnographic field observations provide particularly salient data for answering these questions, in good part because they involve prostitutes who were active at the outset of the study and who were followed through the post-intervention period.

[40] For ease of distinguishing our commentary from the original passages in the ethnographer's report, we single spaced sections drawn from Ms. Brisgone's report.

Do the ethnographic observations support our earlier social observations, and interview data, that suggest a strong impact of treatment at the target site on the behavior of the prostitutes working there?

The ethnographic observations suggest that the Cornelison Avenue site was perceived by prostitutes as "a quick and easy" place to make money, in which police activity was not particularly concentrated. There were large groups of prostitutes working there, and they generally worked without significant police interruption.

"Interviews began on September 3, 1998 prior to the beginning of the intervention at a time when Cornelison site was still perceived as ideal for quick and easy money for drug-addicted prostitutes. But this period also provided evidence of police activity. The extent of activity prior to the intervention was observed on a Sunday afternoon in late July 1998 when I was conducting a physical and social observation audit at the site with another team researcher on Cornelison Avenue. From 4:30 to 6 p.m., we counted the arrival of six prostitutes who began to solicit in the street. Most appeared heavily drugged. Several of them were unkempt. They walked in the middle of the street, waving at cars, walking up to them, and if they were successful, getting in the car with a client.

Typically, women interviewed during this period were temporarily ducking and weaving out of the sight of police cars or out of the target area in ways that predict temporal and spatial displacement during the crackdowns, but stopped short of actual displacement. These behaviors appeared to already be a part of a prostitute's behavioral repertoire that had evolved in response to dealing with police. The following are examples of this behavior.

From **Candy, a 41-year-old African-American in a 9/15/98 interview: '**It's best to have patience. You got to be duckin' and dodgin' the cops.'

From **Star, an African-American female, 33, interviewed 9/4/98:** 'I walk up Grand and Fairmount – never outside of that environment. When the cops come I walk away. I can get a date in between them (cop patrols). I have to. You got to try to make it not so obvious. You got to fade into the background.'"

As we described in Chapter 4, the prostitutes were well aware of an increase in police activity during the crackdown period. The ethnographer found that the "increasing pressure of the police crackdowns… led to a pre-occupation about the crackdowns among research

subjects." Her observations reinforce the view that the activities of the police were unusual and intensive and that the prostitutes were strongly affected by them:

"According to project records, raids took place September 23, 1998, the beginning of the intervention, followed by raids on October 7, October 14, an early November raid; a raid on November 30; February 18; and February 24. My interviews and observations can add to that history. Beginning with interviews on Sept. 23, 1998, talk of the 'Wednesday night stings' and arrests began to dominate discussion among research subjects.

I witnessed on Oct. 8, 1998 what prostitutes described as a raid on a former lumberyard building that was being used by homeless prostitutes. We saw a group of men in plain clothes running out of the building and jumping into cars as I drove one of the research subjects back to Cornelison after an interview. Interviews for the next several weeks focused on the 'lumberyard' raid and research subjects considered this a 'sting.'

On October 14, 1998 the lumberyard was still a focal point of discussion. We recruited four subjects – all except one of whom was standing on Grand Street, who provided evidence of spatial displacement behavior. The lone recruit standing on Cornelison had just gotten out of jail and was taking the risk. Later that night the second 'sting' would take place.

The following Monday, October 19, 1998, my host and I drove up to the lumberyard building hoping to recruit subjects there but found the place deserted and boarded up. A research subject searched the building looking for his peers, but found no one. The target area and nearby streets were fairly devoid of solicitation though we recruited two subjects on Grand Street near the Lafayette projects….November 6, 1998 was a day in which solicitation was almost non-existent in the target area and surrounding catchment areas – save for one lone woman on the stroll mid-day who had been away and didn't know about the crackdowns….

Around 11/17/98 the research subject's interviews begin focusing on a serial rapist who was beating and raping prostitutes that he picks up in the target area. My hosts inform me on December 1, 1998 that another large round up has occurred and that many of the 'regular' prostitutes who are part of our sample are in jail….Reports from my hosts are that the scene was quiet and many women were in jail throughout December and January 1999….

There is evidence of subjects taking chances when they sense the pressure is off. On February 19, 1999 around noon we drive the area and it is quiet. We recruit one subject at the Pathmark shopping center and then shortly before 2 p.m. drive onto Cornelison Street itself and there are three known prostitutes there: one is on Cornelison by Fairmount; a second on Cornelison by State Street; and a third (who had just returned to the stroll after six months absence) on Cornelison near Fairmount by the residential drug treatment center. At around 6 p.m. after dropping off of a research subject, I drive up Cornelison again and spot a regular prostitute on her regular spot on the stoop on Cornelison by Westervelt Place. I pick her up and conduct an interview on Summit Avenue, then drop her off again at the stoop.

Around March 16, 1999 my hosts again report that prostitutes are scarce and that the police 'are finding new and different ways' to arrest the prostitutes. On a subsequent interview day on 3/26/99 we recruit two new subjects – a long-time prostitute who is out on the street and taking risks since her financial supporter – a boyfriend – went to jail six weeks ago, and another female who has arrived from Patterson, NJ fleeing from trouble. She is soliciting on Grand Street near the Lafayette public housing projects."

Interviews with the subjects also provide a strong sense of the intensity of the police activity and the fact that it was strongly felt by prostitutes in the area:

"Sugartoo, 34-year-old African-American, interviewed 10/22/98, describing the Wednesday night sweeps:

> 'Changes as far as the street goes: it's really hard to make money. Cops is out there now and gonna make a sting every Wednesday. They got cops out on motorcycles, and they got bicycle cops out there and the walking cops and the undercover cops in the cars. And you got a take a chance. Johns is afraid to come out 'cause they think you is a cop. They (female decoys) look like they working. There's a big fat girl and a Puerto Rican girl that stand on the corner. I guess they're rookies. They take them (clients) around the corner and that's where the cops are. Then they take them to jail . . . You can't make me go out there. It's just too hot.'

Lil 'D', a 21-year-old African-American, interviewed on 10/14/98, describing the raid on the lumberyard on October 8, 1998: 'The girls are getting busted for being in the warehouse (lumberyard building) on Grand Street. People is going to jail . . . Everybody but 'Flaca' moved out of the warehouse. The cops have the whole back (of the building) under surveillance.'

KK, a 32-year-old African-American interviewed 2/26/99, about the continuing stings: 'I been out three times straight and nobody is out. The streets were so clean. I ask: 'where everybody at?' It's just a crisis. It is so empty. Everybody is afraid of being arrested for solicitation. They done did a lot of sweeps . . . I still goes out. But I'm discreet.'

Is there evidence of displacement, and if so, what are the main types of displacement observed?

The ethnographic field observations provide a number of examples of displacement of crime. As with our arrestee interviews, the most common adaptation appears to be a change in methods.

Method Displacement

"The most dramatic shift during this period was in the incidence of method displacement …Narratives suggest that this occurred as research subjects became more aware of what the intervention entailed and began engaging in different tactics to avoid being detected and arrested by police. Research subjects began pre-arranging dates by means of phone or beepers and working from home (combining spatial and method displacement); quizzing potential clients to ensure they were not police officers; disguising their looks and engaging in stealthy solicitation. Also at this time, research subjects began talking about (and some actually followed up) converting street clients into full-time customers – including one woman who agreed to be locked inside the man's house every day while he went to work to avoid working on the street.

Goldie, 28-year-old African-American, female, interviewed 2/5/99, was observed the day of her interview by the author taking a chance strolling along Fairmount Street just below Cornelison. But she discussed methods displacement in response to the police intervention.

> 'I've made myself more accessible. As time has gone on I've gotten more comfortable letting them (clients) come to the house to where I'm living. It balances out. I'm still dealing with the same clients. I give some of them the privilege of picking me up at the front door. I letting them have the privilege of calling me.'

Tina, 32, an African-American female, on 10/27/98 described pre-arranging dates, a tactical change from soliciting on the street at Cornelison, but also moving to an area away from the stroll and beyond both catchment areas, an example of spatial displacement. 'I'm meeting dates at McDonald's on Grand Street, and on Monmouth.'

Sassy, an African-American transgender male, 30, interviewed 10/30/98 began hanging around a motor court down by the Holland Tunnel near the known prostitution stroll at Tonnele Avenue (at least a mile away from Cornelison), and either solicited male customers himself or had friends arrange transactions for him.

> 'Recently I always catch a good date down at the motor Lodge – the Holland Motor Lodge. I know a lot of guys there that I hang out with. I meet good dates (clients), hang out, smoke dope. They (clients) always come around. They're there at 1 in the morning, at noon, at night.'

KK, 32, African-American female, interviewed 10/22/98, took pains to disguise her looks and the fact that she was soliciting and keeping a watchful eye out for the police and walking away when she spotted them.

> 'I play it safe. Try not to get noticed. The way I present myself. I don't really dress really like a hooker. When it's cold I'm not putting on a mini skirt and catching pneumonia . . . I be out there strolling through and not really (looking) anxious to pick up

a trick. If he pass I'll look and walk. If I've caught his eye, gotten his attention, he'll stop.'

Several women engaged in a tactic of agreeing to take one regular client and turn them into a full-time exclusive client in response to the crackdowns.

Gina, 39, an African-American female (interview 2/19/99), relied on one client exclusively from November 1998, when she got out of jail from an arrest in one of the strings, to February, when her drug habit pushed her back onto Cornelison where she was recruited for this interview.

> 'I met a friend who helps me out with money. He'll give me money and I go through it so quickly. He doesn't know what I'm doing with it. I'm lying to him right now . . . Today is the first time in two weeks I been out here (on Cornelison) . . . More than likely I'll end up in jail again if I don't get it together.'

Shy, 31, an African-American female, **interviewed 3/26/99,** appeared on the Cornelison site after the New Year, having fled from Patterson where she was in trouble. After several hard months of street prostitution on Grand near Lafayette public housing projects she allowed a regular client who is Caucasian to bring her home in late February 1999. Shy said the client locked her in the house when he went to work each day because he doesn't want her coming and going and being seen in his close-knit Italian neighborhood. She knows if she leaves, she cannot return, so she remains locked in.

> 'From that day I been in his house locked in and I haven't had to sell my body. The guy was a date. The type of person he was . . . he was kind of lonely and addicted (to heroin). I don't know where I would be today if I hadn't gotten off that street. In jail. In the hospital. Or dead . . . I love it when we're getting high. But I'm tired of it (the arrangement). I'm just doing it to stabilize me.'"

Temporal Displacement

Temporal displacement was also a common adaptation in the prostitution site according to our ethnographic observations. Informants claimed that they attempted to avoid police crackdowns by moving their activities to the early morning and late evening hours. Although less robust, similar findings from the arrestee interviews were reported in the previous chapter.[41]

"Research subjects shifted from day and evening hours to the early morning hours to avoid the police. Just five research subjects…engaged the in the 'duck and weave' behavior that was evident in the pre-crackdown phase. And, unlike in the beginning where subjects discussed shifting away from mid-day and early evening, the crackdown phase was characterized by a

[41] Using social observations, we attempted to examine possible temporal displacement patterns in the target areas, but were unable to find any consistent patterns. One reason for this may have been that prostitutes had temporarily displaces their activities from very late at night to early hours when observations were not conducted.

dramatic displacement into the early morning hours to avoid police crackdowns that were reported to begin in evening and continue to midnight. The following are some narrative descriptions.[42]

Denise, an African-American female, 37, interviewed 10/30/98: 'Later at night after 12 I go out. The cops usually set up shop at 9 to 10 and they go in around 11 or 12 at o'clock. I go out later (after midnight). Usually there be a lot of johns around that time.'

Linda, African-American female, 47, interviewed 11/5/98:

> 'Before you could go out in the daytime. Now I gotta come out at night. Now if you come out in the daytime the cops is out there all the time. Before you could get more money in the daytime than at night. You could come out for lunchtime get in a car, do what you gotta do and they (clients) go back to work. It's not like before. Things are getting harder and harder in the daytime to take care of my heroin habit. I wouldn't get as sick as fast. Now I get sick (experience withdrawal) in the daytime because the cops is out there and I have to wait until night to get straight (to get heroin).
>
> …I come out late at night. (Roughly midnight until 4 a.m.) That's when they (cops) not out there. You get some stragglers (clients) come late at night. . . a lot of them come out then because the cops be out all during the daytime. I'm out according to how fast the dates come. How fast they come back out. I was going out 11 or 12 and staying out all night. This was last week.'

Black, an African-American female, 26, interviewed 11/17/98 said:

> 'I went out a quarter to five (a.m.). Between 5 and 7:30 that's when the men start coming out (for sex dates). At a quarter to 5 (a.m.) everybody was out (clients). I'm like 'damn'. I have a few steadies who come when the cars come by on the way to work. I caught (one client) at 5:30 (a.m.). It was a blow job (oral sex). I made $20. As soon as I was out of the Jeep on Fairmount I went down to the gas station (at the end and around the corner on Grand Street) and caught (another client) at a quarter to 6. I did another blow job. I made $10.'"

Spatial Displacement

Though we will describe below factors that inhibit spatial displacement, according to the ethnographic field work, spatial displacement did increase in the intervention as contrasted with the pre-intervention period. These data also suggest spatial displacement to the catchment areas, a phenomenon that was not captured in the call for service data, but was evidenced in the January

[42] We attempted to examine this form of displacement in the social observation data but did not observe any consistent and reliable differences. This may be because our data collection did not begin early enough in the morning to capture these changes.

wave of our social observations and in our physical observation data.[43] One reason for this may be that the overall frequency of prostitution declined despite the fact that some prostitutes chose to move into the catchment locations:

"Spatial displacement incidence increased from pre-crackdown to crackdown…. It included a shift from the target area to nearby streets in the catchment areas and just outside of the catchment areas, and to other known prostitution strolls in Jersey City and beyond. The spatial displacement trend described in interviews was to avoid Cornelison and to solicit by walking along Grand Street in a way that mirrored the way they had strolled along Cornelison – from Ivy Place to Fairmount Street -- but also included moving to the Pathmark Shopping Center on Grand Street just outside the 2nd Catchment area, and trying out other Jersey City prostitution strolls such as the Tonnele Avenue stroll near the Holland Tunnel and the so-called 'graveyard cemetery' on Ocean and Cator avenues in the city's southern end. The following examples illustrate that trend.

Goldie, 28-year-old African-American female interviewed 2/5/99 said: 'I try to stay away from that area (Cornelison). I walk down Grand all the way to the Pathmark (at 420 Grand just outside the 2nd catchment area by Center Street) all around. I stand in front of a store.'

Linda, 48, African-American female, on 11/5/98, said: 'Now you meet them at different places. On Grand. On Montgomery, near the projects.'

Shawnice, a 30-year-old African-American female, interviewed 11/17/98, said she 'took the back way' several days earlier -- describing a walking loop around the Cornelison target areas involving mostly the second catchment area. It involved leaving Lafayette Public Housing projects by Woodward Street, and heading to Grand Street, walking down Freemont, crossing Bright to Florence, to Montgomery Street by the Jersey City Medical Center, turning onto Baldwin avenue which turns into Summit Avenue Street, turning briefly onto Astor Place, and then onto Park Street around 'the junction' and onto Grand Street for the length of it to Johnston back into the Lafayette public housing projects. She also said she 'caught a date under the bridge by Pathmark (the bridge between Merseles and Center streets)' just outside the second catchment area.

Sin, 48-year-old Hispanic transsexual (underwent sex change from male to female), interviewed 10/30/98, said she was arrested in one of the early stings, and then began displacing to other areas. 'They treated him (the client) like dirt, they treated me like garbage. They put the names in the Jersey Journal . . . I left the area.' She described spatial displacement to Montgomery Street near the Medical Center, but also to Palisade Avenue; to Tonnele Avenue where she took up residence in a motel there to turn tricks for two weeks; and also to New York City onto its transvestite/transsexual prostitution areas."

[43] As described in the social observation (Chapter 5) and the physical observation (Chapter 6) analyses there was evidence of possible displacement to catchment area 2 of the prostitution site in the measures recorded during the wave falling in January.

There was also evidence of crime type and target displacement, though these phenomenon were relatively rarely described by the prostitutes:

Target Displacement

"[Target displacement] included subjects shifting their solicitation to alcoholic men at the Pathmark Shopping Center, and soliciting elderly men at old age homes for their social security checks.

Shawnice, 30-year-old African-American female, interviewed on 11/17/98, tapped into a new source of clients while soliciting at Pathmark for her old ones.

> 'I walked down Pathmark way and they (client's) ask 'what's up.' I get in the car and that's it. This is a whole different group. They're alcoholics. They drink. They're older guys. The problem is they're cheaper (than Cornelison clients). Those cheap (expletive) give you $5 for a blow job (oral sex). If you're illin (in need of heroin), you'll take it.'

Toni, 34, African-American female, interviewed 2/19/99, also was able to tap into this new group of targets at the Pathmark shopping center -- having encountered them as she panhandled on the sidewalk of a pizza shop there.

> 'They ask: 'would you like some more money? They'll be beatin around the bush and hoping you'll catch it (solicitation). I try to be shy and discreet . . . not draw attention to yourself. Some guys if I'm panhandling will walk down, say "take this" and we'll leave (to engage in prostitution) depending on what they are paying.'

Linda, African-American, 47, interviewed 11/5/98, said that in addition to displacing to late night, and to Grand and Montgomery because of the crackdowns, she learned of a new source of clients – the nearby nursing homes – to exploit in the daytime hours especially at the beginning of the month.

> 'I made pay day last week. Get guys who get their check. Their SSI (social security check). I had no problems. That first week be good. I snuck out in the daytime to the old folks home. A lot of the girls go up there. We do blow jobs. They (clients) get their checks and they called me a few times. It (old folks home) is up on Montgomery. Girls be going with the old men. They really can't do nothing do much.'

This targeting of elderly social security recipients was later confirmed by my HIV outreach hosts -- as discussed in the crackdown observations section above -- who were interviewed about it by a local television reporter in early February 1999. My hosts told me the reporter interviewed prostitutes near Cornelison Avenue, and later accompanied police on the police prostitution raids for this story."

Crime Type Displacement

"…Another adaptation that emerged during the crackdown period was displacement to a different type of crime…. This included research subjects shifting from prostitution to panhandling, shoplifting, and selling food stamps. Another type of adaptation not necessarily illegal but illustrative of the trend was two instances of subjects scrounging old buildings for copper piping to sell to scrap dealers. Following are some examples.

Toni, 34, an African-American female on 2/19/99, talked about panhandling to generate income and avoid soliciting and being arrested. I observed her sitting on the ground in front of a pizza shop in the Pathmark Shopping Center wrapped from head to foot in blankets and scarves and begging for money. In an interview later that day she said: 'I got all kinds of hustles to keep me off that back street (Cornelison). I just say, 'I just need a quarter' or 'I need a beer' . . . you connive somebody. You play on somebody's sympathy.'

Brown Sugar, 40, African-American, interviewed 12/10/98, described daily shoplifting expeditions to Newark, Jersey City, and Hoboken supplement her income from prostitution, which was getting tougher. She attributes it – at least partly – to the weather being too cold to solicit for prostitution.

> 'I'm out there (on Cornelison) when it's warm. When it get cold, I start boosting (shoplifting). I'm out in the daytime. I do it (shoplifting) every day. Yesterday I got pants – 30 panties. I fixed myself up (stuffed them up her clothing) looked to see if nobody looking and 'see ya' -- I start to stepping.'"

Desistance

While most of the offenders continued involvement in criminal behavior 9 of 49 (18.4%) offenders who were subjects of the ethnographic research evidenced desistence as a reaction to the interventions brought by the police:

"…The highly transient nature of this population makes it difficult to gauge how offenders subjected to the crackdowns responded by desisting from offending. Nonetheless I have captured the narratives of nine offenders who ceased to offend on the Cornelison Avenue prostitution stroll in response to the police intervention. I have grouped this group of offenders into three categories: 1) presumed desisters; 2) [permanent][44] desisters; and 3) temporary desisters. The presumed desisters include two women who had been sporadic offenders who had

[44] Permanent is in reference to the period of the study.

"taken a chance" on a day during intensive police activity or its aftermath. One entered treatment; the other insisted on being taken home after her interview. Both said they would not return. The author observed neither of them again during the intervention. The desisters included three women who desisted following an arrest during the crackdown. These include a woman described below who desisted for most of the crackdown period and continued through the post-crackdown period. Subjects in the third group were able to desist for weeks or even months but were lured back to the stroll – or the catchment areas – to solicit because of the lure of drugs. Excluded from this analysis were persons who were jailed for periods of time, but who then resumed offending upon release.

I documented continuing [permanent] desistance (over 7 months) of **Celeste an African-American female, 34,** who was arrested in the October 14, 1998 sting, and was still desisting and drug free at the end of the crackdown period. Celeste had been a regular offender since 1995 in the Cornelison prostitution stroll. She decided to have one last blast of heroin and cocaine before entering treatment two days later. She went out soliciting on Fairmount Street, was arrested in the October 14 police sting, and spent 45 days in jail until November 28, 1998 because of unpaid fines on previous solicitation charges. She said she decided to get out of the life and off drugs because it was getting too hard because of the police raids, she was becoming afraid of the dangers involved, and wanted to regain custody of a small child. The following is from an interview from 12/4/98:

> 'I was tired of being tired. Sick of running. Then it started to scare me. It seemed like there would be stings (police roundups) constantly. I got scared of going to jail. I got tired of hurting my mother – letting her watch me do the things I did. She hated the fact that I worked the street. I got tired of hurting my family in general. I started to dislike myself. I started getting scared. I had a fear in my heart that I was going to die. I felt someone was going to kill me or I would do something terrible to get locked up for a long time . . . I was at the point. I was over the edge. I didn't know how I was doing this job. I had been told that I had a warrant. I didn't want to do it (prostitution) anymore. Or my drug habit anymore.'

Another example of [permanent] desistance is **Toni, an African-American female, who described in an interview on 3/26/99** how she stopped living in abandoned buildings and engaging prostitution and other hustles after three years. She entered drug treatment for heroin addiction at the end of February 1999, and was living in a shelter, trying to regain custody of her children, and was planning to move to Atlanta to ensure she wouldn't relapse and end up on the street. 'I'm just starting to exhale and focus,' she said. 'I'm breathing different air now.'

Adrienne, the third desister, a 34-year-old Hispanic woman, desisted after an intense but short-lived career on the stroll from late fall/ early winter 1998. She was a mainstream woman who entered prostitution for two months after losing her job and becoming involved with one of the hard-core Cornelison prostitutes. Adrienne's brief prostitution career was characterized by cocaine use, a brutal rape by the serial rapist also reported on by other Cornelison prostitutes, and an arrest for prostitution, which ultimately led to her desistance. She found the subsequent court

appearance on prostitution charges so intensely humiliating and at odds with her image of herself, that she got into drug treatment and counseling through my research hosts. They later reported that she was desisting and working again.[45]

Yet the lure of the streets, drugs and easy money proved too difficult for some. **Black, 26, an African-American female**, desisted from January to sometime in April. She worked during that time in a bakery, but quit when the owner began calling her ethnic slurs. She slipped back into her old lifestyle afterward engaging in prostitution and smoking cocaine. But she said she wanted to desist again. 'I'd rather be working or going to school or something,' she said wistfully.

Another desister – **Jaycee, a 24-year-old African-American female**, left the area for Wisconsin in September shortly after the interventions to get off of heroin in order to regain custody of her children. In an interview 11/17/98 she said that after attending court and moving back home with her mother to begin the custody process she met up with another prostitute – Black – and was lured back to the drugs, and eventually the streets. She was offending in the first two weeks in November. 'I should've never gone outside,' she said. 'I don't get high as much (as before). I'm not out there every night. I can't be out here all night. I don't know when they (child authorities) are going to come by.' She was offending for the first two weeks in November 1998 but was not re-interviewed again."

Do the ethnographic observations support the general finding that there are significant barriers to spatial displacement?

Despite evidence of spatial displacement of prostitution, the ethnographic observations also point to factors that work to restrain spatial displacement. As with our interview data, these surround the familiarity of the prostitutes with the sites, and their comfort there as opposed to other areas of the city. They would resist spatial displacement even if they knew that remaining at the Corneilson site would increase their risk of arrest:

"It was apparent that although subjects were familiar with other prostitution areas, such as Tonnele Avenue and the so-called graveyard stroll in the 'hill' neighborhood at Ocean and Cator avenues, they were reluctant to change from the Cornelison area, even if it meant risk, and on occasion no chance to offend because of the police presence. The following describes a general trend toward staying with the familiar, a phenomenon called 'familiarity decay' that asserts that offenders tend to stay near where they live and not to offend outside of a zone of familiarity.

[45] This example of a permanent desister is not included in the appendix as it was provided by the ethnographer in a future correspondence after her report was completed.

Sassy, an African-American transgender male, 30, summed up the general feeling about why subjects persisted on Cornelison despite the risks rather than go somewhere else.

> 'It's right there all you have to do is walk out the door and it's right there. It's quick money. Big fat easy money. The quicker you get out there, the quicker you gonna get it . . . People always tell me to go to over there to New York. That I'd make good money. But I just never knew the spot. I don't know where to go. They say I should go into New York with another person like me – you know 'gay' -- in drag – and go over there. They say I'd make more money than over here. But I don't know the area. I like to know who's who so I not be scared. I wouldn't know where to take a date. Who to trust. I just don't know anybody.'

KK, female, African-American, 32 tried the cemetery stroll – a prostitution site at Ocean and Cator avenues -- but opted to work more cautiously and less often rather than switch to a place that made her uncomfortable.

> 'I walked over (to the graveyard cemetery) and I didn't think I'd make money. It was unfamiliar to me. It was like, It was like . . . unfamiliar to me. I didn't know the guys (clients). On Cornelison you recognize the guys. I know from being out there every day (on Cornelison), the cars, the faces. It's different. In my area, I know the people. Up on 'the hill' -- I don't really know the people at that end of town.'"

Conclusions

The ethnographic observations at the Cornelison Avenue prostitution site support our findings that the interventions in the target area were intense and had a large and immediate effect on prostitution in the target area. These data are consistent and confirm our social observation, physical observation and interview data. They also suggest barriers to spatial displacement reinforcing our arrestee interview findings that familiarity and comfort with an area are important factors in restricting spatial displacement. These data also suggest that desistance is not an uncommon adaptation in response to intensive enforcement, though displacement, especially method displacement, is much more common. While these data generally confirm our earlier findings, they suggest that there is some spatial displacement to the catchment areas, and areas surrounding the catchment areas.

Chapter 11: Conclusions

Over the last decade there have been a substantial number of research studies on hot spots and hot spots policing efforts (Weisburd and Braga, 2003). Overall, these studies show that hot spots policing approaches have strong impacts upon crime in targeted sites (Weisburd and Eck, 2004). In turn, when immediate spatial displacement has been examined, the findings generally support the position that displacement is small and that diffusion of crime control benefits is more likely. Nonetheless, as we noted in our introduction, studies that are designed to measure direct program impacts are often flawed when they are used to examine displacement and diffusion. This study was designed to overcome such methodological flaws by focusing the intervention and data collection on the possibility and characteristics of displacement and diffusion.

Our main focus has been upon immediate spatial displacement or diffusion to areas near the targeted sites of intervention. Does focused crime prevention "simply move crime around the corner?" Or conversely, have the hot spots policing efforts that were brought in unusually high dosage to the target areas "diffused" to areas immediately surrounding the direct focus of the policing efforts? Though our data collection has focused on immediate spatial displacement and diffusion, we also collected data that allowed us to speculate on other potential forms of displacement and the ways in which focused place-based intervention efforts affect them. These data have provided confirmation of the displacement and diffusion findings, as well as context and explanation for the processes we have observed. They also allowed us to develop a more nuanced understanding of the ways in which interventions affect offenders and the factors that influence their decisions regarding displacement.

Our specific focus has been two crime prevention efforts developed specifically for this controlled study in Jersey City, New Jersey. One included a clearly focused geographic concentration of violent crime and drug crime, and the other street level prostitution. Two neighboring areas were selected for each site to serve as catchment areas in order to assess immediate displacement or diffusion effects. To assess displacement and diffusion at each site we used multiple measures including systematic social and physical observations, ethnographies and arrestee interviews, and official crime data. We use these measures to examine how different types of data collection affect our portrait of displacement and diffusion, and to evaluate the magnitude and types of displacement and diffusion that can be expected to result from place-focused policing interventions. Below we summarize our findings in terms of four main questions: Can focused crime prevention efforts be brought without risks of immediate spatial displacement?; Is there evidence of diffusion of crime control benefits in our data?; Are other forms of displacement serious threats to focused crime prevention efforts?; and finally, What have we learned about the validity of different data sources for identifying displacement and diffusion?

Can focused crime prevention efforts be brought without risks of immediate spatial displacement?

Our data show that the police implemented intensive and targeted crime prevention initiatives at both of the sites examined in our study. In turn, we have multiple data sources that suggest that there was, as expected given the intensity of the treatments, a crime prevention outcome in the target areas of each site. The strongest evidence of this effect was found in the social observation data, which showed a dramatic and intense reduction of street level prostitution and disorder at the Corneilson Avenue prostitution site from the first month of

intervention, as well as strong changes in observed drug and disorder activity at the Storms Avenue violent crime/drug site. These findings were supported in observational measures of physical disorder in the target areas, and were reinforced by interviews with arrestees in both sites, and ethnographic observations in the Cornelison Avenue prostitution site. Only resident interviews and emergency call data failed to show a similar effect at statistically significant levels. However, as we noted in earlier chapters the number of residents in the target areas were very small and thus raise questions about the reliability of these data (see later). In turn, while overall city crime trends suggest a declining trend in city crime during the intervention period, the extent of the declines observed and the self reports of offenders in the areas, suggest a very strong relative impact that resulted from the intensive and targeted treatment efforts.

Based on social observations, it is clear that there was not a measurable increase in observable street level prostitution or disorder in the areas immediately surrounding the target sites—what we term catchment areas—during the intervention period. Nor do we find meaningful evidence of spatial displacement in the resident interviews and call for service data, though as we will note later we think some of those data sources are not sensitive to changes in the street level behavior the police interventions were most likely to impact. Accordingly, in our overall measurement of displacement, we find strong support for prior studies that show that focused crime prevention efforts are not likely to have large displacement effects to areas nearby. In this sense, crime does not seem to simply "move around the corner" as a result of hot spots policing efforts.

Explanation for this finding can be found in our qualitative data collection. Both our interviews with arrestees and our ethnographic field observations showed strong evidence that offenders resist movement away from the target areas. A main reason is simply that they are

familiar with those areas. Most of the offenders we examined live close to their "work" in the targeted sites, and they feel "comfortable" with these locations. They resist movement to other sites both because of a natural tendency to stay with what is familiar, and because movement would demand that they encounter new and less familiar circumstances. Just as law abiding citizens will tend to stay close to home, our ethnographic and interview data suggest that offenders here are strongly attached to their home turf.

Their resistance to movement however, also has a strongly rational component. They are not only comfortable in the target sites; they are part of established business and social networks. Other areas that may offer similar opportunities for prostitution or drug selling in the city already have established networks. Some prostitutes told us that another prostitution site was "too fast" for them. But clearly both for the prostitutes at Cornelison Avenue and for the drug-involved offenders in the Storm Avenue site, moving to another established location would potentially put them in conflict with other established actors in those areas. This was particularly true of the Storm Avenue interviewees who noted that movement to another area with an established drug trade was likely to lead to violence. In turn, offenders in these areas have built up established clientele who may not be easily "displaced" to other areas.

Though our arrestee interviews showed only a few examples of movement away from established locations (only three prostitutes, (9.7%), and six drug arrestees, (11.8%), reported moving the location of their criminal activities) our ethnographer found more examples of spatial displacement to the catchment areas and to areas close by but outside the catchment areas. In turn in the prostitution site physical observation of condoms and condom wrappers, needles and drug paraphernalia, and sidewalks covered with broken glass also reflected an increase in catchment area 2 in the pre-to-intervention period. This catchment area also witnessed a spike in

prostitution activities in the January wave of the social observations. This is not necessarily inconsistent with our other findings. We think it clear that established prostitution or drug locations were not shifted to the catchment areas, and thus it was not likely that social observations or other data sources would identify sharp increases in these areas. Rather the displacement activity tended to be somewhat random, moving to a few other sites that never achieved very high levels of activity. Both the ethnographic interviews and the physical observations point to evidence of possible displacement in the pre-to-intervention period which did not remain stable across sites into the post intervention period. Indeed, the social observations suggest that the complex patterns may have been restricted to a sporadic period and did not persist across the intervention period.

It is also important to note that we have evidence of desistence among a non-trivial number of the prostitutes, and our interviews suggest that many of the individuals involved in criminal activity in both sites were removed from the streets for substantial periods. This would suggest that the overall level of problem behavior likely decreased during the intervention period, and thus though some spatial displacement to the catchment areas may have occurred, it may have been based on a much lower offender population overall.

Is there evidence of diffusion of crime control benefits in our data?

Each of the quantitative data sources give evidence of a diffusion of crime control benefits to the catchment areas of the study. The strongest evidence is found for the social observation data, in which there is a clear mimicking of the trends in the target area. Although limited, call for service data in the prostitution site illustrate possible diffusion effects into both catchment areas for the month of February, possibly counteracting displacement effects

witnessed in the other data sources seen in January. Physical observations also evidenced diffusion of benefits in both catchment areas; however, this finding was not consistent. Unfortunately, the qualitative data gained from the arrestee interviews is not generally appropriate for testing for diffusion, as all arrestee interviews were conducted with individuals picked up in the target area, and the ethnographer's work was done only in the prostitution target site.

Nonetheless, based on our qualitative data we can speculate on why a more general trend of reduction in street level activity would have occurred nearby the targeted sites. The offenders did not have a clear view of the limits of the police interventions or the reason for their intensity in the intervention period. This is not surprising, as the offenders in these areas only had limited information about police activities. As was noted in Chapters 9 and10, they were not sure of the time constraints of the intervention, and adapted their behavior in a number of ways that reflected what they "thought" was occurring rather than what was the actual strategy used by the police. We might assume a similar reaction in terms of the physical boundaries of the intervention. From the perspective of offenders in these areas it would have been reasonable to conclude that intensive police interventions brought on one block would be added to blocks immediately adjacent. While we might wonder why they did not adapt to this knowledge later on when it was clear that the police were not entering the catchment areas, it is reasonable to suspect that the crackdowns were assumed to include areas nearby to the target area.

Are other forms of displacement serious threats to focused crime prevention efforts?

While our study confirms prior investigations based on studies of main intervention effects that found that immediate spatial diffusion is more likely than immediate spatial

displacement, we do find in our qualitative analyses that other types of displacement are likely to be common as a result of hot spots policing efforts. This suggests that the crime control benefits of targeted interventions may be offset by adaptations other than spatial displacement.

The most common type of displacement observed in our study was method displacement. It appears in this regard that there is a kind of hierarchy to displacement adaptations. Immediate spatial displacement, which has often been the focus of investigation, and thought to be the most serious threat to crime prevention efforts, appears less serious in our investigation than changes, for example, in the way offenders carry out their illegal activities. The reason for this, as noted earlier, is likely the resistance of offenders to spatial displacement because of issues of familiarity and difficulty of moving to other locations.

We found that six (19.4%) prostitutes and 13 (25.5%) of the drug arrestees interviewed exhibited evidence of changing their methods in response to the intervention. The ethnographic interviews suggested an even larger degree of method displacement in the data. In general, method displacement involved the use of a new approach to drug sales or prostitution. In the case of prostitution, it often involved making "dates" with clients. In a number of cases the behavior was moved off the street to avoid police intervention.

Importantly, these changes in method may reflect an overall crime prevention benefit. It is well known that increasing "effort" in crime prevention is likely to lead to lower levels of crime and disorder activity (Braga, 2001). Having to make appointments with clients clearly makes the process of committing law violating acts more difficult, and is thus likely to reduce the number of events over time that offenders carry out. Moreover, from the perspective of the police and the public, movement of behavior "indoors" reflects in the case of street level crime and disorders, a benefit for the community

Overall, we found little evidence of displacement across crime types. Our analysis of the social observations looked at disorder in addition to the targeted crime and found no evidence of increases in these behaviors. In fact, the analysis found a decrease in disorderly behaviors. Our qualitative analysis further supports the notion that displacement across crime types is rare. For instance, one would expect that drug-using prostitutes would be likely to try to get into the drug trade, but only one prostitute we interviewed mentioned attempting to do so and she had a negative experience due to her addiction (using the product rather than selling it), which led her to a conflict with her supplier.

What have we learned about the validity of different data sources for identifying displacement and diffusion?

As we expected at the outset of our investigation, social observations were the most sensitive database for identifying street level activity in the two sites we studied. The social observation data in turn were confirmed by arrestee interviews and ethnographic observations that suggested large-scale treatment effects at the target site. Social observations allowed us to assess both the direct effects of the intervention on street level activity and overall displacement and diffusion to the catchment areas. However, it is important to note that social observations did not allow for accurate investigation of other types of displacement, such as method displacement, and missed elements of spatial displacement that were captured in the arrestee interviews and ethnographic field observations.

Interestingly, physical observations provided a number of direct indications of displacement and diffusion. It is generally argued that observations of the physical characteristics are unlikely to be affected in the short run from crime prevention initiatives, unless they are directed at improving such characteristics directly (e.g. see Green-Mazzerole,

1995). However, our data suggest that physical observations can provide important indications of changes in the level of certain types of criminal activity. In particular, observation of such offense-related disorder as condoms or drug paraphernalia on the street can provide an independent assessment of whether crime prevention programs are effective in reducing drug or prostitution activities.

While observational measures showed strong utility in our study, resident surveys, which are expensive and difficult to conduct, added little useful information about displacement and diffusion. This was the case for two reasons that we believe are likely to be relevant to other studies. First, in our study places with high levels of street level crime like prostitution were likely to include fewer residential addresses and thus our data were not robust for assessing crime trends. We suspect that this methodological problem is likely to be present in many types of hot spots locations since offenders (especially in the case of crimes like prostitution) may seek out areas where conventional citizens are unlikely to call the police or otherwise interfere with their activities. This problem may not be a serious one when a large number of hot spots are examined (Sherman and Weisburd, 1995; Weisburd and Green, 1995a), but it certainly should be an important consideration in the assessment of crime prevention at individual sites.

Second, it does not appear from our study that residents have accurate knowledge of offender patterns on their block. This is perhaps not surprising, since residents may have routine activity patterns that often bring them away from their blocks for good parts of the day. Why should we expect them to have an accurate view of changes in crime in their areas, especially in the catchment sites where levels of street level crime were lower in the first place? Our findings here are in turn consistent with other victim surveys which suggest that citizens do not have accurate perceptions of crime problems in their neighborhoods (Skogan et al., 1981).

The methodological problems we encountered in our resident survey data were also present in the police emergency call data we utilized in the study. Again, we suspect that there were too few residents in the target sites, and in some catchment areas, to gain a robust view of changes in crime trends. Moreover, there were rarely enough cases of individual crime types in a given month in the small target and catchment areas required to allow for statistical comparison. Thus it was necessary to combine crime types together to get a large enough number of cases, and in doing so we were likely to obscure changes in specific crimes at the targeted sites. This problem may have been overcome with a larger target area; however, this most likely would have diminished the treatment's intensity, thus reducing the chances of displacement. Again, we think that official data may be more useful in studies that look at a large number of sites.

Our study clearly points to the opportunities of qualitative methods for understanding displacement and diffusion effects. Where our quantitative analyses revealed little or no evidence of displacement, our offender interviews suggested that spatial displacement, while relatively minor, was present. This is perhaps the case because interviews capture the overall behavior of offenders, which may not be concentrated in any specific area. Indeed, our data suggest that the spatial diffusion is likely to be "dispersed" from target areas to a number of different locations. Such dispersion is unlikely to be detected by other methods.

Moreover, qualitative measures provide a more robust method for identifying the various displacement options, many of which would be hidden either from observation or official data sources. Also, qualitative data allowed us to delve more deeply into the criminal's decision making process during police crackdowns. In contrasting the two types of qualitative data we collected, it is interesting to note that the ethnographer's field interviews revealed more examples of displacement than did our arrestee interviews. We hypothesized that this is likely due to the

fact that the arrestees interviewed were arrested in the target area, and thus were not as likely to displace given that they were still working in their regular areas at the time of arrest. Thus, it is likely that ethnographic observations and field interviews with known offenders offer a more valid measure of any displacement effects than arrestee interviews.

Conclusions and Policy Implications

This report provides a group of important findings about displacement and diffusion in geographically focused crime prevention programs, and how to best study these phenomena. Perhaps most important, is our confirmation of earlier studies which reported little evidence of immediate spatial displacement, and strong evidence for diffusion of benefits beyond the targeted areas. This finding in the context of a controlled study that was designed to directly study displacement and diffusion effects adds strong support to a policy approach which focuses police resources at crime hot spots. Such concentration on hot spots is likely to lead to strong crime prevention benefits not only in targeted sites but also in areas close to them.

However, our study also suggests some caution to those who have argued that hot spots policing will produce strong crime prevention outcomes without displacement of crime. Our ethnographic field work and arrestee interviews show that while some offenders desist from criminality as a result of hot spots interventions, most seek out adaptations that will allow them to continue offending in the targeted areas. In this regard we found that method displacement was very common in our study.

Finally, our study suggests the importance of non-official data sources for assessing crime prevention programs. In particular, our data suggest the salience of the use of social and physical observations and qualitative data collection for assessing direct program impacts, as

well as displacement. We recognize that social observations, in particular, are expensive and unlikely to be used broadly in evaluations of crime prevention programs, but we think that our study suggests their importance for accurately identifying street level crime and disorder. We also think our data suggest the rich information that can be gleaned from qualitative data sources.

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Appendix A

Report on Qualitative Analysis of Displacement in a Prostitution Site

Author: Regina E. Brisgone, School of Criminal Justice, Rutgers University

Prepared for report to the National Institute of Justice, for a grant to the Police Foundation
David E. Weisburd, Ph.D., principal investigator, University of Maryland.

I. Introduction:

This report analyzes qualitative interviews by the author of 49 active prostitutes on the "Cornelison Avenue" prostitution site from September 1998 to June 1999. Analysis focuses on the adaptations of individuals in this sample to an intensive crackdown by police on prostitution at the site from September 23, 1998 to the end of April 1999. My role as a qualitative researcher focused on observing activity and conducting sit-down interviews with active offenders from the prostitution target site to complement the quantitative data gathering activities of the project. In essence, the qualitative interviews tell the story behind the numbers provided by police statistics, and counts of activities in the target area over time.

This report contains analysis of 79 interviews from a sample of 49 active prostitutes. The interviews have been winnowed from 87 interviews with 55 individuals. Those who were removed were not active enough for analysis because of their levels of activity at the target site at the time. For example, one individual had just resumed work at the stroll on February 19, 1999 -- the day of her interview -- after desisting from prostitution for more than six months and being in drug treatment. She did not have enough experience at the target site to discuss displacement during the project period.

II. Methods and rationale for data collection:

A. Qualitative methodology:

Qualitative methodology is good at explaining "local causality," and it focuses on processes and on the perceptions of those being studied; it doesn't answer variance questions. As a result, my data provides the perceptions of drug-using prostitutes about an intensive 8-month crackdown on prostitution at the Cornelison prostitution stroll. There are going to be

differences between how they perceive what was going on and what the project and those who implemented it did. They may perceive the Cornelison stroll as an area larger than the hot spot area and "catchment areas" conceived by project designers. They may think of all new people – especially if they are white – as police, which could have included student observers for instance. A substantial minority of subjects reported that they have police officers as clients, friends, and neighbors who warned them about police crackdowns. Also, because police arrests are part of the risks of the prostitution/drug lifestyle, this group may have to be "dosed" hard and continually over time to affect their perceptions about police threat and to change their behavior. Otherwise, they're likely to believe it's "just because of the election" and that things will go back to business as usual after Election Day.

An advantage of this type of data is that it can get at active offenders and hidden populations, such as drug users, who are difficult to engage in traditional research. This is because qualitative methodology involves researchers who go directly to subjects using trusted insiders, and interview them in their own environment. Such techniques have a long history of success in getting at groups such as hard drug users. As a result, my sample contains individuals who may not have been accessed by more traditional means. These are persons who keep their behavior hidden even from family and friends for fear of social reprisal. This group routinely engages in behaviors to avoid being detected, such as going out very late at night, being quite mindful of police to avoid being a "known person", and acting and dressing in an inconspicuous manner such as just walking along without making eye contact with potential clients. This group, containing women who are mothers and wives, older women, and male prostitutes, may have been more successful than others because of their routine behaviors.

The sample also contains persons at different levels of commitment to prostitution and the Cornelison stroll. This resulted in some individuals being "dosed" harder than others. Others may be more successful at evading detection or have other options during crackdowns and thus didn't end up in jail. In addition, because the sample is without exception drug abusers, those with other means, or coping skills can desist offending for periods during these times by reducing or controlling their drug intake. Each of these types of subjects can provide information that is interesting and unexpected.

B. Data Collection and Rationale:

Observations for the most part were in connection with riding around Cornelison to recruit and drop off research subjects on the stroll and environs during the intervention rather than "hanging out" in the target areas. It also included observations – passed along to me -- of my hosts at the HIV outreach agency who were hooked into the network of drug users and prostitutes, and other local outreach persons. This observation strategy was the result of decisions made early on to go with a "host agency" to act as a bridge to this group of research subjects. I did this upon advice of Dr. Mercer Sullivan and based on qualitative literature that suggests using trusted local insiders to gain trust and access to hidden populations, such as offenders and drug users. This was after making headway with informants at the drug site on Storms, and realizing it was going to take a long time to gain trust enough for interviews. In that site I was quizzed often about being a drug enforcement agent; informants were suspicious over my focus on "Storms" and not higher volume areas; and my main informant warned me against trying to recruit the Storms drug dealers at the corner of Monticello because they would laugh, threaten me or try to "mess" with me. In addition, the killing of a drug dealer associated with one of my Storms research subject's in August that occurred at a corner a few blocks away made

locals extremely nervous about the police coming down on them. Attempts to interview nearby low-level Monticello dealers resulted in "no shows" and being told to get out by their apparent boss. Bruce Jacobs (1996), in *Crack Dealers and Restrictive Deterrence: Identifying Narcs* encountered similar difficulties with drug dealers and worked for nine months interviewing drug users and hangers on before getting a single dealer to agree to an interview.

In late August, at the advice of Dr. Sullivan, I switched gears. I elected to seek out local social service agencies to approach the prostitutes on Cornelison Avenue. This was done to get into the field as quickly as possible in light of the impending intervention. On August 6, 1998, in between trying to get Monticello drug dealers to do interviews, I drove to an HIV harm reduction agency, and talked to its director about helping me to recruit prostitutes at the Cornelison site. She agreed, saying such a venture would help her agency reach more of the local prostitute network – especially if I could arrange for stipends. She immediately began the process of getting permission for the joint venture. Stipends were arranged for with the Police Foundation principal investigators. Interviews began on September 3 – delayed a week because events in the site that made the agency wary of allowing me out on the stroll to do interviews. They explained to me that there was an increased police presence on the prostitution site in late August 1998. This was due to a reported homicide of a woman believed to be a prostitute at or near the stroll. They also unhappy about an incident involving police roughing up an HIV outreach worker. Also, my hosts said they had conducted a short survey in conjunction with City Hall with prostitutes earlier in the year and said they often were distracted and stopped the interviews to pursue their clients. My hosts argued that if we could get the women into a quiet office away from the strolls using an incentive (stipend), interviews would be substantially improved. This proved to be correct. Also, the outreach workers simply did not want to be out there on

Cornelison for long periods of time. This attitude was tempered with the success of recruiting in the first week of September. Within two weeks, I began accompanying my hosts out to the research site to recruit and observe.

C. My work schedule:

As you can see from (Appendix 1), a timeline of my work activities for the project, there were times when I did not conduct interviews during the study period. These included the American Society of Criminology meetings in November, 1998; a shut-down period in late December, 1998 and into January, 1999 when the host agency moved its offices; and a time in January and February 1999 during which time I shifted to interviews of drug users in response to a request from the principal investigators to help with the drug-assault site. Also there was a period in March 1999 when I became ill and did not conduct interviews.

Prior to that time, I typically worked as many hours as I was authorized (about 15-18 per week) and focused on getting as much data as possible in that time period. I worked less in the spring, but have interviews and observations to provide information about the effects of the waning interventions. The Cornelison area became quite devoid of activity at the end of November beginning of December and continued that way through the winter. It became harder to recruit and to find subjects after December, though this was not a universal phenomenon. On February 19, 1999 – the day after a crackdown, a group of four prostitutes were observed on Cornelison; they agreed to interviews. My observations at the target site in conjunction with interviews will be used to fill in details about the effects of the intervention, displacement effects, and the aftermath. Please refer to Appendix 1, which provides a schedule of interviews by date for the project and includes absences noted above. With recently acquired knowledge of the actual

police “stings,” you can see that my interview schedule closely followed the police intervention schedule up to the final sting on February 24, 1999.

In general the interviews and observations chronicle a pattern of high activity at Cornelison prior to the intervention; a chaotic period of crackdowns through the fall; and a gradual lessening of activity in the area late fall early winter. It became more difficult to recruit subjects. The author and her harm reduction agency hosts began to drive around the area more; to stop by subject’s homes or calling them if they had their number; to visit hang-out spots; to use other informants to recruit; and on 6/25/99 they went to the Lafayette public housing projects to recruit on the suggestion of a research subject recruited on the Cornelison stroll.

III. Analysis:

A. Decisions about how to analyze

The report will focus on 79 interview narratives. These interviews are drawn from a sample of 49 individuals whose level of activity during the pre-intervention, intervention period, and post-intervention period makes them suitable for an analysis of displacement activity. Six individuals were removed from an original total of 55 sample members. An example of someone removed from analysis is a 49-year-old Polish-immigrant male drifter from Chicago who solicited on Cornelison for only a brief period during a three-day stint, soliciting at several locations in Jersey City and in client’s homes. Typically individuals were removed because they had simply spent too little time offending, or attempting to offend, in the intervention area during the intervention period and thus had experienced too little “dosage”.

This sample is made up of 45 females (92%), and 4 males (8%). All except for one of the males dressed and solicited as females. The sample contains 39 (80%) African-Americans and 10 (20%) Hispanics. The lone white sample member referred to above has been removed.

Average age for the sample is 33 years old. All sample members are drug users – using cocaine, heroin or both.

Of those 49 sample members whose narratives were analyzed for displacement activity, 20 of them were interviewed more than once over time. This was a practical matter of documenting displacement behavior in response to police activities at different times over the course of the intervention period using those offenders who were active in the scene throughout. This was useful during times when police stings landed offenders in jail – reducing the pool of available offenders. The most active offenders were interviewed multiple times. Their narratives provide valuable data on how they were changing/adjusting to the external pressure of criminal justice agencies, including the police, jail and court system. The following is a breakdown of the 49 interviewees:

- 28 were interviewed once
- 16 were interviewed twice
- 3 were interviewed three times
- 1 individual was interviewed four times
- 1 individual was interviewed five times

B. Coding:

The 79 interviews were coded for narrative descriptions of each type of displacement type and other effects, including:

- Temporal
- Spatial
- Method (or tactical)
- Target

- Crime Type
- Desistance
- Learning Effects

The "learning effect" narratives provide evidence that research subjects were using knowledge gained on the intervention to adapt their behavior to avoid detection and incarceration. The desistance coding provided evidence of those contemplating desistance or actually desisting in response to the intervention. In addition, interviews were checked for evidence of the impact of the intervention, such as how disruptive police activities were to offending.

C. Description -- Distribution of Displacement Types by period:

The 79 interviews were further analyzed for distributions of displacement behavior by type; for distributions of desistance; and for narratives of the learning effect with an emphasis of looking change over time. Using the dates of the beginning of the crackdown (September 23, 1998), and the dates of various "stings," and the end date of the intervention (April 30, 1999) these narratives were analyzed in the following periods:

- Pre-Intervention Period (September 3-23, 1998)
- Crackdown Period (September 23, 1998-April 30, 1999)
- Post-Intervention Period (May 1-June 30, 1999)

D. Description of Displacement Prevalence:

A separate and comparative analysis of the prevalence of displacement (and desistance) behavior by individuals over the course of the intervention and aftermath was conducted for the crackdown period sample. See Appendix 2 – Prevalence Analysis for this discussion. The prevalence analysis focuses on how many of the displacement behaviors and desistance

behaviors each individual sample member engaged in. The Pre-intervention and Post-intervention analyses of incidence and prevalence are identical because each interview is with a separate individual. Please refer to incidence charts below to see those counts. In the Crackdown Period prevalence counts of displacement represent the sum of displacement behavior for each individual – including those who had multiple interviews. The Crackdown Period Prevalence Chart is in Appendix 2 -- Prevalence Analysis.

E. Main Analysis -- Distribution of Displacement Effects by period and by Interview.

Analysis Chart for Incidence Analysis
Displacement Effects by Period

Period	Temporal	Spatial	Method	Target	Crime Type	Learning Effect	Desist
Pre-Intervention 17 interviews Sample N=17	5(29%)	5 (29%)	2 (12%)	0	0	0	0
Crackdown 55 interviews Sample N=38	26 (47%)	30 (54%)	33 (60%)	7 (12%)	9 (16%)	22 (40%)	9 (16%)
Post Intervention 7 interviews Sample N=7	0	1 (14%)	5 (71%)	0	0	2 (29%)	0*

Legend:
Pre-Intervention Sept. 3 to Sept. 23, 1998, start of crackdowns
Intervention Period Sept. 23 1998 to April 30, 1999, encompasses crackdown period.
Post Intervention May 1 to June 25, 1999, encompasses the post crackdown period.

Note: The desistance count for the post-intervention is zero rather than 1 because the one incidence represents a continuing desistance by an individual who desisted during the crackdown phase.

1. Pre-Intervention Analysis:

Chart Displacement Effects by Period

Pre-Intervention Effects (September 3-23, 1998):

Period	Temporal	Spatial	Method	Target	Crime Type	Learning Effect	Desist
Pre-Intervention 17 cases	**5(29%)**	**5 (29%)**	**2 (12%)**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**

Overview and observations: Interviews began on September 3, 1998 prior to the beginning of the intervention at a time when Cornelison site was still perceived as ideal for quick and easy money for drug-addicted prostitutes. But this period also provided evidence of police activity. The extent of activity prior to the intervention was observed on a Sunday afternoon in late July 1998 when I was conducting a physical and social observation audit at the site with another team researcher on Cornelison Avenue. From 4:30 to 6 p.m., we counted the arrival of six prostitutes who began to solicit in the street. Most appeared heavily drugged. Several of them were unkempt. They walked in the middle of the street, waving at cars, walking up to them**,** and if they were successful, getting in the car with a client. I took close observation notes at the time and three of these women were among my first recruits during the pre-intervention phase. I interviewed a fourth female observed from day in February 1999.

Interviews conducted prior to the start of interventions suggest that research subjects knew that the crackdowns were coming, and had been exposed to police patrols and warnings. Some attributed increased police presence to a well-publicized homicide of a woman in the stroll area in August. Other women reported police had warned them of impending crackdowns.

Fatima, 31, African-American female, interviewed 9/4/98 said: "They tell you to get the hell

out of there. It's getting really bad. We know Cornelison is not safe anymore. It's been in the paper. Two girls got killed. It's . . . this place is played out. Too many busts coming. The men get busted, they names is in the paper. They could lose their jobs."

Typically, women interviewed during this period were temporarily ducking and weaving out of the sight of police cars or out of the target area in ways that predict temporal and spatial displacement during the crackdowns, but stopped short of actual displacement. These behaviors appeared to already be a part of a prostitute's behavioral repertoire that had evolved in response to dealing with police. These were not included in the analysis. The following are examples of this behavior.

From **Candy", a 41-year-old African-American in a 9/15/98 interview: "**It's best to have patience. You got to be duckin' and dodgin' the cops."

From **Star, an African-American female, 33, interviewed 9/4/98:** "I walk up Grand and Fairmount – never outside of that environment. When the cops come I walk away. I can get a date in between them (cop patrols). I have to. You got to try to make it not so obvious. You got to fade into the background."

Temporal Displacement:

However, there were 5 narratives in the 17 interviews of this time that detailed actual temporal displacement – a 29% distribution of the behavior in interviews in the pre-intervention phase. The example below chronicles reactions to increased patrols, warnings, and arrests.

Boobie, a 28-year-old Hispanic female, interviewed 9/10/98 said: "I usually don't come out 'til after 4 o'clock because the cops come out. I don't want to come out because the scooter cops come out then. From 2 to 4 (p.m.). You gotta be careful," she said, and adds that she goes out from 4 p.m. until about 9 p.m., takes a rest, and then returns to the area after midnight.

Spatial Displacement:

Again, narratives provide evidence of regular prostitute behavior pre-intervention that involved leaving the area when police pressure was applied in the pre-intervention period. This was described above. However, there were 5 narratives out of 17 interviews (29% distribution) that illustrated spatial displacement behavior during this period. This involved going to another area to solicit as **Flaca, 34, a Hispanic female, in an interview 9/14/98** explains:

> "For a couple of months the cops been on us. They arrest us if you just walking down that block (Cornelison). So I work just a little bit off (Cornelison), not that far off. Why? Because the cops is just too much! For the first time things are being bad. They started to have a walking cop on Saturday (9/12/98) from 4 to 12 (p.m.) for getting us off the street. It does nothing. We just go down the hill (Fairmount Hill) to Grand."

Methods (or Tactical) Displacement:

Women in pre-intervention interviews discussed having regular clients on whom they could regularly rely on for income, but made no efforts to pre-arrange transactions to avoid going to the target area. They merely were these client's favorite prostitutes. This type of behavior was not included in the analysis, though "regulars" became a way to adapt tactically during the intervention. In the pre-intervention there were only 2 incidences in 17 interviews (12%) of methods displacement. This included a case of one individual using a beeper to make arrangements, and in another described below, making transactions by phone, and engaging in prostitution at the prostitute's home. The following is an example from

Diane, 35, an African-American female interviewed 9/10/98:

> "Now people call me. Now I have a place. Around this time I don't want to be out there. From 3 to 11 (p.m.) the scooter cops are out there. They do not play. If they see you out there more than once they'll stop and question you if they want. That's what they're asking: do you got a record. If they know you for soliciting you going to jail. If they familiar with you for soliciting, uh oh, your going."

Describing how she sets up regulars, Diane said: "If they say they they'd like to see me again, I let them know I have a phone. They say: 'it's all right?' And I say: 'Yeah'. I say (to the client): 'people tell me you been riding all around (Cornelison) looking for me, and now you can call me'. He says: 'that's good'."

Target, Crime Type:

There were no narratives of target or crime switching during the pre-intervention phase.

Desistance:

There were no cases of desistance in this phase.

Learning Effect:

The incidences of displacement – temporal, spatial, methods – represents an early response to pressure from the criminal justice system. In these cases, individuals appear to be converting their regular repertoire of avoidance behaviors -- "ducking and weaving" into temporal, spatial displacement, and method displacement by altering the time and places they work and converting "regular" customers in cars who were typically solicited on Cornelison into clients whose transactions could be arranged by phone and beeper and transacted away from the solicitation area.

2. The Crackdown Period:

a. Chart:

Analysis of Incidence of Displacement Effects by Period

Crackdown Period, September 23, 1998-April 3, 1999

Period	Temporal	Spatial	Method	Target	Crime Type	Learning Effect	Desist
Pre-Intervention 17 cases	5(29%)	5 (29%)	2 (12%)	0	0	0	0
Crackdown 55 cases	**26 (47%)**	**30 (54%)**	**33 (60%)**	**7 (12%)**	**9 (16%)**	**22 (40%)**	**14(25%)**

b. Overview – observations and some narratives:

This period was characterized by dramatic increases found in the measures of displacement (see chart above) in response to the increasing pressure of the police crackdowns, as well as evidence that such increasing pressure led to a pre-occupation about the crackdowns among research subjects, increased narratives of both talk of desisting from prostitution as well as examples of actual desistance. This period also was characterized by evidence that research subjects were adapting to the crackdowns by learning the nature of them and combining multiple types of displacement in their adaptations.

Observations of the crackdown period:

According to project records, raids took place September 23, 1998, the beginning of the intervention, followed by raids on October 7, October 14, an early November raid; a raid on November 30; February 18; and February 24. My interviews and observations can add to that history. Beginning with interviews on Sept. 23, 1998, talk of the "Wednesday night stings' and arrests began to dominate discussion among research subjects.

I witnessed on Oct. 8, 1998 what prostitutes described as a raid on a former lumberyard building that was being used by homeless prostitutes. We saw a group of men in plain clothes running out of the building and jumping into cars as I drove one of the research subjects back to Cornelison after an interview. Interviews for the next several weeks focused on the "lumberyard" raid and research subjects considered this a "sting".

On October 14, 1998 the lumberyard was still a focal point of discussion. We recruited four subjects – all except one of whom was standing on Grand Street, who provided evidence of spatial displacement behavior. The lone recruit standing on Cornelison had just gotten out of jail and was taking the risk. Later that night the second "sting" would take place.

The following Monday, October 19, 1998, my host and I drove up to the lumberyard building hoping to recruit subjects there but found the place deserted and boarded up. A research subject searched the building looking for his peers, but found no one. The target area and nearby streets were fairly devoid of solicitation though we recruited two subjects on Grand Street near the Lafayette projects. We'd been told that the prostitutes were moving to the nearby Pathmark shopping center, at 420 Grand Street, just outside the 2nd Catchment area, and were soliciting for customers there. We drove into that lot and the outreach worker pointed out three women he thought were active prostitutes, though I did not recognize them. Several days later we heard reports from research subjects that police were rounding up women on warrants over at the Pathmark. This chaotic time period also was characterized by women seeking drug treatment, and in fact, my hosts at the HIV agency made arrangements for seven subjects to enter treatment from Oct. 14-Nov. 10. One of those subjects, "Celeste" was arrested in the October 14, 1998 raid despite being signed-up to enter treatment two days later; two others remained in a detoxification unit for seven days, and walked out around November 12, 1998 and were arrested

later in raids; two others never showed up for their arranged treatment. Only two actually entered treatment. One of them reported in subsequent interview that she went on a methadone treatment program Oct. 27, 1998 and remained drug free and desisted for about a month.

November 6, 1998 was a day in which solicitation was almost non-existent in the target area and surrounding catchment areas – save for one lone woman on the stroll mid-day who had been away and didn't know about the crackdowns. Another prostitute appeared on Grand Street near the "Junction" in the 2nd Catchment area around 5 p.m. heading into the target area. This suggests temporal displacement and perhaps spatial displacement

Around 11/17/98 the research subject's interviews begin focusing on a serial rapist who was beating and raping prostitutes that he picks up in the target area. My hosts inform me on December 1, 1998 that another large round up has occurred and that many of the "regular" prostitutes who are part of our sample are in jail. Also around this time there are some reports of women trying the so-called "graveyard stroll" on Ocean and Cator avenues at the southern end of town.

Reports from my hosts are that the scene was quiet and many women were in jail throughout December and January 1999. Observations are minimal during this period and I conducted no interviews because of a shutdown and office move by my hosts.

In the first week of February 1999 my hosts inform me that a known prostitute was soliciting in a lesbian bar, an example of spatial and methods displacement, and that a television reporter is interviewing women around the target site about prostitutes from Cornelison soliciting elderly men at nearby nursing homes for their social security checks. "Linda", an aging prostitute discusses this "target" displacement in an interview 11/5/98. The reporter films subsequent raids at the Cornelison stroll in February.

There is evidence of subjects taking chances when they sense the pressure is off. On February 19, 1999 around noon we drive the area and it is quiet. We recruit one subject at the Pathmark shopping center and then shortly before 2 p.m. drive onto Cornelison Street itself and there are three known prostitutes there: one is on Cornelison by Fairmount; a second on Cornelison by State Street; and a third (who had just returned to the stroll after six months absence) on Cornelison near Fairmount by the residential drug treatment center. At around 6 p.m. after dropping off of a research subject, I drive up Cornelison again and spot a regular prostitute on her regular spot on the stoop on Cornelison by Westervelt Place. I pick her up and conduct an interview on Summit Avenue, then drop her off again at the stoop.

Around March 16, 1999 my hosts again report that prostitutes are scarce and that the police "are finding new and different ways" to arrest the prostitutes. On a subsequent interview day on 3/26/99 we recruit two new subjects – a long-time prostitute who is out on the street and taking risks since her financial supporter – a boyfriend – went to jail six weeks ago, and another female who has arrived from Patterson, NJ fleeing from trouble. She is soliciting on Grand Street near the Lafayette public housing projects.

Interview discussion of the crackdowns:

Shawnice, 30, an African-American female, (interview 10/27/98), describing the first "sting''**:**

> "I was overnight in jail September 23. Wednesday night the cops had a sting. My name was in the paper. Ooh, ooh, wasn't that embarrassing. It hurts me. Before I was going on the street but people didn't know it. Before I didn't care about nobody but now I woke up. It felt like messed up. It ain't cute, nice and pretty. I have kids, family. When I go places people now can say 'that whore'. The first image is a whore. If I'm talking to a man that's the image they have."

Sugartoo, 34-year-old African-American, interviewed 10/22/98, describing the Wednesday night sweeps:

> "Changes as far as the street goes: it's really hard to make money. Cops is out there now and gonna make a sting every Wednesday. They got cops out on motorcycles, and they got bicycle cops out there and the walking cops and the undercover cops in the cars. And you got a take a chance. Johns is afraid to come out 'cause they think you is a cop. They (female decoys) look like they working. There's a big fat girl and a Puerto Rican girl that stand on the corner. I guess they're rookies. They take them (clients) around the corner and that's where the cops are. Then they take them to jail . . . You can't make me go out there. It's just too hot."

Lil "D", a 21-year-old African-American, interviewed on 10/14/98, describing the raid on the lumberyard on October 8, 1998: "The girls are getting busted for being in the warehouse (lumberyard building) on Grand Street. People is going to jail . . . Everybody but "Flaca" moved out of the warehouse. The cops have the whole back (of the building) under surveillance."

KK, a 32-year-old African-American interviewed 2/26/99, about the continuing stings: "I been out three times straight and nobody is out. The streets were so clean. I ask: 'where everybody at'? It's just a crisis. It is so empty. Everybody is afraid of being arrested for solicitation. They done did a lot of sweeps . . . I still goes out. But I'm discreet."

C. Displacement Evidence:

Temporal:

The incidence of temporal displacement increased from 29% to 47% from the pre-crackdown to the crackdown period. Research subjects shifted from day and evening hours to the early morning hours to avoid the police. Just five research subjects – 9% incidence engaged the in the "duck and weave" behavior that was evident in the pre-crackdown phase. And, unlike in the beginning where subjects discussed shifting away from mid-day and early evening, the crackdown phase was characterized by a dramatic displacement into the early morning hours to avoid police crackdowns that were reported to begin in evening and continue to midnight. The following are some narrative descriptions.

Denise, an African-American female, 37, interviewed 10/30/98: "Later at night after 12 I go out. The cops usually set up shop at 9 to 10 and they go in around 11 or 12 at o'clock. I go out later (after midnight). Usually there be a lot of johns around that time."

11/5/98 Linda, African-American female, 47, interviewed 11/5/98:

> "Before you could go out in the daytime. Now I gotta come out at night. Now if you come out in the daytime the cops is out there all the time. Before you could get more money in the daytime that at night. You could come out for lunchtime get in a car, do what you gotta do and they (clients) go back to work. It's not like before. Things are getting harder and harder in the daytime to take care of my heroin habit. I wouldn't get as sick as fast. Now I get sick (experience withdrawal) in the daytime because the cops is out there and I have to wait until night to get straight (to get heroin)."
>
> …I come out late at night. (Roughly midnight until 4 a.m.) That's when they (cops) not out there. You get some stragglers (clients) come late at night. . . a lot of them come out then because the cops be out all during the daytime. I'm out according to how fast the dates come. How fast they come back out. I was going out 11 or 12 and staying out all night. This was last week."

Black, an African-American female, 26, interviewed 11/17/98 said:

> "I went out a quarter to five (a.m.). Between 5 and 7:30 that's when the men start coming out (for sex dates). At a quarter to 5 (a.m.) everybody was out (clients). I'm like 'damn'. I have a few steadys who come when the cars come by on the way to work." "I caught (one client) at 5:30 (a.m.). It was a blow job (oral sex). I made $20. As soon as I was out of the Jeep on Fairmount I went down to the gas station (at the end and around the corner on Grand Street) and caught (another client) at a quarter to 6. I did another blow job. I made $10."

Spatial:

Spatial displacement incidence increased from pre-crackdown to crackdown -- from 29% to 54%. It included a shift from the target area to nearby streets in the catchment areas and just outside of the catchment areas, and to other known prostitution strolls in Jersey City and beyond. The spatial displacement trend described in interviews was to avoid Cornelison and to solicit by walking along Grand Street in a way that mirrored the way they had strolled along Cornelison – from Ivy Place to Fairmount Street -- but also included moving to the Pathmark Shopping Center

on Grand Street just outside the 2nd Catchment area, and trying out other Jersey City prostitution strolls such as the Tonnele Avenue stroll near the Holland Tunnel and the so-called "graveyard cemetery" on Ocean and Cator avenues in the city's southern end. The following examples illustrate that trend.

Goldie, 28-year-old African-American female interviewed 2/5/99 said: "I try to stay away from that area (Cornelison). I walk down Grand all the way to the Pathmark (at 420 Grand just outside the 2nd catchment area by Center Street) all around. I stand in front of a store."

Linda, 48, African-American female, on 11/5/98, said: "Now you meet them at different places. On Grand. On Montgomery, near the projects."

Shawnice, a 30-year-old African-American female, interviewed 11/17/98, said she "took the back way" several days earlier -- describing a walking loop around the Cornelison target areas involving mostly the second catchment area. It involved leaving Lafayette Public Housing projects by Woodward Street, and heading to Grand Street, walking down Freemont, crossing Bright to Florence, to Montgomery Street by the Jersey City Medical Center, turning onto Baldwin avenue which turns into Summit Avenue Street, turning briefly onto Astor Place, and then onto Park Street around "the junction' and onto Grand Street for the length of it to Johnston back into the Lafayette public housing projects. She also said she "caught a date under the bridge by Pathmark (the bridge between Merseles and Center streets)" just outside the second catchment area.

Sin, 48-year-old Hispanic transsexual (underwent sex change from male to female), interviewed 10/30/98, said she was arrested in one of the early stings, and then began displacing to other areas. "They treated him (the client) like dirt, they treated me like garbage. They put

the names in the Jersey Journal . . . I left the area." She described spatial displacement to Montgomery Street near the Medical Center, but also to Palisade Avenue; to Tonnele Avenue where she took up residence in a motel there to turn tricks for two weeks; and also to New York City onto its transvestite/transsexual prostitution areas.

Familiarity Decay:

It was apparent that although subjects were familiar with other prostitution areas, such as Tonnele Avenue and the so-called graveyard stroll in the "hill" neighborhood at Ocean and Cator avenues, they were reluctant to change from the Cornelison area, even if it meant risk, and on occasion no chance to offend because of the police presence. The following describes a general trend toward staying with the familiar, a phenomenon called "familiarity decay" that asserts that offenders tend to stay near where they live and not to offend outside of a zone of familiarity.

Sassy, an African-American transgender male, 30, summed up the general feeling about why subjects persisted on Cornelison despite the risks rather than go somewhere else.

"It's right there all you have to do is walk out the door and it's right there. It's quick money. Big fat easy money. The quicker you get out there, the quicker you gonna get it . . . People always tell me to go to over there to New York. That I'd make good money. But I just never knew the spot. I don't know where to go. They say I should go into New York with another person like me – you know "gay" -- in drag – and go over there. They say I'd make more money than over here. But I don't know the area. I like to know who's who so I not be scared. I wouldn't know where to take a date. Who to trust. I just don't know anybody."

KK, female, African-American, 32 tried the cemetery stroll – a prostitution site at Ocean and Cator avenues -- but opted to work more cautiously and less often rather than switch to a place that made her uncomfortable.

> "I walked over (to the graveyard cemetery) and I didn't think I'd make money. It was unfamiliar to me. It was like, It was like . . . unfamiliar to me. I didn't know the guys (clients). On Cornelison you recognize the guys. I know from being out there every day (on Cornelison), the cars, the faces. It's different. In my area, I know the people. Up on "the hill" -- I don't really know the people at that end of town."

Method:

The most dramatic shift during this period was in the incidence of method displacement from 12% in the pre-crackdown period to 60% as the crackdowns became more intense. Narratives suggest that this occurred as research subjects became more aware of what the intervention entailed and began engaging in different tactics to avoid being detected and arrested by police. Research subjects began pre-arranging dates by means of phone or beepers and working from home (combining spatial and method displacement); quizzing potential clients to ensure they were not police officers; disguising their looks and engaging in stealthy solicitation. Also at this time, research subjects began talking about (and some actually followed up) converting street clients into full-time customers – including one woman who agreed to be locked inside the man's house every day while he went to work to avoid working on the street.

Goldie, 28-year-old African-American, **female, interviewed 2/5/99,** was observed the day of her interview by the author taking a chance strolling along Fairmount Street just below Cornelison. But she discussed methods displacement in response to the police intervention.

> "I've made myself more accessible. As time has gone on I've gotten more comfortable letting them (clients) come to the house to where I'm living. I t balances out. I'm still dealing with the same clients. I give some of them the privilege of picking me up at the front door. I letting them have the privilege of calling me."

Tina, 32, an African-American female, on 10/27/98 described pre-arranging dates, a tactical change from soliciting on the street at Cornelison, but also moving to an area away from the stroll and beyond both catchment areas, an example of spatial displacement. "I'm meeting dates at McDonald's on Grand Street, and on Monmouth."

Sassy, an African-American transgender male, 30, interviewed 10/30/98 began hanging around a motor court down by the Holland Tunnel near the known prostitution stroll at Tonnele

Avenue (at least a mile away from Cornelison), and either solicited male customers himself or had friends arrange transactions for him.

> "Recently I always catch a good date down at the motor Lodge – the Holland Motor Lodge. I know a lot of guys there that I hang out with. I meet good dates (clients), hang out, smoke dope. They (clients) always come around. They're there at 1 in the morning, at noon, at night."

KK, 32, African-American female, interviewed 10/22/98, took pains to disguise her looks and the fact that she was soliciting and keeping a watchful eye out for the police and walking away when she spotted them.

> "I play it safe. Try not to get noticed. The way I present myself. I don't really dress really like a hooker. When it's cold I'm not putting on a mini skirt and catching pneumonia . . . I be out there strolling through and not really (looking) anxious to pick up a trick. If he pass I'll look and walk. If I've caught his eye, gotten his attention, he'll stop."

Several women engaged in a tactic of agreeing to take one regular client and turn them into a full-time exclusive client in response to the crackdowns.

Gina, 39, an African-American female (interview 2/19/99), relied on one client exclusively from November 1998, when she got out of jail from an arrest in one of the strings, to February, when her drug habit pushed her back onto Cornelison where she was recruited for this interview.

> "I met a friend who helps me out with money. He'll give me money and I go through it so quickly. He doesn't know what I'm doing with it. I'm lying to him right now . . . Today is the first time in two weeks I been out here (on Cornelison) . . . More than likely I'll end up in jail again if I don't get it together."

Shy, 31, an African-American female, **interviewed 3/26/99,** appeared on the Cornelison site after the New Year, having fled from Patterson where she was in trouble. After several hard months of street prostitution on Grand near Lafayette public housing projects she allowed a regular client who is Caucasian to bring her home in late February 1999. Shy said the client locked her in the house when he went to work each day because he doesn't want her coming and

going and being seen in his close-knit Italian neighborhood. She knows if she leaves, she cannot return, so she remains locked in.

> "From that day I been in his house locked in and I haven't had to sell my body. The guy was a date. The type of person he was . . . he was kind of lonely and addicted (to heroin). I don't know where I would be today if I hadn't gotten off that street. In jail. In the hospital. Or dead . . . I love it when we're getting high. But I'm tired of it (the arrangement). I'm just doing it to stabilize me."

Target:

Target displacement increased from zero incidences in the pre-crackdown period to an incidence of 12% encompassing seven narratives out of 55 interviews. It included subjects shifting their solicitation to alcoholic men at the Pathmark Shopping Center, and soliciting elderly men at old age homes for their social security checks.

Shawnice, 30-year-old African-American female, interviewed on 11/17/98, tapped into a new source of clients while soliciting at Pathmark for her old ones.

> "I walked down Pathmark way and they (client's) ask 'what's up.' I get in the car and that's it. This is a whole different group. They're alcoholics. They drink. They're older guys. The problem is they're cheaper (than Cornelison clients). Those cheap (expletive) give you $5 for a blow job (oral sex). If you're illin (in need of heroin), you'll take it."

Toni, 34, African-American female, interviewed 2/19/99, also was able to tap into this new group of targets at the Pathmark shopping center -- having encountered them as she panhandled on the sidewalk of a pizza shop there.

> "They ask: 'would you like some more money? They'll be beatin around the bush and hoping you'll catch it (solicitation). I try to be shy and discreet . . . not draw attention to yourself. Some guys if I'm panhandling will walk down, say "take this" and we'll leave (to engage in prostitution) depending on what they are paying."

Linda, African-American, 47, interviewed 11/5/98, said that in addition to displacing to late night, and to Grand and Montgomery because of the crackdowns, she learned of a new source of

clients – the nearby nursing homes – to exploit in the daytime hours especially at the beginning of the month.

"I made pay day last week. Get guys who get their check. Their SSI (social security check). I had no problems. That first week be good. I snuck out in the daytime to the old folks home. A lot of the girls go up there. We do blow jobs. They (clients) get their checks and they called me a few times. It (old folks home) is up on Montgomery. Girls be going with the old men. They really can't do nothing do much."

This targeting of elderly social security recipients was later confirmed by my HIV outreach hosts -- as discussed in the crackdown observations section above -- who were interviewed about it by a local television reporter in early February 1999. My hosts told me the reporter interviewed prostitutes near Cornelison Avenue, and later accompanied police on the police prostitution raids for this story.

Crime Type:

Another adaptation that emerged during the crackdown period was displacement to a different type of crime -- from zero in the pre-crackdown period to an incidence of 16% (9 narratives out of 55 cases) during the crackdown phase. This included research subjects shifting from prostitution to panhandling, shoplifting, and selling food stamps. Another type of adaptation not necessarily illegal but illustrative of the trend was 2 instances of subjects scrounging old buildings for copper piping to sell to scrap dealers. Following are some examples.

Toni, 34, an African-American female on 2/19/99, talked about panhandling to generate income and avoid soliciting and being arrested. I observed her sitting on the ground in front of a pizza shop in the Pathmark Shopping Center wrapped from head to foot in blankets and scarves and begging for money. In an interview later that day she said: "I got all kinds of hustles to keep

me off that back street (Cornelison). I just say, " I just need a quarter or I need a beer . . . you connive somebody. You play on somebody's sympathy.**"**

Brown Sugar, 40, African-American, interviewed 12/10/98, described daily shoplifting expeditions to Newark, Jersey City, and Hoboken supplement her income from prostitution, which was getting tougher. She attributes it – at least partly – to the weather being too cold to solicit for prostitution. "I'm out there (on Cornelison) when it's warm. When it get cold, I start boosting (shoplifting). I'm out in the daytime. I do it (shoplifting) every day. Yesterday I got pants – 30 panties. I fixed myself up (stuffed them up her clothing) looked to see if nobody looking and 'see ya' -- I start to stepping."

Desistance:

Though a relatively rare event, desistance from offending emerged during the crackdown phase and suggests that the crackdowns were putting pressure on offenders – leading at least some to desist from offending. Its incidence increased from zero to 16% (9 incidences out of 55 interviews) in the crackdown phase. The highly transient nature of this population makes it difficult to gauge how offenders subjected to the crackdowns responded by desisting from offending. Nonetheless I have captured the narratives of nine offenders who ceased to offend on the Cornelison Avenue prostitution stroll in response to the police intervention. I have grouped this group of offenders into three categories: 1) presumed desisters; 2) desisters; and 3) temporary desisters. The presumed desisters include two women who had been sporadic offenders who had "taken a chance" on a day during intensive police activity or its aftermath. One entered treatment; the other insisted on being taken home after her interview. Both said they would not return. The author observed neither of them again during the intervention. The desisters included three women who desisted following an arrest during the crackdown. These

include a woman described below who desisted for most of the crackdown period and continued through the post-crackdown period. Subjects in the third group were able to desist for weeks or even months but were lured back to the stroll – or the catchment areas – to solicit because of the lure of drugs. Excluded from this analysis were persons who were jailed for periods of time, but who then resumed offending upon release.

I documented continuing desistance (over 7 months) of Celeste an African-American female, 34, who was arrested in the October 14, 1998 sting, and was still desisting and drug free at the end of the crackdown period. Celeste had been a regular offender since 1995 in the Cornelison prostitution stroll. She decided to have one last blast of heroin and cocaine before entering treatment two days later. She went out soliciting on Fairmount Street, was arrested in the October 14 police sting, and spent 45 days in jail until November 28, 1998 because of unpaid fines on previous solicitation charges. She said she decided to get out of the life and off drugs because it was getting too hard because of the police raids, she was becoming afraid of the dangers involved, and wanted to regain custody of a small child. The following is from an interview from **12/4/98:**

> "I was tired of being tired. Sick of running. Then it started to scare me. It seemed like there would be stings (police roundups) constantly. I got scared of going to jail. I got tired of hurting my mother – letting her watch me do the things I did. She hated the fact that I worked the street. I got tired of hurting my family in general. I started to dislike myself. I started getting scared. I had a fear in my heart that I was going to die. I felt someone was going to kill me or I would do something terrible to get locked up for a long time . . . I was at the point. I was over the edge. I didn't know how I was doing this job. I had been told that I had a warrant. I didn't want to do it (prostitution) anymore. Or my drug habit anymore."

Another example of desistance is **Toni, an African-American female**, who described in an interview on **3/26/99** how she stopped living in abandoned buildings and engaging prostitution and other hustles after three years. She entered drug treatment for heroin addiction

at the end of February 1999, and was living in a shelter, trying to regain custody of her children, and was planning to move to Atlanta to ensure she wouldn't relapse and end up on the street. "I'm just starting to exhale and focus,'' she said. "I'm breathing different air now."

Yet the lure of the streets, drugs and easy money proved too difficult for some. **Black, 26, an African-American female,** desisted from January to sometime in April. She worked during that time in a bakery, but quit when the owner began calling her ethnic slurs. She slipped back into her old lifestyle afterward engaging in prostitution and smoking cocaine. But she said she wanted to desist again. "I'd rather be working or going to school or something," she said wistfully.

Another desister – **Jaycee, a 24-year-old African-American female**, left the area for Wisconsin in September shortly after the interventions to get off of heroin in order to regain custody of her children. In an interview 11/17/98 she said that after attending court and moving back home with her mother to begin the custody process she met up with another prostitute – Black – and was lured back to the drugs, and eventually the streets. She was offending in the first two weeks in November. "I should've never gone outside," she said. "I don't get high as much (as before). "I'm not out there every night. I can't be out here all night. I don't know when they (child authorities) are going to come by." She was offending for the first two weeks in November 1998 but was not re-interviewed again.

3. The Post Crackdown period

Chart Displacement Effects by Period

Period	Temporal	Spatial	Method	Target	Crime Type	Learning Effect	Desist
Pre-Intervention 17 cases	5(29%)	5 (29%)	2 (12%)	0	0	0	0
Crackdown 55 cases	26 (47%)	30 (54%)	33 (60%)	7 (12%)	9 (16%)	22 (40%)	9 (16%)
Post Intervention 7 cases	**0**	**1 (14%)**	**5 (71%)**	**0**	**0**	**2 (29%)**	**0***

As discussed above there were many fewer interviews and observations conducted in the post-intervention phase. There were only seven interviews conducted with seven individuals. Five, including Celeste, had been interviewed in previous phases, while two others were first-time interviews. In this phase, as in the pre-intervention phase, the displacement effects represent both the incidence and prevalence. There were no narratives describing temporal, target or crime type displacement. There was 1 incidence (14%) of spatial displacement and 5 incidences (71%) of method displacement. The only incidence of desistance was the continuing desistance of Celeste, discussed above, which I left out of the analysis. **Desiree, an African-American female, 32, interviewed 6/26/99** typified interviews in this phase. She was a new face but said she had worked around Cornelison before but had focused on other strolls, such as Journal Square lately because she was staying with friends at a nearby public housing project. "You can make more money on Journal Square. This (Cornelison) is closer to home. Closer to the (drug) copping spot,'' she said. Like others in this period, police pressure was not a focal point of her interview. She said she hadn't been arrested but police had warned her to get off the street. She appeared to be casually incorporating displacement behaviors to avoid police. "I

don't stand on a corner and yell out to the cars. I'm not going to do that. When the police come, I get off the street for a while and then go back out there. I just watch to see if I don't see police and then I figure it's safe (to offend).''

Discussion:

Chart Displacement Effects by Period

Period	Temporal	Spatial	Method	Target	Crime Type	Learning Effect	Desist
Pre-Intervention 17 cases	5(29%)	5 (29%)	2 (12%)	0	0	0	0
Crackdown 55 cases	26 (47%)	30 (54%)	33 (60%)	7 (12%)	9 (16%)	22 (40%)	9 (16%)
Post Intervention 7 cases	0	1 (14%)	5 (71%)	0	0	2 (29%)	0*

The analysis – please refer to above chart -- illustrates that the incidence of each type of displacement increased fairly dramatically between the pre-intervention and crackdown period, and then dropped off again in the post-crackdown interviews, with the exception of methods displacement. It has been noted previously that there are few interviews in the post-crackdown phase. Still, it is notable that methods or tactical displacement is the category that remained strongest in the post-intervention phase – from an incidence of 60% (33 of 55 interviews) in the crackdown phase to an incidence of 71% (5 of 7 interviews) in the post-intervention phase.

Analysis of narratives and observations around the times of police stings, and the increasing incidence of desistance behavior during the crackdown period, demonstrate that the interventions were having effects – especially when police were saturating the areas. The crackdowns and their disruptive effects, as noted earlier, were a focal concern of interviewees during the crackdown period, and narratives often touched upon getting drug treatment and

getting out of prostitution, though only nine narratives documented individuals who actually did desist. The behaviors discussed in the pre-crackdown period – displacement and temporary police avoidance behaviors that I referred to as "ducking and weaving" suggest that women already knew how to avoid the police and had a propensity to do so. The increase in displacement activity and the relative drop-off in the post-crackdown period, and the dramatic increase in methods displacement in the crackdown phase and its remaining strong in the post-crackdown phase, suggests that women were both reacting to the pressure of the interventions and learning from them to adapt to them. The last interviews show that subjects continued at least some of the behaviors they had adopted in response to the interventions or from other peers into the post-crackdown period.

A count of incidences of narratives that illustrate that women were learning from the adaptations increased from zero narratives pre-crackdown, to a 40% (mentioned in 22 of 55 interviews) during the crackdown, and then dropped back down to 29% (2 narratives in the 7 interviews). Two cases exemplify the "learning effect" described below.

1. Black, a 26-year-old African-American female, had by 11/16/98 learned how police stings worked and was successful in avoiding arrest on one night when stings were occurring. In a narrative that spanned from 4 o'clock in the afternoon to about 7 a.m. the next day, Black used her knowledge of the interventions to engage in prostitution without being arrested, employing temporal and spatial displacement, a combination of spatial and methods displacement and simple avoidance. The following are some illustrations.

Methods – not looking like a prostitute and using friend's knowledge of crackdowns:

Black: "They saw me coming. I pulled up my jacket and pulled my hood up.''

I: So you did that to not get arrested. Is that how you stay out of jail?

Black: “I got a good cop friend who I date (transact sex with). He tell me “there’s a sweep tomorrow. He keep me informed.”

I: I ask so you stay in?

Black: “Hell yeah. I stay away when they putting them in the truck . . . when they have sting.”

I: But you were out there last night, though, right? What did you do?

Black: “I was walking up to Summit at Fairmount I seen the truck. I know that’s the NARCO truck. I looked once at them I put my hood up and and tied it up. I know they thought I was a dude (a guy).

Methods and Spatial together: pre-arranging a transaction ahead of time by phone and meeting the client outside of the target area at 4 p.m.

Black: The arrangement was made “when they (this client) was around the day before. They (the client) called me (today). He meet me on Summit. And I . . . when I was finished with him it was 20 after (4 o’clock). He gave me 7 bottles (of cocaine) and $20.”

Temporal, Spatial, methods, and avoidance:

Black: “I was at Fairmount near Summit when I made a U-Turn. I cut down in back of the (Jersey City) Medical Center then back to the projects (Lafayette). I stay there till 11 (p.m.). They (the police) be out there til 12.”

(This is an example of how she applied learning the routines of police -- cops stay out till midnight. In this case that’s not what happened).

Black:

> “I came back out (at 11 p.m.) but they (cops) was out there till 2 o’clock (2 a.m.). I see them when I walked up Grand Street. I changed my jacket and went to a guy’s house on Prescott. It’s a place where we get high. All they (police) are concerned about is the strip (Cornelison from) Summit to Fairmount (another example of ‘learning curve). “At 12 o’clock I have my second date. I made $40. Real quick too. I gave him a hand job. He was scary. “They read the paper (read about johns being locked up in the Jersey

Journal)." She says this transaction took place up near the Junction near Crown's C hicken (Communipaw Avenue between Crescent Avenue and Park Street). "I came down and I got me some coke (doesn't say where), then went back up to George's house (on Prescott) until it started raining. I hate to be wet. I went home around 1:30 (a.m.). I ate and watched TV. I sat down in front (of my house) with the drug dealers, hanging out."

Temporal. The following is another illustration learning the police routines, and shifting to offending at times in the target area when police are not around.

Black: "At a quarter for 5 (a.m. 11/17) everybody was out (clients and prostitutes). "I'm like – damn! I have a few steadys (regular clients) who come when the cars come by on their way to work."

Black:

"I caught (guy's name) at 5:30 (a.m.). It was a blow job (oral sex). I made $20. As soon as I was out of the Jeep on Fairmount I went down to the gas station (at the end of the street and on Grand) and caught (guy's name) at a quarter to 6. I did another blow job. I made $20. Then I went up to (names the guy's on Prescott) until "Jaycee" (another prostitute) came up there. That was just a little while ago."

2. Tina, 32, African-American female, a high-rate offender, had learned when the crackdowns occurred and began coming out Thursday, Fridays and Saturdays in the winter from 6 to 2 a.m. and staying around Grand Street. The following is from an interview on 12/10/98.

Tina:

"They (police) don't usually be out on those days. You learn their schedule. They be wasting people's money, doing nothing but wasting money. So they arrest us. So they can put their girls down. They don't look like they working (soliciting). The johns avoid them, but the new johns get picked up (by police for soliciting undercover female police officers). I just been studying this. I come out and work around it. (result of crackdown is many women in jail. "There's only a handful of us out there. You can't be running the streets like we used to. We trying to stay out of jail. This don't change anything. This just makes us a little wiser."

Appendix 1

Project Activities: Overview of interviews, observations, and activities for project. Includes interviews for drug site (in gray) and times when not in the field.

Police Stings	Int. Dates	Prostitute	Drug User	FieldNotes
	9/3/98	2		
	9/4/98	6		
	9/10/98	3		
	9/14/98	3		
	9/15/98	4		
9/23/98 (first)				
	9/25/98	6		Aftermath of intervention
10/7/98 (2nd)				
	10/8/98	2		Raid on lumberyard
	10/14/98	4		Day pre-2nd intervention
10/14/98 (3rd)				
	10/19/98	3		
	10/22/98	4		Impact crackdowns
	10/27/98	3		Impact crackdowns
	10/30/98	8		Breathing space
	11/2/98		4	
	11/5/98	3		
	11/6/98	1		The desolate stroll, a new face and drug rehab admissions. Checking out alternative strolls
10/6/98				

(estimated				
	11/9-11/14/98	ASC No Ints.		
	11/16/98		2	
	11/17/98	6		2 regulars leave rehab; 1 arrested; lots of interview evidence
Police Stings	**Int. Dates**	**Prostitute**	**Drug User**	**FieldNotes**
	11/23-27	Thanksg. No ints		
11/30/98 (5th)				
	12/1/98	1		
	12/4/98	1		
	12/10/98	5		
	12/14/98-1/27/99	Host Agency shutdown to move and for holidays no interviews		
	1/26/99		2	
	1/28/99		1	
	2/2/99		1	
	2/4/99		1	
	2/5/99	1		TV report and raid connected to possible displacement phenomenon
	2/8/99	1		Desister found at women's rehab group
	2/8/99		1	
	2/9/99		2	
	2/11/99		1	
	2/15/99		1	
	2/16/99		2	
	2/18/99		1	
2/18/99 (6th)				

	2/19/99	5		Easing of fear 5 women out on stroll; run to van ; see researchers
	2/23/99		2	
	2/25/99		1	
Police Stings	**Int. Dates**	**Prostitute**	**Drug User**	**FieldNotes**
	2/26/99	6		
2/24/99(7th and final sting				
	3/2/99		1	
	3.4-3/21/99 illness no work	No interviews	End of drug interviews	
	3/26/99	3		
4/30/99 End of police intervention				
	5/21/99	2		
	6/25/99	6		Cops on Fairmount check us out; have to recruit at Lafayette Projects

Note: Includes dates of prostitution stings provided by J. Ready from project.

Note: Actual fieldwork began in June, 1998 and encompassed both prostitution and drug areas. Those dates and counts indicated by a gray tone represent interviews conducted by the author in

conjunction with the drug and assault target side and are separate from prostitution target area interviews. They have been included to provide an accurate representation of author fieldwork during the grant intervention period.

Appendix 2

Description of Displacement Prevalence:

A comparative analysis of the prevalence of displacement behavior by type and desistance by individuals over the course of the intervention and aftermath was conducted for the crackdown period sample. This analysis represents a count for each sample member of the types of displacement behaviors and desistance behaviors each individual sample member engaged in. In the Pre-intervention and Post-intervention analyses incidence and prevalence counts are identical because each interview is with a separate individual. The Crackdown Period prevalence chart differs from the incidence analysis for this period because it represents an accumulation of behaviors for those individuals recruited during this period but interviewed multiple times. Please see a comparison of number of interviews and samples for the three periods below.

Pre-intervention Period:	**Crackdown Period**	**Post-Intervention**
No. of Interviews=17	No. of Interviews=55	No. of Interviews=7
Sample N=17	Sample N=38	Sample N=7

Prevalence Analysis – Crackdown Period:

Sample description for this 38-member sub-sample is similar to the full sample and represents removal of two 32-year-old African American females. See comparison below.

Prevalence Sample	**Full Sample:**
N=38	N=49
Mean Age: 34	33
Black: 79%	80%
Hispanic: 21%	20%
Female: 89%	92%
Male: 11%	8%

Chart

Prevalence Analysis for sample N=38 recruited during the crackdown Period September 23, 1998-April 30, 1999. Prevalence for displacement by type and for desistance.

Displace type	Temporal	Spatial	Method	Target	Crime Type	Desist
%	58%	74%	66%	16%	24%	24%
N=38	22	28	25	6	9	9

Discussion:

The chart above shows that of 38 individuals followed over this period, nearly three quarters -- 74% -- resorted to spatial displacement; 66% changed their offending tactics during the crackdown period; and 58% engaged in temporal displacement. Sixteen percent focused on new targets, while 24% resorted to new crimes types in response to the intensifying intervention. In addition, 24% of this sample desisted from offending during this period. Interestingly the only desistance occurred during the crackdown phase. These results suggest crackdowns were putting heavy pressure on offenders in the areas police were targeting especially when activity was most pronounced and that offenders were responding both by displacing to types of prostitution that do not occur in the target area, not working when police were around or desisting from prostitution altogether – at least for a time.

Appendix B

Observation and Prevention of Crime: The Role of Place Managers in Jersey City, New Jersey

Brian M. Barth

Paper submitted to meet the requirements of the Department of Criminology and Criminal Justice Professional Masters program.

April 21, 2003

Advisor:

David Weisburd, Ph.D.

Department of Criminology and Criminal Justice
University of Maryland, College Park
College Park, MD

Drug and AssaultTarget Site

Vacant Lot at the Intersection of Fairview and Monticello

Heartfelt gratitude and appreciation is due to two people: My advisor, Dr. Weisburd, who graciously granted me access to the data used in this project, and whose guidance and suggestions directed my work; and Laura Wyckoff, whose help with the data and general support proved invaluable in the completion of this project.

Introduction

John Eck first introduced the idea of place managers in his doctoral dissertation in 1994. He described place managers as individuals who limit opportunities for crime through their presence and daily activities at specific locations.[1] Since Eck's introduction, place managers have found a niche in the study of crime and place. Criminologists have become interested in the role that place managers play in allowing crime to occur and what effect they can have on reducing crime. Amidst all this discussion, one important question has gone unanswered: are place managers good observers of crime in their area? It is empirically unknown and often taken for granted that place managers are reliable sources of information about the extent and nature of crime problems. This question strikes at the heart of the relationship between criminal events and the locations in which they take place. In this research project, I attempt to shed light on this issue through an analysis of place manager interviews conducted in Jersey City, New Jersey in 1998 and 1999. The data for this project come from a research grant funded by the National Institute of Justice entitled Measuring Displacement and Diffusion: An Analysis of the Indirect Impacts of Community Policing. Using 128 place manager interviews from a high-crime area of Jersey City, I perform a variety of spatial and temporal analyses, as well as compare the responses with arrest data for the months preceding the interviews. I am interested in two things: how accurately the place managers describe crime problems in their area, and the extent to which they are involved in crime prevention. My paper is comprised of six sections: In section one, I discuss the theoretical foundation that supports the crime and place relationship. I highlight the development and importance of place managers in these theories. In section two, I review the existing literature on place managers and their role in the formation and prevention of criminal

events. In section three, I outline my research questions and the literature that suggests their importance. In section four, I describe the original research project that provided me with the data to investigate these issues, including the methodology and data origins. I section five I present the results of my analysis, and in section six I discuss the implications of my findings on criminal justice policy.

Section One: Theory of Crime and Place

The relationship between crime and place enjoys a long tradition in the field of criminology. Pioneers such as Shaw and McKay identified the importance of location and place characteristics in explaining the existence of criminal behavior. These sociologists believed that the key to understanding crime was to examine the traits of neighborhoods.[2] Their perspective and others focused on aggregate places such as neighborhoods, cities, and states-- they adopted a macro-level approach to the relationship between crime and place. A more recent strategy has been to focus on micro-level relationships between crime and place. That is, criminologists narrow their focus to small areas such as buildings or street blocks and study the criminal events that take place in these locations. Such theories focus not on the formation of the criminal offender, but on the formation of the criminal event.

Several theoretical perspectives have influenced the current state of crime and place in criminology. Ecological perspectives first provided the link between crime and the location in which it took place. From Shaw and McKay's study of Chicago neighborhoods to more recent studies looking at census tracts, cities, and metropolitan areas, crime has been studied in the

[1] See Eck, 1994.
[2] See Shaw and McKay, 1942.

context of its surrounding area.[3] However, these areas are larger than a specific place, and the theoretical constructs on which they base their explanation of crime may not be appropriate at the place level.[4] Eck notes that a theory of crime should not be a special case of a more general ecological theory of crime.[5] Variables such as population characteristics, racial heterogeneity, and population change may be relevant for large areas, but not for smaller places. Furthermore, a large area such as a neighborhood is comprised of many places, all of which are uniquely shaped by their function and owner. The characteristics of a place may not reflect those of the larger setting in which it exists. Other components such as interpersonal contact between residents may be salient at the place level, while not relevant at the city or neighborhood level. Residents on a block face interact with each other in a group setting, while interactions at the neighborhood level are less defined and intense.[6] Eck notes that places structure the form of this interpersonal contact in ways that larger areas do not. He provides the example of a small park with a public telephone adjacent to a parking area. The phone provides a communication tool while the parking area allows for easy access. These characteristics may be an ideal setting for a drug dealer, while no other place in the area has such convenient features. He notes that this notion differentiates situational crime prevention from larger scale crime prevention.[7] Perhaps most importantly, there is evidence that place influences crime even when area compositional and structural effects are held constant. For example, places such as bars and schools lead to greater

[3] For studies using census tracts, see Gordan, 1967 and Schuerman and Kobrin, 1986. For studies using cities, see Chilton, 1986 and Sampson, 1986. For studies using metropolitan areas, see Rosenfeld, 1986.
[4] This size of a place is relatively small. Eck notes that with a few exceptions such as baseball stadiums and shopping malls, places should no bigger than a block face and no smaller than an efficiency apartment (Eck 1994: 12). Places are defined by five features: location, boundaries, function, control, and size. See Eck (1994) for an in-depth discussion of these characteristics.
[5] Eck, 1994: 14.
[6] See Taylor, Gottfredson, and Brower, 1984.
[7] For a description of situational crime prevention, see Clarke, 1983 and 1992. For a description of larger scale crime prevention efforts, see Schneider, 1986 and Lavrakas and Kushmuk, 1986.

numbers of crimes on their street blocks, even after controlling for population characteristics, density, and economic status.[8]

Social control theory is also salient at the place level of analysis. Fear of crime in an area, caused by disorder and incivilities, can result in withdraw behaviors by residents, which decreases the amount of informal social control in the area.[9] Conversely, residents on a street block can enhance informal social control and therefore discourage crime and disorder in their area. Scholars have demonstrated links between the concepts of social cohesiveness and collective efficacy and reduced crime at the street block and neighborhood levels.[10] Furthermore, Eck notes that proximity, a necessary component of social control, is only present at the place level.[11]

Rational choice and routine activities theory combine to form the theoretical basis that supports a micro-level analysis of crime and place. Rational choice theory proposes that individuals engage in a rational consideration of the costs and benefits of crime before deciding to act in a criminal manner. Criminals are not assumed to be perfectly rational; however, they utilize a rational decision-making process. These decisions may often be based on inaccurate or incomplete information, and the thought process may be rushed or only partially developed. Cornish and Clarke note that rational choice theories may be more salient in the explanation of certain types of crime, such as those that generate income.[12] Rational choice theories also distinguish between criminal involvement (the decision to become involved in crime) and criminal events (the decision to commit specific criminal acts). This distinction is especially important at the place level of analysis, since the latter is concerned with the immediate

[8] See Roncek and Meier, 1991 and Roncek and Faggiani, 1985.
[9] See Skogan, 1986 and Bursik and Grasmick, 1993.
[10] See Bursik and Grasmick, 1993.
[11] Eck, 1994: 18.

circumstances and situation of the individual, which among other factors, is determined by place. The issue of target selection and its relevance for explaining crime becomes clearer with a consideration of routine activities theory.

According to routine activities theory, crime is precipitated by a convergence of three elements in time and space: a motivated offender must come into contact with a suitable target, in the absence of a capable guardian.[13] This approach assumes the availability of motivated offenders and explains crime through variations in the benefits (suitable targets) and costs (capable guardians) of crime. Felson expanded this theory to include intimate handlers of offenders: those people who have a supervisory role and exercise social control over potential offenders.[14] He notes that many offenders of various ages have few or no intimate handlers, and that adults spend significant amounts of time away from those intimate handlers that they do have.[15] Eck also expanded the conceptual constructs of routine activities theory to include individuals who discourage crime at amenable places.[16] He terms those people "place managers." This revision is supported by studies of formal and informal control of places by people: narcotics officers patrol drug hot spots, store owners discourage loitering in front of their businesses, superintendents attempt to minimize delinquency in their buildings, and business developers sometimes care for the land and property near their business for a fee.[17] Eck reorganized routine activities theory into two triplets: the respective supervision of targets, offenders, and places by guardians, handlers, and managers. Crime is more likely to occur when the first three are present and the second three are absent. In other words:

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[12] See Cornish and Clarke, 1986.
[13] See Cohen and Felson, 1979.
[14] See Felson, 1987.
[15] See Felson, 1986.

> Crime occurs when there is a convergence in time of a desirable target without an effective guardian, a motivated offender without an effective handler, at a facilitating place without an attentive manager.[18]

Felson took this notion of place management and delineated four levels of responsibility, which vary according to the degree to which a criminal event may be discouraged.[19] Personal responsibility for places is taken by the individuals who own them, such as a landlord or home-owner. Assigned responsibility for places is taken by individuals whose job it is to maintain them, such as a doorman or office secretary. Diffuse responsibility is taken by individuals who are employed in an area but do not exercise as much control as those people who are assigned to the area. For example, a repairman might be working at a house and be in a position to observe criminal activity; however, he is not the primary keeper of the property and does not exercise as much control as the owner. General responsibility for places is taken by individuals who are in a position to observe behavior in a given area but assume no control over the location. For example, bystanders and customers in a store may influence crime by virtue of their presence, but they do not have the responsibility of owners or of employees.

The role of place managers in crime control has been firmly established in criminological theory. However, the concept was introduced less than a decade ago and is still undergoing empirical testing to determine the nature of this relationship and the extent to which place managers can influence crime. The following section examines previous studies of place managers and summarizes existing knowledge of this complex relationship.

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[16] See Eck, 1994.
[17] See Weisburd and Green, 1995; Skogan, 1990; Green, 1996; and Felson, 1987.
[18] Eck, 1994: 29.
[19] See Felson, 1995.

Section Two: Review of Empirical Literature

The studies to date that have specifically examined place managers and their impact on crime can be summarized in one word: scarce. While scholars such as Eck and Felson have published theoretical advances of the place manager idea, few attempts have been made to empirically test the concept or affirm the crime control role that they presumably play.

In the original body of work in which he first coined the term "place managers," Eck examined their role in the selection of places used for drug dealing.[20] He tested the assumption that drug dealers seek out places with weak place management, physical security, and customer access using data from San Diego, California. His study utilized a case-control model, and he collected data at both the block level and place level. He also gathered information on citizen calls and arrests. Eck found circumstantial evidence in support of the place manager role in controlling crime. His analyses showed that small complexes had a disproportionate amount of drug dealing, which he attributed to the inability of the owners of these complexes to control the behavior of the tenants. Unlike larger apartment complexes, which are often managed by firms or hired individuals, small complexes tend to have part-time landlords who have less experience and training in rental management, recruitment and eviction of tenants, and legal issues. All of these factors consummate in weakened place management and serve to attract drug dealers. The same indirect evidence applies to single family and rental homes, which are often locations of drug dealing. Eck also found that motels and convenience stores were particularly vulnerable to drug dealing, primarily because of the reluctance of place managers to intervene in criminal

[20] See Eck, 1994.

activity. To do so would be to risk personal injury and/or a loss of business, prospects that are hardly favorable to the individuals that manage these places.

Another study that indirectly examined the role of place managers in crime prevention was published by Lorraine Green in 1996.[21] In her book, she investigated the crime control effects of the Specialized Multi-Agency Response Team (SMART) program in Oakland, California. The SMART program was a drug-control strategy designed to target businesses, homes, and rental properties. The program coerced the owners of these places to take responsibility for their properties using the enforcement of civil code violations. It also utilized other problem-solving tactics such as encouraging officers to establish relationships with citizens, landlords, and business owners in a joint effort to discourage drug crimes. Green's study found that the SMART program had the most profound impact on commercial properties, as measured by fewer police contacts after the intervention. Owner-occupied properties were also more likely than rented properties to have less drug dealing after the intervention. These findings could be explained by the notion that business and residential owners are more likely to respond to such coercion because they have more to lose if they engage in noncompliance. Green notes that in Clarke's typology of crime prevention tactics, the risks are highest for those persons who stand to lose their businesses or homes when drug problems are found to be associated with their properties.[22]

One of the few studies to date that has specifically addressed the role of place managers in crime control was published by Mazerolle et al. in 1998.[23] The authors of this study were specifically interested in the effect that place managers could have on drug and disorder problems in Oakland, California. They used self-report data from place managers drawn from

[21] See Green, 1996.
[22] See Clarke, 1992, as referenced in Green, 1996: 85.

100 street blocks in the city. These self-reports included information on the place managers' collective and individual actions, their involvement in neighborhood crime prevention activities, their fear of crime, and their feelings of community cohesiveness. They also collected on-site observations to survey the social and physical conditions of the street blocks for use as outcome measures. Fifty of the 100 street blocks were randomly assigned to a civil remedy program run by the Oakland Police Department called "Beat Health." Much like the aforementioned SMART program, "Beat Health" incorporated civil violations such as health and maintenance citations, drug nuisance abatement laws, and other coercion strategies in an effort to compel place managers to control drug and disorder problems. Officers working those 50 street blocks were also encouraged to build working relationships with the place managers. Officers working the 50 control street blocks, by contrast, continued the usual tactics of surveillance and arrest but did not make special attempts to work with place managers.

The authors found evidence that place managers can have an important role in controlling drug and disorder problems. Specifically, they found that the level of collective involvement in community activism among place managers is linked to increases in observed civil behavior and decreases in observed disorder. In addition, the amount of street block cohesiveness is associated with changes in observed drug dealing. The street blocks targeted by the Beat Health program exhibited fewer signs of disorder, less drug dealing, and increases in signs of civil behavior in public places. The specific actions taken by place managers were also found to be important. Most notably, individual reactions to crime problems, such as calling 911 or a city agency, were not associated with reductions in drug dealing or disorder. However, collective community activism was shown to be related to improvements in these areas. The authors reasoned that individual actions are typically reactive in nature, and as such, would not yield changes in the

[23] See Mazerolle et al., 1998.

observed measures. Conversely, collective activities generally demonstrate more commitment to change, as well as more long-term and integrated approaches. These endeavors have the potential to be more effective in reducing drug and disorder problems.

A more recent study, conducted by Eck and Wartell, examined the effects of improved place management on drug dealing and other crimes.[24] This study, performed in San Diego, involved a random assignment of rental properties with a known drug enforcement history to either a control group or one of two treatment groups. The majority (80 percent) of the properties were apartment buildings, while the rest were single-family housing units. Place managers at sites in the first treatment group received a letter from the San Diego Drug Abatement Response Team (DART) immediately following the drug enforcement. This group was designated as the "DART letter only" group. Included in the letter was information about the police enforcement action, available law enforcement assistance to remove known offenders from the property, and state laws regarding the liability of the owner for crimes occurring on the property. There were no follow-ups by the police; however, just over half of the owners in this treatment group initiated contact with the SPDP DART unit after receiving the letter. The second treatment group received a similar letter that asked them to schedule a meeting with a DART representative, and also received a follow-up phone call a week later. Nearly all of the owners responded to the request, after which an inspection of the property took place, followed by the development of a plan to prevent future drug dealing. The DART detective worked with the owner during and after the planning stages to ensure that necessary changes were made. The control group received no contact by the SDPD after the enforcement action. The researchers collected several forms of outcome data, including crime and drug event data for three months before and thirty after the enforcement action, a log of DART interactions with the place managers, owners' responses to a

telephone survey about their management practices, physical descriptions of each site and the surrounding area, and the results of undercover drug sale attempts at each site 45 days after the enforcement action.

The results of this study yielded important information about the role that place managers can play in improving the crime conditions of their property through interaction with the police. The second treatment group, "letter plus DART meeting," showed the most pronounced decrease in crime on the property. Likewise, drug offenders were most likely to be evicted at sites in the same treatment group. Both treatment groups experienced fewer drug and other crimes during the first three months following the initial enforcement. Furthermore, after six months, crimes at properties in the control group dropped to the level of those at properties in the two treatment groups, showing evidence that perhaps the telephone survey conducted by the SDPD encouraged place managers to take action against crime on their property. Based on their analyses, the researchers concluded that many place managers have limited time and resources with which to actively engage in crime prevention activities. For this reason, police agencies wishing to engage in a similar program should have ample resources available to respond to place manager needs and requests. Such assistance could involve training place managers to recognize signs of criminal activity and supporting them in eviction proceedings. Furthermore, the researchers proposed that the likelihood of success for programs such as these may be related to the strength of the rental market. When demand for rental properties is high, the place managers may take action on their own in order to maintain the safety and cleanliness of the premises; when demand for rental properties is low, the place managers are likely to be less concerned with property maintenance and thus less willing to cooperate with police. For this reason, the researchers

[24] Eck and Wartell, 1999.

hypothesize that such programs would be most effective in marginal neighborhoods or areas of transition.

Section Three: Research Questions

Question 1: Are place managers good observers of crime?

Clearly, there is a paucity of research with regard to the role of place managers in crime prevention. That is not entirely unexpected given the youthful nature of this line of theory. However, certain issues remain unexplored that are critical to place manager theory and practice. Among these issues is the extent to which place managers can accurately recognize the amount of crime in their immediate area. Some of the studies reviewed above cited examples of police working with residents and business owners to increase awareness of crime problems in their area.[25] They also described the police training place managers to recognize signs of drug dealing and other crime on their property.[26] These accounts may illustrate that place managers do not have as precise an awareness of the amount of crime in their area as is commonly believed.

There is also evidence to suggest that residents may misjudge ecological conditions in their neighborhood, or fail to take notice of changes in disorder. For example, in a study of residents' perception of ecological conditions, Taylor found that up to 90 percent of the variation in perceptions may be psychological rather than ecological.[27] He also found that perceived signs of incivility reflected individual differences more than differences between locations.[28] In

[25] For example, Green notes that officers in the SMART program "try to increase community awareness of suspicious behavior." (Green, 1996:33).
[26] Eck and Wartell, 1999:2.
[27] See Taylor, 1995a, as referenced in Mazerolle et al., 1998.
[28] See Taylor, 1995b, as referenced in Mazerolle et al., 1998.

addition, he has proposed that residents in high-disorder neighborhoods may take less notice of changes in disorder because they are confronted with multiple social problems or other conditions of disorder.[29] In light of these findings, it would seem plausible that residents and place managers may perceive different levels of crime than actually exist in their area. If it is true that the variation in perceptions of crime is largely due to differences between people as opposed to differences between places, a logical conclusion may be that place managers are not reliable sources of information about criminal activity.

This issue is critical to place manager theory: implicit in the notion that place managers can play a role in crime prevention is an awareness of crime in their area. Place managers cannot be expected to initiate crime prevention measures unless they first recognize a crime problem. Furthermore, increased awareness and general observation by residents and business owners may have a deterrent effect on crime. Common sense would suggest that potential offenders would be more likely to choose unsupervised areas- or those not being carefully watched- as targets. In fact, empirical evidence exists to substantiate this claim. In a 1986 study that involved interviews with burglars, the researchers found that burglars were less likely to choose areas that were well-populated.[30] Other researchers have looked at street offending and shown that muggings are more likely to occur in deserted areas, suggesting that perhaps the locations were chosen for their lack of natural guardians.[31] Eck cited multiple studies documenting the deterrent effect of observers, including the effect of guards on bank robberies[32] and of parking attendants on auto thefts[33] and concluded:

[29] See Taylor, 1997.
[30] Rengert and Wasilchick, 1986.
[31] Rhodes and Conly, 1981 and Shotland and Goodstein, 1984.
[32] Hannan, 1982.

> In summary, offenders avoid targets with evidence of high guardianship. Note that effective guardianship is linked to place management. In each of the studies just cited the additional security was put in place by the owner or manager of the place, not by the users of the place.[34]

With his insightful link, Eck emphasizes the role that place managers have in providing the attention and natural surveillance that prevent crime.

The theory of defensible space suggests that manipulating features of the physical environment may enhance peoples' sense of territoriality, allow them to observe their environment, and thus communicate to potential offenders that they are being watched.[35] While this theory has been severely criticized,[36] research exists that support its fundamental propositions. For example, studies have found that the following physical features are associated with less store robberies: unobstructed windows, placement of the cash register so that the entrance can be monitored, and lighted parking areas fully visible from the inside of the store.[37] Note again that these features are determined by place managers, in this case employees of the store.

These "observational deterrence" measures may be even more prominent in residential areas than in business areas. Taylor[38] states that residents have more familiarity with the social and physical features of the street on which they live than of other streets. As a result, they have a better understanding of normal patterns of behavior on their street. In addition, they are better

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[33] Laycock and Austin, 1992.
[34] Eck, 1994: 61.
[35] Newman, 1973.
[36] See Merry, 1981 or Taylor, et al. 1980.
[37] Hunter and Jeffrey, 1992 and LaVigne, 1991, as cited in Eck, 1994: 59.
[38] Taylor, 1997.

able to recognize people on their own street as opposed to in other areas, which allows them to differentiate between who "belongs" and who does not.[39]

Question 2: What role do place managers play in crime prevention?

Despite the numerous studies previously cited in this paper that enforce the connection between place manager observation and crime prevention, the relationship is not a simple or consistent one. As Taylor notes:

> Although offenders unfamiliar with a particular locale may avoid committing offenses on blocks where many people are present, as they learn about a site they may gain insight into people's willingness or unwillingness to keep an eye on street events, and/or to intervene in incidents.[40]

Indeed, researchers have documented that while the presence of people may serve as a deterrent, their presence alone does not mean that they will intervene in a criminal incident.[41] Some place managers will be more vigilant and responsive than others, and thus will play more of a role in responding to crime. It is important to note that this reactive role by place managers can also have an impact on prevention. It is logical to presume that offenders would avoid those areas where they perceive the residents or place managers as more likely to take action in the event of a crime. One ethnographic study of a multiracial housing project in Boston supports this argument.[42] After conducting interviews with local offenders, the researcher concluded that the

[39] As Taylor notes, it is important to recognize that these trends include within them individual variations around the group tendency. As such, there may be individual exceptions to this general trend. (Taylor, 1997: 138.)
[40] Taylor, 1988: 260.
[41] For more on the role of bystanders in crime control, see Shotland and Goodstein, 1984.
[42] Merry, 1981.

offenders were aware of where residents were located who would intervene or call the police, and they subsequently avoided those areas.

A key factor in place managers' ability to prevent crime is their capacity to intervene. Several scholars have written about the importance of territorial perceptions of neighborhood residents, and their willingness to get involved when necessary.[43] According to Skogan,

> Intervention in local events is a two-step process: Area residents must be alert to untoward persons and activities, and they must be willing either to call the police or to challenge those who are up to no good. To do this effectively, they must know when and where to watch, and recognize what is or is not suspicious at that time and place.[44]

This may be easier done in stable areas, where place managers and residents are familiar with each other and share a sense of community cohesiveness and responsibility for social well-being. In areas with high turn-over or large amounts of crime and disorder, place manager intervention is reduced.

Community organization and neighborhood watch groups are one way in which to bring residents together in fighting to "reclaim their neighborhood." These groups encourage interaction and an exchange of information among residents and place managers, leading to a greater awareness of who and what belongs in the neighborhood. Police play a crucial part in providing support to these organizations, especially in less stable areas. At least one study has found that neighborhood-watch organizations are far more likely to endure when they have the active support of local police.[45] Police can offer such items as information, training, technical support, and equipment. In addition, they can lend non-material things such as visibility,

[43] See Shotland and Goodstein, 1984; Greenberg, Rohe, and Williams, 1985; and Skogan, 1990.
[44] Skogan, 1990: 128.
[45] Garofalo and McLeod, 1986.

continuity, and legitimacy to initial efforts to organize communities.[46] A positive relationship with the police is an obvious and necessary prerequisite for this kind of support to take place.

Section Four: Survey Data and Methodology

The data for this research project came from a National Institute of Justice grant entitled Measuring Displacement and Diffusion: An Analysis of the Indirect Impacts of Community Policing. The study sought to provide insight into the measurement and understanding of crime diffusion and displacement by means of an experiment in Jersey City, New Jersey. The research strategy was to conduct an intervention in a high-crime area of the city, and then gather follow-up measurements of any resulting displacement or diffusion. What follows is a summary of the methods used in target and site selection, a description of the intervention, and a review of the types of data collected.

The target site was selected after a series of meetings between the principal investigators, leading scholars on the effects of community and problem-oriented policing, and high-ranking representatives of the Jersey City Police Department. This group, called the strategy review team, looked at arrest and calls for service data for the year preceding the intervention that was mapped by the project staff. They selected three areas that each met three standards: 1) sufficient amounts of crime and disorder activity; 2) isolation from other potentially confounding programs or operations; and 3) surrounding areas that contained potential targets. The three sites were selected on the basis of high levels of three crime types: 1) violent crime, as measured by drugs and assaults (hereafter the drug/assault site); 2) consensual crime, as measured by prostitution

[46] See Skogan, 1990.

(hereafter the prostitution site); and 3) property crime, as measured by burglaries (hereafter the burglary site).

Each intervention site was considered a "target area," and was surrounded by two "catchment areas," which would be expected to reflect any displacement or diffusion of crime. The target areas and catchment areas were set up in a formation similar to concentric circles, with each radius approximately the length of a block. The target areas had slightly larger radiuses than did the catchment areas. See Appendix 1 for a map of the drug/assault target and catchment areas.

The types of interventions conducted at each site were selected on the basis of their proven effectiveness as demonstrated in the literature on community and problem-oriented policing. They were implemented at high levels in order to produce measurable displacement and diffusion. Furthermore, they were limited to the target areas and were conducted during set intervals at specific times. The drug/assault intervention was conducted between September of 1998 and March of 1999, and included the following police, prosecutorial, and social service components: 1) a nine-officer task force was assigned to the target area, and carried out intensive sweeps, roof-top surveillance, and closures of problematic buildings. These officers comprised a 300% increase in police presence, and they were restricted from operating outside of the target area for six months. 2) Prosecutors and police coordinated to enforce vertical prosecution of repeat offenders and required full bail upon their release. 3) Health codes were aggressively enforced in drug market areas, and a neighborhood program converted a vacant lot into a basketball court. In addition, an after-school youth center was opened in the area.

Multiple sources of data were collected as part of this study. They included qualitative research methods such as ethnography, interviews with inmates, and systematic observations of

crime and disorder. Physical characteristics of the assault/drug and prostitution sites were systematically observed by field researchers. These observations were intended to detect changes in the physical environment over time, as well as provide information about the relationship between physical disorder and crime displacement. Over 500 physical observations were conducted during the course of the study, and they gathered information about the street layout, housing conditions, and signs of physical disorder and decline. Social observations were also recorded in the assault/drug and prostitution sites. Over 6, 000 observations recorded information about criminal activities, social disorders, and external conditions. Two other forms of qualitative data were collected during the course of the study: household surveys and ethnographic interviews. Surveys were conducted by telephone with over 2,400 households, with one wave of surveys occurring before the police intervention and the other wave after the intervention. Questions were asked regarding specific crimes targeted by the police in the area, and the levels of fear and disorder of the respondents. Ethnographic interviews began before the intervention period and lasted for the duration of the intervention and beyond. In addition to other contacts, offenders who were arrested in the target areas were interviewed by field researchers.

The researchers also conducted place manager interviews in each of the three sites. These interviews were conducted in three waves in the assault/drug site: 1) one month before the start of the intervention, 2) about three months into the intervention period- when the intervention was at its strongest, and 3) six months after the conclusion of the intervention. Two waves were conducted in the prostitution and burglary sites: one month before the intervention and approximately a year following the intervention. This technique allows for improvement over prior attempts at place manager research. For example, in studying the role of place managers in

Oakland, California, Mazerolle et al. note that "Funds were only available to conduct one wave of place manager interviews. As such, we do not have effective measures of change in the actions, attitudes, and perceptions of place managers in response to the intervention efforts."[47] Collection of such information in this study allows for a more thorough and insightful analysis.

Field researchers conducted a total of 456 place manager interviews: 182 in the assault/drug site, 145 in the prostitution site and 129 in the burglary site. These interviews were conducted in person at the respondents' place of employment or just outside the premises. Each interview lasted approximately 15 minutes, and consisted of 44 questions. See Appendix C for a copy of the instrument. The interview instrument consisted of structured and open-ended questions in three topic areas. The first topic area pertained to familiarity with the area, including questions such as how much time the respondent spends in the area per week, and how long they have been employed in the area. The second topic area included questions about crime and disorder on the street segment, such as how often fights, muggings, drug dealing, prostitution, and burglary took place. The third topic area involved questions about police activity in the area, such as what specific problems were targeted by the police, and whether the respondent had observed changes as a result of the intervention.

The use of survey-type instruments to interview place managers is grounded in theory. Surveys of residents are frequently used to explore perceptions of physical or social disorder in an area,[48] and they are "easily tailored to the specific issues the researchers or evaluators might want to address."[49] Surveys also allow researchers to detect reasons for variation in levels of crime, and they can provide a more accurate portrait of residents and place users' behaviors and cognitions than can other methods such as self-reports. This is because they can provide real-

[47] Mazerrole et al., 1998.
[48] Bursik and Grasmick, 1993.

time information about residents' perceptions and reactions to their environment, and they can be targeted at place managers to obtain a more representative perspective on the social and physical reality of the place under study.[50]

The place managers were selected for interviews based on their occupation and how much interaction they had with the surrounding area. An even distribution of interviews across the research sites was desired, although the researchers determined it practical to oversample on street segments where several place managers were willing to be interviewed. In addition, several street segments consisted of entirely residential or abandoned areas and thus allowed few opportunities for place manager interviews.

Official police data, including calls for service, crime incidents, and arrests, were also collected as part of the study. The Planning and Research Bureau of the Jersey City Police Department provided this information for the years 1996 through 2000. The calls for service data include such items as when the call was received, the caller's location, the reason for the call, and the nature of any crime that is reported. The crime incident data is in the form of a report filled out by the police officer that responds to the scene of a crime. It includes information such as characteristics of the victims (such as name, gender, address), and characteristics of the crime (such as crime type, time, location, and use of a weapon). The arrest data is in the form of an arrest report that is filled out for every suspect arrested or taken into custody. This report includes information about the arrestee (such as name, address, occupation) and about the offense (such as offense type and location).

The unit of analysis in this study is the street segment. Street segments were defined as a block face, including both sides of a street, from one intersection to the next. This included all

[49] Taylor, 1995b: 10., as referenced in Mazerolle et al., 1998.
[50] Rosenbaum and Lavrakas, 1995.

residential, commercial, and public services buildings on both sides of the street. The street segments in the study sites varied anywhere from .02 to .09 miles; segments that were longer than .09 miles were divided, and street segments that were shorter than .02 miles were combined with a bordering segment. This notion of a street segment is important for its theoretical basis. Taylor suggests that street blocks function as behavior settings, which he defines as "freestanding 'natural' units of everyday environment with a recurring pattern of behaviors (standing patterns of behavior) and a surrounding and supporting physical milieu."[51] They qualify as behavior settings for several reasons: 1) people become acquainted through routine daily interaction; 2) people have various roles within a street block, which may vary in terms of level of involvement; 3) in the absence of high turnover or extreme heterogeneity, members of a street block share common norms about acceptable and unacceptable behavior; and 4) street blocks exhibit regularly recurring rhythms of activity.[52] Furthermore, street blocks can be distinguished from other behavior settings because of some important characteristics: 1) the street block is more likely to be the locus of neighborly ties; 2) communication among households is stronger within street blocks than across blocks; and 3) local improvement activities are more likely to exist on the street block than on the neighborhood level. The last of these characteristics is inherently important for the study of the role that place managers can play in preventing crime.

In this paper, the analysis will be centered on the drug/assault site and will utilize the place manager interviews as a source of information about their observations of crime on their street segment. Of specific interest is the amount of drug crimes that they perceived as taking place on their block. Eck surmised that the role of place managers in drug crimes is enhanced for

[51] Taylor, 1997: 119.
[52] Taylor, 1997: 120-1.

several reasons: 1) the roles of guardian and victim are less prominent in consensual crimes, thus highlighting the role of the place manager; 2) individual and collective security are not as well defined for drug crimes since participation is voluntary; and 3) unlike with most crimes, the offender (dealer) remains in one location, thus increasing the probability of suspicion and the importance of place manager attentiveness.[53]

Section Five: Data Analysis

Description of the Respondents

An attempt was made to conduct interviews with place managers from each of the four categories previously identified by Felson and others (personal, assigned, diffuse, and general). Table 1 shows the distribution of interviews by place manager type. These categories are not necessarily mutually exclusive: place managers could be members of multiple categories depending on the nature of their job and daily activities. However, an attempt was made to classify each place manager as a specific type, with their designation derived from their primary activities throughout the day.

Table 1: Distribution of Place Managers by Type[54]

Assigned	Personal	Diffuse	General
104 (57%)	41 (23%)	28 (15%)	8 (4%)

[53] Eck, 1994: 39-42.
[54] N=181. One respondent did not provide an answer to this question.

Note that the majority of place managers (57%) were of the assigned type. These are place managers who work primarily in the retail or service industries, with jobs such as cashiers, building managers, and security personnel. It is useful to have a lot of these individuals in the sample because unlike residents and homeowners, who are often away from their homes during the course of the day, they have ample opportunity to observe the street block on which they are located. Personal place managers often have an increased interest in the area because they may own property or reside there. Certain personal place managers were selected primarily because of the opportunity that they had to observe public activities and occurrences. People who spent a great deal of time on the street, such as the homeless, were included in this category. Diffuse place managers, such as delivery personnel and utility workers, are transient and move from area to area. While this allows for a more general knowledge of the surrounding area, it generally prevents specific knowledge about individual street segments. General place managers comprised a very small portion of our sample, primarily because of the limited knowledge they have of the area under study. This type includes people such as store customers and pedestrians, and their presence is more sporadic than the other three types.

Within each place manager type, the respondent could conduct a variety of daily activities. Table 2 offers a more comprehensive breakdown of the place managers' specific responsibilities.

Table 2: Respondents' Daily Activities[55]

	Number of Respondents	Percent of Respondents
Manage	49	27.8%
Sell	15	8.5%
Clean	15	8.5%
Deliver	12	6.8%
Serve	14	8.0%
Drive	5	2.8%
Cashier	37	21.0%
Own	12	6.8%
Security	12	6.8%
Hang-Out	24	13.6%
Other	59	33.5%

Note that the categories are not mutually exclusive. As might be expected, numerous place managers fell into multiple categories. For example, many business managers also work as cashiers, which may explain the high numbers in each of those categories. Since so many of the respondents were business employees, it may be interesting to look at their type of business. Table 3 provides a breakdown of types of businesses.

Table 3: Respondents' Type of Business[56]

	Number of Respondents	Percent of Respondents
Retail	45	26.5%
Liquor Store	7	4.1%
Food Service/Convenience Store	35	20.6%
Delivery/Mobile	14	8.2%
Gas Station/Auto Shop	6	3.5%
School/Community Center	28	16.5%
Professional Offices	8	4.7%
Police/Fire/Security	6	3.5%
Residence	21	12.4%

[55] N=175. Six respondents did not answer this question. The "other" category includes such activities as: lives at the location, police/fire, social services, and student.
[56] N=170. Twelve respondents did not answer this question.

Question 1: Are place managers good observers of crime?

To answer this question, I will use a variety of approaches. In this section, I will compare place manager responses across areas, waves, and also with arrest data. First, however, an explanation is needed for how the data were grouped. One of the survey questions asked respondents about the amount of drug crime on their block. The question read as follows: "I'm going to read you a list of things that some people feel are problems on their block. How often do you think the following things occur on this block: every day, a few times a week, a few times a month, a few times a year, or never?" One of items on the list was "people selling drugs."[57] The responses were grouped into four categories: high crime, medium crime, low crime, and no crime.[58]

Within-block Variation

It was noted earlier in this paper that variation in perceptions of crime may be due to differences between people as opposed to differences between places. To test this theory, I examined six street segments on which at least four residents were interviewed during the same wave. Table 4 displays their perceptions of drug crime on their respective block.

Table 4: Within-block Variation in Perceptions of Crime

	N=6	N=6	N=4	N=4	N=4	N=4
High Crime	6	1	4	3	2	4
Medium Crime		2			1	
Low Crime		1		1	1	
No Crime		2				

[57] It should be noted that 12 people did not answer this question, resulting in an N of 170 instead of 182.
[58] Responses that fell into the 'every day' category were coded as 'high crime,' 'a few times a week' as 'medium crime,' 'a few times a month' and 'a few times a year' as 'low crime,' and 'never' as 'no crime.'

Of these six street segments, three (50%) had full consensus among place managers as to the amount of drug crime on their block. On only one of the segments were the responses spread across all three categories. Although the analysis suffers from low base rates, it would appear to indicate a general consistency in place manager perceptions of crime on any given street segment.

Variation Across Areas

The target area was specifically chosen for its high level of drug and assault crime relative to surrounding areas. As such, we would expect place managers to observe less crime in the catchment areas than in the target area, especially in the first wave. The first wave provides the best indicator because of its temporal proximity to site selection. In addition, responses in this wave are not biased by the intervention, nor are they biased by any displacement or diffusion effects that might result from the intervention. Before discussing place manager perceptions across areas, however, it is worth ensuring that crime in the catchment areas was indeed lower than crime in the target area. For this, I turn to calls for service data. Figure 1 shows calls for service across all three areas during the first wave.

Figure 1: Drug Use/Sales Calls for Service Pre-Intervention (Feb 98-Aug 98)



Clearly, more drug crime was present in the target area than in either catchment area during this time. I now examine the place manager perceptions of crime across areas during the first wave.[59] Figure 2 shows perceived levels of drug crime in the target area during the first wave.

Figure 2: Place Manager Perceptions of Drug Crime in the Target Area (N=24) Pre-Intervention (Feb 98-Aug 98)



An overwhelming majority (66.7%) of the place managers in the target area reported high levels of drug dealing. This is consistent with actual levels of crime as measured by calls for service. We would also expect place managers outside of the target area to report lower levels of crime

[59] 41 place managers were interviewed during the first wave. Of these, 24 were interviewed in the target area, 13 were interviewed in catchment area 1, and 4 were interviewed in catchment area 2. Because of the low base rate in catchment area 2, those 4 interviews were removed from all analyses conducted in this section. Therefore, all analyses focusing on this wave will have an N of 37 instead of 182.

for the same time period. Figure 3 shows the place manager perceptions of drug crime in catchment area 1.

Figure 3: Place Manager Perceptions of Drug Crime in Catchment Area 1 (N=13) Pre-Intervention (Feb 98-Aug 98)



As expected, fewer place managers in the first catchment area perceived high levels of drug crime on their street block. Only 30.8% perceived high levels of crime, compared with 66.7% in the target area. Furthermore, 46.2% of the place managers in the first catchment area reported no drug crime on their street block, compared with 16.7% in the target area.

Variation Across Waves

As previously discussed, a high-impact intervention was conducted in the drug/assault target area between September of 1998 and March of 1999. Before comparing place manager perceptions, we first need to determine if the intervention had the intended affect of lowering crime in that area. For this, I turn again to calls for service data. Figure 4 displays drug use and sales calls for service in the target area across the first two waves.

Figure 4: Drug Use/Sales Calls for Service in the Target Area



It is clear that the intervention lowered crime in the target area, as drug-related calls for service were more than cut in half. If it is true that place managers are good observers of crime, we would expect their interview responses to reflect that change. Figures 5 and 6 compare place manager perceptions of drug crime across the first two waves in the target area.

Figure 5: Place Manager Perceptions of Drug Crime Before Intervention (N=24)



Figure 6: Place Manager Perceptions of Drug Crime During Intervention (N=27)



The two figures appear almost identical, indicating that place manager perceptions of the amount of drug crime on their street block did not change as a result of the intervention. If anything, the place managers perceived more crime during this time period. There are a couple

of possible explanations for this finding. First, it is unlikely that each place manager was informed that an intervention would be taking place prior to its enactment. Having no knowledge that an experiment was being conducted in their neighborhood, the place managers would simply observe a strong (300% increase) and unusual police presence in the area. This may have led them to the logical conclusion that crime had increased in the area. Second, drug crime may have in fact become *more visible* to the place managers as a result of the intervention. Part of the intervention strategy was to conduct numerous drug sweeps in the target area. Such sweeps often involve undercover drug buys, which would have looked like normal drug transactions to the place managers. In addition, the sweeps likely resulted in drug arrests and a lot more attention being given to drug transactions than would normally occur. However, even if these explanations are correct, it is not clear why they would have been reflected in the place manager interviews and not in the drug calls for service.

Thus far, we have observed conflicting evidence of place managers' ability to observe crime on their street block. A comparison across areas would seem to indicate that they are reliable observers of crime, while a comparison across waves is inconclusive. In an attempt to resolve this discrepancy, I turn next to a comparison of place manager perceptions and arrest data.

Comparison with Arrest Data

The arrest data was selected for comparison to place manager responses for a number of reasons, both theoretical and practical. Among the three forms of crime data, calls for service would be the least logical to use, because of the nature of the reporting process. Calls for service

generally originate from residents and business owners, meaning that the majority of calls will be from various forms of place managers. Since the crime data is being compared to place manager observations, using the former for analysis purposes seems tautological. The ideal form of crime data to use would be crime incidents, which are in the form of incident reports written by the responding officer. Unfortunately, responding officers in Jersey City do not write incident reports for drug crimes, rendering this form of data useless for this study. The remaining type, arrest data, offers useful information in the form of the location of the arrest and the offense type. Aside from calls for service, it is the best measure of drug crimes recorded by the Jersey City Police Department. However, it also suffers from many problems.

The most obvious problem is that the location of an arrest is not always the same as the location where the crime was committed. For example, an individual may commit a crime while at work, but be arrested at their home. Since the address given on the arrest report will be the work address, the data can at times be misleading. Less problematic is the notion that arrest data is driven by the individual, not by the crime. For example, a single drug deal may involve multiple persons. Each person may be arrested, leading to more than one record for the same crime. However, some may support the validity of arrest data by arguing that each person involved in the drug deal was committing a separate crime. Another issue is that arrest reports are often completed carelessly, and essential information such as the street address is left out. Also common is the listing of a location, such as a store or a park, instead of an address. When the unit of analysis is the street segment, such oversights are inherently damaging to the accuracy of the data. Despite these issues, a comparison of place manager perceptions with arrest data may shed some light on their ability to observe crime on their street block.

I selected arrest data for each of the three months immediately preceding the place manager interview waves. These periods were selected in order to reflect the frame of reference that the place managers would be drawing from when answering the interview questions. It was important that the time periods not overlap with the other waves, but they also had to contain enough time to be representative of the norms in the area with respect to crime. Within these three month intervals, I selected only the arrests that occurred within the three study areas. Arrests outside of catchment area 2 were eliminated. Of the remaining cases, I selected all of the arrests that were made for CDS (Controlled, Dangerous Substances) offenses. The final sample included all drug crime arrests in the three areas for each of the three months preceding the place manager interviews.[60]

The majority of drug arrests took place at fixed locations on specific street segments. However, 42 cases (20.1%) in the final sample listed intersections, instead of addresses, as the arrest location. In these instances, I divided each crime by the number of bordering street segments, and assigned a portion of the crime to each segment. For example, if an arrest occurred at a four-way intersection, each bordering street segment was assigned .25 crimes. If an arrest occurred at a three-way intersection, each bordering street segment was assigned .33 crimes. I chose this method over designating the crimes to only one street segment because place managers on any of the bordering street segments had an equal opportunity to witness the crime and consider it as occurring on their block. I decided to divide the crimes among all bordering segments instead of adding a whole crime to each segment to allow for an even distribution without biasing the sample.

[60] It should be noted that of the 78,808 arrests in Jersey City between 1996 and 2000, only 209 were left after narrowing the sample to the specific areas, times, and crimes of interest. This low number is likely due to the numerous problems with the arrest data that have already been discussed.

Once the intersections were distributed among street segments, I then categorized each street segment as a 'high crime,' 'medium crime,' 'low crime,' or 'no crime' segment to allow for a more logical comparison with the place manager perceptions. Although the categorization process was subjective, I used theoretically sound breaks in the data to assign each segment a label. I first looked at a distribution of arrests across all street segments in the three areas across all three waves.[61] Since crime is a relatively rare event, it was not surprising to find that the majority (72.8%) had no arrests. All segments with no arrests were designated as 'no crime' areas. For the remaining segments, I used the natural distribution of the data to assign the other three labels. The final distribution of cases is theoretically consistent with the idea that there are more 'low crime' street segments than 'medium crime' segments, and more 'medium crime' segments than 'high crime' segments. [62]

The first step in my analysis was to perform a cross tabulation of the arrest data and the place manager perceptions. In this manner, the place manager perceptions were compared only with arrests on the same street segment for the period immediately preceding the wave in which the interview first took place. I found a significant but weak relationship between the two variables, in the positive direction.[63] This would indicate that as crime (measured by arrests) increases on a block, place manager perceptions of crime reflect the same trend. However, I felt it was possible that the high number of 'no crime' street segments was biasing the results, so I conducted a second cross tabulation after removing these segments. I found that when these

[61] Note that not all street segments are represented by place manager interviews. As such, I felt it was important to categorize the segments before merging the arrest database with the place manager database, after which some arrests would be eliminated. The elimination of these cases, however, is irrelevant as we have no place manager interviews to use as a comparison.
[62] The final distribution of cases is as follows: 'no crime': 177 (72.8%); 'low crime': 33 (13.6%); 'medium crime': 21 (8.6%); and 'high crime': 12 (4.9%).
[63] Pearson Chi-square significance = .038. I used Kendall's Tau-b to measure the strength of the relationship, as the number of rows and columns in the crosstab were equivalent. I found a significant (.001) Kendall's Tau-b value of .217.

segments were removed, the relationship was no longer significant. However, this analysis generated some interesting findings. Figures 7 and 8 display place manager perceptions on street segments with 'high' and 'no' levels of crime, respectively.

Figure 7: Place Manager Perceptions of Crime on 'High Crime' Segments (N=17)



Figure 8: Place Manager Perceptions of Crime on 'No Crime' Segments (N=94)



Figure 7 indicates that on street segments with a lot of drug arrests, the majority (58.8%) of place managers perceive high levels of crime. However, according to Figure 8, place managers on street segments with no crime are almost equally likely to perceive their block as having a 'high' (41.5%) level of crime as they are to perceive 'no' (36.2%) crime. This finding is intuitively reasonable: in areas that are crime-ridden, it is hard to ignore that a problem exists, especially when looking at such visible crimes as drug dealing. Even place managers who are generally not attentive to criminal activity in their area are more likely to be cognizant of it when located in high-crime areas. However, in areas with less crime, or at least where fewer arrests are made, the crime problem is not as obvious. Attentive place managers in these areas may still witness criminal activity and perceive that their block has a high level of crime. When fewer arrests are made, however, this crime is not "brought to the attention" of inattentive place managers. In sum, after comparing place manager perceptions of crime with arrest data, it appears as though levels of crime are not perceived equally across all place managers. Place

managers on high-crime street segments are more likely to be consistent in perceiving their block as having a high level of crime. Conversely, place managers on street segments without as much crime are likely to be divided in terms of how much crime they perceive on their block.

Question 2: What role do place managers play in crime prevention?

As previously noted, the fact that a place manager is a good observer of crime does not necessarily indicate that he or she will play a role in preventing it. The next series of analyses examine the role that place managers in Jersey City play in crime prevention. These roles are examined to see if they vary according to police presence in the area. Special attention is also given to variations in crime prevention roles by type of place manager.

Crime Prevention Activities by Place Managers

After being asked about a series of crime problems on their block (including muggings, burglaries, fighting, drug dealing, and prostitution), the place managers were asked if they had tried to do something about any of these problems. Of the 182 place managers interviewed, 55 (31.1%) responded in the affirmative, and 122 (68.9%) responded in the negative.[64] Those who responded that they had done something were then asked what they did. Exactly half of the respondents (27) reported that they had contacted the police or the city. 14.8% (8) said that they had started a neighborhood association or began meeting with police on a regular basis. Another 14.8% (8) said that they worked as an officer or in a security role. Other responses included hiring private security, lecturing at schools or churches, and joining a social service agency.

Figure 9 displays the breakdown of place managers in the target area who reported that they had done something about a crime problem by wave.[65]

Figure 9: Place Managers who Responded that They Had Done Something about a Crime Problem by Wave (N=77)



Respondents who were interviewed before the intervention were only slightly more likely than respondents interviewed during or after the intervention to report that they had done something about a crime problem. Though the difference is extremely slight, this may indicate that place managers respond to an increased police presence by taking a less active role in crime prevention. They may feel as though the police are taking care of the problem and thus they are relieved of their responsibilities. However, because the question asked if the respondent had taken action in the past, it is not clear whether the intervention would have had any impact on the response. For example, a place manager who was interviewed after the intervention could have been referring to a call he made to the police 2 years prior, which would place it well before the intervention.

A more interesting question is whether the type of place manager has any impact on their role in crime prevention. Figure 10 shows a breakdown of place managers by type who responded that they had done something about a crime problem.

[64] 5 respondents did not answer the question, for an N of 177.

Figure 10: Place Managers who Responded that They Had Done Something about a Crime Problem by Type (N=55)



Of the four types, personal place managers are the most likely to report that they have done something about a crime problem (36.6%). It was mentioned earlier that personal place managers often have an increased interest in the area because they may own property or reside there. Figure 10 would seem to indicate that this increased interest includes playing a more active role in crime prevention, or at least that they are more likely to notify the police when they observe crime taking place. As might be expected, assigned place managers are the next in line when it comes to taking an active role in preventing crime (32.3%), followed by diffuse (25.0%) and general (12.5%).

Another question asked place managers if they had called the Jersey City Police Department for any reason other than to report specific crimes in the previous three months.[66] 50 place managers (27.9%) reported that they had, while 129 (72.1%) said that they had not.[67] Of the respondents who had called the police, 11 (22.4%) called to report loitering or noise, 10 (20.4%) called to report shoplifting or theft, and 8 (16.3%) called to report harassment of employees or customers. Other responses included calls about disagreements, medical assistance,

[65] Since only place managers in the target area were selected for this analysis, the N is reduced from 182 to 77.
[66] The specific crimes were fighting, burglary, prostitution, drug dealing, and robbery.
[67] 3 place managers did not answer the question, for an N of 179.

vandalism, and alarms sounding. Some of these cases, such as loitering, disagreements, and employee harassment, might indicate that place managers are playing a role in crime prevention by calling the police before a crime can develop.

One of the survey questions asked respondents if they were aware of specific things that residents were doing to deal with crime problems in the neighborhood. 25.7% (45) of the place managers responded that they were aware of something, while 74.3% (130) said that they were not.[68] Of the place managers who responded in the affirmative, 86.7% (39) said that residents were organizing or attending neighborhood watch or community organization meetings. This indicates that place managers are playing a role in crime prevention independent of interactions with the police. It also demonstrates that in addition to calling police to report crime and other problems, residents can be proactive and work together within the local community or street block to prevent crime. Another 6.7% (3) of respondents said that they were aware of residents cooperating more with police.

Responses to the question about specific things that residents are doing to deal with crime problems in the neighborhood are further examined by place manager type in Figure 11.

Figure 11: Place Managers who Responded that They are Aware of Something that Residents are Doing to Deal With Crime Problems in the Neighborhood (N=174)



Figure 11 indicates that personal place managers are the most likely to be aware of the crime prevention activities of residents. This is not surprising, as many personal place managers are residents themselves. 41.5% of all personal place managers said that they are aware of something that residents are doing. 25.9% of diffuse place managers said that they are aware of something that residents are doing, compared with only 20.4% of assigned place managers. This could be because diffuse place managers spend more time interacting with residents (through jobs involving delivery or utility work), while assigned place managers are more likely to spend their time in business areas. Likewise, assigned place managers may work at the location where they were interviewed but live elsewhere. It is not uncommon for employees to live outside of the neighborhood or city in which they work. General place managers, by contrast, have the least amount of knowledge about resident crime prevention activities. We would expect this as well, since most general place managers are customers or bystanders whose presence in the neighborhood is sporadic.

Place Managers and the Police

Previous literature suggests that many place managers have limited time and resources with which to actively engage in crime prevention activities.[69] For this reason, researchers have suggested that police agencies should invest resources in assisting place managers with crime prevention activities. The final stage of analysis in this study looks at place managers' awareness of and involvement with the police in preventing crime.

[68] 7 place managers did not answer the question, for an N of 175.
[69] Eck and Wartell, 1999.

One of the questions asked of place managers was if they saw more, fewer, or about the same number of police officers on their block than in the previous three months. We would expect that if place managers were aware of police activity in their area, they would observe an increase in police presence during the intervention period. Figure 12 displays place manager responses to this question for all respondents who were interviewed in the target area, where the intervention took place.[70]

Figure 12: Place Manager Reponses in the Target Area to Observed Police Presence on their Block Compared to Three Months Before (N=29)



It is clear that place managers in the target area were aware of an increased police presence on their block. An overwhelming majority (65.5%) reported seeing more police on their block as compared to three months before. It is possible that place managers outside of the target area, as well as those in the target area, were aware of the increased presence. As the catchment areas are only a couple blocks away from the target area, place managers on these street segments may have perceived an increased police presence on their block as well. Figures 13 and 14 display responses to the above question, during the intervention period, for place managers in catchment area 1 and catchment area 2, respectively.

[70] Since this analysis uses only responses from place managers in the target area, the N is reduced to 29.

Figure 13: Place Manager Reponses in Catchment Area 1 to Observed Police Presence on their Block Compared to Three Months Before (N=18)



Figure 14: Place Manager Reponses in Catchment Area 2 to Observed Police Presence on their Block Compared to Three Months Before (N=12)



Figures 13 and 14 indicate that place managers in the areas surrounding the target area did indeed perceive an increased police presence on their block, despite the fact that the police were operating a couple blocks away. 50.0% of the respondents in the first catchment area and 41.7% of respondents in the second catchment area reported seeing more police on their block. This provides evidence that police presence can have a positive impact not only on the area being targeted, but also on surrounding areas as well.

Another question asked respondents if they were aware of something the Jersey City Police Department was doing about a serious crime problem in their neighborhood. 71 residents (42.5%) reported that they were aware of something that the police were doing, while 96 (57.5%) of the residents reported that they were not.[71] Of the respondents who answered in the affirmative, 46 (73%) reported that the police had increased patrols in the area. Other responses included undercover officers, foot patrols, a new task force, and better response to calls.

Next I break down place manager responses to the question about whether the Jersey City Police Department was doing something about a serious crime problem by place manager type.

[71] 15 respondents did not answer this question, for an N of 167.

Figure 15 shows the percent of place managers by type who responded that they were aware that the JCPD was doing something about the problem.

Figure 15: Place Managers who Responded that They are Aware of Something that the JCPD is Doing About A Serious Crime Problem by Type (N=174)



In Figure 15, we see that for the most part, place managers across all types were aware that the police were doing something about the crime problem. Assigned place managers were the most likely (44.2%), while diffuse place managers were the next most likely (42.3%). This is intuitively reasonable, considering that assigned place managers and diffuse place managers are both likely to work in the area, and diffuse place managers are often outside which would increase the likelihood of them witnessing police activity.

Finally, I examine place manager responses to a question that asked what they thought about the quality of police service in their neighborhood.[72] It is logical to think that if place managers feel the police are doing a good job, they might be more willing to cooperate or engage

[72] It should be noted that this question (number 36) changed from "In general, what do you think about the quality of police service in this neighborhood?" which resulted in responses such as good, bad, fair, etc., to "In general, do you think the police are doing a good job in this neighborhood?" which resulted in primarily yes and no responses. The second question was actually biased towards a positive response. In order to correct for this change, I collapsed all the responses into good and bad categories (yes being good and no being bad).

in crime prevention activities themselves. Figure 16 shows place manager responses to the question about the quality of police services in their neighborhood.[73]

Figure 16: Place Manager Reponses to the Quality of Police Service in their Neighborhood (N=174)



100 respondents (57.5%) reported that they think the quality of police service in their neighborhood is good. 16.1% (28) said they thought it was average, and 26.4% (46) said they thought it was bad. 10.4% (19) of all the respondents elaborated and said that the police were visible and responsive in their neighborhood. Conversely, 5.5% (10) said that police had a poor response time, and 3.8% (7) said that police did not prevent crime in their neighborhood.

There are a number of possibilities for the effects of perceived quality of police service on place managers. One school of thought would say that place managers are more willing to engage in crime prevention activities when they perceive a high quality of police service in their neighborhood. Another school of thought might say that place managers would take it upon themselves to be more active in the absence of good policing in their area. Generally, however, the literature supports the first perspective. When residents lose faith in the ability of the police to control crime, they tend to get discouraged, leading to a withdrawal from community-oriented

[73] 8 respondents did not answer this question, for an N of 174.

activities. As Skogan notes: “The problems caused by police estrangement from the community they serve are now widely recognized.”[74]

The last piece of analysis looks at place manager perceptions of the quality of police service by place manager type. Figure 17 shows the percentage of place managers by type who believe that the police are doing a good job in their neighborhood.

Figure 17: Place Managers who Perceive a Good Quality of Police Service in their Neighborhood (N=173)



Over half of the respondents in all four types reported a good quality of police service in their neighborhood. Personal place managers were slightly less likely to perceive a good quality of police service than the other three types. This could be because as residents and owners, they have higher standards of police service, and are more likely to feel that the police are not living up to them. For example, most calls for service likely come from personal place managers, as opposed to the other three types. Therefore, police response time- generally the component of policing for which the police are most criticized- is an important issue for them, whereas other types of place managers are probably not as concerned with the issue.

[74] Skogan, 1990: 89.

Section Six: Discussion and Policy Implications

My analyses indicate that as a general rule, place managers are good observers of crime. However, the degree to which they accurately perceive crime levels is not consistent across all place managers. In other words, some place managers are better observers than others. Attentive place managers may be more cognizant and better aware of crime in their area than inattentive managers. Furthermore, place managers located in high-crime areas are more likely to accurately perceive criminal activity on their street segment than managers in areas with little or no crime. This finding is intuitively sensible: when crime is rampant, it becomes visible even to those people who are otherwise not paying attention.

Increased awareness of crime by place managers may have a deterrent effect. Offenders are less likely to engage in criminal activity if they think other people are watching. Likewise, reactive measures such as calling the police can have a dual effect on crime: in addition to bringing a police response, they may also serve a preventive role. For example, if a drug dealer thinks a local shop owner will call the police upon sighting him, he will be less likely to commit crime on that block.

Place managers in this study were somewhat likely to play an active role in preventing crime. Almost a third of all place managers responded that they had taken some action in response to a crime problem on their block. These responses included contacting the police and participating in neighborhood watch and community mobilization meetings. Personal place managers, who generally have more attachment to their area through ownership or residence, were the most likely to have responded to a crime problem. General place managers, who have less amount of attachment to their area, were the least likely to respond to crime. Place managers

also reported an awareness of what residents and police in their area were doing about crime problems. Not only did place managers notice varying levels of police presence, they also took note of specific actions that the police were doing, both on their street segment and in the surrounding area. The value of this finding should not be underappreciated: prior research shows that place managers are most effective in preventing crime when they work in cooperation with police. As Bursik and Grasmick note: "The cornerstone of [crime control strategies] is the development of strong networks of association among the residents of a community, and between those residents and existent local institutions."[75] Collective activities, among both place managers and police, demonstrate a stronger and more integrative commitment to change and are thus more likely to endure and succeed.

[75] Bursik and Grasmick, 1993: 180.

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Appendix 1: Drug/Assault Site Map



Appendix C

JERSEY CITY DISPLACEMENT PROJECT
PLACE MANAGER INTERVIEW

INTERVIEWERS: FOR ALL RESPONSES, PLEASE CIRCLE THE NUMBER THAT MOST ACCURATELY DESCRIBES HOW THE RESPONDENT ANSWERS. FOR EACH OPEN-ENDED QUESTION, WRITE THE ANSWER IN THE SPACE PROVIDED. DO NOT READ INSTRUCTIONS IN UPPER CASE LETTERING.

1. RESEARCHER CONDUCTING THE INTERVIEW:

1	CARSTEN
2	ANN MARIE
3	VANJA
4	JUSTIN
5	CHRIS
6	KAREN
7	CHOO
8	YESENIA
9	ALLISON
0	OTHER

2. DATE OF INTERVIEW: _____ / ____ / ____

3. TIME OF INTERVIEW: _____ : _____ AM/PM

4. DISPLACEMENT SITE:

1	DRUG/ASSAULT
2	PROSTITUTION
3	BURGLARIES

5. STREET SEGMENT: _____

6. IS THE PLACE MANAGER LOCATED IN THE TARGET AREA OR ONE OF THE CATCHMENT AREAS?

1 TARGET AREA
2 CATCHMENT AREA #1
3 CATCHMENT AREA #2

7. NAME AND/OR TYPE OF BUSINESS (IF APPLICABLE):

_____

8. ADDRESS WHERE THIS PERSON WORKS OR SPENDS TIME:

_____

9. INDICATE PLACE MANAGER TYPE:

1 PERSONAL
2 ASSIGNED
3 DESIGNATED
4 GENERAL

Good morning/afternoon. I'm with the Police Foundation, a non-profit research organization. We're conducting a survey of local businesses and residents in Jersey City about crime and disorder problems in this neighborhood. We would like to know about the things you observe when you are working or spending time in this area. Your participation in this survey would be greatly appreciated. It should only take about 10 minutes.

Most of my questions are about this block. When I talk about this block, I mean STREET 1 from STREET 2 to STREET 3.

10. What do you do here [CIRCLE ALL THAT APPLY]?

1	MANAGE
2	SELL
3	CLEAN
4	DELIVER
5	SERVE
6	DRIVE
7	CASHIER
8	OWN
9	SECURITY
10	HANG OUT
99	0THER (SPECIFY)_______

11. In a normal week, how many hours do you spend here? _____

12. How long have you been working/spending time here? _____

13. What days are you normally here? [PROBE: Whether working or hanging out.]

WEEKDAYS: _____

WEEKEND DAYS: _____

14. What time of day are you usually here? [PROBE: Morning, afternoon, or evening?]

_____

15. How close to here do you live? _____

16. I'm going to read you a list of things that some people feel are problems on their block. How often do you think the following things occur on this block: every day, a few times a week, a few times a month, a few times a year, or never?

	Every Day	A Few Times Per Week	A Few Times Per Month	A Few Times Per Year	Never
a. People getting mugged	1	2	3	4	9
b. People breaking into homes/business	1	2	3	4	9
c. Groups of people hanging out	1	2	3	4	9
d. People getting into fights	1	2	3	4	9
e. People selling drugs	1	2	3	4	9
f. Prostitutes hanging around	1	2	3	4	9

17. Have you been asked, or have you tried, to do something about any of these problems?

1 YES
2 NO (GO TO Q.19)

18. Could you tell me what happened?

_____

_____

19a. Now, I'm going to ask you some specific questions about crimes that may occur on this block. How often do you *see* people fighting on this block? That is, pushing, coming to blows, or threatening one another with weapons.

_____

_____

19b. Where do these fights take place?

_____

_____

19c. What time of day do they take place?

_____

_____

19d. In general, do you think the people who get into fights in this area are mostly from this block, the neighborhood, or other parts of Jersey City?

_____

_____

20. In the last three months, do you think that street fights on this block have increased, decreased, or stayed about the same?

1	INCREASED
2	DECREASED
3	STAYED ABOUT THE SAME
9	DON'T KNOW

21. In the last month, about how many times have you witnessed a fight on this block?

NUMBER OF TIMES	|___|___|
DON'T KNOW	98
REFUSED	99

22a. How often do you think homes and businesses on this block are broken into?

_____

_____

22b. What time of day do they usually take place?

_____

_____

22c. How do you think the burglars break into buildings?

_____

_____

22d. What do they take?

_____

_____

22e. In general, do you think the people who do break-ins are from this block, the neighborhood, or other parts of Jersey City?

_____

_____

23. In the last three months, would you say break-ins on this block have increased, decreased or stayed about the same?

1	INCREASED
2	DECREASED
3	STAYED ABOUT THE SAME
9	DON'T KNOW

24a. How many times have you been broken into in the last three months?

NUMBER OF BREAK-INS	|___|___|
DON'T KNOW	98
REFUSED	99

24b. How many break-ins on this block do you know about in the last three months?

NUMBER OF BREAK-INS	|___|___|
DON'T KNOW	98
REFUSED	99

25a. How often do you *see* prostitutes on this block?

_____

_____

25b. What time of day do you see them?

_____

_____

25c. How many do you usually see?

_____

_____

25d. In general, do you think these prostitutes are mostly from this block, the neighborhood, or other parts of Jersey City?

_____

_____

25e. What about the customers?

_____

_____

26. In the last three months, would you say that prostitution on this block has increased, decreased, or stayed about the same?

1 INCREASED
2 DECREASED
3 STAYED ABOUT THE SAME
9 DON'T KNOW

27a. I'd like to ask you about another problem you may see on this block. How often do you *see* drugs being sold on this block?

_____

_____

27b. What time of day does this take place?

_____

_____

27c. About how many people sell drugs on this block?

_____

_____

27d. Where does this take place? [PROBE: In apartments and houses or on the street? PROBE FOR SPECIFIC STREET NAMES AND INTERSECTIONS]

_____

_____

27e. In general, do you think the people who sell drugs are mostly from this block, the neighborhood, or other parts of Jersey City?

_____

_____

27f. What about the buyers?

_____

_____

28. In the last three months, would you say that drug selling on the block has increased, decreased, or stayed about the same?

1 INCREASED
2 DECREASED
3 STAYED ABOUT THE SAME
9 DON'T KNOW

29. Within the last three months, have you or someone you work with been robbed?

1 YES
2 NO (GO TO Q.31)

30. Could you please describe what happened? [PROBE: Was anything taken, anyone threatened, or anyone injured?]

_____

_____

31. Have you been attacked or threatened on this block within the last three months?

1 YES
2 NO (GO TO Q.33)

32. Could you please describe what happened?

_____

_____

33. Did you report any of these crimes to the Jersey City Police Department?

1 YES
2 NO

34. Within the last three months, have you called the Jersey City Police Department for any [other] reason?

1 YES
2 NO (GO TO Q.36)

35. Why did you call the police?

_____

_____

36. In general, do you think the police are doing a good job in this neighborhood?

_____

_____

37. Do you see more, fewer, or about the same number of police officers on this block than you saw three months ago?

1 MORE
2 FEWER
3 ABOUT THE SAME
9 DON'T KNOW

38. Currently, what would you say is the most important problem facing this neighborhood?

_____

_____

39. Do you know if the Jersey City Police Department is doing something about this problem?

1 YES
2 NO (GO TO Q.41)

40. Could you describe what they are doing?

_____

_____

41. Are you aware of any specific things that residents are doing to deal with crime problems in this neighborhood?

1 YES
2 NO (GO TO Q.43)

42. Could you describe what they are doing?

_____

_____

43. In general, how would you rate this block as a place to work/hang out?

1 Excellent
2 Good
3 Fair

4 Poor
9 DON’T KNOW

44. Is there something in particular that could be done to reduce crime on this block?

_____

_____

END OF INTERVIEW

Appendix D: POTENTIAL SITES FOR MEASURING DISPLACEMENT & DIFFUSION

Site	District	Crime	Size of Area	Intensity	Identified by Police	Clustering (Investigations)	Clustering in 3 block Catchment Area
Ocean Avenue (Lembeck to New)	South	Prostitution	4 block faces	Steady at night	Yes	Low	Low
Tonnele Avenue (Spruce to Manhattan)	North	Prostitution	3 hotels, 3 block faces	Steady at night	Yes	Medium to high	Low
Cornelison Avenue (Ivy to Fairmount)	East	Prostitution	5 block faces	Steady	Yes	Low	Low
Woodlawn & Bergen	South	Drug dealing	1 intersection	Steady	Yes	Medium to high	High
Martin Luther King Dr (Dwight to Stegman)	South	Drug dealing	1 block face	Steady	No	High	High
Bergen Avenue (Claremont to Grant)	South	Drug dealing	1 intersection, 2 block faces	Steady at night	Yes	Medium	Medium
Carteret & Ocean	South	Drug dealing	1 intersection	Steady	Yes	Medium	Medium
Palisade Avenue (Griffith to Hutton)	North	Drug dealing	1 block face	Steady at night	Yes	Low to medium	Low
Monticello Avenue (Storm to Astor)	West	Drug dealing	6 block faces	Steady at night	No	Medium	Low
Stegman & Ocean	South	Drug dealing	2 block faces	Steady	Yes	Medium	Medium
Journal Square	North	Robberies	Journal Square	Periodic	Yes	Medium	Medium
Kennedy Boulevard (Clinton to Communipaw)	West	Robberies	2 block faces	Periodic	No	High	Medium
Duncan Apartments	West	Assaults	Public housing development	Steady	No	High	Low
Stegman & Ocean	South	Assaults	2 block faces	Periodic	Yes	High	Medium
Storm & Bergen	West	Assaults	2 block faces	Periodic	Yes	Medium	Medium
St Pauls & Huron (1-block radius)	North	Auto thefts	1 block	Periodic at night	Yes	Medium	Low
Western slope	North	Auto thefts	5 blocks	Periodic at day	Yes	Low to medium	Medium
Reed & Bergen	West	Residential burglaries	1 intersection, 2 block faces	Periodic at day	Yes	High	Medium
Griffith & Webster (2-block radius)	North	Residential burglaries	4 blocks	Periodic at day	No	Low to medium	Medium

Pavonia & Tonnele (1-block radius)	West	Residential burglaries	1 block	Periodic at day	No	High	Medium

POTENTIAL SITES FOR MEASURING DISPLACEMENT & DIFFUSION
SHORT LIST

Site	*District*	*Crime*	*Size of Area*	*Intensity*	*Identified by Police*	*Clustering (Investigations)*	*Clustering in 3 block Catchment Area*
1. Tonnele Avenue (Spruce to Manhattan)	North	Prostitution	3 hotels, 3 block faces	Steady at night	Yes	Medium to high	Low
2. Cornelison Avenue (Ivy to Fairmount)	East	Prostitution	5 block faces	Steady	Yes	Low	Low
3. Martin Luther King Dr (Dwight to Stegman)	South	Drug dealing	1 block face	Steady	No	High	High
4. Bergen Avenue (Claremont to Grant)	South	Drug dealing	1 intersection, 2 block faces	Steady at night	Yes	Medium	Medium
5. Monticello Avenue (Storm to Astor)	West	Drug dealing	6 block faces	Steady at night	No	Medium	Low
6. Duncan Apartments	West	Assaults	Public housing development	Steady	No	High	Low
7. Academic High	West	Assaults	2 block faces	Periodic	Yes	High	Medium
8. Storm & Bergen	West	Assaults	1 intersection, 2 block faces	Periodic	Yes	Medium	Medium
9. Stegman & Ocean	South	Assaults, Drug dealing	1 intersection, 2 block faces	Periodic	Yes	High	Medium
10. St Pauls & Huron (1-block radius)	North	Auto thefts	1 block	Periodic at night	Yes	Medium	Low
11. Reed & Bergen	West	Residential burglaries	1 intersection, 2 block faces	Periodic at day	Yes	High	Medium
12. Pavonia & Tonnele (1-block radius)	West	Residential burglaries	1 block	Periodic at day	No	High	Medium

Appendix E- Completed Site Selection Assessment Forms

JERSEY CITY PROJECT FOR MEASURING DISPLACEMENT & DIFFUSION
ASSESSMENT INSTRUMENT: SITE #1 (PROSTITUTION)

Site location: Tonnele Avenue (from Spruce to Manhattan)

Description (check one only):
( ) Entirely residential
( ) Residential, some commercial
( ) Entirely commercial
(✓) Commercial, some residential
( ) Mixed residential & commercial

Description of commercial addresses:
(✓) Mostly retail (i.e., malls)
( ) Mostly industrial (i.e., warehouses)

Physical profile:
17 Buildings in target area.
4 Residential buildings.
13 Commercial buildings.
0 Combined commercial/residential buildings.
0 Municipal & social service providers.
0 Recreational areas (i.e., parks and courts).
0 Parking facilities (i.e., garages and lots).
3 Public telephones.
6 24-hour businesses.

Physical deterioration:
1 Burned or boarded up building.
2 Vacant lots.
0 Abandoned vehicles.

135 Calls for service in 1997 (target area).
24 Calls for service in 1997 (catchment area).
11 Addresses generating calls (target area).
0 Hot spots within a two-block radius.

Is alcohol sold legally in this area? Yes ( ) No (✓) Number of outlets: 0

Are broken windows visible? Yes (✓) No ( ) Number of windows: 4

Does a bus run through this area? Yes (✓) No ( ) Number of stops: 1

Yards and streets strewn with litter:
(✓) less than 10%
( ) 10-30%
( ) 31-50%
( ) over 50%

Streets and sidewalks covered with broken glass:
(✓) less than 10%
( ) 10-30%
( ) 31-50%
( ) over 50%

Buildings and fences marred with graffiti:
( ) less than 10%
(✓) 10-30%
( ) 31-50%
( ) over 50%

Commercial addresses (check all that apply):

Offices
( ) Office building
( ) Banking or financial

Retail
( ) Department store
(✓) Convenience store
( ) Drug store
( ) Jewelry store
( ) Florist

Grocery
( ) Supermarket
(✓) Small grocery

Restaurant
(✓) Full restaurant
(✓) Fast food

Entertainment
( ) Nightclub
( ) Video store

Liquor
( ) Bar or pub
( ) Liquor store

Accommodations
(✓) Hotel or motel

Transportation
(✓) Gas station
(✓) Bus terminal
( ) Travel agency

Others
(✓) Check cashing
( ) Laundromat
( ) Funeral home
( ) Fire department
( ) Church or temple
( ) School

Residential addresses (check all that apply):
( ) High-rise tower (over 5 floors)
( ) Large apt (1/4 block size)
( ) Medium apt (5 or fewer floors)
(✓) Two- and three-family homes

( ) Single-family homes
( ) Public housing development

JERSEY CITY PROJECT FOR MEASURING DISPLACEMENT & DIFFUSION
ASSESSMENT INSTRUMENT: SITE #2 (PROSTITUTION)

Site location: Cornelison Avenue (from Ivy to Fairmount)

Description (check one only):
( ) Entirely residential
( ) Residential, some commercial
( ) Entirely commercial
(✓) Commercial, some residential
( ) Mixed residential & commercial

Description of commercial addresses:
( ) Mostly retail (i.e., malls)
(✓) Mostly industrial (i.e., warehouses)

Physical profile:
16 Buildings in target area.
3 Residential buildings.
13 Commercial buildings.
0 Combined commercial/residential buildings.
2 Municipal & social service providers.
0 Recreational areas (i.e., parks and courts).
0 Parking facilities (i.e., garages and lots).
1 Public telephone.
0 24-hour businesses.

Physical deterioration:
6 Burned or boarded up buildings.
2 Vacant lots.
0 Abandoned vehicles.

109 Calls for service in 1997 (target area).
44 Calls for service in 1997 (catchment area).
15 Addresses generating calls (target area).
1 Hot spot within a two-block radius.

Is alcohol sold legally in this area?	Yes ( ) No (✓)	Number of outlets:	0
Are broken windows visible?	Yes (✓) No ( )	Number of windows:	26
Does a bus run through this area?	Yes (✓) No ( )	Number of stops:	0

Yards and streets strewn with litter:
- ( ) less than 10%
- ( ) 10-30%
- ( ) 31-50%
- (✓) over 50%

Streets and sidewalks covered with broken glass:
- ( ) less than 10%
- ( ) 10-30%
- ( ) 31-50%
- (✓) over 50%

Buildings and fences marred with graffiti:
- (✓) less than 10%
- ( ) 10-30%
- ( ) 31-50%
- ( ) over 50%

Commercial addresses (check all that apply):

Offices	(✓) Office building
	( ) Banking or financial
Retail	( ) Department store
	( ) Convenience store
	( ) Drug store
	( ) Jewelry store
	( ) Florist
Grocery	( ) Supermarket
	( ) Small grocery
Restaurant	( ) Full restaurant
	( ) Fast food
Entertainment	( ) Nightclub
	( ) Video store
Liquor	( ) Bar or pub
	( ) Liquor store
Accommodations	( ) Hotel or motel
Transportation	(✓) Gas station
	(✓) Bus terminal
	( ) Travel agency
Others	( ) Check cashing
	( ) Laundromat
	( ) Funeral home
	( ) Fire department
	( ) Church or temple
	( ) School

Residential addresses (check all that apply):

( ) High-rise tower (over 5 floors)
( ) Large apt (1/4 block size)
( ) Medium apt (5 or fewer floors)
(✓) Two- and three-family homes
( ) Single-family homes
( ) Public housing development

JERSEY CITY PROJECT FOR MEASURING DISPLACEMENT & DIFFUSION ASSESSMENT INSTRUMENT: SITE #3 (DRUG DEALING)

Site location: Martin Luther King Dr (from Dwight to Stegman)

Description (check one only):

( ) Entirely residential
( ) Residential, some commercial
( ) Entirely commercial
( ) Commercial, some residential
(✓) Mixed residential & commercial

Description of commercial addresses:

(✓) Mostly retail (i.e., malls)
( ) Mostly industrial (i.e., warehouses)

Physical profile:

16 Buildings in target area.
0 Residential buildings.
0 Commercial buildings.
16 Combined commercial/residential buildings.
3 Municipal & social service providers.
0 Recreational areas (i.e., parks and courts).
0 Parking facilities (i.e., garages and lots).
2 Public telephones.
0 24-hour businesses.

Physical deterioration:

5 Burned or boarded up buildings.
2 Vacant lots.
0 Abandoned vehicles.

35 Calls for service in 1997 (target area).
1,264 Calls for service in 1997 (catchment area).
290

8 Addresses generating calls (target area).
1 Hot spot within a two-block radius.

Is alcohol sold legally in this area?	Yes (✓) No ( )	Number of outlets: 2
Are broken windows visible?	Yes (✓) No ( )	Number of windows: 4
Does a bus run through this area?	Yes (✓) No ( )	Number of stops: 2

Yards and streets strewn with litter:
( ) less than 10%
( ) 10-30%
( ) 31-50%
(✓) over 50%

Streets and sidewalks covered with broken glass:
( ) less than 10%
( ) 10-30%
(✓) 31-50%
( ) over 50%

Buildings and fences marred with graffiti:
( ) less than 10%
(✓) 10-30%
( ) 31-50%
( ) over 50%

Commercial addresses (check all that apply):

Offices	( ) Office building
	( ) Banking or financial
Retail	( ) Department store
	(✓) Convenience store
	( ) Drug store
	(✓) Hair salon
	( ) Florist
Grocery	( ) Supermarket
	(✓) Small grocery
Restaurant	( ) Full restaurant
	(✓) Fast food
Entertainment	( ) Nightclub
	( ) Video store
Liquor	( ) Bar or pub
	(✓) Liquor store
Accommodations	( ) Hotel or motel
Transportation	( ) Gas station
	( ) Bus terminal
	( ) Travel agency
Others	(✓) Check cashing
	( ) Laundromat
	( ) Funeral home
	( ) Fire department

(✓) Church or temple
( ) School

Residential addresses (check all that apply):

( ) High-rise tower (over 5 floors)
( ) Large apt (1/4 block size)
(✓) Medium apt (5 or fewer floors)
(✓) Two- and three-family homes
( ) Single-family homes
( ) Public housing development

JERSEY CITY PROJECT FOR MEASURING DISPLACEMENT & DIFFUSION
ASSESSMENT INSTRUMENT: SITE #4 (DRUG DEALING)

Site location: Bergen Avenue (from Claremont to Grant)

Description (check one only):

( ) Entirely residential
( ) Residential, some commercial
( ) Entirely commercial
( ) Commercial, some residential
(✓) Mixed residential & commercial

Description of commercial addresses:

(✓) Mostly retail (i.e., malls)
( ) Mostly industrial (i.e., warehouses)

Physical profile:

21 Buildings in target area.
5 Residential buildings.
2 Commercial buildings.
14 Combined commercial/residential buildings.
3 Municipal & social service providers.
0 Recreational areas (i.e., parks and courts).
1 Parking facility (i.e., garages and lots).
6 Public telephones.
0 24-hour businesses.

Physical deterioration:

6 Burned or boarded up buildings.
4 Vacant lots.
0 Abandoned vehicles.

565 Calls for service in 1997 (target area).
1460 Calls for service in 1997 (catchment area).
45 Addresses generating calls (target area).
1 Hot spot within a two-block radius.

Is alcohol sold legally in this area?	Yes (✓) No ( )	Number of outlets: 3
Are broken windows visible?	Yes (✓) No ( )	Number of windows: 3
Does a bus run through this area?	Yes (✓) No ( )	Number of stops: 2

Yards and streets strewn with litter:
( ) less than 10%
( ) 10-30%
( ) 31-50%
(✓) over 50%

Streets and sidewalks covered with broken glass:
( ) less than 10%
( ) 10-30%
(✓) 31-50%
( ) over 50%

Buildings and fences marred with graffiti:
( ) less than 10%
(✓) 10-30%
( ) 31-50%
( ) over 50%

Commercial addresses (check all that apply):

Offices
( ) Office building
( ) Banking or financial

Retail
( ) Department store
(✓) Convenience store
( ) Drug store
( ) Jewelry store
( ) Florist

Grocery
( ) Supermarket
(✓) Small grocery

Restaurant
( ) Full restaurant
(✓) Fast food

Entertainment
( ) Nightclub
(✓) Video store

Liquor
( ) Bar or pub
(✓) Liquor store

Accommodations
( ) Hotel or motel

Transportation
( ) Gas station
(✓) Bus terminal
( ) Travel agency

Others
(✓) Check cashing

( ) Laundromat
( ) Funeral home
( ) Fire department
( ) Church or temple
( ) School

Residential addresses (check all that apply):

( ) High-rise tower (over 5 floors)
( ) Large apt (1/4 block size)
(✓) Medium apt (5 or fewer floors)
(✓) Two- and three-family homes
( ) Single-family homes
( ) Public housing development

JERSEY CITY PROJECT FOR MEASURING DISPLACEMENT & DIFFUSION
ASSESSMENT INSTRUMENT: SITE #5 (DRUG DEALING)

Site location: Monticello Avenue (from Storm to Astor)

Description (check one only):
( ) Entirely residential
( ) Residential, some commercial
( ) Entirely commercial
( ) Commercial, some residential
(✓) Mixed residential & commercial

Description of commercial addresses:
(✓) Mostly retail (i.e., malls)
( ) Mostly industrial (i.e., warehouses)

Physical profile:

58 Buildings in target area.
10 Residential buildings.
8 Commercial buildings.
40 Combined commercial/residential buildings.
3 Municipal & social service providers.
1 Recreational area (i.e., parks and courts).
1 Parking facility (i.e., garages and lots).
15 Public telephones.
0 24-hour businesses.

Physical deterioration:

8 Burned or boarded up buildings.
7 Vacant lots.
0 Abandoned vehicles.

807 Calls for service in 1997 (target area).
1218 Calls for service in 1997 (catchment area).
72 Addresses generating calls (target area).
2 Hot spots within a two-block radius.

Is alcohol sold legally in this area?	Yes (✓) No ( )	Number of outlets: 5
Are broken windows visible?	Yes (✓) No ( )	Number of windows: 12
Does a bus run through this area?	Yes (✓) No ( )	Number of stops: 6

Yards and streets strewn with litter:

( ) less than 10%
( ) 10-30%
(✓) 31-50%
( ) over 50%

Streets and sidewalks covered with broken glass:

( ) less than 10%
( ) 10-30%
(✓) 31-50%
( ) over 50%

Buildings and fences marred with graffiti:

( ) less than 10%
(✓) 10-30%
( ) 31-50%
( ) over 50%

Commercial addresses (check all that apply):

Offices
( ) Office building
( ) Banking or financial

Retail
(✓) Department store
(✓) Convenience store
(✓) Drug store
(✓) Hair salon
( ) Florist

Grocery
( ) Supermarket
(✓) Small grocery

Restaurant
(✓) Full restaurant
(✓) Fast food

Entertainment
(✓) Nightclub

	(✓) Video store
Liquor	(✓) Bar or pub
	(✓) Liquor store
Accommodations	( ) Hotel or motel
Transportation	( ) Gas station
	( ) Bus terminal
	( ) Travel agency
Others	(✓) Check cashing
	(✓) Laundromat
	( ) Funeral home
	( ) Fire department
	(✓) Church or temple
	( ) School

Residential addresses (check all that apply):

( ) High-rise tower (over 5 floors)
( ) Large apt (1/4 block size)
(✓) Medium apt (5 or fewer floors)
(✓) Two- and three-family homes
( ) Single-family homes
( ) Public housing development

JERSEY CITY PROJECT FOR MEASURING DISPLACEMENT & DIFFUSION
ASSESSMENT INSTRUMENT: SITE #9 (ASSAULTS & DRUG DEALING)

Site location: Intersection of Stegman & Ocean

(Ocean Avenue from Wegman to Dwight)

Description (check one only):

( ) Entirely residential
( ) Residential, some commercial
( ) Entirely commercial
(✓) Commercial, some residential
( ) Mixed residential & commercial

Description of commercial addresses:

(✓) Mostly retail (i.e., malls)
( ) Mostly industrial (i.e., warehouses)

Physical profile:

14 Buildings in target area.
1 Residential building.
3 Commercial buildings.
10 Combined commercial/residential buildings.

2 Municipal & social service providers.
0 Recreational areas (i.e., parks and courts).
0 Parking facilities (i.e., garages and lots).
7 Public telephones.
0 24-hour businesses.

Physical deterioration:

8 Burned or boarded up buildings.
7 Vacant lots.
0 Abandoned vehicles.

183 Calls for service in 1997 (target area).
420 Calls for service in 1997 (catchment area).
20 Addresses generating calls (target area).
1 Hot spot within a two-block radius.

Is alcohol sold legally in this area?	Yes (✓) No ( )	Number of outlets: 2
Are broken windows visible?	Yes (✓) No ( )	Number of windows: 22
Does a bus run through this area?	Yes (✓) No ( )	Number of stops: 2

Yards and streets strewn with litter:

( ) less than 10%
( ) 10-30%
( ) 31-50%
(✓) over 50%

Streets and sidewalks covered with broken glass:

( ) less than 10%
( ) 10-30%
( ) 31-50%
(✓) over 50%

Buildings and fences marred with graffiti:

( ) less than 10%
( ) 10-30%
(✓) 31-50%
( ) over 50%

Commercial addresses (check all that apply):

Offices

( ) Office building
( ) Banking or financial

Retail

( ) Department store
(✓) Convenience store
( ) Drug store
( ) Jewelry store
( ) Florist

Grocery	( ) Supermarket
	(✓) Small grocery
Restaurant	( ) Full restaurant
	(✓) Fast food
Entertainment	( ) Nightclub
	( ) Video store
Liquor	(✓) Bar or pub
	(✓) Liquor store
Accommodations	( ) Hotel or motel
Transportation	(✓) Gas station
	( ) Bus terminal
	( ) Travel agency
Others	( ) Check cashing
	( ) Laundromat
	( ) Funeral home
	(✓) Fire department
	(✓) Church or temple
	( ) School

Residential addresses (check all that apply):

( ) High-rise tower (over 5 floors)
( ) Large apt (1/4 block size)
(✓) Medium apt (5 or fewer floors)
(✓) Two- and three-family homes
( ) Single-family homes
( ) Public housing development

JERSEY CITY PROJECT FOR MEASURING DISPLACEMENT & DIFFUSION
ASSESSMENT INSTRUMENT: SITE #6 (ASSAULTS)

Site location: Duncan Apartments (public housing)

Description (check one only):

(✓) Entirely residential
( ) Residential, some commercial
( ) Entirely commercial
( ) Commercial, some residential
( ) Mixed residential & commercial

Description of commercial addresses:

( ) Mostly retail (i.e., malls)
( ) Mostly industrial (i.e., warehouses)

Physical profile:

7 Buildings in target area.
7 Residential buildings.
0 Commercial buildings.
0 Combined commercial/residential buildings.
0 Municipal & social service providers.
5 Recreational areas (i.e., parks and courts).
4 Parking facilities (i.e., garages and lots).
3 Public telephones.
0 24-hour businesses.

Physical deterioration:

0 Burned or boarded up buildings.
0 Vacant lots.
2 Abandoned vehicles.

409 Calls for service in 1997 (target area).
997 Calls for service in 1997 (catchment area).
12 Addresses generating calls (target area).
0 Hot spots within a two-block radius.

Is alcohol sold legally in this area?	Yes ( ) No (✓)	Number of outlets:	0
Are broken windows visible?	Yes (✓) No ( )	Number of windows:	6
Does a bus run through this area?	Yes (✓) No ( )	Number of stops:	0

Yards and streets strewn with litter:

( ) less than 10%
( ) 10-30%
( ) 31-50%
(✓) over 50%

Streets and sidewalks covered with broken glass:

( ) less than 10%
( ) 10-30%
( ) 31-50%
(✓) over 50%

Buildings and fences marred with graffiti:

( ) less than 10%
(✓) 10-30%
( ) 31-50%
( ) over 50%

Commercial addresses (check all that apply):

Offices
(✓) Office building
( ) Banking or financial

Retail
( ) Department store

	( ) Convenience store
	( ) Drug store
	( ) Jewelry store
	( ) Florist
Grocery	( ) Supermarket
	( ) Small grocery
Restaurant	( ) Full restaurant
	( ) Fast food
Entertainment	( ) Nightclub
	( ) Video store
Liquor	( ) Bar or pub
	( ) Liquor store
Accommodations	( ) Hotel or motel
Transportation	( ) Gas station
	( ) Bus terminal
	( ) Travel agency
Others	( ) Check cashing
	( ) Laundromat
	( ) Funeral home
	( ) Fire department
	( ) Church or temple
	( ) School

Residential addresses (check all that apply):	(✓) High-rise tower (over 5 floors)
	( ) Large apt (1/4 block size)
	( ) Medium apt (5 or fewer floors)
	( ) Two- and three-family homes
	( ) Single-family homes
	(✓) Public housing development

JERSEY CITY PROJECT FOR MEASURING DISPLACEMENT & DIFFUSION
ASSESSMENT INSTRUMENT: SITE #8 (ASSAULTS)

Site location: Storms Avenue (from Bergen to Monticello)

(Includes Bergen from Montgomery to Fairmount)

Description (check one only):
( ) Entirely residential
( ) Residential, some commercial
( ) Entirely commercial
(✓) Commercial, some residential
( ) Mixed residential & commercial

Description of commercial addresses:
(✓) Mostly retail (i.e., malls)
( ) Mostly industrial (i.e., warehouses)

Physical profile:

32 Buildings in target area.
15 Residential buildings.
8 Commercial buildings.
9 Combined commercial/residential buildings.
1 Municipal & social service provider.
0 Recreational areas (i.e., parks and courts).
2 Parking facilities (i.e., garages and lots).
4 Public telephones.
0 24-hour businesses.

Physical deterioration:

1 Burned or boarded up building.
1 Vacant lot.
0 Abandoned vehicles.

129 Calls for service in 1997 (target area).
625 Calls for service in 1997 (catchment area).
34 Addresses generating calls (target area).
0 Hot spots within a two-block radius.

Is alcohol sold legally in this area?	Yes (✓) No ( )	Number of outlets: 2
Are broken windows visible?	Yes (✓) No ( )	Number of windows: 4
Does a bus run through this area?	Yes (✓) No ( )	Number of stops: 0

Yards and streets strewn with litter:
( ) less than 10%
( ) 10-30%
(✓) 31-50%
( ) over 50%

Streets and sidewalks covered with broken glass:
( ) less than 10%
(✓) 10-30%
( ) 31-50%
( ) over 50%

Buildings and fences marred with graffiti:
( ) less than 10%
(✓) 10-30%
( ) 31-50%
( ) over 50%

Commercial addresses (check all that apply):

Offices	(✓) Office building
	(✓) Banking or financial
Retail	(✓) Department store
	(✓) Convenience store
	(✓) Drug store
	(✓) Jewelry store
	(✓) Florist
Grocery	( ) Supermarket
	( ) Small grocery
Restaurant	( ) Full restaurant
	( ) Fast food
Entertainment	( ) Nightclub
	( ) Video store
Liquor	( ) Bar or pub
	(✓) Liquor store
Accommodations	( ) Hotel or motel
Transportation	( ) Gas station
	( ) Bus terminal
	(✓) Travel agency
Others	(✓) Check cashing
	( ) Laundromat
	( ) Funeral home
	(✓) Hair salon
	( ) Church or temple
	( ) School

Residential addresses (check all that apply):

(✓) High-rise tower (over 5 floors)
( ) Large apt (1/4 block size)
(✓) Medium apt (5 or fewer floors)
(✓) Two- and three-family homes
( ) Single-family homes
( ) Public housing development

JERSEY CITY PROJECT FOR MEASURING DISPLACEMENT & DIFFUSION ASSESSMENT INSTRUMENT: SITE #10 (AUTO THEFT)

Site location: Intersection of St Pauls & Huron

(Includes 1-block radius)

Description (check one only):
( ) Entirely residential
(✓) Residential, some commercial
( ) Entirely commercial

( ) Commercial, some residential
( ) Mixed residential & commercial

Description of commercial addresses:
(✓) Mostly retail (i.e., malls)
( ) Mostly industrial (i.e., warehouses)

Physical profile:

22 Buildings in target area.
11 Residential buildings.
1 Commercial building.
6 Combined commercial/residential buildings.
4 Municipal & social service providers.
2 Recreational areas (i.e., parks and courts).
5 Parking facilities (i.e., garages and lots).
0 Public telephones.
1 24-hour business.

Physical deterioration:

0 Burned or boarded up buildings.
0 Vacant lots.
1 Abandoned vehicle.

21 Calls for service in 1997 (target area).
103 Calls for service in 1997 (catchment area).
9 Addresses generating calls (target area).
0 Hot spots within a two-block radius.

Is alcohol sold legally in this area?	Yes ( ) No (✓)	Number of outlets: 0
Are broken windows visible?	Yes ( ) No (✓)	Number of windows: 0
Does a bus run through this area?	Yes (✓) No ( )	Number of stops: 2

Yards and streets strewn with litter:
( ) less than 10%
(✓) 10-30%
( ) 31-50%
( ) over 50%

Streets and sidewalks covered with broken glass:
(✓) less than 10%
( ) 10-30%
( ) 31-50%
( ) over 50%

Buildings and fences marred with graffiti:

(✓) less than 10%
( ) 10-30%
( ) 31-50%
( ) over 50%

Commercial addresses (check all that apply):

Offices
(✓) Office building
( ) Banking or financial

Retail
( ) Department store
( ) Convenience store
( ) Drug store
(✓) Hair salon
( ) Florist

Grocery
( ) Supermarket
( ) Small grocery

Restaurant
( ) Full restaurant
( ) Fast food

Entertainment
( ) Nightclub
( ) Video store

Liquor
( ) Bar or pub
( ) Liquor store

Accommodations
( ) Hotel or motel

Transportation
( ) Gas station
( ) Bus terminal
(✓) Travel agency

Others
( ) Check cashing
( ) Laundromat
( ) Funeral home
(✓) Print shop
(✓) Church or temple
(✓) School

Residential addresses (check all that apply):

(✓) High-rise tower (over 5 floors)
( ) Large apt (1/4 block size)
( ) Medium apt (5 or fewer floors)
(✓) Two- and three-family homes
( ) Single-family homes
( ) Public housing development

JERSEY CITY PROJECT FOR MEASURING DISPLACEMENT & DIFFUSION
ASSESSMENT INSTRUMENT: SITE #11 (RESIDENTIAL BURGLARY)

Site location: Reed Street

(Includes Bergen from Reed to Fairmount)

Description (check one only):
( ) Entirely residential
( ) Residential, some commercial
( ) Entirely commercial
( ) Commercial, some residential
(✓) Mixed residential & commercial

Description of commercial addresses:
(✓) Mostly retail (i.e., malls)
( ) Mostly industrial (i.e., warehouses)

Physical profile:

40 Buildings in target area.
24 Residential buildings.
3 Commercial buildings.
13 Combined commercial/residential buildings.
3 Municipal & social service providers.
0 Recreational areas (i.e., parks and courts).
1 Parking facility (i.e., garages and lots).
6 Public telephones.
0 24-hour businesses.

Physical deterioration:

4 Burned or boarded up buildings.
1 Vacant lot.
0 Abandoned vehicles.

39 Calls for service in 1997 (target area).
280 Calls for service in 1997 (catchment area).
20 Addresses generating calls (target area).
0 Hot spots within a two-block radius.

Is alcohol sold legally in this area?	Yes (✓) No ( )	Number of outlets: 3
Are broken windows visible?	Yes (✓) No ( )	Number of windows: 5
Does a bus run through this area?	Yes (✓) No ( )	Number of stops: 4

Yards and streets strewn with litter:
( ) less than 10%
( ) 10-30%
(✓) 31-50%
( ) over 50%

Streets and sidewalks covered with broken glass:	( ) less than 10%
	(✓) 10-30%
	( ) 31-50%
	( ) over 50%
Buildings and fences marred with graffiti:	( ) less than 10%
	(✓) 10-30%
	( ) 31-50%
	( ) over 50%

Commercial addresses (check all that apply):

Offices	(✓) Office building
	( ) Banking or financial
Retail	(✓) Department store
	(✓) Convenience store
	( ) Drug store
	(✓) Hair salon
	(✓) Florist
Grocery	(✓) Supermarket
	(✓) Small grocery
Restaurant	( ) Full restaurant
	(✓) Fast food
Entertainment	( ) Nightclub
	( ) Video store
Liquor	( ) Bar or pub
	(✓) Liquor store
Accommodations	( ) Hotel or motel
Transportation	( ) Gas station
	( ) Bus terminal
	( ) Travel agency
Others	( ) Check cashing
	(✓) Laundromat
	( ) Funeral home
	( ) Fire department
	( ) Church or temple
	(✓) School

Residential addresses (check all that apply):

( ) High-rise tower (over 5 floors)
( ) Large apt (1/4 block size)
(✓) Medium apt (5 or fewer floors)
(✓) Two- and three-family homes
( ) Single-family homes
( ) Public housing development

Site location: Intersection of Pavonia & Tonnele

(Includes 1-block radius)

Description (check one only):
( ) Entirely residential
(✓) Residential, some commercial
( ) Entirely commercial
( ) Commercial, some residential
( ) Mixed residential & commercial

Description of commercial addresses:
(✓) Mostly retail (i.e., malls)
( ) Mostly industrial (i.e., warehouses)

Physical profile:

94 Buildings in target area.
87 Residential buildings.
2 Commercial buildings.
3 Combined commercial/residential buildings.
2 Municipal & social service providers.
0 Recreational areas (i.e., parks and courts).
1 Parking facility (i.e., garages and lots).
7 Public telephones.
1 24-hour business.

Physical deterioration:

1 Burned or boarded up building.
1 Vacant lot.
0 Abandoned vehicles.

118 Calls for service in 1997 (target area).
210 Calls for service in 1997 (catchment area).
39 Addresses generating calls (target area).
0 Hot spots within a two-block radius.

Is alcohol sold legally in this area?	Yes ( ) No (✓)	Number of outlets: 0
Are broken windows visible?	Yes (✓) No ( )	Number of windows: 14
Does a bus run through this area?	Yes ( ) No (✓)	Number of stops: 0

Yards and streets strewn with litter: ( ) less than 10%

(✓) 10-30%
( ) 31-50%
( ) over 50%

Streets and sidewalks covered with broken glass:
(✓) less than 10%
( ) 10-30%
( ) 31-50%
( ) over 50%

Buildings and fences marred with graffiti:
(✓) less than 10%
( ) 10-30%
( ) 31-50%
( ) over 50%

Commercial addresses (check all that apply):

Offices
(✓) Office building
( ) Banking or financial

Retail
( ) Department store
( ) Convenience store
( ) Drug store
( ) Jewelry store
( ) Florist

Grocery
( ) Supermarket
( ) Small grocery

Restaurant
( ) Full restaurant
( ) Fast food

Entertainment
( ) Nightclub
( ) Video store

Liquor
( ) Bar or pub
( ) Liquor store

Accommodations
(✓) Hotel or motel

Transportation
( ) Gas station
( ) Bus terminal
( ) Travel agency

Others
( ) Check cashing
( ) Laundromat
(✓) Funeral home
( ) Fire department
(✓) Church or temple
(✓) School

Residential addresses (check all that apply):
( ) High-rise tower (over 5 floors)
(✓) Large apt (1/4 block size)
(✓) Medium apt (5 or fewer floors)
(✓) Two- and three-family homes
(✓) Single-family homes
( ) Public housing development

JERSEY CITY PROJECT FOR MEASURING DISPLACEMENT & DIFFUSION
ASSESSMENT INSTRUMENT: SITE #7 (ASSAULTS)

Site location: Academic High

(Includes one block face on Gifford and Bergen)

Description (check one only):
( ) Entirely residential
(✓) Residential, some commercial
( ) Entirely commercial
( ) Commercial, some residential
( ) Mixed residential & commercial

Description of commercial addresses:
(✓) Mostly retail (i.e., malls)
( ) Mostly industrial (i.e., warehouses)

Physical profile:
30 Buildings in target area.
23 Residential buildings.
0 Commercial buildings.
4 Combined commercial/residential buildings.
3 Municipal & social service providers.
0 Recreational areas (i.e., parks and courts).
1 Parking facility (i.e., garages and lots).
3 Public telephones.
0 24-hour businesses.

Physical deterioration:
0 Burned or boarded up buildings.
0 Vacant lots.
0 Abandoned vehicles.

249 Calls for service in 1997 (target area).
855 Calls for service in 1997 (catchment area).
17 Addresses generating calls (target area).
0 Hot spots within a two-block radius.

Is alcohol sold legally in this area? Yes ( ) No (✓) Number of outlets: 0

Are broken windows visible? Yes (✓) No ( ) Number of windows: 12

Does a bus run through this area? Yes (✓) No ( ) Number of stops: 2

Yards and streets strewn with litter:
( ) less than 10%
( ) 10-30%
(✓) 31-50%
( ) over 50%

Streets and sidewalks covered with broken glass:
( ) less than 10%
(✓) 10-30%
( ) 31-50%
( ) over 50%

Buildings and fences marred with graffiti:
(✓) less than 10%
( ) 10-30%
( ) 31-50%
( ) over 50%

Commercial addresses (check all that apply):

Offices
(✓) Office building
( ) Banking or financial

Retail
( ) Department store
(✓) Convenience store
( ) Drug store
( ) Jewelry store
( ) Florist

Grocery
( ) Supermarket
( ) Small grocery

Restaurant
( ) Full restaurant
( ) Fast food

Entertainment
( ) Nightclub
( ) Video store

Liquor
( ) Bar or pub
( ) Liquor store

Accommodations
( ) Hotel or motel

Transportation
( ) Gas station
( ) Bus terminal
( ) Travel agency

Others
( ) Check cashing
( ) Laundromat
(✓) Funeral home
( ) Fire department
(✓) Church or temple
(✓) School

Residential addresses (check all that apply):
( ) High-rise tower (over 5 floors)
(✓) Large apt (1/4 block size)
(✓) Medium apt (5 or fewer floors)
(✓) Two- and three-family homes
(✓) Single-family homes

( ) Public housing development

Appendix F

JERSEY CITY DISPLACEMENT PROJECT
SOCIAL OBSERVATION INSTRUMENT

1. Street segment:_____

2. Street segment ID number: ____ ____ ____

3. Length of street segment (in miles): ____ ____ ____

4. Displacement site:

   1 = Assault/Drug
   2 = Prostitution
   3 = Burglary

5. Type of area:

   1 = Target Area
   2 = Catchment Area #1
   3 = Catchment Area #2

6. Date of observation: _____ / _____ /

7. Time of observation: ____ : _____ am or pm

8. Period of week:

   1 = Week day
   2 = Week night
   3 = Weekend day
   4 = Weekend night

9. Researcher conducting the observation:

01 = Carsten	07 = Choo	13 = John
02 = Ann Marie	08 = Jeron	14 = Aislynn
03 = Vanja	09 = Mike	15 = Natasha
04 = Justin	10 = Gerry	16 = James
05 = Chris	11 = Laura	17 = Gloria
06 = Chenard	12 = Jim	18 = Other

	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33
	Event Number	Street Segment	Event Begins	Event Ends	Instantaneous Event	# of People	Verbal Disorder	Loud Dispute	Physical Assault	Solicitation	Panhandling	Drug Activity	Drunk/High on Drugs	Public Drinking	Person Down	Homeless Person	Loud Noise/Music	Gambling	Vandalism	Unattended Dogs	Car/Builiding Break-In	Police Patrol	Police Interaction	# of Police	Other
1																								
2																								
3																								
4																								
5																								
6																								
7																								
8																								
9																								
10																								
11																								
12																								
13																								
14																								
15																								
16																								
17																								
18																								
19																								
20																								

	Record the following behaviors:	Male Youths	Male Adults	Female Youths	Female Adults
34.	Standing or sitting in a public place for no observable reason				
35.	Talking on a public telephone (i.e., outdoor payphone)				
36.	Recreational activity (i.e., jogging, biking, etc.)				

37. Rate the volume of automobile traffic:

1 = None
2 = Light
3 = Moderate
4 = Heavy

38. Rate the volume of pedestrian traffic:

1 = None
2 = Light
3 = Moderate
4 = Heavy

39. Describe the lighting in this area:

0 = Day time observation
1 = Whole area lit well
2 = Mostly lit well
3 = Mostly lit poorly
4 = Whole area lit poorly

40. Describe the weather conditions:

0 = Night time observation
1 = Clear
2 = Partly clear
3 = Overcast
4 = Light rain

41. Describe the temperature:

1 = Hot (Over 85° F)
2 = Warm (60–85° F)
3 = Cool (32–59° F)
4 = Cold (Under 32° F)

42. Indicate any reactions people had to the observation:

1 = Did not seem to notice observer's presence
2 = Noticed observer's presence but did not seem to care
3 = Stared curiously at the observer
4 = Slowly walked away from the area because of the observer
5 = Scattered as soon as observer entered the area
6 = Hostile reaction (i.e., yelling)
7 = Asked questions

43. Number of prostitutes observed on the street segment: _____

COMMENT SECTION

Event # _____ _____
Event # _____ _____
Event # _____ _____
Event # _____ _____
Event # _____ _____
Event # _____ _____
Event # _____ _____
Event # _____ _____
Event # _____ _____
Event # _____ _____
Event # _____ _____

Appendix G

JERSEY CITY DISPLACEMENT PROJECT
SOCIAL OBSERVATION CODEBOOK

10. Street Segment
    This column records the ID number of the street segment being observation.

11. Event Begins
    This column records the time you become aware of an instance of crime or "disorder" commensurate with one of the categories below. Write the time you arrived in this column if the activity was going on when your observation period began.

12. Event Ends
    This column records the time that an incident under observation reaches a definite conclusion. Write the time that your observation period ends in this column if the activity is still going on when your observation period concludes. If there is a break in the action of an event, then the action begins again with the same actors (i.e., a loud stereo is turned off for a minute, then is turned back on), this should be coded as a single event.

    NOTE: FOR DATA ENTRY PURPOSES, THERE MAY BE MULTIPLE CHECKS PER LINE ON THE DISORDER CHECKSHEET.

13. Instantaneous Event
    Check this column only if the observed activity is less than a minute in duration. A single loud shout ("Verbal Disorder," variable 13 below) would merit a check in this column as well as in column # 13; a motor vehicle driving through the area with its stereo blasting would receive a check in this column and a check in "Loud Noise/Music" (# 22 below). In these cases, the "Event Ends" time will be the same as the "Event Begins" time. The times must be entered in both columns.

14. Number of People
    Write the number of people in this column responsible for the crime or disorder you observe (i.e., a single drunk staggering around, or two prostitutes standing on a corner, soliciting for the purpose of prostitution).

15. Verbal Disorder
    This column is to be checked when you hear instances of loud shouting, whether friendly, bewildered, or otherwise. A drunk screaming obscenities and curse words, and loud verbal harassment of passing motorists belong in this category.

16. Loud Dispute

Loud threats and loud arguments between and among people should be coded as a "Loud Dispute" rather than a "Verbal Disorder." The level of aggressiveness and the degree of interaction displayed by two or more participants (either directly overheard, or obvious from facial expressions and/or body language) are the distinguishing criteria. For example, a person who follows another down the street at a distance, shouting and making threats from a safe distance and without getting a response (i.e., there appears to be no imminent or likely confrontation) should be coded as #13, Verbal Disorder. If the other person then confronts him, the "Verbal Disorder" ends and a "Loud Dispute" may ensue. In which case, both "Verbal Disorder" and "Loud Dispute" would be checked off.

17. Physical Assault

This column applies to instances of pushing, shoving, or outright attack. It may be accompanied by verbal disorder as well (if so, check both columns on the same line). If the assault is accompanied by a robbery of some kind (i.e., taking something from the victim--wallet, purse, bicycle), write "robbery" on the comment page.

18. Solicitation

This column indicates sexual solicitation only; it should not be checked for solicitation of other products or services. Style of dress is not necessarily a strong indicator of prostitution activity. A female prostitute's appearance may range from the stereotypical image of wearing heavy makeup and revealing attire, such as a miniskirt with fishnet stockings, to jogging suits, snowmobile suits, and the "collegiate look." Female prostitutes often work alone, while male prostitutes often work in groups. Characteristic of both groups is a slow aimless walk confined to a limited area. The male customer approaching a female prostitute generally does not know the woman; while customers of the male prostitutes have a preference for partners they have used before (though some of the verbal exchanges may indicate that "I haven't seen you before" or "I haven't used you before"). Male prostitutes will wave to cars from the corner; female prostitutes can be more aggressive, stepping into the road, sometimes directly into the path of the oncoming car as though they are flagging down help. There will be a short exchange at the car window, and the prostitute either gets into the car or returns to the idewalk/corner. It may take some time before you recognize that the man or woman at the corner is soliciting sexual activity. For our purposes, *the "Begin" time for this activity is the first minute that you feel sure you know what they are doing*. Prostitution codes are as follows:

1 = Loitering or wandering for the purpose of prostitution.
2 = Soliciting for the purpose of prostitution.
3 = Picking up a prostitute in an automobile.

19. Panhandling

This column refers to individuals asking others, usually strangers, for money. Panhandlers are often located in areas where large numbers of people pass through, such as entrances and exits for public transportation. Check this column when you observe a person who is:

- Standing or sitting with a receptacle containing money.
- Standing or sitting with a sign offering to work, or render a service, in exchange for cash or food.
- Approaching people and asking them for money.

20. Drug Activity

Drug activity is marked by very similar behavior patterns. A "crack house" in Jersey City may employ lookouts. The lookout, typically a male, may be visible in a window or on a rooftop. Sometimes the drug sales are blatant, and money, vials, or clips can be observed changing hands. At other times, there will be a brief encounter with a contact person (usually from a car driving by), and the car will stop, the buyer enters a nearby house, and returns within two or three minutes, and drives off. At other times, the transaction will take place on the street, as an open-air drug market; a third person will join the other two (or the buyer alone); the buyer and seller walk together a ways—sometimes around the block—and at some point money changes hands, at another, the drugs. The drug packet may be dropped on the sidewalk by the seller, and picked up by the buyer shortly after, the two part company. There are three main types of drug activity that you will observe: soliciting for a drug sale, drug transaction, and drug use. Soliciting for a drug sale refers to an individual or individual that are congregating in an area trying to make a drug deal. Drug transaction refers to the drug deal itself and involves the exchange of cash and drugs. Drug use refers to an individual that is publicly using drugs (i.e., a person walking down the street and smoking marijuana). Instead of checking the column, code drug activity as one of the following in the column:

1 = Soliciting for drug sale
2 = Drug transaction
3 = Drug use

As with prostitution, the "Begin" time for this activity is the first minute that you feel sure you know what they are doing.

21. Drunk/High on Drugs

Check this column when you observe a person who is:

- Disoriented.
- Lacking in coordination (stumbling, staggering, fumbling with car keys, hand-held packages, etc.).
- Slurring his/her speech, or rambling speech to many people in what appears to be an indiscriminate manner.

22. Public Drinking

This column refers to an individual who is publicly consuming an alcoholic beverage (i.e., a person walking down the street drinking a forty-ounce bottle of beer). Quite often, the person drinking in public will keep his alcohol container in a brown, paper bag as he consumes it. Often, but not necessarily, variable #19 "Drunk/High on Drugs" will also be coded when public drinking is observed.

23. Person Down

A person who falls and remains down for longer than 15 seconds is considered a "Person Down." That person may be drunk or ill. *If you suspect a heart attack, call 911 for an ambulance.* If the weather is very cold, and a person stays down for more than 5 minutes, call 911. If you call 911 to report a life-threatening situation, do *not* identify yourself as a field researcher. If possible, identify yourself as a passing motorist, and give the report anonymously.

24. Homeless Person

A homeless person is typically dressed in worn, dirty clothing, frequently in numerous layers regardless of the weather. Often, the homeless person will be carrying shopping bags or plastic lawn bags full of his /her belongings, often in a cart or on a bicycle.

25. Loud Noise/Music

Loud noise may include loud stereos, boom boxes, power tools, revving motors, band practice, etc. Your tolerance level should be consistent across all of the observation points and displacement sites regardless of neighborhood composition.

26. Gambling

Check this column whenever you observe two or more people gambling in a public area for money. Gambling will usually involve playing cards or dice. It is important to make certain that the people playing cards or dice are truly gambling. It is possible that groups selling drugs might be playing cards or dice to pass time. A good example of gambling would be a group of teenagers, drinking beer, and playing craps in a secluded ally or vacant lot.

27. Vandalism

Check this column whenever you observe someone damage, deface, or destroy property. Commercial, residential, or municipal property may be subject to vandalism.

28. Unattended Dogs

Check this column when you observe a dog, or pack of dogs, on the streets, sidewalks, or in any other unfenced, public area.

29. Car/Building Break-in

Check this column if you observe someone breaking into a building or an automobile. Instead of checking the column, code the break-in as one of the following in the column:

1 = Building break-in
2 = Automobile break-in

A building break in involves someone forcing open a door or window of a building. Note on the comment page whether the building is a residential or commercial building. If possible, note the address at which this occurs. An automobile break-in describes someone breaking into an automobile, either by jimmying the locks or by smashing a window. If the person then drives off with the car, write "Possible Auto Theft" on the comment page.

30. Police Patrol

Police patrol applies when you witness either a police officer or group of officers reconnoitering the displacement site. Reconnoitering refers to police engaged in foot patrol, riding a bicycle/scooter, driving by in a cruiser, or parked in their cruiser for longer than five minutes. Record all uniformed and plain-clothes police presence, as well as marked and unmarked motorized patrols. Motorized patrol refers to marked and unmarked police cars, as well as police motorcycles. Instead of checking the column, code police patrol in the column as one of the following:

1 = Foot patrol
2 = Bike or scooter patrol
3 = Motorized patrol
4 = More than one type, mixed

31. Police Interaction

Police interaction applies when you observe either a police officer or group of officers interacting with a citizen or group of citizens. If *a police interaction is coded, the police patrol column must also be filled out.* This is because the police must first have had to enter into the area to interact with the citizen. A police patrol, on the other hand, does not necessarily mean a police interaction will take place, since it is possible for police to patrol an area without interacting with citizens. *In other words, police interactions are always preceded by police patrols, but not all police patrols lead to police interactions.* Interaction refers to the police talking with citizens, performing a search/investigation, or making an arrest. Police talking refers to an incident where a police officer(s) stops to talk with a citizen or citizens for longer than one minute. Search/Investigation involves the police frisking a citizen or searching the physical surroundings (i.e., police searching the bushes in an empty lot for drugs). Instead of checking the column, code police interaction as one of the following in the column:

1 = Talking to citizens
2 = Search/investigation
3 = Arrest
4 = Traffic citation/automobile accident

32. Number of Police

Write the number of police in this column that you see during an event (i.e., a single officer patrolling on his bike, two officers at the scene of a car accident).

33. Other

We can't think of everything. You might see rare instances of pick pocketing, sexual assault, and/or other varied criminal activities. Some possibilities include indecent exposure (i.e., "flashing"), urinating in public, etc. If an activity seems criminal or disorderly and does not fit any of the categories above, check this column and describe the activities on the comment page.

Appendix H

JERSEY CITY DISPLACEMENT PROJECT
SOCIAL OBSERVATION TRAINING VIGNETTES

How would you code the following ambiguous situations?

1. Upon entering an observation site, you witness two men engaged in a heated argument. After five minutes, one of the men turns and walks into a nearby bodega. The second man yells through the store window and flails his arms wildly for another minute before walking away angrily.

2. Seven African-American males are hanging out on the corner of Monticello and Storms. A patrol car pulls up a half block away. The group casually walks off in different directions upon seeing the patrol car. The patrol car drives off.

3. A teenager walks down the street holding a "boom box" radio playing at maximum volume.

4. A police car cruises through a parking lot, going very slowly, stopping occasionally, but never parking.

5. A woman, who is dressed in revealing clothes waves at traffic. A car pulls over and the woman climbs inside. The car drives off, and is pulled over by an undercover police car. The plain-clothes officers are still talking to the people in the car when the observation time ends.

6. A couple of teenage males are hanging out on a stoop. The youths are joking around, laughing, and being loud and boisterous. The two males stand up and start "shadow boxing" with each other (not touching each other).

7. A storeowner is yelling at a young African-American male standing outside of his store. The boy walks off cursing. The storeowner goes back inside his store.

8. A teenager walks down the street with a blaring "boom box" radio. A foot patrol officer passes by and stops. The police officer has a brief conversation with the teenager. The teenager turns down his radio, then the officer continues walking.

9. A man walks down the street carrying a 40-ounce bottle of beer in a paper bag. He is not drunk or disruptive. Suddenly, he throws his bottle down in the street and breaks it. He keeps on walking.

10. You see a car pull into your view and park. About five minutes later, a uniformed officer gets out of the car and enters a building.

11. A car pulls up in front of an old house. A teenage youth gets out of the car, walks up to

the house, and knocks on the door. The youth is let in. Two minutes pass. The teenage boy comes out of the house and drives away.

12. A foot patrol officer stops a citizen, then frisks and cuffs him over the course of five minutes. About 5 minutes later, a squad car pulls up with lights flashing. An officer gets out and goes to the other officer and detained person. All leave in the squad about one minute later.

13. A woman that appears to be a prostitute stops a man walking down the street. They have a brief conversation, and the man lights the woman's cigarette. The two walk away together, turning the corner, and proceeding down the next street. They disappear out of sight.

14. A squad car passes through your field of vision and turns the corner. About two minutes later, two officers walk from the direction where the squad car disappeared, patrolling the streets.

15. Two males stagger into your observation area, one carrying a bottle wrapped in a brown paper bag, the other playing a "boom box" radio. They yell out lyrics to oncoming pedestrian traffic.

16. A police car pulls up near an intersection. A man comes out of a shop. The man, who is possibly the shopkeeper, talks to the police and points around the corner. The police car drives off in that direction.

17. Five teenagers make lewd gesture at females as they walk by.

18. Seven teenagers are sitting on a street corner, blaring a "boom box" radio, and drinking beer. One of the teenagers nudges the others, and looks toward the end of the street. The other youths follow his gaze, and see that two police officers, on foot patrol, are coming up the sidewalk. They turn down the radio and hide their beers. The officers pass them without stopping. Two minutes later, the teenagers turn their radio back up, and bring their beers out from hiding.

19. A disheveled looking man (age 50-60) stumbles down the street. The man keeps to himself and doesn't bother anyone. He ducks in between two buildings, trying to conceal himself, and urinates.

20. A squad car pulls into the area and double parks at the side of the road. Two officers get out of the car and enter a sandwich shop. Less than a minute later, you observe the officers run out of the shop, get back into the squad car, and drive away with sirens on.

21. At a truck stop, a prostitute walks up to a parked truck and knocks on the door. There is a brief conversation between the truck driver and the prostitute. After one minute, the prostitute climbs down from the truck and walks away.

22. A squad car pulls into the observation site and parks for about one minute. Two officers get out of the car. One officer enters a building, while the other talks with a group of people on the sidewalk. After about five minutes, the officer in the building comes out and talks with the same group of people and the other officer for a couple of minutes. The officers then get into their squad car and leave.

23. A man and woman are standing on a street corner in the observation site. The man is yelling at the woman, and the woman is crying. People pass by, but they do not say anything to the two. The woman screams at the man at one point, but then resumes crying. When the observation time ends, the man is still screaming, and the woman crying.

24. A prostitute enters a room at a motel. You never see a customer (a.k.a. John) during your observation time.

25. Police officers slowly ride their bikes through the observation site. As they patrol, they wave and nod to people on the street and sidewalk. After they pass five teenagers, the teenagers grab their crotches, raise their middle fingers, and make other lewd gestures.

26. A van repeatedly drives through the observation site, a drug market area. On two occasions the van stops and the passenger talks with people on the street.

27. Three teenagers ride their bike down a busy sidewalk, weaving in between people.

28. A woman walks by a construction site carrying a baguette. Two of the construction workers begin to catcall. The woman turns around, approaches the workers, and hits one over the head with the baguette. The woman walks off, and the construction workers are quiet.

29. A patrol car pulls over and a resident comes out and talks with them. It looks like a casual conversation. The police pull away after a few minutes, waving to the civilian as they leave.

30. Five minutes into an observation period, you observe two young males leaving a medium-sized apartment building on Tonnele Avenue. Both are carrying apparently heavy objects that have been placed in green plastic lawn bags. They walk into Journal Square and disappear from sight.

31. A man dressed in worn-out clothes turns away from the street and begins to urinate on a building wall. The man, as he urinates, looks over and sees two police officers on foot patrol walking up the sidewalk. The man stops urinating. The man walks down the street slowly. The police pass the man, and disappear around the corner. The man waits two minutes, then turns back to the wall, and finishes urinating.

32. A drunk weaves down the street, approaching several people. The sixth person he approaches gives him a cigarette.

33. Two teenagers are walking down the street. A patrol car passes them, then stops. Two uniformed police officers get out of the car and approach the youths. The police question the youths and the youths turn out their pockets for the police. The police talk to them for three more minutes, then get back in their car. The police drive off. After the police have left, one of the youths raises his fist and extends his middle finger.

34. A patrol car with lights and siren on arrives in your observation site. Two police officers talk with/or aid accident victims.

35. As you enter an observation site, you observe two youths standing on a corner, which is a known drug market. About five minutes into the observation period, one of the youths walks down the street, casually drops a small object onto the sidewalk, and continues along. Shortly afterward, a pedestrian picks up the object, then disappears around a corner.

36. Four teenage males are hanging out around a public telephone. They watch people, mainly girls, as they go by. One of the teenage males uses the phone several times.

37. A squad car is stopped in your line of vision for about two minutes, with the engine running. An officer gets out and tickets a car, then gets back in his squad car and leaves.

38. A group of young males are sitting on their front porch playing loud music. Occasionally, one enters the apartment and comes back out, while a couple of the others talk, shake hands, and cajole with the motorists.

39. A woman that appears to be a prostitute waves at a car. As the car passes her, the driver honks the horn a couple of times. The car does not stop, and the prostitute keeps walking.

40. A police officer on foot patrol stops to talk to a group of youths hanging out on a front stoop. Two minutes into the conversation, the officer motions for one of the boys to come with him. The boy gets up and leaves the area with the officer.

41. A woman that appears to be prostitute stops a man walking down the street. After a brief conversation, the stranger gives the prostitute a cigarette, and both go on their way.

42. One youth rides his bike down a sidewalk. There are only a few people on the sidewalk.

43. About halfway through your observation period, a truck leaves a parking space and behind it you see an unoccupied squad car.

Appendix I

JERSEY CITY DISPLACEMENT PROJECT
SOCIAL OBSERVATION SHIFT ASSIGNMENTS

	Shift 1 (10AM-4PM)	Shift 2 (1PM-8PM)	Shift 3 (4PM-11PM)	Shift 4 (8PM-2AM)
Sunday	James Perlez	John Guevara	Gerry Dobbyn	Jeron Rayam
Monday	Christine Tartaro	John Guevara	Chenard Cherilus	Carsten Andresen
Tuesday	Gerry Dobbyn	Gloria Montoya	Aislynn Stern	Jeron Rayam
Wednesday	Kyung Seok Choo	James Perlez	Vanja Stenius	Carsten Andresen
Thursday	Laura Parisi	Gloria Montoya	James Perlez	Beverly Carew
Friday	Vanja Stenius	Kyung Seok Choo	Natasha Wilson	John Guevara
Saturday	Aislynn Stern	Chenard Cherilus	Beverly Carew	Tanya Hedlund

Appendix J

JERSEY CITY DISPLACEMENT PROJECT
PHYSICAL OBSERVATION INSTRUMENT

1. Street segment:_____

2. Street segment ID number: ____ ____ ____

3. Length of street segment (in miles): ____ ____ ____

4. Displacement site:

   1 = Assault/Drug
   2 = Prostitution
   3 = Burglary

5. Type of area:

   1 = Target Area
   2 = Catchment Area #1
   3 = Catchment Area #2

6. Date of observation: _____ / _____ /

7. Time of observation: _____ : _____ am or pm

8. Period of week:

   1 = Week day
   2 = Week night
   3 = Weekend day
   4 = Weekend night

9. Researcher conducting the observation:

01 = Carsten	07 = Choo	13 = John
02 = Ann Marie	08 = Jeron	14 = Aislynn
03 = Vanja	09 = Mike	15 = Natasha
04 = Justin	10 = Gerry	16 = James
05 = Chris	11 = Laura	17 = Gloria
06 = Chenard	12 = Jim	18 = Other

Record the following physical characteristics:		Tally	Total
10.	Burned, boarded up or abandoned buildings		_____
11.	Buildings with broken windows		_____
12.	Vacant lots not in use		_____
13.	Vehicles that appear abandoned		_____
14.	Public telephones		_____
15.	Signs restricting access/documenting rules of behavior		_____
16.	Buildings with security gates or barred windows		_____
17.	Benches or picnic tables		_____
18.	Bars or liquor stores		_____

19. Rate the volume automobile traffic:

    1 = None
    2 = Light
    3 = Moderate
    4 = Heavy

20. Are automobiles parked along the street?

    1 = On one side of the street
    2 = On both sides of the street
    3 = On neither side

21. Describe the street pattern:

    1 = One lane
    2 = Two lanes
    3 = Four lanes
    4 = Cul-de-sac

22. Is there a bus stop or bus station on this street segment?

    1 = Yes

0 = No

23. Is there a subway station on this street segment?

1 = Yes
0 = No

24. Is the street one-way or two-way?

1 = One-way street
2 = Two-way street

25. How would you rate the lighting in this area?

1 = Very good
2 = Good
3 = Fair
4 = Poor

26. Describe the property in this area:

0 = No residential or commercial property
1 = Entirely residential
2 = Residential, some commercial
3 = Mixed residential and commercial
4 = Commercial, some residential
5 = Entirely commercial

27. Describe the commercial buildings in this area:

0 = No commercial buildings
1 = Mostly industrial (factories, warehouses, etc.)
2 = Mostly retail (stores and office buildings)

28. Describe the residential buildings in this area:

0 = No residential buildings
1 = Mostly single-family homes
2 = Mostly multi-family homes (triple-deckers, townhouses, etc.)
3 = Mostly apartment buildings
4 = Mostly high-rise apartments (seven or more floors)
5 = Evenly mixed housing

29. Rate the overall perception of the neighborhood:

1 = Ghetto poverty area
2 = Lower to working class area
3 = Middle class area
4 = Mixed, mostly wealthy
5 = Mixed, mostly poor

30. Indicate the approximate percentage of residential buildings on this street segment:

1 = 0%
2 = 1 – 25%
3 = 26 – 50%
4 = 51 – 75%
5 = 76 – 100%

31. Indicate the approximate percentage of commercial buildings on this street segment:

1 = 0%
2 = 1 – 25%
3 = 26 – 50%
4 = 51 – 75%
5 = 76 – 100%

32. Indicate the approximate percentage of burned, abandoned or boarded up buildings on this street segment:

1 = 0%
2 = 1 – 25%
3 = 26 – 50%
4 = 51 – 75%
5 = 76 – 100%

33. Indicate the approximate percentage of public service buildings on this street segment:

1 = 0%
2 = 1 – 25%
3 = 26 – 50%
4 = 51 – 75%
5 = 76 – 100%

34. Condition of grass and shrubbery:

1 = No grass or shrubbery
2 = Not maintained
3 = Partly maintained

4 = Well maintained

35. Condoms and condom wrappers on the sidewalk:

1 = None
2 = Light
3 = Moderate
4 = Heavy

36. Needles and drug paraphernalia on the sidewalk:

1 = None
2 = Light
3 = Moderate
4 = Heavy

37. Buildings with structural damage:

1 = Less than 10%
2 = 10 – 30%
3 = 30 – 50%
4 = More than 50%

38. Buildings marked with graffiti:

1 = Less than 10%
2 = 10 – 30%
3 = 30 – 50%
4 = More than 50%

39. Streets and sidewalks covered with broken glass:

1 = Clean
2 = Mostly clean
3 = Moderately scattered
4 = Heavily scattered

40. Yards and streets with litter:

1 = Clean
2 = Mostly clean
3 = Moderately littered
4 = Heavily littered

Appendix K

JERSEY CITY DISPLACEMENT PROJECT
PHYSICAL OBSERVATION CODEBOOK

10. Burned, Boarded Up, or Abandoned Buildings

    Record the number of burned, boarded up, or abandoned buildings that you see. Only record buildings that are no longer being used for legitimate residential or commercial purposes. Tally the total number of buildings you observe in this condition.

11. Buildings with Broken Windows

    Record the number of buildings that have one or more broken windows. Tally the total number of buildings you observe in this condition. Note: For corner buildings, only record physical attributes that are visible from the sidewalk on the street segment being observed.

12. Vacant Lots Not in Use

    Record the number of vacant lots where buildings used to stand. Vacant lots where buildings used to stand are recognizable because the ground will be covered with dirt or rubble. Often the foundation of the building will be visible. Do not include parking lots or lots covered with asphalt. Tally the total number of vacant lots not in use.

13. Vehicles that Appear Abandoned

    Record the number of cars or trucks that appear abandoned. The physical cues of an abandoned vehicle consist of a shattered windshield or window, an exterior or interior that has been burned or torn out, missing or flat tires, and missing license plates. Note the total number of vehicles that meet two or more of the above conditions.

14. Public Telephones

    Record the number of public telephones that you see. Do not include public telephones that are located indoors, such as phones inside laundromats and fast food restaurants. Note the total number of public telephones present on the street segment.

15. Signs Restricting Access or Documenting Rules

    Record the number of signs restricting access from certain areas or documenting rules of behavior. Do not include traffic signs or signs for private security companies. Examples are no trespassing signs, neighborhood watch signs, and posted ordinances against loud radios. Note the total number of these signs present on the street segment.

16. Buildings with Security Gates, Alarms or Barred Windows

    Record the number of buildings with security gates or barred windows. This measures the presence of security devices. Ordinary fences are *not* considered security gates and should not be recorded under this variable. House alarms, identifiable by stickers posted in windows, should not be included. Note the total number of buildings you observe with one or more security devices.

17. Benches or Picnic Tables

    Record the number of benches or picnic tables. Note the total number of benches or picnic tables present on the street segment.

18. Bars or Liquor Stores

    Record the number of bars or liquor stores. Note the total number of bars or liquors stores on the street segment.

19. Volume of Automobile Traffic

    This variable rates the volume of automobile traffic on a street segment. If automobiles pass by occasionally (i.e., a few every minute or so) rate the traffic as light. If there is a steady stream of cars that does not let up (i.e., one every 20 feet) rate the traffic as moderate. If the vehicles on the street create congestion at traffic lights (i.e., bumper to bumper traffic) rate the traffic as heavy.

20. Automobiles Parked Along the Street

    Indicate whether you observe automobiles parked along the street and indicate whether they are parked along one side or both sides.

21. Street Pattern

    Record whether the street has one lane, two lanes, four lanes, or a cul-de-sac.

22. Bus Stop or Station at this Location

    Indicate whether you see a bus stop or bus station.

23. Subway Station at this Location

    Indicate whether you see a subway station.

24. One-way or two-way street

    Indicate whether the street is one-way or two-way.

25. Lighting in this Area

    Rate the lighting in the area as very good, good, fair, or poor. Very good lighting consists of areas with floodlights or streetlights that illuminate 100 percent of the surface area. Floodlights differ from ordinary lights because they illuminate the buildings *and* the surrounding areas. If you are able to see every part of the street segment, the lighting should be coded as very good. Good lighting, on the other hand, qualifies as an area that has streetlights or building lights that illuminate between 60 and 80 percent of the surface area. A street segment in an area with good lighting should be mostly visible, as well as the shape of the surrounding buildings. Fair lighting describes an area that has lighting that illuminates between 40 and 60 percent of the area. In an area that is fairly lit, about half of the street and sidewalks will be visible, but the buildings and surrounding area will be dark. Poor lighting describes an area that is almost completely obscured in darkness (less than 40 percent of the streets and sidewalks will be illuminated by lighting). This would include areas lacking streetlights and building floodlights. This variable is coded after dark, separate from the other variables.

26. Property in this Area

Indicate whether the property in this area is entirely residential, residential with some commercial, mixed residential and commercial, commercial with some residential, or entirely commercial. Residential properties are buildings that people pay to live in on a permanent or semi-permanent basis (i.e., houses, apartments, and duplexes). Commercial properties describe buildings used in the making, distribution, or sale of goods and services.

27. Commercial Buildings in this Area

Indicate whether the commercial buildings on the street segment are mostly industrial (i.e., factories and warehouses) or mostly retail (i.e., stores and office buildings). If there are no commercial buildings in the area, code accordingly.

28. Residential Buildings in this Area

Indicate whether the homes on the street segment are mostly single-family, mostly multi-family homes (i.e., triple-decker homes, townhouses), mostly apartment buildings, mostly high-rise apartments (i.e., apartment buildings with seven or more floors), or mixed housing (i.e., an even mix of housing types). If there are no residential buildings, code accordingly.

29. Overall Perception of the Neighborhood

Indicate whether the street segment is middle class, working class, or a ghetto poverty area. The last two categories include street segments that consist of both wealthy and low-income residences (i.e., areas undergoing gentrification). This variable should be derived from the several observable criteria: (1) the size of the houses/apartments, (2) the physical condition of residential and commercial properties, and (3) the amount of money the property appears to be worth.

30. Percentage of Residential Street Frontage

Indicate the approximate percentage of residential street frontage for each street segment. Mark the code corresponding to the appropriate range. (The total percentage for this variable may exceed 100%).

31. Percentage of Commercial Street Frontage

Indicate the approximate percentage of commercial street frontage for each street segment. Mark the code corresponding to the appropriate range. Commercial frontage includes both industrial and retail property. (The total percentage for this variable may exceed 100%).

32. Percentage of Street Frontage for Burned, Abandoned or Boarded Up Buildings

Indicate the approximate percentage of street frontage that is burned, abandoned, or boarded up for each street segment. Mark the code corresponding to the appropriate range. (The total percentage for this variable may exceed 100%).

33. Percentage of Public Service Street Frontage

Indicate the approximate percentage of public service street frontage for each street segment. Mark the code corresponding to the appropriate range. Public service frontage includes buildings for religious worship, hospitals or clinics, social services (i.e., YMCA, counseling services), and government services such as police and fire stations. (The total percentage for this variable may exceed 100%).

34. Condition of Grass and Shrubbery

This variable rates the condition of front yards on a street segment. A yard refers to an open dirt or grass area in front of a piece of property that is not covered with cement or asphalt. The options are no grass or shrubbery, not maintained, partly maintained, or well maintained. The street segment should be coded as no grass or shrubbery if the yard space does not have any grass or vegetation. The segment should be coded as not maintained if the yards have grass or plant life that appears to be growing wildly, without maintenance from anyone (i.e., a front yard with grass that is two feet high). The segment should be coded as partly maintained if the basic minimum of human care appears to have been spent on the property (i.e., a mowed yard with overlooked sections of tall grass and/or a sidewalk covered with grass clippings). The segment should be coded as well maintained if yards in the area have grass and shrubbery that have been carefully manicured and tended.

35. Condoms and Condom Wrappers on the Sidewalk

If there are no condoms or condom wrappers on the street segment, code the segment as none. If there is one condom or condom wrapper on a twenty-foot length of sidewalk, code the segment as light. If two or three condoms or condom wrappers can be seen on a twenty-foot length of sidewalk, code the segment as moderate. If four or more condoms or condom wrappers can be seen on a twenty-foot length of sidewalk, code the segment as heavy.

36. Needles and Drug Paraphernalia on the Sidewalk

Needles and drug paraphernalia consist of hypodermic needles, vials, small clear plastic bags with drug traces, and crack pipes. If no drug paraphernalia can be found on the street segment, code the segment as none. If one piece of drug paraphernalia is visible on a twenty-foot length of sidewalk, code the segment as light. If there are two or three pieces of drug paraphernalia visible on a twenty-foot section of sidewalk, code the segment as moderate. If the sidewalk is observed to have four or more pieces of drug paraphernalia on a twenty-foot length of sidewalk, code the segment as heavy.

37. Buildings with Structural Damage

Structural damage refers to buildings that have damaged walls and roofs, missing bricks and boards, and peeling paint. A building displaying any of these characteristics should be counted as having structural damage. Record the percentage of buildings with structural damage. For example, if two out of ten buildings in an observation segment have damaged walls, then 20% should be coded as the percentage of structurally damaged buildings.

38. Buildings Marked with Graffiti

This refers to designs, words, or images painted on buildings with spray paint or graffiti markers. On a street segment, any building with these markings should be counted as being marked with graffiti. Note the percentage of buildings marked with graffiti. For example, if ten buildings are visible on a street segment, and five of them have graffiti markings, then 50% of the buildings have been marked with graffiti.

39. Yards and Streets with Litter

This variable measures the amount of litter present in the yards and streets of a street segment. Litter consists of scraps of paper, pieces of plastic or wood, and other objects that have been discarded. Do not code broken glass as litter. The presence of broken glass will be captured under variable #40. Rate the segment as clean if the segment has only a few pieces of litter scattered about. Rate the segment as mostly clean if the area is mostly free of litter, but has one or two spots with some litter. The total amount of litter for this rating should not fill a five-gallon bucket. Rate the segment as moderately littered if it has litter scattered throughout. This should approximately equal the amount of litter necessary to fill a five-gallon bucket. Code the segment as heavily littered if there are piles of litter or areas where the ground cannot be seen due to the amount of litter. This is approximately the amount of litter necessary to fill a 50-gallon plastic lawn bag or more. For further elucidation as to what constitutes litter and examples for each rating, refer to photographs.

40. Streets and Sidewalks Covered with Broken Glass

This variable measures the amount of broken glass present on streets and sidewalks of a street segment. Broken glass can come from broken mirrors, broken bottles, broken windows, and from car accidents (i.e., shattered tail- and headlights). Rate the segment as clean if it is mostly free of glass. There may be a few pieces of broken glass here and there. Rate the segment as mostly clean if the total amount of glass would fill less than one dustpan. Rate the segment as moderately scattered if the amount of broken glass would fill between one and two dustpans. Rate the segment as heavily scattered if the glass exceeds the amount held by two dustpans. For further clarification, refer to photographs.

Appendix L

JERSEY CITY DISPLACEMENT PROJECT
HOUSEHOLD SURVEY

1a. Hello, my name is INTERVIEWER'S FULL NAME. I'm a student calling from a research center at Rutgers University. We're interviewing residents in Jersey City about crime and disorder on their block. Your participation in this survey would be greatly appreciated. It should only take about ten minutes. Your answers will be kept strictly confidential and used only for research purposes with no names attached. I would like to speak to a member of this household who is at least 18 years old.

INTERVIEWER: IF NO HOUSEHOLD MEMBER 18 OR OLDER IS AVAILABLE, ASK WHEN TO CALL BACK.

CONTINUE WITH SURVEY.....(GO TO Q.1b) 1

HUNG UP DURING INTRODUCTION

CALLBACK.....

PROBLEMS--LANGUAGE .....

REFUSED.....

*** * * * GO TO END * * * ***

1b. Do you live on ***STREET 1 between STREET 2 and STREET 3***?

YES.....(GO TO Q.2) 1

NO 0

DON'T KNOW 8

REFUSED.....9

1c. I just want to confirm that I dialed correctly. Is this (READ TELEPHONE NUMBER)?

YES.....(GO TO END) 1

NO .....(REDIAL NUMBER) 0

DON'T KNOW 8

REFUSED.....9

*** * * * GO TO END * * * ***

2. Most of the following questions are about the block you live on. When I talk about your block, I mean ***STREET 1 from STREET 2 to STREET 3. We want you to include both sides of STREET 1.***

In general, how would you rate your block as a place to live?

Excellent, ... 1

Good, ... 2

Fair, or..... 3

Poor? 4

DON'T KNOW 8

REFUSED..... 9

3. How safe do you feel when walking alone at night on your block?

Very safe, ... 1

Somewhat safe, ... 2

Somewhat unsafe, or..... 3

Very unsafe? 4

DON'T KNOW 8

REFUSED..... 9

4. Now, I'm going to ask you some questions about specific crimes that may be occurring on your block.

How often do you think apartments and houses on your block get broken into?

A few times a year, ... 1

About once a month, ... 2

About once a week, ... 3

A few times a week, ... 4

Every day, or 5

Not at all? ..... (GO TO Q.13) 6

DON'T KNOW ..... (GO TO Q.13) 8

REFUSED ..... (GO TO Q.13) 9

5. When do you think these break-ins usually take place?

Mostly in the morning from 6 a.m. to noon, 1

Mostly in the afternoon from noon to 6 p.m., or 2

Mostly at night after 6 p.m.? 3

OTHER (SPECIFY) 4
.....

DON'T KNOW 8

REFUSED 9

6. Where do you think these break-ins usually take place?

Mostly in apartment buildings, ... 1

Mostly in smaller single- and multi-family houses, 2

Both in apartment buildings and houses, or 3

Some other place? (SPECIFY) 4
.....

DON'T KNOW 8

REFUSED 9

7. Who do you think breaks into homes on your block?

PROBE: By home, we mean both houses and apartments.

Mostly people who live on your block, .. 1

Mostly people who live in your neighborhood, 2

Mostly people who live in other parts of Jersey City, or 3

Mostly people who are not from Jersey City? 4

OTHER (SPECIFY) 5
.....

DON'T KNOW 8

REFUSED..... 9

8. In the last four months, has anyone broken into, or tried to break into, your home to steal something?

YES..... 1

NO ..... (GO TO Q.12) 0

DON'T KNOW ..... (GO TO Q.12) 8

REFUSED..... (GO TO Q.12) 9

8b. How many times has this happened?

NUMBER OF TIMES ..... |___|___|

9. When was the last time this happened?

Less than one week ago, ... 1

Between one week and one month ago,.. 2

Between one month and six months ago, or 3

More than six months ago?..... 4

DON'T KNOW 8

REFUSED..... 9

10. How did this person break into your home?

_____

_____

_____

11. What did this person take from your home?

_____

_____

_____

12. In the last four months, do you know anyone else on your block who has had a break-in or an attempted break-in at their home?

YES..... 1

NO 0

DON'T KNOW 8

REFUSED..... 9

13. Now, I'm going to ask you some questions about one more type of crime that may occur on your block.

How often do you see people fighting on your block? That is, pushing, coming to blows, or threatening one another with weapons.

A few times a year, ... 1

About once a month,..... 2

About once a week,..... 3

A few times a week,..... 4

Every day, or.....5

Not at all?.....(GO TO Q.17) 6

DON'T KNOW .....(GO TO Q.17) 8

REFUSED.....(GO TO Q.17) 9

14. When do fights usually take place?

Mostly in the morning from 6 a.m. to noon, 1

Mostly in the afternoon from noon to 6 p.m., or. 2

Mostly at night after 6 p.m.?.....3

OTHER (SPECIFY) 4
_____

DON'T KNOW 8

REFUSED.....9

15. Who do you think is involved in fights on your block?

PROBE: In general, do you think these people are mostly from your block, your neighborhood, other parts of Jersey City, or ***not*** from Jersey City at all?

Mostly people who live on your block, ..1

Mostly people who live in your neighborhood, 2

Mostly people who live in other parts of Jersey City, or 3

Mostly people who are not from Jersey City? 4

OTHER (SPECIFY) 5
_____

DON'T KNOW 8

REFUSED.....9

16. In the last month, about how many times have you witnessed a fight on your block?

NUMBER OF TIMES ..... |___|___|

DON'T KNOW 98

REFUSED..... 99

17. In the last month, about how many times have you been attacked or threatened on your block?

NUMBER OF TIMES ..... |___|___|

NONE ..... (GO TO Q.20) 00

DON'T KNOW 98

REFUSED..... 99

18. Were you attacked or threatened by . . .

A stranger,..... 1

A family member, or..... 2

Someone you know who is not a family member? 3

OTHER (SPECIFY) 4

_____

DON'T KNOW 8

REFUSED..... 9

19. Please describe what happened the last time you were attacked or threatened.

_____

_____

_____

20. Now I'm going to ask you about something else that may be occurring on your block.

How often do you see prostitutes on your block?

A few times a year, ... 1

About once a month, ... 2

About once a week, ... 3

A few times a week, ... 4

Every day, or 5

Not at all? ..... (GO TO Q.32) 6

DON'T KNOW ..... (GO TO Q.32) 8

REFUSED ..... (GO TO Q.32) 9

21. Do prostitutes work on your block in the morning between 6 a.m. and noon?

YES 1

NO ..... (GO TO Q.24) 0

DON'T KNOW ..... (GO TO Q.24) 8

REFUSED ..... (GO TO Q.24) 9

22. About how many prostitutes work on your block in the morning?

NUMBER OF PROSTITUTES ..... |___|___|

DON'T KNOW 98

REFUSED 99

23. Where do they spend most of their time in the morning?

PROBE: Where do they hang out?

Mostly outside on the sidewalk and street, 1

Mostly inside apartments and houses, ... 2

Both outside and inside, or 3

Someplace else? (SPECIFY) 4

_____

DON'T KNOW 8

REFUSED..... 9

24. Do prostitutes work on your block in the afternoon between noon and 6 p.m.?

YES..... 1

NO ..... (GO TO Q.27) 0

DON'T KNOW ..... (GO TO Q.27) 8

REFUSED..... (GO TO Q.27) 9

25. About how many prostitutes work on your block in the afternoon?

NUMBER OF PROSTITUTES ..... |___|___|

DON'T KNOW 98

REFUSED..... 99

26. Where do they spend most of their time in the afternoon?

PROBE: Where do they hang out?

Mostly outside on the sidewalk and street, 1

Mostly inside apartments and houses, ... 2

Both outside and inside, or 3

Someplace else? (SPECIFY) 4

_____

DON'T KNOW 8

REFUSED..... 9

27. Do prostitutes work on your block at night after 6 p.m.?

YES..... 1

NO ..... (GO TO Q.30) 0

DON'T KNOW ..... (GO TO Q.30) 8

REFUSED..... (GO TO Q.30) 9

28. About how many prostitutes work on your block at night?

NUMBER OF PROSTITUTES ..... |___|___|

DON'T KNOW 98

REFUSED..... 99

29. Where do they spend most of their time at night?

PROBE: Where do they hang out?

Mostly outside on the sidewalk and street, 1

Mostly inside apartments and houses, ... 2

Both outside and inside, or 3

Someplace else? (SPECIFY) 4

_____

DON'T KNOW 8

REFUSED..... 9

30. Who do you think these prostitutes are?

PROBE: In general, do you think these **prostitutes** are mostly from your block, your neighborhood, other parts of Jersey City, or ***not*** from Jersey City at all?

Mostly people who live on your block, .. 1

Mostly people who live in your neighborhood, 2

Mostly people who live in other parts of Jersey City, or 3

Mostly people who are not from Jersey City? 4

OTHER (SPECIFY) 5

_____

DON'T KNOW 8

REFUSED..... 9

31. Who do you think their customers are?

PROBE: In general, do you think their ***customers*** are mostly from your block, your neighborhood, other parts of Jersey City, or ***not*** from Jersey City at all?

Mostly people who live on your block, .. 1

Mostly people who live in your neighborhood, 2

Mostly people who live in other parts of Jersey City, or 3

Mostly people who are not from Jersey City? 4

OTHER (SPECIFY) 5

_____

DON'T KNOW 8

REFUSED..... 9

32. Now I'm going to ask you about another type of crime that may be occurring on your block.

How often do you think drugs are sold on your block?

A few times a year, ... 1

About once a month, ... 2

About once a week, ... 3

A few times a week, ... 4

Every day, or 5

Not at all? ..... (GO TO Q.45) 0

DON'T KNOW ..... (GO TO Q.45) 8

REFUSED..... (GO TO Q.45) 9

33. Does drug selling on your block take place in the morning between 6 a.m. and noon?

YES..... 1

NO ..... (GO TO Q.36) 0

DON'T KNOW ..... (GO TO Q.36) 8

REFUSED..... (GO TO Q.36) 9

34. About how many people sell drugs on your block in the morning?

NUMBER OF PEOPLE ..... |___|___|

DON'T KNOW 98

REFUSED..... 99

35. Where does it usually take place in the morning?

PROBE: That is, drug selling.

Mostly outside on the sidewalk and street, 1

Mostly inside apartments and houses, ... 2

Both outside and inside, or 3

Some other place? (SPECIFY) 4

_____

DON'T KNOW 8

REFUSED..... 9

36. Does drug selling on your block take place in the afternoon between noon and 6 p.m.?

YES..... 1

NO ..... (GO TO Q.39) 0

DON'T KNOW ..... (GO TO Q.39) 8

REFUSED..... (GO TO Q.39) 9

37. About how many people sell drugs on your block in the afternoon?

NUMBER OF PEOPLE ..... |___|___|

DON'T KNOW 98

REFUSED..... 99

38. Where does it usually take place in the afternoon?

PROBE: That is, drug selling.

Mostly outside on the sidewalk and street, 1

Mostly inside apartments and houses, ... 2

Both outside and inside, or 3

Some other place? (SPECIFY) 4

_____

DON'T KNOW 8

REFUSED..... 9

39. Does drug selling on your block take place at night after 6 p.m.?

YES..... 1

NO ..... (GO TO Q.42) 0

DON'T KNOW ..... (GO TO Q.42) 8

REFUSED..... (GO TO Q.42) 9

40. About how many people sell drugs on your block at night?

NUMBER OF PEOPLE ..... |___|___|

DON'T KNOW 98

REFUSED..... 99

41. Where does it usually take place at night?

PROBE: That is, drug selling.

Mostly outside on the sidewalk and street, 1

Mostly inside apartments and houses, ... 2

Both outside and inside, or 3

Some other place? (SPECIFY) 4

_____

DON'T KNOW 8

REFUSED..... 9

42. Who do you think ***sells*** most of the drugs on your block?

PROBE: In general, do you think the ***sellers*** are mostly from your block, your neighborhood, other parts of Jersey City, or ***not*** from Jersey City at all?

Mostly people who live on your block, .. 1

Mostly people who live in your neighborhood, 2

Mostly people who live in other parts of Jersey City, or 3

Mostly people who are not from Jersey City? 4

OTHER (SPECIFY) 5

_____

DON'T KNOW 8

REFUSED..... 9

43. Who do you think ***buys*** most of the drugs on your block?

PROBE: In general, do you think the ***buyers*** are mostly from your block, your neighborhood, other parts of Jersey City, or ***not*** from Jersey City at all?

Mostly people who live on your block, .. 1

Mostly people who live in your neighborhood, 2

Mostly people who live in other parts of Jersey City, or 3

Mostly people who are not from Jersey City? 4

OTHER (SPECIFY) 5

_____

DON'T KNOW 8

REFUSED..... 9

44. In the last two weeks, about how many times have you been approached by someone on your block who wanted to sell you drugs?

NUMBER OF TIMES ..... |___|___|

DON'T KNOW 98

REFUSED..... 99

45. In the last month, have you witnessed any crimes on your block where you were not the victim?

YES..... 1

NO ..... (GO TO Q.47) 0

DON'T KNOW ..... (GO TO Q.47) 8

REFUSED..... (GO TO Q.47) 9

46. About how many crimes have you witnessed on your block in the last month?

NUMBER OF CRIMES ..... |___|___|

DON'T KNOW 98

REFUSED..... 99

47. Do you know someone (other than yourself) who was the victim of a crime on your block in the last month?

YES..... 1

NO ..... (GO TO Q.49) 0

DON'T KNOW ..... (GO TO Q.49) 8

REFUSED..... (GO TO Q.49) 9

48. Please describe what happened to them.

_____

_____

_____

49. Next, I would like to ask you a few questions about disorders that might occur on your block. For each of the following, please tell me if it happens on your block often, sometimes, or not at all.

49a. Let's start with youths hanging out being disorderly. Does this happen often, sometimes, or not at all?

OFTEN 1

SOMETIMES 2

NOT AT ALL 3

DON'T KNOW 8

REFUSED..... 9

49b. People drinking alcohol in public. (Does this happen often, sometimes, or not at all?)

OFTEN 1

SOMETIMES 2

NOT AT ALL 3

DON'T KNOW 8

REFUSED..... 9

49c. Panhandlers asking for money. (Does this happen often, sometimes, or not at all?)

OFTEN 1

SOMETIMES 2

NOT AT ALL 3

DON'T KNOW 8

REFUSED..... 9

49d. People damaging property. (Does this happen often, sometimes, or not at all?)

OFTEN 1

SOMETIMES 2

NOT AT ALL 3

DON'T KNOW 8

REFUSED..... 9

49e. Gambling on the sidewalk. (Does this happen often, sometimes, or not at all?)

OFTEN 1

SOMETIMES 2

NOT AT ALL 3

DON'T KNOW 8

REFUSED..... 9

49f. Cars being broken into or stolen. (Does this happen often, sometimes, or not at all?)

OFTEN 1

SOMETIMES 2

NOT AT ALL 3

DON'T KNOW 8

REFUSED..... 9

49g. People getting mugged. (Does this happen often, sometimes, or not at all?)

OFTEN 1

SOMETIMES 2

NOT AT ALL 3

DON'T KNOW 8

REFUSED..... 9

50. In the last three months, do you think that crime on your block has increased, decreased, or stayed about the same?

INCREASED..... 1

DECREASED..... 2

STAYED ABOUT THE SAME 3

DON'T KNOW 8

REFUSED..... 9

51. In the last three months, do you think that crime in Jersey City has increased, decreased, or stayed about the same?

INCREASED..... 1

DECREASED..... 2

STAYED ABOUT THE SAME 3

DON'T KNOW 8

REFUSED..... 9

52. Compared to three months ago, do you see more police officers on your block, fewer officers, or about the same number of officers?

MORE.....1

FEWER.....2

ABOUT THE SAME.....3

DON'T KNOW 8

REFUSED.....9

53. Finally, a few questions about yourself.

How long have you lived in Jersey City?

INTERVIEWER: IF LESS THAN ONE YEAR, ENTER "00" FOR YEARS AND RECORD NUMBER OF MONTHS.

|___|___| YEARS/ |___|___|MONTHS

DON'T KNOW 98

REFUSED.....99

54. How long have you lived at your current address?

INTERVIEWER: IF LESS THAN ONE YEAR, ENTER "00" FOR YEARS AND RECORD NUMBER OF MONTHS.

|___|___| YEARS/ |___|___|MONTHS

DON'T KNOW 98

REFUSED.....99

55. In what year were you born?

BIRTH YEAR .....19 |___|___|

DON'T KNOW 98

REFUSED.....99

56. Are you Hispanic, Latino, or of Spanish origin?

YES.....1

NO 0

DON'T KNOW 8

REFUSED..... 9

57. What is your racial background? Are you . . .

White,..... 1

Black or African American,..... 2

American Indian or Alaskan Native, ... 3

Asian, or..... 4

Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander? 5

OTHER (SPECIFY) 6

_____

DON'T KNOW 8

REFUSED..... 9

58. Are you . . .

Working full-time, ... 1

Working part-time, ... 2

Unemployed,..... 3

Retired, or 4

Something else? (SPECIFY) 5

_____

DON'T KNOW 8

REFUSED..... 9

59. Do you own or rent your home?

OWN..... 1

RENT..... 2

DON'T KNOW 8

REFUSED..... 9

60. Was your 1997 household income from all sources and before taxes . . .

Less than $10,000, ... 1

Between $10,000 and $25,000,..... 2

Between $25,000 and $40,000,..... 3

Between $40,000 and $60,000, or 4

More than $60,000? 5

DON'T KNOW 8

REFUSED..... 9

61. Do you have any children under 18 living with you?

YES..... 1

NO 0

DON'T KNOW 8

REFUSED..... 9

62. Including yourself, how many people does your household income support?

NUMBER OF PEOPLE ..... |___|___|

DON'T KNOW 98

REFUSED..... 99

63. **INTERVIEWER: ASK ONLY IF UNSURE:** Are you . . .

Male, or..... 1

Female?..... 2

END Thank you very much for your time and cooperation. Your participation was greatly appreciated.

Appendix M

JERSEY CITY DISPLACEMENT PROJECT
OFFENDER INTERVIEW – ASSAULT/DRUG SITE

NAME OF ARRESTEE: _____

CHARGE: _____

ARREST LOCATION: _____

HOME ADDRESS: _____

Hello, my name is _____. I'm a researcher working for a research center at Rutgers University. I would like to talk to you for ten minutes about the area around Monticello Avenue. This interview is completely voluntary. Nothing you tell me can be used against you in any way. I'm not a cop or a lawyer. I'm just a researcher trying to learn about drug markets in Jersey City. We're learning about how people sell drugs and the areas where drugs are sold. [IF THE ARRESTEE ASKS YOU WHAT THE RESEARCH IS FOR] This information is being gathered for a book, but your name will not be mentioned in it anywhere. I just want to learn from your experiences.

I understand that you were arrested for _____. I would like to ask you a few general questions about drug selling in the area where you were arrested. I don't want to know any names. I'm only interested in the neighborhood where you were arrested and how people make money in this area.

RESIDENCE:

1.a Are you from Jersey City? [IF SO, HOW LONG HAVE YOU LIVED THERE?]

1.b Where else have you lived besides Jersey City?

FAMILY:

2.a Do you have a girlfriend? Do you have a family?

2.b Do you support them financially?

2.c How did you make money before you were arrested? [PROBE FOR LEGAL AND ILLEGAL SOURCES OF INCOME]

THE ARREST:

3.a Were you arrested in an area where you normally hang out?

3.b How many times have you been arrested? How many times have you been arrested in the last three months?

3.c Tell me what happened when you were arrested.

DRUG ACTIVITY:

4.a How often do you buy/sell drugs on Monticello Avenue? [PROBE: Do you use drugs?]

4.b Where exactly do you buy/sell drugs? [PROBE FOR SPECIFIC STREET NAMES AND INTERSECTIONS]

4.c How many days a week do you buy/sell drugs in this area? [PROBE: How many hours do you spend on Monticello Avenue on a normal day?

4.d Do you work alone or do you work with other people? [PROBE: How many people do you work with?]

4.e Do you work for anyone? [PROBE: How many people do you work for?]

4.f Are most of these people your friends, are they related to you, or are they just business partners?

.

4.g Does each person on your team have a specific job, or does everyone do the same thing?

.

4.h What do you do?

MARKET CONDITIONS:

5.a What types of drugs are sold in this area?

5.b When is the best time to do business in this area? [PROBE FOR THE BEST TIME OF DAY]

5.c Can anyone buy in this area, or are the customers mostly regulars?

5.d Are any of your customers prostitutes? [PROBE: How many?]

MARKET COMPETITION:

6.a About how many teams work on Monticello Avenue?

.

6.b Is there any competition in this area as far as the drug market goes?

6.c What are the major groups that work in this area? Where do they work?

6.d In general, how do these groups get along with each other?

6.e Are there any beefs between these groups? [PROBE: How often do fights break out on Monticello Avenue?]

6.f Which group fights the most?

STREET FIGHTS:

7.a Who is involved in most of the fights in this area: people selling drugs, people buying drugs, or people who are not involved in the drug trade?

7.b Why do fights typically break out on Monticello Avenue?

MOVEMENT PATTERNS:

8.a Do you usually stay in one intersection, or do you go to other parts of Jersey City to buy/sell drugs? [PROBE: Where else do you go? How often?]

8.b How many times a day will you leave this area?

8.c How far do you travel from this area on a normal day?

.

8.d In the last three months, have you changed the area where you do most of your business? [PROBE: Where did you used to do most of your business? Why did you move?]

8.e In the last three months, have you changed the time when you do most of your business? [PROBE: When did you used to do most of your business? Why did you change?]

8.f In the last three months, have you changed your methods in any way? [PROBE: In what ways have you changed how you do business? Why did you change?]

OTHER ACTIVITIES:

9.a Besides selling drugs, are there other ways that you make money?

.

9.b What do you do when you are not working? [PROBE FOR BOTH LEGAL AND ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES]

ASSAULTS:

10.a Describe your relationship to the other person. [PROBE: Was he or she a friend, a relative, or someone you didn't know?]

10.b What was the fight over? [PROBE: Were drugs involved?]

10.c Did the other person do something to provoke you? [PROBE: Did they threaten you, push you, or say something that pissed you off?

10.d Were you or the other person high at the time of the assault?

USE OF WEAPONS:

11.a Did you use a weapon? [PROBE: What kind of weapon did you use? Did the other person have a weapon?]

11.b Where did you get your weapon?

THE POLICE:

12.a In the last three months, have the cops been doing anything different on Monticello Avenue? How has this affected your business?

12.b How often do you see cops on Monticello Avenue? During the last three months, have you seen more, fewer, or the same number of cops on Monticello Avenue?

12.c Do you usually see them on foot, on bikes, or in cars?

Thank you for your time and cooperation.

Appendix N

JERSEY CITY DISPLACEMENT PROJECT
OFFENDER INTERVIEW – PROSTITUTION SITE

NAME OF ARRESTEE: _____

CHARGE: _____

ARREST LOCATION: _____

HOME ADDRESS: _____

Hello, my name is _____. I'm a researcher working for a research center at Rutgers University. I would like to talk to you for ten minutes about the area around Cornelison Avenue. This interview is completely voluntary. Nothing you tell me can be used against you in any way. I'm not a cop or a lawyer. I'm just a researcher trying to learn about prostitution in Jersey City. We're learning about how prostitutes do business and the neighborhoods where they work. [IF THE ARRESTEE ASKS YOU WHAT THE RESEARCH IS FOR] This information is being gathered for a book, but your name will not be mentioned in it anywhere. I just want to learn from your experiences.

I understand that you were arrested for _____. I would like to ask you a few general questions about prostitution markets and how customers know where to pick someone up. I don't want to know any names. I'm only interested in the neighborhood where you were arrested and how people make money in this area.

RESIDENCE:

1.a Are you from Jersey City? [IF SO, HOW LONG HAVE YOU LIVED THERE?]

1.b How did you learn that Cornelison Avenue was a good place to pick up customers?

FAMILY:

2.a Do you have a boyfriend? Do you have a family?

2.b Do you support them financially?

THE ARREST:

3.a Were you arrested in an area where you normally hang out?

3.b How many times have you been arrested in the last three months?

3.c Tell me what happened when you were arrested.

PROSTITUTION:

4.a How often do you work on or around Cornelison Avenue?

4.b Where exactly do you usually work? [PROBE FOR SPECIFIC STREET NAMES AND INTERSECTIONS]

4.c How many days a week do you work in this area? How many hours do you work on a normal day?

4.d Do you work alone or do you work with other people?

4.e Do you work for anyone? [PROBE: How many other people work for this person?]

4.f Is this person a friend, is he related to you in some way, or is he just a business partner?

4.g Do many of the women who work around Cornelison Avenue use drugs? [PROBE: Do you use drugs?]

4.h How often do you use? [PROBE: What kind of drugs do you use?]

MARKET CONDITIONS:

5.a Are most of your customers from Jersey City? How many live near Cornelison Avenue?

5.b When is the best time of day to make money in this area?

5.c How many customers do you have on a normal day? [PROBE: How many or your customers are regulars?]

5.d Do any of your customers sell drugs? [PROBE: How many of your customers sell drugs?]

MARKET COMPETITION:

6.a About how many different prostitutes work near Cornelison Avenue?

6.b Is there any competition for customers?

6.c In general, how do most of the women get along with each other?

MOVEMENT PATTERNS:

7.a Do you only work around Cornelison Avenue or do you work in other parts of Jersey City?

7.b How often do you leave this area?

7.c How far do you travel from this area on a normal day?

7.d In the last three months, have you changed the area where you do most of your business? [PROBE: Where did you used to do most of your business? Why did you move?]

7.e In the last three months, have you changed the time when you do most of your business? [PROBE: When did you used to do most of your business? Why did you change?]

7.f In the last three months, have you changed how you do business? What are you doing differently? [PROBE: Why did you change?]

OTHER ACTIVITIES:

8.a Are there other ways you make money from time to time? [PROBE FOR BOTH LEGAL AND ILLEGAL SOURCES OF INCOME]

8.b What do you do when you are not working? [PROBE LEGAL AND ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES]

THE POLICE:

9.a Are the cops doing anything different around Cornelison Avenue? How has this affected your business?

9.b How often do you see cops on Cornelison Avenue? [PROBE: Do you know any of them? How many of them do you know?]

9.c Do you usually see them on foot, on bikes, or in cars?

Thank you for your time and cooperation.

Appendix O

JERSEY CITY DISPLACEMENT PROJECT
RESEARCH STAFF

Resident and Place Manager Interviews	Social and Physical Observations	Ethnography and Offender Interviews
Allyson Carvajal	Carsten Andresen	Elizabeth Ashimine
Yesenia Fermin	Beverly Carew	Regina Brisgone
Samuel Hakim	Chenard Cherilus	Danielle Gunther
Anabel Mayo	Kyung Seok Choo	Tania Hedlund
Judah Moskowitz	Gerard Dobbyn	Vilma Hernandez
Atanda Reynolds	John Guevara	Jesenia Pizarro
Thomas Sharpe	Ann Marie McNally	Michael Wagers
Aislynn Stern	Gloria Montoya	
Ernesto Urbina	James Perlez	
Angel Vergara	Jeron Rayam	
Erika Vergara	Vanja Stenius	
Natasha Wilson	Christine Tartaro	
Laura Wyckoff		