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Informal social control of crime in high drug use neighborhoods: Final project report

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Introduction

Community characteristics have long been argued to be important in determining variation in crime rates. Shaw and McKay (1942) noted the stability of the geographical dispersion of crime and other social problems. They observed that most of the high crime neighborhoods in Chicago in 1900 remained high crime neighborhoods thirty years later, even though many of these neighborhoods had undergone dramatic changes in ethnic composition. Shaw and McKay (1942) argued that structural characteristics of communities such as poverty, racial/ethnic heterogeneity, and residential mobility affected the extent to which communities were socially disorganized. Their concept of social disorganization has been developed over the years to refer to the inability of community residents to regulate themselves and to realize the common value of living free of predatory crime (Bursik 1988; Kornhauser 1978).

Recent community-level studies of crime emanating from Shaw and McKay's social disorganization theory have increased our understanding of the community level structural conditions that affect crime rates, and have begun to address the processes through which those structural conditions most likely operate. Poverty, racial heterogeneity, residential instability and family structure have all been found to be related to community level crime rates (see e.g., Bellair 1997; Bursik and Grasmick 1993a; Chilton 1964; Crutchfield, Geerken and Gove 1982; Quinney 1964; Sampson 1986; Smith and Jarjoura 1988, 1989; Warner and Pierce 1993; Willie and Gershenovitz 1964). Contemporary community-level crime models have argued that these factors are important because they affect social ties within the community, which are the foundation

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for community informal social control (Sampson 1986; Sampson and Groves 1989; Bursik and Grasmick 1993b).

While the recent theoretical developments of the structural aspects of a social disorganization model have provided important insights for understanding variations in crime rates in terms of informal social control, the role of *cultural* disorganization within communities has been left undeveloped. Cultural disorganization refers generally to a weakened culture that inhibits informal social control. Interpretations of a weakened or attenuated culture can take two approaches: weakened conventional values or value heterogeneity.

Weakened conventional values

Kornhauser's (1978) seminal interpretation of Shaw and McKay's work has been the basis of much of contemporary social disorganization theory. While Kornhaasuer (1978) argued persuasively for dismissing the role of *cultural deviance* in contemporary social disorganization models she was nonetheless clear regarding the cultural aspect of social control within social disorganization theory. She argues throughout her book for the importance of viewing culture as a *variable*, and that "the objective of social disorganization theory is to uncover the social sources of that variation" (Kornhauser 1978:30).

The central aspect of culture with which social disorganization theory concerns itself is values--- those embodied by community institutions such as the church, school, family and other community organizations. The belief in the moral validity of these values does not vary, rather, it is the strength with which those values are held that varies, and that variation in strength of commitment flows from structural sources (Kornhauser

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1978:30). Indeed, it is weakened or attenuated values that, in part, define social

disorganization. For example, while Kornhauser (1978:120) first defines social

disorganization as " the inability to realize common values," she continues by stating

that "a more analytical definition of social disorganization...[is] the attenuation of

cultural values: their lack of relevance to the self or to a specified collectivity. The

attenuation of cultural values is indicated by their distortion, their selective disuse, or

their withering away."

In current social disorganization models "the inability to realize common values"

has come to be defined in terms of the inability to prevent crime, or the inability to realize

the value of living free of predatory crime. A much richer interpretation of Kornhauser's

ideas of attenuated values, however, would suggest that it is the inability of community

residents to realize many of society's common values that creates a weakened social

fabric. When community social structure limits the extent to which residents can live out

values, attachment to those values is weakened throughout the community, making

culture ineffective. The inability of neighborhood residents to live out cultural values

means values are not being reinforced in the community through their visible presence.

Such a weak culture attenuates the social control power of the community. As

Kornhauser (1978:78) states "an attenuated communal value system cannot serve as a

basis for effective community control. The community cannot organize itself to combat

delinquency unless united by common values. A fragile, badly divided community

opinion cannot evoke shame in the child. The community ceases to be an agency of social

control." Thus, a fuller development of social disorganization theory would include

variation in cultural strength.

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The strength of the culture within neighborhoods is affected by structural arrangements that affect the ability of residents to live out and thereby reinforce within their communities many of society's common values. The main structural factors that effect cultural disorganization are the same as those that affect structural disorganization: poverty, racial heterogeneity and residential mobility. These community structural conditions create barriers to living out the conventional values espoused by community institutions, which weakens allegiance to them, and in turn diminishes the likelihood of informal control or punishment of behaviors not in line with those values.

Value heterogeneity

Kornhauser's (1978) work stresses the untenable nature of criminal subcultures. She argues, "The belief that cultures or subcultures vary substantially in the content of their definitions of theft and violence is unsupported by any evidence. There is no culture known to man in which those actions enjoined in the core of the criminal law are or can be collectively endowed with value, for they have no value for human beings whose existence depends upon their safe association with one another (Kornhauser, 1978, p.244.) Nonetheless, work on the urban underclass, such as Wilson's (1987, 1996) and Anderson's (1991, 1994, 1999), has led several sociologists and criminologists to argue that neighborhoods characterized by concentrations of poverty and social isolation may develop values or norms counter to those of the larger society (see e.g., Sampson and Wilson; 1995; Krivo and Peterson 1997; Massey and Denton 1993; Warner and Pierce 1993; Warner and Wilcox Rountree 1997). This has led some scholars to suggest that subcultural values, particularly ones related to an "underclass" culture or a subculture of violence, may be an important aspect to add to contemporary community level crime

models (Anderson 1990, 1991, 1994; Fischer 1995; Markowitz et al. 2001; Pattillo 1998; Sampson and Wilson 1995).

Some of this literature suggests that sub-cultural values are important because they encourage criminal behavior. In contrast, the focus here is on their effect on informal social control. The presence of non-conventional or "street" values, existing along side of conventional values, may create uncertainty with regard to appropriate behavior within the neighborhood, and therefore inhibit informal social control.

Sampson and Jeglum Bartusch (1998) suggest that in culturally disorganized communities "conventionality clashes with a 'street culture' where crime, disorder, and drug use are expected and serve as a symbolic embodiment of the precariousness of everyday life.... Although conventional norms are pervasive in any community, it may be that tolerance of deviance, a cultural emphasis on 'toughness' and 'bravado' in the face of danger, and an overt readiness to use violence, varies across structural and situation contexts. In this regard, community contexts may shape 'cognitive landscapes'(Sampson 1997) of appropriate standards and expectations of conduct" (p.781). Sampson and Jeglum Bartusch examine the extent to which neighborhood level factors are related to the acceptance of non-conventional norms by examining neighborhood differences in the tolerance for deviance. They measure tolerance for deviance in terms of how wrong it is for teenagers to smoke cigarettes, use marijuana, drink alcohol and get into fist fights. Their findings show that tolerance for deviance does vary across neighborhoods, with tolerance being greater in poor and residentially unstable neighborhoods, and lower in neighborhoods with high levels of immigrants. Unfortunately, they do not examine the extent to which the acceptance of non-conventional values affects informal social control.

Other studies have examined the role of social ties in neighborhoods with non-conventional values. Pattillo's (1998) ethnographic study of a middle class black neighborhood suggests that different values systems do co-exist within neighborhoods and this diminishes social control, particularly where there are ties between the different groups. She suggests that ties between groups with different value systems do not necessarily lead to increased social control, but rather work both ways. Ties not only connect deviant groups to the demands for conformity to conventional norms but also diminish the requirement of conventional groups for complete compliance with those norms. Pattillo (1998) points out that residents of middle class black neighborhoods must compromise some of their negative attitudes toward drug dealing and drug related violence "for the achievement of a 'quiet neighborhood'" (p.755).

Integrating Structural and Cultural Disorganization

In this study we integrate aspects of both structural and cultural disorganization in explaining variations in informal social control. The systemic model of social disorganization has focused on structural predictors of informal social control. Viewing community "as a complex system of friendship and kinship networks and formal and informal associational ties rooted in family life and ongoing socialization processes" (Kasarda and Janowitz 1974:329), it has primarily examined the role of social ties within communities as the mechanism that mediates between neighborhood disadvantage and mobility, and informal social control (see for example, Bellair 1997;Sampson and Groves 1989;Warner and Wilcox Rountree 1997).

Combining this model with the ideas of cultural disorganization laid out above could result in several models. One model which combines aspects of both cultural and

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structural disorganization would argue that poverty, heterogeneity and residential mobility make it difficult for communities to provide informal social control because of attenuated culture, brought about in part by weak social ties within the community. Social ties provide one potential avenue through which widely held conventional values can be articulated, shared and displayed. When social ties are weak, one avenue for realizing shared values and strengthening culture is narrowed, which in turn erodes the basis of community control.

While friendship and kinship ties may be the most salient way in which conventional values are shared, behaviors may be more important in leading to the perception of non-conventional values. Hannerz (1969) argues that certain ghetto-specific behaviors arise, due to structural constraints, within ghetto communities and are viewed by other members of the community. These observations of non-conventional behavior (such as drinking in public and illegitimate sources of income) communicate to others that, at least for some members of the community, this is acceptable behavior. The observing of non-conventional behaviors, then, is another way, potentially in contrast to articulated value statements, that residents learn what is acceptable or unacceptable in their community. The frequent presence of non-conventional behaviors, therefore, may affect people's understanding about what behaviors are acceptable within the community and, consequently, their likelihood of intervening.

The role of social ties in such a model is unclear. Findings from a study by Warner and Wilcox Rountree (1998) suggest that "ghetto related" behaviors increase ambiguity regarding community values and thereby decrease the likelihood of informal social control, regardless of the level of social ties within the community. Pattillo's

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(1998) work, on the other hand, suggests that the effect of social ties on informal social control may be conditioned by community value systems. In neighborhoods with high levels of perceived "oppositional" or "street" values, social ties may actually decrease informal social control.

In summary, current structural interpretations of social disorganization theory have created a model that assumes that communities have shared values regarding illegal and problematic behavior, and focuses on measures of social ties as the foundation for enforcing informal social control. However, recent research has raised the question as to whether social networks may play both positive and negative roles within communities, and whether culture may play a more proximate role in explaining variations in informal social control than social ties. Taken as a whole, these studies have suggested that weakened conventional values, due to weakened social ties, or perceived value heterogeneity as evidenced through observed non-conventional behavior in the community, may make ambiguous the norms of the community and either <u>directly</u> discourage intervening, or moderate the effects of social ties on informal social control.

These issues of culture are likely to be particularly relevant in neighborhoods with high rates of drug activity. Drug activity may further undermine middle class values and strengthen the "criminal underclass subculture" (Johnson et al.1990:26). Further drug activity may create fear and suspicion within neighborhoods, and decrease residents willingness to become involved in neighborhood issues.

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Methods

The primary interest in this neighborhood level study is to explore the effect of culture on informal social control, and the extent to which these effects may be conditioned by the level of drug use in the neighborhood. Because many of the issues of values and norms seem particularly relevant to neighborhoods in which drugs are heavily used and in which a drug culture may develop, we intentionally include neighborhoods known to be home to high levels of drug activity.

Sampling

The sample for this study consists of 66 block groups in two urban communities in a Southern state. The sampling plan was developed to assure a sufficient number of high drug use neighborhoods and to assure an adequate distribution of predominantly white, predominantly racially mixed and predominantly minority neighborhoods. To achieve these goals, non-proportional stratified sampling of block groups was used.

Once block groups were sampled, all street segments within those block groups were identified. Using the "street section" of city wide directories, all addresses on these street segments were then identified, and a sample of approximately 60 households from each block group was selected using systematic random sampling.

Study Design

Each sampled household was mailed an introductory letter explaining the study. Households with phone numbers were then contacted and interviewed over the phone, while households without phones were interviewed face to face by members of the research team. Approximately 25% of the completed surveys were conducted in person.

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The average number of respondents in the remaining 66 neighborhoods was 35, and the overall cooperation rate was 60%.

Measures

Data from the survey were supplemented with 1990 census data on block group characteristics (as well as U.S. Census 2000 population counts), police crime incident reports, and police data on drug arrests.

Independent variables.   The exogenous variables used to indicate the structural characteristics of these neighborhoods were poverty, racial heterogeneity and residential mobility. Measures for these variables were taken from the 1990 U. S. Census STF-3A data tapes.

Mediating and moderating variables in this study include measures of neighborhood social ties, weakened conventional values, "street" values, "street" behaviors, and the frequency of drug-related behaviors within neighborhoods. These variables were created by aggregating individual level survey responses to the neighborhood level.

Because cultural values are argued to be a property of the neighborhood, *sui generis*, we use respondents as knowledgeable informants about neighborhood values as the basis for our measures of culture, rather than simply aggregating *respondents'* values. Respondents were asked how strongly they felt their **neighbors** would agree or disagree with twelve values statements such as, it is important to get a good education; family members should make sacrifices in their personal life for the good of the family; selling drugs is always wrong; it is okay to smoke marijuana; and if someone offends you and doesn't apologize, you lose respect. Indices based on aggregated responses to these items

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were used to create measures of conventional values and "street" values. Similar scales were created for the respondents' own values.

"Street" behaviors are measured here in terms of how often respondents saw or heard the following in the last six months in their neighborhood: people drunk in public places like streets, parks or playgrounds; people drinking in public; people buying or selling drugs; people using drugs; foul language; and loud arguments.

We also specifically measure drug activity. While drug activity is part of the above measure of "street" behaviors it is also measured and analyzed separately. Neighborhood drug activity is measured two ways. The number of drug arrests in each neighborhood, and a measure based on a survey question asking how many times in the last six months respondents had witnessed or heard about drugs being bought or sold in their neighborhood.

The measure for *social ties* used here is based on the number of friends and relatives that live in the neighborhood. Finally, because the two cultural constructs and the drug measure are viewed as potentially moderating the relationship between social ties and informal social control, interaction terms for each of these variables with social ties were created, using mean-centered terms (Aiken and West 1991; Jaccard et al. 1990).

Dependent variables. The major dependent variable in these analyses is collective efficacy, which is based on questions regarding the likelihood of intervening in inappropriate neighborhood behaviors and neighborhood cohesion. The ten items used in the collective efficacy index were summed for each respondent and averaged over the

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valid number of items (alpha=.87). Individual scores were then aggregated to the neighborhood level, to provide a neighborhood collective efficacy score.

RESULTS

The current study addresses the role of culture in neighborhood levels of informal social control by examining cultural disorganization in terms of both weakened conventional culture and value heterogeneity. Findings from this study suggest support for each of these approaches. Examination of cultural disorganization in terms of weakened conventional culture found that poverty increases, and stability decreases, residents' perceived level of conventional values within their neighborhood. Further, the perceived level of conventional values is significantly increased in neighborhoods with more extensive social ties. This supports the assumption within the systemic model of social disorganization theory that social ties are one mechanism through which shared values may be articulated and supported within the community. Perceived conventional values, in turn, are found to be a significant predictor of the level of collective efficacy in the community, mediating some of the effects of poverty and social ties on collective efficacy. These findings suggest that neighborhoods that are high in poverty, and low in social ties are less likely to perceive a high level of agreement with conventional values within their neighborhoods, an indicator of weak culture. Weak cultures do not provide a basis for empowering residents to intervene and informally control inappropriate behaviors.

Some recent research has suggested that the effects of social ties on collective efficacy may be moderated by neighborhood values (see for example Patillo 1998 ; Warner and Wilcox Rountree 1997). That is, to the extent that there is a high level of

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perceived agreement with conventional values, social ties among neighbors should have even a stronger effect on collective efficacy. Tests of the hypothesis that the level of perceived conventional values may moderate the effect of social ties on collective efficacy, however, were not supported.

Within the context of this weakened culture model, we also examined the role of drugs. While drug activity does not appear to affect the perceived level of conventional values, drug activity was found to have a significant direct effect on collective efficacy. In neighborhoods with high levels of drug activity collective efficacy is decreased, controlling for the level of perceived conventional values. It may be that in neighborhoods with high visible drug activity residents are too fearful of retaliation to become involved in informal social control of any neighborhood behaviors, even when they perceive neighbors to share the same values.

The role of culture in informal social control can also be examined in terms not just of weakened agreement with conventional values, but also in terms of value heterogeneity. That is, Anderson (1990;1999) has argued that in disadvantaged inner-city neighborhoods both "decent" and "street" cultures may co-exist. The coexistence of different values systems may lead to ambiguity in terms of the appropriateness in intervening in non-normative behaviors. Because conventional values were found to be held by the majority of respondents in all neighborhoods, we examined value heterogeneity in terms of the extent to which oppositional values were perceived to be also present in neighborhoods. Findings from these analyses showed that poverty significantly increases perceived "street" values and stability significantly decreases the perception of "street" values, although the effects of stability become non-significant

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when controlling for the level of respondents' own "street" values. The perception of "street" values is also significantly affected by the presences of "street" behaviors, such as public drunkenness, the use of foul language, loud arguments, and the use of drugs. Unlike the perception of conventional values, however, the perception of "street" values is not affected by social ties. This suggests that the mechanisms through which neighborhood values are determined is different for conventional and "street" values. Specifically, social ties are important in creating the perception of conventional values within the neighborhood, but the presence of "street behaviors" conveys the presence of "street" values within the neighborhood, regardless of the levels of social ties. In turn, both the presence of "street" behaviors and perceived "street" values significantly decrease collective efficacy.

While social ties do not affect the level of perceived "street" values, the question remains as to whether social ties may moderate the effect of "street" values on collective efficacy. The statistical significance of the interaction effect of "street" values and social ties on collective efficacy was marginal. Nonetheless, the positive coefficient for this interaction *suggests* that social ties may be most important in neighborhoods with perceived "street" values. In neighborhoods where social ties are more limited, perceptions of "street" values has even a stronger negative impact on collective efficacy.

We also examined the effect of drug activity on the perception of "street" values, although this was more difficult to do as our measure of "street" behaviors, a significant predictor of "street" values, includes an item on drug use. The findings from these analyses suggest that visible drug activity is one component of "street" behaviors that leads to a perception of "street" values; however, drug activity does not as fully mediate

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the effects of poverty on perceived "street" values as the more general "street" behaviors measure does. Further, as in the attenuated values model, visible drug activity significantly decreases collective efficacy.

Conclusion

The findings from this study clearly affirm the importance of the role of perceived values in creating collective efficacy within neighborhoods. While the majority of respondents, including those in the most disadvantaged neighborhoods in this study, articulated conventional values, neighborhood poverty rates significantly affected the *perception* of values held by neighbors. Poverty significantly decreased the perception of conventional values and significantly increased the perception of "street" values. These perceived values, in turn, are found to be important predictors of the level of collective efficacy within the community. The findings also suggest that perceived conventional values within communities can be strengthened by strengthening neighborhood social ties. While conclusions for the role of social ties are less clear in terms of a value heterogeneity model, the marginally significant interaction term of social ties and perceived "street" values suggests that strengthening social ties may also be important in terms of dampening the negative effects of perceived "street" values on informal social control.

Our findings on the effects of "street" behavior on crime and collective efficacy parallel findings on disorder (Skogan 1990; Sampson and Raudenbush 1999; Taylor 1997; Wilson and Kelling 1982). The literature on disorder has shown how disorder can lead to more serious predatory crime and has suggested the importance of controlling incivilities within neighborhoods. While the findings here are similar to the findings on

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disorder, the theoretical frameworks are different. The disorder literature argues that disorder leads to fear due to an interpretation of disorder as "no one is in charge here." The theoretical framework that we present suggests a deeper rooted problem. That is, we suggest that "street" behaviors (or disorder) lead to a perception of "street" values within the neighborhood. We suggest further attention should be given to blending the disorder, oppositional culture and structural social disorganization literatures.

CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

The overall purpose of this study is to examine the role of culture in a community-level model of informal social control, specifically including neighborhoods known to be associated with high levels of drug activity. Understanding the community context in which behaviors occur is viewed as critical in predicting a wide variety of social problems for an increasing number of disciplines. While sociology and public health disciplines have a long tradition for understanding the ecological context of social problems, other disciplines including developmental psychology are also moving toward a more ecological approach (see e.g., McLoyd 1998).Within criminology, this trend of context-sensitivity has produced a literature that has become increasingly concerned with understanding the processes or mechanisms through which community characteristics affect crime rates.

The most common community level approach to understanding crime has been within the social disorganization tradition. However, empirical examinations of the social disorganization model have almost invariably examined aspects of structural disorganization, ignoring what Kornhauser (1978) has referred to as cultural disorganization. Studies of structural disorganization have focused on the mediating role of friendship networks and organizational ties between neighborhood disadvantage and stability, and informal social control (see for example, Bellair 1997; Sampson and Groves 1989; and Warner and Wilcox Rountree 1997). In contrast, the idea of cultural disorganization focuses on the extent to which culture has become weakened and can no longer provide the basis for social control. This study theoretically and empirically develops the idea of cultural disorganization within the social disorganization model.

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Current Structural Disorganization Models

Community characteristics have long been argued to provide important determinants to variation in crime rates. Shaw and McKay (1942) noted the stability of the geographical dispersion of crime and other social problems. They observed that most of the high crime neighborhoods in Chicago in 1900 remained high crime neighborhoods thirty years later, even though many of these neighborhoods had undergone dramatic changes in ethnic composition. Such facts, they concluded, cannot be adequately explained by "kinds of people" theories and must be explained by the characteristics of the communities themselves. Shaw and McKay (1942) argued that structural characteristics of communities such as poverty, racial/ethnic heterogeneity, and residential mobility affected the extent to which communities were socially disorganized. Their concept of social disorganization has been developed over the years to refer to the inability of community residents to regulate themselves and to realize the common value of living free of predatory crime (Bursik 1988; Kornhauser 1978).

Recent community-level studies of crime emanating from Shaw and McKay's social disorganization theory have increased our understanding of the community level structural conditions that affect crime rates, and have begun to address the processes through which those structural conditions most likely operate. Poverty, racial heterogeneity, residential instability and family structure have all been found to be — related to community level crime rates (see e.g., Bellair 1997; Bursik and Grasmick 1993a; Chilton 1964; Crutchfield, Geerken and Gove 1982; Quinney 1964; Sampson 1986; Smith and Jarjoura 1988, 1989; Warner and Pierce 1993; Willie and Gershenovitz 1964). The reigning community-level crime model, the systemic model, has argued that

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these factors are important because they affect social ties within the community, which are the foundation for community informal social control (Sampson 1986; Sampson and Groves 1989; Bursik and Grasmick 1993b).

The systemic model approaches community "as a complex system of friendship and kinship networks and formal and informal associational ties rooted in family life and ongoing socialization processes" (Kasarda and Janowitz 1974:329). It is through local social ties that modern social disorganization theorists have sought to explain the effects of community structural variables on informal social control and crime rates. Specifically, communities with high rates of poverty, residential mobility, and racial or ethnic heterogeneity are argued to be less able to support lasting, wide-ranging friendship networks. Neighborhoods with high mobility rates are neighborhoods in which fewer residents are likely to know each other, thereby decreasing the potential for informal social control (Freudenburg 1986; Greenberg, Rohe and Williams 1982). Heterogeneity also diminishes community ties, as racial and ethnic differences among residents may impose barriers to friendships and broad-based organizational ties, thereby limiting the breadth of neighborhood networks and the consequential potential for informal social control (Bursik and Grasmick 1993b; Greenbaum and Greenbaum 1985; Merry 1981). Likewise Sampson (1986; 1987) argues that communites with high levels of family disruption suffer from a loss of organizational participation and a lack of community attachment leading to decreased informal social control.

Poverty constrains the choices people have regarding where and among whom an individual can live. Poverty may directly decrease social ties due to the demanding and "negative" nature of social ties in impoverished community (Rainwater 1970; Merry

1981; Stack 1974; Belle 1983; Wilson 1996). It also establishes a framework wherein mutual obligations can increase the difficulty of escaping poverty (Stack 1974). Because of these issues, poverty may lead to withdrawing from social networks; an adaptive strategy in some poor neighborhoods (Wilson 1996).

Social ties between community members are viewed as an essential mediating characteristic between the community structural characteristics and informal social control of crime. Social ties are the foundation for informal social control as they provide the mechanism through which articulation of shared values occurs and support for enforcing those values is generated within communities. Communities with wider friendship and associational ties are thus argued to have a greater potential for informal social control.

Informal social control refers to "the development, observance and enforcement of local norms for appropriate public behavior" (Greenberg and Rohe 1986:80). Behaviors included within informal social control include supervising public behaviors, intervening in inappropriate behaviors and administering rewards and informal sanctions (or threats of informal sanctions) for behaviors. Most recently Sampson and his colleagues (Sampson and Raudenbush 1999; Sampson, Raudenbush and Earls 1997) have discussed informal social control in terms of collective efficacy. Collective efficacy is defined as "social cohesion among neighbors combined with their willingness to intervene on behalf of the common good" (Sampson, Raudenbush and Earls 1997:917). Their measure of collective efficacy thus includes social cohesion measures as well as items measuring neighbors' willingness to intervene in inappropriate behavior. Informally controlling inappropriate community behaviors has been identified as an

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important element in affecting neighborhood level crime rates (Elliott et al. 1996; Sampson and Groves 1989; Sampson, Raudenbush and Earls 1997).

The extent to which social ties actually affect informal social control and subsequently crime, however, remains uncertain. Early studies often reported contradictory results and the analyses were hampered by extremely small sample sizes. (Compare, for example, the results of Macoby, Johnson and Church [1958] and Freudenberg [1986] who find support for the role of social ties with Greenberg, Rohe, and Williams [1982] and Simcha-Fagan and Schwartz [1986] who do not find support for the role of social ties.)

Within the past decade studies of the effects of social ties on crime with large sample sizes have begun to appear, but most of these studies do not distinguish between social ties and informal social control. For example, Sampson and Groves' (1989) study of 238 localities in England and Wales measured the extent of local social ties with the average number of friends who lived within a 15 minute walk of their home. In this study, social ties, along with organizational participation and a measure of teenagers "hanging out," were viewed as measure of informal social control. Results showed that ties significantly decrease some forms of victimizations (mugging/street robbery, burglary and total victimizations), but not others (stranger violence, auto theft or vandalism). Similarly, ties were found to affect some measures of self-reported crime (property crime) but not others (personal violence).

Similarly, Bellair (1997), using the 1977 Police Services Study data on 60 neighborhoods, examined the effect of frequency of neighbor social interactions on crime victimization data for robbery, burglary and motor vehicle theft, but did not measure

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informal social control. He reported that measures of cumulative social interaction that include both frequent and infrequent interaction among neighbors significantly decrease victimization rates.

While the studies of Sampson and Groves (1989) and Bellair (1997) show that social ties mediate the effects of some of the community structural variables on some crimes, they do not develop the linkages between social ties and informal social control. Indeed, the relationship between social ties and informal social control of crime remains elusive.

Recently, Warner and Wilcox Rountree (1997) raised questions about the meaningfulness of social ties as an indicator of informal social control. In a study of 100 Seattle neighborhoods, they found that social ties significantly decreased assault rates in predominantly white neighborhoods, but they did not significantly affect assault rates in either predominantly mixed or predominantly minority neighborhoods. They conclude that social ties may provide the foundation for informal social control only within certain contexts.

Other recent studies also raise questions regarding the role of social ties. Sampson, Raudenbush and Earls (1997), for example, found that their measure of collective efficacy which measures social cohesion and willingness to intervene, was a better predictor of violent crime rates than were measures of social ties. Their results suggest that "dense personal ties, organizations, and local services by themselves are not sufficient; reductions in violence appear to be more directly attributable to informal social control and cohesion among residents" (p.923).

Similarly, Elliott, Wilson, Huizinga, Sampson, Elliott, and Rankin (1996), in a study of 91 neighborhoods in two sites, reported that informal networks significantly decreased delinquent problem behaviors only in one (Denver) of two study sites. In another site (Chicago), which had a larger proportion of high poverty neighborhoods and predominantly African-American neighborhoods, measures of informal control, but not informal networks, significantly decreased problem behaviors.

Morenoff et al. (2001) also address the role of social ties in producing informal social control. They find that while social ties are positively associated with collective efficacy, social ties don't always lead to social control. Specifically, they find homicide hot spots "are divided almost evenly between neighborhoods that are low in ties and efficacy (40 out of 103) and those that are high in ties and low in efficacy (38 out of 103)"(p.548). They suggest that future research examine the conditions under which strong social ties create social control.

Developing a Cultural Disorganization Model

While the recent theoretical developments of the structural aspects of a social disorganization model have provided important insights for understanding variations in crime rates in terms of informal social control, the role of *cultural* disorganization within communities has remained undeveloped. Cultural disorganization is beginning to be discussed in the literature (see e.g., Brownfield 1996; Elliot et al. 1996; Sampson and Jeglum Bartusch 1998), but there is little agreement on its conceptualization and it has rarely been measured. Most discussions of cultural disorganization are based on Kornhauser's (1978) rearticulation of Shaw and McKay's work. Cultural disorganization refers generally to a weakened culture which inhibits informal social control.

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Interpretations of a weakened or attenuated culture can take two approaches: weakened conventional values or value heterogeneity. This section develops each of these theoretical interpretations.

Weakened conventional values

Kornhauser's (1978) seminal interpretation of Shaw and McKay's work has been the basis of much of contemporary social disorganization theory. While Kornhaasuer (1978) argued persuasively for dismissing the role of *cultural deviance* in contemporary social disorganization models she was nonetheless clear regarding the cultural aspect of social control within social disorganization theory (see especially pages 72-82, but throughout). She argues throughout her book for the importance of viewing culture as a *variable*, and that "the objective of social disorganization theory is to uncover the social sources of that variation" (Kornhauser 1978:30).

The central aspect of culture with which social disorganization theory concerns itself is values--- those embodied by community institutions such as the church, school, family and other community organizations. The belief in the moral validity of these values does not vary, rather, it is the strength with which those values are held that varies, and that variation in strength of commitment flows from structural sources (Kornhauser 1978:30). Indeed, it is weakened or attenuated values that, in part, define social disorganization. For example, while Kornhauser (1978:120) first defines social disorganization as " the inability to realize common values," she continues by stating that "a more analytical definition of social disorganization...[is] the attenuation of cultural values: their lack of relevance to the self or to a specified collectivity. The

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attenuation of cultural values is indicated by their distortion, their selective disuse, or their withering away."

In current social disorganization models "the inability to realize common values" has come to be defined in terms of the inability to prevent crime, or the inability to realize the value of living free of predatory crime. A much richer interpretation of Kornhauser's ideas of attenuated values, however, would suggest that it is the inability of community residents to realize many of society's common values that creates a weakened social fabric. When community social structure limits the extent to which residents can live out values, attachment to those values is weakened throughout the community, making culture ineffective.[1] The inability of neighborhood residents to live out cultural values means values are not being reinforced in the community through their visible presence. Such a weak culture attenuates the social control power of the community. As Kornhauser (1978:78) states "an attenuated communal value system cannot serve as a basis for effective community control. The community cannot organize itself to combat delinquency unless united by common values. A fragile, badly divided community opinion cannot evoke shame in the child. The community ceases to be an agency of social control." Thus, a fuller development of social disorganization theory would include variation in cultural strength.

The strength of the culture within neighborhoods is affected by structural arrangements that affect the ability of residents to live out and thereby reinforce within their communities many of society's common values. The main structural factors that effect cultural disorganization are the same as those that affect structural disorganization: poverty, racial heterogeneity and residential mobility. Racial/ ethnic heterogeneity

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weakens the culture or various subcultures and therefore loosens the controlling influence that they would normally provide. "The presence of groups bearing so many different subcultures gives rise to one of the cultural causes of disorganization: diversity in respect to non-delinquent values… The narrow base of slum culture does not accurately reflect the extent of value similarity among the residents; rather it reflects their difficulty in finding a vantage point from which they could recognize their common interest and values" (Kornhauser 1978:75). Because neither subcultures nor the dominant culture value criminal behavior, if they are strong they will provide social control. Heterogeneity makes it difficult to recognize common cultural values and consequently difficult to support them through informal sanctions of inappropriate behavior.

Community economic status affects the extent to which conventional values are relevant, and therefore the extent to which communities are committed to them. "A societal culture by whose values the members of a community stand condemned cannot serve as an effective guide to the conduct of their lives, nor can it serve as a foundation upon which to build a common community culture" (Kornhauser 1978:76). Residential mobility leads to a continual breakdown and need for renewal of understanding of shared values.

These three exogenous factors lead to a weakening of conventional values. "When diverse and obsolete subcultural values cannot provide a common ground, or societal values a relevant basis for establishing standards of morality, and when population movement continuously annuls shared understandings, societal values are held in abeyance because they are inapplicable, and community values fail to emerge, are tenuous, or are weakened by inattention to them… Societal values that cannot be realized

become attenuated because of their irrelevance. They are not rejected... but they are disused (Kornhauser 1978:77)." Finally, an attenuated culture cannot serve as a means of community social control. "[A]n attenuated communal value system cannot serve as a basis for effective community control. The community cannot organize itself to combat delinquency unless united by common values... The community ceases to be an agency of social control" (Kornhauser 1978:78). When community structural conditions do not allow conventional values espoused by community institutions to be lived out, allegiance to them weakens, which weakens any informal control or punishment of behaviors not in line with those values.

Several other scholars have also discussed the importance of weakened or attenuated conventional values. In *Crime and the American Dream,* Messner and Rosenfeld (1994) note the relevance of a weak prosocial culture. They argue that American economic institutions are so powerful that economic values outweigh values emerging from other institutions such as the family and schools. This imbalance among institutions and the values they promulgate creates "weak normative environments," or anomie. "A primary task for noneconmic institutions such as the family and schools is to inculcate beliefs, values, and commitments other than those of the marketplace. But as these non-economic institutions are relatively devalued and forced to accommodate to economic considerations, as they are penetrated by economic standards, they are less able to fulfill their distinctive socialization function successfully" (Messner and Rosenfeld 1994:86). It is this aspect of weakened non-economic culture, or cultural imbalance, they argue that uniquely affects the American crime problem.

While Messner and Rosenfeld address the problem of weakened (or imbalanced) "pro-social" culture at the national level, Wilson (1996) addresses the issue of cultural attenuation at the neighborhood level. He argues that structural changes in inner city neighborhoods such as the disappearance of manufacturing jobs, and out-migration of middle-class minorities, have led to poor minority neighborhoods being socially isolated from middle class resources, value reinforcements, and role models. While most resident in these neighborhoods accept the moral validity of middle class values (Wilson 1996:67), they may be less able to live out those values due to the constraints imposed by pervasive poverty. To the extent that fewer residents in impoverished neighborhoods act out conventional values, the less these values are reinforced through observance of others' behaviors, and the weaker they become. Thus in impoverished neighborhoods, residents are less able to fully embrace middle class values and therefore less likely to re-enforce them in daily interactions.

In summary this presentation of cultural disorganization suggests that conventional values are widely held across all neighborhoods but because residents of distressed neighborhoods are often not able to live out those values in their everyday life, those values become weakened and cannot function as the basis for informal social control.

Value heterogeneity

Kornhauser's (1978) work stresses the untenable nature of criminal subcultures. She argues, "The belief that cultures or subcultures vary substantially in the content of their definitions of theft and violence is unsupported by any evidence. There is no culture known to man in which those actions enjoined in the core of the criminal law are or can

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be collectively endowed with value, for they have no value for human beings whose existence depends upon their safe association with one another (Kornhauser, 1978, p.244.) Nonetheless, work on the urban underclass, such as Wilson's (1987, 1996) and Anderson's (1991, 1994, 1999), has led several sociologists and criminologists to argue that neighborhoods characterized by concentrations of poverty and social isolation may develop values or norms counter to those of the larger society (see e.g., Sampson and Wilson; 1995; Krivo and Peterson 1997; Massey and Denton 1993; Warner and Pierce 1993; Warner and Wilcox Rountree 1997). The work of some scholars has suggested that subcultural values, particularly ones related to an "underclass" culture or a subculture of violence, may be an important aspect to add to contemporary community level crime models (Anderson 1990, 1991, 1994; Fischer 1995; Markowitz et al. 2001; Pattillo 1998; Sampson and Wilson 1995).

Some of this literature suggests that subcultural values are important because they encourage criminal behavior. In contrast, the focus here is on their effect on informal social control. The presence of non-conventional or "street" values, existing along side of conventional values, may create uncertainty with regard to appropriate behavior within the neighborhood, and therefore inhibit informal social control. In this sense the value heterogeneity model developed here remains focused on its consequences for informal social control.

Sampson and Jeglum Bartusch (1998) suggest that in culturally disorganized communities "conventionality clashes with a 'street culture' where crime, disorder, and drug use are expected and serve as a symbolic embodiment of the precariousness of everyday life.... Although conventional norms are pervasive in any community, it may be

that tolerance of deviance, a cultural emphasis on 'toughness' and 'bravado' in the face of danger, and an overt readiness to use violence, varies across structural and situation contexts. In this regard, community contexts may shape 'cognitive landscapes'(Sampson 1997) of appropriate standards and expectations of conduct" (p.781). Sampson and Jeglum Bartusch examine the extent to which neighborhood level factors are related to the acceptance of non-conventional norms by examining neighborhood differences in the tolerance for deviance. They measure tolerance for deviance in terms of how wrong it is for teenagers to smoke cigarettes, use marijuana, drink alcohol and get into fist fights. Their findings show that tolerance for deviance does vary across neighborhoods, with tolerance being greater in poor and residentially unstable neighborhoods, and lower in neighborhoods with high levels of immigrants. Unfortunately, they do not examine the extent to which the acceptance of non-conventional values affects informal social control.

Other studies have examined the role of social ties in neighborhoods with non-conventional values. Pattillo's (1998) ethnographic study of a middle class black neighborhood suggests that different value systems do co-exist within neighborhoods and this diminishes social control, particularly where there are ties between the different groups. She suggests that ties between groups with different value systems do not necessarily lead to increased social control, but rather work both ways. Ties not only connect deviant groups to the demands for conformity to conventional norms but also diminish the requirement of conventional groups for complete compliance with those norms. Pattillo (1998) points out that residents of middle class black neighborhoods must compromise some of their negative attitudes toward drug dealing and drug related violence "for the achievement of a 'quiet neighborhood'" (p.755).

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Similarly, Warner and Wilcox Rountree (1997) speculate that their lack of findings of a significant effect of social ties on crime in predominantly mixed or predominantly minority neighborhoods may be due to a lack of a singular value system within these neighborhoods. Specifically, oppositional culture may arise out of the extreme structural disadvantage experienced disproportionately by many mixed and minority neighborhoods. They suggest that to the extent such a culture exists, it may dampen any negative effects of local social ties on crime.

In summary, a value heterogeneity model would suggest that the co-existence of conventional and "street" values within communities may also lead to cultural disorganization. The lack of faith in the criminal justice system and the precariousness of street life lead to an acceptance of values that may be inconsistent with conventional values (Anderson 1999). In neighborhoods where residents perceive their neighbors to hold non-conventional values the likelihood of informal social control is diminished due to uncertainty regarding appropriate behavior and the level of support for intervening in neighbors' behavior. Further, in such neighborhoods the effect of social ties on informal social control may be moderated (Pattillo 1998; Warner and Wilcox Rountree 1997).

Integrating Structural and Cultural Disorganization

The 1980s rebirth of social disorganization theory as the systemic model closely followed Kornhauser's (1978) explanation of social disorganization as a social control model, but focused solely on the structural aspects of social disorganization. The research emanating from this model has been important in revitalizing social disorganization theory, and examinations of the cultural aspects of social disorganization should not

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discount, but rather build upon, the structural aspects which have been developed over the past two decades.

The systemic model of social disorganization has focused on structural predictors of informal social control. Viewing community "as a complex system of friendship and kinship networks and formal and informal associational ties rooted in family life and ongoing socialization processes" (Kasarda and Janowitz 1974:329), it has primarily examined the role of social ties within communities as the mechanism that mediates between neighborhood disadvantage and mobility, and informal social control (see for example, Bellair 1997; Sampson and Groves 1989; Warner and Wilcox Rountree 1997).

Combining this model with the ideas of cultural disorganization laid out above could result in several models. One model which combines aspects of both cultural and structural disorganization would argue that poverty, heterogeneity and residential mobility make it difficult for communities to provide informal social control because of attenuated culture, brought about in part by weak social ties within the community. Social ties provide one potential avenue through which widely held conventional values can be articulated, shared and displayed. When social ties are weak, one avenue for realizing shared values and strengthening culture is narrowed, which in turn erodes the basis of community control. Hence, this model suggests that poverty, heterogeneity and residential mobility decrease social ties which, in turn, decrease the level of perceived conventional values, consequently diminishing informal social control.

While friendship and kinship ties may be the most salient way in which conventional values are shared, behaviors may be more important in leading to the perception of non-conventional values. Hannerz (1969) argues that certain ghetto-specific

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behaviors arise, due to structural constraints, within ghetto communities and are viewed by other members of the community. These observations of non-conventional behavior (such as drinking in public and illegitimate sources of income) communicate to others that, at least for some members of the community, this is an acceptable thing to do. The observing of non-conventional behaviors, then, is another way, potentially in contrast to articulated value statements, that residents learn what is acceptable or unacceptable in their community. The frequent presence of non-conventional behaviors, therefore, may affect people's understanding about what behaviors are acceptable within the community and, consequently, their likelihood of intervening. In a sense, non-conventional behaviors muddy the water with regard to what the community perceives as appropriate or inappropriate behaviors. Hannerz (1969:186) raises a question about this:

> ...[A]ccording to the mainstream culture which ghetto dwellers know and
> tend to idealize, some ghetto-specific modes of action are to be labeled
> morally inappropriate. In the mainstream society outside the ghetto this
> labeling would probably function in a rather unambiguous way in most
> cases of such behavior; it would be denounced so thoroughly that there
> could be little doubt that it should not be taken as an appropriate model for
> the behavior of others. Considering the ghetto dwellers' sharing of
> mainstream culture, would such behavior be more acceptable in their
> community?

While Hannerz (1969) answers this question only in terms of plausibilities, he suggests that it would be more acceptable. "We can probably assume that its very occurrence can be taken to indicate that at least the actor involved regards it as an

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appropriate mode of behavior. In the absence of any information to the contrary, the prospective learner who happens to be present will thus assume that this is a permissible way of behaving" (Hannerz 1969: 186-87).

Hannerz's work suggests that culture can be examined not only in terms of stated values, but also in terms of behaviors transmitted by precept. This "softer" view of culture would suggest that while conventional values may be articulated across communities, the presence of high levels of non-conventional behaviors in some communities may create uncertainty in terms of what values are held by neighbors and what *is* appropriate behavior. In communities with high levels of non-conventional behaviors what is acceptable behavior may not be clear (even though conventional values may be articulated) and thus residents may be more hesitant to intervene in behaviors.

The role of social ties in such a model is uncertain. Findings from a study by Warner and Wilcox Rountree (1998) suggest that "ghetto related" behaviors increase ambiguity regarding community values and thereby decrease the likelihood of informal social control, *regardless* of the level of social ties within the community. Pattillo's (1998) work, on the other hand, suggests that the effect of social ties on informal social control may be conditioned by community value systems. In neighborhoods with high levels of perceived "oppositional" or "street" values, social ties may actually decrease informal social control.

In summary, structural interpretations of social disorganization theory have created a model that assumes that communities have shared values regarding illegal and problematic behavior, and focuses on measures of social ties as the foundation for enforcing informal social control. However, recent research has raised the question as to

whether social networks may play both positive and negative roles within communities, and whether culture may play a more proximate role in explaining variations in informal social control than social ties. Taken as a whole, these studies have suggested that weakened conventional values, due to weakened social ties, or perceived value heterogeneity as evidenced through observed non-conventional behavior in the community, may make ambiguous the norms of the community and either directly discourage intervening, or moderate the effects of social ties on informal social control. These issues of culture are likely to be particularly relevant in neighborhoods with high rates of drug use.

The Role of Drugs

The devastating effects of crack cocaine use, especially, on family and community life have been well noted. For example, Johnson et al. (1990) argue that drugs, such as heroin and cocaine, are "an important factor in the continued relative decline of inner-city communities and persons who reside in those communities"(p.9).

Drug activity can affect neighborhoods in several ways. They can affect social networks within neighborhoods, the use of space within neighborhoods, and the values within neighborhoods. For example, while studies of social networks have suggested that women are "more anchored in their neighborhood environments than are working husbands" (Greenbaum and Greenbaum 1985) crack abusing women are often socially isolated, commonly reporting no close friends (Cohen, Navaline and Metzger1994). Drug use may also affect the collective supervision of neighborhood children. Not only are drug abusing parents unlikely to supervise others' children, ethnographic studies suggests that their own children are often neglected and left unsupervised. Even when drug

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abusing families do provide support for their children and extended family (such as, nephews, nieces, and grandchildren), they are often the "vehicle for cross-generational transmission of drug behavior" (Dunlap 1992).

Peterson and Harrell (1992) note the role of drug use and drug selling in further isolating residents of many inner city neighborhoods. They note that drug use, drug selling, and violent crime are behaviors that inhibit others' ability "to use" a neighborhood.

In addition, income generated from drug sales may affect the likelihood of involvement in the formal labor market. This further undermines middle class values, such as the importance of education and the importance of hard work for achieving success, and strengthens the "criminal underclass subculture" (Johnson et al 1990:26). Further, it potentially decreases ties to other working members in the neighborhood. On the other hand, ethnographic studies of persons involved in drugs have been ambiguous regarding the extent to which drugs are related to an opppositional culture. For example, Hagedorn's (1994) study of conventionality among gang members involved in the drug economy found that most gang members continued to embrace conventional values, some of whom even stated that they believed it was wrong to sell drugs. As Hagedorn states (1994:216) "Our study found that some underclass gang members had embraced the drug economy and had forsaken conventionality, but we also found that the *majority* of adult gang members are still struggling to hold onto a conventional orientation to life (emphasis in original). In summary, while drug use has rarely been examined in community level crime models, there are reasons to suggest it may have effects on variables central to those models.

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CHAPTER 2. METHODS

The primary interest in this neighborhood level study is to explore the effect of culture on informal social control, and the extent to which these effects may be conditioned by the level of drug use in the neighborhood. Because many of the issues of values and norms seem particularly relevant to neighborhoods in which drugs are heavily used and in which a drug culture may develop, we intentionally include neighborhoods known to be home to high levels of drug activity.

While there has been a good bit of discussion on how to best geographically define neighborhoods, most community and crime level studies have used relatively large boundaries such as census tracts, political wards, municipally defined neighborhoods or police beats (see for example, Sampson and Groves 1989; Sampson Raudenbush and Earls 1997; Smith and Jarjoura 1989; Warner and Pierce 1989; Warner and Wilcox Rountree 1997). These "neighborhoods" however are generally quite large, comprised of several thousand residents. For example, Sampson, Raudenbush and Earls study of Chicago neighborhood clusters, which include several census tracts have about 8,000 residents per cluster (Sampson et al. 1997). Similarly Seattle census tracts used by Warner and Wilcox Rountree (1997) and Wilcox Rountree and Warner (2000) have an average population of 4281 residents. These "neighborhoods" are often quite heterogeneous, and as the "hot spots" literature points out, even in high crime neighborhoods, there are areas that are completely crime free (Sherman, Gartin and Buerger 1989; Roncek and Maier 1991). In contrast, much of the urban sociology literature on social networks and neighboring uses much smaller areas such as census block groups or block faces (see for example, Lee, Campbell and Miller 1991; Campbell

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and Lee, 1992; Logan and Spitze 1994). This suggests that particularly when examining the effects of social networks, smaller units may be better. The smallest unit of analysis for which the structural variables used in this study are available is the census block group. Therefore, the census block group (BG) was chosen as the unit of analysis for this study.

Sampling

The sample for this study is 68 block groups in two urban communities in a Southern state: Louisville and Lexington, Kentucky. Both of these cities have 2000 population counts of over one-quarter of a million (256,231 and 260,512, respectively) (American Fact Finder, 2000).

The sampling plan was developed to assure a sufficient number of high drug use neighborhoods and to assure an adequate distribution of predominantly white, predominantly racially mixed, and predominantly minority neighborhoods. To achieve these goals non-proportional stratified sampling was used. Census block groups were first placed into one of three strata: high drug use, adjacent to high drug use and non-adjacent to high drug use.

In order to identify neighborhoods that were likely high drug use neighborhoods, data from a previous study (part of a National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA) Cooperative agreement) examining risk behaviors of not-in-treatment crack-cocaine or heroin drug abusers (n=1393) were used (Leukefeld et al. 1999). While drug arrest data could be used to identify areas of high drug users, arrest data may be biased by public pressure on police to "clean up" certain neighborhoods (see, e.g., DeFleur 1975). As part of the NIDA study the street intersection nearest to the present residence of the study

subject was obtained. A data file of those intersections was then created and analyzed with ARCVIEW (a geographical information system package) to determine the number of those study participants in each block group in both Lexington and Louisville.

Block groups were identified where at least 10 drug users were known to live. In some instances, two adjoining blocks, each with slightly less than 10 drug users but with a total of at least 10 drug users when combined, were used. For example, one block may have had seven drug users and an adjoining block may have had 6. Since the blocks were adjoining and both fairly high this suggests a high drug use area---consequently, both blocks were included. These high drug use block groups comprised the first strata.

After the high drug use block groups were identified, all physically adjacent, block groups not included as high drug use were identified and comprised the second strata. Finally, all remaining census block groups that were entirely within the city limits of Louisville or Lexington/Fayette County comprised the third strata.

Once these three strata were established, basic census data (race, gender, number of housing units, number of owner and renter occupied housing units and number of housing units with telephones) for all block groups were obtained. Block groups with fewer than 100 households were deleted from the sampling frame at this time (n=20), leaving a total of 503 block groups. Before sampling, block groups were sub-divided into three further strata –predominantly (greater than 67%) white, predominantly black, and predominantly racially mixed. Approximately one-third of the sampled blocks from the adjacent and non-adjacent block groups were chosen from each of these sub-strata to assure an adequate representation of white, black, and racially mixed neighborhoods. All of the block groups in the high drug use neighborhoods were included in the sample.

Characteristics of sampled high drug activity block groups

We wanted to get some approximation of how representative high drug use neighborhoods in the sample are in relation to other high drug use neighborhoods in these cities. Since the only drug activity data available for all block groups that we are aware of is drug arrest data, we use that as a proxy for drug activity. Using drug arrest rates, we identified the 101 block groups with the highest drug arrest rates (top 20% of block groups) as well as the top 26 block groups with the highest drug arrest rates (top 5%). Neighborhoods in the top 5% had an average drug arrest rate of 11.52 arrests per 100 population, while those in the top 20% had an average drug arrest rate of 6.04 arrests per 100 population. Of these neighborhoods, the sample included 8 (approximately 31%) of those block groups in the highest 5% and 23 (approximately 23%) of those block groups in the highest 20%. We compared the high drug arrest rate neighborhoods in our sample to neighborhoods with high drug arrest rates not in our sample on three census variables collected for sampling purposes: percent male, percent African- American and percent renter.

Examining both the 5% of neighborhoods with the highest drug rates (n=26) and the 20% of neighborhoods with the highest drug rates (n=101), we found no differences in racial or gender composition for those in the sample and those not in the sample. However, sampled neighborhoods were found to have a significantly higher percentage of renters than were non-sampled neighborhoods. (See table 1).

Table 2.1. Comparison of Sampled to non-sampled high drug arrest rate block groups.

Top 5% of drug arrest block groups	Mean	N	T	df	p
Percent Male			-1.35	24	.19
Sample	42.21	8			
Not in Sample	47.27	18			
Percent African-American			.78	24	.44
Sample	78.77	8			
Not in Sample	69.33	18			
Percent Renter			4.58	22.25	.00
Sample	96.48	8			
Not in Sample	67.29	18			

Top 20% of drug arrest block groups	Mean	N	T	df	P
Percent Male			-.92	27.86	.37
Sample	45.50	23			
Not in Sample	47.70	78			
Percent African- American			.33	43.26	.74
Sample	59.94	23			
Not in Sample	57.38	78			
Percent Renter			4.16	99	.00
Sample	79.94	23			
Not in Sample	57.39	78			

Comparison of all sampled block groups to sampling frame

LOUISVILLE

The Louisville sampling frame consisted of 353 block groups. The number of block groups sampled from each strata appear below. As can be seen from this table, this sampling procedure over-sampled predominantly black and predominantly racially mixed neighborhoods, while under-sampling predominantly white neighborhoods. This is principally due to the over-sampling of black and mixed neighborhoods in the "non-adjacent" block groups.

Table 2.2. Comparison of racial distributions in sampling frame and sampled block groups (Louisville).

	TOTAL		HIGH DRUG USE		ADJACENT		NON-ADJACENT	
	Sampling Frame	Sample	Sampling Frame	Sample	Sampling Frame	Sample	Sampling Frame	Sample
Predominantly Black	92 (26%)	12 (35%)	4 (44%)	4 (44%)	7 (32%)	3 (30%)	81 (25 %)	5 (33%)
Predominantly White	223 (63%)	10 (29%)	1 (11%)	1 (11%)	5 (23%)	3 (30%)	217 (67%)	6 (40%)
Predominantly Mixed	38 (11%)	12 (35%)	4 (44%)	4 (44%)	10 (45%)	4 (40%)	24 (7%)	4 (27%)
Total	353 (100%)	34 (100%)	9 (100%)	9 (100%)	22 (100%)	10 (100%)	322 (100%)	15 (100%)

Table 2.3. Comparison of Basic Census Variables for Sample and Sampling Frame (Louisville)

Block Groups	N	Population (Range)	Percent Black (Range)	Percent Male (Range)	Percent Renters (Range)
In Sample	34	693.26 (274-1804)	52.64 (0.0-100.0)	46.19 (25.42-72.68)	63.61 (7.37-100.0)
In Sampling Frame	353	705.87 (171-3128)	32.23 (0.0-100.0)	45.55 (23.69-72.68)	43.97 (0.0-100.0)

LEXINGTON

In Lexington, there are a total of 150 block groups. The number of block groups sampled from each strata appear below. Again, this sampling procedure over-sampled predominantly black and predominantly racially mixed neighborhoods, while under-sampling predominantly white neighborhoods.

Table 2.4. Comparison of racial distributions in sampling frame and sampled block groups (Lexington).

	TOTAL		HIGH DRUG USE		ADJACENT		NON-ADJACENT	
	Sampling Frame	Sample	Sampling Frame	Sample	Sampling Frame	Sample	Sampling Frame	Sample
Predominantly Black	10 (7%)	9 (26%)	5 (46%)	5 (46%)	3 (14%)	2 (20%)	2 (2%)	2 (15%)
Predominantly White	126 (84%)	13 (38%)	2 (18%)	2 (18%)	13 (62%)	4 (40%)	111 (94%)	7 (54%)
Predominantly Mixed	14 (9%)	12 (35%)	4 (36%)	4 (36%)	5 (24%)	4 (40%)	5 (4%)	4 (31%)
Total	150 (100%)	34 (100%)	11 (100%)	11 (100%)	21 (100%)	10 (100%)	118 (100%)	13 (100%)

Table 2.5. Comparison of Basic Census Variables for Sample and Sampling Frame

Block Groups	N	Population (Range)	Percent Black (Range)	Percent Male (Range)	Percent Renters (Range)
In Sample	34	1092.91 (195-5364)	44.93 (0.0-100.0)	48.05 (30.50-67.58)	56.03 (5.22-95.56)
In Sampling Frame	150	1490.17 (183-7233)	15.59 (0.0-100.0)	48.19 (30.50-67.58)	44.79 (1.92-95.56)

Sampling of respondents

Once block groups were sampled, all street segments within those block groups were identified using ARCVIEW. Using the "street guide" section of city wide directories, all addresses on these street segments were then identified, and a sample of approximately 60 households from each block group was selected using systematic random sampling. Since the cross-reference directory distinguished between residences and businesses, we were able to include only residences in our sampling frames.

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Study Design

Each sampled household was mailed a letter explaining the purpose of the study and stating they may be contacted to participate in the study. The letter further informed recipients that participation in the study was voluntary and completely confidential, and that survey respondents would be paid $15 for participating in the survey which would last approximately 20-25 minutes. The letter also gave the phone number that we had for that address and asked the recipient to call the study office on a toll free number if that was not the correct number. (If the address had no phone number we asked that the recipient contact us if they currently had a phone). Cover letters were mailed to sampled households in Louisville on February 10, February 16, February 22, and February 25, 2000, and to households in Lexington on April 1, April 5, and April 10, 2000. The mailing of the letters was staggered in order to assure that each household would receive the letter only days before interviewers would contact them.

At this point households with phones were separated from the households without phones. The "with phones" sample was then turned over to the University of Kentucky Survey Research Center, who conducted the telephone interviews. Households without phones were interviewed face to face by members of the research team.

While employing two different methodologies (face-to-face surveys and telephone surveys) has the *potential* for allowing some systematic variance into our measures, we expect little, if any, differences in the quality of the data collected using the different methodologies. Indeed, Rogers (1976), in an experimental study, found no significant differences in the quality of data obtained from face to face interviews

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compared to telephone interviews. Given the necessity of collecting face-to-face data for those without phones, and the need to keep costs reasonable we believe the blending of telephone and face-to-face interviews is reasonable.

Telephone interviews were conducted between February 16, 2000 and June 11, 2000. All telephone interviews began with a confirmation of the respondent's address, so that we were certain to interview only persons at the sampled addresses. Interviewers were instructed to speak with the person in the household who had most recently had a birthday and that was at least 18 years of age. Disconnected numbers were tried again two weeks later in order to attempt to capture temporary disconnects. If those numbers were still disconnected at that time they became eligible to be included in the "no-phone" list. At least 20 attempts, and in some neighborhoods as many as 30 attempts, were made to contact a household member at the listed phone number.

Even though we used the most recent city wide directories, many of the sampled households were currently vacant or we had a telephone number that was no longer in service or no longer associated with the sampled address. Therefore in some neighborhoods it was necessary to draw a second random sample in order to achieve the desired 35 respondents per neighborhood.

Households without telephones, or with disconnected numbers, were interviewed using face-to-face interviews. Interviewers were trained by the research team and included both males and females, and African Americans and Caucasians. Face to face interviewers attempted to make contact at each address five times. Approximately 75% of the completed surveys were conducted over the phone and 25% were conducted in person.

Two neighborhoods were eventually dropped from the study. One neighborhood

in the medical area of Louisville, had only a small number of respondents and another

neighborhood consisting of elderly housing had a low response rate. The average number

of respondents in the remaining 66 neighborhoods was 35, and the overall cooperation

rate was 60%.

Police data

As part of this study police data for each of the two study cities were also

collected. We collected police incident reports for 1997, 1998 and 1999, as well as drug

arrest data for 1999. All police data were geo-coded using ARCVIEW. After geocoding,

lists of incidents were printed off for each neighborhood. These lists were verified by a

research assistant, who checked addresses on all boundary streets to be sure only those

addresses on the included side of the street (odd vs. even) were counted. Further,

incidents that occurred in the intersection of boundary streets were treated in two ways.

Because these incidents could be counted in as many as four different neighborhoods (for

example, if the intersection was a boundary on the Southeast corner of neighborhood A,

the Southwest corner of neighborhood B, the Northeast corner of neighborhood C and the

Northwest corner of neighborhood D), we counted them in each neighborhood in which

they were included (total counts) and randomly assigned them to one of the

neighborhoods in which they could be included (random counts). Most of the analyses in

this report use the "random counts" variable, but the two measures are highly correlated

and it appears to make little difference which measure is used.

Measures

The measures for this study come from three sources: The U.S. Census 1990 STF3A data tapes (as well as U.S. Census 2000 population counts), Lexington and Louisville Police crime incident reports, and survey data collected in the study.

Independent variables.   Data for the exogeneous variables used to indicate the structural characteristics of these neighborhoods were taken from the 1990 U. S. Census STF-3A data tapes available through the Internet (http://venus.census.gov/cdrom/lookup). These data were collected at the block group level. The exogenous variables used here are the traditional variables identified by Shaw and McKay (1942) and Kornhauser (1978) as the most important aspects of neighborhoods: the level of poverty, ethnic heterogeneity, and residential stability. The level of *poverty* is measured as percentage of population in each block group that has a ratio of income to poverty level of less than 1.0. *Racial heterogeneity* is measured by subtracting from one the sum of the squared proportions of persons (p) within each racial group $(1-\Sigma p_i^2)$. While the 1990 Census identifies five racial groups, the total percentage in the categories of Asian, American Indian and Other, were quite small for all the neighborhoods examined here. Therefore, these three categories were combined into one category, leaving us with three groups for the calculation of heterogeneity. For three groups, values for heterogeneity can range from 0 to .67, with 0 representing complete homogeneity and .67 representing complete heterogeneity across the three groups. *Residential stability* is measured by the percentage of population age five and older in each block group that resided in the same house five years previously.

Mediating and moderating variables in this study include measures of neighborhood social ties, weakened conventional values, "street" values, "street"

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behaviors, and the frequency of drug-related behaviors within neighborhoods. These variables were created by aggregating individual level survey responses to the neighborhood level.

Social ties refer to the extent to which neighbors have friends and family within the neighborhood. Such social ties have been argued to be the foundation from which informal social control can develop. The measure for *social ties* used here is based on the number of friends and relatives that live in the neighborhood. This variable was created by summing individual responses to the following two questions: "How many of your relatives live in your neighborhood, not including those in your household?" and "Not including people in your household, how many of your neighbors do you consider to be friends?" There were some extreme values for both of these variables, so each was truncated before summing. Variables were truncated at values which included 99% of the respondents (20 and 50, respectively). Once the individual level responses for these two items were summed, the mean for each neighborhood was created.

Consistent with the neighborhood focus of this study values are examined primarily in terms of residents' perceptions of neighborhood values. Because values become visible and alive through peoples' words and behaviors, the primary measures of values used here are measures of respondents' perceptions of neighborhood values, based on what they see and hear in their neighborhood. Further, any measure of neighborhood culture must be more than a compositional measure of the values held by respondents. As Fischer (1995) points out a "powerful minority may shape the community culture" (p. 548). Cultural values are a property of the neighborhood, *sui generis*, and therefore must be measured as a property of the neighborhood. Hence, rather than simply aggregate

respondents' values, we use respondents as knowledgeable informants about neighborhood values.

Twelve items concerning neighbors' values were factor analyzed. Respondents were asked, "Based on what you see and hear in your neighborhood, How strongly do you feel **your neighbors** would agree or disagree with the following statements?" 1) It is important to get a good education; 2) It is important to be honest; 3) Family members should make sacrifices in their personal life for the good of the family; 4) It is wrong to drink alcohol to the point of getting drunk; 5) Selling drugs is always wrong; 6) It is okay to smoke marijuana; 7) It is okay to use drugs such as cocaine, crack and heroin; 8) It is a good thing to turn the other cheek and forgive others when they harm you; 9) If someone offends you and doesn't apologize, you lose respect; 10) Children should always respect their elders; 11) It is wrong for young women to get pregnant before they are married; 12) To make money there are no right and wrong ways any more, only easy ways and hard ways.

Response categories for these questions were strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, and strongly disagree. These items were factor analyzed (principal components analysis) at the individual level using a varimax rotation to determine whether an underlying variable structure could be determined. Two factors with eigenvalues greater than one emerged. These two factors appear to represent conventional values and "street" values. The variables and their factor loadings appear in Table 2.6. At first, the loading of the item "It is a good thing to turn the other cheek and forgive others when they harm you" on the conventional values factor may seem surprising, as the urban poverty literature suggests that getting revenge when one has

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been disrespected is a critical aspect of oppositional or "street" culture. However, when asked this question, many respondents commented with statements like, "well, that's what the Bible says, so yes, I agree." Thus, respondents were interpreting this statement in terms of conventional values.

Table 2.6. Primary Factor loadings of value items using principal components analysis.

Items	Conventional Values	"street" Values
1. It is important to get a good education.	.74	
2. It is important to be honest.	.77	
3. Selling drugs is always wrong.	.69	
4. It is wrong to drink alcohol to the point of getting drunk.	.66	
5. It is wrong for young women to get pregnant before they are married.	.55	
6. Family members should make sacrifices in their personal life for the good of the family.	.73	
7.Children should always respect their elders.	.64	
8. It is a good thing to turn the other cheek and forgive others when they harm you.	.47	
9. It is okay to smoke marijuana		.70
10. It is okay to use drugs such as cocaine, crack and heroin.		.65
11. To make money, there are no right and wrong ways anymore, only easy ways and hard ways.		.58
12. If someone offends you and doesn't apologize, you lose respect.		.54

Based on this factor analysis, two indices were created. The percentage of respondents in each neighborhood perceiving their neighbors to strongly agree with each of the statements on the conventional values factor were averaged across the eight items to create a measure of the strength of *perceived conventional values* at the neighborhood level (alpha=.89). Similarly, the percentage of respondents in each neighborhood agreeing with each of the statements on the "street" values factor were summed across the four items to create a measure of the strength of *perceived "street" values* (alpha=

.63). [2] Similar scales were created for the respondents' own values. That is, respondent's responded to each of the above value items in terms of the question, "How strongly do **you** agree or disagree with the statement that...". Based on the same index structure above, these variables are the level of *respondents' conventional values* and the level of *respondents' "street" values*.

The use of the word culture within criminological research has most often referred to value orientations. According to Parsons (1951:11-12) a value is "an element of a shared symbolic system which serves as a criterion or standard for selection among the alternatives of orientation which are intrinsically open in a situation." Culture, thus, directs behavior through making some ends more desirable or more morally appropriate than others. More recently, however, scholars have attempted to identify other relevant cultural phenomena. These phenomena refer to modes of behavior or strategies that organize behavior (Hannerz 1969; Swidler 1986; Wilson 1996). These modes of behavior emerge from a particular understanding of the world in which one finds oneself (Swidler1986).

Modes of behavior that may transmit oppositional or "street" values have rarely been examined in the criminological literature. When the concept is discussed in the theoretical and ethnographic literature, however, it generally refers to "ghetto-related" behaviors such as public drinking, out of wedlock births, and not being involved in steady employment(Anderson 1991; Hannerz 1969; Wilson 1996). The presence of similar behaviors are often discussed in the disorder literature in terms of social incivilities. While the disorder literature focuses on "incivilities" as signs that no one is in control within the neighborhood and as causes of fear that lead to withdraw from the

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neighborhood (see e.g., Markowitz et al. 2001, Sampson and Raudenbush 1999), we conceptualize these behaviors as cultural messages of non-conventional or "street" values, and refer to them as "street" behaviors. "Street" behaviors are measured here in terms of how often respondents saw or heard the following in the last six months in their neighborhood: people drunk in public places like streets, parks or playgrounds; people drinking in public; people buying or selling drugs; people using drugs; foul language; and loud arguments (α=.91). These behaviors are hypothesized to provide one avenue through which neighbors come to perceive "street" values. For each of these behaviors, the percent of respondents in each neighborhood stating that the behavior occurred very often was calculated. These percentages were then averaged across the six behaviors within each neighborhood.

We also specifically measure drug activity. While drug activity is part of the above measure of "street" behaviors it is also measured and analyzed separately. Neighborhood drug activity is measured two ways. The number of drug arrests in 1999 per neighborhood were divided by the 2000 neighborhood population count and multiplied by 1000 to get the *drug arrest rate* per 1000 residents for each neighborhood. As a supplementary measure we also examine drug activity based on a survey question asking how many times in the last six months respondents had witnessed or heard about drugs being bought or sold in their neighborhood. Responses to this question were summed across respondents in each neighborhood and divided by the number of respondents to get a neighborhood average for *visible drug activity*.

Finally, because the two cultural constructs and the drug measure are viewed as potentially moderating the relationship between social ties and informal social control,

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interaction terms for each of these variables with social ties were created, using mean-centered terms (Aiken and West 1991; Jaccard et al. 1990).

Dependent variables. The major dependent variable in these analyses is informal social control. Informal social control has several dimensions, including the extent to which neighbors engage in surveillance behaviors in the neighborhood and directly intervene in inappropriate behaviors. Surveillance has been defined as "the casual but active observation of neighborhood streets that is engaged in by individuals during the course of daily activities. It includes recognizing and paying careful attention to strangers in the neighborhood and keeping an eye on neighbors' homes and property"(Greenberg, Rohe and Williams 1982:9) Direct intervention refers to residents intervening in suspicious or inappropriate behavior in order to stop the behavior (see e.g., Elliot et al. 1996; Sampson et al. 1997). Further, recent studies have focused on collective efficacy, which merges willingness to intervene and neighborhood cohesion. Neighborhood cohesion or bonding refers to the extent that neighbors trust and get along with their neighbors as well as care about their neighborhood.

Seventeen items related to supervision, intervening, and cohesion were factor analyzed at the individual level. Four factors with eigenvalues greater than 1 emerged. The factors represent intervening in community behavior, intervening in school truancy, supervision, and cohesion. The items and their primary factor loadings appear in Table 2.7. The items for the intervening variables asked "How likely is it that someone in you neighborhood would do something to stop it" for each incident. The supervision items asked, "How common is it for people in your neighborhood to" engage in each of these

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items. The cohesion items asked "How strongly do you agree or disagree with" each of the items.

Based on this factor analysis, four indices were created by averaging individual responses for each of the items which had their highest loading on that factor. As in previous studies (Elliot et al. 1996; Sampson, Raudenbush and Earls 1997), intervening in community activities and cohesion were highly correlated (r=.88). Therefore we combined the items from these two indices and created a measure of collective efficacy, which will be the focus of our analysis on informal social control.

The ten items used in the collective efficacy index were recoded such that a high score (4) represents high cohesion or high likelihood of intervening. The items were summed for each respondent and divided by the valid number of items (alpha=.87). (If respondents had provided valid responses to more than half of the items an average collective efficacy score was generated. Only 18 respondents answered fewer than 6 items and were not included.) Individual scores were then aggregated to the neighborhood level, to provide a neighborhood average collective efficacy score.

Table 2.7. Primary factor loadings for informal social control items.

Items	Intervening in Community Behaviors	Cohesion	Intervening in School Truancy	Super-vision
1. If a fight broke out in front of your house and someone was being beaten up...	.72			
2. If someone was trying to sell drugs to a neighborhood child in plain sight...	.70			
3. If children were spray painting graffiti on a local building...	.68			
4. If someone was breaking into your house in plain sight...	.67			
5. If someone was trying to sell drugs to an adult in plain sight...	.66			
6. If children were showing disrespect to an adult in your neighborhood...	.58			
7. People in my neighborhood can be trusted.		.77		
8. People in my neighborhood generally get along with each other.		.76		
9. People in my neighborhood care about the neighborhood.		.76		
10. People in my neighborhood take an interest in the welfare of the neighborhood children.		.66		
11. If children were on the street, in a park, or in a store on a school day...			.85	
12. How likely is that someone in your neighborhood would tell the child's parent?			.77	
13. If a teenager from your neighborhood was seen away from the school grounds on a school day...			.80	
14. ...to look out their windows during the day to determine whether anything out of the ordinary is occurring on your street?				.76
15. ...to spend time outside of their home for more than just a few minutes, sitting outside, working in the yard, or taking a walk in the neighborhood?				.68
16. ...to watch each others' houses or property when they go away?				.61
17. How likely is it that people in your neighborhood would be able to recognize strangers in the neighborhood?				.49

In the final models, we also examine neighborhood level rates of violent crime. The study includes two different sources of violent crime measures: survey questions and police incident reports. Based on responses to survey questions two different violent crime measures were constructed. The first of these is the *average number of violent crimes witnessed in the neighborhood*. Respondents were asked questions regarding the occurrence of five violent crimes during the past six months within their neighborhood. Specifically respondents were asked, "During [the last six months] have you witnessed or heard about any of the following things happening in your neighborhood? A fight in which a weapon was used? A fight in which no weapon was used? A sexual assault or rape? A robbery or mugging? A spouse or partner being hit, slapped, punched or otherwise beaten?" Affirmative responses were followed up with a question regarding the number of times this had occurred in the last six months. The number of times each of these incidents had been witnessed or heard about were summed across all five of the above crimes for each respondent. Because residents may be reporting about the same incident, we then averaged these sums of reported violent crimes for each neighborhood, rather than summing them within each neighborhood. The average across all neighborhoods was 7.20.

The second measure that was based on the survey data reflects the *percentage of households that had violent victimizations* in their neighborhood. Respondents were asked, "While you have lived in this neighborhood, have you or any member of your household been a victim of violence, such as a mugging, a sexual assault or a fight?" The percentage of residents in each neighborhood who responded affirmatively was

calculated. The average percent reporting violent victimization across the neighborhoods was nine percent.

The third measure of violent crime is based on official reports of violent crimes (including homicide, aggravated assault, rape, and robbery) at the block group level, obtained from Lexington and Louisville police departments. The number of homicides, aggravated assaults, rapes and robberies were summed for 1999 within each block group, divided by the 2000 population counts and multiplied by 1,000, to obtain a *violent crime rate* for each neighborhood. The average violent crime rate for these neighborhoods was 26.71 violent crimes per 1,000 persons. All three of these measures are examined as indicators of block group violent crime rates.

CHAPTER 3: RESULTS

The purpose of the analysis is to empirically explore aspects of cultural disorganization within a social disorganization model. As discussed in Chapter 1, cultural disorganization is argued to arise from neighborhood structural characteristics and diminishes neighborhood levels of informal social control. Two conceptualizations of cultural disorganization have been discussed: weakened conventional values and value heterogeneity due to the coexistence of conventional values and "street" values. An integrated cultural and structural social disorganization model would suggest that conventional values are articulated, shared, and consequently strengthened through social ties. Because conventional values are believed to be widely held, the greater the level of social ties within the neighborhood the greater the perception that conventional values are widely held by neighbors. In contrast, in neighborhoods where residents remain socially isolated, even if conventional values are widely held, residents may be less likely to perceive their neighbors as holding conventional values, weakening culture. Alternatively, culture can also be weakened when residents perceive neighbors to hold "street" values. This perception may be most likely to occur through the appearance of "street" behaviors occurring in the community. We empirically explore these issues in this chapter.

Neighborhood Descriptions

We begin with a description of the study neighborhoods in terms of the variables within the study and a few additional structural characteristics of the neighborhoods. As can be seen in Table 3.1 many of these neighborhoods are disadvantaged neighborhoods. The average percent below poverty in these neighborhoods is 36.86 percent. In fact, 32% of the neighborhoods (n=21) had poverty rates greater than 40%, which is generally considered ghetto poverty (see for example Wilson 1996; Jargowsky and Bane 1991). The average percent white in these

neighborhoods is 50.2 percent, ranging from 0 to 100 percent. The average percent black is 48.92 percent, also ranging from 0 to 100 percent.[3] The neighborhoods generally exhibit little racial heterogeneity, with the average level of heterogeneity being only .27, and the range being 0 to .51. Approximately 48 percent of the residents in the average neighborhood were residentially stable for at least 5 years, but the range is from only 12 percent to 86 percent. On average, over half of the residents in these neighborhoods are renters (58.6), but neighborhoods range from only 5.22 percent renters to 100 percent renters.

[INSERT TABLE 3.1 ABOUT HERE]

Examining items from the survey, we find that the percentage of *residents* strongly agreeing with the conventional values items in the average neighborhood is 75.12 percent, with neighborhoods varying between 61 percent and 85 percent of residents strongly agreeing with conventional values. In contrast approximately 27 percent of residents in the average neighborhood strongly or somewhat agree with "street" values, with neighborhoods varying between 16 percent and 38 percent. The *perceived* level of agreement with conventional values and "street" values within the neighborhood is somewhat different. In the average neighborhood, only 57 percent of respondents perceived their neighbors to strongly agree with conventional values and 41 percent of respondents perceived their neighbors to agree with "street" values.

The average level of social ties across neighborhoods was 7.52, with a range of 3.66 to 16.83. The average level of cohesion across neighborhoods on a 4 point scale (with high scores representing high levels of cohesion) was 3.27, the average level of likelihood of intervening in community behaviors was 3.20, and the average level of collective efficacy was 3.22.

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Table 3.1. Descriptive data on neighborhoods (N=66).

Variable	Mean	s.d.	Min.	Max.
Poverty	36.86	25.26	.00	93.00
Percent White	50.20	34.48	.00	100.00
Percent Black	48.92	34.84	.00	100.00
Racial Heterogeneity	.27	.20	.00	.51
Residential Stability	48.07	16.15	11.79	86.21
Percent Renters	58.60	26.78	5.22	100.00
Conventional values (Resp.)	75.12	4.96	61. 31	84.64
"Street" values (Resp.)	26.74	4.45	15.93	38.21
Perceived conventional values	56.97	8.49	42.00	76.12
Perceived "Street" values	41.20	7.76	25.36	56.54
Social ties	7.52	2.41	3.66	16.83
Cohesion	3.27	.32	2.63	3.89
Likelihood of Intervening	3.20	.28	2.52	3.67
Collective Efficacy	3.22	.29	2.58	3.73
Drug arrest rate	28.43	33.41	.00	175.30
Visible drug activity	27.17	29.26	.00	129.00
Avg. N of violent crimes witnessed	7.20	10.39	.18	58.51
% Violent victimizations	8.92	5.64	.00	22.86
Violent crime rate	26.71	28.89	.00	123.88

While the descriptive data demonstrate that the majority of residents in all neighborhoods, even those with very high poverty levels, strongly agree with conventional values, there is some variance across neighborhoods. Therefore we next examine to what extent the level of residents' agreement with conventional and "street" values varies by characteristics of the neighborhood. While we argue that perceptions of values are the appropriate measures for culture, it is important, nonetheless to examine the stated values of respondents and their relationship to neighborhood characteristics and perceived values.

The Effects of Neighborhood Characteristics on Values

We begin the examination of the effects of neighborhood characteristics on values by examining the three main exogenous variables from social disorganization theory—poverty, racial heterogeneity, and residential stability—in relation to respondents' articulated values. We then go on to examine the extent to which neighborhood characteristics affect the perceived values in the community. As can be seen in Table 3.2, model I, the only variable that significantly affects respondents' conventional values is racial heterogeneity, with racial heterogeneity increasing the level of agreement with conventional values.[4] The effects of neither residential stability nor poverty are significant. Further, the F for the overall equation does not reach significance suggesting values do not vary significantly by neighborhood characteristics. Model II examines the effect of the exogenous variables in the respondents' level of agreement with "street" values. In this model only residential stability is significant, with residential stability decreasing respondents' agreement with "street" values. Again, however, the F for the overall equation does not reach significance at the .05 level.

[INSERT TABLE 3.2 ABOUT HERE]

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Table 3.2. The effects of exogenous variables on respondents' values and perceived values within the neighborhood (Standardized coefficients).

	I Respondents' Conventional Values	II Respondents' "Street" Values	III Perceived Conventional Values	IV Perceived "Street" Values	V Perceived Conventional Values	VI Perceived "Street" Values
Poverty	-.04	.04	-.34**	.44**	-.32**	.42**
Stability	.20	-.28*	.25*	-.26*	.13	-.11
Heterogeneity	.26*	-.19	.01	-.04	-.17	.06
Respondents' Conventional Values					.60**	
Respondents' "street" Values						.54**
R^2	.10	.11	.25	.35	.58	.61
F	2.38	2.61	7.05**	11.12**	21.32**	23.61**

* $p \leq .05$
** $p \leq .01$

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Models III and IV examine the effects of the exogenous variables on our measures of culture, specifically, respondents' perceptions of neighbors' level of agreement with conventional and "street" values. As can be seen in Model III, residential stability significantly increases, and poverty significantly decreases, the perceived level of conventional values within the neighborhood. The overall F value for the equation is significant at the .01 level. Similarly, stability is found to significantly decrease, and poverty to significantly increase, the perceived level of agreement with "street" values in the neighborhood. (See Model IV.) This model is also significant at the .01 level.[5]

Together these models suggest that while respondents' articulated values vary little with respect to neighborhood characteristics, respondents' perceptions of neighborhood values are significantly affected by the level of poverty and residential stability within the neighborhood. In the final models in this table we re-examine the effects of the neighborhood variables controlling for the respondents' level of agreement with conventional and "street" values, respectively. Since respondents' articulated values appear to vary little in terms of the neighborhood factors considered here, the variance across neighborhoods in values shown in the descriptive data may be due to differences in values of individuals comprising these neighborhoods, representing compositional rather than contextual effects. Therefore, we control for respondents' own level of agreement with conventional and "street" values.

In Models V and VI we see that the mean respondents' articulated values are highly and positively associated with the mean perceived level of agreement with values in the neighborhood. This provides some criterion-related validity for the perceived values measures. That is, in neighborhoods where respondents were likely to perceive their neighbors as having high levels of agreement with conventional values, a high

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proportion of respondents in those neighborhoods articulated conventional values. Similarly, in neighborhoods where respondents were more likely to perceive their neighbors as having high levels of agreement with "street" values, a higher proportion of respondents in those neighborhoods articulated agreement with "street" values. Further, while respondents' articulated values explain a good portion of the variance in the neighborhood level of perceived agreement with conventional and "street" values, poverty continues to significantly decrease the perception of conventional values within the neighborhood, and significantly increase the perception of "street" values above and beyond the actual level of articulated values in those communities.

Next, we examine the effect of social ties on perceived values. Social ties are one important mechanism through which respondents' values may be made known, and because most residents articulate conventional values, the perception of conventional values, in particular, should be increased with increased social ties. Model I in Table 3.3 examines the effects of social ties on the perception of conventional values. Controlling for the average level of articulated values in the neighborhood, poverty, heterogeneity and stability, we find that social ties do have a significant positive effect on the perceptions of conventional values.

[Insert Table 3.3 about here]

On the other hand, however, Model II shows that social ties do not have a significant effect on the perceived level of "street" values. This isn't surprising given the earlier findings that most residents articulate conventional values. Therefore, it is likely that the perception of "street" values comes, not from shared statements of values among friends, but rather from something else. The literature suggests that the perception of "street" values may come from behaviors observed in the community. Observation of non-conventional behavior within the

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neighborhood may lead residents to believe neighbors hold "street" values. Hannerz (1969), Wilson (1996), and Sampson and Wilson (1995) refer to this as transmission by precept. Therefore in Model 3 we examine the effects of the level of observed "street" behaviors within the community on perceived "street" values. Controlling for the average level of respondent's agreement with "street" values, poverty, racial heterogeneity, and stability, we find that observed "street" behaviors significantly increases the perception of "street" values with in the neighborhood. Further, the introduction of "street" behaviors, dramatically reduces the effects of poverty, making it no longer significant.

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Table 3.3. The effects of social ties on perceived values within the neighborhood (Standardized coefficients).

	I Perceived Conventional Values	II Perceived "Street" Values	III Perceived "Street" Values
Poverty	-.30**	.41**	.17
Stability	.03	.-.05	-.12
Heterogeneity	-.13	.04	.08
Respondents' Conventional Values	.60**		
Social Ties	.21*	-.15	
Respondents' "Street" Values		.50**	.52 **
"Street" behaviors			.29*
R^2	.62	.62	.63
F	19.14**	19.77**	20.68**

* $p \leq$ .05
** $p \leq$ .01

The Effects of Culture on Informal Social Control

The analysis next turns to the examination of culture on informal social control and the extent to which social ties and "street" behaviors mediate those effects. As noted earlier, we use respondents' perceptions of neighborhood values as the bases for our measures of culture, and we use collective efficacy as our measure of informal social control. Model I in Table 3.4 provides the baseline effects of neighborhood characteristics on collective efficacy. Consistent with much of the current literature, we find poverty significantly decreases and residential stability significantly increases collective efficacy. However, we find no effect of racial heterogeneity on collective efficacy. Next we include social ties and find, as expected, social ties increase collective efficacy and mediate the effects of residential stability. Social ties, however, do not mediate any of the effects of poverty.

In the next two models we add our measures of culture: perceived level of agreement with conventional values and perceived level of agreement with "street" values within the neighborhood. The findings from Model III (Table 3.4) show that perceived conventional values significantly increase collective efficacy and mediate some of the effects of social ties on collective efficacy. Further, perceived conventional values mediate some of the effects of poverty on collective efficacy. The findings from Model IV (Table 3.4) show that "street " behaviors significantly decrease collective efficacy and mediate all of the effects of poverty. The addition of perceived "street" values, in Model VI, shows that perceived "street" values significantly decrease collective efficacy and mediate some of the effects of "street" behaviors.

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Table 3.4. The effects of culture on collective efficacy (Standardized coefficients).

	I	II	III	IV	V
Poverty	-.69**	-.68**	-.58**	-.02	.01
Stability	.19*	.08	.04	.22**	.15
Heterogeneity	.02	.04	.04	-.03	-.03
Social Ties		.24**	.17*		
Perceived Conventional Values			.28**		
"Street" Behaviors				-.79**	-.69**
Perceived "Street" Values					-.25**
R^2	.63	.67	.72	.82	.86
F	34.56**	30.52**	31.43**	68.30**	71.03**

* $p \leq .05$
** $p \leq .01$

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The next analyses examine the extent to which measures of culture moderate the effects of social ties. As suggested earlier, social ties may have the strongest effect on informal social control when those ties are embedded in a strong conventional culture. More importantly, perhaps, is an understanding of the effects of social ties in neighborhoods where high proportions of residents perceive approval of "oppositional" or "street" values. In such neighborhoods, the level of social ties may have even a stronger effect on the level of informal social control.

In Table 3.5 the moderating or conditional effects of culture on social ties are examined, using mean centered terms. Model I (Table 3.5) evaluates the extent to which a strong conventional culture moderates the effects of social ties on collective efficacy. While findings from the previous analyses (Table 3.4, Models II and III) demonstrate that some of the effects of social ties on collective efficacy are *mediated* by a strong culture, i.e., social ties are important, in part, because they create a strong conventional culture, the findings here do not suggest that the remaining effects of social ties on collective efficacy are moderated or conditioned by the strength of the conventional culture. That is, the effects of social ties on collective efficacy do not seem to vary by the strength of conventional culture.

Model II (Table 3.5) examines the extent to which the effects of social ties on collective efficacy are moderated by increased perceptions of "street" values. While the coefficient for the interaction term does not quite reach significance, the unstandardized coefficient is greater than 1.5 times its standard error (t=1.63), suggesting a possible effect, given the small sample size. The positive coefficient for the interaction term suggests that the positive effect of social ties on collective efficacy is *increased* in neighborhoods with higher levels of perceived "street" values. In contrast to Pattillo's (1998) argument that high levels of social ties in such neighborhoods would decrease the

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Table 3.5. Examining culture as a moderator for the effects of social ties on collective efficacy (Standardized coefficients).

	Collective Efficacy	Collective Efficacy
	I	II
Poverty	-.58**	-.50**
Stability	.04	.04
Heterogeneity	.03	.01
Social ties[a]	.19*	.18*
Perceived Conventional Values[a]	.30**	
Social ties*Perceived Conventional Values[a]	-.06	
Perceived "Street" Values[a]		-.39**
Social ties* Perceived "Street" Values[a]		.13[+]
R^2	.73	.74
F	26.08**	28.50**

[a] Mean centered terms
[+] $p \approx .10$
* $p \leq .05$
** $p \leq .01$

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likelihood of informal social control, this finding suggests that the positive effect of social ties on informal social control is _enhanced_ in those neighborhoods where there is a higher perception of "street" values. Thus, in neighborhoods with high levels of perceived "street" values social ties are even more important for informal social control.

One could also examine this interaction in terms of the conditioning effects of social ties on perceived culture. While perceptions of "street" culture decrease collective efficacy, this is more likely to occur when social ties are limited. Higher levels of social ties actually diminish the negative effects of perceived "street" culture on collective efficacy. In neighborhoods with high levels of "street" values, if residents have only a few social ties there may be increased uncertainty regarding the appropriateness of intervening. Further, the costs of providing informal social control in such a neighborhood may be viewed as too high without social ties to support compliance with conventional norms. Indeed, in neighborhoods with high levels of perceived "street" values, sparse social ties among residents may be used to exchange personal approval for non-normative behaviors rather than compliance with conventional norms (see for example, Flache and Macy 1996).

The Role of Drugs

In the next set of analyses we explicitly examine any impact that drug behaviors may have on the previous models explaining informal social control. Because drug behavior is often associated with violence and retaliation toward those who interfere, high levels of drug behavior may, in and of themselves, inhibit informal social control. In these models we examine drug behaviors with two different measures: drug arrest rates and the average number of times residents report seeing the buying or selling of drugs. The measures are highly correlated (r=.60) and provide fairly similar results.

These analyses begin by examining the extent to which perceived culture is affected by the level of drug activity, then move to examine the extent to which drug activity independently affects informal social control, and finally to the extent to which the relationship between social ties and informal social control is affected by community levels of drug activity. We begin the analyses with a focus on perceived conventional culture. As can be seen in Table 3.6, Models 1 and 2, neither measure of drug activity has a significant effect on perceived conventional culture. Perceived conventional culture continues to be affected by the percent of residents articulating conventional values, the levels of social ties and poverty. Both drug activity measures share a significant amount of variance with poverty, and in Model 2, the significance of poverty drops just below the .05 level (t=-1.86; p=.068). Nonetheless, both models suggest that the addition of drug activity measures to the equation predicting the level of perceived conventional values has little effect.

In Models III and IV of Table 3.6 the drug behavior variables have been added to the weakened culture model (Model 3 from Table 3.4). Again, both models provide fairly similar pictures. While drug behavior is shown to significantly decrease collective efficacy, it does not substantially change the effects of the other variables on collective efficacy. Perceived conventional culture continues to have a strong positive effect on collective efficacy, and drug activity is found to have a strong independent negative effect, as does poverty. Social ties also continue to have a significant positive effect when the drug arrest rate is used, but the effect becomes non-significant when the survey measure of drug activity is used.

[INSERT TABLE 3.6 ABOUT HERE]

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Table 3.6. The effects of drug activity on perceived conventional culture and collective efficacy (Standardized coefficients).

	I Perceived Conventional Values	II Perceived Conventional Values	III Collective Efficacy	IV Collective Efficacy
Poverty	-.32**	-.22[+]	-.41**	-.34**
Stability	.03	.04	-.00	.07
Heterogeneity	-.13	-.15	-.01	-.02
Social ties	.21*	.19*	.16*	.11
Respondents' Conventional Values	.60**	.61**		
Perceived Conventional Values			.29**	.29**
Drug Arrest Rate	.02		-.27**	
Avg. # times saw Drug activity		-.11		-.35**
R^2	.62	.62	.76	.78
F	15.69**	16.08**	30.99**	35.46**

[+] $p \approx .10$
* $p \leq .05$
** $p \leq .01$

Finally we examine the possibility that drug activity may condition the effect of social ties on collective efficacy. To examine this possibility an interaction term for social ties and each of the two drug measures was added to their respective equations. Neither interaction term was found to be significant (results not presented).

Next we examine the effects of drug activity in relation to perceptions of "street" culture and "street" behavior. We begin by adding drug arrest rates to the previous model predicting perceived "street" values (model III in Table 3.3). The results are presented in Model 1 of Table 3.7. The results of this model suggest that drug activity, in and of itself, has no effect on the perceptions of "street" values within the neighborhood. Indeed the results in this model are very similar to the model without drug arrests (Table 3.3, Model III). However, because the measure of "street" behavior includes an item on drug activity, we also examine the effect of drug arrests without the measure for "street" behavior in the model (Table 3.7, Model II). As can be seen in this model, drug arrests still have no significant effect on perceptions of "street" culture.

We next examine the effects of visible drug activity. The first of these models (Model III) examines the effects of visible drug activity on perceived culture with "street" behaviors in the equation. Clearly, visible drug activity accounts for a good portion of the effects of "street" behaviors on perceived "street" culture, although because of the shared variance (r=.81) neither variable is significant. Again, because of the similarity of this measure with an item in the "street" behavior measure, and consequentially, the inevitable shared variance, we delete the "street" behavior measure to examine the effects of visible drug activity in isolation (Model IV). When "street" behaviors are removed from the equation visible drug activity becomes a significant predictor of perceived "street" culture. However, some of the effects of poverty on

Table 3.7. The effects of drug activity on perceived "street" values (Standardized coefficients).

	I Perceived "Street" Values	II Perceived "Street" Values	III Perceived "Street" Values	IV Perceived "Street" Values
Poverty	.19	-.42**	.16	.26*
Stability	-.14	-.11	-.12	-.12
Heterogeneity	.06	.06	.09	.09
"Street" behaviors	.33*	---	.18	---
Respondents' "Street" Values	.52**	.54**	.52**	.53**
Drug Arrest Rate	- .09	.00		
Visible Drug activity			.14	.22*
R^2	.64	.61	.64	.63
F	17.21**	18.58**	17.43**	20.67**

* $p \leq .05$
** $p \leq .01$

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perceived "street" culture, that were previously mediated by "street" behaviors, are not mediated by visible drug activity. This suggests that visible drug activity accounts for some of the effects of poverty on perceived "street" culture, but other "street" behaviors also partially mediate the effects of poverty.

The role of drugs is next examined in the value heterogeneity model of informal social control. Table 3.8 adds the two measures of drug activity to Model V from Table 3.4. Regardless of the measure of drug activity used, the results are similar. Perceived "street" values continue to have a strong negative effect on collective efficacy. However, drug activity is clearly a large part of the negative effect of "street" behaviors on collective efficacy. While drug activity does not have a significant effect on collective activity when "street" behaviors are in the model, when "street" behaviors are removed from the model, drug activity significantly reduces collective efficacy. Nonetheless, the broader measure of "street" behavior (which includes an item on visible drug activity) completely mediates the effects of poverty on collective efficacy, while the singular measures of drug activity do not. Further the models that include "street" behavior explain a considerably large proportion of the variance in collective efficacy.

[INSERT TABLE 3.8 ABOUT HERE]

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Table 3.8. The effects of value heterogeneity on collective efficacy (Standardized coefficients).

	I	II	III	IV
Poverty	.03	-.35**	.01	-.34**
Stability	.13*	.04	.15*	.11
Heterogeneity	-.05	-.04	-.03	-.03
Perceived "Street" Values	-.26**	-.38**	-.25**	-.32**
"Street" Behaviors	-.64**	---	-.69**	---
Drug Arrest Rate	-.10	-.28**		
Visible Drug Activity			-.00	-.30**
R^2	.86	.76	.86	.76
F	60.23	37.59	58.21	38.62

* $p \leq .05$
** $p \leq .01$

Violent Crime Models

The major focus of this study has been on examining the effects of cultural disorganization on informal social control. The theoretical models presented above do not address the effect of culture as a motivating factor for crime, and therefore we do not expect cultural disorganization to have any direct effects on crime, only indirect effects through collective efficacy.

In the final sets of analyses we briefly examine a community level causal model of violent crime. This model includes the key concepts of the integrated structural and cultural disorganization model of crime control presented above. We begin the analysis with an examination of the total effects of collective efficacy on our three measures of violence: average number of violent crimes witnessed in the neighborhood, percent of households experiencing violent victimization, and the violent crime rate. (Because of the possibility of organizational differences in the recording of crimes across jurisdictions, we include a dummy variable for city whenever the dependent variable is an official crime measure.) We then examine a model that adds the predictors of collective efficacy for the cultural attenuation model, and subsequently for the value heterogeneity model.

As can be seen in Table 3.9 collective efficacy significantly decreases violent crime, regardless of the measure of violence used. Further, as hypothesized the effects of most other variables are mediated through collective efficacy (Table 3.10). In two of the three models of violent crime in Table 3.10, no other variable, besides collective efficacy, significantly affects violence. The findings are somewhat different in the model which examines the violent crime rate. In this model collective efficacy falls just below significance (t=1.86; p=.067) and poverty is found to significantly increase violent crime rates, as well as the dummy variable for city.

Table 3.9. The effect of collective efficacy on violence

	I Average No. Violent Crimes Witnessed	II % HHs with Violent Victimizations	III Violent Crime Rate
Collective Efficacy	-.74**	-.48**	-.42**
Louisville			-.65**
R^2	.54	.23	.46
F	76.42	19.11	27.11

* $p \leq$ .05
** $p \leq$ .01

Table 3.10. An integrated social and cultural disorganization model of violence based on weakened conventional culture.

	I Average No. Violent Crimes Witnessed	II % HHs with Violent Victimizations	III Violent Crime Rate
Collective Efficacy	-.62**	-.57**	-.32$^+$
Poverty	.21	-.03	.30*
Stability	-.05	.06	.06
Heterogeneity	-.11	-.05	.08
Social Ties	-.00	-.02	.14
Perceived Conventional Values	.09	.07	.07
Louisville			-.62**
R^2	.58	.24	.54
F	13.47	3.09	9.64

$^+$ $p \leq$ .10
* $p \leq$ .05
** $p \leq$ .01

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In Table 3.11, we add the drug arrest rate to the models in 3.10, to determine whether drug activity has a direct affect on violent crime rates, in addition to its effect on collective efficacy. In both models of violence based on survey measures, drug arrests do not significantly affect violence. However, when police reports of violent crime are examined, drug arrest rates significantly increase violent crime and substantially diminish the effects of collective efficacy on violent crime rates.

[INSERT TABLE 3.11 ABOUT HERE]

The second approach to cultural disorganization that we discussed was one in which perceived value heterogeneity decreased the likelihood of residents engaging in informal social control. Findings from that model demonstrated that perceived "street" values and "street" behaviors significantly reduced collective efficacy. In the following models we examine whether these variables also have a direct effect on violent crime.

Again, regardless of the measure of violence used, a similar picture appears. These findings suggest that "street" behavior has a positive significant effect on crime rate. However, the collinearity among the variables in this equation, especially between collective efficacy and street behaviors ($r = -.88$), collective efficacy and perceived "street" values ($r = -.71$) and collective efficacy and poverty ($r = -.77$) make the results difficult if not impossible to interpret. To obtain a more precise test of this model, a larger sample size, which would decrease the collinearity problem, would be needed.

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Table 3.11. An integrated social and cultural disorganization model of violence based on weakened conventional culture, with drug activity included.

	I Average No. Violent Crimes Witnessed	II % HHs with Violent Victimizations	III Violent Crime Rate
Collective Efficacy	-.54**	-.50**	-.18
Poverty	.15	-.08	.19
Stability	-.02	.08	.12
Heterogeneity	-.08	-.03	.11
Social Ties	-.01	-.03	.11
Perceived Conventional Values	.07	.05	.04
Drug arrest rates	.04	.14	.32*
Louisville			-.68**
R^2	.54	.25	.58
F	11.85	2.73	9.69

+ $p \leq$ .10
* $p \leq$ .05
** $p \leq$ .01

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Table 3.12. An integrated social and cultural disorganization model of violence based on value heterogeneity.

	I Average No. Violent Crimes Witnessed	II % HHs with Violent Victimizations	III Violent Crime Rate
Collective Efficacy	-.15	-.00	.14
Poverty	.01	-.27	.13
Stability	-.10	-.00	.06
Heterogeneity	-.08	-.01	.08
"Street" Behaviors	.52*	.60*	.51*
Perceived "Street" Values	.12	.22	.04
Louisville			-.65**
R^2	.62	.30	.56
F	15.73	4.28	10.55

* $p \le$ .05
** $p \le$ .01

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CHAPTER 4. CONCLUSIONS

Studies of community level models of crime drew increasing levels of attention at the end of the twentieth century. Social disorganization theory provided a basis for the understanding of variation in crime rates from a structural perspective. Arguing that neighborhood poverty levels, racial heterogeneity, and residential mobility limited social ties and thereby weakened the community's ability to informally control inappropriate behaviors, social disorganization theory began to receive growing empirical support. At about the same time, ethnographic studies of communities once again suggested that the culture within the community played an important role in motivated crime.

Lost between these two perspectives of the structural predictors of social control and the cultural foundation of criminal behavior, has been the important question of how culture affects informal social control. Almost twenty-five years ago Kornhauser (1978) tried to clarify this aspect of social disorganization theory. Unfortunately, much of the attention to Kornhauser's work focused on her arguments for dismissing cultural deviance as a cause of neighborhood variation in criminal offending, and neglected her emphasis on the importance of cultural variation in maintaining informal social control. She referred to this as cultural disorganization. Cultural disorganization refers generally to a weakened culture which is inadequate for providing informal social control.

The current study addresses this important issue of the role of culture in neighborhood levels of informal social control by examining cultural disorganization in terms of both weakened conventional culture and value heterogeneity. Findings from this study suggest support for each of these approaches. Examination of cultural disorganization in terms of weakened conventional culture found that poverty increases,

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and stability decreases, residents' perceived level of conventional values within their neighborhood. Further, the perceived level of conventional values is significantly increased in neighborhoods with more extensive social ties. This supports the assumption within the systemic model of social disorganization theory that social ties are one mechanism through which shared values may be articulated and supported within the community. Perceived conventional values, in turn, are found to be a significant predictor of the level of collective efficacy in the community, mediating some of the effects of poverty and social ties on collective efficacy. These findings suggest that neighborhoods that are high in poverty, and low in social ties are less likely to perceive a high level of agreement with conventional values within their neighborhoods, an indicator of weak culture. Weak cultures do not provide a basis for empowering residents to intervene and informally control inappropriate behaviors. Collective efficacy, in turn, is found to be the most important variable in effecting levels of violent crime.

Some recent research has suggested that the effects of social ties on collective efficacy may be moderated by neighborhood values (see for example Patillo 1998 ; Warner and Wilcox Rountree 1997). That is, to the extent that there is a high level of perceived agreement with conventional values, social ties among neighbors should have even a stronger effect on collective efficacy. Tests of the hypothesis that the level of perceived conventional values may moderate the effect of social ties on collective efficacy, however, were not supported.

Within the context of this weakened culture model, we also examined the role of drugs. While drug activity does not appear to affect the perceived level of conventional values, drug activity was found to have a significant direct effect on collective efficacy.

In neighborhoods with high levels of drug activity collective efficacy is decreased, controlling for the level of perceived conventional values. It may be that in neighborhoods with high visible drug activity residents are too fearful of retaliation to become involved in informal social control of any neighborhood behaviors, even when they perceive most neighbors to share the same values.

The role of culture in informal social control can also be examined in terms not just of weakened agreement with conventional values, but also in terms of value heterogeneity. That is, Anderson (1990; 1999) has argued that in disadvantaged inner-city neighborhoods both "decent" and "street" cultures may co-exist. The coexistence of different value systems may lead to ambiguity in terms of the appropriateness in intervening in non-normative behaviors. Because conventional values were found to be held by the majority of respondents in all neighborhoods, we examined value heterogeneity in terms of the extent to which oppositional values were perceived to be also present in neighborhoods. Findings from these analyses showed that poverty significantly increases perceived "street" values and stability significantly decreases the perception of "street" values, although the effects of stability become non-significant when controlling for the level of respondents' own "street" values. The perception of "street" values is also significantly affected by the presences of "street" behaviors, such as public drunkenness, the use of foul language, loud arguments, and the use of drugs. Unlike the perception of conventional values, however, the perception of "street" values is not affected by social ties. This suggests that the mechanisms through which neighborhood values are determined is different for conventional and "street" values. Specifically, social ties are important in creating the perception of conventional values

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within the neighborhood, but the presence of "street behaviors" conveys the presence of "street" values within the neighborhood, regardless of the levels of social ties. In turn, both the presence of "street" behaviors and perceived "street" values significantly decrease collective efficacy.

While social ties do not affect the level of perceived "street" values, the question remains as to whether social ties may moderate the effect of "street" values on collective efficacy. The statistical significance of the interaction effect of "street" values and social ties on collective efficacy was marginal. Nonetheless, the positive coefficient for this interaction *suggests* that social ties may be most important in neighborhoods with perceived "street" values. In neighborhoods where social ties are more limited, perceptions of "street" values has even a stronger negative impact on collective efficacy. It appears that in neighborhoods where there are many visible cues that suggest values in opposition to conventional values and consequently dampen the likelihood of intervening in appropriate behavior, social ties have a particularly important role to play. Social ties in these neighborhoods may be one of the few mechanisms through which shared conventional values can be made known. Unfortunately, because residents in these neighborhoods *perceive* many of their neighbors to not hold conventional values it may be less likely that neighbors will create social ties on their own. Our findings suggest that it is important that these neighborhoods receive help in establishing *visible* signs of the conventional values that the majority of the residents share. An awareness of shared values would encourage residents to create social ties and these social ties would then enhance informal social control in neighborhoods where there is also a visible presence of "street" values.

We also examined the effect of drug activity on the perception of "street" values, although this was more difficult to do as our measure of "street" behaviors, a significant predictor of "street" values, includes an item on drug use. The findings from these analyses suggest that visible drug activity is one component of "street" behaviors that leads to a perception of "street" values; however, drug activity does not as fully mediate the effects of poverty on perceived "street" values as the more general "street" behaviors measure does. Further, as in the attenuated values model, visible drug activity significantly decreases collective efficacy. Finally, findings from this model show that "street" behaviors are the strongest predictors of violent crime, however, the levels of multicollinearity in this model are very high, with collective efficacy having correlations above .7 with three other independent variables. An accurate assessment of this final model would require a much larger sample to reduce the collinearity problems.

The findings from this study clearly affirm the importance of the role of perceived values in creating collective efficacy within neighborhoods. While the majority of respondents, including those in the most disadvantage neighborhoods in this study, articulated strong agreement with conventional values, neighborhood poverty rates significantly affected the *perception* of values held by neighbors. Poverty significantly decreased the perception of conventional values and significantly increased the perception of "street" values. These perceived values, in turn, are found to be important predictors of the level of collective efficacy within the community. The findings also suggest that perceived conventional values within communities can be strengthened by strengthening neighborhood social ties. While the findings are less clear in terms of "street" values, the marginally significant interaction term of social ties and perceived

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"street" values suggests that strengthening social ties may also be important in terms of dampening the negative effects of perceived "street" values on informal social control.

These findings suggest that it is important to strengthen the awareness and visibility of shared values within the community. An awareness of shared values removes doubt about what is appropriate behavior and increases residents' willingness to intervene. We believe that there is further evidence of the importance of perceived shared values in community behavior from events following the September 11 terrorist activities. Since September 11 American flags are present everywhere—on cars, hanging from houses and pasted on windows. The American anthem is being sung by some of the most popular musicians in a wide variety of widely televised events. This increased display of symbols of American political values makes clear to all that values of freedom and democracy are supported and not to be questioned. This strengthening of the political culture through very visible symbols makes citizens acutely aware of shared values. We would argue that this strengthened culture is one very important element increasing the likelihood of citizens engaging in informal surveillance, questioning suspicious behavior and reporting to the authorities unusual activities.

Our findings on the effects of "street" behavior on crime and collective efficacy parallel findings on disorder (Skogan 1990; Sampson and Raudenbush 1999; Taylor 1997; Wilson and Kelling 1982). The literature on disorder has shown how disorder can lead to more serious crime and has suggested the importance of controlling incivilities within neighborhoods. While the findings here are similar to the findings on disorder, the theoretical frameworks are different. The disorder literature argues that disorder leads to fear due to an interpretation of disorder as "no one is in charge here." The theoretical

framework that we present suggests a deeper rooted problem. That is, we suggest that "street" behaviors (or disorder) lead to the perceived existence of "street" values within the neighborhood. The perception of a value system in opposition to the conventional values actually held by most residents decreases the likelihood of citizen involvement. We suggest further attention should be given to blending the disorder, oppositional culture and structural social disorganization literatures.

While we believe this study has provided an important beginning for encouraging research on cultural disorganization, there are some limitations within the current study that should be noted. First, we would encourage other researchers to develop and test different operationalizations of cultural disorganization. In this study we measure the strength of culture in terms of the extent to which neighborhood residents perceive their neighbors to strongly agree with conventional values. While we believe this captures the essence of the strength of culture, we would encourage others to examine the strength of conventional culture in other ways. For example, Rokeach (1973) argues that values are organized into a value system which prioritizes some values over others. Thus, a value system is an "enduring organization of beliefs concerning preferable modes of conduct or end-states of existence along a continuum of relative importance" (p.5). The strength of culture may be displayed in the extent to which communities uniformly or consistently rank these values.

Value heterogeneity was measured in this study as the extent to which residents perceived neighbors to agree with "street" values. The items used to measure "street" values offer only a limited definition of this concept. In particular, we did not ask questions about the importance of material things, and we did not delve far enough into

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the importance of respect. We encourage other researchers to develop more extensive measures of "street" values. Further, in this study we measure perceived conventional values and perceived "street" values as two distinct variables, while they could be argued to be opposite ends of a value continuum. These two variables are highly (negatively) correlated ($r=-.72$) suggesting that they may be two extremes of a value measure. That is, neighborhoods that are high on perceived conventional values, tend to be low in perceived "street" values and vice-versa. Because these variables are so highly correlated, and because we use them as separate variables, we were not able to include them into one model to examine, for example, whether perceived conventional values is a better predictor of collective efficacy than perceived "street" values.

Another limitation of the study is the cross-sectional nature of the data. Because the data measuring cultural disorganization, social ties, and collective efficacy were all collected in the same survey it is difficult to determine with certainty the causal ordering of some parts of the model proposed here. For example, we suggest that social ties strengthen culture (i.e., increase the perception of conventional values), but it may be that a perception of shared conventional values increases the likelihood of social ties among neighbors. Further we suggest that "street" behaviors, lead to a perception of "street" values that, in turn, decrease collective efficacy, but it may be that weak collective efficacy leads to the emergence of "street" behaviors, which then increases the perception of "street" values. Although we believe that the models we tested fall most logically from the theory presented, definitive answers to questions regarding causal order should be addressed with longitudinal data and examination of possible feedback loops.

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Sample size has also created a limitation in terms of fully addressing important questions regarding interaction effects and the effects of perceived "street values" on crime. Obviously, gathering survey data on a hundred or more neighborhoods becomes quite expensive and one must balance the costs with the benefits to be received. Nonetheless, we believe the findings of a potential interaction effect between "street" values and social ties is worthy of further examination. If the interaction found in this study is genuine, this would suggest the heightened importance of finding ways to develop social ties among residents in those neighborhoods where there is a perception of an oppositional culture.

Finally, working across police jurisdictions (neighborhoods were located in two cities) created some problems with the crime data. While one city was able to provide very detailed information on crime types (e.g., a description plus the specific violation code), the other city was only able to provide general descriptions for the crime incidents. This was particularly problematic in terms of assaults, as we were not able to distinguish between aggravated and simple assaults in this city. We believe this to be the strongest reason for the significance of the city variable in the violent crime equation.

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NOTES

[1] Note that while such a statement evokes elements of strain theory—which have always been a part of social disorganization theory—it is only as Kornhauser (1978:76) points out "insofar as strain effects controls by rendering the societal culture inoperative."

[2] Because the vast majority of respondents perceived their neighbors to either strongly agree or somewhat agree with the conventional items we maximize our variance by using the percentage that strongly agree. Further, because we are concerned with the strength of the conventional culture using the percentage that strongly agree seems to make more sense. On the other hand, the proportion of respondents perceiving their neighbors to either somewhat agree or strongly agree with the "street" values is relatively small. Further, theoretically we are interested in the extent to which "street" values simply exist in communities. Therefore, in measuring "street" values, we include the percentage of residents that perceive their neighbors to strongly agree and somewhat agree to the "street" value items.

[3] While the indicators of neighborhood structure taken from the U.S. Census are now over ten years old, several of these variables are not yet available from the 2000 census. However, we do currently have data on race from the 2000 census for these neighborhoods and the correlation between the 1990 percent white and the 2000 percent white is .94, with the average percent white in 2000 dropping slightly to 46.27. Because of the stability of this measure, we believe the 1990 data are good proxies for the 2000 data, and rather than be inconsistent, using some measures from the 2000 data and some from the 1990 data, we have chosen to use the 1990 census data for the exogenous measures of neighborhood structure.

[4] When racial heterogeneity is replaced with percent black, the positive significant effect remains.

[5] All equations were examined for multicollinearity, outliers and influential cases. The highest variance inflation factor (VIF) for these equations was 1.2 and no outliers or influential cases were found.

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