196854

Domestic Violence Policy: Exploring Impacts on Informing Police, Arresting the Offender, and Deterring Domestic Violence

A Final Report to the National Institution of Justice for Grant # 97WTVX0004

Laura Dugan, Ph.D.

Department of Criminology and Criminal Justice
University of Maryland
2220 LeFrak Hall
College Park, MD 20742

Abstract

The goal of this research is to better understand how a jurisdictions' domestic violence policy profile influences the violent behavior of family members and intimate partners living in the area. Furthermore, in recognition that effective policy can reduce violence by leading more cases into the system, and/or by directing the police to seriously pursue the case, this research also had two secondary objectives: 1) to test the relationship between policy and the likelihood that the police discover an incident, and 2) to examine how policy relates to the likelihood that the police make an arrest. This research addresses all three objectives by combining data on domestic violence laws, police and prosecution policies, and local victim services with that from the geographically identified National Crime Victimization Survey for the years 1992 to 1998. Several logistic models are run to identify the marginal effect of each policy on three outcomes: the probability that the police are informed of a domestic violence incident, the probability that the police make and arrest, and, finally, the probability that a household suffers from at least one form of domestic violence. Results reveal that many policies are related to reduced chances of family or intimate violence, while only a few relate to the police discovering an incident and/or making an arrest.

Narrative

State legislatures have increasingly passed statutes authorizing participants of the criminal justice system to pursue domestic violence offenders more aggressively (Harvard Law Review, 1993; Dugan, Nagin, Rosenfeld, 2000). Domestic violence policies are designed to either reduce subsequent violence after an incident (e.g., statues authorizing the courts to issue protection orders) or to deter potential violence (e.g., changing domestic violence offenses from misdemeanors to felonies) (Harvard Law Review, 1993). Pursuant to these goals one would also expect domestic violence policy to impact victims' reporting behavior and police officers' arresting. While these recent proactive statutes have received widespread public support and attention, there is a scarcity of research that assesses their efficacy.

Limitations in crime-related data sources preclude analysts from accurately measuring behavioral outcomes resulting from policy changes (Crowell and Burgess, 1996). For instance, the Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) only reports offenses in which an arrest was made. Since higher arrest rates are likely consequential to directives promoting arrest, UCR analyses could show an increase in domestic disturbances after policy implementation, which could hide the true impact of these policies. A second source of crime data is generated from the National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS) which is administered randomly to a sample of US residents. Respondents are questioned about their experiences as crime victims, including those incidents that do not involve the police. However, because confidentiality restrictions suppress geographic identifiers, it has been impossible to link policy information to particular respondents or incidents. To remedy this, the government has recently changed procedure so "sworn-in" researchers

can access the geocoded NCVS data under strict protocols that preserves confidentiality. This research is conducted on the geocoded NCVS data.

Knowing the policy profile of the localities where specific family or intimate crimes were committed is crucial if we are to more fully understand how policy relates to violent outcomes. By linking policy to NCVS data, this research is the first to estimate policy impacts on the likelihood that a household suffers from domestic violence. Two implied policy-related steps that could lead to reduced violence are, first, getting an individual to report domestic violence and, second, getting officers to arrest once an incident is reported. While past research has explored many factors that influence reporting and arrest behavior, no study, to date has specifically assessed the impact of domestic violence policies and laws on both actions across multiple jurisdictions.[1] Using NCVS data with geographical identifiers, this study will measure the impact of several domestic violence policies on reporting behavior, police arrests and ultimately domestic violence itself.

On Informing Police

Policy is unlikely to deter recurring domestic violence if the offenders are unknown to the police. As the most common first contact, police generally become aware of a crime from the victim or a third party (Felson, Messner, and Hoskin, 1999; Berk, Berk, Newton, and Loseke, 1984).[2] However, evidence suggests that police are less likely to be informed of violent accounts perpetrated by family members or intimate

---

[1] Several studies have estimated how changes in rape reform relate to reporting and convicting rape offenders (Bachman, 1998).

partners than by other offenders (Felson, et. al., 1999; Skogan, 1984). In attempts to better understand reporting behavior researchers have explored how situational and individual characteristics of victims and offenders affect the likelihood that the police are contacted (Felson, et. al., 1999; Abel and Suh, 1987; Johnson, 1990; Bachman and Coker, 1995). Using NCVS incidents where females were violently victimized by male intimates between 1987 and 1992, Bachman and Coker (1995) found that police were informed of the crime in 56 percent of the cases. Furthermore, victims who were black or injured were more likely to report the incident to the police (see, also, Kantor and Straus, 1990; and Bachman, 1998).

Bachman and Coker (1995) also found that women are less likely to seek police help if the perpetrator had previously victimized them. They suggest this finding may be partially explained by "learned helplessness" found in women who are battered over time (see Walker, 1979, 1984). Another plausible explanation is that previously victimized women may have been disappointed by earlier criminal justice responses. Fleury, Sullivan, Bybee, and Davidson (1998) found that in their sample battered women were generally disappointed with police response to the crime. Conaway and Lohr (1994) used longitudinally linked NCVS data to show that victims (including non-domestics) are more likely to report a crime to the police if by reporting an earlier incident someone was arrested or property was recovered. To better understand victims' decision-making processes, Fleury, et. al., (1998) directly ask victims recruited from a battered women's shelter the reasons they chose not to call the police. Sixty-four percent of the victims had

---

[2] Felson, et. al. (1999) also report that third party calls are less common among cases of domestic violence, especially between intimates, because such events are less likely to be witnessed.

no confidence that the police would help. These findings suggest that victims who are satisfied with previous police response may be more likely to seek criminal justice support. This further implies that if officers proactively pursue domestic violence cases, victims will be more willing to report offenders.

While the above research does not specifically assess policy, it does suggest how policy might affect reporting decisions. In the current study, policies that encourage officers to treat domestic violence seriously are hypothesized to increase the likelihood that police discover an incident. I estimate policy effects on informing the police of a domestic violence incident. Secondarily, because police can discover an incident from a number of sources, this research also estimates the policy effects on victim reporting and on the police discovering the event some other way.

On Arresting Offenders

As discussed above, policy is unlikely to reduce incidence of domestic violence, if reported cases are not taken seriously by the police (Fleury et. al., 1998; Conaway and Lohr, 1994). One indication that the police are taking a case seriously is if an arrest is made. Earlier writings on police arresting behavior postulate a thesis claiming that officers are disinclined to arrest individuals if the offender is the victims' husband (Dobash and Dobash, 1979; Martin, 1976). Research testing the "leniency thesis" is mixed. Some studies found that the circumstances surrounding the violence are stronger predictors of arrest than the victim and offender relationship (Berk and Loseke, 1981; Oppenlander, 1982; Smith and Klein, 1984; Worden and Pollitz, 1984; Klinger, 1995). However, in a more recent analysis using data from 392 violent attacks, Fyfe, Klinger,

and Flavin (1997) found that, indeed, officers were less likely to arrest if the offender was a male married to his victim, leaving this question still definitively unanswered.

Recently, laws and policies have been adopted that encourage or mandate police to arrest domestic violence offenders when probable cause is apparent. Robinson (2000) points out that domestic violence training and pro-arrest response policies are now incorporated into the standard curricula of many police departments (see, also Dugan et. al., 2000). Still, little research examines how state laws and local police policy influence officers' arresting behavior when called domestic scenes (Robinson, 2000; Ferraro, 1989; Black, 1971). Two important studies examine police arrest behavior after policy changes. Ferarro (1989) and several colleagues rode with officers after the Phoenix police department adopted a presumptive arrest policy, and found that of the 69 "family fight calls," only 9 ended in arrest, despite the policy.[3] More recently, Jones and Belknap (1999) found that 74 percent of cases in Boulder, Colorado ended in arrest, complying with the department's pro-arrest policy.

To date, no research has compared arrest decisions in jurisdictions with and without mandatory or preferred arrest policies. Robinson (2000) approaches this by hypothesizing that officers arresting behavior is dependent on the attitudinal schema that was in place during the period in which they were hired. Those hired prior to the adoption of a pro-arrest policy may be less likely to arrest because their schemata were formed during a period when domestic violence was considered a family matter and arrest was discouraged. While Robinson found no statistical arrest differences between

---

[3] In May, 1984, Phoenix police department adopted a policy stating that "... When probably cause exists, an arrest should be made even if a misdemeanor offense did not occur in the officer's presence..." (Ferarro, 1989: 63).

officers hired pre- or post-policy, those hired before the policy were more skeptical about victims' willingness to prosecute. This implies that overall changes in officers' willingness to adhere to policy is likely to grow over time.

The current research improves upon those illustrated above by examining the arresting behavior of officers with and without laws and polices promoting arrest across multiple jurisdictions. Additionally, it controls for victim, offender, and situational characteristics already found important in earlier research (Berk and Loske, 1981; Smith, 1987; Klinger, 1995; Bachman and Coker, 1995; Fyfe, et. al., 1997; Kane, 1999; Melton, 1999; Robinson and Chandek, 2000).

On Deterring Domestic Violence

Although both reporting and arrest behavior is important, domestic violence policy is ultimately aimed at reducing violence. To date two research strategies dominate the literature examining policy effects on domestic violence. The first relies upon experimental or observational data that includes only individuals known to be victimized by an intimate partner or family member. Tolman and Weiss (1995) use official police and court records in a jurisdiction with strict policy to examine the relationship between arrest and successful prosecution on the likelihood that the offender recidivates (see, also, Berk, Newton, and Berk, 1986; Sullivan and Bybee, 1999). They found that arrested persons without a prior record of abuse are most likely to refrain from further abuse.

A series of arrest experiments sponsored by the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) produced mixed results leaving policy-makers unsure of the efficacy of mandatory arrest laws and pro-arrest policies (Garner, Fagan, and Maxwell, 1995). The much publicized evaluations conducted by Sherman and Berk (1984) and five other research teams on the

impact of arrest on subsequent violence also focused only on already violent homes in specific jurisdictions.[4] The original Sherman and Berk finding led to a wide-spread adoption of pro- and mandatory-arrest policies throughout the nation. However, replication studies found that by arresting offenders, police may not be providing additional protection to the victim. In fact, one study found that arrest may increase offenders proclivity towards future violence (Hirshel, Hutchinson, Dean, Kelley, and Pesackis, 1990). Sherman concludes that the efficacy of re-offense depends highly on the perpetrators' "stake-in-conformity"(Sherman, 1992).

The above observational and experimental research is limited in three important ways that restrict the authors' abilities to generalize the findings. First, because they rely on official records to identify the sample and to record offending, information is missing on households that fail to enter the criminal justice or social service systems. Second, by only examining victims, the findings fail to inform readers if the policy deters potential perpetrators without prior offenses. Third, because each experiment was limited to one jurisdiction it is challenging to generalize the results to other regions (Sherman, 1992). The current research addresses all three limitations by using data from a nationally representative survey of victims and non-victims who may or may not have had criminal justice contact.

A second strategy in policy research aggregates information on all persons living in specific localities to examine policy impacts on rates of intimate partner homicide (Browne and Williams, 1989; Dugan, Nagin, and Rosenfeld, 1999, 2000). By examining

---

[4] Sherman and Berk, 1984; Sherman, Schmidt, Rogan, Smith, Gartin, Collins, and Bacich, 1992; Dunford, Huizinga, and Elliott, 1990; Hirshel, Hutchinson, Dean, Kelley, and Pesackis, 1990; Berk, Campbell, Klap, and Western, 1992; Pate and Hamilton, 1992.

domestic violence policy effects with aggregated data, conclusions are drawn based on the experiences of both victims and non-victims. Aggregated intimate partner homicide research relies on evidence that a large number of these killings resulted from homes where partner abuse if prevalent (Smith and Stanko, 1998; Browne, Williams, and Dutton, 1998; Campbell, 1992; Geotting, 1995). Browne and Williams (1989) examined how state-wide measures of domestic violence services relate to spousal homicide. They found that greater service availability is significantly associated with lower rates of married women killing their husbands, suggesting that these services may reduce incidence of violence. This finding was replicated in a longitudinal analysis of domestic violence services in 29 large US cities. Dugan, et. al. (1999) found that increases in legal advocacy services are associated with reduced victimization for married men, but not for women. A larger study expanded this sample to 48 US cities and examined the association of several domestic violence laws, policies, and services on the homicide victimization by gender, marital status, and race over a 20 year period (Dugan, et. al., 2000). It found that domestic violence resources can positively or negatively relate to homicide depending on the type of policy and the type of victim.

The above aggregate studies inform policy-makers of overall patterns in relationships, however, this type of research design also has three important limitations that prohibit strong conclusions. First, by only studying homicide, outcomes are restricted to only a small portion of domestic violence cases—those ending in death. Results can only suggest policy impacts on homicide. Non-lethal behavioral responses to policy may be more sensitive than homicidal outcomes. The second limitation is inherent to aggregated research. Household or individual characteristics cannot be directly linked

to domestic violence participants. For example, we cannot conclude that educated persons are less likely to kill an intimate because cities with a high percent of well educated residents have lower homicide rates. Third, by aggregating cases to geographic units, information on the process relating individual behavior to policy is missing. Coefficient estimates fail to tell us if a policy effect is due to changes in the likelihood that an individual will access the system, to the accuracy in which a policy is implemented, or both. This research improves upon the above aggregate analyses by directly testing how policy relates to the non-lethal domestic violence victimization experiences of a large number of US households while controlling for important household characteristics.

Domestic Violence Policy[5]

Policies examined in this research include domestic violence laws, police and prosecution policies, and local victim services. Many of the selected resources relate to protection orders which are legally binding court orders that prohibit assailants from further abusing victims. A recent US national survey found that only 36.6% of the women who were assaulted by an intimate were issued protection orders (Tjaden and Thoennes, 2000a). Most states have statutory provisions allowing orders to direct the assailant to refrain from having *any* contact with the victim. The purpose of "no-contact" protection orders is not to punish the offender for past conduct, but to prevent future assaults (Harvard Law Review, 1993). Other statutory provisions are designed to allow

[5] Except where indicated otherwise, the material in the following sections is drawn from personal communication with Dawn Henry and Barbara Hart of the Pennsylvania Coalition Against Domestic Violence and staff members of the Women's Center and Shelter of Greater Pittsburgh.

judges to customize protection orders to better suit the needs of each case. For example, if the parties are parents, the order may require that immediate custody of the children be granted to victims. A third type of statute reinforces the order by strengthening the sanctions towards violators. Potential offenders may refrain from further contact, if violating the order would incarcerate them on felony charges.

State Statutes

Several key provisions are examined. The first expands the eligibility of protection orders to cover victims who do not live with the abuser, *beyond cohabitation. Custody* is a second provision that strengthens protection by authorizing judges to award temporary custody of children to the victim after an order is issued. Five legal provisions relate to the consequence of violating an order. Violation of a protection order can be classified as *a misdemeanor, contempt (either civil or criminal), or a felony* depending on, among other things, the provision that was violated.[6] The *firearm confiscation* provision is a controversial state law that requires offenders to relinquish all weapons once convicted for a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence. Finally, some states mandate police officers to arrest offenders who violate orders. *Mandatory arrest* provisions, in principle, eliminate the police officer's discretion in making an arrest once probable cause is established.

---

[6] For purposes of this study, we examine the type of violation that corresponds with the no-contact provision.

Local Resources

Three types of local resources are examined: police, prosecution, and service providers. Local police departments began to adopt *pro-arrest* and *mandatory policies* encouraging or requiring officers to arrest violators of protection orders. Some police departments accompany statutory powers with policies and procedures that provide guidance for police response. *Police domestic violence units* may employ social workers or counselors who are trained for crisis intervention. Many include police officers who handle all domestic violence calls, either at the time of the call or as follow-up to the immediate police response. *In-service training* equips officers with knowledge and skills needed for effective response and reinforces departmental norms to treat domestic assault seriously.

A second important component of the effectiveness of the criminal justice response to domestic violence is the local prosecutor's office. Three aspects of prosecution can more safely support victims: *specialized domestic violence units, legal advocates on staff*, and the absence of a "*no drop" policy*. While a no-drop policy assures that a case will be prosecuted regardless of victims' preferences, it also prohibits victims from withdrawing complaints that may put them in greater danger (Ferraro, 1995).

The third resource is available through local domestic violence agencies. *Hotlines* are among the earliest domestic violence services and for many victims constitute the first and sometimes only contact with a city's network of protective services, including legal advocacy and police and prosecutorial services (Dugan et. al., 1999:194). Where

hotlines are prevalent, access to more targeted domestic violence resources should be greater.

Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC)

This research also examines the association of benefits provided by AFDC to household violence and reporting because changes in welfare support could affect a victim's dependency on an abuser. AFDC is a federal welfare cash grant program established in 1935 to aid needy children without fathers. The program grew to provide payments to children who have been deprived of parental support due to one parent's absence, incapacitation, or unemployment (House Ways and Means Committee, 1996).[7] The key feature of interest is that this program provides financial resources to low-income women and their children once they leave the abuser. Therefore, as fewer welfare benefits are available to single parent households, a battered woman may feel financially "stuck" in an abusive partnership. Dugan et. al., (2000) found that drops in AFDC are associated with increase in homicide risk for some intimate partners.

In summary, I expect that most domestic violence policy will be positively related to the probability that the police will be informed of the incident. Furthermore, it is expected that policies encouraging arrest will be related to an increased probability that officers arrest. Finally, I hypothesize that domestic violence policy will be associated with a decreased probability that a family member or intimate partner will violently victimize a household member. Since previous evidence suggests that some criminal

[7] This cash is also granted to the children's caretaker.

justice behavior may lead to increased violence, all tests will be two-tailed (Dugan, et. al., 2000; Hirshel, et. al., 1990; Sherman, 1992).

Data and Methodology

Three series of analyses are conducted. The first is conducted at the incident-level and only includes violent incidents where the offender was a family member or intimate partner (current or ex). The purpose is to examine policy effects on the probability that the police are informed of the crime. The second series is also conducted at the incident-level and only includes cases in which the police were informed of the incident. Estimates are generated to predict the policy effects on whether or not an arrest is made. The final analysis is conducted at the household-level and uses households with both victims and non-victims as the sampling unit. By structuring the sample this way, it is possible to estimate policy effects on the likelihood of victimization while controlling for individual and family characteristics.

Data

National Crime Victimization Survey Data

The NCVS, sponsored by the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS), is the second largest ongoing government-run U.S. survey (Bachman, 2000). Since 1972, the NCVS has collected rich information from residents 12 years and older living in randomly selected housing units. In addition to detailed information on each household and individual, respondents report their experiences of criminal victimization and its consequences during the six months prior to the interview. It is ongoing going survey that uses a rotating panel designed to interview residents in select housing units seven

times within a three-year period. Every six months a subgroup of housing units is interviewed for the first time and another subgroup is interviewed for the last time. Data collected from the first set of interviews are used only for bounding purposes, not for analysis or estimation. Bounded interviews provide a reference point to the respondents in the following interview to reduce the chances that they will report about crimes committed prior to the six-month window (ICPSR, 1997).

All dependent variables and many of the independent variables are created from the responses to the NCVS from January 1992 to June 1998.[8] Because the accuracy of all survey data relies on how well the survey is designed, how clearly and truthfully humans communicate, as well as how dependably each resident participates in the survey, survey data is inherently fallible. For this reason several issues related to the survey design will be considered in the methodology of this research.

Informing Police and Arrest

Two levels of dependent variables are constructed with incident-level data to show contact with the criminal justice system. The first refers to whether and how the police were informed of the violence. More generally one variable indicates whether the *police were informed*, depending on how the victim responded to the survey question, "Were the police informed or did they find out about this incident in another way? (ICPSR, 1997, 251-252)" Two remaining variables refer to how the police found out about the incident. One indicates if the *victim reported* the incident, and the other shows if the police were an informed *another way* (see Table 1).

---

[8] The data is from the redesigned NCVS survey.

The second incident-level dependent variable is an indicator as to whether an *arrest* was made. The survey question asks the victim or proxy, "As far as you know, was anyone arrested or were charges brought against anyone in connection with this incident? (ICPSR 1997, 279)" Unfortunately, the question fails to specify who was arrested, and a "yes" response may refer to someone other than the offender. Keeping this caveat in mind, the analysis assumes that the party was the offender.

--Insert Table 1 About Here--

Deterring Violence

NCVS data was aggregated to the household-level, and a dichotomized dependent variable was constructed indicating whether any household member was violently victimized by a family member or an intimate partner within the prior six-month period. Because domestic violence is often not considered a crime, or is sometimes perceived by its victims as stigmatized, some victims are reluctant to report incidents to the interviewer. For this reason, the dependent variable is generated from the joint probability that a household member was victimized and reported the crime to the survey interviewer. Violent victimizations include completed and attempted incidents of rape, robbery, and aggravated assault, simple assault, sexual attack with serious assault or minor assault, threatened assault with weapon, sexual assault without injury, unwanted sexual contact without force, assault without weapon or injury, verbal threats of rape, sexual assault, or assault, and completed burglary with unlawful entry with or without force. Four categories of domestic violence are constructed according to the victim's relationship to the offender. The first and most general includes all cases of *domestic violence* in which there was only one offender and he or she was a spouse, ex-spouse,

parent, step parent, child, step child, sibling, other relative, boy/girlfriend, or ex boy/girlfriend.[9] The second general category is that of *intimate violence*. This includes cases where at least one household member was victimized by a married or unmarried partner or ex-partner. The final two classifications separate intimate violence by marital status. *Spousal violence* includes spouses and ex-spouses, and *boy/girlfriend violence* includes cases where the offender was a current or ex boyfriend or girlfriend. A summary of all dependent variables is found in Table 1.

Policy Data

Two types of policy data are used according to their availability. Information on state statutes are available for all 50 states and can therefore be linked to all respondents to the NCVS during the period of interest. Information on Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) and policies found in local police departments, prosecutor offices, and domestic violence agencies are only available for 48 of the largest 50 cities. Therefore secondary analyses using restricted samples are conducted to examine effects of relevant variables from the larger models and the local policy variables on all three outcomes.

---

[9] Because children under the age of 12 are omitted from the sample, some cases of child abuse are not measured in this study. Additionally, if an adult household member objects to a 12 or 13 year old member being interviewed, then that or another member will serve as a proxy and respond to the questions for the child. If the proxy interviewer is unaware of the child's victimization or is invested in keeping the crime a secret, it is unlikely that those incidents will be reported to the interviewer. Finally, if a particular household member is physically or mentally unable to answer the questions, or is temporarily absent and not expected to return before the closeout date, the interviewer will accept information from another knowledgeable household member. All proxy interviews can reduce the chances that an actual incident is recorded in the NCVS.

State Statutes

Longitudinal data on state statutes related to protection orders were collected by a legal expert for all 50 states. The statutory provisions used in the current research include *beyond cohabitation*, *custody*, *felony*, *contempt*, *misdemeanor*, *firearm confiscation*, and *mandatory arrest* during the years 1991 to 1997. Contempt and misdemeanor are combined to index the discretion of the judge to sentencing outcomes. See Table 2.

--Insert Table 2 About Here--

Local Policy

The crux of the data collection strategy was to seek out informants within the local agencies of the 50 largest cities and ask them to complete a survey inventorying policies or activities by type and year of implementation.[10] Completed surveys were received with no missing data on prosecutor policies for all 50 cities, police policies for all but New York and Charlotte, NC, and domestic violence services for all but New York, yielding a final sample of 48 cities. Although the accuracy of the information depends on the quality and extensiveness of agency record-keeping, the strategy was to minimize measurement error by identifying the person(s) best positioned in the agency to answer our questions, and by phrasing the questions in a standardized format, typically calling for a simple "yes/no" response. (The survey instruments for the local agencies and the coding protocol for the state statutes are available from the author by request.)

---

[10] The data on state statutes was compiled in 1998 by the Pennsylvania Coalition Against Domestic Violence and Julie Kunce Field. The Women's Center & Shelter of Greater Pittsburgh (WC&S) and the Pittsburgh Police collected information on changes over time in domestic violence services and local police and prosecution policies. Even though repeated call-backs were required in some cases, response rates were impressively high, especially given the long time span for which we requested detailed information.

Three measures of domestic violence resources shown in Table 2. The first is a direct measure showing the availability of *hotlines* in a city. The second is an index that measures components of local *police policy*, including police arrest directives, the presence of domestic violence units, and training in police agencies. The final is an index of *prosecution policy* showing the presence of domestic violence units, legal advocates on staff, and the absence of a "no-drop" policy.

AFDC

Conventional practice in welfare analysis was followed by measuring AFDC benefit levels based on the benefit received by a family of four persons. All figures are adjusted to 1983 dollars using the consumer price index. Data on state AFDC benefits were obtained from annual versions of the "green book" compiled by the House Ways and Means Committee (1996).[11]

Control Variables

Because factors other than policy influence reporting, arrest, and violent behavior, several control variables were constructed from NCVS data. The incident-level characteristics shown in Table 3 are used to more precisely estimate relationships between policy and the likelihood that the police are informed of an event and the likelihood that the police make an arrest. These variables describe either the victim, the offender, the incident, or the location. Household-level characteristics are displayed in Table 4. These control variables are predominantly used in the models that examine

---

[11] Data on 1995 AFDC benefit levels were missing. In all but eight cases, the 1994 benefit level was equal to the 1996 level, and we used that value for 1995. For the eight states where the 1994 and 1996 benefit levels differed, we used the average of the two for the 1995 level.

policy impacts on violence. In cases where an individual is described, such as *white*, traits of the reference person are measured. This is the person who is identified as owning or renting the living quarters. Household characteristics were selected because they either are related to the household's stability, likelihood of exposure to violence, or demographics already found to be related to violence. Also, several variables were created to control for survey characteristics that could affect the likelihood that the victim reports the crime to the survey interviewer.

--Insert Table 3 About Here--

Methodology

The primary goal of this research is to identify policy factors that are associated with the probability that a household member is violently victimized by a family member or intimate partner. In order to understand the process relating policy to deterrence, this research first pursues two secondary goals: to estimate the policy impact related to 1) the probability that the police are informed a domestic violence incident, given that it happened, and 2) the probability that the police made an arrest, given that they were informed of the incident. The sequential conditioning of the above three events dictates that a more restricted data set be used for each outcome. Data sets for each outcome are summarized in Figure 1.

--Insert Figure 1 About Here--

Furthermore, policy data describing statute provisions are available for the entire sample through 1997, while AFDC and local policy data are only available for 48 cities through 1996. For this reason, a second series of data sets are constructed that contain only information from the 48 cities. Models based on the 48 city samples use fewer

explanatory variables depending on their adherence to confidentiality restrictions. There are six data sets in total.

Informing Police

Logistic models are used to estimate policy coefficients associated with outcomes measuring if and how police are informed of the incident, while controlling for other important incident-level characteristics. The model generated from the total sample uses the three dependent variables described in Table 1, 1) if the police are informed, 2) if the victim reported the incident to the police, and 3) if the police discovered the incident another way (see Berk, et. al., 1984).[12] Equation 1 shows the form of the logistic model used to estimate the probability that an incident was reported to the police. The model was weighted with the normalized incident weight which was created by dividing the incident weight by the average weight of all incidents.

$$P(Police\ \ Informed = 1) = \frac{\exp(\beta_0 + \beta_1 Policy + \beta_2 Control + \beta_3 Time)}{1 + \exp(\beta_0 + \beta_1 Policy + \beta_2 Control + \beta_3 Time)} \qquad (1)$$

Police Informed represents a vector of dependent variables described in Table 1. *Policy* represents one of two vectors of policy variables depending on which sample is used. The models using the full sample use all four state provision variables described in Table 2. The sample based on 48 cities uses all statutes except for *Felony* and additionally includes *AFDC*, *Hotlines*, *Policy Index*, and *Prosecution Index*, all described in Table 2.

---

[12] Because the sample size is reduced significantly when examining only the 48 cities, only the first outcome is modeled.

The *Control* vector includes characteristics describing the victim, offender, and incident. Victim characteristics in the model using the total sample includes all variables listed under victim in Table 3—*Age, Female, Separated, Young Children, White, Hispanic, College,* and *Job* (see Felson, et. al., 1999; Bachman, 1998; Johnson, 1990; Bachman and Coker, 1995; Conaway and Lohr, 1994; Berk, et. al., 1984; Rennison and Welchans, 2000). The smaller sample omits *Hispanic.* Offender characteristics in the larger model include *Spouse, Parent, Child, Sibling, Other Family, Gang, Drugs or Alcohol, Previous Offense,* and *Similar Race* (see Felson, et. al., 1999; Bachman, 1998; Conaway and Lohr, 1994; Berk, et. al., 1984). The model based on the smaller sample replaces the specific categories of immediate family members with *Immediate Family* (excluding spouse) an omits *Gang.* The incident characteristics in the larger model include *Weapon, Injury, Others Present, Robbery,* and *Unlawful Entry* (see Skogan, 1984; see Felson, et. al., 1999; Bachman, 1998; Johnson, 1990; Bachman and Coker, 1995; Conaway and Lohr, 1994; Berk, et. al., 1984). The model using the smaller sample omits *Weapon*, and uses *Assault* instead of *Robbery* and *Unlawful Entry.* Location Characteristics in the larger model include the *Urban, South,* and *Public* (see Bachman, 1998). The smaller sample omits *Urban*, since all data are drawn from urban areas. Finally, the *Time* vector includes year dummies and the *Interview Period.*

Arrest

The logistic model used to estimate selected policy coefficients associated with arrest is shown in equation 2. As with equation 1, policy effects are estimated after controlling for victim, offender, incident, location, and time related factors. The *Policy* vector using data from all sampled U.S. households includes three of the six statute

provisions—*Discretion Index, Felony,* and *Mandatory Arrest.* The model for the smaller sample omits *Felony*, but includes the *Police Index*. The model was weighted with the normalized incident weight which was created by dividing the incident weight by the average weight of all incidents.

$$P(Arrest = 1) = \frac{\exp(\beta_0 + \beta_1 Policy + \beta_2 Control + \beta_3 Time)}{1 + \exp(\beta_0 + \beta_1 Policy + \beta_2 Control + \beta_3 Time)} \quad (2)$$

The *Control* vector consists of most of the characteristics describing the victim, offender, and incident as in the reporting model with a few additional variables. Offender characteristics also include *Same Gender,* the incident characteristics include *Victim Reported* and *Within Hour,* and location omits *Public.*[13] As with the above model, the model based on the smaller sample omit some control variables.

Deterring Violence

Logistic models are used to estimate policy, control, survey design, and time coefficients associated with four different outcomes of domestic violence. As described in Table 1, the dependent variables are dichotomous outcomes identifying households with domestic violence, intimate violence, spousal violence, or boy/girlfriend violence. Equation 3 shows the form of the logistic model used to estimate the probability that a household suffers from some form of domestic violence. As noted above, because of inherent fallibility associated with survey data, the dependent variables are generated from the joint probability that the incident occurred and the victim declared it to the

---

[13] Literature on how the control variables should effect arrest includes the following citations, Berk and Loske (1981), Klinger (1995), Fyfe, et. al. (1997), Kane (1999), Melton (1999), Robinson and Chandek (2000).

interviewer. The model was weighted with the normalized household weight which was created by dividing the household weight by the average weight of all households.

$$P(Violence = 1) = \frac{\exp(\beta_0 + \beta_1 Policy_{t-0.5} + \beta_2 Control + \beta_3 Survey + \beta_4 Year)}{1 + \exp(\beta_0 + \beta_1 Policy_{t-0.5} + \beta_2 Control + \beta_3 Survey + \beta_4 Year)} \quad (3)$$

Violence represents a vector of dependent variables described in Table 1. The *Policy* vector using data from all sampled U.S. households includes all six statute provisions. The model for the smaller sample omits the *Felony* variable, but includes all four local policy measures: *AFDC*, *Hotlines*, *Legal Advocacy*, *Police Index*, and *Prosecution Index*. Note that all policies are measured during the year, t – 0.05. This is to accommodate the six month reporting window in NCVS data.

The *Control* vector consists of household characteristics that are described in Table 4. Each relates to either household stability, opportunity for violence, demographics, or survey issues. The stability variables that are expected to be related to less violence include *Months, Own Home,* and *College* (Rennison and Welchans, 2000).[14] The remaining stability variables are expected to be related to more violence since they describe less stable households—*Low Income, Public Housing, Other Units, Separated/Divorced,* and *Lone with Child* (Rennison and Welchans, 2000; Allard, Albelda, Colten, and Cosenza, 1997). The opportunity variables either describe less opportunity for violence—*Alone, Male Out,* and *Female Out*—or more, *Female Not Shopping*. Demographics include *White, Hispanic, Over 60, Urban,* and *South* (Tjaden

[14] Some respondents failed to report the number of months at the current address. To avoid missing data, those values were set at zero and an indicator was created to control for victimization differences between those and other households.

and Theonnes, 2000b; Rennison and Welchans, 2000). The 48-city sample omits *Missing Month*, *Over 60*, *Urban*, and *Public Housing*.

Survey is a vector of interview characteristics that could relate to whether or not a victim informs the survey interviewer of a domestic violence incident. Because NCVS responses rely on the willingness of each individual to accurately report incidents to the interviewer three potential sources of bias are controlled for 1) attrition, 2) respondent fatigue, and 3) proxy ignorance or reluctance. Both the large and small samples include the *Survey* variables *Proxy*, *Unbounded*, and *Interview Period*, for reasons described below.

As discussed in footnote nine, when another person answers the survey questions for an absent or unable respondent, important information, including relevant violent incidents may be omitted. For this reason, the indicator *Proxy* is placed in the model to control for households with at least one proxy interview. It is expected that households with at least one proxy interview will have, on average, fewer incidents, and will, therefore, be negatively related to the probability of violence.

Since households residing in sampled housing units are interviewed over a three year period, some will move during the period that they are designated to be in the sample. Using National Crime Survey (NCS) data from the middle 1980s to 1990, Dugan (1999) shows that about 23 percent of the households interviewed in period one (not including the bounded interview) move before their final interview.[15] While those households are usually replaced, data from the replacement households are "unbounded."

---

[15] National Crime Survey is the name of the National Crime Victimization Survey prior to the 1992 redesign.

Bounding interviews provide a reference point to respondents reducing the chances that they report crimes that were committed before the six-month reference period. Therefore, unbounded interviews are likely to contain more incidents than those that actually happened during the previous six months. Biderman and Cantor (1984) used early NCS data and estimated that unbounded households inflate victimization rates by more than 10% (117.5 to 131.89). To control for this type of bias, *Unbounded* is added to the model.

Another source of bias also relates to the repeated interview design. Since all housing units have seven interview periods, the longer each unit is in the sample, the more likely its occupants have been interviewed multiple times. One consequence is that victimization rates may appear to decrease the longer the household is in the sample because "older" households may be more reluctant to report incidents to the survey interviewer (Bidderman and Cantor, 1984). "Respondent fatigue" can result from a loss of interest, an accumulation of burden, or other conditions that make later interviews less novel. For instance, the respondent now knows that if he or she mentions an incident during the screening questions, another batch of lengthy questions will be asked substantially extending the length of the interview. To control for this type of bias, *Interview Period* is included in the model.

Results

In total, 529,829 households were interviewed using the revised NCVS between January 1992 and June 1998.[16] From those, 2,873, or 0.5 percent, reported at least one incident of domestic violence (unweighted). Between January 1992 and December 1997, 3,508 domestic violence incidents were recorded using the revised NCVS. Police were informed of less than half of them, 1,730 (unweighted), suggesting that the "dark figure" in domestic violence (the difference between what happens and what is reported) is at least twice that of what is known to the police. A little more than a third of the violent domestic situations where police were involved resulted in arrest, 594 (unweighted). Specifically, one out of every two incidents gets reported to the police, and one out of every six ends in arrest.

In the sampled households from the 48 cities, 63,004 were interviewed using the revised NCVS between January 1992 and June 1998. From those, 339 households (0.5 percent) reported at least one incident of domestic violence (unweighted). Between January 1992 and December 1996, 427 domestic violence incidents were recorded using the revised NCVS. Police were informed of more than half of them, 222 (unweighted). Close to one-third of the violent domestic situations where police were involved resulted in arrest, 62 (unweighted).

Informing Police

When the police discovered a domestic violence offense, it was most likely to have been reported by the victim (70 percent). In the remaining 30 percent of the

incidents, the police were most likely to have discovered the event through a third party (about 85 percent).

The results from the three logistic models are shown in Table 5. Each column displays the coefficient estimates with their standard errors below and their exponents (odds ratios) next to them. The coefficient and standard errors are included to show the direction of the association and its degree of significance. Odds ratios are included to compare effects across independent and dependent variables. For example, by looking at the odds ratios for *Female* in all three outcomes, we see that the odds that police discover a domestic violence episode if the victim was a female are 1.262 times higher than if the victim was male. The odds that female victims report a violent victimization by an intimate are 1.741 higher than male victims. And finally, the odds that incidents are reported to the police by a third party if the victim is a female are 0.574 times as high than if the victim were male.

--Insert Table 5 About Here--

The victim characteristics that are associated with an increased likelihood that the police are informed of an incident are older victims, female, those with young children, and those who are Hispanic. Victims are more likely to report an incident to the police if they are separated or divorced. However, the victim's marital status is likely to deter third parties from calling the police after an incident, nullifying the overall chances that a the police will be informed of a violent domestic incident involving a victim is separated

---

[16] Because this research only uses data from the revised NCVS, fewer households from 1992 and 1993 are included in the data, the years that only a portion of the sample got the revised survey intrument.

or divorced. Finally, police are less likely to discover a domestic violence incident if the victim is white.

Three offender characteristics are associated with an increased possibility that the police will discover the violent domestic episode. Police are more likely to be informed of offenders whose minds are altered by substance, those who have previously committed a similar offense towards the victim, and those who are a similar race as the victim—suggesting that offenders are less likely to be reported if their race is different from the victim. If the offender was a sibling or a gang member he or she is less likely to be reported to the police.

All variables describing the incident lead to an increased likelihood that the police discover the offense. Police are more likely to be informed of incidents when the offender had a weapon, when the victim was injured, when a third party was present, and when the offender robbed the victim or unlawfully entered the victim's residence. The odds ratios suggest that the strongest predictors of whether the police discover an incident is when the offender had a weapon or broke into the victim's home.

Policy Effects on Informing the Police

The only significant policy predictor of whether the police are informed of a violent domestic episode is the statute that makes violating a protection order a felony. This result seems to be driven by third party informants. The odds that officers in states with this type of felony statute discover and incident are 1.60 higher than officers in states without the statute. This suggests that if the courts treat violations more seriously, more cases will come to court. There is weak evidence that as the judge gains more discretion in deciding whether the offense is a misdemeanor or contempt the victim will

be more likely to report the incident to the police. This same incentive decreases the likelihood that a third party will report the incident nullifying the chances that the police will be informed.

Two findings suggest that third parties are less likely to call the police in domestic situations if there are direct consequences to the offender. The results for *Custody* show that the odds that third parties will report an incident to the police in states that automatically award custody of children to the victims are 0.747 times as high than if they reside in states without this statute. Similarly, the odds that third parties report in mandatory arrest states are 0.732 as high than if they lived elsewhere. Overall, there is a weekly negative relationship between *Mandatory Arrest* and the police discovering an event.

The two final statutes are unrelated to the likelihood that the police discovered a violent domestic incident by any means. Officers in states that expand the eligibility of protection order to victims who live separately from the offender are no more or less likely to be informed of a domestic violence incident. Also those who work in states with firearm confiscation laws are just as likely to discover an incident as officers who live in states without the law.

The only policy variable in the analysis conducted on the 48-city sample that significantly relates to police being informed of an incident is AFDC benefit levels (see Table 6). As welfare benefit levels increase for single-parent households with children, police officers are less likely to discover incidents of family and intimate violence. Data limitations preclude an analysis to discern whether this effect is driving by victim or third-party reporting.

--Insert Table 6 About Here--

Making an Arrest

Police made at least one arrest in 34.3% of the domestic violence cases of which they were informed. The decision to arrest appears unrelated to any of the tested characteristics describing the victim or offender, except in cases where the offender appeared to be influenced by drugs or alcohol (see Table 7). The odds that offenders who were under the influence at the time of the offense are arrested are almost twice that of those who were not. Furthermore, police are more likely to make an arrest if the offender had a weapon or the if the victim was injured. The odds that offenders who injured their victims are arrested are nearly 1.8 times higher than those who caused no physical harm. Also, cases when the police arrived within an hour of being called were more likely to end in arrest than those where officer arrived later. Finally, the police are more likely to arrest when someone other than the victim reported the crime (as shown by the negative coefficient for *Victim Reported*).

--Insert Table 7 About Here--

Policy Effects on Making an Arrest

As shown in Table 8, officers who are mandated to arrest domestic violence offenders are more likely to arrest than those living in states without a mandatory arrest law. However, the severity of offense is unrelated to the arresting behavior officers. The results for the model using the smaller sample of incidents shows no association between arrest laws or policy and officers' arresting behavior. These null findings are likely to have resulted from the low power of the sample of only 222 incidents.

--Insert Table 8 About Here--

Deterring Violence

Of the 529,829 households sampled, only 0.5 percent reported to the NCVS interviewer at least one incident of domestic violence, almost 0.4 percent reported at least one incident of intimate violence, close to 0.2 percent reported at least one incident of spousal violence, and a little more than 0.2 percent reported at least one incident of non-marital intimate violence.

All three conditions describing stable households are associated with a decreased probability of violence when the relationship is significant, months at residence, owning the home, and having a college educated reference. Three of the five conditions associated with less stability are positively associated with violence when significant, low income, a separated or divorced reference person, and single adult households with children. Households residing in public housing units are no more likely to be affected by domestic violence than other households. However, unexpectedly, households living in multiple-family units are *less* not more likely to suffer from violence. It may be that those households are too deterred by the proximity of third parties to let smaller altercations turn violent.

Two of the four opportunity variables are significant in the predicted direction. Persons living alone are less likely to suffer from family or intimate violence. And, households with male reference persons (or spouses of reference persons) who go out socially every night are less likely to suffer from all forms of domestic violence. However, households where the female reference person (or spouse of reference person)

goes out every night show a higher likelihood of suffering from all forms of domestic violence, implying increased tension related to the female's social activities.

The control variables that account for biases related to survey implementation are significant in the predicted direction. Households with proxy interviews are less likely to report victimization experiences when the offender was a family member or intimate partner. Interviews that were conducted on households who are in the sample for the first time (unbounded households), are more likely to report violent domestic incidents. And, the longer the household is in the sample, the less likely it is to report incidents of violence to the NCVS interviewer.

Policy Effects on Deterring Violence

Recall that incidents in states where protection order violations are prosecuted as a felony are more likely to be reported to the police. The felony statute is also related to a decreased probability of non-marital violence (see Table 9). The odds that households in states where such violation is a felony are likely to suffer from boyfriend or girlfriend violence are 0.659 as high as those that reside in states with lower penalties for violation. Similarly, domestic violence in general is less likely to affect households with more sanctioning options available to judges.

--Insert Table 9 About Here--

The odds that households in states with mandatory arrest laws suffer from domestic or intimate violence are 0.918 as high as those residing elsewhere. The statute expanding eligibility of protection orders to victims living separately from the offender is related to less family violence, and most strongly to a decreased probability that households will suffer from non-marital intimate violence. As expected, the likelihood of

spousal violence is unrelated to this law. Spousal violence is, however, *positively* affected by the statute awarding custody to the victim of domestic violence once a protection order is issued. Namely, the odds that households in states granting custody to the victim will be victimized by a spouse or ex-spouse are 1.223 higher than households in other states. Finally, households in states with laws directing offenders to surrender their firearms once convicted of a domestic violence charge are less likely to suffer from family or intimate violence. While this possible deterrence effect is absent in the marital equation, the results generated from smaller sample only show deterrence for marital violence.

Results from the smaller sample of 48 cities show a negative association between the prosecution index and violence (see Table 10). More specifically, households in cities where the prosecutors office is better prepared to support victims (by offering specialized staff support and allowing them to drop charges if desired) are less likely to be affected by domestic or spousal violence. Finally, households in states with higher levels of AFDC benefits have lower probabilities of domestic violence.

--Insert Table 10 About Here--

Discussion

The goal of this research was to better understand the influence of policy on violent behavior between family members and intimate partners. Citizens would like to think that effective policy can deter violence by threatening sanctions and preventing repeated offenses. We would also like to think that effective policy would guide concerned or needy individuals to the criminal justice system and that the system will treat their cases appropriately. This research hypothesized that households in

jurisdictions with criminal justice policy designed to aid domestic violence victims will have a lower probability of family and intimate violence. In recognition that policy can work by leading more cases to the system, and by directing the police to seriously pursue the case, this research also had two secondary hypotheses. Namely, policy should increase the chances that police officers discover the incident, and it should also increase the likelihood that the offender is arrested.

Figure 2 summarizes the findings by illustrating how each policy influences the tested outcomes: reporting, arrest, and violence. It shows that while relatively few policies have an impact on reporting and arrest, most seem to reduce the overall probability of domestic violence. Four of the more interesting results associated with lower violence are those for *Mandatory Arrest*, *Firearm Confiscation*, *Prosecution* and *AFDC*. The effects of mandatory arrest laws are significant in two of the three components of the process. After controlling for many factors, the findings suggest households in states that mandate arrest are less likely to suffer from domestic violence. And, officers in these states are more likely to arrest. It is important to note that the deterrence of mandatory arrest does not appear to directly result from more cases entering the criminal justice system. In fact, the results weakly suggest that officers are less likely to discover violent episodes in states with mandatory arrest laws.

--Insert Figure 2 About Here--

The second intriguing finding is that for the firearm confiscation statute. It started as a controversial state law and became federal on September 30, 1996. Prior to federal adoption, twenty-four states had statutes requiring that firearms be seized from offenders convicted of a domestic violence misdemeanor. Because of controversy, state adoption

likely increased the public's awareness of the current sanctions for domestic violence. And, according to these results its adoption may have also reduced the chances that homes within those states suffer from domestic violence. Since confiscation is unrelated to calling the police, this law seems to have more of a impact on offenders' decision-making than victims'.

The third interesting finding suggests that by specializing prosecutors' offices to be more sensitive to victims needs, fewer homes in the surrounding jurisdiction will suffer from family or intimate violence. The most specialized prosecutors' office measured here, is one that permits victims to drop charges *with* the support of a specialized domestic violence unit staffed by legal advocates. While a no-drop policy has noble intention, it is unclear that prohibiting victims from dropping charges increases their safety. Past research shows that some victims withdraw their complaint because proceeding with prosecution would put them and their children in further danger (Ferraro, 1995). Their concerns appear to be well-founded. Ford (1992) reports that over a quarter of the defendants in the Indianapolis Prosecution Experiment re-offended before their cases went to trial.

The findings for AFDC are intriguing because increased benefit levels seems to reduce the chances that the police will discover a case instead of increasing them. It was hypothesized that by increasing support for single parents with children, battered partners would be freer to take steps to leave the dangerous home. However, in the context of actual patterns of AFDC, benefits have dropped over this period. The findings suggest that, with these drops, police are receiving more domestic violence calls and that more homes suffer from family and intimate violence. Since the odds that single parent

households suffer from violence is almost three times that of other households, reducing financial support may intensify already violent situations.

Dropping welfare benefits is not the only finding that seems to intensify household strife. Unexpectedly, homes in states that have adopted a statute granting immediate custody of children to victims have a *greater*, not lesser, odds of spousal violence. Both sets of results suggest two groups that need specialized attention from the criminal justice system, low income single parent victims and the role that children play in the realities and decision-making processes of married couples.

This research goes a long way in informing readers of policy how relates to the chances of violence in the home and its possible consequences. However, it fails to determine if policy contributes to the well-being of the victim after he or she seeks help. Arrest is a crude measure of victim support because evidence of its efficacy is mixed. As such, an important next step is to link victims longitudinally and examine how arrest relates to future violence in different policy environments.

References

Abel, Eileen Mazur and Edward K. Suh. 1987. "Use of Police Services by Battered Women," *Social Work* 32: 526-528.

Allard, Mary Ann, Randy Albelda, Mary Ellen Colten, and Carol Cosenza. 1997. *In Harms Way? Domestic Violence, AFDC Receipt, and Welfare Reform in Massachusetts*. A report from the University of Massachusetts Boston, February 1997.

Bachman, Ronet. 2000. "A Comparison of Annual Incidence Rates and Contextual Characteristics of Intimate-Partner Violence Against Women From the National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS) and the National Violence Against Women Survey (NVAWS)." *Violence Against Women* 6: 815-838.

Bachman, Ronet. 1998. "The Factors Related to Rape Reporting Behavior and Arrest," *Criminal Justice and Behavior* 25: 8-29.

Bachman, Ronet and Ann L. Coker. 1995. "Police Involvement in Domestic Violence: The Interactive Effects of Victim Injury, Offender's History of Violence, and Race," *Violence and Victims* 10: 91-106.

Berk, Richard A., Sarah Fenstermaker Berk, Phyllis J. Newton, and Donileen R. Loseke. 1984. "Cops on Call: Summoning the Police to the Scene of Spousal Violence," *Law & Society Review* 18: 478-498.

Berk, Richard A., Phyllis J. Newton, and Sarah Fenstermaker Berk. 1986. "What a Difference a Day Makes: An Empirical Study of the Impact of Shelters for Battered Women." *Journal of Marriage and the Family* 48:481-490.

Berk, Sara Fenstermaker and Donileen R. Loseke. 1981. "'handling' Family Violence: Situational Determinants of Police Arrest in Domestic Disturbances," *Law & Society Review* 15: 317-346.

Biderman, Albert D. and David Cantor. 1984. "A Longitudinal Analysis of Bounding, Respondent Conditioning, and Mobility as Sources of Panel Bias in the National Crime Survey." *Proceedings of the Section for Survey Research Methods, American Statistical Association*, pp. 708-713.

Black, Donald J. 1971. "The Social Organization of Arrest," *Stanford Law Review* 23: 1087-1111.

Browne, Angela and Kirk R. Williams. 1989. "Exploring the Effect of Resource Availability and the Likelihood of Female-Perpetrated Homicides." *Law and Society Review* 23:75-94.

Browne, Angela, Kirk R. Williams, and Donald G. Dutton. 1998. "Homicide Between Intimate Partners." In M.D. Smith and M.A. Zahn, eds., *Studying and Preventing Homicide Issues and Challenges* Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, Inc.

Campbell, Jacquelyn C. 1992. "'If I Can't Have You, No One Can:' Power and Control in Homicide of Female Partners." In J. Radford and D. E. H. Russel (Eds.), *Femicide: The politics of women killing* (pp. 99-113). New York: Twayne Publishers.

Conaway, Mark R. and Sharon L. Lohr. 1994. "A Longitudinal Analysis of Factors Associated with Reporting Violent Crimes to the Police," *Journal of Quantitative Criminology* 10: 23-39.

Crowell, Nancy A. and Ann W. Burgess. 1996. *Understanding violence against women.* Washington: National Academy Press.

Dobash, R. Emerson and Russell Dobash. 1979. *Violence Against Wives: A Case Against Patriarchy* New York, NY: Free Press.

Dugan, Laura J. 1999. "The Effect of Criminal Victimization on a Household's Moving Decision," *CRIMINOLOGY* 37: 903-930.

Dugan, Laura, Daniel Nagin, and Richard Rosenfeld. 1999. "Explaining the Decline in Intimate Partner Homicide: The Effects of Changing Domesticity, Women's Status, and Domestic Violence Resources." *Homicide Studies* 3:187-214.

Dugan, Laura, Daniel Nagin, and Richard Rosenfeld. 2000. "Exposure Reduction or Backlash? The Effects of Domestic Violence Resources on Intimate Partner Homicide," A Report to the National Institute of Justice.

Felson, Richard B., Steven F. Messner, and Anthony Hoskin. 1999. "The Victim-Offender Relationship and Calling the Police in Assaults," *Criminology* 37: 931-947.

Ferraro, Kathleen J. 1989. "Policing Women Battering," *Social Problems* 36: 61-74..

Fleury, Ruth E., Cris M. Sullivan, Deborah I. Bybee, and William S. Davidson II. 1998. "'Why Don't They Just Call the Cops?': Reasons for Differential Police Contact Among Women wit Abusive Partners," Violence and Victims 13: 333-346.

Fyfe, James J., David A. Klinger, and Jeanne M. Flavin. 1997. "Differential Police Treatment of Male-on-Female Spousal Violence," *Criminology* 35: 455-473.

Garner, J., Fagan, J., and Maxwell, C. 1995. "Published Findings from the Spouse Assault Replication Program: A Critical Review," *Journal of Quantitative Criminology* 11: 3-28.

Goetting, Ann. 1995. *Homicide in Families and Other Special Populations*. New York: Springer.

Harvard Law Review. 1993. "Developments in the Law: Legal Responses to Domestic Violence." *Harvard Law Review* 106:1498-1620.

Hirshel, J. David, Ira W. Hutchinson III, Charles Dean, Joseph J. Kelley, and Carolyn E. Pesackis. 1990. *Charlotte Spouse Assault Replication Project: Final Report*. Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice.

House Ways and Means Committee. 1996. *1996 Green Book* Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office.

ICPSR. 1997. *National Crime Victimization Survey, 1992 – 1994 Part 18 1992 – 1994 Codebook for Full Files*. United States Department of Justice Bureau of Justice Statistics, Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research

Johnson, Ida M. 1990. "A Loglinear Analysis of Abused Wives' Decisions to Call the Police in Domestic-Violence Disputes," *Journal of Criminal Justice* 18: 147-159.

Jones, Dana A. and Joanne Belknap. 1999. "Police Responses to Battering in a Progressive Pro-Arrest Jurisdiction," *Justice Quarterly* 16: 249-273.

Kantor, G. K., and M. A. Straus. 1990. "Response of Victims and the Police to Assaults on Wives," in M.A Straus and R.J. Gelles, eds., *Physical Violence in American Families: Risk Factors and Adaptations to Violence in 8,145 Families* New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers.

Kane, Robert J. 1999. "Patterns of Arrest in Domestic Violence Encounters: Identifying a Police Decision-Making Model," *Journal of Criminal Justice* 27: 65-79.

Klinger, David A. 1995. "Policing Spousal Assault," *Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency* 32: 308-324.

Martin, Del. 1976. *Battered Wives* San Francisco, CA: Glide.

Melton, Heather C. 1999. "Police Responses to Domestic Violence," *Journal of Offender Rehabilitation* 29: 1-21.

Oppenlander, Nan. 1982. "Coping or Copping Out: Police Service Delivery in Domestic Disputes," *Criminology* 20: 449-465.

Rennison, Callie Marie and Sarah Welchans. 2000. *Intimate Partner Violence*, Bureau of Justice Statistics Special Report Washington, DC: US Department of Justice.

Robinson, Amanda L. 2000. "The Effect of Domestic Violence Policy Change on Police Officers' Schemata," *Criminal Justice Behavior* 27: 600-624.

Robinson, Amanda L. and Meghan S. Chandek. 2000. "The Domestic Violence Arrest Decision: Examining Demographic, Attitudinal, and Situational Variables," *Crime & Delinquency* 46: 18-37.

Sherman, Lawrence W. 1992. *Policing Domestic Violence Experiments and Dilemmas.* New York, NY: The Free Press.

Sherman, Lawrence W. and Richard Berk. 1984. "The Specific Deterrent Effects of Arrest for Domestic Assault." *American Sociological Review* 49:261-272.

Skogan, Wesley, G. 1984. "Reporting Crimes to the Police: The Status of World Research," *Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency* 21: 113-137.

Smith, Douglas A. 1987. "Police Response to Interpersonal Violence: Defining the Parameters of Legal Control." *Social Forces* 65: 767-782.

Smith, Douglas A. and Jody R. Klein. 1984. "Police Control of Interpersonal Disputes," *Social Problems* 31: 468-481.

Smith Jonathan and Elizabeth Stanko. 1998. "Femicide: the killing of women in England and Wales 1986- 1996." Paper presented to the American Society of Criminology. Washington, November 1998.

Sullivan, Cris M. and Deborah I. Bybee. 1999. "Reducing Violence Using Community-Based Advocacy for Women With Abusive Partners." *Journal of Counseling and Clinical Psychology* 67: 43-53.

Tolman, Richard M. and Arlene Weisz. 1995. "Coordinated Community Intervention for Domestic Violence: The Effects of Arrest and Prosecution on Recidivism of Woman Abuse Perpetrators." *Crime & Delinquency* 14:481-495.

Tjaden, Patricia and Nancy Thoennes. 2000a. "Prevalence and Consequences of Male-to-Female and Female-to-Male Intimate Partner Violence as measured by the National Violence Against Women Survey." *Violence Against Women* 6:141-161.

Tjaden, Patricia and Nancy Thoennes. 2000b. *Full Report of the Prevalence, Incidence, and Consequences of Violence Against Women*, Report from the National Institute

of Justice and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Washington, DC: US Department of Justice.

Walker, L. 1979. *The Battered Woman*. New York, NY: Harper and Row.

Walker, L. 1984. *The Battered Woman Syndrome*. New York, NY: Springer Publishing Company.

Worden, Robert E. and Alissa A. Pollitz. 1984. "Police Arrests in Domestic Disturbances: A Further Look," *Law & Society Review* 18: 105-119.

Appendix

Table A-1: 48 City Sample, Predicting Reporting

Variable	Police Informed	
Statute Provisions		
Beyond Cohabitation	-0.286	0.751
	0.370	
Custody	-0.016	0.984
	0.372	
Discretion Index	-0.134	0.875
	0.159	
Mandatory Arrest	0.156	1.169
	0.272	
Firearm Confiscation	0.018	1.018
	0.291	
Local Resources		
Hotlines	-0.323	0.724
	0.233	
Police Index	0.061	1.063
	0.071	
Prosecution Index	0.160	1.172
	0.169	
AFDC	-0.002	0.998**
	0.001	
Victim		
Age	0.012	1.012
	0.010	
Female	0.249	1.283
	0.286	
Separated	-0.122	0.886
	0.261	
Young Children	0.012	1.012
	0.095	
White	-0.463	0.639*
	0.260	
College	-0.008	0.992
	0.389	

Job	-0.483 0.234	0.617**
Offender		
Spouse	-0.201 0.291	0.818
Immediate Family	-0.956 0.358	0.384***
Other Family	-0.876 0.363	0.417**
Drugs or Alcohol	0.073 0.228	1.075
Previous Offense	-0.025 0.236	0.976
Similar Race	0.481 0.371	1.619
Incident		
Injury	0.205 0.228	1.227
Others Present	0.554 0.237	1.723**
Assault	0.273 0.296	1.314
Location		
South	0.665 0.328	1.994*
Public	-0.228 0.344	0.796
Time		
Interview Period	-0.068 0.072	0.935
Year 96	0.278 0.395	1.320
Year 95	0.170 0.374	1.185
Year 93	0.333 0.324	1.396
Year 92	0.483	1.621

0.365

Table A-2: 48 City Sample, Predicting Arrest

Variable	Arrest	
Policy		
Discretion Index	0.238	1.093
	0.191	
Mandatory Arrest	0.317	0.951
	0.358	
Police Index	0.106	0.951
	0.097	
Victim		
Age	0.000	1.016
	0.014	
Young Children	0.082	0.885
	0.128	
White	0.401	0.999
	0.349	
Job	0.401	0.999
	0.349	
Offender		
Spouse	-0.078	0.929
	0.358	
Drugs or Alcohol	1.044	0.722***
	0.331	
Previous Offense	0.197	1.353
	0.339	
Incident		
Victim Reported	-0.300	2.115
	0.363	
Weapon	0.730	11.321*
	0.380	
Injury	0.596	11.321*
	0.329	
Location		
South	-0.157	0.881
	0.356	
Time		
Interview Period	0.252	0.881**

	0.104	
Year 96	-2.436	0.974***
	0.805	
Year 95	×	×
Year 94	-2.274	0.594***
	0.821	
Year 93	-2.264	0.594***
	0.790	
Year 92	-2.703	0.675***
	0.801	

Table A-3: 48 City Sample, Predicting Violence

Variable	Domestic		Intimate		Spousal		Boy/Girlfriend	
Statute Provisions								
Beyond Cohabitation	-0.255	0.775	-0.182	0.833	×	×	-0.829	0.437***
	0.206		0.242				0.331	
Custody	0.203	0.816	-0.121	0.886	0.100	1.106	-0.258	0.772
	0.180		0.212		0.338		0.272	
Discretion Index	0.100	1.105	0.094	1.098	0.168	1.182	0.055	1.057
	0.072		0.084		0.135		0.107	
Mandatory Arrest	0.089	1.093	0.193	1.213	0.264	1.303	0.118	1.126
	0.130		0.147		0.244		0.189	
Firearm Confiscation	-0.050	0.951	-0.093	0.911	-0.526	0.591**	0.181	1.199
	0.139		0.151		0.261		0.195	
Local Resources								
Hotlines	-0.053	0.949	-0.038	0.963	-0.091	0.913	0.024	1.024
	0.102		0.121		0.192		0.156	
Police Index	0.015	1.016	-0.013	0.987	0.026	1.027	-0.047	0.955
	0.034		0.036		0.064		0.046	
Prosecution Index	-0.122	0.885*	-0.075	0.928	-0.226	0.798*	0.018	1.018
	0.073		0.085		0.137		0.109	
AFDC	-0.001	0.999**	-0.001	0.999	-0.001	0.999	-0.001	0.999
	0.000		0.001		0.001		0.001	
Stability								
Months	-0.001	0.999	-0.001	0.999	0.001	1.000	-0.001	0.999*
	0.000		0.001		0.001		0.001	
Own Home	-0.073	0.929	-0.030	0.970	0.095	1.100	-0.154	0.857
	0.156		0.186		0.294		0.239	
College	-0.325	0.722**	-0.294	0.745*	-0.329	0.720	-0.263	0.768
	0.130		0.154		0.243		0.198	
Low Income	0.303	1.353**	0.324	1.383**	0.191	0.826	0.683	1.980***
	0.132		0.157		0.247		0.201	
Other Units	-0.106	0.899	0.045	1.046	-0.200	0.819	0.169	1.184
	0.146		0.174		0.275		0.224	
Separated/Divorced	0.749	2.115***	1.026	2.791***	2.348	10.468**	0.170	1.185
	0.146		0.174		0.274	*	0.223	
Lone With Child	2.427	11.321**	3.017	20.428**	3.491	32.813**	2.708	14.994**
	0.184	*	0.219	*	0.346	*	0.282	*

Exposure								
Alone	-0.583	0.558***	-0.556	0.573***	×	×	-0.493	0.611**
	0.133		0.158				0.203	
Male Out	-0.126	0.881	-0.068	0.934	×	×	-0.045	0.956
	0.162		0.193				0.248	
Female Out	0.847	2.333***	0.817	2.264***	0.376	1.456	1.093	2.982***
	0.166		0.198		0.312		0.254	
Demographics								
White	-0.027	0.974	0.037	1.037	0.415	1.514*	-0.232	0.793
	0.124		0.148		0.234		0.190	
Hispanic	-0.371	0.690**	-0.459	0.632**	-0.206	0.813	-0.628	0.534**
	0.182		0.217		0.343		0.279	
South	-0.522	0.594***	-0.447	0.639**	0.451	1.637	-0.474	0.623*
	0.165		0.196		0.310		0.252	
Survey Issues								
Proxy	-0.394	0.675***	-0.443	0.642***	0.143	1.153	-0.814	0.443***
	0.129		0.153		0.242		0.197	
Unbounded	0.781	2.184***	0.864	2.373***	1.331	3.783***	0.547	1.728**
	0.147		0.174		0.276		0.224	
Interview Period	-0.023	0.978	-0.049	0.952	-0.145	0.865**	0.004	0.004
	0.037		0.042		0.069		0.054	
Year 96	-0.084	0.919	--	--	0.284	1.329	--	--
	0.250				0.469			
Year 95	-0.066	0.937	--	--	0.266	1.305	--	--
	0.242				0.454			
Year 94	-0.117	0.889	--	--	-0.168	0.846	--	--
	0.234				0.439			
Year 93	-0.077	0.926	--	--	0.129	1.138	--	--
	0.210				0.395			
Year 92	0.072	1.075	--	--	0.221	1.247	--	--
	0.209				0.393			

Table 1: Summary of Dependent Variables

Variable	Measure	Possible Values
Informing Police and Arrest		
Police Informed	An indicator variable identifying domestic violence incidents of which police became informed	0, 1
Victim Reported	An indicator variable identifying domestic violence incidents in which the victim reported to the police	0, 1
Another Way	An indicator variable identifying domestic violence incidents in which the police were informed of the incident another way	0, 1
Arrest	An indicator variable identifying reported domestic violence incidents in which the police made an arrest	0, 1
Deterring Violence		
Domestic Violence	An indicator variable identifying households where at least one respondent was violently victimized by a family member, intimate partner, or ex-intimate partner	0, 1
Intimate Violence	An indicator variable identifying households where at least one respondent was violently victimized by a spouse, ex-spouse, boy/girlfriend, or ex-boy/girlfriend	0, 1
Spousal Violence	An indicator variable identifying households where at least one respondent was violently victimized by a spouse or ex-spouse	0, 1
Boy/girlfriend Violence	An indicator variable identifying households where at least one respondent was violently victimized by a boy/girlfriend or ex-boy/girlfriend	0, 1

Table 2: Summary of Policy Variables

Variable	Measure	Possible Values
Statute Provisions		
Beyond Cohabitaton	An indicator variable identifying states that allow victims who do not live with the offender to petition for a protection order	0, 1
Custody	An indicator variable identifying states that authorize the court to award temporary custody of children to the victim once a protection order is issued	0, 1
Discretion Index	An index describing the type of sanction available to the judge in cases of protection order violation, 1 = misdemeanor, 2 = civil or criminal contempt, 3 = both misdemeanor and contempt	1, 2, 3
Felony	Violating a protection order is a felony	0, 1
Mandatory Arrest	The state has a mandatory arrest policy when protection orders are violated	0, 1
Firearm Confiscation	The state confiscates offenders firearms once a protection order is violated	0, 1
Local Resources		
Hotlines	The total number of hotlines adjusted for the number of women over the age of 15 in the city.	$[0, \infty)$
Police Index	An index that sums the following characteristics of the local police department: proarrest policy, mandatory arrest for protection order violation, mandatory arrest for general domestic violence, domestic violence unit, and domestic violence in-service training to offices	0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5
Prosecution Index	An index describing prosectution characteristics that provide more support to the victim of domestic violence: 0 = a no drop policy in place with no other support, 1 = no no drop policy and either specialized legal advocates on staff or a domestic violence unit, 2 = no no drop policy and both legal advocates on staff and a domestic violence unit	0, 1, 2
AFDC	The number of AFDC 1983 benefit dollars available to a family of four	$[0, \infty)$

Table 3: Summary of Incident-Level Control Variables

Variable	Measure	Possible Values
Victim		
Age	The age of the victim	[12, ∞)
Female	The victim is female	0, 1
Separated	The victim is separated or divorced	0, 1
Young Children	Number of victim's children under the age of 12	[0, ∞)
White	The victim is white	0, 1
Hispanic	The victim is of hispanic origin	0, 1
College	The victim has completed at least 4 years of college	0, 1
Job	The victim has a job	0, 1
Offender		
Spouse	The offender was the victim's spouse or ex-spouse	0, 1
Parent	The offender was the victim's parent or step parent	0, 1
Child	The offender was the victim's child or step child	0, 1
Sibling	The offender was the victim's sibling	0, 1
Other Family	The offender was the victim's extended family member	0, 1
Immediate Family	The offender was the victim's immediate family member	0, 1
Gang	The offender was known to be a member of a street gang	0, 1
Drugs or Alcohol	The offender was on drugs or alcohol	0, 1
Previous Offense	The incident is a series event or the victim reported that the offender has done this before	0, 1
Similar Race[b]	The victim and offender are of a similar race	0, 1
Same Gender	The victim and offender are the same gender	0, 1
Incident		
Weapon	The offender had a weapon	0, 1

Injury	The victim was injured	0, 1
Others present	Others were present during the incident	0, 1
Robbery	The offender robbed or attempted to rob the victim	0, 1
Unlawfully Entry	The offender unlawfully entered the victim's residence	0, 1
Assault	The offender assaulted (aggravated or simple) the victim with injury, attemped aggravated assault with a weapon, or threatened an assault with a weapon	0, 1
Victim Reported	The victim reported the crime to the police	0, 1
Within Hour	The police arrived at the scene within an hour of being informed of the incident	0, 1
Location		
Public	The incident occurred in a public setting	0, 1

[a]Missing months were set at zero.
[b]This variable only considers the groupings of white and non-white. Therefore, a victim's and offender's race could be considered similar if one is Native American and the other is African American.

Table 4: Summary of Household-Level Control Variables

Variable	Measure	Possible Values
Stability		
Months[a]	The number of months the reference person has lived at the current residence	[0, ∞)
Own Home	At least one resident owns the home	0, 1
College	The reference person has completed at least 4 years of college education	0, 1
Low Income	Household income is less than $15,000/year	0, 1
Public Housing	The household lives in public housing	0, 1
Other Units	Multiple unit living quarters	0, 1
Separated/Divorced	The reference person is separated or divorced	0, 1
Lone With Child	The reference person is an adult living alone with one or more children	0, 1
Opportunity		
Alone	Single person household	0, 1
Male Out	Male reference person or the husband of the reference person reports spending almost every evening away from home for work, school, or entertainment	0, 1
Female Out	Female reference person or the wife of the reference person reports spending almost every evening away from home for work, school, or entertainment	0, 1
Female Not Shopping	Female reference person or the wife of the reference person reports that she never goes shopping	0, 1
Demographics		
White	The reference person is white	0, 1
Hispanic	The reference person is of hispanic origin	0, 1
Over 60	The reference person is over 60 years old	0, 1
Urban	The household lives in an urban setting	0, 1
South	The household lives in a southern state	0, 1
Survey Issues		

Missing Month	An indicator variable identifying households in which the reference person failed to report the number of months at the current residence	0, 1
Proxy	At least one interview was a proxy	0, 1
Unbounded	The household was not interviewed in the previous six month period	0, 1
Interview Period	The number of times that housing unit was scheduled to be interviewed	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6

[a]Missing months were set at zero.



Figure 1: Data Sets for Each Outcome

Table 5: Total Sample, Predicting Reporting

Variable	Police Informed		Victim Reported		Another Way	
Statute Provisions						
Beyond Cohabitation	-0.1276	0.880	-0.094	0.910	-0.087	0.917
	0.112		0.116		0.151	
Custody	-0.025	0.975	0.129	1.138	-0.292	0.747*
	0.118		0.125		0.153	
Discretion Index	0.024	1.025	0.078	1.081*	-0.095	0.910*
	0.042		0.143		0.057	
Felony	0.468	1.597**	0.208	1.231	0.573	1.773*
	0.237		0.241		0.305	
Mandatory Arrest	-0.130	0.879	0.025	1.025	-0.312	0.732***
	0.079		0.083		0.110	
Firearm Confiscation	-0.064	0.938	-0.015	0.985	-0.105	0.901
	0.086		0.090		0.119	
Victim						
Age	0.013	1.013***	0.008	1.008**	0.012	1.012**
	0.004		0.004		0.005	
Female	0.232	1.262**	0.554	1.741***	-0.556	0.574***
	0.096		0.105		0.124	
Separated	0.104	1.110	0.230	1.258***	-0.214	0.807*
	0.082		0.083		0.115	
Young Children	0.127	1.135***	0.118	1.125***	0.040	1.040
	0.033		0.033		0.043	
White	-0.437	0.646***	-0.294	0.745***	-0.347	0.707***
	0.096		0.096		0.121	
Hispanic	0.347	1.415***	0.193	1.213	0.352	1.421**
	0.135		0.139		0.168	
College	-0.191	0.827	-0.049	0.953	-0.300	0.741
	0.131		0.135		0.197	
Job	0.015	1.015	0.035	1.035	-0.034	0.967
	0.075		0.077		0.100	
Offender						
Spouse	-0.003	0.997	0.144	1.155	-0.274	0.760**
	0.095		0.097		0.130	
Parent	-0.021	0.886	-0.376	0.687*	0.451	1.570**
	0.175		0.198		0.212	
Child	0.099	1.104	0.196	1.217	-0.162	0.850

	0.181		0.184		0.247	
Sibling	-0.293	0.746*	-0.207	0.790	-0.162	0.760
	0.150		0.161		0.200	
Other Family	-0.166	0.847	-0.207	0.813	0.044	1.045
	0.129		0.137		0.171	
Gang	-0.445	0.641*	-0.368	0.692	-0.227	0.797
	0.232		0.251		0.306	
Drugs or Alcohol	0.175	1.191**	0.053	1.054	0.261	1.298***
	0.073		0.075		0.098	
Previous Offense	0.175	1.191**	0.161	1.175**	0.161	1.060**
	0.074		0.076		0.076	
Similar Race	0.283	1.327**	0.214	1.239	0.181	1.199
	0.126		0.132		0.172	
Incident						
Weapon	0.455	1.577***	0.234	1.264**	0.500	1.644***
	0.096		0.098		0.117	
Injury	0.399	1.491***	0.004	1.004	0.881	2.251***
	0.074		0.076		0.101	
Others Present	0.200	1.221***	-0.055	0.946	0.513	1.699***
	0.077		0.079		0.105	
Robbery	0.395	1.485***	0.370	1.448***	0.121	1.128
	0.138		0.136		0.176	
Unlawful Entry	0.677	1.968***	0.628	1.874***	0.218	1.244
	0.202		0.199		0.304	
Location						
Urban	0.086	1.090	0.038	1.034	0.114	1.120
	0.088		0.092		0.124	
South	0.160	1.173*	0.207	1.230**	-0.058	0.944
	0.087		0.090		0.118	
Public	-0.083	0.920	-0.236	0.790**	0.269	1.308*
	0.104		0.111		0.141	
Time						
Interview Period	0.018	1.018	-0.012	0.988	0.058	1.060**
	0.021		0.022		0.029	
Year 96	-0.108	0.898	0.013	1.103	-0.245	0.783
	0.121		0.123		0.167	
Year 95	-0.123	0.884	-0.119	0.887	-0.030	0.971

	0.120		0.124		0.162	
Year 94	-0.235	0.791**	-0.151	0.860	-0.200	0.819
	0.117		0.121		0.160	
Year 93	-0.366	0.694***	-0.321	0.725**	-0.150	0.860
	0.121		0.126		0.161	
Year 92	-0.037	0.963	-0.027	0.973	-0.026	0.975
	0.126		0.129		0.166	

Table 6: Policy Results for the
48 City Sample Predicting Reporting[a]

Variable	Police Informed	
Statute Provisions		
Beyond Cohabitation	-0.286	0.751
	0.370	
Custody	-0.016	0.984
	0.372	
Discretion Index	-0.134	0.875
	0.159	
Mandatory Arrest	0.156	1.169
	0.272	
Firearm Confiscation	0.018	1.018
	0.291	
Local Resources		
Hotlines	-0.323	0.724
	0.233	
Police Index	0.061	1.063
	0.071	
Prosecution Index	0.160	1.172
	0.169	
AFDC	-0.002	0.998**
	0.001	

[a] See appendix for the full set of results.

Table 7: Total Sample, Predicting Arrest

Variable	Arrest	
Statute Provisions		
Discretion Index	0.034	1.035
	0.060	
Felony	0.467	1.595
	0.330	
Mandatory Arrest	0.202	1.224*
	0.119	
Victim		
Age	-0.006	0.994
	0.007	
Female	-0.166	0.847
	0.160	
Separated	0.035	1.036
	0.118	
Young Children	-0.024	0.976
	0.045	
White	0.019	1.019
	0.131	
Hispanic	-0.282	0.754
	0.190	
Job	-0.119	0.888
	0.108	
Offender		
Spouse	0.013	1.013
	0.131	
Parent	-0.168	0.845
	0.286	
Child	0.195	1.215
	0.263	
Sibling	-0.187	0.829
	0.242	
Other Family	0.054	1.056
	0.222	
Gang	0.221	1.248
	0.369	
Drugs or Alcohol	0.661	1.937***

	0.106	
Previous Offense	0.022	1.022
	0.107	
Similar Race	-0.046	0.956
	0.190	
Same Gender	-0.229	0.795
	0.200	
Incident		
Victim Reported	-0.253	0.777**
	0.118	
Within Hour	0.575	1.777***
	0.113	
Weapon	0.240	1.271*
	0.131	
Injury	0.581	1.788***
	0.108	
Robbery	-0.174	0.841
	0.181	
Unlawful Entry	0.424	1.528
	0.267	
Location		
Urban	0.079	1.082
	0.133	
South	-0.115	0.891
	0.118	
Time		
Interview Period	0.025	1.025
	0.031	
Year 96	-0.262	0.770
	0.172	
Year 95	-0.254	0.776
	0.174	
Year 94	-0.306	0.737*
	0.171	
Year 93	-0.464	0.629***
	0.174	
Year 92	-0.486	0.615***

0.176

Table 8: Policy Results for the

48 City Sample Predicting Arrest[a]

Variable	Arrest	
Policy		
Discretion Index	0.238 0.191	1.093
Mandatory Arrest	0.317 0.358	0.951
Police Index	0.106 0.097	0.951

[a] See appendix for the full set of results.

Table 9: Total Sample, Predicting Violence

Variable	Domestic		Intimate		Spousal		Boy/Girlfriend	
Statute Provisions								
Beyond Cohabitation	-0.188	0.829***	-0.197	0.821***	-0.148	0.863	-0.235	0.790**
	0.058		0.069		0.102		0.093	
Custody	0.040	1.041	0.084	1.087	0.201	1.223*	-0.021	0.979
	0.061		0.074		0.112		0.098	
Discretion Index	-0.045	0.956**	-0.031	0.969	-0.057	0.945	-0.006	0.994
	0.022		0.027		0.038		0.037	
Felony	-0.167	0.846	0.068	1.935	0.271	1.311	-0.417	0.659**
	0.121		0.136		0.180		0.209	
Mandatory Arrest	-0.085	0.918**	-0.098	0.907	-0.112	0.918	-0.090	0.914
	0.042		0.050		0.073		0.068	
Firearm Confiscation	-0.147	0.863***	-0.121	0.886**	-0.123	0.886	-0.129	0.879*
	0.045		0.054		0.079		0.073	
Stability								
Months	-0.001	0.999***	-0.002	0.998***	-0.002	0.998***	-0.001	0.999***
	0.000		0.000		0.000		0.000	
Own Home	-0.118	0.889*	-0.076	0.926	0.000	1.000	-0.193	0.825**
	0.053		0.063		0.088		0.090	
College	-0.501	0.606***	-0.429	0.651***	-0.175	0.839*	-0.698	0.497***
	0.057		0.067		0.089		0.100	
Low Income	0.385	1.470***	0.319	1.375***	0.385	1.049***	0.524	1.689***
	0.120		0.052		0.120		0.070	
Public Housing	0.053	1.055	-0.030	0.971	-0.466	0.628	0.163	1.177
	0.044		0.141		0.288		0.160	
Other Units	-0.088	0.915	-0.017	0.983	-0.150	0.861*	0.066	1.069
	0.131		0.058		0.085		0.078	
Separated/Divorced	0.612	1.884***	0.707	2.027***	1.456	4.291***	0.157	1.170**
	0.046		0.053		0.084		0.072	
Lone With Child	1.073	2.923***	1.327	3.770***	1.154	3.171***	1.324	3.760***
	0.052		0.062		0.092		0.084	
Exposure								
Alone	-0.479	0.619***	-0.235	0.790***	-0.733	0.481***	-0.029	1.030
	0.063		0.074		0.120		0.095	
Male Out	-0.181	0.835***	-0.312	0.732***	-0.226	0.798*	-0.353	0.703***
	0.064		0.082		0.120		0.112	

Female Out	0.424 0.047	1.529***	0.433 0.055	1.541***	0.343 0.082	1.410***	0.484 0.073	1.622***
Female Not Shopping	0.441 0.271	1.554	--	--	--	--	--	--
Demographics								
White	0.289 0.052	1.335***	0.336 0.061	1.400***	0.643 0.100	1.901***	0.141 0.077	1.152*
Hispanic	-0.521 0.075	0.594***	-0.573 0.089	0.564***	-0.404 0.127	0.668***	-0.704 0.125	0.495***
Over 60	-1.114 0.091	0.328***	-1.292 0.123	0.275***	-1.059 0.118	0.342***	-1.490 0.169	0.225***
Urban	0.111 0.049	1.118**	0.158 0.059	1.171***	-0.008 0.079	0.992	0.331 0.088	1.392***
South	-0.191 0.045	0.826***	-0.180 0.054	0.836***	0.035 0.076	1.036	-0.377 0.076	0.686***
Survey Issues								
Missing Month	-0.014 0.105	0.986	0.012 0.130	1.012	0.506 0.197	1.659*	-0.261 0.174	0.770
Proxy	-0.295 0.042	0.746***	-0.362 0.049	0.696***	-0.332 0.023	0.718***	-0.382 0.066	0.682***
Unbounded	0.543 0.046	1.721***	0.575 0.055	1.778***	0.551 0.080	1.736***	0.584 0.074	1.793***
Interview Period	-0.069 0.012	0.933***	-0.075 0.014	0.928***	-0.098 0.020	0.907***	-0.055 0.019	0.947***
Year 96	0.129 0.063	1.138**	0.136 0.075	1.145*	0.064 0.111	1.066	0.219 0.101	1.245**
Year 95	0.043 0.063	1.044	0.051 0.075	1.052	0.137 0.106	1.147	0.014 0.105	0.986
Year 94	0.097 0.061	1.102	0.107 0.072	1.113	0.012 0.106	1.012	0.193 0.097	1.213**
Year 93	0.044 0.062	1.045	0.052 0.074	1.053	0.110 0.104	1.116	-0.001 0.103	1.999
Year 92	-0.125 0.064	0.882	-0.091 0.076	0.913	-0.144 0.111	0.866	-0.041 0.103	0.960

Table 10: Policy Results for the 48 City Sample Predicting Violence[a]

Variable	Domestic		Intimate		Spousal		Boy/Girlfriend	
Statute Provisions								
Beyond Cohabitation	-0.255	0.775	-0.182	0.833	×	×	-0.829	0.437***
	0.206		0.242				0.331	
Custody	0.203	0.816	-0.121	0.886	0.100	1.106	-0.258	0.772
	0.180		0.212		0.338		0.272	
Discretion Index	0.100	1.105	0.094	1.098	0.168	1.182	0.055	1.057
	0.072		0.084		0.135		0.107	
Mandatory Arrest	0.089	1.093	0.193	1.213	0.264	1.303	0.118	1.126
	0.130		0.147		0.244		0.189	
Firearm Confiscation	-0.050	0.951	-0.093	0.911	-0.526	0.591**	0.181	1.199
	0.139		0.151		0.261		0.195	
Local Resources								
Hotlines	-0.053	0.949	-0.038	0.963	-0.091	0.913	0.024	1.024
	0.102		0.121		0.192		0.156	
Police Index	0.015	1.016	-0.013	0.987	0.026	1.027	-0.047	0.955
	0.034		0.036		0.064		0.046	
Prosecution Index	-0.122	0.885*	-0.075	0.928	-0.226	0.798*	0.018	1.018
	0.073		0.085		0.137		0.109	
AFDC	-0.001	0.999**	-0.001	0.999	-0.001	0.999	-0.001	0.999
	0.000		0.001		0.001		0.001	

[a] See appendix for the full set of results.



[a] The custody statute relates to an increase in spousal violence

Figure 2: Pattern of Associations Throughout Process

Codebook for Grant # 97WTVX0004, State Statute Analysis

Sources: Original data collection by authors, Supplementary Homicide Reports, US Bureau of Census

Laura Dugan
Daniel S. Nagin
Richard Rosenfeld

```
year ------------------------------------------------------------------------ year
                  type:  numeric (float)

                 range:  [1976,1997]                  units:  1
          unique values:  22                     coded missing:  0 / 1122

                  mean:    1986.5
             std. dev:    6.34712

           percentiles:        10%       25%       50%       75%       90%
                              1978      1981    1986.5      1992      1995


state ----------------------------------------------------------------- state name
                  type:  string (str20)

          unique values:  51                     coded missing:  0 / 1122

               examples:  "Georgia"
                          "Maryland"
                          "New Jersey"
                          "South Carolina"

                warning:  variable has embedded blanks


anypfal ------------------------------------------------- any PFA legislation?
                  type:  numeric (float)
                 label:  statute

                 range:  [0,1]                        units:  1
          unique values:  2                      coded missing:  0 / 1122

             tabulation:  Freq.   Numeric  Label
                            239         0  does not have statute
                            883         1  has statute
```

```
nocontac ------------------------------------------------ no contact PO available
                  type:  numeric (float)
                 label:  statute

                 range:  [0,1]                        units:  1
          unique values:  2                    coded missing:  0 / 1122

            tabulation:  Freq.   Numeric  Label
                           439         0  does not have statute
                           683         1  has statute


beycohab ------------------------------------- eligibility beyond cohabitation
                  type:  numeric (float)
                 label:  statute

                 range:  [0,1]                        units:  1
          unique values:  2                    coded missing:  0 / 1122

            tabulation:  Freq.   Numeric  Label
                           483         0  does not have statute
                           639         1  has statute


custody ------------------------------------------------ victim custody relief
                  type:  numeric (float)
                 label:  statute

                 range:  [0,1]                        units:  1
          unique values:  2                    coded missing:  0 / 1122

            tabulation:  Freq.   Numeric  Label
                           411         0  does not have statute
                           711         1  has statute


misdem ---------------------------------------- misdemeanor for violating PO
                  type:  numeric (float)
                 label:  statute

                 range:  [0,1]                        units:  1
          unique values:  2                    coded missing:  0 / 1122

            tabulation:  Freq.   Numeric  Label
                           659         0  does not have statute
                           463         1  has statute
```

```
contempt ------------------------------------ either civil or criminal contempt
                  type:  numeric (float)
                 label:  statute

                 range:  [0,1]                        units:  1
          unique values:  2                   coded missing:  0 / 1122

            tabulation:  Freq.   Numeric  Label
                           524         0  does not have statute
                           598         1  has statute


felony ------------------------------------------------ felony for PO violation
                  type:  numeric (float)
                 label:  statute

                 range:  [0,1]                        units:  1
          unique values:  2                   coded missing:  0 / 1122

            tabulation:  Freq.   Numeric  Label
                          1091         0  does not have statute
                            31         1  has statute


warrantl ---------------------------------------------- warrantless arrest is ok
                  type:  numeric (float)
                 label:  law

                 range:  [0,1]                        units:  1
          unique values:  2                   coded missing:  0 / 1122

            tabulation:  Freq.   Numeric  Label
                           438         0  does not have law
                           684         1  has law


manarst ------------------------------------ mandatory arrest for violating PO
                  type:  numeric (float)
                 label:  law

                 range:  [0,1]                        units:  1
          unique values:  2                   coded missing:  0 / 1122

            tabulation:  Freq.   Numeric  Label
                           826         0  does not have law
                           296         1  has law
```

```
firearmc ------------------------------ firearm confiscation for violating
                                        protection order
                  type:  numeric (float)
                 label:  law

                 range:  [0,1]                        units:  1
          unique values:  2                    coded missing:  0 / 1122

            tabulation:  Freq.   Numeric  Label
                          1014         0  does not have law
                           108         1  has law
```

```
censtate ---------------------------------------------------- census state code
                  type:  numeric (float)

                 range:  [11,95]                      units:  1
          unique values:  51                   coded missing:  0 / 1122

                  mean:   54.8235
             std. dev:    25.324

           percentiles:        10%       25%       50%       75%       90%
                               16        34        55        81        88
```

```
 11 Maine
 12 New Hampshire
 13 Vermont
 14 Massachusetts
 15 Rhode Island
 16 Connecticut
 21 New York
 22 New Jersey
 23 Pennsylvania
 31 Ohio
 32 Indiana
 33 Ilinois
 34 Michigan
 35 Wisconsin
 41 Minnesota
 42 Iowa
 43 Missouri
 44 North Dakota
 45 South Dakota
 46 Nebraska
 47 Kansas
 51 Delaware
 52 Maryland
 53 District of Columbia
 54 Virginia
 55 West Virginia
 56 North Carolina
 57 South Carolina
 58 Georgia
 59 Florida
 61 Kentucky
```

62 Tennessee
63 Alabama
64 Mississippi
71 Arkansas
72 Louisiana
73 Oklahoma
74 Texas
81 Montana
82 Idaho
83 Wyoming
84 Colorado
85 New Mexico
86 Arizona
87 Utah
88 Nevada
91 Washington
92 Oregon
93 California
94 Alaska
95 Hawaii

fipstate ---------- FIP state code

type:	numeric (float)		
range:	[1,56]	units:	1
unique values:	50	coded missing:	22 / 1122
mean:	28.64		
std. dev:	15.6733		

percentiles:	10%	25%	50%	75%	90%
	7	16	28.5	41	50.5

1 Alabama
2 Alaska
4 Arizona
5 Arkansas
6 California
8 Colorado
9 Connecticut
10 Delaware
11 District of Columbia
12 Florida
13 Georgia
15 Hawaii
16 Idaho
17 Ilinois
18 Indiana
19 Iowa
20 Kansas
21 Kentucky
22 Louisiana
23 Maine
24 Maryland
25 Massachusetts
26 Michigan

27 Minnesota
28 Mississippi
29 Missouri
30 Montana
31 Nebraska
32 Nevada
33 New Hampshire
34 New Jersey
35 New Mexico
36 New York
37 North Carolina
38 North Dakota
39 Ohio
40 Oklahoma
41 Oregon
42 Pennsylvania
44 Rhode Island
45 South Carolina
46 South Dakota
47 Tennessee
48 Texas
49 Utah
50 Vermont
51 Virginia
53 Washington
54 West Virginia
55 Wisconsin
56 Wyoming

First and Last Observations of data for Grant # 97WTVX0004, State Statute Analysis

Sources: Original data collection by authors, Supplementary Homicide Reports, US Bureau of Census

Laura Dugan
Daniel S. Nagin
Richard Rosenfeld

Observation 1

year	1976	state	Alabama	anypfal	does not
nocontac	does not	beycohab	does not	custody	does not
misdem	does not	contempt	does not	felony	does not
warrantl	does not	manarst	does not	firearmc	does not
censtate	Alabama	fipstate	Alabama		

Observation 2

year	1977	state	Alabama	anypfal	does not
nocontac	does not	beycohab	does not	custody	does not
misdem	does not	contempt	does not	felony	does not
warrantl	does not	manarst	does not	firearmc	does not
censtate	Alabama	fipstate	Alabama		

Observation 3

year	1978	state	Alabama	anypfal	does not
nocontac	does not	beycohab	does not	custody	does not
misdem	does not	contempt	does not	felony	does not
warrantl	does not	manarst	does not	firearmc	does not
censtate	Alabama	fipstate	Alabama		

Observation 4

year	1979	state	Alabama	anypfal	does not
nocontac	does not	beycohab	does not	custody	does not
misdem	does not	contempt	does not	felony	does not
warrantl	does not	manarst	does not	firearmc	does not
censtate	Alabama	fipstate	Alabama		

Observation 5

year	1980	state	Alabama	anypfal	does not
nocontac	does not	beycohab	does not	custody	does not
misdem	does not	contempt	does not	felony	does not
warrantl	does not	manarst	does not	firearmc	does not
censtate	Alabama	fipstate	Alabama		

Observation 1118

year	1993	state	South Caroli..	anypfal	has statu
nocontac	has statu	beycohab	has statu	custody	has statu
misdem	has statu	contempt	does not	felony	does not
warrantl	has law	manarst	does not	firearmc	does not
censtate	South Car	fipstate	South Car		

Observation 1119

year	1994	state	South Caroli..	anypfal	has statu
nocontac	has statu	beycohab	has statu	custody	has statu
misdem	has statu	contempt	does not	felony	does not
warrantl	has law	manarst	does not	firearmc	does not
censtate	South Car	fipstate	South Car		

Observation 1120

year	1995	state	South Caroli..	anypfal	has statu
nocontac	has statu	beycohab	has statu	custody	has statu
misdem	has statu	contempt	does not	felony	does not
warrantl	has law	manarst	does not	firearmc	does not
censtate	South Car	fipstate	South Car		

Observation 1121

year	1996	state	South Caroli..	anypfal	has statu
nocontac	has statu	beycohab	has statu	custody	has statu
misdem	has statu	contempt	does not	felony	does not
warrantl	has law	manarst	does not	firearmc	does not
censtate	South Car	fipstate	South Car		

Observation 1122

year	1997	state	South Caroli..	anypfal	has statu
nocontac	has statu	beycohab	has statu	custody	has statu
misdem	has statu	contempt	does not	felony	does not
warrantl	has law	manarst	does not	firearmc	does not
censtate	South Car	fipstate	South Car		

Codebook for Grant # 97WTVX0004, Intimate Partner Homicide Analysis

Sources: Original data collection by authors, Supplementary Homicide Reports, US Bureau of Census

Laura Dugan
Daniel S. Nagin
Richard Rosenfeld

```
stcode ------------------------------------------- state code defined by SHR
                  type:  numeric (float)
                 label:  state

                 range:  [2,51]                       units:  1
         unique values:  28                   coded missing:  0 / 1050

             2 Arizona
             4 California
             5 Colorado
             8 District of Columbia
             9 Florida
            10 Georgia
            12 Illinois
            13 Indiana
            17 Louisiana
            19 Maryland
            20 Massachusetts
            21 Michigan
            22 Minnesota
            24 Missouri
            26 Nebraska
            30 New Mexico
            31 New York
            32 North Carolina
            34 Ohio
            35 Oklahoma
            36 Oregon
            37 Pennsylvania
            41 Tennessee
            42 Texas
            45 Virginia
            46 Washington
            48 Wisconsin
            51 Hawaii
```

```
ori ---------------------------------------------------- ori code from shr source
                  type:  string (str9), but longest is str7

         unique values:  50                    coded missing:  0 / 1050

              examples:  "CA04313"
                         "MA01301"
                         "NY03030"
                         "TN01901"


citycode ----------------------------------------------------- code for each city
                  type:  numeric (float)
                 label:  city

                 range:  [1,50]                         units:  1
         unique values:  50                    coded missing:  0 / 1050

            1 Albuquerque
            2 Atlanta
            3 Austin
            4 Baltimore
            5 Boston
            6 Buffalo
            7 Charlotte
            8 Chicago
            9 Cincinnati
           10 Cleveland
           11 Columbus
           12 Dallas
           13 Denver
           14 Detroit
           15 El Paso
           16 Fresno
           17 Fort Worth
           18 Honolulu
           19 Houston
           20 Indianapolis
           21 Jacksonville
           22 Kansas City
           23 Long Beach
           24 Los Angeles
           25 Memphis
           26 Miami
           27 Milwaukee
           28 Minneapolis
           29 Nashville
           30 New Orleans
           31 New York
           32 Oakland
           33 Oklahoma City
           34 Omaha
           35 Philadelphia
           36 Phoenix
           37 Pittsburgh
           38 Portland
           39 Sacramento
```

```
          40 San Antonio
          41 San Diego
          42 San Francisco
          43 San Jose
          44 Seattle
          45 St Louis
          46 Toledo
          47 Tucson
          48 Tulsa
          49 Virginia Beach
          50 Washington
```

pop ---------- total population as listed in the SHR

type:	numeric (float)		
range:	[177900,7530493]	units:	1
unique values:	996	coded missing:	0 / 1050
mean:	810652		
std. dev:	1.1e+06		

percentiles:	10%	25%	50%	75%	90%
	343916	374041	494660	732022	1.4e+06

year ---------- year

type:	numeric (float)		
range:	[1976,1996]	units:	1
unique values:	21	coded missing:	0 / 1050
mean:	1986		
std. dev:	6.05819		

percentiles:	10%	25%	50%	75%	90%
	1978	1981	1986	1991	1994

malprmar ---------- percent of males who are married

type:	numeric (float)		
range:	[31.1452,62.0566]	units:	.0001
unique values:	1049	coded missing:	0 / 1050
mean:	48.2553		
std. dev:	6.53972		

percentiles:	10%	25%	50%	75%	90%
	39.5366	43.5066	48.368	53.7279	56.6872

femprmar ---------- percent of females who are married

type:	numeric (float)		
range:	[21.2488,65.1037]	units:	.0001
unique values:	1049	coded missing:	0 / 1050
mean:	43.814		
std. dev:	7.62765		

percentiles:	10%	25%	50%	75%	90%
	33.3085	38.1277	44.3967	49.3512	52.8638

malprdiv ---------- percent of males who are divorced

type:	numeric (float)		
range:	[5.062,19.2955]	units:	.0001
unique values:	1041	coded missing:	0 / 1050
mean:	10.9698		
std. dev:	2.35211		

percentiles:	10%	25%	50%	75%	90%
	8.0118	9.2679	10.8412	12.6047	14.0374

femprdiv ---------- percent of females who are divorced

type:	numeric (float)		
range:	[8.2205,21.4819]	units:	.0001
unique values:	1039	coded missing:	0 / 1050
mean:	14.9382		
std. dev:	2.30012		

percentiles:	10%	25%	50%	75%	90%
	11.7643	13.331	14.9927	16.5254	18.0202

lbmale ---------- male labor force participation

type:	numeric (float)		
range:	[.596392,.846854]	units:	1.000e-06
unique values:	1048	coded missing:	0 / 1050
mean:	.732576		
std. dev:	.048642		

percentiles:	10%	25%	50%	75%	90%
	.667699	.696453	.738161	.76442	.789524

lbfem ---------- female labor force participation

type:	numeric (float)		
range:	[.425824,.709701]	units:	1.000e-06
unique values:	1043	coded missing:	0 / 1050
mean:	.555133		
std. dev:	.057432		

percentiles:	10%	25%	50%	75%	90%
	.47772	.509656	.557233	.599365	.629619

prblack ---------- percent of pop who is black

type:	numeric (float)		
range:	[1,83.2615]	units:	.0001
unique values:	1008	coded missing:	0 / 1050
mean:	24.7819		
std. dev:	18.1163		

percentiles:	10%	25%	50%	75%	90%
	4.76685	11.13	22.29	31.94	54.13

educmale ---------- % of men 25 + with at least 4 yrs college

type:	numeric (float)		
range:	[6.88,45.4]	units:	.01
unique values:	799	coded missing:	0 / 1050
mean:	23.9952		
std. dev:	6.98952		

percentiles:	10%	25%	50%	75%	90%
	14.79	19.2	24.61	28.79	32.56

educfem ---------- % of females 25 + with at least 4 yrs college

type:	numeric (float)		
range:	[4.54,42.18]	units:	.01
unique values:	786	coded missing:	0 / 1050
mean:	18.0882		
std. dev:	6.30975		

percentiles:	10%	25%	50%	75%	90%
	10.55	13.48	17.485	22.06	26.445

```
mearnmal ---------------------------------------------------- male median earnings
                  type:  numeric (float)

                 range:  [9232,44672]                 units:  1
          unique values:  1021                  coded missing:  0 / 1050

                  mean:   22850.6
             std. dev:    6691.13

            percentiles:        10%       25%       50%       75%       90%
                             14192.5     17266   22479.5     28055     31730


mearnfem ---------------------------------------------------- female median earnings
                  type:  numeric (float)

                 range:  [6431,34025]                 units:  1
          unique values:  1018                  coded missing:  0 / 1050

                  mean:   16556.7
             std. dev:    5927.02

            percentiles:        10%       25%       50%       75%       90%
                              9084.5     11389   16153.5     20973   24505.5


proarest ----------------------------- police pro-arrest policy for PO
                                       violation
                  type:  numeric (float)
                 label:  proarrest

                 range:  [0,1]                        units:  1
          unique values:  2                     coded missing:  42 / 1050

             tabulation:  Freq.   Numeric  Label
                            761         0  no policy
                            247         1  has policy


manppov ------------------------------ police mandatory arrest policy for PO
                                       violation
                  type:  numeric (float)
                 label:  manpol

                 range:  [0,1]                        units:  1
          unique values:  2                     coded missing:  42 / 1050

             tabulation:  Freq.   Numeric  Label
                            809         0  no policy
                            199         1  has policy
```

```
mandv ------------------------------------------ policy mandatory arrest for dv
                  type:  numeric (float)

                 range:  [0,1]                        units:  1
          unique values:  2                    coded missing:  42 / 1050

            tabulation:  Freq.  Value
                           818  0
                           190  1


pldvunit ---------------------------------------- police domestic violence unit
                  type:  numeric (float)
                 label:  pdvunit

                 range:  [0,1]                        units:  1
          unique values:  2                    coded missing:  42 / 1050

            tabulation:  Freq.   Numeric  Label
                           912         0  no dv unit
                            96         1  has dv unit


recruitn ------------------------------------------------- recruit dv training?
                  type:  numeric (float)
                 label:  recruit

                 range:  [0,1]                        units:  1
          unique values:  2                    coded missing:  42 / 1050

            tabulation:  Freq.   Numeric  Label
                           768         0  does not train recruits
                           240         1  trains recruits


inservtn ------------------------------------------------ inservice dv training?
                  type:  numeric (float)
                 label:  inserv

                 range:  [0,1]                        units:  1
          unique values:  2                    coded missing:  42 / 1050

            tabulation:  Freq.   Numeric  Label
                           832         0  does not provide inservice
                                          training
                           176         1  provides inservice training
```

rechour ---------- number of hours for recruit training

type:	numeric (float)		
range:	[0,80]	units:	1
unique values:	14	coded missing:	114 / 1050
mean:	3.66026		
std. dev:	12.385		

percentiles:	10%	25%	50%	75%	90%
	0	0	0	0	8

inshour ---------- number of hours for inservice training

type:	numeric (float)		
range:	[0,24]	units:	.01
unique values:	10	coded missing:	96 / 1050
mean:	.490828		
std. dev:	1.97462		

percentiles:	10%	25%	50%	75%	90%
	0	0	0	0	2

genunit ---------- unit has general victim witness services

type:	numeric (float)		
label:	genunit		
range:	[0,1]	units:	1
unique values:	2	coded missing:	0 / 1050

tabulation:	Freq.	Numeric	Label
	469	0	does not provide services
	581	1	provides general victim witness services

nodrop ---------- prosecutors office has a no drop policy

type:	numeric (float)		
label:	nodrop		
range:	[0,1]	units:	1
unique values:	2	coded missing:	0 / 1050

tabulation:	Freq.	Numeric	Label
	796	0	no policy
	254	1	has policy

payadv ---------- amount advocates are paid

type:	numeric (float)		
range:	[0,75014]	units:	.1
unique values:	25	coded missing:	57 / 1050
mean:	3064.87		
std. dev:	8977.44		

percentiles:	10%	25%	50%	75%	90%
	0	0	0	0	20000

prdvunit ---------- dv unit in prosector's office

type:	numeric (float)		
label:	pdvunit		
range:	[0,1]	units:	1
unique values:	2	coded missing:	0 / 1050

tabulation:	Freq.	Numeric	Label
	820	0	no dv unit
	230	1	has dv unit

prslegad ---------- da dv unit does legal advocacy

type:	numeric (float)		
label:	plegal		
range:	[0,1]	units:	1
unique values:	2	coded missing:	0 / 1050

tabulation:	Freq.	Numeric	Label
	843	0	does not provide legal advocacy
	207	1	provides legal advocacy

prstkcse ---------- prosecutors take PO violation case

type:	numeric (float)		
label:	takecase		
range:	[0,1]	units:	1
unique values:	2	coded missing:	0 / 1050

tabulation:	Freq.	Numeric	Label
	484	0	does not take PFA cases
	566	1	takes PFA cases

```
prswrtpl ------------------------------ prosecutor has written policy on PO
                                       violation
                  type:  numeric (float)
                 label:  written

                 range:  [0,1]                        units:  1
          unique values:  2                   coded missing:  0 / 1050

             tabulation:  Freq.   Numeric  Label
                            911         0  no written policy
                            139         1  has written policy


numpros -------------------------------- number of prosecutors offices in city
                  type:  numeric (float)

                 range:  [1,2]                        units:  1
          unique values:  2                   coded missing:  0 / 1050

             tabulation:  Freq.  Value
                            756  1
                            294  2


anypoleg ------------------------------------------------- any PO legislation?
                  type:  numeric (float)
                 label:  statute

                 range:  [0,1]                        units:  1
          unique values:  2                   coded missing:  0 / 1050

             tabulation:  Freq.   Numeric  Label
                            180         0  does not have statute
                            870         1  has statute


nocontac ------------------------------------------------ no contact PO available
                  type:  numeric (float)
                 label:  statute

                 range:  [0,1]                        units:  1
          unique values:  2                   coded missing:  0 / 1050

             tabulation:  Freq.   Numeric  Label
                            284         0  does not have statute
                            766         1  has statute
```

```
beycohab ------------------------------------- eligibility beyond cohabitation
                  type:  numeric (float)
                 label:  statute

                 range:  [0,1]                        units:  1
          unique values:  2                   coded missing:  0 / 1050

             tabulation:  Freq.   Numeric  Label
                            412         0  does not have statute
                            638         1  has statute


custody ------------------------------------------------ victim custody relief
                  type:  numeric (float)
                 label:  statute

                 range:  [0,1]                        units:  1
          unique values:  2                   coded missing:  0 / 1050

             tabulation:  Freq.   Numeric  Label
                            343         0  does not have statute
                            707         1  has statute


misdem ----------------------------------------- misdemeanor for violating PO
                  type:  numeric (float)
                 label:  statute

                 range:  [0,1]                        units:  1
          unique values:  2                   coded missing:  0 / 1050

             tabulation:  Freq.   Numeric  Label
                            556         0  does not have statute
                            494         1  has statute


contempt ----------------------------- violation is either civil or criminal
                                        contempt
                  type:  numeric (float)
                 label:  statute

                 range:  [0,1]                        units:  1
          unique values:  2                   coded missing:  0 / 1050

             tabulation:  Freq.   Numeric  Label
                            460         0  does not have statute
                            590         1  has statute
```

```
felony ------------------------------------------------ felony if PO is violated
                  type:  numeric (float)
                 label:  statute

                 range:  [0,1]                        units:  1
          unique values:  2                    coded missing:  0 / 1050

             tabulation:  Freq.   Numeric  Label
                           1031         0  does not have statute
                             19         1  has statute


warrantl ----------------------------------------- law says warrantless arrest ok
                  type:  numeric (float)
                 label:  law

                 range:  [0,1]                        units:  1
          unique values:  2                    coded missing:  0 / 1050

             tabulation:  Freq.   Numeric  Label
                            464         0  no law
                            586         1  has law


manarst ---------------------------------- law mandates arrest for violating PO
                  type:  numeric (float)
                 label:  law

                 range:  [0,1]                        units:  1
          unique values:  2                    coded missing:  0 / 1050

             tabulation:  Freq.   Numeric  Label
                            857         0  no law
                            193         1  has law


firearmc --------------------------------- firearm confiscation for violating PO
                  type:  numeric (float)
                 label:  law

                 range:  [0,1]                        units:  1
          unique values:  2                    coded missing:  0 / 1050

             tabulation:  Freq.   Numeric  Label
                            954         0  no law
                             96         1  has law
```

```
afdc ------------------------------------------ afdc benefits at approx 1983 $
                  type:  numeric (float)

                 range:  [141.56627,903.33917]        units:  .00001
          unique values:  569                  coded missing:  0 / 1050

                  mean:   386.899
             std. dev:   164.583

           percentiles:        10%       25%       50%       75%       90%
                           174.743   260.105   350.604   508.803   646.755


bedsadj ---------------------------------------------------- beds per 100000 fems
                  type:  numeric (float)

                 range:  [0,76.658119]                units:  1.000e-08
          unique values:  887                  coded missing:  21 / 1050

                  mean:   19.4102
             std. dev:   16.8625

           percentiles:        10%       25%       50%       75%       90%
                                 0    6.8096   15.3286   26.3286   44.5595


budgadj ---------------------------------------- budgeted la amt per 100k fems
                  type:  numeric (float)

                 range:  [0,514412.88]                units:  1.000e-06
          unique values:  273                  coded missing:  42 / 1050

                  mean:   14499.6
             std. dev:   50447.3

           percentiles:        10%       25%       50%       75%       90%
                                 0         0         0    6305.2   29927.8


counadj ------------------------------------------------ counseling per 100k fems
                  type:  numeric (float)

                 range:  [0,5.2871938]                units:  1.000e-09
          unique values:  931                  coded missing:  21 / 1050

                  mean:    .86293
             std. dev:    .76785

           percentiles:        10%       25%       50%       75%       90%
                            .160448   .384357   .653864    1.1599   1.70644
```

hotladj ---------- hotlines per 100k fems

type:	numeric (float)		
range:	[0,3.5712585]	units:	1.000e-09
unique values:	969	coded missing:	21 / 1050
mean:	.820549		
std. dev:	.588969		

percentiles:	10%	25%	50%	75%	90%
	.267677	.425804	.655961	1.1599	1.48937

hot24adj ---------- 24 hr hotlines per 100k fems

type:	numeric (float)		
range:	[0,3.0901585]	units:	1.000e-09
unique values:	933	coded missing:	21 / 1050
mean:	.736579		
std. dev:	.551167		

percentiles:	10%	25%	50%	75%	90%
	.132863	.382702	.64034	1.0175	1.39992

lawyadj ---------- # of lawyers per 100k fems

type:	numeric (float)		
range:	[0,1.3264359]	units:	1.000e-08
unique values:	141	coded missing:	21 / 1050
mean:	.075734		
std. dev:	.238985		

percentiles:	10%	25%	50%	75%	90%
	0	0	0	0	.159801

legadadj ---------- legal adv per 100k fems

type:	numeric (float)		
range:	[0,5.9480929]	units:	1.000e-09
unique values:	711	coded missing:	21 / 1050
mean:	.640237		
std. dev:	.80411		

percentiles:	10%	25%	50%	75%	90%
	0	0	.440085	.787799	1.83082

```
lanbadj ---------------------------------------- la with no budg per 100k fems
                  type:  numeric (float)

                 range:  [0,2.6374321]                units:  1.000e-09
          unique values:  507                  coded missing:  21 / 1050

                  mean:   .361246
             std. dev:    .520134

        percentiles:        10%       25%       50%       75%       90%
                             0         0         0   .557977   1.11185


lapayadj --------------------------------------- # w/ paid la staff per 100k fem
                  type:  numeric (float)

                 range:  [0,5.2871938]                units:  1.000e-09
          unique values:  514                  coded missing:  21 / 1050

                  mean:   .370816
             std. dev:    .615279

        percentiles:        10%       25%       50%       75%       90%
                             0         0         0   .599675   .947539


laybadj ---------------------------------------- # of la with budget per 100k fe
                  type:  numeric (float)

                 range:  [0,3.9653952]                units:  1.000e-09
          unique values:  450                  coded missing:  21 / 1050

                  mean:   .306969
             std. dev:    .487975

        percentiles:        10%       25%       50%       75%       90%
                             0         0         0   .555812   .862344


polnadj ---------------------------------------- # of folks in police dv unit pe
                  type:  numeric (float)

                 range:  [0,18.792324]                units:  1.000e-08
          unique values:  111                  coded missing:  45 / 1050

                  mean:   .527041
             std. dev:    1.86125

        percentiles:        10%       25%       50%       75%       90%
                             0         0         0         0   .624465
```

prolaadj ---------- # of la on prosec staff per 100

type:	numeric (float)		
range:	[0,9.396162]	units:	1.000e-08
unique values:	134	coded missing:	42 / 1050
mean:	.226064		
std. dev:	.912702		

percentiles:	10%	25%	50%	75%	90%
	0	0	0	0	.547933

lbratio ---------- fem to mal labor force part rat

type:	numeric (float)		
range:	[.57326561,.89596701]	units:	1.000e-08
unique values:	1050	coded missing:	0 / 1050
mean:	.758255		
std. dev:	.065549		

percentiles:	10%	25%	50%	75%	90%
	.666473	.713737	.763074	.808897	.84137

educrati ---------- fem to mal educ ratio (4 yrs po

type:	numeric (float)		
range:	[.52139461,1.9315069]	units:	1.000e-08
unique values:	1040	coded missing:	0 / 1050
mean:	.751872		
std. dev:	.122982		

percentiles:	10%	25%	50%	75%	90%
	.62266	.674121	.741724	.806184	.86567

earnrati ---------- fem to mal median earnings

type:	numeric (float)		
range:	[.53792816,.93179041]	units:	1.000e-08
unique values:	1050	coded missing:	0 / 1050
mean:	.712242		
std. dev:	.07364		

percentiles:	10%	25%	50%	75%	90%
	.619419	.65711	.710239	.762169	.812518

adulthom ---------- adult non-intimate homicide rat

type:	numeric (float)		
range:	[0,74.9086]	units:	.0001
unique values:	1018	coded missing:	31 / 1050
mean:	19.5407		
std. dev:	13.137		

percentiles:	10%	25%	50%	75%	90%
	6.9718	10.1327	15.6311	25.6111	37.4953

beds ---------- number of beds

type:	numeric (float)		
range:	[0,174]	units:	1
unique values:	99	coded missing:	21 / 1050
mean:	43.4179		
std. dev:	37.233		

percentiles:	10%	25%	50%	75%	90%
	0	17	34	64	101

budget ---------- amount budgeted for LA

type:	numeric (float)		
range:	[0,2165875]	units:	.01
unique values:	180	coded missing:	42 / 1050
mean:	35779.4		
std. dev:	131015		

percentiles:	10%	25%	50%	75%	90%
	0	0	0	14560	80250

counsel ---------- number offering counseling

type:	numeric (float)		
range:	[0,10]	units:	1
unique values:	11	coded missing:	21 / 1050
mean:	1.99514		
std. dev:	1.75686		

percentiles:	10%	25%	50%	75%	90%
	1	1	1	3	4

hotline ---------- number with a hotline

type:	numeric (float)		
range:	[0,6]	units:	1
unique values:	7	coded missing:	21 / 1050

tabulation:

Freq.	Value
57	0
464	1
269	2
124	3
48	4
45	5
22	6

hotln24 ---------- number with a 24 hr hotline

type:	numeric (float)		
range:	[0,6]	units:	1
unique values:	7	coded missing:	21 / 1050

tabulation:

Freq.	Value
94	0
501	1
239	2
102	3
43	4
48	5
2	6

lawyer ---------- number with lawyers on staff

type:	numeric (float)		
range:	[0,4]	units:	1
unique values:	5	coded missing:	21 / 1050

tabulation:

Freq.	Value
889	0
84	1
46	2
7	3
3	4

legaladv ---------- number with legal advocacy

type:	numeric (float)		
range:	[0,11]	units:	1
unique values:	12	coded missing:	21 / 1050
mean:	1.48785		
std. dev:	1.86069		

percentiles:

10%	25%	50%	75%	90%
0	0	1	2	4

```
nobudg ------------------------------------------- number without a sep. LA budg
                  type:  numeric (float)

                 range:  [0,7]                        units:  1
         unique values:  8                    coded missing:  21 / 1050

            tabulation:  Freq.  Value
                           522  0
                           313  1
                            77  2
                            83  3
                            24  4
                             7  5
                             2  6
                             1  7


paystaff ----------------------------------------- number with paid LA staff
                  type:  numeric (float)

                 range:  [0,9]                        units:  1
         unique values:  10                   coded missing:  21 / 1050

                  mean:   .859086
             std. dev:   1.36613

           percentiles:        10%       25%       50%       75%       90%
                                 0         0         0         1         2


yesbudg ------------------------------------------ number with a sep. LA budget
                  type:  numeric (float)

                 range:  [0,8]                        units:  1
         unique values:  9                    coded missing:  21 / 1050

            tabulation:  Freq.  Value
                           579  0
                           316  1
                            70  2
                            31  3
                             8  4
                            15  5
                             4  6
                             2  7
                             4  8
```

numunit ---------- number of folks in unit

type:	numeric (float)		
range:	[0,180]	units:	1
unique values:	20	coded missing:	45 / 1050
mean:	1.92438		
std. dev:	11.0905		

percentiles:	10%	25%	50%	75%	90%
	0	0	0	0	1

prolanum ---------- number of legal advocates in da dv unit

type:	numeric (float)		
range:	[0,21]	units:	.1
unique values:	20	coded missing:	42 / 1050
mean:	.676091		
std. dev:	2.29762		

percentiles:	10%	25%	50%	75%	90%
	0	0	0	0	2

mrrep ---------- number of months agency submitted UCR to FBI

type:	numeric (float)		
range:	[0,12]	units:	1
unique values:	8	coded missing:	0 / 1050

tabulation:	Freq.	Value
	4	0
	1	1
	1	6
	1	8
	1	9
	4	10
	2	11
	1036	12

hom ---------- return A UCR homicide reports

type:	numeric (float)		
range:	[0,2245]	units:	1
unique values:	365	coded missing:	0 / 1050
mean:	180.49		
std. dev:	283.885		

percentiles:	10%	25%	50%	75%	90%
	32	45	85	174	439.5

tvic ---------- total victims reported in SHR

type:	numeric (float)		
range:	[3,2089]	units:	1
unique values:	376	coded missing:	20 / 1050
mean:	183.529		
std. dev:	283.093		

percentiles:	10%	25%	50%	75%	90%
	33	47	87	173	443

vhusb ---------- total husband victims killed by wives

type:	numeric (float)		
range:	[0,24]	units:	1
unique values:	25	coded missing:	20 / 1050
mean:	2.27767		
std. dev:	3.26191		

percentiles:	10%	25%	50%	75%	90%
	0	0	1	3	6

vwife ---------- total wife victims killed by husbands

type:	numeric (float)		
range:	[0,29]	units:	1
unique values:	25	coded missing:	20 / 1050
mean:	3.42621		
std. dev:	4.02904		

percentiles:	10%	25%	50%	75%	90%
	0	1	2	4	8

vclhb ---------- total common law husband victims

type:	numeric (float)		
range:	[0,23]	units:	1
unique values:	21	coded missing:	20 / 1050
mean:	1.2165		
std. dev:	2.93379		

percentiles:	10%	25%	50%	75%	90%
	0	0	0	1	4

vclwf ---------- total common law wife victims

type:	numeric (float)		
range:	[0,26]	units:	1
unique values:	18	coded missing:	20 / 1050
mean:	1.11068		
std. dev:	2.51553		

percentiles:	10%	25%	50%	75%	90%
	0	0	0	1	4

vbfrd ---------- total boyfriend victims killed by girlfriend

type:	numeric (float)		
range:	[0,18]	units:	1
unique values:	19	coded missing:	20 / 1050
mean:	1.8068		
std. dev:	2.58285		

percentiles:	10%	25%	50%	75%	90%
	0	0	1	2	5

vgfrd ---------- total girlfriend victims killed by boyfriend

type:	numeric (float)		
range:	[0,24]	units:	1
unique values:	24	coded missing:	20 / 1050
mean:	2.68252		
std. dev:	3.51302		

percentiles:	10%	25%	50%	75%	90%
	0	0	2	3	7

vxhsb ---------- total ex-husbands killed by ex-wives

type:	numeric (float)		
range:	[0,4]	units:	1
unique values:	5	coded missing:	20 / 1050

tabulation:

Freq.	Value
904	0
106	1
16	2
3	3
1	4

vxwfe ---------- total ex-wives killed by ex-husbands

type:	numeric (float)		
range:	[0,6]	units:	1
unique values:	7	coded missing:	20 / 1050

tabulation:

Freq.	Value
838	0
139	1
45	2
3	3
3	4
1	5
1	6

vhomo ---------- total homosexual victims killed by gay partner

type:	numeric (float)		
range:	[0,21]	units:	1
unique values:	14	coded missing:	20 / 1050
mean:	.540777		
std. dev:	1.50535		

percentiles:	10%	25%	50%	75%	90%
	0	0	0	0	1

t25pl ---------- total adult homicide victims age 25 and older

type:	numeric (float)		
range:	[1,1299]	units:	1
unique values:	298	coded missing:	20 / 1050
mean:	118.194		
std. dev:	181.092		

percentiles:	10%	25%	50%	75%	90%
	21	32	57	116	268

mrshr ---------- months in which agency reported to SHR

type:	numeric (float)		
range:	[0,12]	units:	1
unique values:	11	coded missing:	0 / 1050
mean:	11.2162		
std. dev:	2.11038		

percentiles:	10%	25%	50%	75%	90%
	10	11	12	12	12

allint ---------- total number of intimate partner homicides

type:	numeric (float)				
range:	[0,106]			units:	1
unique values:	81			coded missing:	20 / 1050
mean:	13.2078				
std. dev:	15.8063				
percentiles:	10%	25%	50%	75%	90%
	2	4	8	14	30

adnonint ---------- total number of adult nonintimate homicides, age 25 and up

type:	numeric (float)				
range:	[0,1249]			units:	1
unique values:	279			coded missing:	20 / 1050
mean:	104.986				
std. dev:	168.557				
percentiles:	10%	25%	50%	75%	90%
	17	26	49	102	240.5

bhusb ---------- total black husband victims killed by wives

type:	numeric (float)				
range:	[0,20]			units:	1
unique values:	19			coded missing:	20 / 1050
mean:	1.5068				
std. dev:	2.563				
percentiles:	10%	25%	50%	75%	90%
	0	0	1	2	4

bwife ---------- total black wife victims killed by husbands

type:	numeric (float)				
range:	[0,20]			units:	1
unique values:	17			coded missing:	20 / 1050
mean:	1.42816				
std. dev:	2.28022				
percentiles:	10%	25%	50%	75%	90%
	0	0	1	2	4

bclhb ---------- total black common law husband victims

type:	numeric (float)		
range:	[0,22]	units:	1
unique values:	20	coded missing:	20 / 1050
mean:	1.04078		
std. dev:	2.59481		

percentiles:	10%	25%	50%	75%	90%
	0	0	0	1	3

bclwf ---------- total black common law wife victims

type:	numeric (float)		
range:	[0,13]	units:	1
unique values:	13	coded missing:	20 / 1050
mean:	.724272		
std. dev:	1.7451		

percentiles:	10%	25%	50%	75%	90%
	0	0	0	1	2

bbfrd ---------- total black boyfriend victims killed by girlfriend

type:	numeric (float)		
range:	[0,18]	units:	1
unique values:	17	coded missing:	20 / 1050
mean:	1.45825		
std. dev:	2.32402		

percentiles:	10%	25%	50%	75%	90%
	0	0	1	2	4

bgfrd ---------- total black girlfriend victims killed by boyfriend

type:	numeric (float)		
range:	[0,20]	units:	1
unique values:	18	coded missing:	20 / 1050
mean:	1.6466		
std. dev:	2.61106		

percentiles:	10%	25%	50%	75%	90%
	0	0	1	2	5

bxhsb ---------- total black ex-husbands killed by ex-wives

type:	numeric (float)		
range:	[0,3]	units:	1
unique values:	4	coded missing:	20 / 1050

tabulation:

Freq.	Value
959	0
64	1
6	2
1	3

bxwfe ---------- total black ex-wives killed by ex-husbands

type:	numeric (float)		
range:	[0,3]	units:	1
unique values:	4	coded missing:	20 / 1050

tabulation:

Freq.	Value
954	0
65	1
10	2
1	3

bhomo ---------- total black homosexual victims killed by gay partner

type:	numeric (float)		
range:	[0,8]	units:	1
unique values:	8	coded missing:	20 / 1050

tabulation:

Freq.	Value
881	0
98	1
30	2
11	3
3	4
4	5
1	7
2	8

whusb ---------- total white husband victims killed by wives

type:	numeric (float)		
range:	[0,9]	units:	1
unique values:	9	coded missing:	20 / 1050

tabulation:

Freq.	Value
621	0
232	1
119	2
23	3
17	4
6	5
7	6
3	7
2	9

wwife ---------- total white wife victims killed by husbands

type:	numeric (float)		
range:	[0,19]	units:	1
unique values:	17	coded missing:	20 / 1050
mean:	1.77087		
std. dev:	2.34156		

percentiles:

10%	25%	50%	75%	90%
0	0	1	2	4

wclhb ---------- total white common law husband victims

type:	numeric (float)		
range:	[0,5]	units:	1
unique values:	6	coded missing:	20 / 1050

tabulation:

Freq.	Value
913	0
84	1
19	2
9	3
3	4
2	5

```
wclwf ------------------------------------ total white common law wife victims
                  type:  numeric (float)

                 range:  [0,15]                       units:  1
         unique values:  10                   coded missing:  20 / 1050

                  mean:    .36699
             std. dev:   1.09743

           percentiles:        10%       25%       50%       75%       90%
                                0         0         0         0         1


wbfrd ------------------------------- total white boyfriend victims killed by
                                      girlfriend
                  type:  numeric (float)

                 range:  [0,8]                        units:  1
         unique values:  7                    coded missing:  20 / 1050

            tabulation:  Freq.  Value
                           782  0
                           202  1
                            34  2
                             7  3
                             3  4
                             1  5
                             1  8


wgfrd ------------------------------- total white girlfriend victims killed by
                                      boyfriend
                  type:  numeric (float)

                 range:  [0,12]                       units:  1
         unique values:  12                   coded missing:  20 / 1050

                  mean:    .927184
             std. dev:   1.48839

           percentiles:        10%       25%       50%       75%       90%
                                0         0         0         1         3


wxhsb ------------------------------- total white ex-husbands killed by
                                      ex-wives
                  type:  numeric (float)

                 range:  [0,3]                        units:  1
         unique values:  4                    coded missing:  20 / 1050

            tabulation:  Freq.  Value
                           975  0
                            48  1
                             6  2
                             1  3
```

```
wxwfe ------------------------------- total white ex-wives killed by
                                      ex-husbands
                  type:  numeric (float)

                 range:  [0,6]                        units:  1
          unique values:  5                    coded missing:  20 / 1050

            tabulation:  Freq.  Value
                           901  0
                           102  1
                            23  2
                             3  3
                             1  6


whomo ------------------------------ total white homosexual victims killed by
                                      gay partner
                  type:  numeric (float)

                 range:  [0,13]                       units:  1
          unique values:  10                   coded missing:  20 / 1050

                  mean:   .293204
             std. dev:    .983564

           percentiles:        10%       25%       50%       75%       90%
                                0         0         0         0         1


bec3edrt ---------------------------- black female to male education ration, 3
                                      yr avg
                  type:  numeric (float)

                 range:  [.47777477,6.6305838]        units:  1.000e-08
          unique values:  1050                 coded missing:  0 / 1050

                  mean:   1.17183
             std. dev:    .457328

           percentiles:        10%       25%       50%       75%       90%
                            .753953   .905128   1.09008    1.3523   1.62399


wec3edrt ---------------------------- white female to male education ration, 3
                                      yr avg
                  type:  numeric (float)

                 range:  [.51717788,2.9044533]        units:  1.000e-08
          unique values:  1050                 coded missing:  0 / 1050

                  mean:   .799243
             std. dev:    .199446

           percentiles:        10%       25%       50%       75%       90%
                            .606976    .66177   .762934   .892158   1.02337
```

bma13pmr ---------- black % of men who are married, 3 yr avg

type:	numeric (float)		
range:	[24.78694,57.020378]	units:	1.000e-06
unique values:	1050	coded missing:	0 / 1050
mean:	38.1793		
std. dev:	6.13615		

percentiles:	10%	25%	50%	75%	90%
	30.6192	33.9058	37.8589	41.654	46.4098

bma13pdv ---------- black % of men who are divorced, 3 yr avg

type:	numeric (float)		
range:	[7.3900657,20.609816]	units:	1.000e-07
unique values:	1050	coded missing:	0 / 1050
mean:	15.4901		
std. dev:	2.16262		

percentiles:	10%	25%	50%	75%	90%
	12.6884	14.2991	15.6526	16.9421	17.9789

bfem3pmr ---------- black % of females who are married, 3 yr avg

type:	numeric (float)		
range:	[15.43726,57.663235]	units:	1.000e-06
unique values:	1050	coded missing:	0 / 1050
mean:	30.9681		
std. dev:	6.69855		

percentiles:	10%	25%	50%	75%	90%
	23.4911	26.3476	30.0013	34.2385	38.8279

bfem3pdv ---------- black % of females who are divorced, 3 yr avg

type:	numeric (float)		
range:	[6.469089,26.211618]	units:	1.000e-07
unique values:	1050	coded missing:	0 / 1050
mean:	20.8839		
std. dev:	2.61982		

percentiles:	10%	25%	50%	75%	90%
	18.6288	19.8973	21.1229	22.366	23.9119

```
wma13pmr ------------------------------ white % of men who are married, 3 yr avg
                  type:  numeric (float)

                 range:  [32.101303,68.404091]        units:  1.000e-06
          unique values:  1050                  coded missing:  0 / 1050

                  mean:   51.7027
             std. dev:    7.28014

           percentiles:        10%       25%       50%       75%       90%
                            43.1778   47.2904   52.1561   57.5166   60.1068


wma13pdv ------------------------------ white % of men who are divorced, 3 yr
                                       avg
                  type:  numeric (float)

                 range:  [5.0871692,21.855543]        units:  1.000e-07
          unique values:  1050                  coded missing:  0 / 1050

                  mean:    11.011
             std. dev:    2.29058

           percentiles:        10%       25%       50%       75%       90%
                           7.95857   9.36202   10.9549   12.5741   13.7259


wfem3pmr ------------------------------ white % of females who are married, 3 yr
                                       avg
                  type:  numeric (float)

                 range:  [26.531113,69.890701]        units:  1.000e-06
          unique values:  1050                  coded missing:  0 / 1050

                  mean:   46.2777
             std. dev:    7.26122

           percentiles:        10%       25%       50%       75%       90%
                           37.7017   41.9106   45.7309   51.0332   54.9326


wfem3pdv ------------------------------ white % of females who are divorced, 3
                                       yr avg
                  type:  numeric (float)

                 range:  [3.1626823,24.828922]        units:  1.000e-07
          unique values:  1050                  coded missing:  0 / 1050

                  mean:   13.8398
             std. dev:    2.85961

           percentiles:        10%       25%       50%       75%       90%
                           10.0038   11.7637    14.139    15.889   17.2659
```

First and Last Observations of data for Grant # 97WTVX0004, Intimate Partner Homicide Analysis

Sources: Original data collection by authors, Supplementary Homicide Reports, US Bureau of Census

Laura Dugan
Daniel S. Nagin
Richard Rosenfeld

Observation 1

stcode	New Mexic	ori	NM00101	citycode	Albuquerq
pop	292265	year	1976	malprmar	57.229
femprmar	55.8833	malprdiv	7.1138	femprdiv	11.2271
lbmale	.774395	lbfem	.491945	prblack	2.26
educmale	28.54	educfem	17.08	mearnmal	13395
mearnfem	7632	proarest	no policy	manppov	no policy
mandv	0	pldvunit	no dv uni	recruitn	does not
inservtn	does not	rechour	0	inshour	0
genunit	does not	nodrop	no policy	payadv	0
prdvunit	no dv uni	prslegad	does not	prstkcse	does not
prswrtpl	no writte	numpros	1	anypoleg	does not
nocontac	does not	beycohab	does not	custody	does not
misdem	does not	contempt	does not	felony	does not
warrantl	no law	manarst	no law	firearmc	no law
afdc	362.0387	bedsadj	42.47547	budgadj	16990.19
counadj	1.699019	hotladj	1.699019	hot24adj	.8495094
lawyadj	0	legadadj	.8495094	lanbadj	0
lapayadj	.8495094	laybadj	.8495094	polnadj	0
prolaadj	0	lbratio	.6352637	educrati	.5984583
earnrati	.5697649	adulthom	9.1815	beds	50
budget	20000	counsel	2	hotline	2
hotln24	1	lawyer	0	legaladv	1
nobudg	0	paystaff	1	yesbudg	1
numunit	0	prolanum	0	mrrep	12
hom	28	tvic	31	vhusb	1
vwife	1	vclhb	0	vclwf	2
vbfrd	0	vgfrd	0	vxhsb	0
vxwfe	0	vhomo	0	t25pl	19
mrshr	11	allint	4	adnonint	15
bhusb	1	bwife	0	bclhb	0
bclwf	0	bbfrd	0	bgfrd	0
bxhsb	0	bxwfe	0	bhomo	0
whusb	0	wwife	1	wclhb	0
wclwf	2	wbfrd	0	wgfrd	0
wxhsb	0	wxwfe	0	whomo	0
bec3edrt	.7436459	wec3edrt	.6048633	bmal3pmr	51.40519
bmal3pdv	13.81454	bfem3pmr	44.65796	bfem3pdv	19.99031
wmal3pmr	57.58131	wmal3pdv	7.767696	wfem3pmr	54.64706
wfem3pdv	11.50199				

Observation 2

stcode	New Mexic	ori	NM00101	citycode	Albuquerq
pop	292341	year	1977	malprmar	56.218
femprmar	55.3359	malprdiv	7.4425	femprdiv	11.6402
lbmale	.774127	lbfem	.502435	prblack	2.27
educmale	29.18	educfem	17.61	mearnmal	14367
mearnfem	8293	proarest	no policy	manppov	no policy
mandv	0	pldvunit	no dv uni	recruitn	does not
inservtn	does not	rechour	0	inshour	0
genunit	does not	nodrop	no policy	payadv	0
prdvunit	no dv uni	prslegad	does not	prstkcse	does not
prswrtpl	no writte	numpros	1	anypoleg	does not
nocontac	does not	beycohab	does not	custody	does not
misdem	does not	contempt	does not	felony	does not
warrantl	no law	manarst	no law	firearmc	no law
afdc	363.0363	bedsadj	41.00411	budgadj	16401.64
counadj	1.640164	hotladj	1.640164	hot24adj	.8200822
lawyadj	0	legadadj	.8200822	lanbadj	0
lapayadj	.8200822	laybadj	.8200822	polnadj	0
prolaadj	0	lbratio	.6490344	educrati	.6034955
earnrati	.5772256	adulthom	12.9274	beds	50
budget	20000	counsel	2	hotline	2
hotln24	1	lawyer	0	legaladv	1
nobudg	0	paystaff	1	yesbudg	1
numunit	0	prolanum	0	mrrep	12
hom	31	tvic	38	vhusb	0
vwife	0	vclhb	0	vclwf	0
vbfrd	0	vgfrd	1	vxhsb	2
vxwfe	1	vhomo	0	t25pl	25
mrshr	10	allint	3	adnonint	22
bhusb	0	bwife	0	bclhb	0
bclwf	0	bbfrd	0	bgfrd	0
bxhsb	1	bxwfe	0	bhomo	0
whusb	0	wwife	0	wclhb	0
wclwf	0	wbfrd	0	wgfrd	1
wxhsb	1	wxwfe	1	whomo	0
bec3edrt	.7844886	wec3edrt	.6083504	bmal3pmr	50.70542
bmal3pdv	14.18105	bfem3pmr	44.2979	bfem3pdv	20.44217
wmal3pmr	58.20692	wmal3pdv	8.175456	wfem3pmr	53.95214
wfem3pdv	11.93268				

Observation 3

stcode	New Mexic	ori	NM00101	citycode	Albuquerq
pop	291834	year	1978	malprmar	55.2926
femprmar	54.8263	malprdiv	7.7429	femprdiv	12.0242
lbmale	.77386	lbfem	.512926	prblack	2.28
educmale	29.82	educfem	18.14	mearnmal	15340
mearnfem	8954	proarest	no policy	manppov	no policy
mandv	0	pldvunit	no dv uni	recruitn	does not
inservtn	does not	rechour	0	inshour	0
genunit	does not	nodrop	no policy	payadv	0
prdvunit	no dv uni	prslegad	does not	prstkcse	does not
prswrtpl	no writte	numpros	1	anypoleg	does not
nocontac	does not	beycohab	does not	custody	does not
misdem	does not	contempt	does not	felony	does not
warrantl	no law	manarst	no law	firearmc	no law
afdc	351.227	bedsadj	39.63158	budgadj	15852.63
counadj	1.585263	hotladj	1.585263	hot24adj	.7926317
lawyadj	0	legadadj	.7926317	lanbadj	0
lapayadj	.7926317	laybadj	.7926317	polnadj	0
prolaadj	0	lbratio	.662815	educrati	.6083165
earnrati	.5837027	adulthom	.	beds	50
budget	20000	counsel	2	hotline	2
hotln24	1	lawyer	0	legaladv	1
nobudg	0	paystaff	1	yesbudg	1
numunit	0	prolanum	0	mrrep	12
hom	37	tvic	18	vhusb	1
vwife	0	vclhb	0	vclwf	0
vbfrd	0	vgfrd	0	vxhsb	0
vxwfe	1	vhomo	1	t25pl	11
mrshr	5	allint	2	adnonint	9
bhusb	0	bwife	0	bclhb	0
bclwf	0	bbfrd	0	bgfrd	0
bxhsb	0	bxwfe	0	bhomo	0
whusb	1	wwife	0	wclhb	0
wclwf	0	wbfrd	0	wgfrd	0
wxhsb	0	wxwfe	1	whomo	1
bec3edrt	.8233423	wec3edrt	.6115299	bmal3pmr	50.09357
bmal3pdv	14.51245	bfem3pmr	43.97147	bfem3pdv	20.86744
wmal3pmr	57.51656	wmal3pdv	8.563	wfem3pmr	53.28866
wfem3pdv	12.34369				

Observation 4

stcode	New Mexic	ori	NM00101	citycode	Albuquerq
pop	302120	year	1979	malprmar	54.4409
femprmar	54.3486	malprdiv	8.0199	femprdiv	12.3848
lbmale	.773592	lbfem	.523417	prblack	2.29
educmale	30.46	educfem	18.67	mearnmal	16312
mearnfem	9615	proarest	no policy	manppov	no policy
mandv	0	pldvunit	no dv uni	recruitn	does not
inservtn	does not	rechour	0	inshour	0
genunit	does not	nodrop	no policy	payadv	0
prdvunit	no dv uni	prslegad	does not	prstkcse	does not
prswrtpl	no writte	numpros	1	anypoleg	does not
nocontac	does not	beycohab	does not	custody	does not
misdem	does not	contempt	does not	felony	does not
warrantl	no law	manarst	no law	firearmc	no law
afdc	333.3333	bedsadj	38.34768	budgadj	15339.07
counadj	1.533907	hotladj	1.533907	hot24adj	.7669535
lawyadj	0	legadadj	.7669535	lanbadj	0
lapayadj	.7669535	laybadj	.7669535	polnadj	0
prolaadj	0	lbratio	.676606	educrati	.612935
earnrati	.5894433	adulthom	16.4795	beds	50
budget	20000	counsel	2	hotline	2
hotln24	1	lawyer	0	legaladv	1
nobudg	0	paystaff	1	yesbudg	1
numunit	0	prolanum	0	mrrep	12
hom	47	tvic	45	vhusb	1
vwife	2	vclhb	1	vclwf	0
vbfrd	0	vgfrd	0	vxhsb	0
vxwfe	1	vhomo	0	t25pl	33
mrshr	11	allint	4	adnonint	29
bhusb	0	bwife	0	bclhb	1
bclwf	0	bbfrd	0	bgfrd	0
bxhsb	0	bxwfe	0	bhomo	0
whusb	1	wwife	2	wclhb	0
wclwf	0	wbfrd	0	wgfrd	0
wxhsb	0	wxwfe	1	whomo	0
bec3edrt	.8343849	wec3edrt	.6187665	bmal3pmr	49.30513
bmal3pdv	14.83759	bfem3pmr	43.36293	bfem3pdv	21.16553
wmal3pmr	57.10486	wmal3pdv	8.92963	wfem3pmr	52.77429
wfem3pdv	12.73994				

Observation 5

stcode	New Mexic	ori	NM00101	citycode	Albuquerq
pop	328837	year	1980	malprmar	53.6559
femprmar	53.902	malprdiv	8.2747	femprdiv	12.722
lbmale	.773325	lbfem	.533908	prblack	2.3
educmale	31.1	educfem	19.2	mearnmal	17284
mearnfem	10276	proarest	no policy	manppov	no policy
mandv	0	pldvunit	no dv uni	recruitn	does not
inservtn	does not	rechour	0	inshour	0
genunit	does not	nodrop	no policy	payadv	0
prdvunit	no dv uni	prslegad	does not	prstkcse	does not
prswrtpl	no writte	numpros	1	anypoleg	does not
nocontac	does not	beycohab	does not	custody	does not
misdem	does not	contempt	does not	felony	does not
warrantl	no law	manarst	no law	firearmc	no law
afdc	322.8155	bedsadj	37.14462	budgadj	14857.85
counadj	1.485785	hotladj	1.485785	hot24adj	.7428924
lawyadj	0	legadadj	.7428924	lanbadj	0
lapayadj	.7428924	laybadj	.7428924	polnadj	0
prolaadj	0	lbratio	.6904057	educrati	.6173633
earnrati	.5945383	adulthom	14.6065	beds	50
budget	20000	counsel	2	hotline	2
hotln24	1	lawyer	0	legaladv	1
nobudg	0	paystaff	1	yesbudg	1
numunit	0	prolanum	0	mrrep	12
hom	49	tvic	44	vhusb	0
vwife	2	vclhb	0	vclwf	1
vbfrd	0	vgfrd	0	vxhsb	0
vxwfe	0	vhomo	0	t25pl	28
mrshr	9	allint	3	adnonint	25
bhusb	0	bwife	0	bclhb	0
bclwf	1	bbfrd	0	bgfrd	0
bxhsb	0	bxwfe	0	bhomo	0
whusb	0	wwife	2	wclhb	0
wclwf	0	wbfrd	0	wgfrd	0
wxhsb	0	wxwfe	0	whomo	0
bec3edrt	.8219675	wec3edrt	.630448	bmal3pmr	48.36953
bmal3pdv	15.16249	bfem3pmr	42.51641	bfem3pdv	21.33466
wmal3pmr	56.86743	wmal3pdv	9.27965	wfem3pmr	52.39962
wfem3pdv	13.12466				

Observation 1045

stcode	District	ori	DCMPD00	citycode	Washingto
pop	598000	year	1991	malprmar	32.4826
femprmar	26.19	malprdiv	13.8952	femprdiv	16.2008
lbmale	.709078	lbfem	.622737	prblack	65.4038
educmale	36.76	educfem	31.59	mearnmal	30168
mearnfem	26395	proarest	no policy	manppov	no policy
mandv	0	pldvunit	no dv uni	recruitn	does not
inservtn	does not	rechour	0	inshour	0
genunit	provides	nodrop	no policy	payadv	0
prdvunit	no dv uni	prslegad	does not	prstkcse	does not
prswrtpl	no writte	numpros	1	anypoleg	has statu
nocontac	has statu	beycohab	has statu	custody	has statu
misdem	does not	contempt	has statu	felony	does not
warrantl	has law	manarst	has law	firearmc	no law
afdc	383.2599	bedsadj	32.37105	budgadj	0
counadj	1.091159	hotladj	1.091159	hot24adj	1.091159
lawyadj	0	legadadj	.3637197	lanbadj	.3637197
lapayadj	0	laybadj	0	polnadj	0
prolaadj	0	lbratio	.8782348	educrati	.859358
earnrati	.8749337	adulthom	54.91	beds	89
budget	0	counsel	3	hotline	3
hotln24	3	lawyer	0	legaladv	1
nobudg	1	paystaff	0	yesbudg	0
numunit	0	prolanum	0	mrrep	12
hom	482	tvic	489	vhusb	1
vwife	2	vclhb	0	vclwf	0
vbfrd	0	vgfrd	1	vxhsb	0
vxwfe	0	vhomo	0	t25pl	234
mrshr	12	allint	4	adnonint	230
bhusb	1	bwife	2	bclhb	0
bclwf	0	bbfrd	0	bgfrd	1
bxhsb	0	bxwfe	0	bhomo	0
whusb	0	wwife	0	wclhb	0
wclwf	0	wbfrd	0	wgfrd	0
wxhsb	0	wxwfe	0	whomo	0
bec3edrt	1.524011	wec3edrt	1.382369	bmal3pmr	29.58931
bmal3pdv	16.61322	bfem3pmr	22.41174	bfem3pdv	18.8812
wmal3pmr	33.07274	wmal3pdv	9.379734	wfem3pmr	29.97162
wfem3pdv	10.95741				

Observation 1046

stcode	District	ori	DCMPD00	citycode	Washingto
pop	589000	year	1992	malprmar	32.4264
femprmar	25.9137	malprdiv	14.041	femprdiv	16.1646
lbmale	.711391	lbfem	.626567	prblack	64.9642
educmale	37.22	educfem	32.28	mearnmal	31385
mearnfem	27589	proarest	no policy	manppov	no policy
mandv	0	pldvunit	no dv uni	recruitn	does not
inservtn	does not	rechour	0	inshour	0
genunit	provides	nodrop	no policy	payadv	0
prdvunit	no dv uni	prslegad	does not	prstkcse	does not
prswrtpl	no writte	numpros	1	anypoleg	has statu
nocontac	has statu	beycohab	has statu	custody	has statu
misdem	does not	contempt	has statu	felony	does not
warrantl	has law	manarst	has law	firearmc	no law
afdc	355.6664	bedsadj	32.50311	budgadj	0
counadj	1.09561	hotladj	1.09561	hot24adj	1.09561
lawyadj	0	legadadj	.3652034	lanbadj	.3652034
lapayadj	0	laybadj	0	polnadj	0
prolaadj	0	lbratio	.8807632	educrati	.8672756
earnrati	.8790505	adulthom	56.3341	beds	89
budget	0	counsel	3	hotline	3
hotln24	3	lawyer	0	legaladv	1
nobudg	1	paystaff	0	yesbudg	0
numunit	0	prolanum	0	mrrep	12
hom	443	tvic	450	vhusb	0
vwife	1	vclhb	0	vclwf	1
vbfrd	0	vgfrd	0	vxhsb	0
vxwfe	0	vhomo	0	t25pl	239
mrshr	12	allint	2	adnonint	237
bhusb	0	bwife	1	bclhb	0
bclwf	1	bbfrd	0	bgfrd	0
bxhsb	0	bxwfe	0	bhomo	0
whusb	0	wwife	0	wclhb	0
wclwf	0	wbfrd	0	wgfrd	0
wxhsb	0	wxwfe	0	whomo	0
bec3edrt	1.604726	wec3edrt	1.564778	bmal3pmr	29.06955
bmal3pdv	16.68378	bfem3pmr	21.97696	bfem3pdv	18.93233
wmal3pmr	33.00213	wmal3pdv	9.25607	wfem3pmr	30.07293
wfem3pdv	10.93344				

Observation 1047

stcode	District	ori	DCMPD00	citycode	Washingto
pop	578000	year	1993	malprmar	32.3693
femprmar	25.6352	malprdiv	14.1896	femprdiv	16.1285
lbmale	.713703	lbfem	.630397	prblack	64.5245
educmale	37.68	educfem	32.97	mearnmal	32603
mearnfem	28782	proarest	no policy	manppov	no policy
mandv	0	pldvunit	no dv uni	recruitn	does not
inservtn	does not	rechour	0	inshour	0
genunit	provides	nodrop	no policy	payadv	0
prdvunit	no dv uni	prslegad	does not	prstkcse	does not
prswrtpl	no writte	numpros	1	anypoleg	has statu
nocontac	has statu	beycohab	has statu	custody	has statu
misdem	does not	contempt	has statu	felony	does not
warrantl	has law	manarst	has law	firearmc	no law
afdc	345.3287	bedsadj	34.46973	budgadj	0
counadj	1.100098	hotladj	1.100098	hot24adj	1.100098
lawyadj	0	legadadj	.3666993	lanbadj	.3666993
lapayadj	0	laybadj	0	polnadj	0
prolaadj	0	lbratio	.8832765	educrati	.875
earnrati	.8828022	adulthom	56.3895	beds	94
budget	0	counsel	3	hotline	3
hotln24	3	lawyer	0	legaladv	1
nobudg	1	paystaff	0	yesbudg	0
numunit	0	prolanum	0	mrrep	12
hom	454	tvic	423	vhusb	0
vwife	1	vclhb	0	vclwf	0
vbfrd	0	vgfrd	0	vxhsb	0
vxwfe	0	vhomo	0	t25pl	223
mrshr	12	allint	1	adnonint	222
bhusb	0	bwife	1	bclhb	0
bclwf	0	bbfrd	0	bgfrd	0
bxhsb	0	bxwfe	0	bhomo	0
whusb	0	wwife	0	wclhb	0
wclwf	0	wbfrd	0	wgfrd	0
wxhsb	0	wxwfe	0	whomo	0
bec3edrt	1.694938	wec3edrt	1.835925	bmal3pmr	28.537
bmal3pdv	16.75602	bfem3pmr	21.47116	bfem3pdv	18.93189
wmal3pmr	32.93235	wmal3pdv	9.134471	wfem3pmr	30.17469
wfem3pdv	10.90983				

Observation 1048

stcode	District	ori	DCMPD00	citycode	Washingto
pop	570000	year	1994	malprmar	32.3107
femprmar	25.3544	malprdiv	14.3425	femprdiv	16.0918
lbmale	.716015	lbfem	.634228	prblack	64.0849
educmale	38.14	educfem	33.66	mearnmal	33820
mearnfem	29976	proarest	no policy	manppov	no policy
mandv	0	pldvunit	no dv uni	recruitn	does not
inservtn	does not	rechour	0	inshour	0
genunit	provides	nodrop	no policy	payadv	0
prdvunit	no dv uni	prslegad	does not	prstkcse	does not
prswrtpl	no writte	numpros	1	anypoleg	has statu
nocontac	has statu	beycohab	has statu	custody	has statu
misdem	has statu	contempt	has statu	felony	does not
warrantl	has law	manarst	has law	firearmc	no law
afdc	346.1538	bedsadj	36.45254	budgadj	0
counadj	1.104622	hotladj	1.104622	hot24adj	1.104622
lawyadj	0	legadadj	.3682075	lanbadj	.3682075
lapayadj	0	laybadj	0	polnadj	0
prolaadj	0	lbratio	.8857747	educrati	.882538
earnrati	.8863394	adulthom	55.1394	beds	99
budget	0	counsel	3	hotline	3
hotln24	3	lawyer	0	legaladv	1
nobudg	1	paystaff	0	yesbudg	0
numunit	0	prolanum	0	mrrep	12
hom	399	tvic	416	vhusb	0
vwife	1	vclhb	0	vclwf	1
vbfrd	2	vgfrd	5	vxhsb	0
vxwfe	0	vhomo	0	t25pl	243
mrshr	12	allint	9	adnonint	234
bhusb	0	bwife	0	bclhb	0
bclwf	1	bbfrd	2	bgfrd	5
bxhsb	0	bxwfe	0	bhomo	0
whusb	0	wwife	1	wclhb	0
wclwf	0	wbfrd	0	wgfrd	0
wxhsb	0	wxwfe	0	whomo	0
bec3edrt	1.796527	wec3edrt	2.290982	bmal3pmr	27.99125
bmal3pdv	16.82981	bfem3pmr	20.95653	bfem3pdv	18.93145
wmal3pmr	32.86352	wmal3pdv	9.013721	wfem3pmr	30.27676
wfem3pdv	10.88575				

Observation 1049

stcode	District	ori	DCMPD00	citycode	Washingto
pop	554000	year	1995	malprmar	32.2505
femprmar	25.0716	malprdiv	14.4994	femprdiv	16.0547
lbmale	.718328	lbfem	.638058	prblack	63.6452
educmale	38.6	educfem	34.35	mearnmal	35038
mearnfem	31169	proarest	has polic	manppov	has polic
mandv	1	pldvunit	no dv uni	recruitn	trains re
inservtn	provides	rechour	40	inshour	.
genunit	provides	nodrop	no policy	payadv	0
prdvunit	no dv uni	prslegad	does not	prstkcse	does not
prswrtpl	no writte	numpros	1	anypoleg	has statu
nocontac	has statu	beycohab	has statu	custody	has statu
misdem	has statu	contempt	has statu	felony	does not
warrantl	has law	manarst	has law	firearmc	no law
afdc	336.6142	bedsadj	36.60308	budgadj	0
counadj	1.109184	hotladj	1.109184	hot24adj	1.109184
lawyadj	0	legadadj	.3697281	lanbadj	.3697281
lapayadj	0	laybadj	0	polnadj	0
prolaadj	0	lbratio	.8882544	educrati	.8898964
earnrati	.889577	adulthom	36.8254	beds	99
budget	0	counsel	3	hotline	3
hotln24	3	lawyer	0	legaladv	1
nobudg	1	paystaff	0	yesbudg	0
numunit	0	prolanum	0	mrrep	12
hom	361	tvic	345	vhusb	0
vwife	0	vclhb	0	vclwf	2
vbfrd	1	vgfrd	1	vxhsb	0
vxwfe	0	vhomo	0	t25pl	154
mrshr	12	allint	4	adnonint	150
bhusb	0	bwife	0	bclhb	0
bclwf	1	bbfrd	1	bgfrd	1
bxhsb	0	bxwfe	0	bhomo	0
whusb	0	wwife	0	wclhb	0
wclwf	1	wbfrd	0	wgfrd	0
wxhsb	0	wxwfe	0	whomo	0
bec3edrt	1.84918	wec3edrt	2.542619	bmal3pmr	27.71627
bmal3pdv	16.86698	bfem3pmr	20.69775	bfem3pdv	18.9314
wmal3pmr	32.82919	wmal3pdv	8.953806	wfem3pmr	30.3281
wfem3pdv	10.87392				

Observation 1050

stcode	District	ori	DCMPD00	citycode	Washingto
pop	543000	year	1996	malprmar	32.1883
femprmar	24.7862	malprdiv	14.661	femprdiv	16.0174
lbmale	.72064	lbfem	.641888	prblack	63.2055
educmale	39.06	educfem	35.04	mearnmal	36256
mearnfem	32362	proarest	has polic	manppov	has polic
mandv	1	pldvunit	has dv un	recruitn	trains re
inservtn	provides	rechour	40	inshour	.
genunit	provides	nodrop	has polic	payadv	42000
prdvunit	has dv un	prslegad	provides	prstkcse	takes PFA
prswrtpl	has writt	numpros	1	anypoleg	has statu
nocontac	has statu	beycohab	has statu	custody	has statu
misdem	has statu	contempt	has statu	felony	does not
warrantl	has law	manarst	has law	firearmc	no law
afdc	326.9598	bedsadj	38.61133	budgadj	0
counadj	1.113788	hotladj	1.113788	hot24adj	1.113788
lawyadj	0	legadadj	.3712628	lanbadj	.3712628
lapayadj	0	laybadj	0	polnadj	6.68273
prolaadj	1.485051	lbratio	.8907194	educrati	.8970814
earnrati	.8925971	adulthom	.	beds	104
budget	0	counsel	3	hotline	3
hotln24	3	lawyer	0	legaladv	1
nobudg	1	paystaff	0	yesbudg	0
numunit	18	prolanum	4	mrrep	12
hom	397	tvic	.	vhusb	.
vwife	.	vclhb	.	vclwf	.
vbfrd	.	vgfrd	.	vxhsb	.
vxwfe	.	vhomo	.	t25pl	.
mrshr	0	allint	.	adnonint	.
bhusb	.	bwife	.	bclhb	.
bclwf	.	bbfrd	.	bgfrd	.
bxhsb	.	bxwfe	.	bhomo	.
whusb	.	wwife	.	wclhb	.
wclwf	.	wbfrd	.	wgfrd	.
wxhsb	.	wxwfe	.	whomo	.
bec3edrt	1.906308	wec3edrt	2.904453	bmal3pmr	27.43648
bmal3pdv	16.90476	bfem3pmr	20.43585	bfem3pdv	18.93119
wmal3pmr	32.79531	wmal3pdv	8.89407	wfem3pmr	30.37916
wfem3pdv	10.86166				

State Statute Provisions Related to Restraining Order Violations

Year	Any restraining order legislation (yes/no)	No contact (yes/no)	Eligibility beyond cohabitation (yes/no)	Victim able to get custody relief? (yes/no)	Violation type for no contact (misdemeanor, civil, or criminal contempt)	Warrantless arrest (yes/no)	Mandatory arrest (yes/no)	Firearm confiscation (yes/no)
1997								
1996								
1995								
1994								
1993								
1992								
1991								
1990								
1989								
1988								
1987								
1986								
1985								
1984								
1983								
1982								
1981								
1980								
1979								
1978								
1977								
1976								

Organization :
City:
Name and Address of Contact Person:

Written Directives for Police Officers on Protection Order* Violations

Year	Pro-arrest Policy (yes/no) for violation of protection orders*	Mandatory Arrest Policy (yes/no) for violation of protection orders*		Formalized Domestic Violence Unit		Is domestic violence included in you curriculum for training?		If yes, how many hours are dedicated to domestic violence? (# of hours)	
		PFA	DV	(y/n)	#	Recruit	In-serv	Recruit	In-serv
1997									
1996									
1995									
1994									
1993									
1992									
1991									
1990									
1989									
1988									
1987									
1986									
1985									
1984									
1983									
1982									
1981									
1980									
1979									
1978									
1977									
1976									

Where appropriate, please use the following abbreviations:
dk = do not know
un = information is unavailable

Organization :
City:
Name and Address of Contact Person:

Policy of Local Prosecutors Regarding Domestic Violence

Year	Do you handle protection order* violations? (yes/no)	Does your office have any written policies on the violation of protection orders*? (yes/no)	Does your office have a specialized domestic violence unit? (yes/no)	If yes, does your unit provide legal advocacy services? (yes/no)		If you have advocates who specialize in domestic violence services, what is your staff number and average salary?		Do you have a policy that requires prosecution of domestic violence offenders regardless of the victim's desires in <u>most</u> circumstances? (yes/no)
				Gen. Vic. Witn.	Spec. d.v.	# of Staff	Aver. salary	
1997								
1996								
1995								
1994								
1993								
1992								
1991								
1990								
1989								
1988								
1987								
1986								
1985								
1984								
1983								
1982								
1981								
1980								
1979								
1978								
1977								
1976								

Where appropriate, please use the following abbreviations:
dk = do not know
un = information is unavailable

Organization :
City:
Name and Address Contact Person:

Legal advocacy is defined by the National Coalition Against Domestic Violence as legal assistance provided to battered women, such as assistance in obtaining restraining orders, accompaniment to court, legal clinics, advocacy, etc.

The Availability of Legal Advocacy Services

Year	Paid Legal Advocacy Staff (yes/no)	Lawyer(s) on staff (Yes/No)	Budget for legal advocacy salary and expenses (yes/no)	If yes, budget amount in dollars	Provided advocacy without a budget (yes/no)
1997				$	
1996				$	
1995				$	
1994				$	
1993				$	
1992				$	
1991				$	
1990				$	
1989				$	
1988				$	
1987				$	
1986				$	
1985				$	
1984				$	
1983				$	
1982				$	
1981				$	
1980				$	
1979				$	
1978				$	
1977				$	
1976				$	

Where appropriate, please use the following abbreviations:
dk = do not know
un = information is unavailable

Organization :
City:
Name and Address of Contact Person:

Services Provided by Domestic Violence Programs

Year	Hotline (yes/no)	24 Hour Hotline (yes/no)	Counseling (yes/no)	Legal Advocacy (yes/no)	Beds for Emergency Sheltering (# of beds available)
1997					
1996					
1995					
1994					
1993					
1992					
1991					
1990					
1989					
1988					
1987					
1986					
1985					
1984					
1983					
1982					
1981					
1980					
1979					
1978					
1977					
1976					

Where appropriate, please use the following abbreviations:
dk = do not know
un = information is unavailable