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Author(s): Juan Pena-Acosta ; Amber Boglin ; Mark Braza ; Naomi Kleckner ; Jody Rogish ; Yeewan Tom ; Frank Trigianni ; Mary C. Hult

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Gun Bounty Program

Program Design and Evaluation for the City of Pittsburgh

Juan Pena-Acosta

Amber Boglin

Mark Braza

Mary Catherine Hult

Naomi Kleckner

Jody Rogish

Yeewan Tom

Frank Trigianni

Dr. Alfred Blumstein, Faculty Advisor

Youth Firearms Systems Synthesis

The H. John Heinz III, School of Public Policy and Management

Carnegie Mellon University

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Youth Firearms Systems Synthesis is a year-long project by Master of Science students at the H. John Heinz School III, School of Public Policy and Management at Carnegie Mellon University. It evaluated the issue of youth gun violence in the city of Pittsburgh. The result of our project is the design and evaluation plan for a gun bounty program.

In our report, we address trends in youth violence, potential interventions to address gun violence, the rationale for the selected intervention, a gun bounty program, the design of a gun bounty program, and program evaluation methods.

Youth Violence is a Both a National and Local Problem

While violent crime rates began to climb in the early 1980s, they did not have an impact on both large and small cities until the early 1990s. There were two disturbing characteristics of this escalation of violence. First, younger portions of the population were engaging in violent behavior at higher rates. Youth, persons ages 24 and younger, were a driving force behind the rise in violent crime—not only were their arrest rates increasing at a faster pace than adults but they overtook adults in accounting for the majority of handgun homicides. This new tendency towards the use of firearms among young offenders signaled the second disturbing trend: young people began committing violent crimes with guns at a higher rate than their adult counterparts.

Pittsburgh was no exception to the rise in violence the country was experiencing. The increase of juvenile and youth handgun violence started in 1990 and peaked in 1993. During these three years, the number of homicides in Pittsburgh roughly tripled. We examined three particular sources of information in an effort to profile handgun violence in Pittsburgh. Our

profile identified the trends and characteristics in the concentration of firearm violence in specific geographic and demographic portions of Pittsburgh

Interventions

In response to the high crime rates of the 1980s and 1990s, the federal government began passing legislation and funding programs targeted at interrupting the rise in gun violence. As illustrated by crime trends, despite several year of combating the problem of youth gun violence, crime rates remain above their levels prior to the escalation. It is therefor critical to continue developing and implementing programs that work to reduce levels of youth gun violence.

Reduction strategies have been generally developed based on two models of acquisition and use of firearms among youth: (i) supply and demand, and (ii) diffusion and escalation. Both build on the foundation of two interacting forces driving the acquisition of a firearm by a youth. The supply and demand model is primarily built on the concept that the acquisition of a gun is the result of the availability of guns and the desire to possess a gun. The concept of diffusion and escalation is built on the tenants action and reaction. Generally, law enforcement and legal interventions address youth gun violence through interventions aimed at reducing or restricting the supply (or diffusion) of guns. Social programs often address the problem of violence through creating alternatives to responding to violence by acquiring a gun and/or using the gun. These social programs by deterring gun acquisition reflect the ideas of escalation and demand. The prevention of using the gun is often classified as tactics to prevent escalation.

Each set of tactics, when concentrated on a specific component of gun violence faces barriers to its effectiveness. Tactics concentrated on reducing the supply of guns cover a wide range. They operate under on main assumption: if youth do not have access to guns, they won't use them. Some examples of supply side interventions are implementing new regulations for

gun manufacturers and dealers, stricter laws and penalties associated with the purchase and ownership of guns, and establishing gun registries and tracing practices. They face several key limitations that include, but are not limited to, legal opposition, lack of uniformity of firearm regulations, and organization of gun markets.

Demand side tactics reduce attempt to mitigate the environmental factors that motivate young people to possess and use a gun. There is a multitude of driving forces behind why young people acquire guns. Barriers to the effectiveness of demand side tactics are grounded in the fact that the environmental and social factors behind gun acquisition and use are so varied.

Because there are several barriers to the effectiveness of an intervention acting alone, integrated responses to youth violence are critical. Based on the experiences of cities across the country in combating gun violence, the most successful programs were built on interagency cooperation and effective integration of a wide variety of services and interventions. Two examples of successful integrated responses are the Boston Project and Allegheny County's integrated response.

A wide variety of interventions were considered for implementation in Pittsburgh. The key interventions most seriously considered were stricter gun regulations, probation and police ride-along, and gun capture programs. Each category of interventions was evaluated based on several criteria ranging from feasibility to potential impact.

Rationale for a Gun Bounty Program

A gun bounty program was selected based on its ability to meet three important criteria. The program could be successfully implemented by linking it to existing programs, and it could effectively utilize existing resource. Although the program is primarily a law enforcement

program, the success relies on the coordinated efforts of community and law enforcement. In addition to incorporating the idea of an integrated approach to gun violence, the program simultaneously addresses the supply and demand of guns.

Gun Bounty Program Design

The bounty program functions to confiscate guns possessed illegally in a public place. Any caller can contact the bounty program by calling a designated gun tips phone number. The caller relays specific detailed information about the possession and location of a gun to the operator. The operator subsequently dispatches police officers to the specified public location. Operating under their own protocol, the police department will respond immediately to specific, immediate and public tips. If an offender is arrested, the caller relaying the information will be eligible for a \$100 reward. The bounty program ensures the anonymity of callers by assigning each tip with a secret numerical code. This code serves as to identify a caller throughout the reporting and payment process.

Evaluation of the Gun Bounty Program

Programs are implemented to fill needs that are not met by existing sources. The critical question we want to ask about the gun bounty program is whether it is meeting its intended purpose. Program evaluation is an important component in measuring the program's impact and ensuring its continuous effectiveness. A well-carried out evaluation would provide many benefits to the program and its stakeholders. Benefits include documentation of the program's impact and insight to future strategies for the natural evolution of the program.

I. YOUTH VIOLENCE IS BOTH A NATIONAL AND LOCAL PROBLEM

National Crime Trends

Violent crime in the United States increased subtly in the early 1980s; however, it was not until 1986 that there was a dramatic escalation. This trend continued for roughly 10 years, with violent crime rates only beginning to fall in the mid-1990s. Despite several years of declining violent crime rates, the national levels are still considerably higher they were before 1980. Most notable in this trend is: (i) the increase in young offenders, (ii) the higher use of firearms in violent crime, and (iii) the increased number of black offenders.


It is important to note that national crime rates are predominantly driven by large metropolitan cities, such as New York City and Los Angeles. Despite the fact that in 1986 the nation and its large cities experienced an incredible growth in violent crime, it was not until 1989 and 1990 that the majority of smaller cities experienced a similar increase. Likewise, crime rates in small cities did not decline until 1993, roughly two years after the larger cities.

One of the most disturbing characteristics of this rise in violence over the last decade is the 200 percent growth in arrest rates for young offenders. Children and young adults are committing more violent crimes and using increasingly lethal weapons to do so. In 1997, the lowest national crime rate was reported in the FBI's Uniform Crime Reports. Despite this, there were still 19,645 murders in this country, amounting to a rate of 7.4 per 100,000 inhabitants.¹ An exceptional portion of the weapons used in these homicides were firearms. This trend is more poignant when the percent of homicides involving the use of firearms is compared to other

¹ In 1996 homicides were 1.2 percent of all violent crime and about 0.2 percent of all crime offenses. Among the other violent crime offenses, rape was less than 0.7 percent of all crime offenses, robbery was about 4 percent, and aggravated assault makeup 7.6 percent. This is based on figures from the FBI Uniform Crime Report.

types of violent crimes and their weapon use patterns. Graph 1 shows the level of firearm use in homicides as a percent of all weapon types for 1984 – 1996.²

Graph 1:




A closer look at these changes in weapon use for homicide, showed that among different age groups, youth ages 24 and younger were contributing to the growing level of firearm homicides. From 1986 to 1992, the percentage of handgun homicides committed by adults (classified by ages 25 and older) registered an increase of 51 percent. In the same period, young people (ages 24 and younger) experienced increases in handgun homicides twice the increase seen in adults. Handgun homicide rates for youth had increased by 109 percent.

Not only were murder arrest rates for youth growing faster than adult rates, but youth were also using firearms at a higher rate than their adult counterparts. Graph 2 illustrates the growth in handgun use among youth. By 1995 after most of the country experienced a few years of decline in handgun homicides, the youth still remained 91 percent above their 1986 level, while adults were only 28 percent above their 1986 level.


² Supplementary Homicide Reports.

Graph 2



Prior to 1986, the discrepancies between the level of handgun homicides among black and white youths were relatively small. However as the level of handgun use began to increase in the late 1980s, the growth in the frequency was most dramatic among black youths. Between 1984 and 1995, there were 23,136 youth handgun homicides.³ Of this figure, 77 percent were committed by black youths. Graph 3 shows the frequency for handgun homicides by black and white youths.

Graph 3



³ Supplementary Homicide Report.

In response to the growing use of firearms among youth, the Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) introduced a program aimed at reducing firearm violence among youth. This program, the Youth Crime Gun Interdiction Initiative, which was initially piloted in 17 cities and was recently expanded to include ten additional cities, confirmed the predominance of handguns among youths. This program involved the intensive tracing of every firearm taken from or associated with a youth. Tracing involved tracking the gun's history, from the manufacturer to the last known legal ownership or sale of the gun, in an effort to inform the development of new interventions.⁴ Eight out of ten of the traced crime guns were handguns. Furthermore, juvenile offenders were particularly likely to use specific makes and models of guns. The top ten crime guns represented slightly less than a quarter of all guns traced. (The remaining 76 percent of traced firearms were comprised of roughly 1,207 different types of guns.)

Pittsburgh Crime Trends

The trends seen nationally are also reflected in Pittsburgh's violent crime. This dramatic increase in handgun violence among youth registered an impact on the several indicators. These indicators included the number of handgun homicides, 911 calls, reported arrest rates, and firearm-related injuries and fatalities. Emergency calls for service (911 calls) involving guns provides insight into locations and neighborhoods with a high likelihood of violence. Among the reported arrest rates there are two crimes in particular that are important indicators of the presence and use of firearms. These two crimes are weapon violations and murder. Weapon violations are a strong measure of the ownership and carrying of guns among young people. Arrests for weapon violations of youth under the age of 18 demonstrates desire and ease of


⁴ ATF, "ATF Crime Gun Trace Analysis Report," July 1997.

illegally acquiring a firearm. For individuals over the age of 17, an arrest for this crime is, at minimum, an indicator of the propensity to illegally carry, and possibly illegally possess, a gun.⁵ The most immediate and extreme indicator of violence is murder. Firearm related injuries and fatalities help to identify the sections of Pittsburgh's population most directly affected by acts of violence. These indicators combined with each other provide a very clear picture of who is committing crimes, who is affected by their acts, and where they take place. In turn, this profile sheds light on where resources and efforts need to be focused.

Handgun Homicide

Handgun homicide among youth, ages 24 and younger, began a steady five-year increase in 1990. Graph 4 illustrates the trend of handgun homicides among from 1980 to 1995, in Pittsburgh by age and race. In 1993, Pittsburgh saw an explosion of firearm homicides, amounting to roughly tripled its number of homicides in three years.

Graph 4




⁵ Pennsylvania Statute regulating firearms established that one must be at least 18 years old to own and 21 receive a permit to carry.

911 Calls

The dramatic growth in handgun homicides that Pittsburgh experienced from 1990 to 1995 was also seen in the changes with 911 calls. From 1990 to 1994, emergency calls reporting shots fired experienced a growth of almost 300 percent. The number of calls reporting "guns" experienced similar increases, however not on the same magnitude. Based on average citywide annual changes in 911 calls, "guns" increased by 81 percent. Graph 5 shows the growth in 911 gun-related calls for Pittsburgh.

Graph 5




In this time period, two sections of Pittsburgh have account for the majority of calls.⁶ In the East End, the annual number of "shots fired" calls increased from 234 calls in 1990 to 1008 calls in 1994. While the East End of Pittsburgh is the most significant source of 911 calls, the North Side also accounts for a large portion. Based on aggregates by police zones, collectively the North Side (Zone 1) and the East End (Zone 5) accounted for at least 50 percent of all 911

calls classified as "shots" or "guns" over a five year period (from 1990 to 1994). The remaining half were rather evenly distributed among the other four zones.

Arrests

While 911 calls provide insight into where gun violence was occurring, Pittsburgh Police arrest reports supply information about the perpetrators of violence.

Graph 6



Prior to 1990, adults generally had higher numbers of arrests for violent crimes and weapon violations. As a percent of total arrests for murder and weapon violations, in 1990 adults (ages 25 and older) accounted for 52 and 60 percent, respectively. By 1991, their share of arrests for murder and weapon violations had been overtaken by youth (ages 24 and younger). Youth represented 79 percent of arrests for murder, and 63 percent of weapon violation arrests. Graph 6, above, shows that the distribution of arrests by age, youth became more active in violent crime

⁶ This was based on examination of 911 calls classified as "shots" or "guns". Shots are phone calls reporting the sound of shots fired in the surrounding area. Calls classified as "guns" are typically the reporting of a found gun, someone misusing a gun, or to report the illegal possession/carrying of a gun.

and crimes associated with firearms. Their arrests peaked in 1993, however, despite the two years of decline, the number of arrests for youth had still not returned to their 1990 levels. Table 1 below shows the number of arrests for weapons violations and the percent change from 1990 to 1996 for three age categories.

Table 1: Weapons Violations

	# of Arrest Juvenile	% Change <19	# of Arrest Young Adult	% Change 19-24	# of Arrest Adult	% Change >24
1990	21	0	60	0	123	0
1991	29	38	92	53	108	-12
1992	73	248	113	88	100	-19
1993	117	457	169	182	144	17
1994	116	452	163	172	146	19
1995	80	281	132	120	123	0
1996	39	86	120	100	104	-15

*% change in arrests, base year is 1990

Firearm Injuries and Fatalities

Firearm related injuries and fatalities further enhance the understanding of where violence occurs and who is impacted by it. Based on residence of the victim, firearm injuries and fatalities demonstrate similar locale concentrations. Based on data from collected for three years (1994-1996), injury counts for the city of Pittsburgh has decreased by roughly 17 percent. In 1994, firearm injuries totaled 328; in 1995 there were 234. In 1995, injuries increased slightly to 247. While the number of gun fatalities from 1994 to 1996 were 47, 38, 35, respectively. In these three years, the North Side (Zone 1) and East End (Zone 5) annually represented over half of all firearm injuries and fatalities. Injuries for Zone 1, Zone 5 and the whole city are listed in table 2.

Table 2: Injuries and Fatalities by Zones

	Zone 1		Zone 5		City total	
	<i>Injury</i>	<i>Fatals</i>	<i>Injury</i>	<i>Fatals</i>	<i>Injury</i>	<i>Fatals</i>
1994	69 (21%)	8 (17%)	81 (25%)	16 (34%)	328	47
1995	67 (28%)	6 (16%)	55 (24%)	12 (32%)	234	38
1996	64 (26%)	8 (23%)	38 (15%)	15 (43%)	247	35

% uses total number of incidents

A neighborhood analysis of injuries and fatalities show that there are some differences between fatalities and injuries within zones. Based on concentration of locations, there are two key differences. First, citywide roughly 10 neighborhoods annually accounted for at least 70 percent of all known firearm injuries. Table 3 lists the ten neighborhoods and the number of injuries per neighborhood.

Table 3: Selected Injury Counts for Pittsburgh

	1994	1995	1996
Northside	81	55	38
East Liberty	36	32	22
Homewood	20	24	38
Bloomfield	11	9	2
Lawrenceville	2	2	2
Downtown/Hill	29	33	31
Hazelwood	9	9	10
Crafton/Broadhead	7	9	10
Oakland	14	12	12
Beltzhoover	20	33	22
all other neighborhoods:	99	16	60

However for gun related fatalities, the distribution across city neighborhoods is not as concentrated. Second, analysis also shows that there is not as strong of a correlation as would be

expected between injury, fatalities, and neighborhoods. Table 4 lists the neighborhoods with the highest number of gun fatalities.


Table 4: Selected Fatality Counts for Pittsburgh

	1994	1995	1996
North Side	8	6	8
East Liberty	1	3	2
Homewood	6	2	7
Hazelwood	2	1	2
Garfield	2	1	1
Lincoln/Lamier/Lemington	3	3	1
Downtown/Hill	2	3	1
Oakland	4	4	0
Beltzhoover	2	1	1
Fairywood	3	2	0
all other neighborhoods	14	12	12

Comparisons of fatalities and injuries also indicate some differences between changes over the last three years. Overall, the number of gun related deaths have fallen each year and by 1996, total fatalities were 26 percent below the 1994 level. Injuries in 1996 were roughly 25 percent below the level in 1994. Unlike fatalities, injuries fell in 1995 and had increased in 1996.

In addition to firearm injuries and fatalities being concentrated into specific parts of Pittsburgh, they are disproportionately affecting specific age and race groups. Individuals under the age of 25 represent the majority of firearm injuries. In 1993, this age group experienced 158 gun-related injuries. In 1994, it was 133 and in 1996, 162 injuries. As a percent of the total injuries for these three years, young people under the age of 25 accounted for 64 percent, 58 percent, and 67 percent respectively. Graph 8 shows the number of firearm injuries for five different age categories for three years, 1994-1996.

Graph 8



The vast majority of victims of firearm injuries are young black males ages 24 and younger. Injury rates for white and black males by age illustrate the uneven impact of firearms by race. Injury rates by age and race are listed in Table 5.

Table 5: Injury Rates for Males by Age and Race

Age	1994		1995		1996	
	Black	White	Black	White	Black	White
14 and younger	81.3	10.6	65.0	5.3	8.1	15.9
15 to 19	2102.5	73.7	1419.2	49.1	1787.1	61.4
20-24	1498.9	47.3	1564.0	47.3	2183.1	37.9
25-29	618.2	42.9	1020.1	21.5	989.2	10.7
30 and older	171.5	13.9	180.8	6.9	102.0	19.4

*rates are per 100,000

**based on population estimates for 1995

As indicated by the injury rates, young black males under the age of 25 are at highest risk. More specifically, the highest rates of injury are found among two age categories of black males, 15 to 19 and 20 to 24. In 1996, despite the decline in firearm violence, the disparity in

injury rates between black and white males, ages 15 and 19, was extreme (1787 and 61 per 100,000, respectively).

II. INTERVENTIONS

Reduction Strategies

In response to high crime levels of the 1980s and early 1990s, the federal government began passing legislation and funding programs that worked to interrupt the rise in gun violence. In 1995 violent gun crime rates began to decline and have continued to fall. However, in Pittsburgh despite several years of declining crime rates, they have not fallen to their pre-1980 levels. This is true especially among youth. It is therefore critical to continue developing and implementing programs that work to reduce levels of juvenile gun violence.

There are two possible models for the acquisition and use of a firearm among youth: (i) supply and demand, and (ii) diffusion and escalation. Both build on the foundation of two interacting forces driving the acquisition of a firearm by a youth. The youth must have both the desire to possess a gun *and* the means of acquiring it. If one considers gun markets as the meeting point of the two forces where acquisition becomes possible, these two forces easily fit into a traditional supply and demand model. An alternative model of the two interacting forces is one of diffusion and escalation. The presence of a gun in a young person's environment acts as the motivation for acquiring a firearm. This results in a "diffusion effect" where the possession, or perceived possession, of a gun causes a chain reaction of one kid responding to another kid by acquiring a gun. The implication is that the presence of one gun can cause a rippling effect throughout the youth's community. As the presence of guns increases, so does the probability of an incident escalating to the point of the firearm being used.

Generally, law enforcement and legal interventions address youth gun violence through reducing or restricting the supply of guns. Social programs often address the problem of

violence through dampening the diffusion effect in hopes of reducing the probability of escalation.

Reducing the Gun Supply

Several agencies and programs seek to reduce the supply of guns to young people. The driving rationalization behind these interventions is that if the guns are not available, youth can not engage in firearm violence. Organizations such as the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) and law enforcement agencies have concentrated their efforts on reducing the availability and access that young people have to the supply of guns. Interventions that function to reduce gun availability include regulation of gun manufacturers and dealers, stricter restrictions on purchases and storage of firearms, enforcement of existing weapons violations, and registry and tracing of crime guns.

Despite the validity and impact of programs that affect the supply of guns, there are several barriers that limit the effectiveness of such programs. These barriers range from legal opposition to difficulties due to gun market formations. Barriers to legal intervention face several dimensions of opposition and difficulty. First and foremost, there is strong organized opposition to stiff regulation of gun sales and ownership. Many argue that guns are an integral part of American culture. Citing the Second Amendment, many argue that Americans should always have to the right to own a gun.

A second cause for limited effectiveness of legal intervention is that regulating possession and carrying is confined to the powers of the states, and at times, local municipalities. Currently, the federal government can only regulate the sale of firearms across state borders. Consequently, gun regulations vary by jurisdiction and strictness from state to state and

potentially within states. The lack of uniformity of firearm regulations contributes to the potential barriers to legal intervention. As a result, law enforcement agencies may restrict supply in their area of jurisdiction, but little can be done to limit the trafficking of guns from a less restrictive to a more restrictive jurisdiction.

Third, with respect to youth acquisition, laws already exist. Most states have legislation that provides age restrictions to the possession, purchase, and carrying of a gun. For example, the Pennsylvania Uniform Firearms Act establishes minimum ages for the purchase and carrying of firearms. In response to seriousness of this issue, law enforcement agencies have made the penalties to weapons violations harsher through longer sentences, heavier fines, and reduced possibilities of plea-bargaining. Despite these efforts, a leading scholar on crime and violence, David Kennedy writes, "in most cities with serious juvenile gun problems, the purchase and possession of handguns by juveniles are already illegal... Increasing the penalties for violating gun laws won't help much either..."⁷

Enforcement interventions also face difficulties arising from the nature of gun markets. Intervention is most effective when guns are supplied by established or organized sources. Tactics such as tracing and debriefing of juvenile offenders capture information on the suppliers and allow for very directed intervention. However, when gun markets are characterized by a lack of organization and formality, intervention can be limited in impact. Gun tracing and debriefing help identify patterns in gun acquisition. The usefulness of this information is limited when the source of a gun was through a one-time opportunity, such as a straw purchase (when someone buys a gun for someone else and the purchaser is a person who would do this on a repeated basis).

Reducing the Demand for Guns

Due to the existence of guns and barriers in reducing their existence, several interventions attempt to reduce the demand that young people have for guns. Many individuals who work to combat firearm violence subscribe to strategies that focus on reducing the demand for and diffusion of guns. They argue that the availability of guns will always exist; however, the demand can be changed. Typically, agencies that work in the realm of social services or on a community-level adopt strategies that work on the demand side of gun violence. They try to mitigate the circumstances that drive young people to own or possess a gun.

As mentioned earlier, the model of diffusion and escalation is applicable in explaining why demand side interventions are critical. If one accepts that the presence of a gun is adequate motivation for a young person to respond in-kind, determinants of gun ownership are important in shaping interventions that “change attitudes”. One national study tried to better understand demand for guns identified six main explanations for gun ownership. These explanations are: (i) economic resources, (ii) socialization, (iii) fear and victimization, (iv) fear and loathing, (v) collective security, (vi) conservative ideology.⁸ The research was based on legal gun owners, but the explanations do provide insight into motivating factors among juveniles. These points are reinforced by the findings of other researchers. Attempts to eliminate or reduce diffusion need to target motivating factors for the first acquisition to the last. Many of the demand-side interventions can be categorized by the determinant that they try to reduce.

There are several barriers and limitations to the exclusive use of demand-side interventions. First of all, there is a lack of clear evidence about the concrete determinants of demand. Second, there are environmental factors that require changing more than a program or

⁷ Kennedy, David. “Can We Keep Guns Away From Kids?”

an agency's response. Finally, demand is an individual motivation. It is difficult to develop integrated community-level strategies.

Integrated Response – A Model for Intervention

Because there are barriers to both strategies of intervention, supply-side or demand-side strategies alone are not effective in reducing youth gun violence. An integrated response to community violence should simultaneously address both the supply of guns to youth and the demand of youth for guns.

Based on the experiences of other cities in the United States, the most successful programs have been built on the cooperation and integration of a variety of existing services and agencies. "An interagency approach, permitting the application of a varied menu of sanctions and incentives, can greatly increase the effectiveness of the strategy."⁹ These services and agencies can range from the traditional policing units and probation officers to social service workers and public health workers. The Boston Project epitomizes a community's coordinated effort to reduce youth gun violence.

The Boston Project

Often cited as an example of success in fighting juvenile and youth gun violence, Boston implemented a series of programs covering a full range of supply and demand tactics targeted at the diffusion of firearms. Testimony to their success was the initial elimination of handgun homicides among youth and juveniles, and in subsequent years the continued low homicide rates.

⁸ Cao, Liquin, Francis Cullen, Bruce Link. "The Social Determinants of Gun Ownership: Self-Protection in an Urban Environment." *Criminology*, vol. 35, no. 4, 1997.

⁹ Kennedy, David. "Pulling Levers: Chronic Offenders, High-Crime Settings, and a Theory of Prevention". *Alparaiso Law Review*, 1997.

The tactics adopted were designed to send out one message, that there would be no tolerance for the carrying or use of firearms. On the supply side, law enforcement agencies (primarily the police department, probation officers, and ATF agents) worked in coordination with each other to disrupt gun markets through several strategies. These strategies included, but were not limited to, intensive gun tracing, debriefing of any juvenile or youth found with a gun to solicit gun market information, intensive probation officer interaction with kids, and zero tolerance of weapons violations. In addition to addressing the supply of guns, these policies helped reduce the diffusion of firearms among youth. Probation officers and community workers identified youth considered to be "high risk" for carrying firearms. Intensive monitoring of these high risk youth, dampened the diffusion of guns. On the demand side, the Boston project also incorporated programs that involved community and social services. In cooperation with community police, direct intervention programs such as victim counseling and conflict negotiation were implemented. These programs helped to address potential escalation of disputes and retaliation actions.

Allegheny County Implemented an Integrated Response to Youth Violence:

In response to the rise in crime and violence across cities in the nation, cities have begun to develop programs built upon the integration and coordination between law enforcement and social services. In 1994, after Pittsburgh experienced its highest level of youth handgun homicides, Allegheny County introduced a coordinated plan to address youth violence. Recognizing the benefits of a concerted strategy, the County aimed to integrate the previously fragmented response to youth violence. The resulting initiative established several task forces and programs that sought to either strengthen enforcement tactics or enhance prevention efforts.

These interventions can be seen as strategies that either affect the supply of guns or the demand for guns.

In an attempt to affect change in the supply side of the market, Law Enforcement Agency Directors (LEAD) and several task forces were developed. LEAD is a collaboration of 17 law enforcement officials including federal, state and local leaders that meet regularly to address issues pertaining to crime and violence. In response to increasing juvenile violence, LEAD has worked to develop a database of information about gun traces in Pittsburgh. The Pittsburgh Police Department's Gun Task Force works in conjunction with the local ATF. This cooperation has two primary benefits. First, the task force facilitates the tracing of all crime guns found in Pittsburgh. Second, this coordinated effort between federal and local agencies was critical to eliminating gang activity.

Also in 1994, the Youth Crime Prevention Council (YCPC) was established to address the demand that young people may have for guns. Since its inception, YCPC has convened community leaders in a coordinated effort to develop programs to reduce juvenile violence. The Council exists of representatives from law enforcement, juvenile justice, education, government, health and human services, the media, the ministry, and the community who have worked to foster a juvenile violence prevention plan. In the past three years, the Council has developed several initiatives including after-school safe places, sports leagues, job services, family support centers, mentoring programs, leadership development, and anti-gun proliferation programs. "Hands Without Guns" is a national campaign that has been adopted by YCPC. The program seeks to reduce levels of gun violence and promote positive outlets by using "youth-designed,

scripted, and voiced public service announcements.¹⁰ Overall, these programs have served to create alternatives for young people with the goal of preventing violence.

Allegheny County has taken steps towards implementing an integrated response to youth violence in Pittsburgh, and these collaborative efforts have been successful. However, there are additional interventions that could augment existing efforts in Pittsburgh. Three alternatives that were under consideration for implementation in Pittsburgh included a gun registry, a probation-police-officer ride-a-long program, and a gun capture program.

Potential Intervention Alternatives for Pittsburgh

Gun Regulation

The first type of intervention considered for Pittsburgh is stricter gun regulation in the form of enhanced gun registry and tracing. A gun registry is an intervention that attempts to restrict the supply of firearms in the market by collecting and using information about gun owners to better intervene in legal and illicit gun markets. In Pittsburgh specifically, a gun registry would strengthen existing LEAD and policing efforts.

There are two primary reasons preventing the implementation and maintenance of a gun registry in Pittsburgh. First, there are legislative barriers to operating a gun registry. Under Pennsylvania statute, the creation, maintenance and operation of a firearms registry is explicitly prohibited.¹¹ Secondly, to propose such a strategy for reducing youth gun violence would meet significant political opposition from organized, adult gun owners. Gun tracing and registry does not address youth gun possession and use explicitly, but rather seeks to address problems in gun markets.

¹⁰ Youth Crime Prevention Council, Strategic Plan, 1997

¹¹ 18 Pa.C.S. 6111.4 (1997)

Community-wide Enforcement -- Police and Probation Ride-Along

The second form of intervention considered for Pittsburgh was the implementation of a police and probation officer ride-along program. This intervention was one of several tactics that the city of Boston used in their strategy of zero tolerance for youth gun violence. This strategy was based on the key assumption that there was a core group of high risk, violent young offenders who could be identified and who were on probation. Probation officers were critical in this strategy for two important reasons. First, they had a better understanding of who the "high risk" offenders were. Second, probation officers have authority that police do not, such as the right to search individuals who are currently on probation. By allowing probation officers to ride along with patrol officers, these benefits were captured. It allowed intensive "crack down" for minor violations including vehicle violations, public drinking, curfew violation, and truancy. This strategy also sent out the powerful message that unless the youth did not want this type of intense attention, they had to change their behavior.

Despite its success in Boston, such an intervention would have limited effectiveness in Pittsburgh. These limitations are grounded in the distinct differences in both the roles of probation officers and the characteristics of the offender population in Pittsburgh. The role of probation officers in Pittsburgh is more closely related to the role of social worker than law enforcer. And, unlike Boston probation officers, probation officers in Pittsburgh do not carry guns. Such a strategy would raise questions of concern for the safety of probation officers. Furthermore, Pittsburgh does not seem to have an easily identified core group of young offenders.

Gun Capture Programs

The third type of intervention explored for Pittsburgh was a variety of gun capture programs. Gun capture programs are usually operated by a law enforcement agency and seek to collect guns by offering incentives or rewards to individuals who voluntarily turn in weapons. Both gun buy-back and gun bounty programs are examples of gun capture programs.

Through a gun buy-back program, law enforcement agencies can 'buy back' weapons from individuals using gift certificates, money or prizes. The Pittsburgh Police Department currently operates a gun buy-back program, and this past December bought approximately 1,000 weapons from city residents. While effective at capturing weapons, the primary disadvantage of a gun buy-back program is that the weapons captured are most often older and rarely used. Such a program does not selectively capture high-risk guns that are most often used by young people. However, the program offers a mechanism for people to turn in their guns without penalty.

The second type of gun capture program is a gun bounty program. Gun bounty programs are also operated by law enforcement agencies, and provide monetary rewards to individuals for voluntarily submitting accurate information about the illegal possession of a gun in a public place. A gun bounty program differs from a buy-back program in several ways. First, a bounty program operates under the premise that the reporting individual will remain anonymous. In contrast, in a buy-back program, an individual who turns in a gun is not assured anonymity. Thus, an individual can safely report information about the illegal possession of a weapon, without fear or concern of retaliation. Also, a bounty program rewards individuals for information about weapons in public, whereas, there is no such requirement for a buy-back program. Most likely, weapons that are carried more frequently will be seen and reported than those that are never carried in public.

III. RATIONALE FOR A GUN BOUNTY PROGRAM

National and local crime trends indicate that young people are increasingly committing violent crimes and are relying on more lethal weapons with which to commit offenses. Emergency calls for service, arrest statistics and firearm injury and fatality data indicate that youth gun violence is localized in several areas in Pittsburgh and is predominantly 'localized' within particular offender groups. An integrated approach that relies on the coordinated efforts of several agencies has proven to be the most effective strategy of response to the problem.

Although a gun bounty program does not currently exist in Pittsburgh, it could be linked with existing efforts and implemented with minimal impact on resources.¹ While the gun bounty program is primarily a law enforcement program, the ultimate success of the program relies on a coordinated effort between law enforcement, community prevention programs, hospitals and schools. The operation, maintenance and enforcement of the program are strictly under the auspices of the Pittsburgh Police Department. Furthermore, law enforcement commitment to the program is critical to both establish program credibility and to successfully confiscate guns from public places. However, community groups serve an important role in promoting, advertising and supporting the program.

In addition, a bounty program simultaneously addresses the gun supply and a young person's demand for a gun. The gun market in Pittsburgh is characterized by the

¹ See Appendix for Forecast of Gun Tips.

absence of organized illegal gun suppliers and one-time straw purchasers. Ultimately the illegal acquisition of a gun by a juvenile is a crime of opportunity. Unlike other supply-side strategies, a gun bounty program does not require an organized market to effectively reduce the supply of guns. In addition, by establishing a hot-line and ensuring anonymity the program is open to any individual willing to provide information about a gun.

Secondly, a gun bounty program deters young people from carrying handguns through reducing the incentive to carry and simultaneously increasing the risk of carrying and brandishing. This deterrence is generated by the willingness of community member and the youth themselves to utilize the program, sending out a very clear message that guns will not be tolerated.

Gun bounty programs have been implemented in several cities nationwide. One program, Gun Stoppers, in Charleston, South Carolina, is often cited as the model for a gun bounty program. Gun Stoppers was established in 1994 in response to the "increasing prevalence of firearms being carried illegally in public places."¹² The program was implemented under the jurisdiction of Crime Stoppers¹³, but is operated jointly by Crime Stoppers and the Charleston Police Department. Since May 1994 when Gun Stoppers was first implemented, they have experienced a success rate where over half of the gun tips have resulted in a confiscated gun.¹⁴

Gun Stoppers has sent a description of its program to hundreds of police departments interested in implementing their own programs. Two of these police departments, Lake County, Florida¹⁵ and Monrovia, California¹⁶ have already successfully implemented gun bounty programs.

¹² Gun Stoppers Program Materials

¹³ Crime Stoppers is a national bounty program that rewards bounties to individuals who report information about all crimes. The program has operated for over a decade and functions in numerous cities.

¹⁴ Out of 87 reported gun tips, 44 resulted in confiscation.

¹⁵ Lake County, Florida adopted a bounty program as part of an overall strategy to reduce the number of guns in the hands of youth. The program, initiated by the sheriff's department in coordination with the local school district, is modeled closely after Gun Stoppers. There have been four rewards given out since the beginning of last school year: three guns confiscated in schools, and one in a movie theater.

¹⁶ The Gun Bounty program has been successfully implemented in Monrovia, CA. Originated by the police department, the program is operated by four community members under the direction of Monrovia Police Sergeant Steve Cofield.

IV.. GUN BOUNTY PROGRAM DESIGN

Description

The bounty program functions to confiscate guns possessed illegally in a public place. Any caller can contact the bounty program by calling a designated gun tips phone number. The caller relays specific detailed information about the possession and location of a gun to the operator. The operator subsequently dispatches police officers to the specified public location. Operating under their own protocol, the police department will respond immediately to specific, immediate and public tips. If an offender is arrested, the caller relaying the information will be eligible for a \$100 reward. The bounty program ensures the anonymity of callers by assigning each tip with a secret numerical code. This code serves as to identify a caller throughout the reporting and payment process.


The gun bounty program is a law enforcement program, relying on police officers to follow up on gun tips. However, there are additional people/staff, including an operator and a bounty coordinator, needed to assure the operation of the program. The operator functions to respond to the gun tip call and dispatch the police officers to the specified location. A bounty coordinator is an individual who serves to coordinate the administrative aspects of the program.

Requirements for a Bounty Program

There are three requirements for the successful operation of a gun bounty program. These include maintaining anonymity of the informant, assuring rapid response to the tip and incurring a minimal impact on existing public services. It is critical to maintain the anonymity of the caller for several reasons. People must feel safe in reporting information to the police, and must feel

protected from potential identification and retaliation. In addition, it is important to eliminate any needless delay between the time when an incident occurs and the time that the police respond. This will help maintain both the credibility and effectiveness of the program. Finally, it is crucial that the bounty program reinforce existing public services, rather than burden them. We have designed the bounty program at each stage in order to meet these criteria.

Steps in Program Design



In its operation, the bounty program is comprised of six sequential stages. These stages represent the major actions that need to occur in order for the program to function efficiently and effectively. First, an operator receives a gun tip and police officers respond to the tip. Next, the arrest report and gun tip report are sent to the bounty coordinator so that s/he can then determine the reward eligibility. Finally, the informant can call the bounty coordinator, and collect his/her reward at the bank.

We expect that these stages could be completed over the course of three working days. In order to describe the components of the bounty program, we outline the details of these six stages as they would occur for an average gun tip call. Please see the following diagram that depicts the six stages of the bounty program.

Stage 1: Operator Receives Gun Tip

Operator answers the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) Non-Emergency Phone Line

After reviewing the three primary options for routing phone calls to the bounty program – the 911 system, one of the Emergency Operations Center's non-emergency lines, and a new phone line connected to the police department¹⁷ – we recommend using one of the EOC's non-emergency lines. The non-emergency lines have several distinct advantages over the other alternatives. First of all, they are staffed 24 hours per day by trained operators who are located in the same room as police dispatchers. These features facilitate rapid police response to gun tip calls.¹⁸ If the phone line was connected to the police department, police department personnel it would still require relaying the incident information to the EOC. This would cause needless delay in the dispatch of police officers. Furthermore, the police department does not necessarily have trained operators that could be assigned to handle gun tip calls on a consistent basis.

Second, the non-emergency lines do not have an automatic tracing capability. This is one of the many safeguards in the bounty program that would protect the anonymity of the informant. Unlike the 911 lines -- which automatically display the phone number, address and name of the

¹⁷ Gun Stoppers in Charleston receives calls through a phone line that is dedicated exclusively to gun tips. Phone calls are answered during the day by the employees of Gun Stoppers; and at night, they are answered by the Charleston Police Department.

¹⁸ Although no official statistics on the amount of time it takes to answer the non-emergency line are available, the average 911 call in Pittsburgh is answered within two rings. Although the non-emergency lines have a lower priority when the EOC phone lines are at capacity, they are answered as quickly as possible as well, according to Henry J. Caparelli the coordinator of the EOC.

owner of the phone -- the non-emergency lines have no special call tracing capability. Thus, even the operators of the bounty program would not have any information that would allow identification of the informant.¹⁹ The coordinators of the Charleston Gun Stoppers program emphasized that the lack of call tracing ability on their gun bounty line has been crucial for maintaining the anonymity of informants.²⁰

Third, one of the EOC non-emergency lines²¹ could be dedicated to a bounty program. Operators, for example, could answer the phone: "Gun tips. Would you like to report an illegal gun?" A greeting that is unique to a gun bounty program would make callers feel comfortable when reporting information. By contrast, the more formal operator response when calling 911 or the Police Department may intimidate young people from anonymously reporting an illegal gun. Operators of the Charleston Gun Stoppers program indicated that their program would not be successful if calls were routed through 911.²²

Using the non-emergency line would place no additional burden on the operations of the EOC. If operators at the EOC answer gun tip phone calls, the impact of an additional 1 to 2 calls per week would be very small.²³ EOC operators receive approximately 35,000 emergency calls for service per month. An additional 59 gun calls per year -- the lower bound of our estimates -- would increase total calls by a mere 0.014 percent; an additional 112 calls per year would increase total calls by only 0.027 percent.

¹⁹ Unlike the Gun Stoppers program in Charleston, however, all calls to the EOC -- including those to the non-emergency line -- are recorded.

²⁰ The Gun Stoppers' phone line has no caller identification system, no call tracing capabilities, and no dial face so that *69 cannot be dialed.

²¹ The Emergency Operations Center has four non-emergency phone lines: 255-2800, 255-2801, 255-2802, and 255-2804. These lines currently are used to take a variety of non-emergency calls such as general questions from the public, but one of them -- such as 255-2804 -- could be designated as a gun bounty phone line.

²² Conversation with Detective W.J. O'Brien III of the Charleston Police Department and Gun Stoppers on January 30, 1998.

²³ In conversations with Emergency Operations Coordinator Henry J. Caparelli, March 1998, he indicated that this increase would indeed be minimal.

EOC operator elicits details about incident and enters them into computer

Operators at the Emergency Operations Center follow a strict set of procedures for conducting phone conversations and reporting the relevant information about the conversations to police dispatchers. New procedures for the operation of the gun bounty hotline would need to be developed by the police department and the EOC. Such procedures -- including the use of telephone scripts and protocol for data entry -- would need to safeguard the anonymity of the informant. Essentially, the operators should be instructed to ask the informant for identifying information about the suspect, the location of the incident, and the circumstances surrounding the incident. They should be instructed not to ask for any identifying information about the informant him/herself.

The personnel of Gun Stoppers in Charleston do not adhere to a formal script. However, they have first-hand experience in dealing with crime. They are instructed not to ask informants to identify themselves, and, because Gun Stoppers is a division of Crime Stoppers, they regularly handle anonymous tips for a variety of crimes. A facsimile of the form which Gun Stoppers of Charleston uses to handle such calls is in Appendix 2. This form serves as a guide to the operator in conducting the phone conversation.

Although this method meets the needs of Charleston, using the EOC computer system would be a more efficient means of recording gun bounty data in Pittsburgh. The computer system -- which is the same system that is used by 911 operators -- has data elements for the major items of information that need to be collected. The prompts in the computerized form, ordinarily relating to the identity of the informant, could either be left blank or blocked through computer programming. The computer system is already an integral part of the operations

protocol of the EOC. Using it to enter information about gun tips would conform to the regular routine of EOC operators and would allow direct and immediate communication with police dispatch.

EOC operator sends information via computer to the police dispatcher.

The dispatch of police officers in response to a gun tip would occur according to existing EOC and police procedure. Currently, when a 911 call is received at the dispatch center, one of ten operators answers the initial phone call. There is also at least one operator to answer one of four non-emergency phone lines that would handle phone calls dedicated to the Pittsburgh gun bounty program. After receiving a call, this operator would then electronically send the information to one of three dispatchers who are seated across the room. Three dispatchers are located in the dispatch room at all times, including dispatchers for the fire department, police department, and ambulance service. Each dispatcher views the location of all officers on duty through a formatted grid on a computer screen. The dispatcher is also aware of the exact activity of each officer at the time, whether that activity is responding to a murder or simply directing traffic at a busy intersection. When a call is received about a potential gun tip, the nearest available officer would be dispatched to the scene. The dispatched officer may or may not be a police officer from the police zone in which the crime is committed, since all officers in that particular zone could be busy. In case of a report in a school zone, an issue of concurrent jurisdiction arises. Both the Pittsburgh school police and the city police have jurisdiction to respond to the report. Depending on the conditions of the situation, the city police dispatcher may contact the school police dispatcher and ask for cooperation. School and city police departments have different dispatchers but share communication codes. A bounty program in

Pittsburgh would naturally fit in with these procedures and does not require any change of these procedures.

EOC operator gives informant instructions for following up on the call.

The EOC operator would conclude a conversation with an informant by giving him or her three important pieces of information: a secret code number, the phone number of the bounty coordinator, and instructions to call the bounty coordinator in two working days. A distinctive component of bounty programs is the use of secret numbers to identify informants. Although there are several means of generating such a number – including a randomly generated number and a sequential number generated specifically for the bounty program – we recommend that this program use the identification number that the EOC already assigns to all incoming calls. These identification numbers begin at one, cycle through to 99,999, and begin again at one again. The system cycles through this range of numbers in approximately three months. Using the existing EOC identification number would not require additional computer programming and would be unique for all practical purposes. Because of the large number of available identification numbers, it is unlikely that two informants would be given the same code number in the same year are infinitesimal. The chances that a person could try to trick the system by guessing at the next bounty number are effectively zero.

After giving the informant a secret code number, the operator would then give him or her the phone number of the bounty coordinator and instructions to call in two working days. The bounty program has been designed so that the EOC operator handles the initial call on the bounty hotline and the bounty coordinator handles subsequent interactions with the informant. The informant is instructed to call back in two days in order to give the bounty coordinator enough

time to determine the outcome of the incident and whether or not the informant is eligible for a reward.

Stage 2: Police Officers respond to the gun tip.

Once a gun tip is made, police respond to determine whether the suspect is in violation of a firearms statute. Tips made by anonymous informants do not constitute probable cause for searching a suspect because the informant does not agree to submit an affidavit. In order to establish probable cause, police officers must find corroborating evidence that indicates that the suspect is indeed violating a firearms statute. They have a variety of means for establishing this probable cause. In the case of *Terry v. Ohio*, 392 U.S. 1, 1968, the Supreme Court ruled that police officers may pat down suspects if they can articulate a reason for believing that a crime is about to occur. The gun reduction project in Kansas City indicates that these means include search upon arrest, frisks for safety and the weapon being in plain view.²⁴ Conversations with Pittsburgh Police officers indicate that Pittsburgh police officers use similar methods to establish probable cause for search. They may pay special attention to the behavior of the suspect if s/he appears to be moving as to conceal a weapon or appears to be fleeing an area where a crime has just occurred. In addition, they may establish a point of surveillance and discretely observe the suspect. Finally, if the gun is possessed or carried in a public place, police officers can ask to search the suspect²⁵. The gun bounty program would not require a change in these operating procedures of the Pittsburgh Police Department; officers would respond to gun tips and relate to suspects in the same manner as they currently handle similar circumstance.

²⁴ "The Kansas City Gun Experiment" US Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, National Institute of Justice, January 1995

²⁵ For legal purposes, any place open to the public is considered a public place. Most illegal possessions and carries of handguns are made in public places.

The applicable Pennsylvania state regulations require anyone over 21 to have a permit in order to carry a handgun. No person under the age of 18 is allowed either to carry or possess a handgun. Pennsylvania criminal statute 6110.1 states that the possession or transport of a firearm by a minor is illegal²⁶. Any person who carries a firearm without a permit commits a felony of third degree with a penalty of up to nine months of restorative sanctions²⁷ and seizure of the firearm. Enforcement of statutes is made on the basis of hints, reports and police investigations in accordance with the Constitution of the Commonwealth and the Pennsylvania Code. The most important legal constraint for the enforcement of the Pennsylvania Uniform Firearms Act of 1995 is the contents of the Declarations of Rights, included in the Article 1, Section 8 of the Constitution that establishes the security of the people from unreasonable searches and seizures.²⁸

Because of the small number of annual calls, the impact of a gun bounty program on the services of the Pittsburgh Police Department would be low. In 1995, the Pittsburgh Police Department handled 52,322 offenses. If a bounty program were to generate 59 calls per year, the total number of offenses to which Pittsburgh police respond would increase by a mere one-tenth of one percent. Even if the program 112 calls per year -- the maximum forecasted number -- the total number of offenses to which Pittsburgh police respond would increase by only one-fifth of one percent. Furthermore, a bounty program would have a minimal impact on police services even in the police zones where gun tips are most likely to originate. Zone 5, the zone with the highest incidents of gun-related crime, could expect to receive between 15 and 38 calls per year.

²⁶ Except as provided in subsection (b) [minors under supervision of their legal custodian or those who are lawfully hunting or trapping according with 34 Pa. C.A. (relating to game)]

²⁷ <http://www.la.psu.edu/pcs/matrices.html#basic>

²⁸ Pa. Const. Art 1, Section 8. Security from searches and seizures. The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and possessions from unreasonable searches and seizures, and no warrant to search any place or to

This would increase the total number of offenses in Zone 5 by between 0.4 percent and 1.04 percent. Table 1 shows the impact of a bounty program on Pittsburgh as a whole and on individual police zones.

Table 1: The Impact of a Bounty Program on the Workload of Police Officers*

Police Zone	Estimated Number of Gun Tip Calls per Year	
	<i>Minimum</i>	<i>Maximum</i>
1	9	19
2	11	24
3	6	13
4	6	16
5	15	38
6	5	15
Total	59	112

* Calls were divided among zones according to the proportion of juvenile aggravated assaults in that zone in 1995 as reported by the Pittsburgh Police Department's annual report.

Follow-up Procedures

The gun bounty program could be used to support existing public services. We suggest that several potential enhancements of the bounty program be considered as it is implemented. In the instance that the gun is confiscated from a juvenile, we recommend several follow-up procedures. First, gun tracing is an important component of an integrated gun control intervention in Pittsburgh. The confiscated gun should be submitted for crime gun tracing. Second, the suspect should be interrogated in order to attempt to identify the supplier of the gun and accomplices of the suspect.

seize any person or things shall issue without describing them as nearly as may be, nor without probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation subscribed by the affiant.

Stage 3: Bounty coordinator determines whether the informant is eligible for a reward.

We recommend that the bounty program begin by offering rewards only for tips that result in the arrest of the suspect. In order to determine whether or not this criterion has been met, the bounty coordinator needs two pieces of information: an arrest report or a field contact report from the Police Department and a report of gun tips from the EOC. Each morning, the EOC operators would generate a report of all of the gun tips received from the previous day. The report would contain the secret code number of the informant and the CCR number, a unique number used by the Police Department and the EOC to identify incidents. Upon receiving the gun tip report, the bounty coordinator will use the CCR number to request the corresponding arrest reports from the police records room. Police officers file an arrest report if the incident resulted in an arrest using standard operating procedure. In some instances, the police would file a report – such as a field contact report – even when the incident did not result in an arrest. Either report would indicate the outcome of an event and a CCR number.

While the bounty program currently specifies that an informant is eligible for a bounty reward if his/her gun tip led to the arrest of an offender in a public place, the program may wish to consider expanding the threshold for bounty eligibility. Instead of rewarding the bounty only if an arrest is made subsequent to a gun tip, a bounty could be rewarded for the confiscation of an operable weapon from a public place. This would allow individuals to receive a reward for reports of hidden or discarded weapons. According to anecdotal evidence, youth often “stash” firearms outside of school when they arrive at school to see portable metal detectors have been placed at the entrance to their school. In addition, this threshold would apply to stashes of firearms such as “rent-a-rocks,” storage places for illegal weapons that can be leased for use for a short period of time. Finally, it is common for offenders to discard illegal firearms when being

pursued by police. According to this threshold, informants making reports leading to the recovery of such weapons would be eligible for a reward.

Stage 4: Bounty coordinator contacts bank to arrange the bounty payment.

After deciding the reward eligibility, the bounty coordinator arranges for the bounty payment. The coordinator calls the bank branch where the program account is located and provides the information required for the payment transaction to occur. The following four pieces of information must be relayed to a bank representative: the account number, the Personal Identification Number (PIN), the secret codes for the eligible informants, and the total amount to be dispersed (\$100 for each eligible informant).

Stage 5: The informant calls the bounty coordinator.

The informant, having been instructed to call the bounty coordinator within two working days, must identify him/herself by his/her unique secret code number. If an arrest was made, the bounty coordinator describes the procedure for collecting the reward to the informant. First, the coordinator explains that the informant must go to the designated bank branch that dispenses bounty rewards. At this point, the coordinator emphasizes to the informant that the reward process is entirely anonymous. The bank is not informed about the identities of any of the informants, and the transactions are conducted using only the secret codes. Second, the informant is instructed that there is no time limit for collecting the reward. The bounty money is assigned to the secret code number, and will remain so, until collected.

Stage 6: Informant Collects Reward at Bank

To collect the reward at the bank, the informant must go to a customer service representative.²⁹ The informant needs only to identify him/herself by the individual secret code. Any individual with the secret code number can claim the bounty on behalf of the informant. The representative matches the secret code against the gun bounty account information to check that the secret code number / informant is eligible. The teller then withdraws the pre-authorized amount (\$100) from the gun bounty account and pays the informant \$100 in cash. To complete the transaction, the teller sends a confirmation report to the bounty coordinator. This report includes the secret code number, the amount withdrawn, the updated account balance, the time and date the reward was received, and the teller's name who handled the transaction.

²⁹ Customer service representatives are the employees seated behind desks who typically open new accounts.

V. ADDITIONAL PROGRAM ISSUES

Estimated Program Budget

Based on the experiences of other bounty programs, several costs associated with implementing and operating a bounty program can be identified. These include training and acquiring personnel, installing and operating a phone line, advertising, maintaining a bank account, and funding the rewards.

Table 1: Program Costs

Program Component	Estimated Cost
Personnel	----
Phone Line	\$200 / year
Advertising	\$90 (500 posters and business cards)
Bank Account	\$48 / year
Bounty Rewards	\$7,200 / year

As recommended, the gun bounty program would be housed in the EOC, so costs for acquiring and training personnel would be minimal. The existing operators would be trained in the protocol specific for the program, and would use existing computer resources of the EOC. Existing operators at the center could answer the bounty phone line with a minimal change in workload. While the Center received nearly 35,000 calls for service in March of 1998, we predict that the gun bounty program would produce at most 11 additional calls per month. A coordinator for the remainder of the program could be identified from within the existing ranks of the Pittsburgh Police Department.

Also, the program would use an existing phone line, so it would not incur expenses for the establishment of a phone line. The 255-2804 line is already maintained by the Emergency

Communications Center, and would be operated even without the gun bounty program. The cost to maintain a 1-800 phone number for the bounty phone line is also minimal, with an estimated annual cost of \$200.³⁰

Advertising and bank costs together comprise a minimal portion of the total program costs. Initially, advertising costs would include printing expenses for promotional materials such as posters and small program business cards. It is estimated that printing 500 posters and 500 business cards costs \$90.³¹ Potentially, the program may wish to design broadcast announcements; however, such announcements could presumably be donated through public service announcements. Bank costs would include the expense associated with opening and maintaining a checking account. This expense is also minimal, and has been estimated at \$48 a year.³²

Finally, the bounty rewards comprise the largest component of the program costs. The funding requirements necessary for the bounty rewards can be estimated from other gun bounty programs. Both Charleston, SC and Monrovia, CA began their program with \$10,000. We estimate that the initial bounty reward fund would be a minimum of \$7,200.

³⁰ According to MCI, there is a \$72 maintenance cost per year, and a per minute cost of \$.25. If we calculate phone calls to be on average four minutes, or \$1 each, and estimate there will be 120 phone calls a year, the total phone costs is \$72 + 120, or approximately \$200.

³¹ Kinko's estimates that 500 11" x 17" colored posters cost \$50, and 500 black and white business cards cost \$30-40.

³² It costs \$4 a month to maintain a standard checking account.

Potential Funding Sources

Several foundations and corporations have been identified to secure funding for the gun bounty program. Foundations such as the Heinz Foundation contribute to community programs that focus on youth-oriented initiatives

Corporations can also play a key role in providing the monetary resources necessary to successfully implement the gun bounty program. There are several reasons why corporations would be interested in donating funds to implement a gun bounty program. First, corporations can impact the community and make a difference by contributing to violence-reduction programs. Locally, Giant Eagle sponsors the Police Department's gun buy-back program by providing the gift certificates for turned-in guns. The Gun Stoppers program in Charleston received \$10,000 from local businesses to develop a reward fund. Also, corporations can develop a positive relationship with the community by contributing to a variety of community-interest projects. Finally, because donations are tax-deductible contributions, private corporations aiming to reduce their taxable profits have a financial incentive to contribute. To date, \$2,000 in donations has been secured for the gun bounty program.

Promoting the Program

Advertising and promotion is an important component of the gun bounty program. In order for the program to be successful, the appropriate audience must both be aware of the program's existence and feel encouraged to use the program. There are three main 'vehicles' or mechanisms through which the gun bounty program can be promoted. These include local schools, hospital-based programs, and community prevention organizations.

Sources that Target Young People

Considering that the objective of the program is to reduce gun carrying amongst youth, sources of advertising that specifically target youth are critical to the promotion of the program.

Schools are a primary mechanism to reach young people under 18 years old. Posting informational brochures and posters in schools and at after-school programs can expose a sizable population of young people to the existence and functioning of the program. In addition to traditional advertising, other outreach programs can be developed. For example, Gun Stoppers in Charleston regularly sends program representatives to speak with students about the gun bounty program. These outreach efforts have been a crucial part of the advertising effort of the Gun Stoppers program. A similar promotional effort could be developed by the Pittsburgh gun bounty coordinator and implemented in the Pittsburgh Schools. The coordinator could conduct an annual information session about the gun bounty program to cooperating officials in the Pittsburgh schools who would then promote the program to students within their own schools.

Hospital-based programs are another vehicle for promoting the gun bounty program. The goal of a hospital-based program is to reduce the future incidence of an additional incident of violence. These programs are important ways for disseminating information about the gun bounty program. Promoting the program at this point would provide a young person with an alternative the next time s/he is confronted with a potentially violent situation. Currently, Allegheny General Hospital operates an emergency room counseling program that seeks to provide program information to gun shot victims. Information about the bounty program could easily and effectively be conveyed through this program.

Finally, community prevention organizations are well equipped with the resources and community linkages needed to promote a violence reduction program. Organizations, such as the

Youth Crime Prevention Council, could serve a critical role in fostering the public support and trust that is needed for effective program implementation and use.

VI. EVALUATION OF THE GUN BOUNTY PROGRAM

Programs are implemented to fill needs that are not met by existing sources. The critical question we want to ask about a program is whether it is meeting its intended purpose. Program evaluation is an important component in measuring a program's impact and ensuring the continuous effectiveness of an implemented program. Unfortunately, program evaluations often have a negative connotation. A well-carried out evaluation will provide many benefits to the program and stakeholders. Such an effort can document success, measure the impact of the program, and provide insight to the types of strategies that would work as well as those that would fail. In addition to assessing elements of the program design, the information collected may be used to request funds from foundations and government grants in order to extend the program in time or scope.

Outline of Design Options and Steps to Evaluation

Key stakeholders should consider two issues prior to designing an evaluation. First, what questions should the evaluation answer? Second, how feasible, in terms of time and cost, would it be to answer the questions of interest? These two questions will help determine which evaluation method to employ and the type of information available once the evaluation is completed. There are three broad categories of program evaluations: 1) process evaluation 2) impact/outcome evaluations and 3) program performance monitoring. Process evaluation examines implementation and operations issues to see how services are provided against how the program was designed. Impact evaluation focuses on causality, asking whether the program met its intended goals. Specifically, impact evaluations decipher what program characteristics

contributed to the outcome effect. Performance monitoring provides regular data on the program as a means of routine service delivery assessment.

Within these three categories of evaluation, there are a number of models from which to select. Examples of models include the social science research model, the objective-based evaluation, the accountability model, and the improvement-focused model. Although there are several evaluation approaches, they are not exclusive. In fact most evaluations combine elements from several models into the evaluation design.³³ The first step in planning an evaluation is to select criteria as the basis for program assessment. It is important that the criteria reflect the program's intent, that they are reliable, that they are based stakeholder input, and that they can be compared to some objective. The questions to be answered by the evaluation guides criteria selection. The next step is to select measures. The measures are variables to assess the evaluation questions. Another component of the second step is to identify sources of data for evaluation. The last step is to develop methods for evaluation. This step maps out how the evaluation will be carried out.

Evaluation of the Bounty Program

Evaluation Purpose

The Bounty program was chosen among a list of alternatives because it specifically targeted the unique gun market in Pittsburgh. The Youth Firearms Systems Synthesis Group established a twofold objective for the Bounty program.³⁴ Reward of a gun bounty intends to reduce the level of gun carrying among youths through confiscation and deterrence. In turn, the presence of the gun Bounty program would decrease opportunities for youth firearms related incidents. In

³³ Emil J. Posavac and Raymond G. Carey, "Program Evaluation Methods and Case Studies" pg. 23

order to assess the merits of this program, we need to determine how well the program meets these objectives. By examining effectiveness, highlights from program elements that works and those that do not can be incorporated into the program to make improvements. Evaluation of the program can provide stakeholders with the information necessary to make decisions about the worth of the Bounty program and possible expansion should it demonstrate a significant impact on the youth firearm activities. Therefore, the questions we want the evaluation to answer are:

- Is the program effective at reducing the level of youth firearms carrying?
- Is the program effective at reducing the consequences of youth firearms carrying?
- Is the program helping change the attitudes of youths towards firearms carrying?
- Is the program providing an alternative option for youths action against illegal firearms possession?

Three major steps were involved in planning the evaluation for the Bounty program: 1) identification of evaluation criteria 2) identification of evaluation measures and 3) identification of the comparison group and methods of evaluation.

Evaluation Criteria

Evaluation criteria are indicators of program success. The criteria for the Bounty program are based on the main evaluation question: Has the Bounty Program made a positive impact in confiscating and deterring youth firearms carrying? Based this question, we expect that the level of youth firearms carrying and the consequences of carrying, such as firearms injuries, to decrease through firearms confiscation. We also expect that the Bounty program will send a message of deterrence that illegal firearms possession is not acceptable. With the evaluation question and objectives in mind, the selected assessment criteria are: 1) an increase in

³⁴ The stated objectives and consequently the evaluation questions and approaches, are subject to modifications with further discussion with Pittsburgh community and police groups.

the number of firearms confiscated 2) a decrease in the number of youth firearms related activities and 3) a decrease in the level of firearm carrying due to attitude changes among youths.

Several issues have to be considered when applying these criteria. One is program maturity: Are all the components of the program in full operation, including advertising and promotional activities? The program must be fully implemented before we can anticipate program effects. Another issue that influenced criteria selection is whether data needed to assess the criteria are available.

Evaluation Measures

After evaluator and stakeholders agree on above criteria as indicators of successful program outcome, the next step is to identify measurement methods to assess them. There are several existing sources that will be useful to measure the level of firearms activity, and consequently the level of carrying. Arrest data shows that there are three high frequency types of crime that involves the use of firearms. They are weapons violations, aggravated assault, and homicides. There is a sufficient number of weapon violations to measure change which will be a good measure of illegal firearms carrying. This data will come from the Pittsburgh Annual Crime Report. Firearms injuries are another measure for firearms related activities and a gauge for the level of firearms carrying. The data for this measure is from the Center for Injury Control. Shots fired from 911 calls are another measure of the level of firearms carrying and activities. In addition to the levels of firearms carrying and activities, we would also be interested in recording the number of firearms confiscated. Weapons violation, firearm injuries, shots fired, and the number of guns confiscated are the four measures identified for the evaluation.

In identifying measure for the Bounty program, two issues surfaced and posed a limitation on the type of measures we could use. One, was the issue of data availability, specifically with validity. In many cases, the existing data were aggregated and not specific to the targeted age group or location. Another validity issue was that there simply were not enough observations for particular measures to be useful. For example, homicide, which is the worst firearms related outcome, would not be a valid measure for the Bounty program because there are a small number of observations.

The other measurement issue arises from the program objectives. The Bounty program aims to reduce youth firearms carrying through confiscation and deterrence. We can measure the level of illegal possession if it translate to a crime on another person or if the offender is caught with the weapon. Confiscation can simply be measured by taking a count of the number of firearm retrieved before and after implementation of the Bounty program. However unless a physical crime has been committed with a firearm, possession and deterrence are more difficult to measure Deterrence is complicated because it deals with behavior and attitudes.

To help resolve this problem, we included a survey instrument as part of the evaluation design.³⁵ This survey attempts to fill in the gaps between the four measures above and attempts to gauge youth attitudes on Bounty program as a deterrence to carry. The survey will address four key areas that may influence program outcomes: overall perceptions of crime and firearms level among youths, knowledge of the program, willingness to participate in the program, and perception of program effectiveness.

Evaluation method

³⁵ See appendix for survey

The primary purpose of including an evaluation design into this project is to examine program impact. Given this purpose and the questions to be addressed by the evaluation, the evaluation design for the Bounty program incorporated the following two approaches: The “social science research model” and the “objectives-based evaluation”.³⁶ The basis for social science approach is the use of recipient and comparison groups. Inclusion of a comparison group is a powerful evaluation technique. Having these two groups allows evaluators to isolate the effects of the program from the effects of other historical events.³⁷ If the differences between these two groups are statistically significant, the program is deemed to be successful. The benefits of this approach are increased rigor and objectivity. However, to conclude that the Bounty program is a success or failure based solely on statistical tests would be a pitfall. The objectives-based evaluation focuses on the stated program goals and then measures the degree to which these goals are achieved. A combination of these two approaches will provide the bounty program evaluation with the intensity of an objective design and the framework to make judgments in context to program objectives.

Since the police department is the ideal agency to implement the bounty program, a natural partition for comparison would be by police zone. To ensure internal validity, it is important that the zones selected be comparable. Two zones were chosen based on a judgment sample using three levels of zone analysis: socio-demography similarities, patterns in firearms activities based the measures discussed above, and police recommendation.

The crime and census data shows that zone 1 and 5 are similar in regards to both crime and demographic characteristics. After discussions with the police, we believe that zone 1 and 5 would serve as our comparison areas. In addition to the to demographic and crime similarities,

³⁶ Emil J. Posavac and Raymond G. Carey, “Program Evaluation Methods and Case Studies” pg. 24

zone 1 and 5 have the added benefit of being isolated from one and other by the Allegheny river.

This natural separation may be useful in buffering potential spillovers between the recipient and the comparison area.

By including a comparison group into the evaluation, we cannot only measure change within the recipient group, but also to compare that change to another group that has not receive the service. This design allows us to isolate program effect from external effects. We expect to see no difference in the level of youth firearms carrying and activities before the program is implemented. The method proposed to measure any change that may have occurred as a result of the Bounty Program is based on a pre-test post-test technique.

Pre-testing would involve an assessment of the level of youth firearms carrying, as indicated by the measures we have selected, and comparing them against the comparison group. This result is expected, as shown in our discussion of youth crime in Pittsburgh, and the socio-demography comparison. Likewise the results of the survey administered in the recipient zone will be compared with those from the comparison zone. We expect that the attitude towards guns and the perception of youth firearms possession to be similar in the two zones. A statistical analysis of the survey should show no difference between the population in zone 1 and the population in zone 5. If the results from this data source contradict our findings from the pre-test, we may have to consider an alternative location.³⁸

Post-test of the two comparison areas involves the same set of procedure as in the pre-test. The post-test results should show that the level of youth firearms carrying and activities between zone 1 and zone 5 are different. With the recipient area having a low number of

³⁷ An important assumption is that historical forces effected both groups equally. The highest form of internal validity is ensured with random assignment of the recipient and comparison groups.

³⁸ The survey is not yet administered, it is expected to be distributed prior to program implementation.

firearms activities. The survey results, likewise, should indicate that the attitude among youths in the recipient zone should perceive a low level of firearms presence in their neighborhood.

A more rigorous method is the interrupted time-series. This technique will look at the evaluation measures over time for both the recipient and comparison zone after program implementation.

The trend for a particular measure, i.e. weapons violation and confiscation, should initial increase and then start to decrease over time in the recipient area. Both firearms injuries and shots fired should show a decreasing trend after program implementation in the recipient area.

The interrupted time series takes the trend and divide it into two parts: pre and post implementation. The mean of the two time segments will be statistical evaluated. If the means are statistical significant different, then we can conclude that the level of the particular measure decreased. We expect that the crime activities trend in the recipient zone significant decreased while the trend in comparison show no difference in the level of crime activities.

Program evaluation, similar to program design and implementation, is a key element in ensuring overall program success and effectiveness. We believe that by incorporating an evaluation component in this project that it will help improve the Bounty program to meet the community needs.

APPENDIX 2

GUN TIPS FORECAST

GUN TIPS FORECAST

A gun bounty program in Pittsburgh would receive between 59 and 112 calls per year, according to our four forecasting methods. Each of these forecasts is derived by multiplying the average annual number of gun tips received by Gun Stoppers of Charleston, South Carolina and some "scaling factor" which accounts for the difference in crime level between Charleston and Pittsburgh. From May 1994 through the January 1998, Gun Stoppers of Charleston received 87 gun tips – an average of 25 tips per year. We multiplied 25 by each of three scaling factors: (1) the overall crime as measured by the crime index, (2) the number of incidents of gun-related aggravated assault and robbery, and (3) population. The following table shows the details for each of these estimates.

Estimates of the Annual Number of Gun Tips in Pittsburgh Bounty Program

Estimation Method	Level in Charleston (Avg. 1994-97)	Level in Pittsburgh (Projected for 1998)	Scaling Factor (Pittsburgh Level/ Charleston Level)	Estimated Number of Gun Tips per Year
1. Crime Index	9,374	19,000	2.36	59
2. Gun-Related Aggravated Assaults and Robberies	223	999	4.5	112
3. Population	79,101	354,543	4.5	112

APPENDIX 3

**GUN STOPPERS PROGRAM,
CHARLESTON, SC**

INFORMATION COLLECTION SHEET

CRIME STOPPERS

CALLER CODE No. _____

CALL TAKEN BY: DET. W. J. O'BRIEN

DATE REC'D. _____ TIME REC'D. _____

Type of offense _____ Date: / / Time occurred: _____

Location of offense _____

SUSPECT INFORMATION

Suspect No. 1		Suspect No. 2	
Name	_____	Name	_____
Address	_____	Address	_____
Race/Sex/Age/Hgt/Wgt/Hair/Eyes	_____	Race/Sex/Age/Hgt/Wgt/Hair/Eyes	_____
Other Characteristics	_____	Other Characteristics	_____
Suspect No. 3		Suspect No. 4	
Name	_____	Name	_____
Address	_____	Address	_____
Race/Sex/Age/Hgt/Wgt/Hair/Eyes	_____	Race/Sex/Age/Hgt/Wgt/Hair/Eyes	_____
Other Characteristics	_____	Other Characteristics	_____

VEHICLE INFORMATION

Make: _____ Model: _____ Year: _____ Color: _____ Lic. No.: _____

Identifying Marks: _____

Owner: _____ Operator: _____

INFORMANT

Informant: _____ Reward: _____

Already Given to Police: _____

Immediate Disposition Agency:	Officer/Unit:	Date/Time:
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NARRATIVE:

(Continued on Reverse)

APPENDIX 4

**LEGAL ISSUES FOR A
GUN BOUNTY PROGRAM**

LEGAL ISSUES FOR A GUN BOUNTY PROGRAM

According to Pennsylvania Uniform Firearms Act of 1995¹ regulations of handguns are only made at the state level and cities and counties are not allowed to impose further constraints to the purchase, possession or carrying of guns.

Several agencies coordinate in the enforcement of the Pennsylvania Uniform Firearms Act. The Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms Bureau provides tracing information and enforcement in behalf of the federal government. State police provide the authorization for firearm permits. County and school police are the agencies that work at the street level and perform the searches and seizures necessary for the enforcement of the law.

Search Warrant Procedure

Pennsylvania's Courts have created a substantial body of strict guidelines for the performance of legal searches, which may lead to the discovery of crimes in terms of the Pennsylvania Uniform Firearms Act of 1995. These precedents establish the requirements for the application for², issuance³, contents⁴, purpose⁵, and issuer⁶ of a search warrant. Among these requirements, the most relevant for the purposes of this research is the necessary existence of a sworn affidavit of a person that declares that a crime was committed. A report made on the telephone of the possible possession of a handgun is not sufficient evidence to issue a search warrant. Hints and reports are not deemed as a probable cause of a crime. Hence, police agents are required to obtain a search warrant in order to search a private person in a public place.

¹ Also known as Title 18 of Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes

² Pa. R. Cr. P. 2006 (1997) Rule 2006. Contents of Application for Search Warrant Each application for a search warrant shall be supported by written affidavit(s) signed and sworn to or affirmed before the signing authority...

³ Pa. R. Cr. P 119 (1997) Rule 119. Requirements for Issuance. (a) No arrest warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by one or more affidavits sworn to before the issuing authority...

⁴ Pa. R. Cr. P 2005 (1997) Rule 2005. Each search warrant shall be signed by the issuing authority and shall (a) specify the date and time of issuance; (b) identify specifically the property to be seized; (c) name and describe with particularity the person or place to be searched; (d) direct that the search be executed within a specified period of time, not to exceed 2 days from the time of issuance; (e) direct that the warrant be served in the daytime unless otherwise authorized on the warrant...

⁵ Pa. R. Cr. P. 2002 (1997) Purpose of the Warrant. A search warrant may be issued to search for and to seize: (a) contraband, the fruits of crime, or things otherwise criminally possessed; or (b) property which is or has been used as the means of committing a criminal offense; or (c) property which constitutes evidence of the commission of a criminal offense

⁶ Pa. R. Cr. P. 2001 (1997). Who may issue. A search warrant may be issued by an issuing authority within the judicial district wherein is located either the person or the place to be searched.

It is very unlikely that a juvenile would use their Constitutional rights, refuse to be searched, and ask police officers to produce a search warrant. It is to be noted that evidence produced without a search warrant is not admissible in a court of law. However, police agents use different tactics to approach a juvenile who is a suspect of possessing or carrying a gun. These situations and tactics can include:

- The suspect appears to be running away and a crime has just been reported in the area.
- The suspect is hanging around with some people who are under police investigation.
- The suspect is near where a crime has just been reported.
- The suspect is somewhere where the officer thinks people have no reason to be at that time of day or night and his presence
- The person acts is suspicious, and acts even more suspiciously when the officer sees that you have spotted him.
- The officer thinks that the suspect may have stolen property in his possession.
- The officer legally stops the suspect on the street or while driving in his car and refuses to answer simple questions, gives false or evasive answers or makes contradicting statements.
- Someone has reported the suspect as a possible suspect involved in a crime.
- The suspect hangs around places and people who are using or selling drugs
- The suspects uses obscene language, acts disorderly, or drunk and/or high in a public place⁷

This may lead to the commission of other misdemeanors that would allow police officers to claim that they have found a suspect committing a *fratant* crime. Such a crime does not require a warrant and would produce evidence that would be admissible in court.

Jurisdiction of Schools

In terms of the Public School Code of 1949⁸, schools have a separate treatment under the law. They have a particular legal status similar to that of subordinate units of government that allows them a high degree of independence. School authorities have broader legal rights in terms of search and seizure of the property of the school than other government authorities. They do not require a search warrant in order to seize the lockers of students or any property of the school district.

⁷ <http://info.co.allegheny.pa.us/services/police/stopstr.htm>

⁸ Pa. Code. Title 24 (Public School Code of 1949)

School districts have independent jurisdiction on school areas and they enforce the law within these boundaries by means of the school police. The school police are trained as any other police corporation. School police officers are paid by the school districts and have similar authority to other police officers from other corporations. The most relevant feature is that they are not entitled to carry guns in the school areas.

APPENDIX 5

**GUN STOPPERS PROGRAM,
CHARLESTON, SC**

ADVERTISING MATERIALS

● GUNS HURT KIDS
AND OTHER LIVING

THINGS. SUPPORT

● YOUR LOCAL
GUN STOPPERS



● STAY UNKNOWN... TELL A TEACHER OR PRINCIPAL

STOPPERS

Do you know
someone who has
a gun in school?

**FOR A
\$100 REWARD
CALL 554-1111**

us what you know! Protect your school! Collect up to \$100 reward!

Don't identify yourself. Don't confront the person with the gun!

Don't tell anyone you phoned us. Just DO IT...

...and collect your reward at a time and place that is safe for you.

 **UP TO A \$100 REWARD** 

FOR ANYONE WHO HELPS US KEEP GUNS OUT OF SCHOOLS

Don't give us your name. We give you your own secret code number.
then you call back later...

APPENDIX 6

PITTSBURGH GUN BOUNTY PROGRAM

CRIME SURVEY

PITTSBURGH CRIME SURVEY

Hello. We are conducting a survey about youth and crime in Pittsburgh for a project aimed at reducing the level of crime in the city. We would like to learn more about your experiences with crime. Participation in this survey is voluntary, although your help is very important to us. All your responses will remain anonymous and confidential. If you would like to see the results of this survey, please contact Y at 268-0000. Thank you for your time and help.

1. Is crime a problem in your neighborhood?

- Yes No Don't know

2. Have you ever seen someone your age carry a gun in public?

- Yes No Don't know

3. Do you know people who carry guns?

- Yes No Don't know

If you answered "Yes" to question #8, please answer the next two questions otherwise skip to question #11.

4. How many people do you know carry guns in public?

- Less than 5 Between 5-10 Between 10-15 More than 15

5. How often do you think they carry their guns?

- Everyday A few times a week A few times a month A few times a year

In general, do you think a lot of people carry illegal guns?

- Yes No Don't know

6. Why would someone your age want to carry a gun?

- Protection Show/Status Sport/Recreation Fear
 Other (*specify*) _____

7. If a person you do not know was carrying an illegal gun, would you report the person?

- Yes No Maybe Don't know

8. If a person you know was carrying an illegal gun, would you report the person?

- Yes No Maybe Don't know

9. If you were give a monetary reward for information about people carrying illegal guns, would you report:

- A person you do not know? • A person you know?
 Yes Yes

- No
- Maybe
- Don't know

- No
- Maybe
- Don't know

11. Would you be willing to report information about an illegal gun to?

- School Official
- Police Officer
- None of the Above
- Friend
- Anonymou
s Operator
- Other (*specify*) _____
- Neighbor
- Parent

12. Do you think people your age would use a program that offered a reward for information about an illegal gun?

- Yes
- No
- Maybe
- Don't know

13. Would a monetary reward be a reason to report someone with an illegal gun?

- Yes
- No
- Maybe
- Don't know

14. *If yes*, how much money should the reward be? _____

15. Would people your age report someone with an illegal gun if the reward were \$100?

- Yes
- No
- Maybe
- Don't know

16. Do you know of any program that offers a reward for information in illegal guns?

- Yes
- No
- Maybe
- Don't know

17. If yes, what is the name of the Program? _____