The author(s) shown below used Federal funds provided by the U.S. Department of Justice and prepared the following final report:

Document Title: Collaborative Effort and the Effectiveness of Law Enforcement Training Toward Resolving Domestic Violence

Author(s): Martha Smithey Ph.D. ; Susanne E. Green M.A. ; Andrew L. Giacomazzi Ph.D.

Document No.: 191840

Date Received: January 14, 2002

Award Number: 97-WE-VX-0131

This report has not been published by the U.S. Department of Justice. To provide better customer service, NCJRS has made this Federally-funded grant final report available electronically in addition to traditional paper copies.

Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

191840

A Collaborative Effort and the Effectiveness of Law Enforcement Training Toward Resolving Domestic Violence

NIJ Award Number: 97-WE-VX-0131

Final Report
presented to
The National Institute of Justice

by

Martha Smithey, Ph.D.
Associate Professor
Department of Sociology
University of Texas at El Paso
El Paso, TX 79968
(915) 747-6588
FAX: (915) 747-5505
e-mail: msmithey@miners.utep.edu

Susanne E. Green, M.A.
Public Policy Research Center
University of Texas at El Paso
El Paso, TX 79968
(915) 747-6531
(915) 747-5505
e-mail: sgreenl1@elp.rr.com

and

Andrew L. Giacomazzi, Ph.D.
Assistant Professor
Department of Criminal Justice Administration
Boise State University
Boise, ID 83725
(208) 426-4162
FAX: (208) 426-4371
e-mail: agiacom@boisestate.edu

FINAL REPORT
Approved By:
Date: 11/7/01

November 2000
(revised based on NIJ reviews)

PROPERTY OF
National Criminal Justice Reference Service (NCJRS)
Box 6000
Rockville, MD 20849-6000

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

A Collaborative Effort and the Effectiveness of Law Enforcement Training Toward Resolving Domestic Violence

CONTENTS

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

A Collaborative Effort and the Effectiveness of Law Enforcement Training Toward Resolving Domestic Violence

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES

Martha Smithey is an associate professor of sociology at University of Texas-El Paso. Smithey received her Ph.D. from Texas A&M University in 1994. While at Texas A&M University, she served at the Principal Investigator on a Pre-doctoral Fellowship for the National Institute on Drug Abuse. Her research interests are infant homicide, family violence, and medical examiner decision-making. Her recent articles appear in journals such as Journal of Family Violence, Homicide Studies, Deviant Behavior, and Women & Criminal Justice.

Susanne E. Green received her Master of Arts degree in sociology from University of Texas-El Paso in 2000. She received her Bachelor of Arts degree in anthropology from University of Texas-El Paso in 1998. Her academic areas and research interests include feminist studies, the family, and family violence. Her master's thesis is titled Adoptive Kinship and Child Abuse.

Andrew L. Giacomazzi is assistant professor of criminal justice administration at Boise State University. Giacomazzi received his Ph.D. from Washington State University - Pullman in 1995. While at Washington State University, he served as Project Coordinator for the Project ROAR evaluation grant, and Grant Coordinator for a community policing grant received by the Spokane Police Department. He is co-author of Community Policing in a Community Era: An Introduction and recent articles have appeared in journals such as American Journal of Police, Crime and Delinquency, Police Studies, Justice Quarterly, and Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies and Management.

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

.A Collaborative Effort and the Effectiveness of Law Enforcement Training Toward Resolving Domestic Violence

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Project Scope

Responding to the needs of millions of women who are violently victimized each year, Title IV of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act was passed by Congress in 1994, and among other important elements, seeks to strengthen law enforcement, prosecution, and victim services for female victims of violent crimes. This project sought 18 months of National Institute of Justice funding for a concentrated effort aimed at combating the pervasive social problem of violence against women, which is a particularly troublesome phenomenon in the State of Texas. As such, this project sought to build upon an already existing, inter-agency, collaborative partnership established in 1996 and initiated by the police department of a large, southwestern city, which was well-engaged in the practice of community policing. The partnership was established with the financial support from the COPS office in an effort to reduce the occurrence of domestic violence in the city. Key components of this project included (1) the introduction of the researchers as academic resources for the collaborative in the area of domestic violence theory, training, policies, and program evaluation, (2) the continuation and strengthening of the collaborative partnership under the "Four T" approach (training, tracking, targeting, and transferring) among the police department, district attorney, shelter for battered women, and other service providers, (3) the monitoring of the process of inter-agency collaboration in the area of domestic violence, and (4) a comprehensive outcome evaluation of the effects of inter-agency domestic violence training.

Throughout the project period, the co-principal investigators and a graduate research

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

assistant (project staff) worked extensively with the collaborative in three ways. First, at least one of the project staff was in attendance at all collaborative meetings and subcommittee meetings in an effort to collect data for our first deliverable. Second, project staff conducted a process evaluation of inter-agency collaboration by examining meeting notes and conducting focus group interviews of agency partners. Finally, project staff conducted a comprehensive outcome assessment of the effectiveness of the Duluth Domestic Abuse Intervention Project Training Model for Law Enforcement Response, which was administered to some of the city's police officers under the rubric of the department's community policing philosophy.

Project Setting

With an estimated population of approximately a half million, this city is a large and growing metropolitan area located in the southwest United States. Its corporate limits encompass approximately 250 square miles. According to the 1990 Census, this metropolitan area is a minority-majority city with more than two-thirds of the people of minority descent.

According to police department records, family violence against female spouses is the most common type of reported family violence in the city. On average, 81 percent of family violence arrests between the years 1996 and 1998 were of males who allegedly either committed or threatened acts of violence against women (Domestic Violence Prevention Coordination Unit 1999).

Through its community policing initiatives, the department applied for federal funding from the COPS Office under its *Community Policing to Combat Domestic Violence* solicitation. The grant ultimately was awarded in March, 1997 under Category I of the solicitation, "Department-sponsored multi-disciplinary training initiatives." With funding from the COPS

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

Office, the department established the Domestic Violence Prevention Commission (hereafter, *Commission*) for the primary purpose of developing an effective approach to reduce family violence in the city.

Representatives of the Commission reflect a public-private, multi-level collaborative partnership and include members of the police department, the District Attorney's office, the County Attorney's office, the City Attorney's office, probation, parole, the military, the school district, the Council of Judges, state, county, and municipal legal assistance, Juvenile Probation, the Battered Women's Shelter, the YMCA, the Transitional Living Center, the clergy, and other volunteer services dealing with the problems of family violence.

In addition to formalizing the Commission, the police department, with support from the COPS Office, established the Domestic Violence Prevention Coordination Unit (DVPCU) in March 1997 for the primary purpose of implementing a multi-faceted approach to combating family violence in the city, based on recommendations from the Commission.

Process Evaluation of Inter-Agency Collaboration

Process Evaluation Methods

Focus group interviews and archival research were employed in this process evaluation as the primary methods to assess the inter-agency effort and the extent to which collaboration existed among members of the Domestic Violence Prevention Commission. Four focus group interview sessions were conducted at strategic points in the evaluation process: two were conducted in February 1998, which corresponds to the end of the Commission's *planning* efforts (Phase 1), and two additional focus groups were conducted in April, 1999, approximately one year into the Commission's *implementation* efforts (Phase 2). Focus group participants were

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

randomly selected for focus group participation and consisted of representatives from commission agencies.

In addition to focus group interviews, archival data in the form of meeting notes and other documentation were used to provide descriptive information regarding the number of commission meetings, average attendance at meetings, and agencies participating in commission activities.

Process Evaluation Findings and Discussion

Archival data revealed that a total of 22 collaborative meetings took place during the Phase 1 planning stage, beginning with the first Commission meeting on April 23, 1997 and the last on September 17, 1997. The average attendance at the meetings was 36. The meetings not only included the 6 joint commission meetings, but also meetings of the commission's subcommittees, including the human services' sub-committee, the law enforcement sub-committee, and the judicial sub-committee. Also included in the total were 4 community forums seeking input from citizens regarding family violence interventions. These forums, which commenced in July 1997, took place in 4 distinct regions of the city.

Beginning in May 1998, the Commission undertook Phase 2, the implementation of the recommendations. At the first Phase 2 Commission meeting, Phase 1 recommendations were prioritized, and subcommittees were formed to explore the implementation of the recommendations. Through October 1999, approximately 10 subcommittees, including the judicial, speakers' bureau, law enforcement, and education subcommittees, met on various occasions and presented reports to the full membership at 8 separate Commission meetings. The average attendance at the Phase 2 Commission meetings was 30.

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

Despite the high activity levels of Commission members during Phase 1 (and to a lesser extent during Phase 2), and the outward appearance of collaboration, focus group data reveal the practical and philosophical problems that threaten inter-agency, collaborative efforts both during planning and implementation phases.

Self Interest as a Motivation to Participate. Focus group data revealed that agency motivations for participation in the Commission's activities were not directly goal-oriented. At the very least, focus group responses raised the question of whether agencies were motivated to participate out of self-interest in the forms of either protecting one's "turf" or acquiring new information and resources.

Leadership and Dominance. Several Phase 1 focus group participants were concerned that the commission was established by the police department. While others were more supportive of the police department's establishment of the commission, the following examples illustrate an ongoing tension at two levels. First, there was a perception that the police department controlled the Commission's activities, which may be counter to true collaboration. Second, among human service providers and educators, there appeared to be a philosophical difference regarding the solution for family violence when compared to law enforcement. Human service providers and educators exhibited a decided emphasis toward preventive activities rather than law enforcement responses.

Organizational Ambiguity Resulting in Unclear Expectations. A variety of other barriers to the realization of the Commission's goals also were reported, including perceptions of waning interest in the Commission's activities, lack of organization, lack of notification of meetings, scheduling of meetings, and unclear expectations of participants. While these are practical

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

problems of multi-agency collaborations, in this case they contributed to a loss of individual interest and motivation to participate. This loss posed potential threats to collaboration and, ultimately, realization of the Commission's goals.

The Absence of Key Players in the Implementation Phase. While the Commission itself is co-chaired by the Director of the Battered Women's Shelter, the Chief of the police department, and the President of the local university, Phase 2 focus group respondents were frustrated by the lack of involvement of these and other key leaders in Commission activities. In addition, in the fall of 1998, the Chief of the local police department resigned his position.

Marginalization of Commission Members from Non-Law Enforcement Agencies. If there was, indeed, a direction that the Commission was taking, it was one primarily focused on law enforcement responses to family violence against women. This was manifested in law enforcement training for handling domestic violence calls for service, prosecutor's efforts to bring more cases to court, and more programs for offenders.

As such, this direction appeared to be marginalizing those agency representatives who were primarily concerned with proactively—rather than reactively—preventing family violence against women. And while we have little in terms of actual data to support this assertion, collectively, we sensed that marginalization of non-law enforcement agencies was occurring and was a hindrance to inter-agency collaboration. For example, much of the frustration concerning the Commission activities, both in Phase 1 and Phase 2, stemmed from focus group participants who represented non-law enforcement agencies, such as private citizens with no organizational affiliation, educators, and social service agencies in the public, private and non-profit sectors.

Effects of Training on Police Officer Attitudes

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

Project staff also undertook a comprehensive evaluation of the effects of police officer training on police officer attitudes of domestic violence. The training intervention was the Duluth Domestic Abuse Intervention Project Training Model for Law Enforcement Response (training). which is comprised of five units: (1) the changing role of law enforcement in domestic violence cases; (2) safety and interviewing techniques; (3) fundamentals of a domestic violence investigation; (4) documentation of evidence and report writing; and (5) special issues in investigating domestic violence cases. The training was administered to 135 police officers from a regional command center in the city.

Data collection on the effectiveness of the training occurred as an attitude survey of law enforcement officers in the city. The Solomon four-group design was implemented to isolate and estimate the interaction effect that could occur when the subject deduces the desired results from a combination of the pretest and test stimulus. The test stimulus was the Duluth Model domestic violence training. This design required four groups, two of which received domestic violence training (the experimental groups) and two of which did not (the control groups).

The bivariate relationships from the experimental designs were tested by oneway analysis of variance. Multiple regression was implemented to test the bivariate relationships in the presence of control variables: years of service, position and assignment within the police department. age. gender, and the other test variables. Path analysis was then employed to assess the direct and indirect effects of the control and test variables.

A summary of the major findings is reported below.

Traditional Gender Roles

- The hypothesis that the domestic violence training would change police officer attitudes

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

toward traditional gender roles was not supported.

- The presumption that the officers initially would have opinions somewhat favorable to traditional gender roles was unfounded. The mean scores across all groups, while homogeneous, favored a "liberal" attitude toward gender roles.
- There was a "gender effect" among the subjects, with female police officers in less agreement with traditional gender roles than male officers.

Belief in Inaccurate or Simplistic Causes of Family Violence

- The domestic violence training did not dispel belief in inaccurate or simplistic causes of family violence (*.e.g.* "The primary cause of family violence is alcohol consumption" or "Family violence occurs much more in poor families than in middle class families").
- As officers tended toward mandatory arrest as an effective way to reduce repeated episodes of violence they also tended to believe in inaccurate or simplistic causes of family violence.
- The more difficult the officers perceived the ease by which the perpetrator could be identified, the more the respondents believed in simplistic or inaccurate causes of family violence.
- Belief in inaccurate or simplistic causes of family violence tended to be higher among male officers and those who agreed with traditional gender roles.

Family Violence as a Matter for the Police

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

- There was uniformity among all police officers that family violence was not a personal or private matter and that police officers should spend an appropriate amount of time on the scene assisting or managing the dispute. The domestic violence training did not change the attitudes of the police officers in this regard.
- Agreement with family violence as a matter for the police was higher among female officers than among male officers.

Victim Cooperation

This item asked respondents to indicate their level of agreement with the following statement: *Victims must not want to resolve domestic violence in their homes or else they would cooperate enough with prosecutors.*

- The police officers tended to disagreed with the idea that a victim's level of cooperation was an indication of desire to resolve his/her current situation.
- The domestic violence training did not change police officer attitudes toward victim cooperation as an indication of desire to resolve his/her current situation was not supported.

Attitude Toward Mandatory Arrest

- The domestic violence training did not change police officer attitudes toward mandatory arrest. Police officers tended not to have an opinion about the effectiveness of mandatory arrest.
- The more police officers agreed that identification of the perpetrator in domestic violence

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

disputes was difficult, the less agreement there was toward mandatory arrest as an effective policy.

- Agreement with mandatory arrest as an effective policy was higher among police officers who served in the police department prior to the implementation of this policy.

Prosecution is Likely

The intent of this questionnaire item was to ascertain perceptions toward prosecution. This item asked respondents to consider the likelihood of prosecution while setting aside quality of report writing and evidence gathering and cooperation by the victim.

- The police officers tended to have "no opinion" about the likelihood of prosecution. The domestic violence training did not lead to formation of an opinion.
- Female officers were slightly more likely than male officers to view prosecution as likely. They also tended to view uncooperative victims as not wanting to resolve their current situation resulting in a decreased likelihood of prosecution.

Identification of the Perpetrator is Easy

Here, respondents were asked to indicate level of agreement with the statement "It is usually clear who is the perpetrator in a domestic violence episode."

- The domestic violence training did not change police officer attitudes toward identification of the perpetrator was not supported.
- Police officers tended to have no opinion regarding the ease with which a perpetrator in a domestic violence dispute could be identified.

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

Attitude Toward Training

Experimental group subjects were asked to respond to five items regarding their perceptions of the training on their posttest questionnaires. The responses to the items regarding how interesting, relevant, organized, and useful the training indicated an overall favorable impression of the training.

- Although respondents had favorable opinions toward the training, there was little change in attitudes as a result of the intervention.

Effects of Training on Time at the Scene, Acceptance of Case for Prosecution, and Convictions

In addition to testing the effects of the Duluth Model training on police officer attitudes, three other experimental designs were implemented to test the effects of the training on (1) police officer time at the scene of a domestic violence incident, (2) acceptance of the case for prosecution, and (3) convictions.

Time at the Scene

For domestic violence offenses occurring from September 1998 through September 1999, time spent at the scene by law enforcement officers was obtained from the police department's CAD system. For the purposes of this study, time at the scene was assigned to the principal or senior officer of record and was calculated as the difference between the initial time of arrival at the scene and the time when the police unit informs dispatch it is leaving the scene of the domestic violence call. Therefore, "time at the scene" was operationalized as the length of time

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

in minutes that the officer spent at the family violence scene and **did not** include transport of the offender for booking. For "report only" cases where the family violence victim filed a complaint at a police substation, time at the scene was operationalized as the time spent compiling the report for the victim.

- There were no differences between trained officers and untrained officers in regard to the time spent at the scene of a domestic violence incident.
- The average time spent at the scene was 33.58 minutes with 75% of the cases spending 41 minutes or less. Only 5% of the cases spent more than one hour at the scene.

Acceptance of Case for Prosecution

Once the family violence cases where an arrest had been made were collected at the District Attorney's Office, the status of the case was researched at the agency on its centralized computer system. Computer records detailed whether the case was accepted or declined for prosecution.

- The domestic violence training did not affect the number of cases accepted for prosecution.
- Of the 291 cases reviewed, 80% were accepted for prosecution and 20% were declined.

Convictions

Disposition of family violence cases was determined by locating the cases on the prosecuting attorney's centralized computer system. The outcome of each case was noted as either a dismissal or conviction. Of the 291 cases, 122 (42%) had final dispositions at the time of data collection.

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

- The training intervention did not affect the number of convictions.
- Of the 122 cases reviewed, 19% resulted in convictions and 81% in dismissals.
- While the differences among groups were not large enough to support a clear trend or change of case outcomes prior to the training and outcomes after the training, the percentages do favor more convictions during the six months following the training for both the experimental and control groups.

Conclusion and Implications

This project sought to inform key decision-makers in the public, private and non-profit sectors regarding the extent to which the Domestic Violence Prevention Commission served as a collaborative forum for domestic violence issues among interested groups. Additionally, it sought to determine the extent to which police officer training was effective in changing police officer attitudes toward domestic violence, and the extent to which the training would lead to behavioral changes among officers (time spent at the scene of a domestic violence incident) and changes at the prosecutor's office (case acceptance and conviction rates). As such, we conducted both a process evaluation of inter-agency collaboration, and an outcome evaluation of the Duluth model domestic violence training.

Process Evaluation of Inter-Agency Collaboration

Focus group data suggest that the Domestic Violence Prevention Commission did not achieve true collaboration. But regardless of whether this inter-agency, public-private process was collaborative or negotiative in nature, some positive outcomes could to be realized. However, we anticipate differences in the means by which these outcomes will be attained based on whether the process is collaborative or negotiative. Upon further evaluation, it is expected

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

that a collaborative process ultimately will result in more innovative and comprehensive, longer term solutions to the problem of family violence which have greater chances of becoming institutionalized in the region. And while the current negotiative process likely will continue to produce sporadic programs and initiatives to reduce family violence in the area, the quality of response to family violence is likely to be lower due to a lack of clear, open, comprehensive evaluation of agency capabilities and resources, and a lack of vision and concrete objectives.

The results of this research suggest that in an era of multi-agency collaboration, we cannot presume that the personnel of relatively autonomous organizations—both public and private alike—have the organizational capacity and/or the willingness among personnel to truly collaborate. Formidable barriers exist here and elsewhere that hinder collaborative efforts and transform the process to one based on negotiation. Agency policies and procedures that either obstruct or facilitate collaboration should be examined, and effective team building interventions should be planned in an effort to move closer to collaborative problem-solving, the approach which offers the most hope for finding meaningful, long-term solutions to social problems.

Outcome Evaluation

Given the lack of substantial changes in attitudes toward domestic violence among officers who participated in the Duluth Model training intervention, it was not surprising that the training did not affect time at the scene of a domestic violence incident, case acceptance for prosecution, and conviction rates. We found that both trained and untrained officers tended to spend about one-half hour at the scene of a domestic violence incident, that there were no differences in case acceptance rates between cases involving a trained or untrained officer, and that while conviction rates had increased at the prosecutor's office during the last six months of

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

the study period, there were no differences between cases where the senior police officer was trained or untrained.

Several implications emerge from these findings. First, there should be systemic efforts toward dispelling traditional patriarchal beliefs and belief in simplistic or inaccurate causes of family violence in order to relieve their potentially pervasive effect. In this particularly progressive police department, we found that police officers tended not to have patriarchal beliefs. However, the pervasive finding of a gender effect with male law enforcement personnel agreeing more with traditional, patriarchal gender roles raises a concern with regard to managing domestic violence disputes. Believing in erroneous or simplistic causes of domestic violence creates the potential for bias in interpretation or documentation of events. This attitude is arguably supported by erroneous belief in causes of violence potentially biasing which person's story the officers believe or emphasize as they sort out and document the events and collect evidence. It could also lead to more serious erroneous conclusions, such as the perception that the situation is not threatening to the victim or that no serious injury has occurred.

Second, law enforcement personnel need a better understanding of the complexities of domestic violence. The finding of the relationship between identifying the perpetrator and erroneous beliefs of causes of domestic violence potentially creates confusion over who is the perpetrator at a domestic violence scene or if both parties have contributed to the onset of the violence. This can occur if alcohol consumption has occurred or if the officer believes only men are aggressive. Further, domestic violence calls to poor neighborhoods that are managed by an officer who generally expects poor families to be abusive could result in less vigilance or attentiveness on the part of the officer or the presumption of guilt solely on the socio-economic

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

environment.

Third, it was found that agreement with mandatory arrest as an effective policy is higher among respondents who served in the police department prior to implementation of this policy. yet these officers hold erroneous beliefs in causes of domestic violence. These officers potentially have as a comparison point an era when officers did not know how to respond to interpersonal crimes where victims often would not press charges or truthfully describe the events surrounding the violence. Mandatory arrest may be embraced by these officers as a "routine" solution or option to domestic violence disputes, but does not ultimately dissuade their beliefs in simplistic or inaccurate causes of domestic violence.

Fourth, now is the time to expedite research on effectiveness of domestic violence policies and infuse them in criminal justice practices before law enforcement personnel form a final but potentially negative opinion concerning mandatory arrest and the benefits of collaboration with prosecutors. Attitudes of "no opinion" toward mandatory arrest and likelihood of prosecution suggest these officers are malleable in regard to the recent political and philosophical changes toward violence against women and toward better collaboration with prosecutors. While the effectiveness of mandatory arrest in reducing domestic violence is debated on several fronts, there appears to be a willingness on the part of these officers to embrace policy change.

Fifth, techniques for how to identify perpetrators and how to deal with "victims" who may be offenders are needed. It was found that the more difficult the identification of the perpetrator, the less agreement there was with mandatory arrest as an effective policy. Requiring arrest in this type of call also requires a determination of who to arrest. The more difficult this

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

determination, the more the dissatisfied the officer is with the policy. Many law enforcement agencies resist or discourage "dual" arrests. so officers are compelled to identify a perpetrator.

Sixth, research is needed on what evidence gathering, interviewing, and documentation techniques best achieve the goals of the criminal justice system in managing and reducing family. Not only would findings from this type of research be informative for law enforcement practices, it would establish baselines for "best practices" that allow agencies and personnel to self-assess effectiveness.

Sixth, a longitudinal study on all training received by an officer with a time series analysis is needed to detect the unique and cumulative effects of each training session experienced. Such a study would be informative in regard to which types and what content of training best produces systemic change and reduces engendered responses. In addition, other law enforcement programs, interventions, and/or organizational changes also should be documented and examined to determine "what" might lead to any observed effects in attitudes and/or behaviors on the part of police officers.

Finally, researchers should strive to find better ways of measuring attitudinal and behavioral changes that might result from domestic violence interventions such as training. Our research on police officer attitudes suggests that there either was no training effect or that our measures did not tap particular attitude changes. We also reasoned that trained officers were likely to spend more time at the scene of a domestic violence incident, but did not tap the quality of the interaction between the police officer and victim. In light of these issues, continued research in this area is warranted.

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

A Collaborative Effort and the Effectiveness of Law Enforcement Training Toward Resolving Domestic Violence

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

Violence against women is a continuing and pervasive social problem in the United States today, and it is a particularly troublesome phenomenon in the State of Texas. The size and geography of Texas create barriers affecting violence against women. According to the 1994 Census, Texas is the second most populous state, which encompasses 254 counties and almost 262,000 square miles. While Texas has some of the country's largest cities, the state is still primarily rural. More than 65 percent of the counties in Texas have populations of less than 25,000. Because of this, it is not uncommon for female victims of violence to travel hundreds of miles to reach victim services.

According to the Texas Department of Public Safety, between the years 1995 and 1996 reported incidents of domestic violence (as well as reported victims and offenders) increased. In addition, approximately 73 percent of domestic violence victims in 1996 were women. The overwhelming majority of domestic violence cases in the State of Texas in 1996 involved simple assault (70 percent), followed by aggravated assault (16 percent), and intimidation (11 percent) (Texas Department of Public Safety, 1997).

Against the backdrop of the evidence cited above, Texas Governor George W. Bush in 1995 signed an Executive Order creating the Governor's Planning Council for STOP Violence Against Women. Headed by the Criminal Justice Division of the Office of the Governor, the Council set the following goals, many of which mirror objectives of the Violence Against

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

Women Act of 1994:

- To expand and enhance exiting victim assistance programs, as well as create new programs that address the special needs of women from unserved, underserved, and special populations;
- To develop and implement comprehensive regional or local multi-disciplinary training programs to improve the criminal justice system's response to victims of domestic violence, sexual assault, and stalking/harassment;
- To develop uniform training that is legislatively mandated for law enforcement officers and prosecutors in the areas of victim and witness interview techniques, prosecuting without victims, and collaboration and systems' coordination; and
- To create or enhance specialized units within law enforcement agencies and prosecutors' offices or specialized multi-disciplinary units devoted to handling domestic violence, sexual assault, and stalking cases.

This project sought 18 months of National Institute of Justice funding for a concentrated effort aimed at combating the pervasive social problem of violence against women. Responding to the needs of millions of women who are violently victimized each year, Title IV of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act was passed by Congress in 1994, and among other important elements, seeks to strengthen law enforcement, prosecution, and victim services for female victims of violent crimes. As such, this project sought to build upon an already existing, inter-agency, collaborative partnership established in 1996 and initiated by the police department of a large, southwestern city, which was well-engaged in the practice of community policing. The partnership was established with the financial support from the COPS office in an effort to reduce the occurrence of domestic violence in the city. Key components of this project included (1) the introduction of the researchers as academic resources for the collaborative in the area of domestic violence theory, training, policies, and program evaluation, (2) the continuation and strengthening of the collaborative partnership under the "Four T" approach (training, tracking,

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

targeting, and transferring) among the police department, district attorney, shelter for battered women, and other service providers, (3) the monitoring of the process of inter-agency collaboration in the area of domestic violence, and (4) a comprehensive outcome evaluation of the effects of inter-agency domestic violence training.

Throughout the project period, the co-principal investigators and a graduate research assistant (project staff) worked extensively with the collaborative in three ways. First, at least one of the project staff was in attendance at all collaborative meetings and subcommittee meetings to in an effort to collect data for our first deliverable. Second, project staff conducted a process evaluation of inter-agency collaboration (first deliverable, Chapter 3) by examining meetings notes and conducting focus group interviews of agency partners. Finally, project staff conducted a comprehensive outcome assessment of the effectiveness of the Duluth Domestic Abuse Intervention Project Training Model for Law Enforcement Response (second deliverable, Chapters 4 and 5), which was administered to some of the city's police officers under the rubric of the department's community policing philosophy.

Sample of Relevant Literature

Community Policing And Collaborative Efforts Addressing Family Violence

Community policing represents a philosophical shift in the mission of policing. Rather than simply enforcing laws, community policing recognizes the importance of community mobilization and public-private partnerships with the police in addressing crime and its victims. Accordingly, rather than relying solely on the police, citizens are encouraged to come together in an effort to address a wide range of community problems--including crime and fear of crime. To this end, community policing is an attempt to address quality of life issues at the neighborhood

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

level, and like other current reform movements in the public and private sector, it emphasizes decentralized decision-making, problem-solving, and attention to customer needs in achieving these goals (Eck and Rosenbaum 1994:4).

As Eck and Rosenbaum (1994:3) note, the emergence of the community policing movement is reflected not only in the growing body of literature concerning the topic, but also by the resounding endorsement of community policing by all of the national police research organizations, and by the proliferation of community policing in practice. Several factors have contributed to this redefinition of the police role, at the same time that traditional isolation of the police from the public, the ineffectiveness of police as crime fighters, and research findings called into question O.W. Wilson's police management principles (c.f. Skolnick and Bayley 1986:4-6) with the result that many police executives and academics have called for a new approach to policing.

Evaluations of community policing have focused, in part, on the relationship between strategic problem solving efforts and fear of crime, crime rates, disorder, and satisfaction with the police. For example, Eck and Spelman (1987) found evidence that proactive problem solving approaches in concert with efforts by community members and relevant city agencies can lead to a reduction in the incidence of specific crimes. In addition, Toch and Grant (1991) found that a collaborative approach to problem-solving involving the police, residents, and representatives of various city agencies can stem neighborhood social and physical disorder.

However, as Yin (1986) notes, the key to successful community-based efforts to reduce crime and fear of crime and to improve neighborhood conditions seems to be the active involvement of the police in educating citizens about crime prevention and collaborative efforts

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

with citizens, business owners, and private, non-profit, and public agencies to solve problems.

It is within the community policing context that many coordinated, multi-faceted, problem-solving approaches dealing with family violence have arisen. According to Gwinn and O'Dell (1993:1502) and Sadusky (1995), rather than relying on only one particular strategy such as mandatory arrest or victim assistance, these coordinated community responses emphasize a broad, holistic approach to the problem of family violence. Their focus centers on early criminal justice system intervention at the misdemeanor level, policies dealing with the abuser rather than the victim, eliminating policies which tend to re-victimize victims, and long term accountability for the abuser (c.f., National Law Enforcement Policy Center 1990).

Many of the above approaches to addressing domestic violence have stemmed from "grass roots" collaborative efforts. Here, planning and coordination of family violence responses typically are undertaken through public-private partnerships which include law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, judges, shelters, therapists, medical service providers, advocates, educators, military, probation officers, churches, local bar associations, youth groups, social services and other groups who have dealings with victims of domestic abuse or abusers themselves (Gwinn and O'Dell 1993; Lerman 1992). In some areas (e.g. Dane County, Wisconsin) grass roots collaborative efforts have been combined with "top-down" task forces in a blended arrangement which allows for the potential implementation of suggested policy revisions.

Whether these collaborative partnerships take a distinct "top down" approach, a grass roots approach, or a combined approach to family violence, they tend to be multi-faceted, addressing both the victim and the abuser (see for example the "Duluth Initiative" as outlined in

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

Asmus, Ritmeester, and Pence 1991). While no two collaborative efforts are alike, many attempt to integrate two or more of the components described below.

System Intervention at Early Stages of Violence

As noted above, the traditional police response of non-interference in family violence situations gradually was replaced in many jurisdictions in the 1980s and 1990s with coordinated police department efforts directed at early intervention at the misdemeanor level. The idea is a simple one: family violence at a misdemeanor level (1) may still be quite serious (as in the hidden tax of verbal and mental abuse), and (2) may escalate to serious injury or death (Wangberg 1991).

Police departments such as the San Diego P.D. and the Seattle P.D. have established new procedures in responding to misdemeanor family assault cases. In all departments where early intervention is valued, the message is strong: if there is probable cause to arrest, the police officer not only should do so, but he or she should also begin to prepare the case for an effective prosecution.

Practically speaking, this policy means that officers need to be trained in a number of important areas so that the prosecutor has a case that he or she may prove beyond a reasonable doubt in court. In San Diego, a Domestic Violence Coordinator oversees training for patrol officers, ensuring that those who respond to allegations of family violence are well versed in proper investigation techniques and know how to avoid "re-victimizing" victims (Gwinn and O'Dell 1993). Family violence cases then are forwarded to the Domestic Violence Investigations Unit with the aim of working gently with victims, assuring them that prosecution is focused on the conduct of the abuser, and attempting to engender the support of the victim during criminal

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

prosecutions.

Focusing on the Abuser

While traditional police and prosecutorial responses in family violence cases placed a substantial burden on the victim to "press charges" or testify in court, recent policy changes in a growing number of jurisdictions (e.g. Los Angeles and Seattle) now focus on building a criminal case against the alleged offender, and removing the responsibility of such an effort from the victim. According to Wangberg (1991), this allows the victim to focus on her safety issues--and those of her children--while the criminal justice system focuses its attention on the criminal prosecution. Of course, the key to the success of such efforts is the ability of the prosecutor, working jointly with police, to build a substantial case consisting of direct, physical and/or circumstantial evidence, with less dependency on the victim as the centerpiece of the case. Recent police training initiatives in many jurisdictions have focused on essential police investigation techniques (Asmus, Ritmeester. and Pence 1991).

Policies Dealing With Victims

Some collaborative efforts across the country have been focusing on the problem of what to do in the event that a victim who is served a subpoena does not show up for court hearings. This problem has been a common one in family violence criminal prosecutions since prosecutors traditionally have relied on the testimony of the victim in court to prove his or her case. Without the victim. the prosecutor risked losing the case.

However, in recent years, increased collaboration between local police departments and prosecutors' offices in an effort to gain enough evidence to successfully convict an abuser, even without the victim's testimony (Asmus, Ritmeester, and Pence 1991) has occurred. And in those

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

instances when the victim's testimony is essential to the successful prosecution of the abuser, an arrest warrant directed toward the victim no longer is a "given" in many areas. For example, in San Diego if a victim fails to appear at a trial for which she was subpoenaed, a special domestic violence prosecutor, who understands the reasons why many victims are unwilling to testify, is referred the case. If the prosecutor believes the case can be proved without the victim's assistance, he or she will not request a warrant for the arrest of the victim (Gwinn and O'Dell 1993). Even in those instances where an arrest warrant is issued, special prosecutors make numerous attempts to contact the victim and bring her to court before an arrest warrant is executed.

The San Diego experience is simply one example of how coordinated efforts can effect change in the criminal justice system so that risk of "re-victimizing" the victim is minimized. Other efforts have centered around victim assistance services (Berk 1993; Wangberg 1991). Cities such as Bellevue (Washington), New York, and Phoenix have collaborated with social service and mental health providers to take a more proactive approach to victim assistance (Law Enforcement Policy Center 1990). In Bellevue and in New York, the police departments team with social service agencies to follow-up with victims regarding available services. And in Phoenix, trained volunteers assist police officers on the scene to provide on-site crisis intervention (Law Enforcement Policy Center 1990).

Offender Accountability

In an effort to find long term solutions to family violence in the United States, several states and localities (e.g., California, Colorado, and Duluth, Minnesota) are moving far beyond traditional "non-interference" practices toward newer mandatory arrest policies (Buzawa and

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

Buzawa 1993), and even newer expedited arraignments (Mickish and Schoen 1991). These programs emphasize treatment and counseling and harsh sanctions (usually confinement) have been enacted to ensure that offenders not only are provided treatment services, but also are held accountable for violations of probation contracts (Buzawa and Buzawa 1993).

In these jurisdictions, fines and diversion programs are deemphasized. Fines tend to also punish the victim, and diversion programs typically allow an offender to avoid responsibility for his actions. While unsuccessful completion of a diversion contract may result in the prosecutor filing charges against the defendant, successful prosecutions of these types of cases are rare (Gwinn and O'Dell 1993).

The preceding discussion illustrates some relatively recent innovations in criminal justice responses to allegations of family violence. Many of these programs and policies have come directly from collaborative, multi-level, public-private partnerships in an era of community policing. While we do not argue that these changes are a direct result of community policing initiatives--indeed many changes have been the result of successful lawsuits initiated on behalf of victims or as a result of the shelter movement (Asmus, Ritmeester, and Pence 1991)--we do suggest that community policing, with its emphasis on collaborative problem solving, has led to community and agency mobilization and has facilitated the establishment of collaborative organizations and a new commitment among law enforcement agencies to address the problem of family violence.

Collaboration: Necessary Conditions

Recent organizational research sheds light on the necessary conditions for a successful social, multi-agency collaboration. According to Gifford and Pinchot (1993:216) an essential

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

ingredient is "community" which

> *...serves as the vessel of vision, values, and mutually beneficial connections that guide the work of individuals and teams and shape market interactions. The ideal community combines freedom of choice and responsibility for the whole – everyone's relationships are full of choice and collaborative, vision sharing and value driven.*

Also, Pfieffer (1995:xi) contends that community is essential to successful collaboration and argues that organizations *simultaneously augment the power of individuals and limit their freedom.* Without a sense of community, individuals are intolerant of limitations on freedom. When effectively balanced, this duality optimizes collective creativity and problem-solving. Further, Gifford and Pinchot (1993:220) maintain that community must not only stem from individuals accepting limits on their freedom, but must also be maintained by all members of the collaborative. They summarize the effect of this by stating "*Without balance of community responsibility, markets often produce results nobody would choose*" (Gifford, and Pinchot 1993:220). An ineffective "product" of a multi-agency collaborative effort whose sole purpose is to resolve family violence would be erroneous policy recommendations and increased polarization of participating agencies.

Among the many "major forces" for an effective collaborative effort in bureaucracies (see Gifford and Pinchot 1993; Straus 1993), four are particularly relevant to social, multi-agency collaborative efforts:

Intra-ownership and owning a piece of the whole which allows retention of independence and identity of each of the component agencies, yet results in a unified sense of achievement, and speaks to the need for mutual responsibility of the component agencies and the balance between

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

individual freedom and community.

Processes of democratic self-management, in particular, the lateralization of power which allows a sense of contribution and control by each component agency.

Widespread information and education regarding the bigger picture, occurring in the form of educating the component agencies about causes and legal constraints of processes surrounding family violence.

A sense of safety, security, and wider-systems' memberships which allows a free-flowing exchange of information about each agency's resources and practices without fear of a lack of reciprocity from other agencies. This sense also decreases the fear of loss of resources or the right to continue agency practices deemed valuable and efficient by the agency.

These forces are subsumed in common definitions of "collaboration," such as the following definition from the Western Regional Institute for Community Oriented Public Safety (1998):

> Collaboration is the highest degree of partnership, which requires shared resources and joint programming. This relationship implies not only common goals and program outcomes, but also a commitment to shared implementation. Required for true collaboration are joint goals, shared power and decision making, equal access to the acquisition of resources, team outcomes, and team accountability.

We return to the forces for collaboration and the above definition in light of the findings from the process evaluation in Chapter 3.

In Chapter 2, we briefly discuss the context under which a domestic violence prevention

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

commission was established in one southwestern, metropolitan area. We describe the problem of family violence in the city, the local police department's community policing initiatives, and the commission itself.

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

CHAPTER TWO

THE SETTING

With an estimated population of approximately a half million, this city is a large and growing metropolitan area located in the southwest United States. Its corporate limits encompass approximately 250 square miles. According to the 1990 Census. this metropolitan area is a minority-majority city with more than two-thirds of the people of minority descent.

Domestic Violence in the City

One of the local police department's most frequent calls for service is for a reactive response to allegations of family violence. For purposes of record-keeping, family violence is broken down into three categories: (1) child abuse, (2) abuse of the elderly, and (3) spousal abuse. Exhibit 1 shows the police department's family violence statistics from 1996 through 1998. On average, the department received 29,092 family violence calls for service per year (representing approximately 2,424 calls per month).[1] Of these calls, more than 9,356 were determined by officers to be serious enough to result in the writing of a police report, and in 3,827 instances probable cause was found to arrest an alleged offender (Domestic Violence Prevention Coordination Unit 1999).

--Exhibit 1 here--

According to police department records, family violence against female spouses is the most common type of reported family violence. On average. 81 percent of family violence arrests between the years 1996 and 1998 were of males who allegedly either committed or threatened acts of violence against women (Domestic Violence Prevention Coordination Unit

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

1999).

In addition, the police department and prosecutor's office have an agreement whereby police officers at the scene of an alleged family violence offense (where the alleged offender(s) is/are present) speak via telephone with a prosecutor, who screens the case and determines whether there is probable cause to make an arrest. This screening process occurred with 1,655 incidents in 1996, the first year the agreement was implemented. Of those incidents, 71 percent of the cases ultimately were dismissed by the prosecutor or resulted in a pre-trial diversion program. And in 25 percent of the cases, an offender either pled guilty or was found guilty by a judge.

Community Policing Initiatives

The police department's commitment to policing innovations and the broader philosophy of community policing appears to be well developed. Both departmental mission and values' statements involve a community policing philosophy of police-citizen partnerships in the co-production of order, and the collaborative process of identifying and solving problems of crime, drugs, fear of crime, and social and physical disorder at the neighborhood level. As a result of the department's philosophical shift from traditional to community-based policing, several operational and programmatic innovations have been implemented, including decentralization of command and a number of other initiatives geared toward collaborative problem-solving.

The Domestic Violence Prevention Commission

In addition to its other community policing initiatives, the department applied for federal funding from the COPS Office under its *Community Policing to Combat Domestic Violence* solicitation. The grant ultimately was awarded in March, 1997 under Category I of the

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

solicitation, "Department-sponsored multi-disciplinary training initiatives." With funding from the COPS Office, the department established the Domestic Violence Prevention Commission (hereafter, *Commission*) for the primary purpose of developing an effective approach to reduce family violence in the city.

Representatives of the Commission reflect a public-private, multi-level collaborative partnership and include members of the police department, the District Attorney's office, the County Attorney's office, the City Attorney's office, probation, parole, the military, the school district, the Council of Judges, state, county, and municipal legal assistance, Juvenile Probation, the Battered Women's Shelter, the YMCA, the Transitional Living Center, the clergy, and other volunteer services dealing with the problems of family violence.

In addition to formalizing the Commission, the police department, with support from the COPS Office, established the Domestic Violence Prevention Coordination Unit (DVPCU) in March 1997 for the primary purpose of implementing a multi-faceted approach to combating family violence in the city, based on recommendations from the Commission (**See Appendix 1**).

The Four "T" Approach

The general strategy to combat domestic violence as outlined in the police department's 1997 COPS grant application shares with the Violence Against Women Act the common objective (among others) of encouraging the arrest, prosecution, and conviction of domestic violence offenders. As such, the DVPCU in conjunction with the Commission has begun initial planning into the efficacy of a Four "T" approach to domestic violence: training, tracking, targeting, and transferring.

Training. The DVPCU in conjunction with the Commission initiated police officer

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

family violence training at one of its Regional Command Centers, which is the focus of the outcome evaluation discussed in greater detail in Chapters 4 and 5. Eventually, the department will make use of its community policing initiatives and departmental decentralization and will empower sergeants from each of five Regional Command Centers throughout the city not only to be trained in effectively dealing with family violence cases, but also to be involved in the implementation of the training program for line-level officers. All police officers will be trained in the techniques of proper investigation documentation of family violence cases, how to avoid "re-victimizing" the victim. accountability for a police officer's action or inaction, the writing of detailed reports, and the taking of witness statements and pictures of the crime scene and victim.

In addition, prosecutors will be trained to become more effective in prosecuting domestic violence cases. Here, training will focus on more effectively prosecuting misdemeanor arrests, arrests that typically are considered "less serious" and often not the focus of prosecutorial efforts. However, the presumption under this approach to domestic violence is that aggressive misdemeanor arrests and prosecutions might prevent violence from escalating to the felony level. Prosecutorial training also will focus on the abuser rather than the victim. Through training, prosecutors will be sensitized to the fact that abusers frequently become more violent and aggressive toward a victim when they learn that the victim controlled the outcome of the criminal prosecution.; thus, training also will focus on taking the responsibility out of the hands of the victim and placing it with the state.

Tracking. Working with the District and County Attorney's offices, the police department's Crime Analysis Unit and Management Information Unit, and 911 communications staff, the DVPCU reviews domestic violence cases reported to the police department, and track

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

these cases from arrest to final disposition. The tracking component of the domestic violence strategy is an attempt to find commonalties among successfully prosecuted and unsuccessfully prosecuted domestic violence cases, and to provide the foundation for additional police department and/or prosecutorial training.

Targeting. The DVPCU also targets repeat domestic violence offenders in an attempt to assure that victims' needs are addressed. In this regard, the DVPCU works closely with the District Attorney's Office to see that repeat offenders are identified and special prosecutorial attention is given to their cases. In addition, the COPS grant provided for the funding of cellular telephones to assist victims in dire situations so that they may contact the police in emergency situations.

Transferring. The DVPCU also transfers domestic violence cases in which final disposition has been made to various service agencies that deal with the causes of the behavior of the abuser. Here, the DVPCU's presumption is that arrest, jail time, and aggressive prosecution, along with transfer to service agencies is the most effective strategy for reducing recidivism. As such, the DVPCU plans to monitor offenders' attendance in service programs and work with the probation department to ensure that proper action is taken for those offenders who do not comply with court ordered social service conditions.[1]

In the chapters that follow, we present process and outcome evaluation data which speak to the extent to which members of the Domestic Violence Prevention Commission truly were collaborating with one another, and the extent to which the Duluth Training Model was effective across several outcomes.

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

CHAPTER THREE

PROCESS EVALUATION OF INTER-AGENCY COLLABORATION

Methods

Focus group interviews and archival research were employed in this process evaluation as primary methods to assess the inter-agency effort and the extent to which collaboration existed among members of the Domestic Violence Prevention Commission. According to Stewart and Shamdasani (1990:16), focus group interviews are an ideal way to collect qualitative data. In addition, there are other advantages to focus group interviews including: (1) they allow the researcher to interact directly with the program recipients; (2) they allow the researcher to obtain large amounts of data in the respondents' own words; and (3) they allow the researcher to further question responses and build upon answers for further discussion.

Four focus group interview sessions were conducted at strategic points in the evaluation process: two were conducted in February 1998, which corresponds to the end of the Commission's *planning* efforts (Phase 1), and two additional focus groups were conducted in April, 1999, approximately one year into the Commission's *implementation* efforts (Phase 2). Focus group participants consisted of representatives from commission agencies. For the Phase 1 focus groups, a systematic random sampling procedure was used to select nineteen agencies. Once agencies were selected for possible participation from the list of all commission agencies, telephone calls were made to the designated agency member who had been participating in Commission activities. Fourteen individuals agreed to participate in the focus group discussions, and eleven individuals (7 females and 4 males) participated in the scheduled focus group meetings. While small in number, focus group participants represented the breadth of

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

membership for the commission: two probation officers, one police officer, one private security officer, two non-profit advocates, two human service employees, one educator, one municipal court administrator, one military officer, and one legal aid attorney. On average, focus group participants attended approximately 7 Commission meetings/sub-committee meetings.

The same procedure was used for Phase 2 focus groups. Here, eighteen agencies were randomly selected, and the designated agency member who had been participating in Commission activities was contacted. All 18 agency members agreed to participate (15 females and 3 males). As was the case for Phase 1 focus groups, participants were representative of the Commission membership: four representatives from the courts, four law enforcement personnel, four private social service representatives, one educator, three public/non-profit social service representatives, and two individuals from the private sector.

Focus group discussions were moderated by the authors. One undergraduate and one graduate student served as recorders. Focus group questions centered around participants' perceptions of the mission of the commission, the process of collaboration within the commission, barriers to achieving the commission's goals, and reasons for the participants' agency's involvement with the commission.

In addition to focus group interviews, archival data in the form of meeting notes and other documentation were used to provide descriptive information regarding the number of commission meetings, average attendance at meetings, and agencies participating in commission activities.

Findings and Discussion

Archival data revealed that a total of 22 collaborative meetings took place during the

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

Phase 1 planning stage, beginning with the first Commission meeting on April 23, 1997 and the last on September 17, 1997. The average attendance at the meetings was 36. The meetings not only included the 6 joint commission meetings, but also meetings of the commission's subcommittees, including the human services' sub-committee, the law enforcement sub-committee, and the judicial sub-committee. Also included in the total were 4 community forums seeking input from citizens regarding family violence interventions. These forums, which commenced in July 1997, took place in 4 distinct regions of the city.

These data also reveal that the Commission is a public-private, coordinated effort representing 88 distinct organizations (not including concerned citizens who do not have an organizational affiliation). Organizations represented include the clergy, courts, education, law enforcement, medical, non-profit agencies, private sector service providers, and public social service agencies. All Commission members were asked to join one of three subcommittees for which they could make the greatest impact: law enforcement, judicial/prosecution, or human services.

Subcommittees met independently of the Commission and as often as its members felt necessary. Subcommittees elected a chair, vice-chair, and a recording secretary, proceeded with brainstorming activities, eventually narrowing their problem-solving activities to specific issues. Subcommittees also presented progress reports to the general membership of the commission during monthly commission meetings from April through September, 1997. The monthly commission meetings also afforded members the opportunity to hear topical presentations on a variety of family violence issues.

Commission members ultimately developed formal recommendations to achieve their

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

mission. This process led members (1) to examine how each agency addressed the issue of family violence, (2) to determine areas where the current system was not sufficient, (3) to decide which areas were most important to address, and (4) to identify the improvements needed. The recommendations were presented at a press conference in November 1997, and included 6 focused areas:

- Prevention through public awareness
- Specialized domestic violence response team
- Enforcing domestic violence cases
- Victims' assistance
- Programs for offenders
- Funding

The presentation of these recommendations put closure on Phase 1 of the Commission's efforts.

Beginning in May 1998, the Commission undertook Phase 2, the implementation of the recommendations. At the first Phase 2 Commission meeting, Phase 1 recommendations were prioritized, and subcommittees were formed to explore the implementation of the recommendations. Through October 1999, approximately 10 subcommittees, including the judicial, speakers' bureau, law enforcement, and education subcommittees, met on various occasions and presented reports to the full membership at 8 separate Commission meetings. The average attendance at the Phase 2 Commission meetings was 30.

Despite the high activity of Commission members during Phase I (and to a lesser extent during Phase 2), and the outward appearance of collaboration, focus group data revealed the practical and philosophical problems that threaten inter-agency, collaborative efforts both during

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

planning and implementation phases.

Obstacles Jeopardizing Collaboration

Self Interest as a Motivation to Participate. Focus group data revealed that agency motivations for participation in the Commission's activities were not directly goal-oriented. At the very least, focus group responses raised the question of whether agencies were motivated to participate out of self-interest in the forms of either protecting one's "turf" or acquiring new information and resources.

1. Turfism. If collaboration truly is goal-oriented, then it is a process that brings together all relevant partners in an effort to solve problems. However, many apparent "collaborative" endeavors suffer from "turfism": partners who consciously or unconsciously strive to remain in control, protecting their own interests. We found that the Domestic Violence Prevention Commission was no different. Turfism "naturally" emerged during the Phase I focus groups and, once prompted, arose as an extreme—and continuing problem in the Phase 2 focus groups. In fact, it was the consensus of all focus group participants that turf issues remained a stumbling block for true collaboration. Several qualitative data illustrate this point:

> **I think this [turfism][2] is true. I attended the Commission to shore up weak points of my agency and also to defend my agency.**
>
> **Turfness is almost palpable. It is entrenched and the Commission may have nicked a little hole into it but agencies are still only cordial with all clutching to their territory.**
>
> **I saw turfness in the beginning and it has continued with the Commission.**
>
> **There is still a lot of turfness with fund-cutting and down-sizing.**

Similar comments were made from Phase 2 focus group participants. Here, turfism appeared to affect each agency's sense of safety, security, and wider-systems' membership. The

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

need to defend one's agency seemed to constrict an individual's ability to assess the social problem from various angles, an important component that leads to the creativity necessary for innovative and effective solutions to the problem of family violence against women.

2. *Acquiring New Information and Resources.* Several other focus group participants identified a primary motivation for participation in the Commission as the acquiring and sharing of new information and resources.

> **I am personally involved to 'cross-fertilize' with other agencies.**
>
> **Information was taken back to each department to use. It was a fantastic shortcut in doing the job better.**
>
> **One benefits just by identifying resources. It brings them into the loop.**
>
> **Generally, lot's of good information.**
>
> **Agency representatives now have information to give the victim.**

While on the surface the acquisition of new information and resources may appear as a benefit, it is also an indication of the fragility of the collaborative effort. One could question the likelihood of continued motivation for participation if the desire for new information is left unfulfilled or becomes satiated. Ideally, motivation for participation would come from the desire to solve the social problem and sustained motivation would stem from a unified sense of community and the attainment of such goals. While the dispersion of information is an important by-product of the collaborative effort, it is not a direct goal of the Commission, and combined with the protection of one's turf, could transform the collaborative process into one that is closer to "negotiative."

Leadership and Dominance. Several Phase 1 focus group participants were concerned that the commission was established by the police department. While others were more

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

supportive of the police department's establishment of the commission, the following examples illustrate an ongoing tension at two levels. First, there was a perception that the police department controlled the Commission's activities, which may be counter to true collaboration.

> **It is a flaw that the Commission was brought up by the police department. To improve it further we need a separate agency because of the tendency of the police department to dominate and repel criticism.**
>
> **The [local] police department might be a hindrance. If they are the power players, the police department has more power to move the Commission in their direction.**

Second, among human service providers and educators, there appeared to be a philosophical difference regarding the solution for family violence when compared to law enforcement. Human service providers and educators exhibited a decided emphasis toward preventive activities rather than law enforcement responses. The following data, first from the Phase 1 focus group, then the Phase 2 focus group illustrates this difference.

> **The police department came into it as the lead; but once the police are dealing with domestic violence, it is too late. Those in human services should take the lead and give up-front education and outreach to children and employees.**
>
> **No one is really looking at prevention, just punishment.**

Perceived dominance by the "founding" agency (in this case the local police department) appears to undermine the necessary conditions of lateralization of power and intra-ownership. According to Straus (1993:31-32) resistance to a collaborative process results from a growing dissatisfaction and distrust with leadership fueled by a fear of loss of power and a need to try to solve all the problems by making all the decisions themselves. Persons who are subordinated must therefore "legitimize" their ownership in the solution to the problem by pointing to flaws or omissions by the dominant agency. Flaws or omissions by the police department were articulated by several,

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

non law enforcement Commission members.

> **I wonder if [the] Commission investigations of just violent community occurrences heighten public awareness [a Commission goal]. ...The advertising and education of private sector [groups] is more successful than legal actions of [investigative] agencies. (*Focus Group #1, Private Sector Member*)**
>
> **There is a great deal of domestic abuse within policing [Here the subject is implying the police department can not solve domestic violence within it's own agency, therefore it is incompetent to solve it at the community level]. (*Focus Group #1, Private Sector Member*)**
>
> **The law enforcement checklist [one of a few tangible DVPC objectives] was successful[ly completed] but it is not accepted yet by the police department. It may never be implemented. (*Focus Group #3, Social Service Member*)**
>
> **[Referring to the police department not implementing the checklist] If others had suggestions to make things better for us, we will try it. That is all we want to do ...make things better. Here [meaning the Commission] we have a checklist that nobody is gonna use because of resistance [by the police department].**

But despite the division which arose in the Phase 1 focus groups concerning the leadership role of the police department during the commission's planning stage, by April 1999, Phase 2 focus group participants were concerned about the general lack of leadership in the commission's undertakings, regardless of which agency representative took the lead.

> **There are no leaders because of a lack of funding for specific jobs. It is too much of a burden for the volunteers.**
>
> **There is a lack of direction by the leadership of the commission.**
>
> **There can still be more collaboration, but more leadership is necessary.**
>
> **With the (police department) sergeant leaving, who had a personal mission to change views of domestic violence, there has been a change (in active leadership).**

With regard to this last comment above, it is of some interest to note that the sergeant who secured the original grant to form the Domestic Violence Prevention Unit, had recently

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

announced that he was leaving his position at the police department, and was moving out of the area. This sergeant, who at the very least symbolically represented "law enforcement" as the leader of the commission left a leadership void at a crucial time in the Commission's existence.

Organizational Ambiguity Resulting in Unclear Expectations. A variety of other barriers to the realization of the Commission's goals also were reported, including perceptions of waning interest in the Commission's activities, lack of organization, scheduling of meetings, and unclear expectations of participants.

> **I attended a host of Phase I meetings but feel like a casualty as I have not been invited to the first two meetings of Phase II so I am less motivated. My interest in domestic violence has not lessened, but I have less of an interest in the meetings.**
>
> **To meet the goals you expect Phase II to be as organized as Phase I, but it is not.**
>
> **Yes, with the scheduling, we are notified too late and then you have other commitments.**
>
> **Too much time passed between October [1997] and now, and not enough advance notice of the meetings was given.**
>
> **During Phase I, you knew what was expected and the dates of the meetings. Everything was laid out in black and white, and all was in front of you. This is not the case for Phase II.**
>
> **I'm not exactly sure what had happened, but the implementation aspect of the 2nd Phase was never achieved.**

These examples illustrate other practical problems of multi-agency collaborations. While collaborative efforts may offer the best hope for long term solutions to the problem of family violence, loss of interest due mainly to long time frames for the Commission's activities and organization problems related to the scheduling of meetings and concise expectations, posed potential threats to collaboration and the realization of the Commission's goals.

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

It is worth noting, however, that some of these practical problems recently were addressed. For example, in August 1999 a new police department sergeant was assigned to the DVPU. This sergeant took over the leadership role of the Commission, restructured the subcommittees and their assignments, and developed regular and clear meeting dates and times for the Commission. Of course, it remains to be seen whether yet another "law enforcement" leader will breed the resentment that was manifested by some participants in the Phase 1 focus group sessions.

The Absence of Key Players in the Implementation Phase. While the Commission itself was co-chaired by the Director of the Battered Women's Shelter, the Chief of the police department, and the President of the local university, Phase 2 focus group respondents were frustrated by the lack of involvement of these and other key leaders in Commission activities. In addition, in the fall of 1998, the Chief of the local police department resigned his position.

> **The university is absentee from the Commission and who knows the loyalty of the new police chief. Also missing from the Commission is the school superintendent and it is the kids in the schools who are the witnesses.**
>
> **The sanction to do new things must come from the top level, so things are accepted quickly. The top level involvement by key agencies seems to be missing from the Commission.**
>
> **Territorial issues have not gone away and the higher-ups are needed to help this go away.**
>
> **The major city representatives are missing and no one knows their agenda or whether they are proactive about the Commission.**

The above data attest to implementation problems that the Commission is experiencing. Without the involvement and buy-in of key leaders in the representative agencies, implementation becomes problematic. While the product for Phase 1 activities simply was a

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

plan that outlined recommendations for change, the product for Phase 2 activities was "action." It appears the old adage, "easier said than done" certainly applies here.

Marginalization of Commission Members from Non-Law Enforcement Agencies. As noted above, if there was, indeed, a direction that the Commission was taking, it was one primarily focused on law enforcement responses to family violence against women. This was manifested in law enforcement training for handling domestic violence calls for service, prosecutor's efforts to bring more cases to court, and more programs for offenders.

As such, this direction appeared to marginalize those agency representatives who were primarily concerned with proactively—rather than reactively—preventing family violence against women. And while we have little in terms of actual data to support this assertion, collectively, we sensed that marginalization of non-law enforcement agencies was occurring and was a hindrance to inter-agency collaboration. For example, much of the frustration concerning the Commission activities, both in Phase 1 and Phase 2, stemmed from focus group participants who represented non-law enforcement agencies, such as private citizens with no organizational affiliation, educators, and social service agencies in the public, private and non-profit sectors.

In fact, an unintended consequence of our focus group selection technique for Phase 2 was a distinct difference in agency representation of each group. The first Phase 2 focus group consisted of 6 participants: 4 from law enforcement and only two from non-law enforcement agencies. Conversely, the second focus group consisted of 12 participants: 8 from non-law enforcement agencies and only 4 from law enforcement agencies.

The first focus group (majority law enforcement) was more likely to describe the Commission in positive ways, such as, "extremely organized," "energetic," "positive

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

collaboration," "very vocal," and "coordinated." In fact, one law enforcement official described the Commission as, "...superb and beautiful—a united front to remedy domestic violence." Conversely, participants in the second focus group (majority non-law enforcement) were far more likely to describe the Commission in a negative way, such as "frustrating," "very erratic," "stalled position," "lack of direction," "a little bit lost," and "fragmented and disappointing."

This finding prompted us to conduct a separate analysis to determine the ratio of public to private agency participation in this "public-private collaborative effort." We reasoned that the public-private ratio was appropriate given that the great majority of public agencies within the Commission were law enforcement agencies, while those from the private sector primarily had a service orientation. The analysis included agency participation in twelve Commission meetings beginning in May 1997 and ending in October 1999. The results are shown in Exhibit 2 and suggest that while the ratios fluctuate from meeting to meeting, public agencies **overwhelming** dominate the Commission in terms of numbers of participants.

--Exhibit 2 here--

The distinct differences in general perceptions of the Commission activities at the same point in time combined with a more "reactive" approach to family violence supported and undertaken by some Commission members, and the disproportionate numbers of participants from the public sector suggest a marginalization process for those who support a more preventative approach to reducing family violence. While it remains to be seen whether marginalization continues, it most certainly is negatively affecting a collaborative approach to remedying the problem.

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

CHAPTER FOUR

EFFECTS OF TRAINING ON POLICE OFFICER ATTITUDES

In addition to the activities described in Chapter 3, the co-principal investigators and a graduate research assistant – in collaboration with the Commission—undertook a comprehensive evaluation of police officer training on police officer attitudes. This evaluation lends important insight into the extent to which training might affect police officer perceptions of domestic violence. Described below is the training intervention, followed by the methods, findings, and discussion regarding the effects of training on perceptions of police officers.

The Duluth Domestic Abuse Intervention Project Training Model for Law Enforcement Response

The Duluth Domestic Abuse Intervention Project Training Model for Law Enforcement Response (henceforth referred to as "training") was selected by the Sergeant who heads the domestic violence unit for the police department. The Duluth model has five primary foci or "units".

The first unit addresses the changing role of law enforcement in domestic violence cases. Specifically, the focus is on the "special nature" of this crime with the primary goal being protection of the victim. It argues the low prosecution rate is due to a "system poorly designed to prosecute cases when there is an ongoing relationship in which the offender intimidates the victim" (Paymar and Pence 1998: 5). Special techniques are offered for investigation and preparation for prosecution and for successful intervention with offenders who batter. This unit further addresses the dynamics of an abusive relationship by examining the complexities of intimacy, frequent recanting of allegations by the victim and the need for victim cooperation to

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

ensure prosecution. The unit ends with a section on women who use violence. It maintains that women both initiate violence and use violence in self-defense. It suggests there will be occasions when the female is the perpetrator and should be arrested but that men are much more likely to cause future harm in the form of intimidation, rape, and coercion.

The second unit focuses on safety and interviewing techniques. This unit addresses the need to "lock in" the victim's statement while ensuring her safety. This unit also addresses the credibility of the victim's statement as evidence and, as such, the need for victim cooperation. These ideas are synthesized into interview techniques which achieve the balance between documenting facts but not leading the witness. Finally, this unit focuses on decision-making stemming from all interviews, including children, regarding identification of the perpetrator.

The third unit focuses on the fundamentals of a domestic violence investigation. Specifically, it addresses probable cause, definitions of assault, crimes related to domestic assault, protection orders, establishing self-defense, and criteria for establishing who is the primary or dominant aggressor.

The fourth unit focuses on documentation of evidence and report writing. This unit stresses the importance of the police report in prosecution as well as its use for child protection services, civil court, advocacy programs, and counseling programs among others. Several checklists of necessary information are presented and the purpose of this information is discussed.

The fifth unit focuses on special issues in investigating domestic violence cases. Specifically, it addresses the more severe forms of violence, such as strangulation, and concludes with a discussion on stalking, harassment, and the enforcement of protection orders.

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

Finally, the training concludes with a call for a reexamination of beliefs about gender roles and perspectives on intimate relationships, and how these impact domestic violence.

The training was administered to 135 police officers from a regional command center. This center is one of five police substations and was selected by the police department to receive the training due to its high number of reported domestic violence incidents.

Domestic Violence Response Training and Attitudes Toward Domestic Violence Intervention: Methods

This experiment was designed to measure the effects of the Duluth training on police officer attitudes toward domestic violence intervention. Here, data collection on the effectiveness of the training occurred as an attitude survey of law enforcement officers. The Solomon four-group design (see Figure 1) was implemented to isolate and estimate the interaction effect that could occur when the subject deduces the desired results from a combination of the pretest and test stimulus. The test stimulus is domestic violence training. This design required four groups, two of which received domestic violence response training (the experimental groups) and two of which did not (the control groups). The subjects comprising the experimental group were police officers stationed at the Northeast Command Center. Of the two groups receiving the test stimulus, one group completed both a pretest and posttest and had a sample size of 64. The other completed only the posttest and had a sample size of 72.

Figure 1. Solomon Four-group Design: Domestic Violence Response Training and Attitude toward Domestic Violence Intervention

Experimental Group 1	Pretest *(Questionnaire)*	Test Stimulus *(Training)*	Posttest *(Questionnaire)*
Control Group 1	Pretest *(Questionnaire)*		Posttest *(Questionnaire)*
Experimental Group 2		Test Stimulus	Posttest

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

	(Training)	*(Questionnaire)*
Control Group 2		Posttest *(Questionnaire)*

The subjects for the control groups were selected from the four command stations that did not receive training. These command stations schedule their officers to work an eight hour shift every 48 hours. Various shift change meetings were attended during which officers were solicited for completion of the pretest. Of those officers who agreed to participate, every other officer completed the pretest questionnaire. The same researcher returned to the shift change meeting 48 hours later and administered the posttest to all the officers. The group completing both the pretest and posttest had a sample size of 21. The group that completed only the posttest had a sample size of 60. The proportionately larger posttest only group was due to officers not reporting to shift change on time or not at all. Also, changes in scheduling resulted in some of the officers who were pretested being rescheduled for a later shift.

The pretest/posttest measuring instrument was a questionnaire consisting of a series of items designed to assess attitude toward gender roles, police intervention in domestic violence, police policy surrounding domestic violence, prosecution, the training itself, and belief in inaccurate or simplistic causes of domestic violence (see Appendix 2 for sample questionnaire). Once data collection was completed, a factor analysis was conducted to determine which items could be summed into index scores with the greatest internal reliability (see Appendix 3 for factor analysis results and reliability scores). The sorting of the items resulted in each case having an index score for attitudes toward traditional gender roles, belief in inaccurate or simplistic causes of family violence, attitude toward whether family violence is a matter for the police, and usefulness of training. Five questionnaire items singularly loaded on other factors: the

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

effectiveness of mandatory arrest as police department policy; likelihood of a case being prosecuted; difficulty in identifying perpetrator of domestic violence; victim cooperativeness in resolving domestic violence and attendance at training. The specific items are described in the finding section. For each scale or item, respondents were asked to indicate their level of agreement by selecting from the following Likert scale format:

Strongly Agree	Agree	Somewhat Agree	No Opinion	Somewhat Disagree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
[SA]	[A]	[SwA]	[NO]	[SwD]	[D]	[SD]

Given this design we expected the following outcomes:

Outcome 1: There will be a statistically significant ($p<.05$) increase in favorable attitudes toward police officer intervention in domestic violence after receiving the training. Comparisons will be made between: experimental group 1 pretest and posttest; experimental group 1 posttest and control group 1 posttest; control group 1 pretest and experimental group 2 posttest.

Outcome 2: There will not be a statistically significant ($p<.05$) testing effect. Comparisons will be made between: experimental group 1 and experimental group 2 posttests; control group 1 and control group 2 posttests; experimental group 2 pretest and posttest.

Outcome 3: There will not be a statistically significant ($p<.05$) difference in the groups at the first time of completion of the questionnaire and prior to receiving the test stimulus. This ensures that random assignment to the groups eliminated bias making the groups initially comparable. Comparisons will be made between the pretests for experimental group 1 and control group 1 and the posttest for control group 2.

Findings[2]

Traditional Gender Roles

The gender roles scale included the following items:

> *As long as women's participation in the work force continues to expand, there will be more and more domestic violence.*

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

Women who have small children should stay home with those children instead of working.

Children of single-parent, female-headed households are more likely to be abused than children of dual-parent households.

Family financial matters are handled better by husbands than by wives.

Fathers are better disciplinarians of children than mothers.

Respondents were asked to indicate level of agreement on the previously described Likert-scale with lower scores indicating disagreement and higher scores indicating agreement.

A oneway analysis of variance was calculated to test for significant differences between and within the experimental and control groups attitude toward gender roles. The results are provided in Exhibit 3.

--Exhibit 3 here--

The between-group sum of squares for the model was 22.07 with 5 degrees of freedom. This resulted in a mean square 4.41. The sum of square for the within-group variation was 7656.93 with 294 degrees of freedom This resulted in a mean square of 26.04. The corresponding F statistic was .17 and had a significance level of .9737. Thus, the model was not statistically significant at the 97.37% level.

Bartlett's test for equal variances yielded a value of 9.23. The corresponding significance level (χ^2=9.23 with 5 degrees of freedom) was .100 so we could not reject the null hypothesis that the variances were equal. This gave us no reason to doubt the equal-variances assumption upon which analysis of variances rests.

The mean scores for each group and the results of the Scheffe multiple-comparison test are

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

presented in Exhibit 4 below.

--Exhibit 4 here--

No significant differences (all probability levels are > .05) among the means of the groups were found. Thus, the hypothesis that the domestic violence training would change police officer attitudes toward traditional gender roles was not supported. Nonsignificant pretest differences indicate there were no discernible biases across all groups. Further, the nonsignificant differences between these means supports the assumption no testing effect.

Discussion. The mean scores across all groups, while homogeneous, favored a "liberal" attitude toward gender roles during pretests and posttests. The potential range for this scale was 6 to 42 with higher scores indicating less agreement with scale items. A mean score of ~33 indicates that respondents tended to choose between "disagree" and "somewhat disagree". The presumption that the officers initially would have opinions somewhat favorable to traditional gender roles was unfounded.

Belief in Inaccurate or Simplistic Causes of Family Violence

The scale items for belief in inaccurate or simplistic causes of family violence included

The primary cause of family violence is alcohol consumption.

Family violence occurs much more in poor families than in middle class families.

The only reason battered women stay in battering relationships is that they don't have the economic resources to leave.

Men are more likely than women to respond to conflict with aggression.

Respondents were asked to indicate level of agreement on the previously described Likert-scale with lower scores indicating disagreement and higher scores indicating agreement.

A oneway analysis of variance was calculated to test for significant differences between and

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

within the experimental and control groups in regard to the effectiveness of the training in creating an understanding of the causes of family violence. The results are shown in Exhibit 5.

--Exhibit 5 here--

The between-group sum of squares for the model was 393 with 5 degrees of freedom. This results in a mean square of 78.70. The sum of squares for the within-group variation was 5179.36 with 296 degrees of freedom. The corresponding F statistic was 4.50 and had a significance level of .0006. Thus, the model was significant at the .06% level. Bartlett's test for equal variances yielded a value of 3.96. The corresponding significance level (χ^2=3.96 with 5 degrees of freedom) was .555, so we could not reject the null hypothesis of equal variances, giving us no reason to doubt the equal variances assumption upon which analysis of variance rests.

The mean scores for each group and the results of the Scheffe multiple comparison test of group means are presented Exhibit 6 below.

--Exhibit 6 here--

The only statistically significant difference was between the experimental group 1 posttest and the control group 2 posttest. This difference was –3.18 and is statistically significant at the .004 or .4% level. The respondents of the experimental group posttest had a higher level of disagreement with simplistic or inaccurate beliefs in causes of family violence than those in the control groups posttest. Since the nonsignificant means difference between the experimental and control groups pretest/posttest gave us confidence that a testing effect did not threaten internal validity, the difference between the experimental group posttest and control group posttest can be attributed to training. However, other groups that were expected to demonstrate a

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

training effect did not. Nonsignificant pretest differences indicate there were no discernible biases across all groups.

Discussion. Overall, there was little evidence that the domestic violence training dispelled inaccurate or simplistic causes of family violence. Only one of several comparisons yielded a significant effect. The means fell between 13 and 16, indicating the respondents' answers tended to range across four answers -- somewhat agree, no opinion, somewhat disagree. and disagree.

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

Family Violence as a Matter for the Police

The scale items for attitude toward whether family violence is a matter for the police included:

Only mentally ill people batter family members.

When managing a domestic violence "scene", it is better if the police officer leaves as soon as possible.

Law enforcement policies are ineffective for preventing family violence.

Family violence is a private matter in which law enforcement should not interfere.

Respondents were asked to indicate level of agreement on the previously described Likert-scale with lower scores indicating disagreement and higher scores indicating agreement.

A oneway analysis of variance was calculated to test for significant differences between and within the experimental and control groups in regard to the perception that family violence is criminal in nature and the police should intervene. The results are provided in Exhibit 7.

--Exhibit 7 here--

Bartlett's test for equal variance resulted in a value of 15.9954. The corresponding significance level (χ^2=16 with 5 degrees of freedom) was .007, so we rejected the null hypothesis of equal variances, giving us reason to doubt the equal variances assumption upon which analysis of variance rests. To resolve this violation, the data were transformed by cubing (power of 3) the raw data. The results are presented in Exhibit 8. The between-group sum of squares for the model was 46.18 with 5 degrees of freedom. This results in a mean square of 1.23. The sum of squares for the within-group variation was 2214.49 with 294 degrees of freedom. The corresponding F statistic for the transformed data was 1.14 and had a significance level of .3406.

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

Thus, the model was not statistically significant with a probability level of 34%.

--Exhibit 8 here--

The mean scores for each group and the results of the Scheffe multiple comparison test of group means are presented in Exhibit 9 below. The significance levels from this transformation were used and are presented in the table in bold numbers. To facilitate interpretation, the means are discussed in raw format.

--Exhibit 9 here--

No significant differences (all probability levels are > .05) between the means of groups were found. Thus, the hypothesis that the domestic violence training would change police officer perceptions of family violence as a matter for law enforcement was not supported. Nonsignificant pretest differences indicate there were no discernible biases across all groups. Further, the nonsignificant differences between these means support the assumption of no testing effect.

Discussion. While the training did not affect the respondents' perceptions, they tended to have high scale scores or "disagree" with the items on both the pretests and posttests. Given the potential range of 4 – 28 for this scale and the groups means all approximating 24, there was uniformity among all respondents that family violence is not a personal or private matter and that police officers should spend an appropriate amount of time on the scene assisting or managing the dispute. That training did not change this strongly held position, again, could be an indication that the long-held perception that police officers do not want to "get involved" in domestic violence disputes is no longer true.

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

Attitude Toward Mandatory Arrest

Attitude toward mandatory arrest was measured by the statement *Mandatory arrest of a domestic violence offender is the best way to reduce repeat episodes of violence.* Respondents were asked to indicate level of agreement on the previously described Likert-scale. However, the codes for this item were reversed to facilitate uniformity in interpretation. Therefore, lower scores indicated agreement and higher scores indicated disagreement.

A oneway analysis of variance was calculated to test for significant differences between and within the experimental and control groups in regard to attitude toward mandatory arrest. The results are given in Exhibit 10.

--Exhibit 10 here--

The between-group sum of squares for the model was 26.84 with 5 degrees of freedom. This results in a mean square of 5.37. The sum of squares for the within-group variation was 925.96 with 296 degrees of freedom. The corresponding F statistic was 1.72 and had a significance level of .1307. Thus, the model was not statistically significant, with a probability level of 13%. Bartlett's test for equal variances yielded a value of 2.51. The corresponding significance level (χ^2=2.51 with 5 degrees of freedom) was .775. so we could not reject the null hypothesis of equal variances, giving us no reason to doubt the equal variances assumption upon which analysis of variance rests.

The mean scores for each group and the results of the Scheffe multiple comparison test of group means are presented in Exhibit 11 below.

--Exhibit 11 here--

No significant differences (all probability levels are > .05) between the means of groups

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

were found. Thus, the hypothesis that the domestic violence training would change police officer attitudes toward mandatory arrest was not supported. Nonsignificant pretest differences indicate there were no discernible biases across all groups. Further, the nonsignificant differences between these means support the assumption of no testing effect.

Discussion. For both the pretests and posttests, the respondents tended to have no opinion about the effectiveness of mandatory arrest. This suggests the officers either had no opinion or were withholding judgment on this policy. Texas adopted the mandatory arrest policy approximately six years ago. More than likely the embracing and implementation of it has varied by city and county. The local police department has actively enforced this policing over the past five years. That the officers were withholding judgment could result from varying on-scene experiences making mandatory arrests, little or no experience with domestic violence, or "positive" experiences with this policy despite an opinion by the officer that does not favor mandatory arrest. Therefore, the "verdict" on whether police officers favor or disfavor this policy is not yet in, and training appeared not to have an effect.

Prosecution is Likely

The pretest and posttest for the first training (experimental group) session and the pretest for the second training session contained a mistake in the wording of the questionnaire item. Rather than asking the respondents their level of agreement with the statement "Regardless of how well a victim cooperates, and a police officer documents evidence and writes a police report, prosecution of an offender is likely", the last phrase of the item stated "prosecution of a *victim* is likely". Due to this mistake in the questionnaire, 65 cases were dropped from the analysis. Respondents were asked to indicate level of agreement on the previously described Likert-scale

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

with lower scores indicating disagreement and higher scores indicating agreement. For the remaining cases, a oneway analysis of variance was calculated to test for significant differences between and within the experimental and control groups in regard to perceptions of likelihood of prosecution. The results are given in Exhibit 12

--Exhibit 12 here--

The between-group sum of squares for the model was 15.02 with 5 degrees of freedom. This resulted in a mean square of 3.00. The sum of squares for the within-group variation was 627.87 with 231 degrees of freedom. The corresponding F statistic was 1.11 and had a significance level of .3582. Thus, the model was not statistically significant with a probability level of 36%. Bartlett's test for equal variances yielded a value of 3.06. The corresponding significance level (χ^2=3.06 with 5 degrees of freedom) was .691. so we could not reject the null hypothesis of equal variances giving us no reason to doubt the equal variances assumption upon which analysis of variance rests.

The mean scores for each group and the results of the Scheffe multiple comparison test of group means are presented in Exhibit 13.

--Exhibit 13 here--

No significant differences (all probability levels are > .05) between the means of groups were found. Thus, the hypothesis that the domestic violence training would change police officer attitudes toward prosecution was not supported. Nonsignificant pretest differences indicated there were no discernible biases across all groups. Further. the nonsignificant differences between these means supported the assumption of no testing effect.

Discussion. The intent of this questionnaire item was to ascertain perceptions toward

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

prosecution. This item asked the respondents to consider the likelihood of prosecution while setting aside quality of report writing and evidence gathering and cooperation by the victim. Generally, the answers centered around "no opinion". Regardless of perceptions toward prosecution, the training did not lead to formation of an opinion.

Also, given that 50% of the respondents had 4 years of service or less (years of service median=4), perhaps the officers had not had sufficient experience to form an opinion. Also, respondents may be of the opinion domestic violence is a matter for the courts. While the respondents viewed family violence as a matter for police (see Exhibit 9), they tended to have no opinion concerning mandatory arrest (see Exhibit 11). Mandatory arrest, in effect, removes the discretion of involving offenders of domestic violence in the criminal justice system from the law enforcement officers and places this discretion at the prosecutorial level. In others words, in theory police officers no longer determine whether to charge offenders of family violence. Prosecutors effectively do this by dropping or pursuing a case. Police officers may be less resentful of cases that are dropped if they deem the arrests as unnecessary. Consequently, we may not fully know officers' perceptions toward prosecutors in cases of family violence until officers have formed an opinion on the merit of mandatory arrest.

Identification of the Perpetrator is Easy

Respondents were asked to indicate level of agreement with the statement: *It is usually clear who is the perpetrator in a domestic violence episode.* Respondents were asked to indicate level of agreement on the previously described Likert-scale with lower scores indicating disagreement and higher scores indicating agreement.

A oneway analysis of variance was calculated to test for significant differences between and

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

within the experimental and control groups in regard to perceptions of how easily the perpetrator of domestic violence is identified. The results are given in Exhibit 14.

--Exhibit 14 here--

The between-group sum of squares for the model was 31.42 with 5 degrees of freedom. This resulted in a mean square of 6.28. The sum of squares for the within-group variation was 715.42 with 296 degrees of freedom. The corresponding F statistic was 2.60 and had a significance level of .0255. Thus, the model was significant at the 2.6% level. Bartlett's test for equal variances yielded a value of 1.62. The corresponding significance level (χ^2=1.62 with 5 degrees of freedom) was .899, so we could not reject the null hypothesis of equal variances, giving us no reason to doubt the equal variances assumption upon which analysis of variance rests.

The mean scores for each group and the results of the Scheffe multiple comparison test of group means are presented in Exhibit 15 below.

--Exhibit 15 here--

While the overall model was statistically significant (p=.0255), no significant differences (all probability levels were > .05) between the means of groups were found. Thus, the hypothesis that domestic violence training would change police officer attitudes toward identification of the perpetrator was not supported. Pretest differences indicate there were no discernible biases across all but one comparison[3] Further, the nonsignificant differences between these means supported the assumption of no testing effect.

Discussion. The largest difference was between the experimental pretest and the control

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

group pretest (mean difference = -1.22) with the control group scoring 1.22 points lower than the experimental group. Since this difference occurred between two pretests, neither of these groups had received training at the time of the data collection. While this difference was not statistically significant (p=.082), it suggests the possibility that the groups are not comparable in regard to this matter. Note that the experimental group consisted of 7% rookies while the control group had only 1% rookies. This could account for bias in that they had not actually had to identify a perpetrator "on the scene" and had recently completed the police academy training.

But, overall, the tendency for all groups was to have not formed an opinion.

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

Victim Cooperation

This item asked respondents to indicate their level of agreement with the following statement: *Victims must not want to resolve domestic violence in their homes or else they would cooperate enough with prosecutors.* Respondents were asked to indicate level of agreement on the previously described Likert-scale with lower scores indicating disagreement and higher scores indicating agreement.

A oneway analysis of variance was calculated to test for significant differences between and within the experimental and control groups in regard to perceptions of victim's level of cooperation. The results are provided in Exhibit 16

--Exhibit 16 here--

The between-group sum of squares for the model was 8.64 with 5 degrees of freedom. This resulted in a mean square of 1.72. The sum of squares for the within-group variation was 754.51 with 296 degrees of freedom. The corresponding F statistic was .68 and had a significance level of .6405. Thus, the model was not statistically significant, with a probability of 64.05%. Bartlett's test for equal variances yielded a value of 3.65. The corresponding significance level (χ^2=3.65 with 5 degrees of freedom) was .601, so we could not reject the null hypothesis of equal variances giving us no reason to doubt the equal variances assumption upon which analysis of variance rests.

The mean scores for each group and the results of the Scheffe multiple comparison test of group means are presented in Exhibit 17 below.

--Exhibit 17 here--

No significant differences (all probability levels are > .05) between the means of groups

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

were found. Thus, the hypothesis that the domestic violence training would change police officer attitudes toward victim cooperation as an indication of desire to resolve his/her current situation was not supported. Further, the nonsignificant differences between these means supported the assumptions of random assignment and no testing effect.

Discussion. Generally, the respondents disagreed with the idea that a victim's level of cooperation is an indication of desire to resolve his/her current situation. This perception was the same for the respondents who were not trained and for those trained Also, there was no difference before or after the training.

Attitude Toward Training

As previously described, experimental group subjects were asked to respond to five items regarding their perceptions of the training on their posttest questionnaires. A factor analysis of these items yielded one factor of four items regarding perceptions of the quality and usefulness of the training:

The training was interesting and provided new and innovative ideas.

The training was relevant to my work in the area of domestic violence.

The training was well organized.

I found the training to be useful.

A questionnaire item on how much of the training the respondent attended loaded separately on a second factor and specifically asked

I attended at least MOST of the training.

Respondents were asked to indicate level of agreement on the previously described Likert-scale with lower scores indicating disagreement and higher scores indicating agreement.

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

The four items on the first factor were summed into an index score of perceptions of training quality. Exhibit 18 gives the mean scores for the perception index and attendance.

--Exhibit 18 here--

The responses to the items regarding how interesting, relevant, organized, and useful the training was tended to range between "agree" and "somewhat agree," indicating an overall favorable impression of the training. Subjects tended to strongly agree they attended most of the training.

Discussion. That the subjects had favorable opinions toward the training does not explain, in the aggregate, the lack of effect the training had on the experimental subjects. Basically, there was no change in attitude toward gender roles, attitudes toward police intervention and mandatory arrest, attitude toward prosecutors in domestic violence cases, identification of perpetrators, and beliefs in inaccurate or simplistic causes of family violence.

Summary of Findings Concerning Attitudes

Despite agreement among the respondents that the training was useful, relevant, interesting, and informative, it had no immediate effect on attitudes toward domestic violence. Overall, respondents tended to disagree with inaccurate or simplistic causes of family violence and traditional gender roles. They recognized there is no clear, singular cause of family violence, and that family violence is a social problem in need of police intervention. They tended not to proscribe subordinate behavior and status to females. This implies a recognition that victim responses to law enforcement are not direct reflections of a lack of desire to stop the violence. This casts a hopeful and positive light on effective law enforcement intervention in domestic disputes.

Further, respondents have not yet formed an opinion on mandatory arrest as an effective

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

policy and appear to be withholding judgment concerning the likelihood of prosecution regardless of how well they think the evidence is collected or how cooperative the victim is. This counters frequently expressed concern over tensions between prosecutors' offices and law enforcement.

Attitude Toward Domestic Violence, Law Enforcement Policy, and Likelihood of Prosecution: Multivariate Models

In this section, years of service, position and assignment within the police department, age, and gender were examined to assess the multivariate effects of various questionnaire items and scales. Stepwise, backward elimination multivariate regressions were used to assess the effects of years of service, position and assignment within the department, age, and gender on the bivariate relationships examined in the previous section. For the regressions, the variable *training* is a dichotomized variable indicating whether or not the respondent received the Duluth training. The results are reported in Exhibit 19 and indicate that in the presence of these controls, training still did not significantly change the findings from the previous section.

--Exhibit 19 here--

We then sought to determine the multivariate relations among the attitude survey data. Path analysis was employed to assess the direct and indirect effects of the variables measured resulting in final models which contain the greatest explanatory power while retaining parsimony.

Path Analysis

Path analysis estimates the effects of several different independent variables and shows the causal structure of complex relationships. Spurious effects are discussed to demonstrate the inadequacy of uni-dimensional bivariate Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression for these data.

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

Informed by results from stepwise regressions, a path model was hypothesized for these data based on a logical, temporal ordering of events. The full model is presented in Exhibit 20.

--Exhibit 20 here--

Due to non-significance in the previous analyses, training was not included in the model. Gender, attitude toward ease of identification of the perpetrator, and pre-mandatory arrest service were exogenous variables. Mandatory arrest became policy at the police department 5 years before the training on which this study is focused. "Pre-mandatory arrest" was a variable designed by dichotomizing years of service into respondents who had been members of the police department longer than five years and five years or less to create a measure which would allow detection of a pre-mandatory arrest policy effect. Endogenous variables included mandatory arrest, gender roles, belief in inaccurate or simplistic causes of family violence, victim cooperation, family violence as a matter for the police, and the likelihood of prosecution. The data for the model are shown in Exhibit 21.

--Exhibit 21 here--

In Exhibit 22 the non-significant paths were dropped from the model resulting in a reduced model. This model was tested for adequacy using a chi-square goodness-of-fit test:

$$Q = \frac{1 - R^2_M}{1 - M} = \frac{1 - .0693}{1 - .0139} = \frac{.9307}{.9861} = .945$$

$$W = [-(N - df)]\ln Q = [-(215 - 2)]\ln .945 = [-213]-.057 = 12.141$$

--Exhibit 22 here--

The test statistic (W) had a value of 12.141. The χ^2 tabled statistic with 2 degrees of

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

freedom indicated this test statistic hads a probability less than .005. Therefore, we concluded the reduced model adequately fits the data. Exhibit 23 presents the direct, indirect, total, and spurious effects for this three-equation model.

--Exhibit 23 here--

Having served on the police force prior to the implementation of a mandatory arrest policy for domestic violence had a positive[4], indirect effect on level of agreement with belief in inaccurate or simplistic causes of family violence. Indirectly, this variable caused a .725 increase in level of agreement with these beliefs. This association was mediated by level of agreement with mandatory arrest policy. Specifically, serving prior to its implementation increased agreement with mandatory arrest policy by 1.217 points. This agreement in turn increases level of belief in inaccurate or simplistic causes of family violence .596 points. Compared to an OLS bivariate regression, the spurious effects (S=.725) indicated the non-significant coefficient was due to a suppression effect. In other words, this variable only effects level of belief in inaccurate or simplistic causes of family violence indirectly.

The level of agreement with which identification of the perpetrator of family violence can be easily ascertained had a negative, indirect effect on beliefs in inaccurate or simplistic causes of family violence. Indirectly, this variable caused a .136 decrease in level of agreement with these beliefs. This association was mediated by level of agreement with mandatory arrest policy. Specifically, as agreement with identification of perpetrator as easy increased, agreement with mandatory arrest policy decreased by .228 points. This change in agreement in turn increased agreement with beliefs in inaccurate or simplistic causes of family violence .596 points. Compared to an OLS bivariate regression, the spurious effects (S=.644) indicated that the OLS

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

bivariate regression coefficient (b=.508) incorrectly determined the direction of the association.

Gender had a negative, indirect effect on level of agreement with belief in inaccurate or simplistic causes of family violence. Indirectly, being female decreased these beliefs .532 points. This effect was mediated by attitude toward gender roles. Specifically, females tended to have a 3.235 decrease in agreement with traditional gender roles compared to males. The attitude toward gender roles decreased agreement with belief in inaccurate or simplistic causes .160 points. Compared to an OLS bivariate regression, the spurious effects (S=.532) indicated the non-significant coefficient was due to a suppression effect. In other words, this variable only affected level of belief in inaccurate or simplistic causes of family violence indirectly.

As previously indicated, attitude toward mandatory arrest policy was positively, directly related to belief in inaccurate or simplistic causes of surrounding family violence. For each one point increase in agreement with mandatory arrest as an effective policy, there was a corresponding .596 increase in these beliefs. Spurious effects (S=-.596) indicated the OLS bivariate regression coefficient was non-significant due to suppression.

Also previously indicated, attitude toward traditional gender roles had a direct, negative effect on belief in inaccurate or simplistic causes of family violence. For each one point increase in disagreement with traditional gender roles, there was a corresponding decrease in a surrounding family violence. Spurious effects (S=.336) indicated the OLS bivariate regression coefficient (b=.176) incorrectly determined the direction of the association.

To summarize the previously discussed direct effects on the mediating variables, attitude toward mandatory arrest was 1.217 points more favorable among those who had served prior to the implementation of this policy, and as respondents viewed identification of the perpetrator in

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

cases of domestic violence more difficult, they tended to disfavor the mandatory arrest policy by .228 points. Also, females tended to disagree with traditional gender roles by 3.325 points more than males.

The significant effects for agreement[5] that family violence is a matter for the police were the direct effects of disagreement with traditional gender roles (DE=.234) and the indirect effect of gender ((IE=(3.235)(.234)=.757)). Indirectly, being female increased agreement with family violence is a police matter by .757 points. This effect was mediated by agreement with traditional gender roles. Being female increased disagreement with traditional gender roles by 3.235 points. Gender roles had a negative, direct affect on agreement with family violence as a police matter. As disagreement with traditional gender roles increased, agreement with family violence as a police matter increased .234 points. To summarize, being female and disagreeing with traditional gender roles increased agreement that family violence is a police matter.

The final endogenous variable was agreement with prosecution being unlikely regardless of how well evidence is gathered, documented and written in reports and regardless of how well the victim cooperates. The total effect of gender was that female respondents' agreement with prosecution as unlikely increased .220 points. Gender also indirectly affected agreement that prosecution is unlikely. There were two causal chains in this relationship. First, gender had an overall indirect affect on agreement with unlikelihood of prosecution by increasing it .163 points. This was mediated by agreement with traditional gender roles. As previously stated, females tended to have a 3.235 decrease in agreement with traditional gender roles than males. Gender roles then reduced agreement with unlikelihood of prosecution by .049 points. The larger affect was between gender and gender roles. The second causal chain was gender as mediated by both

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

gender roles and agreement that uncooperative victims do not want to resolve domestic violence. This effect was .057 overall. The additional mediating variable to this chain, uncooperative victim, increased agreement that prosecution is unlikely by .210 points. The larger indirect effect was the causal chain that is only mediated by gender roles. In other words, female respondents disagreed with traditional gender roles and tended to view prosecution as unlikely, especially if they believed uncooperative victims did not want to resolve their current situation as victims of domestic violence.

Prosecution as unlikely was also affected by agreement with traditional gender roles and belief that uncooperative victims did not want to resolve domestic violence. Gender roles had a negative, direct affect on agreement with prosecution being unlikely by reducing it .049 points. It also had a very weak indirect, negative affect mediated by belief that uncooperative victims did not want to resolve domestic violence by reducing prosecution being unlikely by .004. Agreeing with traditional gender roles reduced the belief that uncooperative victims did not want to resolve domestic violence by .081 points. This belief about uncooperative victims increased agreement that prosecution is unlikely by .210 points. In other words, those respondents who agreed more with traditional gender roles also agreed that uncooperative victims did not want to resolve domestic violence and prosecution was unlikely. Spurious effects (S=.013) indicated a slight suppression in the OLS bivariate coefficient (b=.066).

Discussion. Belief in inaccurate or simplistic causes of family violence tended to be higher among male respondents and those who agreed with traditional gender roles. The beliefs included alcohol as the primary cause of family violence; family violence occurs more in poor families than in middle class families; battered women stay in battering relationships because

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

they do not have the economic resources to leave; and men are more likely to respond to conflict with aggression than women. The traditional gender roles scale included women's participation in the workforce causes family conflict; women with small children should stay home; single-parent. female-headed homes have more child abuse than dual parent homes; domestic violence is a private matter; males are better at managing financial matters than females; and fathers are better disciplinarians than mothers. While the overall attitude toward traditional gender roles tended toward disagreement (see previous section), there did appear to be a gender effect.

The concern with law enforcement respondents who manage domestic violence disputes and believe in erroneous or simplistic causes of domestic violence is the potential for bias in interpretation or documentation of events. To believe that men are better at controlling misconduct (as disciplinarians), are better money-managers, and that women should stay at home indicates a patriarchal attitude toward the family. This attitude is arguably supported by erroneous belief in causes of the violence and could bias which person's story the officers believe or emphasize as they sort and document the events and collect evidence. It could also lead to more serious erroneous conclusions such as the situation not being threatening to the victim or that no serious injury has occurred.

Identification of the perpetrator in domestic violence disputes also affected belief in inaccurate or simplistic causes domestic violence. The more difficult the identification of a perpetrator, the more the respondents agreed with the beliefs. Confusion over who is the perpetrator or if both parties have contributed to the onset of the violence can occur if alcohol consumption has occurred or the officer believes only men should be aggressive. Further, domestic violence calls to poor neighborhoods that are managed by an officer who generally

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

expects poor families to be abusive could result in less vigilance or attentiveness on the part of the officer or the presumption of guilt solely on the socio-economic environment.

Agreeing with mandatory arrest led to agreement with simplistic or inaccurate causes surrounding domestic violence. Agreement with mandatory arrest as an effective policy was higher among respondents who served in the police department prior to implementation of this policy. These officers potentially have as a comparison point an era when officers did not know how to respond to interpersonal crimes where victims often would not press charges or truthfully describe the events surrounding the violence. Mandatory arrest may be embraced by these officers as a "routine" solution or option to domestic violence disputes but does not ultimately dissuade their beliefs in the causes.

Agreement with mandatory arrest was also affected by the difficulty in identifying the perpetrator in domestic violence disputes. The more difficult the identification, the less agreement there was with mandatory arrest as an effective policy. Requiring arrest in this type of call also requires a determination of whom to arrest. The more difficult this determination, the more the dissatisfied the officer is with the policy.

Agreement with family violence as a matter for the police was higher among females than among males. Also, those respondents who agreed more with traditional gender roles also agreed that uncooperative victims do not want to resolve domestic violence. This attitude is congruent with the other findings that generally indicate females perceive domestic violence as a complex issue and victims of domestic violence as powerless to affect change .

Finally, female respondents were slightly more likely than male respondents to view prosecution as unlikely. While they disagree with traditional gender roles, they viewed

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

uncooperative victims as not wanting to resolve their current situation resulting in a decreased likelihood of prosecution. Perhaps they pessimistically perceived the joint effect of patriarchy and the need for an adversarial criminal justice system to have witnesses in intimate, interpersonal crimes in resolving domestic disputes as unlikely to result in prosecution.

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

CHAPTER FIVE

EFFECTS OF TRAINING ON TIME AT THE SCENE, ACCEPTANCE OF CASE FOR PROSECUTION, AND CONVICTIONS

In addition to testing the effects of the Duluth Model training on police officer attitudes, three other experimental designs were implemented to test the effects of the training on (1) police officer time at the scene of a domestic violence incident, (2) acceptance of the case for prosecution, and (3) convictions

Methods

In the first experiment we implemented the classical experimental design and measured the effects of domestic violence response training and the amount of time spent at the scene of the domestic violence episode. The test stimulus was the Duluth training. Cases managed by police officers who received training constituted the experimental group. Cases managed by police officers who did not received training constituted the control group. The pretest and posttest consist of the amount of time spent at the scene of the domestic violence episode.

Figure 2. Domestic Violence Response Training and Time at the Scene

Experimental Group	Pretest *(Time at scene)*	Test Stimulus *(Police Training)*	Posttest *(Time at scene)*
Control Group	Pretest *(Time at scene)*		Posttest *(Time at scene)*

Given this design we expected the following outcomes:

Outcome 1: There will be a statistically significant ($p<.05$) increase in the amount of time spent at the scene of the domestic violence episode by the experimental group as compared to the control group. Comparisons will be made between: the experimental group pretest and posttest: the experimental and control group posttests.

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

Outcome 2: There will not be a statistically significant ($p<.05$) difference between the experimental and control group pretests. This ensures that random assignment to the groups eliminated bias making the groups initially comparable.

Outcome 3: There will not be a statistically significant ($p<.05$) difference between the control group pretest and posttest. This outcome indicates internal invalidity due to other stimuli occurring during the experiment.

In the second experiment we again implemented the classical experimental design and measured the effects of Duluth training on the acceptance for prosecution by the District Attorney's (DA) office. The test stimulus was domestic violence response training. Cases managed by police officers who received training constituted the experimental group, and cases managed by police officers who did not receive training constituted the control group. The pretest and posttest consisted of the number of cases accepted for prosecution by the DA's office from both groups.

Figure 3. Domestic Violence Response Training and Acceptance for Prosecution

Experimental Group	Pretest *(Number of cases accepted)*	Test Stimulus *(Training)*	Posttest *(Number of cases accepted)*
Control Group	Pretest *(Number of cases accepted)*		Posttest *(Number of cases accepted)*

Given this design, we expected the following outcomes.

Outcome 1: There will be a statistically significant ($p<.05$) increase in the number of cases accepted for prosecution by the DA's from the experimental group as compared to the control group. Comparisons will be made between: the experimental group pretest and posttest; the experimental and control group posttests.

Outcome 2: There will not be a statistically significant ($p<.05$) difference between the experimental and control group pretests. This ensures that random assignment to the groups eliminated bias making the groups initially comparable.

Outcome 3: There will not be a statistically significant ($p<.05$) difference between the control

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

group pretest and posttest. This outcome indicates internal invalidity due to other effective stimuli occurring during the experiment.

In the last experiment we again implemented the classical experimental design and measured the effects of the Duluth training on the number of convictions. The test stimulus was the training. Cases managed by police officers who received training constituted the experimental group, and cases managed by police officers who did not receive training constituted the control group. The pretest and posttest consisted of the number of cases resulting in convictions from both groups.

Figure 4. Domestic Violence Response Training and Convictions

Experimental Group	Pretest *(Number of convictions)*	Test Stimulus *(Training)*	Posttest *(Number of convictions)*
Control Group	Pretest *(Number of convictions)*		Posttest *(Number of convictions)*

Given this design. we expected the following outcomes:

Outcome 1: There will be a statistically significant ($p<.05$) increase in the number of convictions from the experimental group as compared to the control group. Comparisons will be made between: the experimental group pretest and posttest; the experimental and control group posttests.

Outcome 2: There will not be a statistically significant ($p<.05$) difference between the experimental and control group pretests. This ensures that random assignment to the groups eliminated bias making the groups initially comparable.

Outcome 3: There will not be a statistically significant ($p<.05$) difference between the control group pretest and posttest. This outcome indicates internal invalidity due to other effective stimuli occurring during the experiment.

The goal of the data collection was to develop a unique and comprehensive database of family violence cases that followed the case from the original response of the officers at the

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

scene after a call to 911 to the final disposition of the case. To accomplish this, two agencies were utilized: the District Attorney's Office and the local police department. Two computer systems were used to gather the information: Criminal Justice Information System (CJIS) and Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD).

Family violence[6] cases for September 1998 through September1999 were gathered from two sources at the District Attorney's office. Case numbers where **arrests** had been made at the scene were collected from the District Attorney Information Management System (DIMS) department files. **Non-arrest** case numbers were gathered from the screening log of the family violence attorney in charge of overseeing the prosecution of family violence cases. Once the unique case number assigned by the local police department was identified, archival data each case were collected at the police department. Data collection procedures varied according to the type of data sought and are described below.

Findings

Time at the Scene

For domestic violence offenses occurring from September 1998 through September 1999, time spent at the scene by law enforcement officers was obtained from the police department's CAD system. For the purposes of this study, time at the scene was assigned to the principal or senior officer of record and was calculated as the difference between the initial time of arrival at the scene and the time when the police unit informs dispatch it is leaving the scene of the domestic violence call (CAD category "58s"). Therefore, "time at the scene" was operationalized as the length of time in minutes that the officer spent at the family violence scene and **did not** include transport of the offender for booking. For "report only" cases where the

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

family violence victim filed a complaint at a police substation, time at the scene was operationalized as the time spent compiling the report for the victim.

A oneway analysis of variance was calculated to test for significant differences between and within the experimental and control groups and time spent at the scene. The Bartlett's test for equal variances indicated we could not safely assume equal variances ($p<.0000$). The data were transformed by taking the square root. This resolved the equal variances assumption violation. The tabulated results are presented in raw form to facilitate interpretation. The significance tests for the Bartlett's comparison are given in raw and transformed format (bold characters). The results are given in Exhibit 24.

--Exhibit 24 here--

The between-group sum of squares for the model was 661.754 with 3 degrees of freedom. This resulted in a mean square of 220.585. The sum of squares for the within-group variation was 196151.84 with 274 degrees of freedom. The corresponding F statistic was .31 and had a significance level of .8195. Thus, the model was not significant.

The mean scores for each group and the results of the Scheffe multiple comparison test of group means are presented in Exhibit 25.

--Exhibit 25 here--

Scheffe's comparison yielded no significant differences (all probability levels are > .05) between the means of groups. Thus, the hypothesis that the domestic violence training would increase time at the scene was not supported. Further, the nonsignificant differences between these means supported the assumptions of random assignment and no testing effect.

Discussion. Officers tended to spend between 30 and 35 minutes at domestic violence

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

scenes. Summary statistics of this variable yielded a mean of 33.58 minutes with a standard deviation of 26.65. The large standard deviation reflects a range of 320 minutes. Quartiles illuminate this range as the first 25% (Q_1) of the cases spent 20 minutes or less, the second 25% (Q_2) spent between 20 and 29 minutes, the third 25% (Q_3) spent between 29 and 41 minutes, and the last 25% (Q_4) spent between 41 and 320 minutes. Less than 5% of the cases spent more than 1 hour on domestic violence scenes. There were no differences between the trained officers and the untrained officers in regard to the time at the scene.

Acceptance of Case for Prosecution

Once the family violence cases where an arrest had been made were collected at the District Attorney's Office, the status of the case was researched on a centralized computer system. Computer records detailed whether the case was accepted or declined for prosecution.

A chi-square analysis is presented in Exhibit 26. The dependent variable was acceptance for prosecution and was coded 2 for not acceptance and 1 for acceptance. The independent variable consisted of the four groups described in Figure 3 above.

--Exhibit 26 here--

The chi-square test shows the cell differences were not significantly different (Fisher's exact p=.792). The hypothesis that training would increase the number of cases accepted for prosecution was not supported. Cramer's V indicates a very weak relationship between these two variables.

Discussion. While the Duluth model training focused on evidence gathering and prosecutorial procedures, there was no difference in case acceptance between those cases involving a trained versus untrained officer. This is likely a function of the many elements of a

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

domestic violence case—independent of strength of case—which tends to affect prosecutorial decision-making. While some scholars have advocated training initiatives focusing on essential police investigation techniques as a key ingredient to effective prosecution (cf., Asmus, Ritmeester, and Pence 1991), we found that by itself, this may be a tenuous argument which ignores the great amount of discretion that prosecutors have when deciding to accept or reject cases.

Convictions

As previously noted, disposition of the family violence case was determined by locating the case on the prosecuting attorney's centralized computer system. The outcome of the case was noted as either a dismissal or conviction.

Of the 291 cases, 122 (42%) had final dispositions at the time of data collection. The other 58% were either pending, awaiting trial, or deferred for adjudication. A chi-square analysis is presented in Exhibit 27 for the 122 cases with final outcomes.

--Exhibit 27 here--

The chi-square test shows the cell differences were not significantly different (Fisher's exact p=.119). The hypothesis that the training would increase the number of convictions was not supported. Cramer's V indicated a weak to moderate relationship between the variables.

Discussion. While technically the differences were not large enough to support a clear trend or change from case outcomes prior to the training and outcomes after the training, the percentages did favor more convictions during the six months following the training for both the experimental and control groups. Related to the findings from the previous experiment, the findings here suggest that while the training intervention likely has not led to an increase in

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

domestic violence convictions, other unknown factors have resulted in a proportional increase in the number of convictions during the last months of the project period.

Summary of Findings Concerning Time at the Scene, Case Acceptance, and Convictions

Given the lack of substantial changes in attitudes toward domestic violence among officers who participated in the Duluth model training intervention (as discussed in the previous chapter), it was not unexpected that training did not affect time at the scene of a domestic violence incident, case acceptance, and conviction rates.

Here, we found that both trained and untrained officers tended to spend about one-half hour at the scene of a domestic violence incident, that there were no differences in case acceptance rates between cases involving a trained or untrained officer, and that while conviction rates had increased at the prosecutor's office during the last six months of the study period, there were no differences between cases where the senior police officer was trained or untrained.

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

CHAPTER SIX

CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

This project sought to build upon an already existing, inter-agency, collaborative partnership established in 1996 and initiated by the police department of a large, southwestern city, which was well-engaged in the practice of community policing. The partnership was established with the financial support from the COPS office in an effort to reduce the occurrence of domestic violence in the city. Key components of this project included (1) the introduction of the researchers as academic resources for the collaborative in the area of domestic violence theory, training, policies, and program evaluation, (2) the continuation and strengthening of the collaborative partnership under the "Four T" approach (training, tracking, targeting, and transferring) among the police department, district attorney, shelter for battered women, and other service providers, (3) the monitoring of the process of inter-agency collaboration in the area of domestic violence, and (4) a comprehensive outcome evaluation of the effects of inter-agency domestic violence training.

Specifically, this project sought to inform key decision-makers in the public, private and non-profit sectors regarding the extent to which the Domestic Violence Prevention Commission served as a collaborative forum for domestic violence issues among interested groups. Additionally it sought to determine the extent to which police officer training was effective in changing police officer attitudes toward domestic violence, and the extent to which the training would lead to behavioral changes among officers (time spent at the scene of a domestic violence incident) and changes at the prosecutor's office (case acceptance and conviction rates). As such,

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

project staff conducted both a process evaluation of inter-agency collaboration, and an outcome evaluation of the Duluth model domestic violence training. In the sections that follow, we highlight the conclusions and implications of the findings reported in Chapters 3 through 5.

Process Evaluation of Inter-Agency Collaboration: Conclusions and Implications

If police agencies are to embrace collaborative problem solving efforts, police culture, attitudes, and practices must change in order to begin the process of a meaningful response to family violence. This change must embrace a sense of "community" with the necessary conditions for collaboration in place. While this change is easier said than done, the *community* policing context--one which encourages these conditions (intra-ownership, democratic self-management, education, and a true sense of membership)--certainly appears to be a ripe environment for necessary changes to take place that would enhance collaborative efforts.

This Commission--as well as other coordinated, multifaceted efforts described earlier--is viewed as a promising problem-solving strategy for reducing family violence against women. However, we found that the combination of turfism, the motivation to simply acquire new information, leadership and dominance, organizational obstacles, the absence of key leaders, and the marginalization of representatives of non-law enforcement agencies have hindered collaboration both in the planning and implementation phases, and has transformed this process into a negotiative one.

The need to retain turf has certainly clouded what could be a comprehensive, objective evaluation of how to best resolve the social problem of family violence. But other issues have led to this transformation as well. Most importantly, three and one-half years after the establishment of the Commission, the membership still had not established clear goals,

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

objectives, and working agreements toward which to focus its activities. This has resulted in some ambiguity concerning the direction of the Commission, and heightened dissention among law enforcement and non-law enforcement members. And particularly relevant to the implementation phase has been the absence of agency decision-makers in Commission activities. This has led to considerable frustration among Commission members since effective implementation requires buy-in from top executives in the component agencies.

Despite these barriers to effective collaboration, there were some encouraging signs for this particular Commission. First, focus group respondents overwhelmingly agreed that the Commission's planning and implementation activities provided an educational forum for its membership. We consider this a benefit which enhances collaboration. And while "education" can be regarded as simply acquiring new information, focus group responses suggested that education here refers to providing a broader understanding of agency procedures and policies geared toward solving the social problem of family violence, as well as to understand the general nature of family violence from a variety of perspectives. As such, the component agencies have been inspired to work together by their expanded understanding about the causes, legal and social constraints surrounding family violence, and the roles they and others play in response to the problem of family violence against women.

Second, with the assignment of a new sergeant to the police department's DVPU, the Commission now benefits from a sense of coordination that had previously had been lacking in Phase 2 activities when the original sergeant had resigned. And while there was some resistance to the idea that the police department would again take the lead in Commission activities, that sentiment has been tempered of late as a representative of the Battered Women's Shelter (a non-

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

law enforcement agency) has occasionally stepped-in to mediate and work with the police sergeant.

Finally, we would be in error not to point out that some Phase 1 recommendations—despite the general lack of collaboration—have, in fact, been implemented. For example, a draft of a police officer "check-list" training has been implemented, a city-wide resource directory has been completed, a specialized police department domestic violence response team has been established. and a better working relationship between the police department and the prosecutor's office has developed.

Regardless of whether this inter-agency, public-private process is collaborative or negotiative in nature, some positive outcomes will continue to be realized. However, we anticipate differences in the means by which these outcomes will be attained based on whether the process is collaborative or negotiative. Upon further evaluation, it is expected that a collaborative process ultimately will result in more innovative and comprehensive, longer term solutions to the problem of family violence which have greater chances of becoming institutionalized in the region. And while the current negotiative process likely will continue to produce sporadic programs and initiatives to reduce family violence in the area, the quality of response to family violence is likely to be lower due to a lack of clear, open, comprehensive evaluation of agency capabilities and resources, and a lack of vision and concrete objectives.

The results of this research suggest that in an era of multi-agency collaboration, we cannot presume that the personnel of relatively autonomous organizations—both public and private alike—have the organizational capacity and/or the willingness among personnel to truly collaborate. Formidable barriers exist here and elsewhere that hinder collaborative efforts and

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

transform the process to one based on negotiation. Agency policies and procedures that either obstruct or facilitate collaboration should be examined, and effective team building interventions should be planned in an effort to move closer to collaborative problem-solving, the approach which offers the most hope for finding meaningful, long-term solutions to social problems.

Outcome Evaluation of Police Officer Training: Conclusions and Implications

The findings concerning police officer attitudes toward domestic violence, as reported in Chapter 4, show that the Duluth Model training did little in the short-term to change police officer attitudes. Both trained and untrained officers tended to disagree with inaccurate or simplistic causes of family violence and traditional gender roles. Further, they recognized there is no clear singular cause of family violence and that family violence is a social problem in need of police intervention. Finally, officers tend not to proscribe subordinate behavior and status to females. This implies a recognition that victim responses to law enforcement are not direct reflections of a lack of desire to stop the violence. This casts a hopeful and positive light on effective law enforcement intervention in domestic disputes.

Ironically, despite agreement among the respondents that the training was useful, relevant, interesting, and informative, it had no immediate effect on attitudes toward domestic violence. Perhaps the cross-sectional or "snapshot" nature of this study does not comprehensively capture the pervasive changes occurring in all avenues of training for these respondents. This study tested one training session and found no effect, yet changes in attitudes are occurring—independent of the training—as evidenced by the general disagreement with aged ideas and beliefs.

Given the lack of substantial changes in attitudes toward domestic violence among

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

officers who participated in the Duluth model training intervention, it was not surprising that the training did not affect time at the scene of a domestic violence incident, case acceptance, and conviction rates as discussed in Chapter 5. We found that both trained and untrained officers tended to spend about one-half hour at the scene of a domestic violence incident, that there were no differences in case acceptance rates between cases involving a trained or untrained officer, and that while conviction rates had increased at the prosecutor's office during the last six months of the study period, there were no differences between cases where the senior police officer was trained or untrained.

Several implications emerge from these findings and center around law enforcement issues and research issues.

Law Enforcement Issues

As evidenced above, law enforcement response to domestic violence has great potential for engendered outcomes. Law enforcement training of all types should attempt to dispel traditional patriarchal beliefs in order to relieve this potentially pervasive effect. In this particularly progressive police department, we found that police officers tended not to have patriarchal beliefs to begin with. As such, the results of the attitudinal research were not too surprising.

We suspect, however, that this is not the case in many other police departments across the country, where attitudes stemming from a more traditional police culture may be in stark contrast to the attitudes of the respondents in this particular city. Here, training initiatives such as the Duluth Model training may be an effective means by which to begin a culture change in the organization. However, we are also reminded of the comments of former Minneapolis Police

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

Chief Anthony Bouza, who said, "Beware of simple solutions to complex problems." As such, training interventions may only be one piece of an overall community policing strategy of changing a mindset that domestic violence is not "real crime."

However, in our multivariate analysis we found a gender effect: male law enforcement personnel tend to agree more with traditional, patriarchal gender roles. This raises a concern with regard to managing domestic violence disputes. Believing in erroneous or simplistic causes of domestic violence creates the potential for bias in interpretation or documentation of events. This attitude is arguably supported by erroneous belief in causes of violence potentially biasing which person's story the officers believe or emphasize as they sort out and document the events and collect evidence. It could also lead to more serious erroneous conclusions, such as the perception that the situation is not threatening to the victim or that no serious injury has occurred.

Second, law enforcement personnel need a better understanding of the complexities of domestic violence. The finding of the relationship between identifying the perpetrator and erroneous beliefs of causes of domestic violence potentially creates confusion over who is the perpetrator at a domestic violence scene or if both parties have contributed to the onset of the violence. This can occur if alcohol consumption has occurred or if the officer believes only men are aggressive. Further, domestic violence calls to poor neighborhoods that are managed by an officer who generally expects poor families to be abusive could result in less vigilance or attentiveness on the part of the officer or the presumption of guilt solely on the socio-economic environment.

Third, it was found that agreement with mandatory arrest as an effective policy is higher among respondents who served in the police department prior to implementation of this policy,

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

yet these officers hold erroneous beliefs in causes of domestic violence. These officers potentially have as a comparison point an era when officers did not know how to respond to interpersonal crimes where victims often would not press charges or truthfully describe the events surrounding the violence. Mandatory arrest may be embraced by these officers as a "routine" solution or option to domestic violence disputes, but does not ultimately dissuade their beliefs in simplistic or inaccurate causes of domestic violence.

Fourth, now is the time to expedite research on effectiveness of domestic violence policies and infuse them in criminal justice practices before law enforcement personnel form a final but potentially negative opinion concerning mandatory arrest and the benefits of collaboration with prosecutors. Attitudes of "no opinion" toward mandatory arrest and likelihood of prosecution suggest these officers are malleable in regard to the recent political and philosophical changes toward violence against women and toward better collaboration with prosecutors. While the effectiveness of mandatory arrest in reducing domestic violence is debated on several fronts, there appears to be a willingness on the part of these officers to embrace policy change.

Fifth, techniques for how to identify perpetrators and how to deal with "victims" who may be offenders are needed. It was found that the more difficult the identification of the perpetrator, the less agreement there is with mandatory arrest as an effective policy. Requiring arrest in this type of call also requires a determination of who to arrest. The more difficult this determination, the more the dissatisfied the officer is with the policy. Many law enforcement agencies resist or discourage "dual" arrests, so officers are compelled to identify a perpetrator.

Research Issues

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

Several suggestions for future research can be gleaned from this study. First, a focused approach on domestic violence response by law enforcement, prosecutors, and judges to comprehensively grasp the scope of engendered differences should be initiated.

Second, since law enforcement officers receive specialized and "in-service" training at regular intervals, a comprehensive, longitudinal study on all training received by an officer with a time series analysis would detect the unique and cumulative effects of each training session experienced. Such a study would be informative in regard to which types and what content of training best reduces engendered responses.

Third, other law enforcement programs, interventions, and/or organizational changes also should be documented and tracked to determine what might lead to any observed effects in attitudes and/or behaviors on the part of police officers. Since attitudinal and behavioral changes likely are not the result of one particular intervention, a more comprehensive analysis of all forces for change my help us better understand what is effective in this regard.

Fourth, the effects of training may "lag" depending on the level of resistance toward policy and practice changes in general or specifically toward such changes regarding domestic violence. A longer follow-up to a study like this one or to the above recommended longitudinal study would detect a lag effect, especially in terms of potential behavioral changes on the part of officers.

Finally, researchers should strive to find better ways of measuring attitudinal and behavioral changes that might result from domestic violence interventions such as training. Our research on police officer attitudes suggests that there either was no training effect or that our measures did not tap particular attitude changes. We also reasoned that trained officers were

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

likely to spend more time at the scene of a domestic violence incident, but did not tap the quality of the interaction between the police officer and victim. In light of these issues, continued research in this area is warranted.

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

REFERENCES

Asmus, M. E., Tineke Ritmeester, and E. L. Pence. 1991. "Prosecuting Domestic Abuse Cases in Duluth: Developing Effective Prosecution Strategies From Understanding the Dynamics of Abusive Relationships." *Hamline Law Review* 13:115-163.

Berk, R. 1993. "What the Scientific Evidence Shows: On the Average, We Can Do Better than Arrest." Pp. 323-35 in *Current Controversies on Family Violence*, edited by R.J. Gelles and D.R. Loseke. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.

Buzawa, E. S. and C. G. Buzawa. 1993. "The Scientific Evidence is Not Conclusive: Arrest is No Panacea." Pp. 337-56 in *Current Controversies on Family Violence*, edited by R.J. Gelles and D.R. Loseke. Newbury Park. CA: Sage.

Domestic Violence Prevention Unit. 1999. Crime Analysis Unit, Southwestern, Metropolitan Police Department.

Eck, J. E. and D. P. Rosenbaum. 1994. "The New Police Order: Effectiveness, Equity, and Efficiency in Community Policing." Pp. 3-23 in *The Challenge of Community Policing: Testing the Promises*, edited by D.P. Rosenbaum. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Eck, J. E. and W. Spelman. 1987. *Problem Solving: Problem-Oriented Policing in Newport News*. Washington, D.C.: Police Executive Research Forum.

Gelles, R. J. and C. P. Cornell. 1990. *Intimate Violence in Families*. (2nd edition) Newbury Park: Sage.

Gifford, D. J. and E. Pinchot. 1993. *The End of Bureaucracy and the Rise of the Intelligent Organization*. San Francisco: Berrett-Koehler.

Gwinn, C. G. and A. O'Dell. 1993. "Stopping the Violence: The Role of the Police Officer and

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

Prosecutor." *Western State University Law Review* 20:1501-20.

Lerman, L. G. 1992. "The Decontextualization of Domestic Violence." *The Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology* 83:217-40.

Mickish, J. and K. Schoen. 1991. "Domestic Violence: Developing and Maintaining an Effective Policy." *The Prosecutor* 24:15-20.

National Law Enforcement Policy Center. 1990. *Domestic Violence*. Arlington, VA: IACP/BJA National Law Enforcement Policy Center.

Paymar, M. and E. Pence. 1998. *Domestic Violence: The Law Enforcement Response.* Student Guide, Duluth Domestic Abuse Intervention Project. Minneapolis: Law Enforcement Resource Center.

Pfeiffer, R. S. 1995. *Why Blame the Organization: A Pragmatic Analysis of Collective Moral Responsibility*. Lanham, MD: Littlefield Adam.

Sadusky, J.. 1995. "Working Effectively With the Police: A Guide for Battered Women's Advocates." Unpublished paper, Battered Women's Justice Project.

Skolnick, J. and D. Bayley. 1986. *The New Blue Line: Police Innovations in Six American Cities*. New York: The Free Press.

Stewart, D. W. and P. N. Shamdasani. 1990. *Focus Groups: Theory and Practice*. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.

Straus, D. 1993. "Facilitated Collaborative Problem Solving and Process Management." Pp. 28-42 in *Negotiation Strategies for Mutual Gain*, edited by L. Hall. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.

Straus, M. and G. Kaufman Kantor. 1995. "Trends in Physical Abuse by Parents From 1975 to

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

1992: A Comparison of Three Surveys." Presented at the annual meeting of the American Society of Criminology meetings, Boston

Toch, H. and J. D. Grant. 1991. *Police as Problem Solvers*. New York: Plenum.

Wangberg, K. G. 1991. "Reducing Case Attrition in Domestic Violence Cases: A Prosecutor's Perspective." *The Prosecutor* 24:8-11.

Western Regional Institute for Community Oriented Public Safety. 1998. "Community Policing Assessment Report: Ada County, Idaho Sheriff's Office."

Yin, R. K. 1986. "Community Crime Prevention: A Synthesis of Eleven Evaluations." Pp. 294-308 in *Community Crime Prevention: Does it Work?*, edited by D.P. Rosenbaum. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

EXHIBITS

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

Exhibit 1

City Family Violence Statistics, 1996-1998

Reports to the Police, Reports Filed, Arrests Made

Year	Reports to Police	Reports Filed	Arrests Made
1996	29,997	7,108	3,655
1997	29,952	10,548	4,371
1998	27,328	10,413	3,455
Average	**29,092**	**9,356**	**3,827**

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

Exhibit 2

Public-Private Ratio of Agency Participants for

12 Commission Meetings

Meeting Date	No. of Private	No. of Public	Public to Private Ratio
5/97	**11**	**74**	6.73:1
6/97	**8**	**55**	6.86:1
7/97	**14**	**54**	3.86:1
8/97	**6**	**57**	9.5:1
9/97	**1**	**42**	42:1
5/98	**2**	**16**	8:1
11/98	**4**	**25**	6.25:1
2/99	**7**	**19**	2.71:1
5/99	**6**	**15**	2.5:1
6/99	**8**	**23**	2.88:1
9/99	**3**	**14**	4.67:1
10/99	**5**	**17**	3.4:1

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

Exhibit 3

Attitude Toward Gender Roles

Oneway Analysis of Variance

Analysis of Variance

Source	SS	df	MS	F	Prob > F
Between groups	22.0728244	5	4.41456487	0.17	0.9737
Within groups	7656.92384	294	26.0439586		
Total	7678.99667	299	25.6822631		

Bartlett's test for equal variances: chi2(5) = 9.2254 Prob>chi2 = 0.100

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

Exhibit 4

Attitude Toward Gender Roles

Scheffe Multiple-Comparison Test

Summary Statistics

Testgroup	Mean	Std. Dev.	Freq.
Exp1Pre	33.828125	4.8682799	64
Exp1Pst	33.111111	6.1279663	63
Exp2Pst	33.597222	4.264692	72
Con1Pre	33.333333	5.0629372	21
Con1Pst	33.095238	4.7424125	21
Con2Pre	33.627119	5.2222941	60
Total	33.496667	5.0677671	300

Scheffe's Comparison of Mean Scores

Row Mean- Col Mean	Exp1pre	Exp1pst	Exp2pst	Con1pre	Con1pst
Exp1pst	-.717014 0.987				
Exp2pst	-.230903 1.000	.486111 0.998			
Con1pre	-.494792 1.000	.222222 1.000	-.263889 1.000		
Con1pst	-.732887 0.997	-.015873 1.000	-.501984 1.000	-.238095 1.000	
Con2pst	-.201006 1.000	.516008 0.997	.029896 1.000	.293785 1.000	.531881 0.999

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

Exhibit 5

Understanding the Causes of Family Violence

Oneway Analysis of Variance

Analysis of Variance

Source	SS	df	MS	F	Prob > F
Between groups	393.479564	5	78.6959128	4.50	0.0006
Within groups	5179.35818	296	17.4978317		
Total	5572.83775	301	18.5144111		

Bartlett's test for equal variances: chi2(5) = 3.9617 Prob>chi2 = 0.555

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

Exhibit 6

Understanding the Causes of Family Violence

Scheffe Multiple-Comparison Test

Summary Statistics

Testgroup	Mean	Std. Dev.	Freq.
Exp1Pre	14.5625	4.2008125	64
Exp1Pst	16.296875	4.1849302	64
Exp2Pst	15.458333	3.6267298	72
Con1Pre	15.047619	4.3872109	21
Con1Pst	16.47619	4.5784173	21
Con2Pre	13.116667	4.5588122	60
Total	15.023179	4.3028376	302

Scheffe's Comparison of Mean Scores

Row Mean- Col Mean	Exp1pre	Exp1pst	Exp2pst	Con1pre	Con1pst
Exp1pst	1.73438 0.360				
Exp2pst	.895833 0.906	-.838542 0.928			
Con1pre	.485119 0.999	-1.24926 0.923	-.410714 1.000		
Con1pst	1.91369 0.653	.179315 1.000	1.01786 0.965	1.42857 0.942	
Con2pst	-1.44583 0.594	-3.18021 0.004	-2.34167 0.072	-1.93095 0.652	-3.35952 0.078

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

Exhibit 7

Family Violence as a Matter for the Police

Oneway Analysis of Variance

Analysis of Variance

Source	SS	df	MS	F	Prob > F
Between groups	46.180421	5	9.23608421	1.23	0.2967
Within groups	2214.48625	294	7.53226614		
Total	2260.66667	299	7.56075808		

Bartlett's test for equal variances: chi2(5) = 15.9954 Prob>chi2 = 0.007

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

Exhibit 8

Family Violence as a Matter for the Police

Oneway Analysis of Variance – Transformed Data

Analysis of Variance - Transformed Data

Source	SS	df	MS	F	Prob > F
Between groups	107366176	5	21473235.2	1.14	0.3406
Within groups	5.5506e+09	294	18879460.7		
Total	5.6579e+09	299	18922834.8		

Bartlett's test for equal variances: chi2(5) = 4.6646 Prob>chi2 = 0.458

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

Exhibit 9

Family Violence as a Matter for the Police

Scheffe Multiple Comparison Test

Summary Statistics

testgrp6	Mean	Std. Dev.	Freq.
Exp1Pre	24.5	2.7545057	64
Exp1Pst	24.079365	3.332642	63
Exp2Pst	24.541667	2.2576162	72
Con1Pre	25.428571	2.1111947	21
Con1Pst	25.190476	2.0400747	21
Con2Pre	24.236842	2.9813312	38
Total	24.466667	2.7496833	300

Scheffe's Comparison of Mean Scores

Row Mean- Col Mean	Exp1pre	Exp1pst	Exp2pst	Con1pre	Con1pst
Exp1pst	-.420635				
	0.980				
	0.993				
Exp2pst	.041667	.462302			
	1.000	0.966			
	1.000	**0.996**			
Con1pre	.928571	1.34921	.886905		
	0.874	0.578	0.889		
	0.849	**0.609**	**0.812**		
Con1pst	.690476	1.11111	.64881	.47619	
	0.962	0.764	0.969	1.000	
	0.967	**0.832**	**0.952**	**1.000**	
Con2pst	-.347458	.073177	-.389124	-1.27603	-1.03793
	0.992	1.000	0.985	0.647	0.818
	0.994	**1.000**	**0.997**	**0.624**	**0.840**

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

Exhibit 10

Attitude Toward Mandatory Arrest

Oneway Analysis of Variance

Analysis of Variance

Source	SS	df	MS	F	Prob > F
Between groups	26.8439589	5	5.36879178	1.72	0.1307
Within groups	925.963988	296	3.12825672		
Total	952.807947	301	3.16547491		

Bartlett's test for equal variances: chi2(5) = 2.5122 Prob>chi2 = 0.775

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

Exhibit 11

Attitude Toward Mandatory Arrest

Scheffe Multiple Comparison Test

Summary Statistics

Testgroup	Mean	Std. Dev.	Freq.
Exp1Pre	3.953125	1.8808111	64
Exp1Pst	4.296875	1.6966792	64
Exp2Pst	4.1666667	1.6950633	72
Con1Pre	4.0952381	1.4800257	21
Con1Pst	4.047619	1.82965	21
Con2Pst	4.8166667	1.8730168	60
Total	4.2649007	1.7791782	302

Scheffe's Comparison of Mean Scores

Row Mean-Col Mean	Exp1pre	Exp1pst	Exp2pst	Con1pre	Con1pst
Exp1pst	.34375				
	0.944				
Exp2pst	.213542	-.130208			
	0.992	0.999			
Con1pre	.142113	-.201637	-.071429		
	1.000	0.999	1.000		
Con1pst	.094494	-.249256	-.119048	-.047619	
	1.000	0.997	1.000	1.000	
Con2pst	.863542	.519792	.65	.721429	.769048
	0.197	0.750	0.492	0.763	0.709

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

Exhibit 12

Prosecution is Likely

Oneway Analysis of Variance

Analysis of Variance

Source	SS	df	MS	F	Prob > F
Between groups	15.0240412	5	3.00480825	1.11	0.3582
Within groups	627.870474	231	2.718054		
Total	642.894515	236	2.7241293		

Bartlett's test for equal variances: chi2(5) = 3.0585 Prob>chi2 = 0.691

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

Exhibit 13

Prosecution is Likely

Scheffe Multiple Comparison Test

Summary of Prosecution is Likely

testgrp6	Mean	Std. Dev.	Freq.
exp1pre	4.2439024	1.8544607	41
exp1pst	3.8913043	1.7026549	46
exp2pst	4.6041667	1.4401475	48
con1pre	4.6190476	1.5644868	21
con1pst	4.1904762	1.7210185	21
con2pst	4.3833333	1.6165633	60
Total	4.3122363	1.6504937	237

Scheffe's Comparison of Prosecution is Likely

Row Mean- Col Mean	exp1pre	exp1pst	exp2pst	con1pre	con1pst
exp1pst	-.352598 0.963				
exp2pst	.360264 0.958	.712862 0.496			
con1pre	.375145 0.982	.727743 0.729	.014881 1.000		
con1pst	-.053426 1.000	.299172 0.993	-.41369 0.968	-.428571 0.982	
con2pst	.139431 0.999	.492029 0.803	-.220833 0.993	-.235714 0.997	.192857 0.999

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

Exhibit 14

Identification of the Perpetrator is Easy

Oneway Analysis of Variance

Analysis of Variance

Source	SS	df	MS	F	Prob > F
Between groups	31.4179688	5	6.28359377	2.60	0.0255
Within groups	715.416468	296	2.41694753		
Total	746.834437	301	2.48117753		

Bartlett's test for equal variances: chi2(5) = 1.6194 Prob>chi2 = 0.899

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

Exhibit 15

Identification of the Perpetrator is Easy

Scheffe Multiple Comparison Test

Testgroup	Summary Statistics Mean	Std. Dev.	Freq.
Exp1Pre	4.5625	1.6023297	64
Exp1Pst	4.28125	1.6278211	64
Exp2Pst	4.4027778	1.4404589	72
Con1Pre	3.3333333	1.42595	21
Con1Pst	3.7619048	1.5134319	21
Con2Pre	4.1333333	1.609997	60
Total	4.2384106	1.5751754	302

Scheffe's Comparison of Mean Scores

Row Mean-Col Mean	Exp1pre	Exp1pst	Exp2pst	Con1pre	Con1pst
Exp1pst	-.28125				
	0.958				
Exp2pst	-.159722	.121528			
	0.996	0.999			
Con1pre	-1.22917	-.947917	-1.06944		
	0.082	0.321	0.178		
Con1pst	-.800595	-.519345	-.640873	.428571	
	0.523	0.880	0.736	0.977	
Con2pst	-.429167	-.147917	-.269444	.8	.371429
	0.797	0.998	0.964	0.534	0.971

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

Exhibit 16

Victim Cooperation

Oneway Analysis of Variance

Analysis of Variance

Source	SS	df	MS	F	Prob > F
Between groups	8.64061153	5	1.72812231	0.68	0.6405
Within groups	754.511706	296	2.54902603		
Total	763.152318	301	2.53538976		

Bartlett's test for equal variances: chi2(5) = 3.6506 Prob>chi2 = 0.601

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

Exhibit 17

Victim Cooperation

Scheffe Multiple Comparison Test

Summary Statistics

Testgroup	Mean	Std. Dev.	Freq.
exp1pre	5.25	1.4253933	64
exp1pst	4.84375	1.6734979	64
exp2pst	4.9305556	1.5320647	72
con1pre	4.8095238	1.8873009	21
con1pst	5	1.5165751	21
con2pst	4.7833333	1.6782928	60
Total	4.9470199	1.5922907	302

Scheffe's Comparison of Mean Scores

Row Mean- Col Mean	exp1pre	exp1pst	exp2pst	con1pre	con1pst
exp1pst	-.40625 0.839				
exp2pst	-.319444 0.929	.086806 1.000			
con1pre	-.440476 0.944	-.034226 1.000	-.121032 1.000		
con1pst	-.25 0.996	.15625 1.000	.069444 1.000	.190476 1.000	
con2pst	-.466667 0.754	-.060417 1.000	-.147222 0.998	-.02619 1.000	-.216667 0.998

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

Exhibit 18

Perceptions of Training Quality and Attendance

Mean Scores

Summary Statistics

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Training Quality	134	10.23881	5.130154	4	28
Attendance	135	1.614815	.9059108	1	6

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

Exhibit 19

OLS Regression Estimates of a Model of Belief in Accurate and Simplistic Causes of Family Violence and Family Violence as a Police Matter

Independent Variables	Dependent Variable: Gender Roles	Mandatory Arrest	Belief in Causes	Family Violence As Police Matter
Gender (Male = 1)	3.235[1] (.215)	---	---	---
Perpetrator Easily Identified	---	-.228[2] (-.200)	---	---
Mandatory Arrest	---	---	-.596[1] (-.245)	---
Gender Roles	---	---	.160[2] (.180)	.234 (.430)
Pre-Mandatory Arrest Service (>5 years = 1)	---	---	1.220[3] (.137)	---
Attended Training (Yes=1)	---	---	---	---
Constant	29.709[1]	5.338[1]	11.941	16.554
R^2_{adj}	.0414	.0355	0923	.1812
Prob > F	.0020	.0031	.0001	.0000
N	206	217	195	215

(path coefficients) ; [1]$p \leq .001$; [2]$p \leq .01$; [3]$p \leq .05$

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

Exhibit 20—Full Path Model



This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.



This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.



This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.



.360 (.07)-.565*** (-.229).074 (.204)
-.027(-.018)E= .982r=.061
-.580 (-.045)



Pre-Mandatory Arrest Service (>5 years =1)
Prosecution Is Likely
Family Violence As Police Matter
Belief in Inaccurate Causes of Family Violence
Agreement With Traditional Gender Roles
Gender (Female=1)



.076 (.156)3.235* (.215).153* (.171).047 (.074)

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.



This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

.217*** (.387) 1.336* (.149)

-.049* (.234)ε= .858ε= .986

.046 (.008)

ε= .944

(path coefficients)
[1] Cramer's V
*** p≤ .001; **p≤ .01; * p≤ .05 ε= .979

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

Exhibit 21

OLS Regression Estimates of a Model of Belief in Inaccurate Causes of Family Violence, Family Violence as a Police Matter, and Attitude Toward Likelihood of Prosecution

	Dependent Variable					
Independent Variables	Gender Roles	Mandatory Arrest	Inaccurate Causes	Family Violence As Police Matter	Victim Cooperation	Prosecution Unlikely
Gender (Male = 1)	3.235[2] (.215)	.360 (.070)	-.580 (.045)	---	---	---
Perpetrator Easily Identified		-.217[2] (-.192)	.358 (.120)	-.232 (-.131)	---	.102 (.250)
Mandatory Arrest			-.565[1] (-.229)	-.027 (-.018)	---	.074 (.204)
Gender Roles			.153[3] (.171)	218[1] (.387)	-.081 (-.261)	.049[3] (.234)
Pre-Mandatory Arrest Service (>5 years = 1)			1.336[3] (.149)	.046 (.008)	---	---
Belief in Inaccurate Causes				.046 (.074)	---	---
Family Violence As a Police Matter						.156 (.076)
Victim Cooperation						.210[1] (.200)
Constant	29.709[1]	4.937[1]	11.207[1]	17.449[1]	1.473[3]	1.522
R^2_{AOJ}	.0414	.0349	.1080	.1423	.0693	.0139
Prob > F	.0020	.0097	.0001	.0000	.0002	.1147
N	206	208	190	195	215	215

(structural coefficients) : [1]$p \leq .001$; [2]$p \leq .01$; [3]$p \leq .05$

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

Exhibit 22--Reduced Form Path Diagram



(Path Coefficients)
[1] Log likelihood ratio probability .430*
*** P≤ .001; ** p≤ .01; * p≤ .05(.234)ε = .905

Family Violence as Police Matter

-.160*-.049* .210** -.081***
(.180)(.150) (.200) (.261) ε = .965

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.



This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.



This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

Exhibit 23

Direct, Indirect, Total and Spurious Effects: Reduced 4- Equation Model

Dep. Var.	Ind. Var.	Effects
Prosecution Is Likely	Gender (female=1)	Direct = None Indirect = (-3.325)(-.049) = .163 = (-3.325)(-.081)(.210) = .057 Total = .220 Spurious = 0 - .220 = -.220
	Gender Roles	Direct = None Indirect = (.049)(.081) = .004 Total = .053 Spurious = .066 - .053 = .013
	Victim Cooperation As Reflection of Desire to Solve Domestic Violence	Direct = .210 Indirect = None Total = .210 Spurious = .255 - .210 =.045
Belief in Inaccurate or Simplistic Causes of Family Violence	Pre-Mandatory Arrest Policy Service	Direct = None Indirect = (.596) (1.217) = .725 Total = .725 Spurious = 0- (.725) = -.725
	Identification Of Perpetrator As "Easy"	Direct = None Indirect = (-.228) (.596) = -.136 Total = - .136 Spurious = .508 – (-.136) = .644
	Gender	Direct = None Indirect = (3.325) (-.160) = -.532 Total = -.532 Spurious = 0 – (-.532) = .532
	Attitude Toward Mandatory Arrest Policy	Direct = .596 Indirect = None Total = .596 Spurious = 0 - .596 = -.596

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

Exhibit 23 (Continued)

Direct, Indirect, Total and Spurious Effects: Reduced 4- Equation Model

	Attitude Toward Gender Roles	Direct = -.160 Indirect = None Total = - .160 Spurious = .176 – (-.160) = .336
Attitude Toward Mandatory Arrest Policy	Pre-Mandatory Arrest Policy Service	Direct = 1.217 Indirect = None Total = 1.217 Spurious = 0 – 1.217 = -1.217
	Identification Of Perpetrator As "Easy"	Direct = -.228 Indirect = None Total = -.228 Spurious = -.228 - .228 = 0
Attitude Toward Gender Roles	Gender	Direct = 3.325 Indirect = None Total = 3.325

Spurious = 3.325 – 3.325 = 0

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

Exhibit 24

Time at the Scene

Oneway Analysis of Variance

Analysis of Variance

Source	SS	df	MS	F	Prob > F
Between groups	661.753613	3	220.584538	0.31	0.8195
Within groups	196151.844	274	715.882641		
Total	196813.597	277	710.518401		

Bartlett's test for equal variances: chi2(3) = 31.5267 Prob>chi2 = 0.000
Bartlett's test for equal variances (transformed data): chi2(3) = 5.5011
Prob>chi2 = 0.139

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

Exhibit 25

Time at the Scene

Scheffe Multiple Comparison Test

Summary of time at the scene (in minutes)

testgrp4	Mean	Std. Dev.	Freq.
Exppre	30	14.628739	6
Exppost	33.809524	25.166682	21
Conpre	32.490566	21.281378	159
Conpost	35.652174	34.902827	92
Total	33.582734	26.655551	278

Comparison of timescn by testgrp4
(Scheffe)

Row Mean- Col Mean	Exppre	Exppost	Conpre
Exppost	3.80952 0.992 **0.993**		
Conpre	2.49057 0.997 **0.998**	-1.31896 0.997 **0.997**	
Conpost	5.65217 0.969 **0.983**	1.84265 0.994 **0.999**	3.16161 0.846 **0.937**

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

Exhibit 26

Acceptance of Case for Prosecution

Chi-square Analysis

status	testgrp4 Exppre	Exppost	Conpre	Conpost	Total
accepted 1	5	17	135	77	234
	71.43	80.95	81.82	78.57	80.41
not accepted 2	2	4	30	21	57
	28.57	19.05	18.18	21.43	19.59
Total	7	21	165	98	291
	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00

Pearson chi2(3) = 0.7805 Pr = 0.854
Cramer's V = 0.0518
Fisher's Exact = 0.792

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

Exhibit 27

Convictions

Chi-square Analysis

convict	testgrp4 Exppre	Exppost	Conpre	Conpost	Total
Not convicted 0	4	8	60	27	99
	100.00	80.00	86.96	69.23	81.15
Convicted1	0	2	9	12	23
	0.00	20.00	13.04	30.77	18.85
Total	4	10	69	39	122
	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00

Pearson chi2(3) = 6.0801 Pr = 0.108
Cramer's V = 0.2232
Fisher's Exact = 0.119

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

APPENDIX 1
RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE PREVENTION COMMISSION

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

Recommendations of the El Paso Domestic Violence Prevention Commission

This report reflects a culmination of the work of the members of the Domestic Violence Prevention Commission as they complete the first phase of the DVPC's mission. The report is organized into six sections which encompasses all recommendations made by each of the subcommittees: (1) prevention through public awareness, (2) specialized domestic violence response team, (3) enforcing domestic violence cases, (4) victims' assistance, (5) programs for offenders, and (6) funding. Where appropriate, the following codes have been used, reflecting the contributions of each of the subcommittees to the overall report.

LE=Law Enforcement Subcommittee
JP=Judicial/Prosecution Subcommittee
HS=Human Services Subcommittee

However, it should *not be* implied that the Commission membership has prioritized any one area over another.

In the coming months, the DVPC will oversee the implementation of these recommendations, and will continue to meet regularly to decide specific strategies for implementation, and to monitor its progress. It is envisioned that the DVPC will continue as an on-going resource until its mission is complete.

Prevention Through Public Awareness

- To educate the public on the special nature of domestic violence cases, including victimless prosecution *(JP)*
- To instill better understanding by juries of domestic violence issues *(JP)*
- To gain cooperation of elected and appointed officials *(JP)*
- To gain necessary administrative and economic support *(JP)*
- To train speakers to make presentations at social and civic organizations in order to disseminate information about domestic violence *(HS)*
  - *The effect on children and teens*
  - *The effect on the workplace environment*
  - *The effect on the larger community*
- To educate the clergy on their responsibility to report domestic violence *(HS)*
- To educate personnel from area medical facilities on the management of domestic violence cases *(HS)*
- To educate children on how to identify and gain assistance with domestic violence *(HS)*

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

- To identify and utilize media resources *(HS)*

Specialized Domestic Violence Response Team

- To develop and implement a law enforcement or multi-agency unit which specializes in domestic violence. Responsibilities should include:
  - *tracking compliance of protective orders (JP)*
  - *executing warrants for domestic violence offenders (LE)*
  - *maintaining a close working relationship with all outside agencies and community organizations involved in domestic violence cases (LE)*
  - *acting as the agency liaison to the Domestic Violence Prevention Commission (LE)*
  - *recommending modifications of agency policy to reduce domestic violence incidents and implement an efficient and expedient response (LE)*
  - *monitoring domestic violence trends and community needs (LE)*
  - *providing on-going community education program (LE)*

- To procure permanent funding for full-time and part-time staffing, office space, equipment and supplies *(LE)*

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

Enforcing Domestic Violence Cases

- To develop agency procedures and training curricula which focus on managing domestic violence cases with a high degree of tact, fairness and sensitivity *(LE), (JP)*

- To ensure proper identification of family violence situations[1] *(LE)*

- To improve prosecution *(LE)*
  - *Increase documentation of injuries*
  - *Improve documentation of statements made by the victim and witnesses*

- To develop and implement a family violence investigation checklist *(LE)*
  - *Increase detail*
  - *Improve crime scene photographs*
    - Injuries
    - Property damage
    - Household conditions
  - *Improve collection and increase amount of physical evidence*

- To develop and implement a prosecutorial protocol including: *(LE)*
  1) *Contacting the victim*
  2) *Obtaining medical records*
  3) *Obtaining 911 call records*
  4) *Obtaining prior history of violence by offender*

- To establish a networked, uniform database system for the purpose of:
  - *Interagency information sharing (JP)*
  - *Locating offenders (LE)*
  - *Tracking offenders (JP), (LE)*
  - *Enhancing record keeping (LE)*
  - *Expanding statistics for funding justifications (HS),(LE)*

[1] Texas Family Code Section 71.01

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

- To have regularly scheduled multi-agency review of domestic violence policy and procedures *(LE)*

  Agencies should include:
  - *District Attorney's Office*
  - *County Attorney's Office*
  - *Child Protective Services*
  - *Adult Protective Services*
  - *Shelter for Battered Women*
  - *Emergency Medical Services*

Victims' Assistance

- To have the El Paso Police Department's Crisis Response Team respond to every domestic violence call or report *(HS)*

- To ensure victims are given proper notification of the various resources available in obtaining protective orders, emergency protective orders, legal assistance, shelter and community resources [2] *(LE)*

- To compile and publish an inexpensive and readily available guide of all the agencies involved in domestic violence prevention, investigation, and treatment *(HS)*

- To distribute pertinent information in locales likely to be visited by domestic violence victims, including information concerning *(HS)*
  - *domestic violence laws*
  - *definitions of family violence*
  - *legal procedures*
  - *resources and referrals*
  - *victims' rights*
  - *assessment and intervention of family violence*

[2] Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 5.04 (Duties of Peace Officers)

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

Programs for Offenders

- To increase the number of counseling programs for domestic violence offenders *(HS)*
- To ensure that existing counseling programs for offenders are effective ones *(JP)*
- To obtain current guidelines and practices for domestic violence offender counseling programs *(JP)*
- To procure funding for improving and expanding offender counseling programs *(HS)*

Funding

- To have Commission members commit their respective fund development personnel to form a collaborative partnership to identify sources of funding *(HS)*
- To raise funds collaboratively by directing efforts toward local, state and national foundations and government sources *(HS)*
- To gain local support by periodically organizing local fund raisers *(HS)*
- To generate funds from nontraditional resources: *(HS)*
  - *fine individuals convicted of domestic violence incidents*
  - *assess additional fees for marriage licenses and birth certificates*
  - *utilize fines generated from DWI convictions*
  - *increase the tax on alcohol and use fund confiscated in drug arrests*

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

APPENDIX 2
POLICE OFFICER TRAINING QUESTIONNAIRE

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

Questionnaire



This is a request for completely voluntary participation, and your responses will remain totally anonymous—neither your name nor any other identifying information will be asked or recorded. Please note that the principal investigators at the University of Texas and Boise State University in Idaho are conducting this survey and will retain sole access to the completed questionnaires. Police department officials only will be presented with average responses and percentages.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR QUESTIONNAIRE COMPLETION:

Please respond to all items by placing a check in the brackets beside the category which best represents your answer. Check one and only one category for each item.

Please do not write your name anywhere on this questionnaire.

Principal Investigators:

Martha Smithey, PhD
Department of Sociology
Criminal Justice Program
University of Texas at El Paso
El Paso, TX 79968
(915) 747-6588 Office
(915) 747-5505 Fax
E-mail: msmithey@utep.edu

Andrew Giacomazzi, PhD
Boise State University
Department of Criminal Justice Administration
Boise, ID 83725-1955
(208) 426-4162 Office
(208) 426-4371 Fax
e-mail: agiacom@boisestate.edu

This research is funded by the National Institute of Justice,
Project #97-WE-VX-0131

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

Number of years served as full-time law enforcement officer (including law enforcement agencies other than current Police Department): _____

Race/Ethnicity:
[ ] Hispanic/Mexican Origin
[ ] Hispanic/Other Origin
[ ] Caucasian/White
[ ] African American
[ ] Native American
[ ] Other: _____ (please describe)

Gender:
[ ] Male
[ ] Female

Age in years: _____

EPPD Assignment:
[ ] Support
[ ] Patrol
[ ] Investigations
[ ] Administration
[ ] Other: _____ (please describe)

Position:
[ ] Officer
[ ] Detective
[ ] Sergeant
[ ] Lieutenant
[ ] Captain
[ ] Other: _____

(please describe)

For the following items, please indicate your level of agreement with each statement. Please mark one and only one response for each statement.

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

Strongly Disagree

Disagree

Somewhat Disagree

No Opinion

Somewhat Agree

Agree

Strongly Agree

The primary cause of family violence is alcohol consumption. [SA] [A] [SwA] [NO] [SwD] [D] [SD]

Family violence occurs much more in poor families than in middle class families. [SA] [A] [SwA] [NO] [SwD] [D] [SD]

The only reason battered women stay in battering relationships is that they don't have the economic resources to leave. [SA] [A] [SwA] [NO] [SwD] [D] [SD]

Men are more likely than women to respond to conflict with aggression. [SA] [A] [SwA] [NO] [SwD] [D] [SD]

Only mentally ill people batter family members. [SA] [A] [SwA] [NO] [SwD] [D] [SD]

When managing a domestic violence "scene", it is better if the police officer leaves as soon as possible. [SA] [A] [SwA] [NO] [SwD] [D] [SD]

Mandatory arrest of a domestic violence [SA] [A] [SwA] [NO] [SwD] [D] [SD]

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

offender is the best way to reduce repeat episodes of violence.

Victims must not want to resolve domestic violence in their homes or else they would cooperate enough with prosecutors. [SA] [A] [SwA] [NO] [SwD] [D] [SD]

Most physical injuries of domestic violence victims are accidental rather than intentional. [SA] [A] [SwA] [NO] [SwD] [D] [SD]

Regardless of how well a victim cooperates, and a police officer documents evidence and writes a police report, prosecution of an offender is unlikely. [SA] [A] [SwA] [NO] [SwD] [D] [SD]

It is usually clear who is the perpetrator in a domestic violence episode. [SA] [A] [SwA] [NO] [SwD] [D] [SD]

Law enforcement policies are ineffective for preventing family violence. [SA] [A] [SwA] [NO] [SwD] [D] [SD]

As long as women's participation in the work force continues to expand, there will be more and more domestic violence. [SA] [A] [SwA] [NO] [SwD] [D] [SD]

Women who have small children should stay home with those children instead of working. [SA] [A] [SwA] [NO] [SwD] [D] [SD]

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

Strongly Disagree

Disagree

Somewhat Disagree

No Opinion

Somewhat Agree

Agree

Strongly Agree Children of single-parent, female-headed[SA] [A] [SwA] [NO] [SwD] [D] [SD]
households are more likely to be abused
than children of dual-parent households.

Family violence is a private matter in [SA] [A] [SwA] [NO] [SwD] [D] [SD]
which law enforcement should not interfere.

Family financial matters are handled [SA] [A] [SwA] [NO] [SwD] [D] [SD]
better by husbands than by wives.

Fathers are better disciplinarians of [SA] [A] [SwA] [NO] [SwD] [D] [SD]
children than mothers.

The training was interesting and provided [SA] [A] [SwA] [NO] [SwD] [D] [SD]
new and innovative ideas.

The training was relevant to my work in [SA] [A] [SwA] [NO] [SwD] [D] [SD]
the area of domestic violence.

The training was well organized. [SA] [A] [SwA] [NO] [SwD] [D] [SD]

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

I attended at least MOST of the training. [SA] [A] [SwA] [NO] [SwD] [D] [SD]

I found the training to be useful. [SA] [A] [SwA] [NO] [SwD] [D] [SD]

Please use the remainder of this page or the back of this page to make any comments or express any ideas you think are relevant to the policing and prosecution of family violence:

Thank you for participating in this important undertaking.

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

APPENDIX 3
FACTOR ANALYSIS AND SCALE RELIABILITY SCORES

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

FACTOR ANALYSIS

(principal factors; 8 factors retained)

Factor	Eigenvalue	Difference	Proportion	Cumulative
1	2.73813	1.65452	0.6559	0.6559
2	1.08361	0.41390	0.2596	0.9155
3	0.66971	0.20751	0.1604	1.0759
4	0.46219	0.14508	0.1107	1.1866
5	0.31711	0.12392	0.0760	1.2626
6	0.19320	0.01191	0.0463	1.3088
7	0.18129	0.05545	0.0434	1.3523
8	0.12583	0.14741	0.0301	1.3824
9	-0.02158	0.03193	-0.0052	1.3772
10	-0.05351	0.00768	-0.0128	1.3644
11	-0.06119	0.05841	-0.0147	1.3498
12	-0.11960	0.02572	-0.0286	1.3211
13	-0.14532	0.01185	-0.0348	1.2863
14	-0.15718	0.04419	-0.0377	1.2487
15	-0.20136	0.03982	-0.0482	1.2004
16	-0.24118	0.03096	-0.0578	1.1427
17	-0.27215	0.05122	-0.0652	1.0775
18	-0.32337	.	-0.0775	1.0000

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

Varimax Rotation

Rotated Factor Loadings

Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6
alcohol	0.17110	0.50636	0.03899	-0.05104	0.07106	0.07554
poor	0.19754	0.52909	0.20241	-0.16735	-0.03808	0.02605
economic	0.02353	0.58760	0.00577	0.21678	0.07422	-0.16147
aggress	0.12470	0.41084	-0.09259	0.06864	0.17202	0.12617
menill	0.16707	0.11766	0.48111	-0.08288	-0.02609	-0.00838
leavasap	0.12099	0.02206	0.56229	0.05306	0.00542	0.06205
mandarr	-0.01483	0.17275	-0.04535	-0.03698	0.48559	-0.02604
coopvic	0.16704	0.27578	0.28048	0.25604	-0.08730	-0.14679
accid	0.14484	0.15569	0.31581	-0.00519	-0.03948	-0.24516
pros	0.15564	0.09761	0.05333	0.39265	-0.06054	-0.00075
perp	0.08734	0.22148	-0.12117	0.04140	0.15213	-0.32459
poleff	0.24168	0.05714	0.04107	0.11386	-0.18313	-0.01839
work	0.35343	0.09162	0.03618	0.13528	0.02662	0.01053
home	0.44884	-0.14180	0.05531	0.00280	0.10767	-0.15666
singpar	0.50614	0.20394	0.19672	-0.01873	-0.04900	0.06894
privmat	0.37091	-0.02862	0.37373	0.15951	-0.13398	-0.23216
finmale	0.67599	0.13838	0.11362	0.07025	-0.08382	-0.06776
discfath	0.62509	0.08936	0.04467	-0.00934	0.09925	0.04349

Rotated Factor Loadings

Variable	7	8	Uniqueness
alcohol	0.12569	-0.09887	0.67387
poor	-0.00062	0.07539	0.60425
economic	-0.01464	0.04210	0.57357
aggress	-0.11224	-0.08605	0.73686
menill	0.05295	-0.00350	0.71634
leavasap	-0.01538	0.02677	0.66106
mandarr	0.02394	-0.05352	0.72660
coopvic	0.16923	0.01721	0.69372
accid	0.08422	-0.01606	0.78601
pros	0.05090	0.07984	0.79660
perp	0.00214	0.04422	0.79646
poleff	0.11888	0.34406	0.75729
work	0.33333	0.09473	0.72618
home	0.25355	0.08428	0.66785
singpar	0.13856	-0.15471	0.61289
privmat	0.01288	-0.03534	0.62323
finmale	0.00619	0.03119	0.49342
discfath	-0.02031	0.06549	0.58274

RELIABILITY SCORES: CRONBACH'S ALPHA

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

Traditional Gender Roles

Test scale = mean(unstandardized items)

Average interitem covariance:	.5002138
Number of items in the scale:	6
Scale Reliability Coefficient:	0.7016

Belief in Simplistic or Inaccurate Causes of Family Violence

Test scale = mean(unstandardized items)

Average interitem covariance:	.7028448
Number of items in the scale:	4
Scale Reliability Coefficient:	0.6074

Family Violence is a Matter for the Police

Test scale = mean(unstandardized items)

Average interitem covariance:	.2623471
Number of items in the scale:	4
Scale Reliability Coefficient:	0.5576

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

APPENDIX 4
ANALYSES OF VARIANCE FOR PRECINCT EFFECT TEST

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION FOR PRECINCT PRETESTS

Pretest only groups-- for precinct effect	Freq.	Percent
CCPr (Control Group - Central Precinct)	17	14.29
CPHPr (Control Group - Pebble Hills Precinct)	8	6.72
CWPr (Control Group - Westside Precinct)	17	14.29
EPr1 (Experimental Group 1 - Northeast Precinct)	28	23.53
EPr2 (Experimental Group 2 - Northeast Precinct)	34	28.57
EPr3 (Experimental Group 3 - Northeast Precinct)	15	12.61
Total	119	100.00

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

Precinct Effect Test: Belief in Inaccurate or Simplistic Causes of Family Violence

Oneway Analysis of Variance

pretest only groups -- for precinct effect	Summary of Means Mean	Std. Dev.	Freq.
CCPr	12.294118	4.6336366	17
CPHPr	13.125	5.1668587	8
CWPr	15.529412	4.5016337	17
EPr1	15.464286	5.080698	28
EPr2	14.235294	3.8143177	34
EPr3	14.2	4.6012421	15
Total	14.352941	4.576262	119

Analysis of Variance

Source	SS	df	MS	F	Prob > F
Between groups	143.054832	5	28.6109664	1.39	0.2338
Within groups	2328.12164	113	20.6028464		
Total	2471.17647	118	20.9421735		

Bartlett's test for equal variances: chi2(5) = 2.7307 Prob>chi2 = 0.741

Scheffe's Means Comparison Test

Row Mean-Col Mean	CCPr	CPHPr	CWPr	EPr1	EPr2
CPHPr	.830882 0.999				
CWPr	3.23529 0.508	2.40441 0.909			
EPr1	3.17017 0.402	2.33929 0.894	-.065126 1.000		
EPr2	1.94118 0.838	1.11029 0.996	-1.29412 0.968	-1.22899 0.951	
EPr3	1.90588 0.923	1.075 0.998	-1.32941 0.983	-1.26429 0.979	-.035294 1.000

Precinct Effect Test: Family Violence is a Matter for the Police

Oneway Analysis of Variance

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

pretest only groups -- for precinct effect	Summary of Means Mean	Std. Dev.	Freq.
CCPr	25	2.3717082	17
CPHPr	24.75	2.6592158	8
CWPr	24.411765	3.0833996	17
EPr1	24.428571	3.1555779	28
EPr2	24.882353	2.4091329	34
EPr3	24.466667	2.4746332	15
Total	24.663866	2.6753023	119

Analysis of Variance

Source	SS	df	MS	F	Prob > F
Between groups	6.81708683	5	1.36341737	0.18	0.9682
Within groups	837.737535	113	7.4136065		
Total	844.554622	118	7.15724256		

Bartlett's test for equal variances: chi2(5) = 3.4645 Prob>chi2 = 0.629

Scheffe's Means Comparison Test

Row Mean-Col Mean	CCPr	CPHPr	CWPr	EPr1	EPr2
CPHPr	-.25 1.000				
CWPr	-.588235 0.995	-.338235 1.000			
EPr1	-.571429 0.993	-.321429 1.000	.016807 1.000		
EPr2	-.117647 1.000	.132353 1.000	.470588 0.997	.453782 0.994	
EPr3	-.533333 0.997	-.283333 1.000	.054902 1.000	.038095 1.000	-.415686 0.999

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

Precinct Effect Test: Mandatory Arrest

Oneway Analysis of Variance

pretest only groups -- for precinct effect	Summary of Means Mean	Std. Dev.	Freq.
CCPr	3.7647059	1.601929	17
CPHPr	3	1.7728105	8
CWPr	3.7058824	1.4901638	17
EPr1	4.4285714	1.8743606	28
EPr2	3.6470588	1.8567217	34
EPr3	3.5333333	1.7265435	15
Total	3.7983193	1.7639508	119

Analysis of Variance

Source	SS	df	MS	F	Prob > F
Between groups	18.2162465	5	3.6432493	1.18	0.3235
Within groups	348.943417	113	3.08799484		
Total	367.159664	118	3.11152258		

Bartlett's test for equal variances: chi2(5) = 1.4530 Prob>chi2 = 0.918

Scheffe's Means Comparison Test

Row Mean-Col Mean	CCPr	CPHPr	CWPr	EPr1	EPr2
CPHPr	-.764706 0.959				
CWPr	-.058824 1.000	.705882 0.971			
EPr1	.663866 0.911	1.42857 0.536	.722689 0.876		
EPr2	-.117647 1.000	.647059 0.971	-.058824 1.000	-.781513 0.694	
EPr3	-.231373 1.000	.533333 0.993	-.172549 1.000	-.895238 0.770	-.113725 1.000

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

Precinct Effect Test: Likelihood of Prosecution

Oneway Analysis of Variance

pretest only groups -- for precinct effect	Summary of Means Mean	Std. Dev.	Freq.
CCPr	4.2941176	1.5315313	17
CPHPr	4.125	2.1001701	8
CWPr	5	1.457738	17
EPr1	4	1.9051587	28
EPr2	4.4117647	1.8928517	34
EPr3	4.2666667	1.9444671	15
Total	4.3445378	1.8013036	119

Analysis of Variance

Source	SS	df	MS	F	Prob > F
Between groups	11.3009104	5	2.26018207	0.69	0.6340
Within groups	371.573039	113	3.28825698		
Total	382.87395	118	3.24469449		

Bartlett's test for equal variances: chi2(5) = 2.8070 Prob>chi2 = 0.730

Scheffe's Means Comparison Test

Row Mean-Col Mean	CCPr	CPHPr	CWPr	EPr1	EPr2
CPHPr	-.169118 1.000				
CWPr	.705882 0.935	.875 0.937			
EPr1	-.294118 0.998	-.125 1.000	-1 0.667		
EPr2	.117647 1.000	.286765 0.999	-.588235 0.945	.411765 0.977	
EPr3	-.027451 1.000	.141667 1.000	-.733333 0.934	.266667 0.999	-.145098 1.000

Precinct Effect Test: Identification of Perpetrator is Easy

Oneway Analysis of Variance

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

pretest only groups -- for precinct effect	Summary of Means Mean	Std. Dev.	Freq.
CCPr	3.7058824	1.4901638	17
CPHPr	4.25	1.7525492	8
CWPr	3.3529412	1.4552138	17
EPr1	4.9642857	1.4777897	28
EPr2	4.1470588	1.5202144	34
EPr3	4.4666667	1.641718	15
Total	4.210084	1.5884858	119

Analysis of Variance

Source	SS	df	MS	F	Prob > F
Between groups	33.8738095	5	6.7747619	2.90	0.0168
Within groups	263.87409	113	2.33516893		
Total	297.747899	118	2.52328728		

Bartlett's test for equal variances: chi2(5) = 0.5793 Prob>chi2 = 0.989

Scheffe's Means Comparison Test

Row Mean-Col Mean	CCPr	CPHPr	CWPr	EPr1	EPr2
CPHPr	.544118 0.983				
CWPr	-.352941 0.994	-.897059 0.865			
EPr1	1.2584 0.217	.714286 0.928	1.61134 0.045		
EPr2	.441176 0.966	-.102941 1.000	.794118 0.691	-.817227 0.498	
EPr3	.760784 0.851	.216667 1.000	1.11373 0.520	-.497619 0.959	.319608 0.994

Precinct Effect Test: Victim Cooperation

Oneway Analysis of Variance

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

pretest only groups -- for precinct effect	Summary of Means Mean	Std. Dev.	Freq.
CCPr	4.8235294	1.9440709	17
CPHPr	4.875	1.7268882	8
CWPr	4.8823529	1.8331105	17
EPr1	5.3214286	1.4156159	28
EPr2	5.2647059	1.4419857	34
EPr3	5.0666667	1.4375906	15
Total	5.1092437	1.5719464	119

Analysis of Variance

Source	SS	df	MS	F	Prob > F
Between groups	4.81141457	5	.962282913	0.38	0.8621
Within groups	286.768417	113	2.53777361		
Total	291.579832	118	2.47101552		

Bartlett's test for equal variances: chi2(5) = 3.7334 Prob>chi2 = 0.588

Scheffe's Means Comparison Test

Row Mean-Col Mean	CCPr	CPHPr	CWPr	EPr1	EPr2
CPHPr	.051471 1.000				
CWPr	.058824 1.000	.007353 1.000			
EPr1	.497899 0.959	.446429 0.992	.439076 0.976		
EPr2	.441176 0.972	.389706 0.996	.382353 0.985	-.056723 1.000	
EPr3	.243137 0.999	.191667 1.000	.184314 1.000	-.254762 0.998	-.198039 0.999

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

ENDNOTES

[1] While several elements of the Four "T" approach are documented in Chapters 3 through 5, a formal evaluation of the approach was beyond the scope of this project.

[2] Due to a lack of randomization assignment of police officers to the experimental group, a "precinct effect" test was calculated for each scale or variable to determine if there were significant differences across precincts prior to training. These tests can be found in Appendix 3. With the exception of one variable. *identification of perpetrator*, no precinct effects occurred. An endnote is inserted where appropriate to discuss this effect.

[3] As previously noted, the experimental group consists of all officers assigned to one precinct. Three training sessions occurred at this precinct resulting in three experimental groups. The three control groups consist of officers from other precincts. The precinct effect test yielded fourteen comparisons per scale or variable. One of the fifteen pretest comparisons for the variable *identification of the perpetrator is easy* indicated a statistically significant difference between one of the experimental group pretests and one control group pretest (see Appendix 4: EPr1 – CWPr, p=.045). The means difference indicated the experimental group was 1.611 more points in disagreement with the control group that identification of the perpetrator is easy. This difference can be attributed to the experimental group precinct having a larger percent (22% of total calls to central command dispatcher) than this particular control group precinct (12% of total calls). Thus, the officers from the experimental group have more experience with domestic violence calls than the officers from this particular control group and may, therefore, better understand the complexities of making such a decision. However, two other experimental groups from this precinct did not have statistically significant differences from this control group. Moreover, the pretests between all other groups (including with the other control groups) did yield statistical differences. The preponderance of nonsignificant differences among these pretests lead us to conclude the precincts are comparable.

[4] Level of agreement with myths surrounding family violence was reverse coded to facilitate discussion. Consequently, higher scores indicate higher levels of agreement with the myths.

[5] Level of agreement with family violence as a matter for the police was reverse coded to facilitate discussion. Consequently. higher scores indicate higher levels of agreement that family violence is a matter for police.

[6] Police reports require the identification of domestic violence calls as "family violence" to distinguish between non-family violence domestic disturbances and family violence domestic disturbances. The cases for this study were all identified on police reports as family violence related.

PROPERTY OF
National Criminal Justice Reference Service (NCJRS)
Box 6000
Rockville, MD 20849-6000

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.