

The author(s) shown below used Federal funds provided by the U.S. Department of Justice and prepared the following final report:

**Document Title: Compstat and Organizational Change: A
National Assessment**

**Author: David Weisburd; Rosann Greenspan; Stephen
Mastrofski; James J. Willis**

Document No.: 222322

Date Received: April 2008

Award Number: 98-IJ-CX-0070

This report has not been published by the U.S. Department of Justice. To provide better customer service, NCJRS has made this Federally-funded grant final report available electronically in addition to traditional paper copies.

**Opinions or points of view expressed are those
of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect
the official position or policies of the U.S.
Department of Justice.**

Compstat and Organizational Change: A National Assessment

Report Contents

Executive Summary	Compstat and Organizational Change: A National Assessment
Section 1	Findings from a National Survey
Section 2	Short Site Visits Report
Section 3	Intensive Site Visits Report
Section 4	Compstat and Organizational Change in the Lowell Police Department: Challenges and Opportunities

Executive Summary

Compstat and Organizational Change: A National Assessment

Introduced as recently as 1994 by then Commissioner William Bratton of the New York City police department, Compstat has already been recognized as a major innovation in American policing. The attention shown this reform indicates it may become the 21st Century ideal of what it means to be a progressively managed department, much as Theodore Roosevelt's "good government" approach to policing did a century ago (Berman, 1987). As with Roosevelt's reforms, Compstat did not emerge full-blown and unprecedented in New York City. Commissioner Bratton and his staff drew heavily on management principles that had already received acclaim as state-of-the-art and forward-looking (Bratton, 1998; Micklethwait and Wooldridge, 1996; Simons, 1995). These principles included developing a management commitment and capacity to: (a) clarify the agency's mission by focusing on its basic values and embodying them in tangible objectives, (b) give priority to operational objectives over administrative ones, (c) simplify managerial accountability for achieving those objectives, (d) become more adept at scanning the organization's environment to identify problems early and develop strategies to respond (e.g., being "data-driven"), (e) increase organizational flexibility to implement the most promising strategies, and (f) learn about what works and what does not by following through with empirical assessment of what happened. These, among other features of management style, have come to be characterized as "strategic leadership" and "strategic choice" (Beer, 1980:45; Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1996).

Elements of strategic leadership date back to Philip Selznick (1957), but they received tremendous attention in the United States in the 1980s, when organizational development leaders

made them bywords of progressive management in the private sector (Micklethwait and Wooldrige, 1996). Since then, elements of this approach have been introduced to government agencies in general (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992), and to the police in particular under the rubric of problem-oriented policing (Goldstein, 1990). Compstat brings many of these management prescriptions together in a single program customized for police organizations. We characterize this approach more generically as “strategic problem solving.” “Strategic” is an apropos descriptive because it highlights the thrust of this reform to establish a big-picture approach to police management’s need to deal with an uncertain and unstable environment.

Police departments across the country are turning their attention to Compstat as an innovation in police organization that combines state of the art management principles with cutting edge crime analysis and geographic information systems technology. However, little is known either about the broad picture of the penetration of Compstat and strategic problem solving in American policing, or about the deeper query of what has and has not been achieved, and what implementation entails at all organizational levels. This study provides a systematic exploration and assessment of the adoption and adaptation of Compstat and strategic problem solving in police agencies across the country. It addresses five primary groups of research concerns:

- 1) How widely diffused is Compstat and strategic problem solving as an American policing strategy? How quickly have Compstat-like programs diffused onto the American police scene?
- 2) What are the types of Compstat-like programs that have developed? What elements of strategic problem solving do they stress? Do agencies that introduce Compstat or Compstat-like programs share similar goals and aspirations?
- 3) What has attracted police executives to consider and adopt Compstat or Compstat-like programs? How have departments learned about it and why have they adopted it?
- 4) What special challenges does Compstat present for police organization? What are police departments engaged in Compstat doing to try to deal with these challenges?

5) What special problems exist for the implementation of data and technology and for their integration with problem solving? Can data be collected? Can technology be integrated? Are problem solving strategies implemented, and at what depth?

Our study was designed to address these research concerns using three research methods, which were undertaken sequentially: a national survey of local police agencies (see Section 1), site visits at up to 15 departments (See Section 2), and process evaluations at three sites (See Sections 3 and 4¹). These techniques provide three layers of analysis: (1) a broad based understanding of the diffusion of COMPSTAT in American policing; (2) a richer sense of the varieties of COMPSTAT programs and the extent of implementation; and (3) in-depth knowledge of the most successfully implemented models and their ramifications at all levels of the organizations in which they operate.

Compstat and Organizational Change: History and Core Elements

A review of the emergence of Compstat in New York helps us understand what Compstat is and why it emerged there. The particulars of Compstat's origins have been described in considerable detail elsewhere (Bratton, 1998; Kelling and Coles, 1996; Maple, 1999; McDonald et al., 2001; Silverman, 1999). The impetus behind Compstat was Commissioner Bratton's intention to make a huge organization, legendary for its resistance to change (Sayre and Kaufman, 1960), responsive to his leadership, a leadership that had clearly staked out crime reduction and improving the quality of life in the neighborhoods of New York City as its top priorities (Bratton, 1999). Based on his belief in principles of strategic leadership and his own experiences with the Boston Police Department and the New York City Transit Police, Bratton

¹ In our original proposal we did not intend to provide a separate report for any of the three sites chosen for intensive observation. However, after reviewing the source material for our three site report, we decided that the site report for Lowell yielded enough new insight and data for it to be included as a fully separate report as well.

and his lieutenants set out to disprove skeptics who claimed that the police can do little about crime and disorder.

At the outset, Bratton and his administration's analysis of NYPD's problems revealed several deficiencies that have long been identified as forms of bureaucratic dysfunction (Merton, 1940). First, the organization lacked a sense of the importance of its fundamental crime control mission. Second, NYPD was not setting high enough expectations about what its officers could do and accomplish; consequently a lot less was getting done than was possible. Third, too many police managers had become moribund, content to continue doing things the way they had always been done, rather than searching for better ways to accomplish results. The police were not taking advantage of new theories and studies that highlighted promising strategies to reduce crime and improve the quality of life in neighborhoods. Fourth, the department was beset with archaic, unproductive organizational structures that did more to promote red tape and turf battles than to facilitate teamwork to use scarce resources effectively; operational commanders were "handcuffed" by headquarters, lacking authority to customize crime control to their precinct's needs. Finally, the department was "flying blind"; it lacked timely, accurate information about crime and public safety problems as they were emerging; it had little capacity to identify crime patterns; and it had difficulty tracking how its own resources were being used. And middle managers were not in the habit of monitoring these phenomena, thus serving as a weak link in the chain of internal accountability between top brass and street-level police employees.

Bratton used a "textbook" approach to deal with these problems, following the major prescriptions offered by organizational development experts to accomplish organizational change (Beer, 1980). He brought in outsiders to obtain a candid diagnosis of the organization's strengths and weaknesses. He incorporated both top-down and bottom-up processes to implement change

(Silverman, 1996). He sought and obtained early indicators of the success of the change efforts, and sought ways to reinforce the individual efforts of his precinct commanders and the rank-and-file – by using both incentives and disincentives (Bratton, 1996).

Strictly speaking, Compstat refers to a “strategic control system” developed to gather and disseminate information on NYPD’s crime problems and track efforts to deal with them. As such, it addresses the problem of inadequate information described above, and in this sense, it is a structure intended to serve the implementation of NYPD’s Crime Control and Quality of Life Strategies (Office of Management Analysis and Planning n.d.: 1). But it has become shorthand for the full range of strategic problem solving in the department. These elements of NYPD’s Compstat approach are most visibly displayed in the twice-weekly Compstat “Crime Control Strategy Meetings,” during which precinct commanders appear before several of the department’s top brass to report on crime problems in their precincts and what they are doing about them.

This occurs in a data-saturated environment in which Compstat reports play a central role. Precinct crime statistics and other information about the precinct and its problems are projected onto overhead screens, and commanders respond to queries about what they are doing to deal with those problems. Crime data that were once three to six months late are now available to precinct commanders on a weekly basis *for the past week*. The report includes weekly, monthly, and annual tallies of crime complaints, arrests, summonses, shooting incidents and victims, organized by precinct, borough, and citywide. In addition, electronic pin maps are generated to show how crimes and police activities cluster geographically. Hour-of-the day analyses and “crime spike” analyses are also carried out. In addition, the precinct commander’s

background is profiled, as well as other features of the precinct under his or her command (e.g., demographic data, workload data, and various activities).

Compstat reports serve as the database for commanders to demonstrate their understanding of the crime problems in their areas and discuss future strategies with the top brass and other commanders present. Cross-unit coordination is planned if necessary, and all of the plans are thoroughly documented. When the precinct is reselected for participation in a Compstat meeting, the commander must demonstrate that he or she has followed up on these strategies. Sometimes commanders bring subordinates with them so that they can report on their efforts and receive recognition. The press and other outside agencies are sometimes invited to attend these sessions, with as many as 200 people in attendance, thus providing “great theater,” and developing in the public a greater awareness of how the department is being managed (Bratton, 1998:296).

But there is far more to Compstat than this (Giuliani and Safir, 1998; Gurwitt, 1998). Drawing from what those who developed Compstat have written (see Bratton, 1996; 1998; 1999; Maple, 1999) as well as what those who have studied Compstat have observed (see McDonald et al., 2001; Kelling and Coles, 1996; Silverman, 1999) we identify six key elements that have emerged as central to the development of strategic problem solving in Compstat programs: mission clarification; internal accountability; geographic organization of command; organizational flexibility; data driven problem identification and assessment; and innovative problem solving. Together they form a comprehensive approach for mobilizing police agencies to identify, analyze and solve public safety problems.

Mission Clarification

Compstat assumes that police agencies, like military organizations, must have a clearly

defined organizational mission in order to function effectively. Top management is responsible for clarifying and exalting the core features of the department's mission that serve as the overarching reason for the organization's existence. Mission clarification includes a demonstration of management's commitment to specific goals for which the organization and its leaders can be held accountable -- such as reducing crime by 10% in a year (Bratton, 1998).

Internal Accountability

Internal accountability must be established so that people in the organization are held directly responsible for carrying out organizational goals. Compstat meetings in which operational commanders are held accountable for knowing their commands, being well acquainted with the problems in the command, and accomplishing measurable results in reducing those problems -- or at least demonstrating a diligent effort to learn from the experience -- form the most visible component of this accountability system. However, while such meetings are the visual embodiment of Compstat, they are part of a more general approach in which police managers are held accountable and can expect consequences if they are not knowledgeable about or have not responded to problems that fit within the mission of the department.

Geographic Organization of Operational Command

While Compstat holds police managers to a high level of accountability, it also gives commanders the authority to carry out the agency's mission. Organizational power is shifted to the commanders of geographic units. Operational command is focused on the policing of territories, so central decision-making authority on police operations is delegated to commanders with territorial responsibility (e.g., precincts). Functionally differentiated units and specialists (e.g., patrol, community police officers, detectives, narcotics, vice, juvenile, traffic, etc.) are placed under the command of the precinct commander, or arrangements are made to facilitate

their responsiveness to the commander's needs.

Organizational Flexibility

Middle managers are not only empowered with the authority to make decisions in responding to problems, they are also provided with the resources necessary to be successful in their efforts. Compstat requires that the organization develop the capacity and the habit of changing established routines to mobilize resources when and where they are needed for strategic application.

Data-Driven Problem Identification and Assessment

Compstat requires that data are made available to identify and analyze problems and to track and assess the department's response. Data are made available to all relevant personnel on a timely basis and in a readily usable format.

Innovative Problem-Solving Tactics

In our discussion of strategic problem solving, we identified the importance of problem solving models in the development of Compstat. Middle managers are expected to select responses because they offer the best prospects of success, not because they are "what we have always done." Innovation and experimentation are encouraged; use of "best available knowledge" about practices is expected. In this context, police are expected to look beyond their own experiences by drawing upon knowledge gained in other departments and from innovations in theory and research about crime prevention.

These six key elements constitute the core of organization development prescriptions associated with Compstat. While there is much anecdotal evidence of the adoption of Compstat models by American police agencies outside New York, there has been little systematic examination of whether and to what extent departments are implementing the various elements

of Compstat. It is also unclear whether the adoption of Compstat truly represents a radical departure from models of policing that are carried out in departments that have not adopted the Compstat model. Our study addresses these concerns through systematic survey and field research.

Compstat and Organizational Change: Findings From A National Survey (Section 1)

We conducted a survey of a stratified national sample of American police agencies with municipal policing responsibilities. The mail survey was sent to all such police agencies with over 100 sworn police officers and to a sample of 100 agencies with 50-99 sworn officers. We surveyed the universe of larger departments because Compstat programs were seen to be more relevant to and feasible in such agencies, but we also drew a random sample of smaller departments in order to identify whether Compstat programs were an appreciable factor for them.

The sample was drawn from the most complete listing of American police agencies in 1999, the 1996 Directory Survey of Law Enforcement Agencies conducted by the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) and the Census Bureau (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 1998). There were 515 agencies with 100 or more sworn officers, and 698 agencies with 50-99 officers. Surveys were mailed in August 1999, and the last completed survey was received in January 2000. Overall, 86% of the departments we selected sent responses back to the Police Foundation.² The characteristics of our survey sample follow closely national characteristics of departments in terms of geographic distribution and size.

Our report covers a broad group of topics regarding Compstat and its development in American police agencies. In this executive summary we want to focus on our main findings in regard to three basic questions. (1) How widespread is the adoption of Compstat and who is

² Response rates were similar for the survey of large departments (86%) and the small department sample (85%).

doing it? (2) Which elements of the Compstat approach appear to have been adopted most successfully in Compstat departments, and which have presented the most difficulty for adoption? (3) Finally, do Compstat departments differ significantly from non-Compstat departments in regard to the core elements of Compstat as we have described them?

One of the clearest findings of our study is that Compstat has spread widely and quickly across American police agencies. Among departments that have 100 or more sworn officers, six in ten tell us that they already had or intended to develop within a year a Compstat-like program. While the rate of adoption was much less in our sample of departments with between 50 and 99 sworn officers still forty percent claim to have or to be planning a Compstat program. Compstat as a cohesive program was only developed in 1994 and was not widely known about until two or three years later. It is fair to say that Compstat as a recognized programmatic model has literally burst on to the American police scene.

Why has Compstat diffused so quickly and widely across the landscape of American policing? One reason is that the agency that created this program was the most visible local police agency in the nation and did a great deal to publicize it and show other agencies how it operates. Moreover, the program was widely discussed in the popular and professional news outlets, even leading to William Bratton being featured on the cover of Time Magazine in January, 1996. Compstat was presented as a dramatically more effective management strategy that reduced crime in New York and other cities. As other big cities began to adopt their own Compstat programs, this too increased the “buzz” in the press and among police agencies, helping to make it the “hot” program for local law enforcement leaders to consider in bringing first their own organizations and then crime under control.

Our study also suggests another reason that Compstat has spread so quickly: a number of American police agencies had already adopted many of its features *before* the term Compstat was coined. A number of agencies participating in our sample claimed to have already implemented features of Compstat before 1994, when New York City initially developed and named its program. Some even claimed to have been engaged in all of the elements of Compstat before 1994. So, New York City's contribution appears to be its leadership in bringing all of these elements together into a single program, giving it a clear, coherent role, and providing a highly publicized set of claims that link it to performance – the decline of crime and disorder in the nation's most visible city. Compstat in this sense must be seen as an evolution rather than a revolution in American policing principles.

However, we argue that the program's origins in a highly visible police agency, its high public visibility, and the fact that many of its components were being implemented in other departments, is not enough to explain why the Compstat model has been adopted so widely and so quickly. The crime control promise of Compstat comes as part of a wider package of organizational reform. The originators of Compstat sought to reinvigorate and retool American police organization using the components of strategic problem solving we have defined. However, this package, as it has been developed in the context of Compstat, did not demand that American police agencies fundamentally change the traditional hierarchical organizational structure of American policing. Compstat does not demand a revolution in the organizational structure of American policing but rather seeks to harness that structure in an attempt to have traditional American police organization work better and more effectively. Compstat thus offers American police agencies the prospect of improving how they work, while reinforcing the traditional hierarchical structure of the military model of policing-- a structure that has been

under attack by scholars for much of the last two decades (Goldstein, 1990; Greene and Mastrofski, 1988; Skolnick and Bayley, 1986; Weisburd et al., 1988).

Compstat refines and reinforces traditional structures of policing. The most important structural refinement offered by Compstat is the centralization of information about street-level performance (Mastrofski and Ritti, 2000:197-198). It provides top management a way to comprehend and track the welter of highly decentralized decisions (for example, stops, arrests, field interrogations) made by rank-and-file officers, and it also provides data analysis that indicates the presumed consequences (for example, crime rates). Whether this information really tells top and mid-level commanders what they need to know to improve police performance is a matter that might be debated, but it is irrelevant to our point here. Under Compstat *top management* establishes the terms of accountability for district commanders. This accountability can switch from interrogating a district commander about the particulars of a given case to looking for causes in crime trends in his or her district. Before Compstat, top police executives did not know what questions to ask – except for the exceptional, high-visibility crime or event. Now the district commander must have a credible account to report to his or her superiors.

Thus, rather than “flattening” the organizational hierarchy, Compstat’s centralization of street-level performance information breathes new life into it, in theory making military style structures work better – or at least in closer conformance to what traditional “command and control” should look like. In defining a clear mission, and in enforcing internal accountability for middle managers, such as precinct commanders, Compstat attempts to strengthen the hierarchical features of American police agencies. In emphasizing geographic organization of command and organizational flexibility it attempts to allocate and control resources in a way that empowers that organizational hierarchy. At the same time it seeks to draw from the major

technological innovations in policing of the last two decades. This is reflected in the centrality of crime mapping and the importance of crime analysis in the Compstat model. Compstat also emphasizes problem solving. Importantly, these technological features are not seen as demanding fundamental change in the organizational structure of policing, as was assumed in the case, for example, of the implementation of community policing. Moreover, Compstat suggests that problem solving can be invested in middle management, in a way that does not require a new type of organizational approach to control, and that it can be successful. Put simply, it is easier to change the behavior of a few district commanders (particularly if their assignments are not protected by civil service) than it is hundreds or thousands of rank-and-file police officers.

Compstat accordingly offers American police agencies an approach that in theory allows them to reinforce and make more effective the traditional organizational structure of American policing, while adopting the major technological and strategic innovations of the last two decades. This in our view provides an important explanation for why Compstat has been adopted so quickly and so widely across American police agencies. It may also explain why we find a direct linear relationship between the size of a department and its adoption of Compstat. Larger departments would be expected to benefit most from an approach that attempts to make a large quasi-military structure work more efficiently and with greater centralized control.

While Compstat offers a model of innovation that reinforces rather than challenges traditional police organization, many of its prescriptions demand nonetheless significant change in the ways that American police agencies carry out their work. Compstat draws upon innovative management principles in order to reinvigorate the traditional hierarchical model of police organization. It demands that police organizations rid themselves of the “bureaucratic dysfunctions” that prevent traditional police organizations from being successful. Our findings

suggest, perhaps not surprisingly, that while police agencies are quick to adopt elements of Compstat that reinforce traditional structures and activities, they are resistant to others that demand significant change in the social organization of police activities.

When we examined the core elements of Compstat, we found that departments generally perceive themselves as following the basic elements of strategic problem solving that form the Compstat approach. However, when we looked more deeply we found that implementation of Compstat is not as complete. Many departments that claim to have implemented a Compstat-like program do not implement specific aspects of the core elements of Compstat as we have defined them. In some cases, for example in the availability of timely data and the use of crime mapping, most Compstat departments do follow the Compstat model closely. However, in other areas, for example, providing middle managers the authority to determine beat boundaries or staffing levels so that they can address problems, or in developing innovative problem solving strategies, many department's that claim to have a Compstat-like program do not closely follow the Compstat model.

Compstat departments are less likely to implement specific elements of Compstat that demand significant change in the daily work and management of police agencies. For example, it is one thing for senior police management to give middle managers responsibility for defining problem solving strategies, it is another to invest in them the authority to define staffing levels or beat boundaries. Similarly, it does not demand major change in the culture of policing to develop new technologies of data collection and analysis. However, going beyond traditional police strategies to develop innovative problem solving tactics demands a radical reorientation of the way police approach their task. We also think it consistent with our argument that police agencies are much more likely to use negative supervision approaches than positive ones in

reinforcing internal accountability in Compstat. A negative supervisory system is one of the hallmarks of the traditional bureaucratic or military approach to ensuring compliance with departmental rules and regulations (Weisburd, McElroy and Hardyman, 1988).

In comparing departments that claimed to have implemented a Compstat-like program with other departments we were struck by the extent to which the strategic problem solving model has spread to large American police organizations and not just those that claim to have implemented a Compstat-like program. On each of the six core elements of Compstat that we defined, many non-Compstat departments also report to be implementing that feature of Compstat in their organization. The differences between Compstat and non-Compstat departments were most significant when we examined mission clarification and internal accountability. There were also large differences when we examined the availability of analysis and mapping tools and their use in problem solving.

Accordingly, while the strategic problem solving model has spread widely, specific elements of this model are more likely to be found in Compstat departments. It is in our view not accidental that these Compstat and non-Compstat departments differ most on these specific elements. They reflect on the one hand the parts of the Compstat model that most reinforce the hierarchical military model of control (i.e. developing a clear organizational mission and ensuring internal accountability), and on the other the addition of tools (e.g. crime mapping and data analysis) that do not demand in themselves significant change in the nature of policing. In contrast, Compstat departments do not differ significantly from non-Compstat departments in features of geographic organization of operational command or organizational flexibility. Once again, these features present fundamental challenges to the ways in which American police agencies have traditionally functioned even within the context of the military model of

organizational control. And the fact that Compstat and non-Compstat departments both rely most on traditional police strategies for solving problems is understandable in this context. The development of innovative problem solving tactics also requires fundamental change in the ways in which the police carry out their task.

In surveying American police agencies about Compstat, our study documents what might be termed a revolution in American policing. Strategic problem solving approaches have indeed become an integral part of the American police scene. American police organizations are likely today to be concerned about defining their mission, ensuring accountability, and creating the organizational and informational environment that makes it possible to achieve success. Problem solving has also become an accepted feature of American policing. Compstat itself has indeed reinforced these features of strategic problem solving and provided a clearly articulated philosophy for their importance. But our study suggests that it would be a mistake to see Compstat as a radical departure from prevailing trends. Our study illustrates that Compstat reinforces what has already begun to be common and accepted in American police agencies. It also provides an approach to reform that empowers rather than challenges the traditional hierarchical military structure of American police organization.

Compstat and Organizational Change: Short Site Visits Report (Section 2)

This section of our report provides the second phase of our national description of Compstat programs, considered in the framework of strategic problem solving. Relying on a series of sixteen site visits to departments systematically selected from our representative survey of American police departments (see Section 1), we examine the varieties of Compstat and strategic problem solving in departments that report implementing a Compstat program and

departments that report implementing elements of strategic problem solving without instituting a Compstat program.

The report focuses on fifteen departments in some considerable detail (2 small, 6 medium and 7 large), and compares their implementation of Compstat and strategic problem solving. In addition to further testing and reinforcing findings and conclusions of our other reports, the method of multiple short site visits also leads to the potential for conclusions that have practical implications for other departments interested in whether and how to implement the elements of Compstat and strategic problem solving.

We find that the most important distinctions among departments engaged in Compstat and strategic problem solving are not found in how they are organized geographically or the level of information technology available or other elements of Compstat, or even whether they have explicitly adopted a Compstat-like program. The most important distinction is department size.

Large departments (over 500 sworn officers) that have undertaken Compstat programs are arguably more surprising in the similarities of their programs than in the differences, despite interesting variations and ranges of implementation. Whether these cities have high or low crime rates, and whatever their technological level, there are striking similarities in (1) their focus on crime reduction; (2) the extent to which they have implemented geographic organization of operational command; (3) the emphasis on holding middle managers accountable for knowledge about crime in their areas often without achieving real accountability for solving crime problems; (4) lack of emphasis on effective problem solving tactics and (5) similarly weak emphasis on organizational flexibility. These findings provide further support to our conclusions in our more general conclusion that “compstat refines and reinforces traditional structures of policing.”

Small departments (50-99 officers) that are committed to strategic problem solving are almost interchangeable in important aspects of their approaches despite huge variation in the kind of communities served and the availability of crime data. While the small departments we observed have not implemented formal Compstat programs, they have been successful in adopting many of the elements of strategic problem solving. Small departments do not have the same concerns about accountability as large departments, as their operations are more transparent. Nevertheless, they have adopted geographic organization of operational command that has strengthened the external accountability structure as well as internal accountability. These departments have been innovative and focused in developing effective problem solving tactics. They perhaps demonstrate that while Compstat has served to reinforce traditional structures of policing in larger departments while not encouraging innovation, innovation is more easily adopted without challenging traditional control structures in small departments. In vastly different small departments, elements of strategic problem solving have been and can be implemented successfully without adopting Compstat. As the Chief of one of the small departments told us, introducing Compstat into his department would be “creating a cannon to swat a fly.” While his comment was meant to address mainly the low rate of serious crime in his community, the same sense of the inappropriateness of Compstat could be deduced from the other small department, with its more serious crime problems.

In the medium range, we find some departments behaving more like the small Departments, others that are more like the large departments. Overall, implementation of Compstat was not as successful, in the sense of being not as complete, in the medium departments. Because one of the three departments we selected for intensive site visits was one of the medium size Compstat departments, we know that they were moving towards less frequent

Compstat meetings. We also know that two other departments we originally selected for short site visits had similar experiences. One was meeting so infrequently that we were unable to find a time over several months to schedule a visit; another had at least temporarily suspended its program. This may mean that Compstat adapted for medium departments may entail less frequent than weekly meetings. Or it may suggest that Compstat is less suited for many medium sized departments as a means for adopting elements of strategic problem solving than it is for large departments.

Medium size departments (100-499) tended to share with the large departments a focus on crime reduction. They varied considerably in their implementation of geographic organization of operational command. They ranged widely in their emphasis on internal accountability. They clearly had greater emphasis on innovative and effective problem solving tactics than the large departments, though they did not show the same commitment in this area as the small departments. Organizational flexibility was a complex variable. In those departments that had converted to geographic organization, the new structure operated to strain against flexibility, but also to necessitate flexibility and also to obviate the need for it. Thus it would seem that the tension we find in general between the possibility for innovation and Compstat's tendency to reinforce traditional structures is more prevalent in large departments than in medium departments.

These conclusions are important and encouraging to departments that have not developed in these directions but would like to. For it means that a great deal can be learned from other cities in their size range that have developed to a greater extent the norms and structures of strategic problem solving. Programs can be adapted successfully to different places with differing profiles and problems. The more difficult question is whether departments interested

in increasing implementation of the elements of strategic problem solving will achieve this best through adoption of Compstat. The answer may vary in part in relation to the size of the department concerned.

Findings From in Depth Field Studies in Three Departments (Section 3)

To date, studies on Compstat have tended to be in the form of brief reports that rely heavily on anecdotal evidence, or studies that concentrate on one particular case: the nation's largest police department, the NYPD. There has been little systematic analysis of the elements of Compstat and its implementation in other police departments of different size and organization. Using field observations, interviews, and survey data, this section provides an in-depth process evaluation of how Compstat works in three difference agencies, the Lowell, Minneapolis, and Newark Police Departments. These sites were selected because they had been identified as having fully implemented Compstat in the fifteen short site visit stage of our research. They differed in size, organization, crime environment, and they were receptive to having a field researcher on site for an extended period.

The main field research techniques we used were participation observation and formal interviews with city officials and police at all levels in the chain of command. At each site, researchers observed weekly or bi-weekly Compstat meetings and interviewed city and police department personnel (the mayor, city manager, chief, civilian staff, middle managers, district commanders), captains, lieutenants, detectives, first-line supervisors (sergeants), and patrol officers. We attended 36 department-level Compstat meetings (2-3 hours in length) and 8 shorter district-level or pre-Compstat meetings, and we conducted a total of 70 formal interviews. The interviews ranged in length from twenty minutes to two hours, with many exceeding the allotted time. We supplemented these with numerous informal conversations with personnel of all ranks.

In addition, we attended department-level command staff, internal affairs, and criminal investigations meetings to help us situate Compstat within a larger context. Any documents that could help develop our understanding of Compstat were also collected. These included all Compstat materials provided to the district commanders (maps, spreadsheets, and crime analyses), and internal department memos, research grants, newspaper and WEB articles, and community handouts. Finally, if Compstat has the profound effects on police officers suggested by its proponents, these changes should register with the rank and file. In order to assess the impact of Compstat on those at the bottom of the police organization, a 10-15 minute, anonymous, self-administered survey was distributed to those patrol officers who regularly attended roll call on the late, day, and early night shifts. The survey was distributed to a total of 450 patrol officers and we used both simple descriptive and bivariate approaches in our analysis of their responses.

Similarities and Differences Between Compstat Programs

There was significant variation across sites among some of the Compstat elements while others were very similar. While all three departments valued crime fighting, only Minneapolis had established a goal to reduce crime by a specific percentage. Lowell's ambitious mission was to "become the safest city of its size in America" and Newark had not incorporated a mission statement into daily operations. In contrast to these differences, internal accountability functioned almost identically across all three programs as middle managers felt considerable pressure to reduce crime in their respective beats. Lowell and Newark had devolved decision-making authority down to district commanders who had 24-hour responsibility for their beats, but Minneapolis had succeeded in moving it one level lower to sector lieutenants. Similar to geographic organization of operational command, there was variation in organizational

flexibility. In Lowell the most general practice of resource reallocation was for district commanders to do so on an *ad hoc* or informal basis. This characteristic was common across departments, but Minneapolis had sought to increase organizational flexibility by assigning each district commander his/her own community response team. In contrast, Newark relied upon the creation of task forces to respond quickly and effectively to emerging problems. All three departments used timely crime data and computer mapping in their identification of crime patterns, however daily computer crime maps were only available in Minneapolis. Finally, there was very little variation among departments in terms of problem solving: leadership encouraged innovative thinking, but all three continued to rely upon traditional strategies to solve crime problems.

Key Challenges and Opportunities Associated with Each Element

Although mission statements present an opportunity to show management's commitment to a specific objective and as means to motivate police officers throughout the organization, their effects are complex. Not only do they present chiefs with a dilemma (what happens when the department fails to meet its crime reduction goal?), they may undermine widespread commitment to the very objective that they are trying to promote. Minneapolis was the only department to establish a tangible and specific crime reduction goal, reinforced through training, and supported with deliberate operational tactics (zero tolerance policing and directed patrol) for its accomplishment, but there was lowest buy-in to the Compstat mission among the rank and file. Some had disassociated zero tolerance policing from the department's mission and others regarded it as conflicting with other equally worthy organizational goals.

Weekly Compstat meetings were an effective mechanism for establishing accountability among middle managers, but in the absence of a similar mechanism for the lower ranks,

accountability was not diffused with the same intensity down the organizational structure. As a consequence of this concentration of responsibility, the rank and file experienced decision making under Compstat as a series of commands emanating from middle managers. Rank-and-file autonomy in Minneapolis was further constrained by the department's focus on directed patrol and zero tolerance policing. There had been modest to significant shifts in geographic management as command authority had been shifted down to middle managers and some functionally-specialized units previously located in headquarters had been reassigned to the districts and placed under the direct supervision of the district commander. This decentralization of decision-making authority and resources contrasted sharply with the centralization of these features under the traditional model of policing. District reassignments, however, were limited to a handful of detectives in Lowell and Newark, except in Minneapolis where each district commander controlled his/her own property crimes investigation unit, community response team and CCP/Safe unit.

Despite an increase in district resources and the decision-making autonomy of district commanders, top management continued to play an important role in how decisions were made, especially on critical issues (e.g., allocation of resources). Compstat sought to encourage the rapid redeployment of resources to emerging crime problems, but traditional internal and external constraints -- limits on manpower, conventional approaches to resource allocation, i.e., the equitable distribution of resources according to non-crime factors such as the size of the population and/or geographic area, and city politics -- continued to limit organizational flexibility. Timely crime data were a feature of each department's organization and its operation and facilitated the identification of crime problems at the command level. Nevertheless, middle managers relied upon information contained in daily police reports (using maps less frequently)

to inform, but not drive, decision making. Not only did they receive no training in crime analysis, but aggregate data and descriptive statistics were only available a few days prior to Compstat meetings. Although innovation was rare, it was encouraged under Compstat. The absence of an in-depth follow-up mechanism that evaluated the successes or failures of crime strategies prevented each department from learning about what worked best.

Coherence of Compstat Program

According to Compstat's principal proponents, Compstat's various elements interweave to form a coherent program with its own logical integrity. This report challenges this perspective by suggesting that some elements generate their own internal inconsistencies and may not integrate with one another as neatly as many advocates and prior observers have argued. Finally, certain elements (mission clarification and internal accountability) may conflict with existing programs, such as community policing.

Compstat has been widely praised for re-invigorating the crime control function of the police, but our research suggested that in departments that take community policing seriously, management might be giving mixed messages about what "values" are really important. The more an organization responsible for a variety of important tasks focuses its limited resources on only one goal, the more likely it is that the goal will be met with disaffection among those whom it is intended to inspire. Thus, the implementation of mission statements reveals a potential internal contradiction that might generate organizational dissonance rather than unity.

Compstat's singular focus on reducing crime appeared to conflict directly with the numerous goals of community policing (e.g., reducing crime through zero tolerance policing and fostering closer police-community relations through neighborhood programs).

The element of organizational flexibility also embodied certain inherent contradictions. We noted that allocating additional resources to the districts (*within* district flexibility) necessarily reduced the resources available *between* districts and vice versa -- departments that borrowed personnel to form task forces (an increase in between district flexibility) had to draw upon district resources thereby reducing within district flexibility and compromising the geographic organization of operational command.

In addition to internal consistencies within certain of its elements, Compstat may generate paradoxes between elements. The dominance of internal accountability undermines or interferes with two other key elements: organizational flexibility and innovative problem-solving. Since district commanders were held accountable for their own areas they were reluctant to share their resources with other district commanders. Hence, internal accountability hindered the flexible reallocation of resources among districts. In addition, internal accountability undermined brainstorming during Compstat meetings and pressured district commanders to place a higher priority on acting quickly than acting effectively. Subordinates and peers of the district commanders were unlikely to make brainstorming suggestions during Compstat out of respect for the district commanders (they did not want their comments misconstrued as criticisms) so collaboration and information-sharing, two key features of the innovation process, were constrained. Moreover, since district commanders had already implemented their crime strategies by the time Compstat rolled around, there was little need for discussion of alternative crime-fighting strategies.

Finally, several of Compstat's elements (geographic organization of operational command and using crime data for problem solving) obviously intersect with key features of community policing and problem-oriented policing. Despite this overlap, in reinforcing the ideal

of centralized command and control -- with top management establishing performance criteria for middle managers, holding them accountable, and controlling resources -- Compstat conflicts with one of the key components of community policing: the decentralization of decision-making authority. Furthermore, in encouraging middle managers to react quickly and decisively to emerging problems it conflicts with problem-oriented policing's focus on innovation. Middle managers are now as concerned about response time as patrol officers once were. Compstat has just moved reactive policing to another level. More innovative police response would require that district commanders have sufficient time to foster, develop, and test long-term preventive plans, yet Compstat has made this process more difficult.

Compstat in one Major City: Insights and Findings (Section 4)

Using field observations, interviews, and survey data, this report provides an in-depth process evaluation of how Compstat works in a much smaller police agency (200-300 sworn), the Lowell Police Department.

Operational Level of Each Element

In assaying the degree to which each Compstat element was part of the department's structure and routine (very high, high, moderate, low), we discovered that there was considerable variation within the program. Mission clarification and internal accountability ranked high and very high (as was the case in our national survey), respectively: although the crime-fighting mission was not a very visible part of daily operations, it was widely recognized and the goal of reducing crime widely shared. In regard to internal accountability, middle managers were highly motivated to do something about crime problems that arose. We estimated the dosage of geographic organization of operational command as moderate: middle managers were given 24-

hour responsibility for their beats and granted broad access to departmental resources, but the chief continued to exercise decision-making authority over them. Organizational flexibility remained low: top leadership did encourage teamwork and coordination, but the strategic reallocation of resources was rare and operated on an *ad hoc* basis. Crime data were an integral part of the rapid identification of emerging crime problems, but middle managers did not analyze data to figure out exactly how to respond. Consequently, we assayed data-driven problem identification as moderate. We estimated that both innovative problem-solving and external accountability as low. On occasion top and middle managers looked beyond their own experiences to innovate and experiment, but they continued to rely heavily upon traditional responses to crime problems. Finally, local citizens had very little access to Compstat, either through meetings or through Compstat-generated crime data in the local press.

Challenges and Opportunities Associated with Each Element

Compstat in Lowell worked counter to the notion of many community-policing advocates that line officers must be granted greater decision-making autonomy. Compstat sought to encourage the rapid redeployment of resources to emerging crime problems, but traditional internal and external constraints (limits on manpower and city politics) continued to limit organizational flexibility. Despite the need for fairly sophisticated computer equipment, our case study suggested that small departments can implement Compstat fairly inexpensively. Crime data were very helpful in the rudimentary identification of crime problems, but a more sophisticated level of crime analysis would have required significantly more training. Innovative problem-solving was rare, with the police continuing to rely on traditional tactics that their own experience suggested worked. The absence of a systematic follow-up mechanism might have contributed to this lack of innovation since there was no means of evaluating which crime

strategies were most effective. Lastly, Compstat could be used to generate external support for police departments and to provide some timely information on the department's goals and its progress toward reaching them. Nevertheless, departments may be cautious about sharing information since the provision of detailed crime statistics and problem-solving efforts for external consumption can expose the police to the unwelcome pressure of increased criticism.

Coherence of Compstat Program

According to Compstat's principal proponents, Compstat's various elements interweave to form a coherent program with its own logical integrity. This report challenges this perspective by suggesting that its elements may not integrate with one another as neatly as many advocates and prior observers have argued. The dominance of internal accountability undermines or interferes with two other key elements: organizational flexibility and innovative problem-solving. Since district commanders were held accountable for their own areas they were reluctant to share their resources with other district commanders. Hence, internal accountability hindered the flexible reallocation of resources among districts. In addition, internal accountability undermined brainstorming during Compstat meetings and pressured district commanders to place a higher priority on acting quickly than acting effectively. Subordinates and peers of the district commanders were unlikely to make brainstorming suggestions during Compstat out of respect for the district commanders (they did not want their comments misconstrued as criticisms) so collaboration and information-sharing, two key features of the innovation process, were constrained. Moreover, since district commanders had already implemented their crime strategies by the time Compstat rolled around, there was little need for discussion of alternative crime-fighting strategies.

References

- Anselin, Luc, Jacqueline Cohen, David Cook, Wilpen Gorr and George Tita. 2000. "Spatial Analyses of Crime." In David Duffee, David McDowall, Brian Ostrom, Robert D. Crutchfield, Stephen D. Mastrofski, and Lorraine Green Mazerolle, eds., *Measurement and Analysis of Crime and Justice*, pp. 213-62. Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice.
- Beer, Michael. 1980. *Organization Change and Development: A Systems View*. Santa Monica, CA: Goodyear Publishing Company.
- Berman, Jesse. 1987. *Police Administration and Progressive Reform*. New York: Greenwood.
- Bratton, William J. 1996. "Cutting Crime and Restoring Order: What America Can Learn from New York's Finest." Heritage Foundation *Lectures and Educational Programs*, Heritage Lecture #573. Available from www.nationalsecurity.org/heritage/library/categories/crimelaw/lect573.html.
- Bratton, William. 1998. *Turnaround: How America's Top Cop Reversed the Crime Epidemic*. New York: Random House.
- Bratton, William J. 1999. "Great Expectations: How Higher Expectations for Police Departments Can Lead to a Decrease in Crime." In Robert H. Langworthy, ed., *Measuring What Matters: Proceedings from the Policing Research Institute Meetings*, pp. 11-26. Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice.
- Bureau of Justice Statistics. 1998. *Census of State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies, 1996*. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics.
- Finkelstein, Sydney and Donald C. Hambrick. 1996. *Strategic Leadership: Top Executives and Their Effects on Organizations*. St. Paul, MN: West Publishing Co.
- Giuliani, Rudolph W. and Howard Safir. 1998. "Compstat: Leadership in Action." New York City: New York City Police Department.
- Goldstein, Herman. 1990. *Problem-Oriented Policing*. New York: McGraw-Hill.
- Greene, Jack R. and Stephen D. Mastrofski. 1988. *Community Policing: Rhetoric or Reality*. New York: Praeger.
- Gurwitt, Rob. 1998. "The Comeback of the Cops." *Governing* January:14-19.
- Kelling, George L. and Catherine M. Coles. 1996. *Fixing Broken Windows: Restoring Order and Reducing Crime in Our Communities*. New York: Free Press.

- Maple, Jack. 1999. *The Crime Fighter: Putting the Bad Guys Out of Business*. New York, NY: Doubleday.
- Mastrofski, Stephen D. and R. Richard Ritti. 2000. "Making Sense of Community Policing: A Theory-Based Analysis." *Police Practice and Research Journal* 12:183-210.
- McDonald, Phyllis Parshall, Sheldon Greenberg and William Bratton. 2001. *Managing Police Operations: Implementing the NYPD Crime Control Model Using COMPSTAT*. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing.
- Merton Robert K. 1940. "Bureaucratic Structure and Personality." *Social Forces* 18:560-568.
- Micklethwait, John and Adrian Wooldridge. 1996. *The Witch Doctors: Making Sense of the Management Gurus*. New York: Random House.
- Osborne, D. and T. Gaebler. 1992. *Reinventing Government*. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
- Sayre, Wallace Stanley and Herbert Kaufman. 1960. *Governing New York City: Politics in the Metropolis*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
- Silverman, Eli B. 1996. "Mapping Change: How the New York City Police Department Re-engineered Itself to Drive Down Crime." *Law Enforcement News* December.
- Silverman, Eli B. 1999. *NYPD Battles Crime: Innovative Strategies in Policing*. Boston, MA: Northeastern University Press.
- Simons, Robert. 1995. "Control in an age of empowerment." *Harvard Business Review* 73:1-7.
- Skolnick, Jerome H. and David H. Bayley. 1986. *The New Blue Line: Police Innovations in Six American Cities*. New York: Free Press.
- Weisburd, David, Jerome McElroy and Patricia Hardyman. 1988. "Challenges to Supervision In Community Policing: Observations on a Pilot Project." *American Journal of Police* 7 (2): 29-50.

Section 1

Compstat and Organizational Change: Findings from a National Survey

David Weisburd, Ph.D.

Stephen Mastrofski, Ph.D.

Ann Marie McNally, M.A.

Rosann Greenspan, Ph.D.

POLICE FOUNDATION

**Section 1:
Compstat and Organizational Change:
Findings from a National Survey**

Table of Contents

I.	Introduction.....	1
II.	Compstat and Organizational Change: Historical Background and Core Elements	4
III.	Research Methods.....	14
IV.	How Widely has Compstat Been Adopted and What Types of Departments are Implementing Compstat?.....	18
V.	Are Key Components of the Compstat Approach Implemented in Compstat Departments?	25
	Taking a Closer Look at the Core Elements of Compstat Departments	28
	Mission Clarification	29
	Internal Accountability	30
	Geographic Organization of Operational Command	32
	Organizational Flexibility	33
	Data Driven Problem Identification and Assessment	35
	Innovative Problem Solving Tactics.....	35
VI.	Do Compstat Departments Differ from Non-Compstat Departments in their Implementation of Core Elements of the Compstat Model?	41
	A Detailed Comparison of Compstat and Non-Compstat Departments	43
VII.	Discussion and Conclusions	56
VIII.	References.....	64

Appendices

Appendix I: Managing Problem Solving in Police Agencies: A National Survey

Appendix II: Drawing the Sample for the Police Foundation's Compstat Survey

Appendix III: Survey Cover Letter to Police Departments

List of Tables

Table 1: Response Rate For The Sample.....	16
Table 2: Response Rate By Region Of Country	16
Table 3: Has Your Department Implemented A Compstat-Like Program	18
Table 4: Was This Feature (Of Compstat) Implemented Six Or More Years Ago?.....	20
Table 5: Familiarity With New York City’s Compstat By Department Size (Small Agency Sample Included)	21
Table 6: Top Five Goals Pursued By Chief Executive In Last Year: Items That Showed Statistically Significant Difference By Implementation Of Compstat	24
Table 7: Are “Compstat” Departments Implementing Core Elements Of Compstat?.....	27
Table 8: Specific Items Reflecting Mission Clarification.....	29
Table 9: Punishment As A Means Of Ensuring Internal Accountability In Compstat Department	31
Table 10: Reward As A Means Of Ensuring Internal Accountability In Compstat Departments	32
Table 11: Are Middle Managers Given Authority For Determining Problem Solving Strategies?	32
Table 12: Are Middle Managers Allowed To Determine Beat Boundaries Or Routine Staffing Levels?	33
Table 13: The Department Allows Middle Mangers To Approve Flexible Hours Or Mobilize Swat Teams	34
Table 14: Organizational Flexibility In Addressing A Specific Problem.....	34
Table 15: Availability And Use Of Crime Analysis And Mapping Software	35
Table 16: Typical Lag Between The Time An Officer Follows The Following Reports And Their Being Available For Computer Reporting By The Agency.	36
Table 17: Is Technology Used For Problem Solving?.....	37
Table 18: How Frequently Are Data, Analyses Or Crime Maps Available To People Directly Responsible For Problem Solving?	38

Table 19: Deciding Upon Problem Solving Strategies	39
Table 20: Tactics Used To Solve Priority Crime/Disorder Problem In Last 12 Months (In Order Of Frequency).....	40
Table 21: Comparing Compstat And Non-Compstat Departments On Core Compstat Elements.....	42
Table 22: Mission Clarification	43
Table 23: Internal Accountability	45
A. Punishment As A Means Of Ensuring Internal Accountability.....	45
B. Reward As A Means Of Ensuring Internal Accountability.....	45
Table 24: Geographic Organization Of Operational Command.....	46
Table 25: Organizational Flexibility (General Items).....	47
Table 26: Organizational Flexibility In Dealing With A High Priority Problem	47
Table 27: Timely Data	48
Table 28: The Availability Of Crime Mapping And Other Crime Analysis Tools	48
Table 29: Is There A Difference Between The Types Of Departments And The Technology They Use For Problem Solving?	49
Table 30: Is There A Difference Between The Types Of Departments And If The Data Gets To People Directly Responsible For Problem Solving?.....	50
Table 31: Deciding Upon Problem Solving Strategies.....	51
Table 32: Tactics Used To Solve Priority Crime/Disorder Problem In Last 12 Months (In Order Of Frequency).....	52
Table 33: Summary Of Overall Findings: Contrasting Compstat And Non-Compstat Departments.....	54

List of Figures

Figure 1: Percent Of Departments Of A Certain Size In The Sample As Contrasted With The BJS Directory Survey17

Figure 2: The Year Of Compstat Implementation (Large Department Sample Only)19

Figure 3: Where Compstat Departments Attended A Compstat Meeting20

Figure 4: Implementation Of Compstat And Department Size (Small Agency Sample Included)22

Figure 5: Implementation Of Compstat By Region (Large Department Sample Only)23

I. Introduction

Introduced as recently as 1994 by then Commissioner William Bratton of the New York City police department, Compstat has already been recognized as a major innovation in American policing. Police departments across the country are turning their attention to Compstat to invigorate police management by combining state-of-the-art management principles with cutting edge crime analysis and geographic information systems technology. In the few years since its appearance, it has been reported that police departments around the country have begun to adopt Compstat or variations of it (Law Enforcement News, 1997; Maas, 1998; McDonald, 1998). The program has received national publicity (including awards from Harvard University and former Vice President Al Gore) and has been credited by its originators and proponents with impressive reductions in crime and improvements in neighborhood quality of life in New York City. Other cities, such as violence-plagued New Orleans, have reported success with their versions of Compstat (Gurwitt, 1998; Remnick, 1997), and agencies from around the nation and world are flocking to New York City to learn more about the program (Maas, 1998).

The attention that American police leaders and elected officials have shown this police management reform indicates it may be poised to become the turn of the century ideal of what it means to be a progressively managed department, much as Theodore Roosevelt's "good government" approach to policing did a century ago (Berman, 1987). Just as historical assessment of Roosevelt's policing reforms shows, NYPD's Compstat did not emerge full-blown and unprecedented in New York City in the mid-1990s. Commissioner Bratton and his staff drew heavily on management principles that have received acclaim as state-of-the-art and forward-looking (Bratton 1998; Micklethwait and Wooldridge, 1996). These principles include developing in management a commitment and capacity to: (a) clarifying the agency's mission by

focusing on its basic values and embodying them in tangible objectives, (b) giving priority to operational objectives over administrative ones, (c) organizing to simplify managerial accountability for achieving those objectives, (d) becoming more adept at scanning the organization's environment to identify problems early and develop strategies to respond (e.g., being "data-driven"), (e) increasing organizational flexibility to implement the most promising strategies, and (f) learning about what works and what does not by following through with empirical assessment of what happened. These, among other features of management style, have come to be characterized as "strategic leadership" and "strategic choice" (Beer, 1980:45; Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1996).

Elements of strategic leadership date back to Philip Selznick (1957), but they received tremendous attention in the United States in the 1980s, when organizational development leaders made them bywords of progressive management in the private sector (Micklethwait and Wooldrige, 1996). Since then, elements of this approach have been introduced to government agencies in general (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992), and policing in particular, under the rubric of problem-oriented (Goldstein, 1990) and community policing (Moore and Stephens, 1991). Compstat brings many of these management prescriptions together in a single program customized for police organizations. We characterize Compstat and its related features generically as "strategic problem solving." We find the descriptive "strategic" particularly apropos because it highlights the thrust of this reform to establish a "big-picture" approach to police management's need to deal with an uncertain and unstable environment.¹

1. McDonald (1998:34) offers a definition that resonates with treating Compstat as strategic problem solving: "...[I]t should be considered enhanced leadership focused on a restructuring and integration of police operations driven by a scientific analysis of data. It is a reconfiguration of the relationship between patrol, investigations and all other specialized units. It is a shift in departmental priorities from administration to crime control, especially by the chief of police and other high-ranking staff. In short, it is clearly an operations management program."

To date there has been very little systematic analysis of Compstat programs in policing. Most of what we know about Compstat comes from those involved in its implementation, and relatively little is available on the various elements of strategic problem solving it encompasses except through anecdotes and small-scale case studies (Sparrow et al., 1990; Moore, 1995). There is concern about even defining what Compstat is and is not (McDonald, 1998), suggesting that we may be entering a period of debate over definitions similar to that which followed the rapid popularity of “community policing” as a reform concept over a decade ago (Greene and Mastrofski, 1988). Further, there is considerable debate about the validity of its proponents’ claims. Criminologists tend to be skeptical of a simple, one-source explanation that changes in police organization can account for a decline in crime rates (e.g. see Eck and Maguire, 2001). Although many police leaders are excited about the promise of this approach, others call it little more than “good luck” (Bouza, 1997), and many remain cautious about the risks of raising public expectations beyond the capacity of police to deliver results. To date, there has been no comprehensive empirical assessment of what Compstat is, much less, how much credit it deserves for declining crime rates (Witkin, 1998). The promises and popularity of Compstat make it a prime target for a thorough and unbiased national program of assessment of what it is and what it can accomplish.

This report provides the first national description of Compstat programs, considered in the framework of strategic problem solving. Relying on a representative survey of American police departments conducted by the Police Foundation we examine the diffusion of Compstat and factors that are associated with the implementation of Compstat. Has Compstat in fact spread widely across the landscape of American policing since 1994? What types of police departments are more or less likely to adopt this innovation and when adopted how do

departments learn about what Compstat requires? Our report also examines whether the implementation of Compstat in police agencies represents a substantive change in for American policing. Do police agencies that claim to have adopted the Compstat model actually implement core elements of Compstat programs? How deeply have such core elements penetrated into Compstat departments? Finally, do Compstat departments differ significantly from non-Compstat departments in regard to the basic elements of strategic problem solving?

II. Compstat and Organizational Change: Historical Background and Core Elements

The Compstat idea emerged in the immediate context of a newly elected local administration in New York City that promised to gain control over crime and disorder. But viewed in the broader context, the impetus for these changes came from several sources. First are the failures, both perceived and documented, of “traditional” policing (Fogelson, 1977; Kelling and Moore, 1988): entrenched bureaucracies that focused more on administration than real performance, rising crime rates, increasing fear of crime, feelings of inequitable treatment among disadvantaged and minority groups, studies showing that traditional enforcement approaches had no effect on crime (e.g., 911 policing, preventive patrol, and follow-up criminal investigations), and competition from the private sector in the form of corporation-provided security services. In this context, as Moore (1997: 67) suggested, “Commissioner Bratton’s bold statement – reacceptance of responsibility for controlling crime – was a very important moment in leadership of the criminal justice system.” Second is the ambiguity surrounding setting priorities in community policing, and especially the challenge of finding ways to harness the diffuse forces that pressure a police agency once it commits to decentralizing decision making, increasing the participation of the rank and file, and encouraging community input in setting

priorities and partnership strategies with the police (Mastrofski, 1998). Bratton defined this for NYPD as its community policing approach losing its focus on the ultimate goal, crime reduction (1998).

On the positive side, four rapidly growing and interrelated trends made strategic problem solving in the context of Compstat both appealing to police leaders and feasible to implement. First among these is problem-oriented policing (Goldstein, 1990), an approach that, above all else, stresses the importance of data-driven decision making about what to do. A second trend is the growth in knowledge about crime and effective responses to crime (Sherman et al., 1997).² A third trend is the ready availability of rapidly growing technology in computers, data management and analysis, geographic information systems, and communications – all of which make it possible to process large amounts of information and disseminate it to diverse users on a timely basis (Anselin et al., 2000; Weisburd and McEwen, 1997). Finally, police leaders have become increasingly open to the prescriptions of progressive management, communicated to them by consultants, trainers, and contractors outside policing who apply the most recent terms, methods, and approaches to strategic management developed for corporations in the private sector (Micklethwait and Wooldridge, 1996). These positive and negative trends have attracted and driven police leaders toward an increasingly receptive view of strategic problem solving.

A brief review of the emergence of Compstat in New York helps us understand what Compstat is and why it has emerged. The particulars of Compstat's origins in New York City have been described in considerable detail in several available works (Bratton, 1998; Kelling and Coles, 1996; McDonald 1998; Silverman, 1999). For our purposes, we note that the impetus behind Compstat was Commissioner Bratton's intention to make a huge organization, legendary

2. Especially relevant to the data-driven decision-making and flexibility elements are research on the effectiveness of "hotspot" policing and police crackdowns (Braga, 2001; Sherman, 1990; Sherman and Weisburd, 1992; Weisburd and Green, 1995).

for its sluggish resistance to change, responsive to his leadership, a leadership that had clearly staked out crime reduction and improving the quality of life in the neighborhoods of New York City as its top priorities (Bratton, 1999). Based on his belief in principles of strategic leadership and his own experiences with Boston and the New York City Transit Police, Bratton and his lieutenants set out to disprove skeptics who claimed that the police can do little about crime and disorder.

At the outset, Bratton and his administration's analysis of NYPD's problems revealed several deficiencies that have long been identified as forms of bureaucratic dysfunction (Merton, 1940). First, the organization lacked a sense of the importance of its fundamental crime control mission. Second, NYPD was not setting high enough expectations about what its officers could do and accomplish; consequently a lot less was getting done than was possible. Third, too many police managers had become moribund, content to continue doing things the way they had always been done, rather than searching for better ways to accomplish results. The police were not taking advantage of new theories and studies that highlighted promising strategies to reduce crime and improve the quality of life in neighborhoods. Fourth, the department was beset with archaic, unproductive organizational structures that did more to facilitate red tape and turf battles than to promote teamwork to use scarce resources effectively; operational commanders were "handcuffed" by headquarters, lacking authority to customize crime control strategies to their precinct's needs. Finally, the department was "flying blind"; it lacked timely, accurate information about crime and public safety problems as they were emerging; it had little capacity to identify crime patterns; and it had difficulty tracking how its own resources were being used. And middle managers were not in the habit of monitoring these phenomena, thus serving as a weak link in the chain of internal accountability between top brass and street-level police

employees.

Bratton used a “textbook” approach to dealing with these problems, following the major prescriptions offered by organizational development experts to accomplish organizational change (Beer, 1980). He brought in outsiders (both to his staff and as consultants) to obtain a candid diagnosis of the organization’s strengths and weaknesses. He incorporated both top-down and bottom-up processes to implement change.³ He sought and obtained early indicators of the success of the change efforts, and he found ways to reinforce the individual efforts of his precinct commanders and the rank-and-file – by using both positive and negative incentives (Bratton, 1996).

Strictly speaking, Compstat refers to a “strategic control system” developed to gather and disseminate information on NYPD’s crime problems and track efforts to deal with them. As such, it addresses the problem of inadequate information described above, and in this sense, it is a structure intended to serve the implementation of NYPD’s Crime Control and Quality of Life Strategies (Office of Management Analysis and Planning n.d.: 1). But it has become shorthand for the full range of strategic problem solving in the department. At the core of the approach are four crime reduction principles: (1) accurate and timely intelligence about crime made available at all levels in the organization, (2) the selection of the most effective tactics for specific problems, (3) rapid deployment of people and resources to implement those tactics, and (4) “relentless” follow-up and assessment to learn what happened and make subsequent tactical adjustments as necessary (Bratton, 1998; Maple, 1999; McDonald, 1998; Office of Management

3. Top-down elements included formal statements and “decrees” about the department’s new direction, the introduction and improvement of crime-tracking technology, the replacement of managers unable or unwilling to act on the changes (replacing half of the precinct commanders in the first year), and instituting a number of structural changes that form the core of Compstat. Bottom up changes focused on the use of focus groups and re-engineering committees and reports (Silverman, 1996).

Analysis and Planning n.d.; Silverman, 1999). These and other elements of NYPD's Compstat approach are most visibly displayed in the twice-weekly Compstat "Crime Control Strategy Meetings," during which precinct commanders appear before several of the department's top brass to report on crime problems in their precincts and what they are doing about it.

This occurs in a data-saturated environment in which Compstat reports play a central role. Precinct crime statistics and other information about the precinct and its problems are projected onto screens, and commanders respond to queries about what they are doing to deal with those problems. Crime data that were once three to six months late are now available to precinct commanders on a weekly basis *for the past week*. The report includes weekly, monthly, and annual tallies of crime complaints, arrests, summonses, shooting incidents and victims, organized by precinct, borough, and citywide. In addition, electronic pin maps are generated to show how crimes and police activities cluster geographically. Hour-of-the day analyses and "crime spike" analyses (profiling precincts with sudden crime increases) are also carried out. In addition, the precinct commander's background is profiled, as well as other features of the precinct under his or her command (e.g., demographic data, workload data, and various activities).

Compstat reports serve as the database for commanders to demonstrate their understanding of the crime problems in their areas and discuss future strategies with the top brass and other commanders present. Cross-unit coordination is planned if necessary, and all of the plans are thoroughly documented. When the precinct is reselected for participation in a Compstat meeting, the commander must demonstrate that he or she has followed upon these strategies. At first, precincts knew when it would be their turn in the rotation and there was a concern "that some precincts were slacking off because of the predictable Compstat schedule" (Silverman, 1999:118). As a result, as Silverman (1999:118) notes, in "the summer of 1996

Commissioner Safir switched off Compstat's automatic pilot by killing the established schedule. Precincts and boroughs now learn only a few days prior to a scheduled meeting whether they will be requested to appear." Sometimes commanders bring subordinates with them so that they can report on their efforts and receive recognition. The press and other outside agencies are sometimes invited to attend these sessions, with as many as 200 people in attendance, thus providing "great theater," and developing in the public a greater awareness of how the department is being managed (Bratton, 1998:296).

But there is far more to Compstat than this (Giuliani and Safir, 1998; Gurwitt, 1998). We identify six key elements that have emerged as central to the development of strategic problem solving in Compstat programs: mission clarification; internal accountability; geographic organization of command; organizational flexibility; data driven problem identification and assessment; and innovative problem solving.⁴ They form together a comprehensive approach for mobilizing police agencies to identify, analyze and solve public safety problems.

The first element of this approach is *Mission Clarification*. Compstat assumes that police agencies, like military organizations, must have a clearly defined organizational mission in order to function effectively. In Compstat, top management is responsible for clarifying and exalting the core features of the department's mission that serve as the overarching reason for the organization's existence. Mission clarification includes a demonstration of management's commitment to specific goals for which the organization and its leaders can be held accountable -

4. Arguably, "external accountability" has also been seen as an important component of Compstat. In this context the department makes its efforts visible to other key constituents (e.g., the courts, correctional agencies, other government services) and the general public. Publicity provides a way for "stakeholders" to know what the department is doing and accomplishing, and is essential for building support for these efforts. In New York, Bratton "widened access to the department for the press, researchers, and others. The press welcomed pre-packaged communications messages. Some carefully cultivated members of the media were offered advance information about personnel changes, upcoming crime strategies, and crime data. Given entry to the inner sanctum, tabloids responded with favorable stories. Thus, Bratton's crime reduction messages were repeated frequently, helping to push the police force into an aggressive law enforcement mind-set" (Silverman, 1999:91).

- such as reducing crime by ten percent in a year (Bratton, 1998).

But in Compstat it is not enough to define a mission for police organization. A system of *Internal Accountability* must be established so that people in the organization are held directly responsible for carrying out organizational goals. For many middle managers in cities that have adopted Compstat this is the most critical component of the Compstat model. For example, in one smaller city we studied, a sector Captain noted simply that Compstat was an “accountability process.” Compstat meetings in which operational commanders are held accountable for knowing their commands, being well acquainted with the problems in the command, and accomplishing measurable results in reducing those problems -- or at least demonstrating a diligent effort to learn from the experience-- form the most visible component of this accountability system. However, while such meetings are the visual embodiment of Compstat, they are part of a more general approach in which police managers are held accountable and can expect consequences if they are not knowledgeable about or have not responded to problems that fit within the mission of the department. As Maple argues: “Nobody ever got in trouble because crime numbers on their watch went up. I designed the process knowing that an organization as large as the NYPD never gets to Nirvana. Trouble arose only if the commanders didn’t know why the numbers were up or didn’t have a plan to address the problems” (Maple, 1999:33). Internal accountability in Compstat establishes middle managers as the central actors in carrying out the organizational mission, and holds them accountable for the actions of their subordinates.

While Compstat holds police managers to a high level of accountability, it does not do so without identifying practices that give commanders the authority to carry out the Compstat mission. Middle managers are empowered in this model through the concept of *Geographic Organization of Operational Command*. Operational command is focused on the policing of

territories, so central decision-making authority about police operations is delegated to commanders with territorial responsibility (e.g., precincts). Functionally differentiated units and specialists (e.g., patrol, community police officers, detectives, narcotics, vice, juvenile, traffic, etc.) are expected to be placed under the command of the precinct commander, or arrangements are made to facilitate their responsiveness to the commander's needs. Silverman notes in terms of New York, that "rather than allow headquarters to determine staffing and deployment on a citywide basis, it was decided that reducing crime, fear of crime, and disorder would flow from patrol borough and precinct coordination of selected enforcement efforts" (1999:85).

Related to the idea of geographic orientation of command is that of *Organizational Flexibility*. Middle managers are not only given the authority to make decisions that will empower them to be effective in responding to problems, they are also provided with the resources necessary to be successful in their efforts. Compstat requires that the organization develop the capacity and the habit of changing established routines as needed to mobilize resources when and where they are needed for strategic application. For example, in New York "commanding officers (COs) were authorized to allow their anticrime units to perform decoy operations, a function that had previously been left to the Citywide Street Crime Unit. Precinct personnel were permitted to execute felony arrests warrants, and COs could use plainclothes officers for vice enforcement activities. Patrol cops were encouraged to make drug arrests and to enforce quality-of-life laws" (Silverman, 1999:85).

We noted earlier the importance of data to the Compstat mission. Bratton (1998:233) suggests that the name itself is short for "computer statistics meetings," though others have linked it to the name of the specific computer program used when Compstat was first developed (Silverman, 1999:98). Whatever the origins of the acronym, *Data-Driven Problem Identification*

and Assessment is a central component of Compstat. It is not enough to establish goals, to hold people responsible for achieving them, and to provide them with the authority and resources needed for response. Managers must have the data necessary to define and analyze such problems. Compstat requires that data are made available to identify and analyze problems and to track and assess the department's response. Data are made available to all relevant personnel on a timely basis and in a readily usable format. According to Maple, "we needed to gather crime numbers for every precinct daily, not once every six months, to spot problems early. We needed to map the crimes daily too, so we could identify hot spots, patterns, and trends and analyze their underlying causes" (Maple, 1999:32). Innovations in crime analysis, particularly in geographic analysis of crime, were quickly adopted in New York and other well known Compstat programs.

In our discussion of strategic problem solving, we identified the importance of problem solving models in the development of Compstat. *Innovative Problem Solving Tactics* are a central element in the Compstat model. Middle managers are expected to select responses because they offer the best prospects of success, not because they are "what we have always done." Innovation and experimentation are encouraged; use of "best available knowledge" about practices is expected. In this context, police are expected to look beyond their own experiences by drawing upon knowledge gained in other departments and from innovations in theory and research about crime prevention.

These features constitute the core of organization development prescriptions that may be associated with the Compstat model. They focus on the twin crises faced by contemporary bureaucracies: how to secure the commitment of workers to the organization's mission and how to make the organization adaptable to unpredictable, unstable demands and environments (Beer, 1980). Compstat is an application of organization development principles that looks for and

attempts to correct incongruities between the police department's environment, structures, processes, and people. According to Bratton (1996), for example, crime in NYC was high and only beginning to decline slowly, and the department's community policing program was virtually ignoring it when he assumed command. His change strategy involved transforming processes, structures, and individuals. For example, the Compstat meeting is a powerful way for top managers to convey to middle managers exactly what changes are expected of them in taking responsibility for identifying and solving problems. Structures were changed by giving precinct commanders control over resources that had traditionally been assigned to the turf of functional bureaus and units, whose work responsibilities were defined in terms of task specialization, rather than the needs of client groups (e.g., neighborhoods). Bratton delegated many decisions previously made in his office to the precinct commanders, who should have better information about the needs of their clients, but he also abandoned the previous administration's attempt to give more decision-making discretion to the rank-and-file officer (in the context of community policing). Thus, he decentralized command to his precinct commanders but attempted to concentrate more power there to shape department practices. An example of his individual-level intervention was his willingness to replace and terminate middle managers unable or unwilling to make this transition (about half of them in a year).

We have distilled a number of elements that full implementation of Compstat requires: mission clarification; internal accountability; geographic organization of operational command; organizational flexibility; data-driven problem identification and assessment; and innovative problem solving tactics. Little is known about whether and to what extent departments are implementing these elements of Compstat or whether new varieties of the program are evolving. There are indicators that police leaders around the nation are interested and willing to explore

Compstat, but we do not know how widely Compstat models have diffused across the United States or what types of departments are most likely to develop Compstat programs. For departments that have adopted Compstat models, it is not known whether they have implemented its key elements. And more generally, it is unclear whether the adoption of Compstat truly represents a radical departure from models of policing that are carried out in departments that have not adopted the Compstat model. Our study was designed to address these concerns. Below we describe results from a national survey of police agencies conducted by the Police Foundation. We also use data collected from field visits in selected Compstat departments. However, before discussing our findings we detail the methods we used in collecting our data.

III. Research Methods

Our survey focuses on the basic themes of Compstat as described above and was sent to all American police agencies with over 100 sworn police officers and to a sample of 100 agencies with between 50 and 100 sworn officers (see Appendix I).⁵ We take the full universe of larger departments because we believe that Compstat programs are most appropriate to such departments and thus most likely to be implemented in them. Nonetheless, we think it important to assess whether smaller agencies are also beginning to develop elements of strategic problem solving. Though it would have been prohibitively costly to survey all smaller agencies, our random sample of agencies with 50-99 officers allows us to identify whether Compstat programs are also impacting upon smaller departments. We decided not to sample from departments with fewer than 50 full time sworn officers because we thought it reasonable to assume that such police agencies lack the organizational complexity to effectively implement Compstat.

5. Our instrument was reviewed by a group of academics and practitioners including Eli Silverman, Ed Maguire, Richard Ritti, Lorraine Green Mazerolle, Roger Parks, Scott Keeter, Frank Gajewski, Chris Tutko, and Thomas Frasier.

At the time of our selection of the sample in 1999, the most complete current listing of American police agencies was the 1996 Directory Survey of Law Enforcement Agencies conducted by the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) and the Census Bureau (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 1998).⁶ This file was obtained with its documentation directly from BJS. According to this sampling frame, there were 515 agencies with 100 or more sworn officers, and 698 agencies with 50-99 officers.

We sent the survey instrument by mail to all of the 515 largest agencies and a random sample of 100 agencies with between 50 and 99 officers.⁷ This mailing included a letter asking the Chief to fill out (or to delegate to a person who could reflect his/her views) Part I of the survey and someone familiar with technology related aspects of the department to complete Part II (see letter, Appendix III).⁸ We assured the department of complete confidentiality, and included a survey instrument with a unique identification number affixed, and a stamped, addressed return envelope. This first mailing occurred on August 18, 1999. After the initial mailing, follow up phone calls (begun September 7, 1999), a second mailing (September 17, 1999), another round of follow up phone calls (begun October 8, 1999), a third mailing (November 2, 1999), and final wave of follow up phone calls (begun November 17, 1999) were conducted. The final surveys were received in January of 2000. The response rate achieved using this method was very high for a mail survey. Overall, as detailed in Table 1, 86 percent of the departments we selected sent responses back to the Police Foundation.

6. We want to thank Ed Maguire for his assistance in the selection of the study sample (see Maguire Memo, Appendix II).

7. We conducted a pretest in 15 departments, 5 small and 10 large.

8. Part I of the survey was filled out by the Chief Executive Officer (i.e. Chief, Director, Superintendent or

Table 1: Response Rate for the Sample

DEPARTMENT SIZE	RECEIVED/TOTAL	PERCENT
Small (50-99 Sworn)	85 / 100	85%
Large (100 + Sworn)	445 / 515	86.4%
Total	530 / 615	86.2%

We found no systematic reasons for non-response by selected departments. We received about the same proportion of responses from larger departments as from smaller ones (see Table 1). Moreover, there are relatively small differences in our response rate across regions (see Table 2), though departments in the South and West were somewhat more likely to return our survey. When we compare the distribution of our sample in terms of size of department to the BJS Directory Survey in 2000 we find that our sample is representative of the population of police agencies in the United States (see Figure 1).⁹

Table 2: Response Rate by Region of Country¹⁰

DEPARTMENT REGION OF COUNTRY	RECEIVED/TOTAL	PERCENT
Northeast Region	119 / 146	81.5%
North Central Region	102 / 122	83.6%
South	192 / 215	89.3%
West	117 / 132	88.6%


While we report primarily on our survey in this section of our report, we also draw on observations made during 15 short site visits to Compstat programs (see Section 2 of this report), and three longer assessments of what we defined as model Compstat programs (see Section 3 of this report).

Commissioner) in half of the departments.

9. The slight under-representation of the larger departments might be due to the increase in sworn officers that resulted from the Crime Bill program to hire more police on the street.

10. The Northeastern region includes the states of Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Vermont. The South includes Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and West Virginia. The North Central region includes the states of Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, South Dakota, and Wisconsin. And the Western region includes Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana,

Figure 1: Percent of Departments of a Certain Size in the Sample as Contrasted with the BJS Directory Survey



IV. How Widely has Compstat Been Adopted and What Types of Departments are Implementing Compstat?

Our first research question is simply whether Compstat models have been adopted widely across American police agencies. This has been the impression of commentators but has not been backed up to date with hard evidence. Our study suggests that Compstat has in fact diffused widely across the landscape of American policing (see Table 3).¹¹ A third of departments with 100 or more sworn officers in our study responded “yes” when asked whether they had “implemented a Compstat-like program.”¹² An additional quarter of the large departments in our survey claimed to be “planning” a Compstat-like program. As we expected,

Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming.

11. To simplify interpretation, we generally do not report the N of cases in the tables that follow. Overall, there were very few missing values associated with the items in the survey (mean=2.7%).

12. This question followed a section of the survey that provided a list of 11 “features that have been associated with Compstat and similar programs instituted in other departments.”

departments in our “small” department sample were significantly less likely to have implemented a Compstat model. Only 9 departments or 11 percent of the departments with between 50 and 99 sworn officers had done so. However, almost 30 percent claimed to be planning to implement a Compstat program. Because the number of departments in our sample with between 50 and 99 sworn officers who have implemented a Compstat model is small, unless otherwise noted in the tables below, we examine characteristics of Compstat in the large department sample only.¹³

Table 3: Has Your Department Implemented a Compstat-Like Program?


DEPARTMENT SIZE	Yes	No, But Planning	No
Small (50-99 Sworn)	11.0%	29.3%	59.8%
Large (100 + Sworn)	32.6%	25.6%	41.8%

*Due to rounding rows may not add to 100.

We also asked departments when their Compstat program was implemented. As would be expected the large growth in implementation of Compstat programs occurs after New York’s program had begun to gain wide scale publicity (see Figure 2). As can be seen, Compstat implementation was greatest in 1997. The downward trend in 1999 may be an artifact of our study, since some departments who responded quickly to our survey may have implemented a Compstat program later in that year.

13. The number of departments who have implemented a Compstat program in our sample of departments with between 50 and 99 officers is too small to draw reliable statistical conclusions.

Figure 2: The Year of Compstat Implementation




Interestingly, 18 departments in our large agency sample report implementation prior to 1994 – the year NYPD introduced Compstat. How could departments claim to have implemented a Compstat like program before New York City coined the term? It appears that in such cases, departments believed that they had implemented many elements of Compstat even before New York City’s model had become prominent. For example, Table 4 reports the percentage of departments that claimed to have implemented specific features “associated with Compstat and similar programs” at least six years before the survey – a time that predates the creation of Compstat in New York City. Here it is clear that a substantial portion of agencies in this sample report being engaged in the various elements of Compstat at times that *predate* the emergence of Compstat as a programmatic entity. For example, 26 percent of departments said that they “set specific objectives in terms that can be precisely measured” or that they held “regularly scheduled meetings with district commanders to review progress toward objective.” Thirty percent report using data to “assess progress towards objectives” prior to 1994.

Table 4: Was This Feature (of Compstat) Implemented Six or More Years Ago?

Survey Item	% Yes
Set specific objectives in terms that can be precisely measured	26.0%
Hold regularly scheduled meetings with district commanders to review progress toward objectives	26.3%
Hold middle managers responsible for understanding crime patterns and initiating plans to deal with them	22.7%
Give middle managers control over more resources to accomplish objectives	23.1%
Use data to assess progress toward objectives	30.2%
Develop, modify or discard problem solving strategies based on what the data show	24.8%

While a number of departments claim to have implemented elements of Compstat before New York formally introduced this model, the influence of New York City and its centrality in the diffusion of Compstat models is reflected in the large number of police agencies that came to New York to learn about Compstat (see Figure 3). An overwhelming number of departments who observed a Compstat meeting or department did so at the NYPD. While departments that have implemented Compstat-like programs have also visited Los Angeles, New Orleans, or Broward Co., all places that have well publicized Compstat programs, New York is clearly the site where most police agencies go to learn about this innovation.

Figure 3: Where Compstat Departments Attended a Compstat Meeting



The profound influence of New York’s promotion of Compstat becomes even more apparent when considering the level of familiarity the surveyed departments claim to have with New York City’s Compstat program. Table 5 shows that fully 40 percent of the smallest agencies that had *not* implemented a Compstat-like program considered themselves very or somewhat familiar with New York City’s program. The percentage of the non-Compstat departments claiming familiarity increases with each size category, reaching 90 percent for the largest departments. A similar pattern (albeit at higher levels) is shown for Compstat departments. New York City employs the nation’s largest and undoubtedly most publicized police force. Further, the department undertook a significant campaign to publicize Compstat, and to familiarize other agencies with it by hosting visitors at Compstat meetings. Not surprisingly, those agencies that expressed the most familiarity with Compstat were the largest ones. But remarkably, even many of the smaller agencies around the nation paid attention to Compstat in New York City.


Table 5: Familiarity with New York City’s Compstat by Department Size (Small Agency Sample Included)

Number of Sworn	% Very or Somewhat Familiar with New York City’s Compstat Program	
	Compstat-like Program Not Implemented	Compstat-like Program Implemented
50-99	40.3	71.4
100-299	55.7	73.2
300-499	66.7	100.0
>500	90.3	97.6

In Figure 4 it is apparent that the relationship between department size and the implementation of Compstat is not restricted to a broad comparison between the largest and smallest departments (as was illustrated in Table 1 above). We can see here that there is a direct relationship between Compstat programs and department size across our sample. Almost 60% of


departments with 500 or more sworn officers claim to have implemented a Compstat-like program. Forty-four percent of departments with between 300 and 499 sworn officers, and 31 percent of departments with between 200 and 299 sworn, say that they have established a Compstat-like program. This linear relationship between department size and implementation of a Compstat-like program is strong and statistically significant ($p < .001$).

Figure 4: Implementation of Compstat and Department Size (Small Agency Sample Included)



We also find a statistically significant relationship between region and implementation of Compstat-like programs ($p < .05$), though the relationship is not as strong as that of size of department (see Figure 5). Over 40% of the departments with over 100 sworn officers in the South have implemented Compstat. This can be contrasted with the Northeast where only 26% of departments claim that they have implemented a Compstat-like program.

Figure 5: Implementation of Compstat by Region



The survey did not ask respondents to indicate directly the motivations or priorities that led to the implementation of Compstat. However, the survey affords an opportunity to observe patterns from which we might infer such motivations. Respondents were asked to rank the top five goals that the chief executive pursued in the previous twelve months, selecting from a list of nineteen.¹⁴ We assigned a score of 5 to the top priority goal identified by each respondent, a 4 to the second ranking goal, and so on giving all unranked goals a score of zero. Because we wanted to examine priorities of departments close to when they implemented a Compstat program we excluded all departments that had implemented Compstat before 1998. We compare these departments with those that stated in the survey that they had not implemented a Compstat like program and they were *not* planning to do so.

The average ranking for the 19 goals was .78 for the large department sample. Only four

14. The nineteen goals in the order listed were: reduce serious crime, reduce quality of life offenses, reduce fear of crime, reduce calls for service, increase citizen satisfaction with the police, increase service to citizens living in high-crime areas, increase efficiency of service (reduce cost per unit of service), reduce conflict among different segments of the community, increase citizen participation in police programs, increase citizens' ability to make their own neighborhoods better places to live, give citizen groups more influence over police policy and practice, improve coordination with other public and private organizations, reduce complaints about police misbehavior, increase police managers' control over actual field operations, improve officers' policing skills, improve employee morale, be more responsive to the priorities of individual neighborhoods, provide better service to crime victims, improve the physical appearance of neighborhoods.

of the nineteen items showed a statistically significant difference ($p < .05$) between the two groups of departments (Table 2). Accordingly, there is a good deal of consensus in these police agencies regarding the priority goals for policing. However, departments that had recently implemented Compstat tended to rank the reduction of serious crime and increasing management control over field operations substantially higher than departments that were not planning implementation of Compstat. Departments that were not planning to implement a Compstat like program tended to score much higher than departments that claimed to recently have adopted Compstat on the ranks they assigned to improving officer policing skills and employee morale.

Table 6: Top Five Goals Pursued by Chief Executive in Last Year: Statistically Significant Differences by Implementation of Compstat

	Average Rank of Goal	
	Compstat-like program Implemented After 1997 (n=79)	Not planning Implementation (n=178)
Reduce serious crime	3.32	2.26
Increase police manager's control over field operations	.91	.44
Improve officers' policing skills	.46	.96
Improve employee morale	.28	.68

Departments that had recently implemented Compstat gave the reduction of serious crime a priority ranking 1.5 (3.32/2.26) times that of departments not planning to implement Compstat, and increasing management control a ranking of 2.1 (.91/.44) times that of such departments. Similarly, though in reverse, departments not planning to implement Compstat gave priority rankings to improving police officer skills that were on average 2.1 (.96/.46) times those of agencies that had claimed to recently implemented a Compstat like program, and priority rankings for improving employee morale that were on average 2.4 (.68/.28) times those of such agencies. This pattern is consistent with the interpretation that the dominant motivations for

implementing Compstat are to secure management control over field operations that will reduce serious crime. At the same time, focus on improving skills and morale of street level officers -- which for example have been high priorities in many community-policing programs -- are relatively lower priorities for recently implemented Compstat departments.

V. Are Key Components of the Compstat Approach Implemented in Compstat Departments?

While we think it significant that a growing number of American police agencies want to identify their departments as implementing a Compstat-like program, we now turn to an analysis of what this actually means for those agencies. Is it just a way for these departments to identify themselves with new and innovative practices in policing? Or, are department's that are claiming to implement a Compstat-like model actually following the basic elements of Compstat as we identify them?

In order to analyze these issues, we took two approaches. In the first we simply identified a series of broad elements and told the agencies we surveyed that they are "associated with Compstat and similar programs." We then asked whether the department is "doing this"? The second approach was meant to go deeper, and to identify specific practices that are associated with these broader elements. Here we asked a series of more targeted questions that were meant to gauge the extent of a department's implementation of the Compstat model. As we will see below, these two approaches provide very different images of what Compstat departments are doing and how closely they are following the Compstat model. In these analyses we examine only our large department sample, and focus only on those departments that responded that they

had implemented a Compstat or Compstat-like program.¹⁵

Table 7 presents the results of our first approach. Items that were identified as associated with Compstat are listed under the six core elements of Compstat described earlier. Taking this approach it seems as if the Compstat model is followed closely in departments that claim to have implemented a Compstat-like program. For example, we had one item that operationalized what we have termed “mission clarification”: that the “department set specific objectives in terms that can be precisely measured.” When “Compstat” departments were asked if they set specific objectives in terms that can be precisely measured, 92% said that they do. A similar proportion of departments that claim to have implemented Compstat, also claim to stress “internal accountability.” Almost all Compstat departments hold regularly scheduled meetings to “review progress toward objectives,” and 94% claim to “hold middle managers responsible for understanding crime patterns and initiating plans to deal with them.” Eighty-nine percent also claim to “hold specialized units accountable at regular meeting.

15. We remind the reader that only 9 departments in the small agency sample (50-99 sworn officers) responded that they had instituted a Compstat or Compstat-like program. We think this number to small to allow for meaningful analysis.

Table 7: Are “Compstat” Departments Implementing Core Elements of Compstat?

Survey Item	% Yes
MISSION CLARIFICATION	
Set specific objectives in terms that can be precisely measured	92.0%
INTERNAL ACCOUNTABILITY	
Hold regular scheduled meetings with district commanders to review progress toward objectives	98.6%
Hold middle managers responsible for understanding crime patterns and initiating plans to deal with them	93.5%
Hold specialized units accountable at regularly held meetings	88.6%
GEOGRAPHIC ORGANIZATION OF OPERATIONAL COMMAND	
Give middle managers independence in selecting strategies to accomplish these objectives	99.3%
ORGANIZATIONAL FLEXIBILITY	
Give middle managers control over more resources to accomplish objectives	96.4%
Require specialized units to assist patrol to solve problems	99.3%
DATA-DRIVEN PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION AND ASSESSMENT	
Use data to assess progress toward objectives	99.3%
Use map to display crime problems and department activities which address those problems	88.6%
INNOVATIVE PROBLEM SOLVING TACTICS	
Develop, modify or discard problem solving strategies based on what the data show	91.3%

When we turn to elements of Compstat that ensure that commanders are given the authority and autonomy to achieve their missions, we also find that departments that claim to have implemented a Compstat-like program also claim to be strongly in line with the Compstat model. Almost all of these departments claim to “give middle managers independence in selecting strategies to accomplish objectives,” or say that they “require specialized units to assist patrol to solve problems.” Both of these items reflect the importance of “geographic organization of command” in the Compstat model. Ninety six percent of Compstat departments claim to give “middle managers control over resources” needed to accomplish their missions, and almost all of these departments argue that they “give middle managers independence in selecting strategies” to accomplish their objectives. These questions suggest the importance of “organizational flexibility” in Compstat departments.

“Data-driven problem identification and assessment” was examined in this series of items by asking if a department uses “data to assess progress toward objectives” and/or uses “maps to display crime problems and department activities which address those problems.” Nearly all of the departments that claimed to have a Compstat program say they use data to assess progress toward objectives. A smaller, though still substantial proportion of these departments (89%), report using maps to display crime problems and department activities that address those problems.

Whether or not departments “develop, modify or discard problem solving strategies based on what the data show” was used as a general measure to determine if the department was engaged in the final of our core elements of Compstat-- “innovative problem solving tactics.” As with earlier items, most of the departments who claim to have implemented Compstat (91%) report relying on data in this way.

Taking a Closer Look at Core Elements of Compstat in Compstat Departments

While this overall view of the implementation of Compstat in Compstat departments suggests that such departments are very much in line with the Compstat model, a closer look at what departments claim to be doing is needed to understand how deeply the Compstat approach has actually penetrated into the activities of these agencies. We now review a series of specific items that allow us to examine more carefully the implementation of Compstat in those agencies that claim to have a Compstat or Compstat-like program.

Mission Clarification

We use two items to gauge more specifically the degree of mission clarification in Compstat departments. The first asks directly whether: “in the last 12 months has your agency publicly announced a goal of reducing crime or some other problem by a specific number or percent?” The second, identifies whether the department has set “many different goals” in the last 12 months. Such departments would not be seen as establishing a clear organizational mission as is suggested by the Compstat model. Looking at these items, the degree of implementation of Compstat appears much weaker than that suggested by the general responses examined above, though a substantial proportion of these departments still meet these standards for mission clarification (see Table 8). Less than half of the departments that claim to have implemented a Compstat-like program had announced a goal of reducing crime or some other problem by a specific number. And almost a third of these departments have focused on “many different goals.”

Table 8: Specific Items Reflecting Mission Clarification in Compstat Departments

	Public goal of reducing crime or some other problem by specific number or percent in last 12 months	Department handles many different goals selected by the Chief
% Yes	48.2%	31.4%

It is important to recognize that some departments that implement a Compstat program seek to develop specific goals, but are prevented from doing so because of resistance from other city agencies. For example, in one city we visited, the City Manager and Assistant City Manager were reluctant to commit to specific crime reduction goals believing that such goal setting could backfire if the police department failed to meet them. When the department proposed a specific reduction it was rejected by city officials. At the same time, a number of Compstat programs

create ambiguity by setting so many goals that police officers may become confused. This of course contradicts directly the Compstat model's goal of clearly identifying the mission of police organization. In one department for example, research and planning staff told us that they "get mixed messages about what their focus should be because" the Compstat program focuses on "different things at each meeting."

Internal Accountability

What of the degree to which internal accountability is introduced in departments that claim to have implemented a Compstat-like program? Earlier we noted that more than half of New York City's middle managers were removed during the first year of Compstat. Certainly punishing middle managers who fail to meet the standards of Compstat accountability is a key element of this model. Many departments take this element of Compstat seriously (Table 9). Almost seven in ten departments that claim to have implemented a Compstat-like program tell us that a district commander would be somewhat or very likely to be replaced if he does not "know about the crime patterns" in his or her district." In turn, almost eight in ten of these departments tell us that a commander of a specialized unit would be somewhat or very likely to be replaced if he or she regularly failed to fulfill requests for cooperation from district commanders. A much smaller proportion of these departments said that a district commander would be replaced simply if crime continued to rise in a district. This reflects perhaps, the position that Compstat demands that commanders are familiar with problems and develop solutions to them, but should not be unrealistic in recognizing that sometimes problems may not be responsive to police interventions. According to Bratton (1998: 239), "No one ever lost his job over not having the right answers. No one got in trouble for crime being up in their precinct. People got in trouble if they didn't know what the crime was and had no strategy to deal with it."

Table 9: Punishment as a Means of Ensuring Internal Accountability in Compstat Departments*

	If crime in a district stays at a high level or continues to rise over many months, the district commander will be replaced	If a district commander does not know about crime patterns in the district, the district commander will be replaced	If the commander of a specialized unit frequently fails to fulfill requests for cooperation from district commanders, the specialized unit commander will be replaced
% Very Likely	7.2%	22.3%	33.1%
% Somewhat Likely	35.3%	45.3%	45.3%
% Somewhat Unlikely	36.0%	21.6%	16.5%
% Very Unlikely	21.6%	10.8%	5.0%

*Due to rounding columns may not add to 100.

While the use of “punishment” to maintain accountability is very much apparent in Compstat departments, we find that they are much less likely to use reward in ensuring internal accountability (see Table 10). If crime in a district declines, fewer than a quarter of Compstat departments report that it is very or somewhat likely that the district commander will be rewarded with a promotion or desired job assignment. Rewards for specialized unit commanders are more likely, however still only 38 percent of Compstat departments report that it is very or somewhat likely that a specialized unit commander will be promoted or given a desired job assignment if the specialized unit commander routinely fulfills requests for assistance from district commanders.

Table 10: Reward as a Means of Ensuring Internal Accountability in Compstat Departments*

	If crime in a district declines over many months, the district commander will be promoted or get a desired job assignment	If the commander of a specialized unit routinely fulfills requests for assistance from district commanders, the specialized unit commander will be promoted or get a desired job assignment
% Very Likely	2.9%	6.5%
% Somewhat Likely	20.3%	30.9%
% Somewhat Unlikely	55.1%	46.0%
% Very Unlikely	21.7%	16.5%

*Due to rounding columns may not add to 100.

Geographic Organization of Operational Command

When we ask whether departments give authority to middle managers to select problem solving strategies for low-level problems we find strong support for the Compstat emphasis on geographic organization of command (see Table 11). Ninety percent of departments that claim to have implemented a Compstat-like program give district commanders, line supervisors, or specialized unit commanders such authority. However, when problems are highly visible, these departments are much less likely to allow commanders at that level the authority to chose problem solving strategies. This was the case for only seventy percent of these departments.

Table 11: Are Middle Managers Given Authority for Determining Problem Solving Strategies? (Compstat Departments)

Decision	% Yes
District Commander, Line Supervisor, or Specialized Unit Commander selects problem solving strategies for high-profile problems	69.7%
District Commander, Line Supervisor, or Specialized Unit Commander selects problem solving strategies for low-profile problems	90.1%

When we examine the extent to which departments are willing to give middle managers

greater responsibility for determining beat boundaries or staffing levels, we find even less support for the idea of geographic organization of command. Only four in ten departments that claim to have implemented a Compstat-like model give district commanders, line supervisors or specialized unit commanders the authority to determine routine staffing levels for patrol shifts (see Table 12). Even fewer, only 19 percent, give such commanders the authority to determine beat boundaries.

Table 12: Are Middle Managers Allowed to Determine Beat Boundaries or Routine Staffing Levels? (Compstat Departments)

Decision	% Yes
District Commander, Line Supervisor, or Specialized Unit Commander determines beat boundaries	19.0%
District Commander, Line Supervisor, or Specialized Unit Commander determines routine staffing levels for patrol shifts	38.7%

Organizational Flexibility

We examined organizational flexibility in two ways. First we asked departments whether middle managers had general authority to approve requests for flexible hours or to mobilize SWAT units to support specific operations (see Table 13). Though these two items also reflect the commitment of the department to geographic organization of command, they do focus directly on whether there is flexibility in the allocation of departmental resources. Three quarters of the departments responded that they allow district commanders, line supervisors, or specialized unit commanders to decide on flexible hour requests, and 65 percent allow them to mobilize SWAT units.

Table 13: The Department Allows Middle Mangers to Approve Flexible Hours or Mobilize Swat Teams (Compstat Departments)

Decision	% Yes
District Commander, Line Supervisor, or Specialized Unit Commander approves flexible hour requests for sworn personnel	75.0%
District Commander, Line Supervisor, or Specialized Unit Commander mobilizes SWAT unit to support operations	65.2%

We also examined how much flexibility the organization allowed when dealing with “the crime/disorder problem that used more of the department’s effort than any other problem in the last 12 months” (see Table 14). Again, departments that claim to have implemented a Compstat-like program do appear to allow a good deal of organizational flexibility. Eighty-four percent of these departments had reassigned patrol officers to new units, areas or work shifts to address this problem. Eighty percent of the departments had used overtime to provide personnel to deal with the problem. While few of the departments allowed reassignment of civilian employees, reflecting perhaps contract or other restrictions, about six in ten of the departments had reassigned criminal investigators and 66 percent other sworn specialists to new units, areas or work-shifts.

Table 14: Organizational Flexibility in Addressing a Specific Problem (Compstat Departments)

Change made to deal with specified problem	% Yes
Reassign patrol officers to new units, areas, or work shifts	84.3%
Reassign criminal investigators to new units, areas, or work shifts	59.3%
Reassign other sworn specialists to new units, areas, or work shifts	65.5%
Reassign civilian employees to new units, areas, or work shifts	28.6%
Use overtime to provide personnel	80.0%

Data-Driven Problem Identification and Assessment

Crime statistics have formed a central element of Compstat from the outset. And our survey suggests that Compstat departments do have the capability to manage and analyze data in sophisticated ways (see Table 15). Over 90 percent of these departments claim to conduct “crime trend identification and analysis” and almost 90 percent claim to use “database or statistical analysis software for crime analysis.” The originators of the Compstat program in New York were very much aware of the importance of crime mapping in Compstat. As Maple notes, “It’s easy to lose sight of the power of mapping. Maps are superior to numbers or narratives as a means of communicating to individuals at every level of an organization the immediate challenges in front of them. Maps tell a story in a way numbers and narratives simply can’t.” (Maple 1999:105). Almost ninety percent of the departments that claim to have a Compstat-like program report using crime mapping to examine crime hot spots. However, it is interesting to note that a much smaller proportion of these departments utilize crime mapping or statistical analysis for Compstat meetings. This despite the fact that in New York the visual presentation of crime statistics and crime maps is a central component of their Compstat meetings.

Table 15: Availability and Use of Crime Analysis and Mapping Software (Compstat Departments)

	% Yes
Mapping software for crime analysis	85.2%
Pin mapping – of crime activity for all crimes by area	77.1%
Pin mapping – of specific crimes by type	91.4%
Pin mapping – of crimes by specific suspect or modus operandi	65.7%
Hot spot mapping	87.9%
Crime trend identification and analysis	93.4%
Database or statistical analysis software for crime analysis	88.7%
Database or statistical analysis software for Compstat meetings	57.0%
Mapping software for Compstat meetings	66.2%

While departments that claim to have implemented a Compstat-like program are clearly sophisticated in their ability to use and analyze data, are those data available in a timely fashion?

Again, Compstat departments appear very much to follow the emphasis placed on timely data in the Compstat model (see Table 16). Almost eight in ten reports that calls for service information are immediately available or available the same day, and another 13 percent report that calls for service are available within 7 days. Arrests are also very timely, with 56 percent being available immediately or on the same day and an additional 33 percent being available within a week. Although citation reports and field interrogation reports seem to lag a bit in terms of their availability, at least 70 percent of departments report these types of reports being available for computer analysis within seven days.

Table 16: Typical Lag between the Time an Officer Files a Report and Its Being Available for Computer Reporting By the Agency.* (Compstat Departments)

	Immediately or Same Day	Within 7 Days	8-14 Days	15-30 Days	Longer than 30 Days	N/A
Calls for Service	76.7%	13.4%	2.8%	3.5%	0.7%	2.8%
Crime Incident	47.9%	38.0%	4.2%	4.9%	3.5%	0.7%
Arrest	56.4%	33.3%	2.1%	4.2%	2.8%	1.4%
Citation	33.8%	43.7%	4.9%	4.2%	3.5%	9.9%
Field Interrogation	31.7%	38.0%	4.9%	7.7%	2.8%	14.1%

*Due to rounding rows may not add to 100.

Innovative Problem Solving Tactics

So far we have examined the ways in which Compstat is used to focus a department's efforts, and to organize itself in ways that ensure accountability and efficient marshalling of resources. But this strategic system is centered on the idea of solving problems. When we examine specific tactics, do we actually find that departments that claim to have implemented a Compstat-like program encourage innovative problem solving approaches? We considered two ways in which problem-solving might be innovative: how problems are analyzed and selected and whether the solutions selected were a break from traditional law enforcement methods.

Police have long collected data and compiled statistics, but those data were rarely used to make important decisions about how to solve problems (Mastrofski and Wadman, 1991). Compstat is intended to harness problem-solving decisions to statistical and mapping data analysis. When asked specifically whether statistical analysis software is used for problem solving, about seventy percent of the departments answer yes (See Table 17). Sixty seven percent say that crime mapping software is used for problem solving efforts. And crime mapping and data analysis are reported to be given to people “directly responsible for problem solving” (see Table 18). Often such information is available daily or weekly. For example, eighty four percent of these departments say that information on criminal arrests or incidents is given to problem solvers this quickly. Two thirds of the departments say that detailed information is available on problem solving efforts daily or weekly. These numbers become much smaller when we examine analysis of data. For example, 36 percent of departments say that “statistical summaries or graphs of problem solving projects” are available on a daily or weekly level. However, fully three quarters of these departments say such information is available at least on a monthly basis. Crime mapping is less available at the level of problem solving. However, even here, more than half of the departments say that crime maps are available to them at least monthly.

Table 17: Is Technology Used for Problem Solving? (Compstat Departments)

	% Yes
Database or statistical analysis software for problem solving	69.0%
Mapping software for problem solving	66.9%

Table 18: How Frequently Are Data, Analyses or Crime Maps Available to People Directly Responsible for Problem Solving? (Compstat Departments)

Survey Item	% Daily or Weekly	% Monthly
Detailed information on individual cases of criminal incidents	85.0%	9.3%
Detailed information on individual cases of arrests	84.3%	7.1%
Detailed information on individual cases of calls for service	64.1%	18.7%
Detailed information on individual cases of problem solving projects	65.9%	21.7%
Statistical summaries or graphs of criminal incidents	54.6%	38.3%
Statistical summaries or graphs of arrests	38.5%	42.9%
Statistical summaries or graphs of calls for service	32.8%	46.4%
Statistical summaries or graphs of problem solving projects	36.3%	38.4%
Maps of criminal incidents	49.2%	32.6%
Maps of arrests	28.7%	22.1%
Maps of calls for service	25.7%	27.2%
Maps of problem solving projects	32.5%	21.5%

While crime mapping and other innovative data analysis approaches are being used by Compstat departments for problem solving, this does not necessarily mean that such efforts have significant depth. One element often mentioned by those advocating innovation in problem solving is that departments look beyond their own experiences in identifying innovative strategies to solve problems. This does not seem to be the case very often in Compstat programs. When we asked departments how they decided upon a problem solving strategy to address “the one crime/disorder problem that used more of the department’s efforts than any other problem in the last 12 months” they were most likely to tell us that they relied on the department’s previous success with that approach (see Table 19). In only 15 percent of these Compstat departments did they draw significantly from outside experts. Nonetheless, reflecting the growing openness of police agencies to research, they were more likely to tell us that “research evidence” was very

important in deciding a strategy, about four in ten departments told us this. About a third of the departments reported that they had drawn from experiences of other departments.

Table 19: Deciding Upon Problem Solving Strategies (Compstat Departments)

Importance of the following in deciding which tactics or methods to use to solve a specified problem	% Very Important
Previous success with the approach	66.2%
Research evidence suggesting this was the best approach	39.6%
Other department's reported previous success with the approach	32.4%
Outside experts recommending this approach	15.1%

The strategies used by departments to address this “crime/disorder problem that used more of the department’s efforts than any other problem in the last 12 months” also points to the reliance of Compstat departments on traditional police enforcement strategies (see Table 20). Though many of the departments said that that they had used such innovative tactics as nuisance abatement or altering the physical environment, traditional enforcement activities consistently ranked high on this list. The two highest ranked strategies, for example, are “saturation of an area with police,” which was employed by 79 percent of the departments, and “increasing arrests for targeted offenders,” employed by 74 percent of the departments. Interestingly, tactics that suggest a community policing approach are also high on this list. For example, the next highest ranked tactic is “educating the public,” which is present in 72 percent of the cases. And “mobilizing community groups” is a tactic reported in 57 percent of the cases.

Table 20: Tactics Used to Solve Priority Crime/Disorder Problem in Last 12 Months (In Order of Frequency; Compstat Departments)

Strategy	% Used Tactic	Strategy	% Used Tactic
Saturation of an Area with Police	78.7	Warrant Checks on Arrestees	41.1
Increasing Arrests for Targeted Offenders	73.8	Altering the physical Environment	34.0
Educating the Public	72.3	Check Points	31.2
Targeting Repeat Offenders	56.0	Sting Operations	29.8
Mobilizing Community Groups	56.7	Enforcing Laws Not Enforced Earlier	27.7
Mobilizing Other Public/Private Agency	56.0	Gun Seizures	27.0
Intensive Enforcement of Minor Offenses	50.4	Pressuring Other Agencies to Improve Service	27.0
Nuisance Abatement Law Enforcement	47.5	Seeking New Laws	24.1
Buy-Bust Operations	41.8	Improving Victim Services	22.7
Mobilizing Other Law Enforcement	41.1	Improving Response Time	10.6
Increasing Traffic Enforcement	41.1	Mediating Between Conflicting Parties	10.6
		Vertical Patrols in Buildings	2.9

These statistical findings were confirmed in our observations of Compstat departments. Commanders often rely on what they call “just good old police work:” saturation of an area, arrests, and increased police visibility. Many times they appear to be more concerned with appearing to be knowledgeable about problems than in actually developing strategies to ameliorate them. As one commander told us in a department that is often considered a model for

Compstat implementation: “Compstat is in some ways just like being a student. As a student you study just so that you can pass a test; just like with Compstat you just prepare in order to pass it.”

The test in this case is the Compstat meeting.

VI. Do Compstat Departments Differ from Non-Compstat Departments in their Implementation of Core Elements of the Compstat Model

Our review of departments that claim to have implemented a Compstat-like program suggests that many of the core elements of the Compstat model are reported to be in place in these departments. We found overall that the depth of such implementation was not consistent. For example, it was much more developed in such areas as internal accountability (at least in the case of punishment), and data driven analysis. Innovative problem solving appears to have the least degree of depth in such departments, though even here there is a good deal of commitment to making data and analysis available to those who are responsible for problem solving. But we have not as yet examined whether Compstat departments are different from those who have not implemented a Compstat-like program. Perhaps American police agencies per se have moved in the basic direction of strategic problem solving irrespective of Compstat. We now turn to these concerns. Again, we remind the reader that our analyses are conducted on our large department sample only.

Table 21 reports the proportion of Compstat and non-Compstat departments who claim to have implemented “features that have been associated with Compstat and similar programs.” This is the general set of questions that we presented at the outset of our discussion in the previous section. As is apparent the differences between Compstat and non-Compstat departments are significant for every one of the items tested. However, there is a high degree of reporting of implementation of these core elements of strategic problem solving in the non-Compstat departments as well.

Table 21: Comparing Compstat and Non-Compstat Departments on Core Compstat Elements

Survey Item	% Yes Compstat	% Yes Non-Compstat	Sig.
MISSION CLARIFICATION			
Set specific objectives in terms that can be precisely measured	92.1%	70.2%	p<.001
INTERNAL ACCOUNTABILITY			
Hold regularly scheduled meetings with district commanders to review progress toward objectives	98.6%	80.3%	p<.001
Hold middle managers responsible for understanding crime patterns and initiating plans to deal with them	93.5%	72.5%	p<.001
Hold specialized units accountable at regularly held meetings	88.7%	56.8%	p<.001
GEOGRAPHIC ORGANIZATION OF OPERATIONAL COMMAND			
Give middle managers independence in selecting strategies to accomplish these objectives	99.3%	84.1%	p<.001
ORGANIZATIONAL FLEXIBILITY			
Give middle managers control over more resources to accomplish objectives	96.4%	75.4%	p<.001
Require specialized units to assist patrol to solve problems	99.3%	92.0%	p<.01
DATA-DRIVEN PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION AND ASSESSMENT			
Use data to assess progress toward objectives	99.3%	82.1%	p<.001
Use maps to display crime problems and department activities which address these problems	88.7%	70.5%	p<.001
INNOVATIVE PROBLEM SOLVING TACTICS			
Develop, modify or discard problem solving strategies based on what the data show	91.4%	78.4%	p<.001

For example, Compstat departments are much more likely than non-Compstat departments to claim that they set specific objectives in terms that can be precisely measured. But 70 percent of non-Compstat departments do this as well. Seventy-eight percent of non-Compstat departments claim to “develop, modify or discard problem solving strategies based on what the data show.” While this is true for 91 percent of the Compstat departments, it is noteworthy that so many departments that do not claim to have a Compstat-like program also take this approach. Similarly eighty two percent of the non-Compstat departments claim to use

data to “assess progress toward objectives or claim to give middle managers independence in selecting strategies to accomplish” them. This was true for nearly all of the Compstat departments.

While these findings are suggestive, as earlier, we turn to a more detailed and specific look at Compstat related activities to identify more carefully whether and in what ways Compstat departments differ from those that do not claim to have implemented a Compstat-like program.

A Detailed Comparison of Compstat and Non-Compstat Departments

When we take a closer look at mission clarification we continue to find significant differences. Compstat departments were more than twice as likely to set a specific public goal of reducing crime or other problems by a specific number of percent (see Table 22). However, while Compstat departments were significantly less likely to set many different goals (an approach suggesting a lack of focus in developing the departmental mission) the absolute difference between Compstat and non-Compstat departments is only ten percent.

Table 22: Mission Clarification

	Public goal of reducing crime or other problem by specific number or percent in the last 12 months***	Department handles many different goals selected by the Chief*
% Yes Compstat	48.2%	31.4%
% Yes Non-Compstat	22.6%	42.4%

*p<.05

***p<.001

Specific measures of internal accountability also suggest important differences between Compstat and non-Compstat departments. But here again they also show that non-Compstat departments claim to be carrying out many of the specific components of strategic problem solving. For example, 68 percent of Compstat departments say that it is very or somewhat likely that a district commander would be replaced if he or she was not knowledgeable about crime problems (see Table 23). This was true for 46 percent of non-Compstat departments. Forty-two percent of Compstat departments say that it is very or somewhat likely that a district commander would be replaced if “crime in a district stays at a high level or continues to rise over many months.” This was true for only twenty percent of non-Compstat departments. It is interesting to note that Compstat departments are about twice as likely to give a district commander a promotion or a desired job assignment if “crime declines over many months.” However, as noted earlier the proportion of Compstat departments who do this is relatively small (23%). This suggests more generally that police agencies are more likely to use punishment as a strategy of internal accountability than reward.

The one area of internal accountability where there is little difference between Compstat and non-Compstat departments is that related to special units. Here our results are not statistically significant. In both cases, special unit commanders are likely to be replaced if they routinely fail to “fulfill requests for cooperation from district commanders.” In turn, in about thirty seven percent of both Compstat and non-Compstat department’s special unit commanders are likely to be rewarded if they “routinely fulfill requests for assistant from district commanders.”

Table 23: Internal Accountability

A. Punishment as a Means of Ensuring Internal Accountability

% Very or Somewhat Likely	If crime in a district stays at a high level or continues to rise over many months, the district commander will be replaced***	If a district commander does not know about crime patterns in the district, the district commander will be replaced***	If the commander of a specialized unit frequently fails to fulfill requests for cooperation from district commanders, the specialized unit commander will be replaced
Compstat	42.4%	67.6%	78.3%
Non-Compstat	19.9%	46.3%	80.6%

***p<.001

B. Reward as a Means of Ensuring Internal Accountability

% Very or Somewhat Likely	If crime in a district declines over many months, the district commander will be promoted or get a desired job assignment**	If the commander of a specialized unit routinely fulfills requests for assistance from district commanders, the specialized unit commander will be promoted or get a desired job assignment
Compstat Departments	23.2%	37.4%
Non-Compstat Departments	12.8%	37.6%

**P<.01

We find relatively small differences between Compstat and non-Compstat departments in terms of geographic organization of command, and these differences are generally not statistically significant (see Table 24). This is the case for example, when we compare the ability of middle managers to set beat boundaries or determine routine staffing levels. This is the case as well when we examine whether district commanders, line supervisors or specialized unit commanders are free to select problem solving strategies for low-profile problems. However, we do find somewhat larger differences (15% in absolute terms), when we examine whether such commanders are given authority to select problem solving strategies for high profile problems.

Compstat departments are significantly ($p < .01$) more likely to allow this.

Table 24: Geographic Organization of Operational Command

Decision	% Yes Compstat	% Yes Non-Compstat
District Commander, Line Supervisor, or Specialized Unit Commander determines beat boundaries	19.0%	13.9%
District Commander, Line Supervisor, or Specialized Unit Commander determines routine staffing levels for patrol shifts	38.7%	31.3%

Decision	% Yes Compstat	% Yes Non-Compstat
District Commander, Line Supervisor, or Specialized Unit Commander selects problem solving strategies for high-profile problems**	69.7%	54.3%
District Commander, Line Supervisor, or Specialized Unit Commander selects problem solving strategies for low-profile problems	90.1%	86.1%

** $p < .01$

What of organizational flexibility? Again, we do not find strong nor statistically significant differences between Compstat and non-Compstat departments when we look at whether commanders are able to approve flexible hours or mobilize Swat Unit support (see Table 25). More significant differences however are found when we examine organizational flexibility in regard to “the one crime/disorder problem that used more of the department’s effort than any other in the last 12 months” (see Table 26). For example, Compstat departments were significantly more likely to reassign patrol officers to deal with that problem, or to reassign “other sworn specialists.” However, there were not statistically significant differences when we examined reassignment of criminal investigators, civilian employees, or the provision of overtime to add personnel for problem solving efforts. Importantly, such activities to deal with a high priority problem (with the exception of reassignment of civilian personnel) were common both in Compstat and non-Compstat departments.

Table 25: Organizational Flexibility (General Items)

Decision	% Yes Compstat	% Yes Non-Compstat
District Commander, Line Supervisor, or Specialized Unit Commander approves flexible hour requests for sworn personnel	75.0%	67.4%
District Commander, Line Supervisor, or Specialized Unit Commander mobilizes SWAT unit to support operations	65.2%	62.9%

Table 26: Organizational Flexibility in Dealing with a High Priority Problem

Change made to deal with specified problem	% Yes Compstat	% Yes Non-Compstat
Reassign patrol officers to new units, areas, or work shifts***	84.3%	68.8%
Reassign criminal investigators to new units, areas, or work shifts	59.3%	50.5%
Reassign other sworn specialists to new units, areas, or work shifts*	65.5%	52.7%
Reassign civilian employees to new units, areas, or work shifts	28.6%	21.1%
Use overtime to provide personnel	80.0%	74.3%

* p<.05

*** p<.001

Turning to data-driven problem identification and analysis, we again do not find differences between Compstat and non-Compstat departments in the availability of data (see Table 27). About the same proportion of Compstat and non-Compstat departments have calls for service, crime incident, arrest, citation or field interrogation data available “immediately or the same day.” Overall, for both groups of departments, a high proportion has calls for service information available that quickly, about half have crime incidents and arrests, and about a third citation and field interrogation data.

Table 27: Timely Data

	Calls for Service	Crime Incident	Arrest	Citation	Field Interrogation
% Compstat Immediately or Same Day	76.8%	48.2%	56.3%	33.8%	31.9%
% Non-Compstat Immediately or Same Day	74.3%	44.0%	55.1%	36.4%	29.6%

When we turn to analysis of information or crime mapping the differences between Compstat and non-Compstat departments grow and are statistically significant (see Table 28). The largest differences are found in regard to crime mapping, reflecting the centrality of crime mapping to Compstat programs. But even here many departments that have not implemented a Compstat-like program are using crime mapping. For example, there is a thirty-three percent gap between Compstat and non-Compstat departments in terms of use of mapping software. Nonetheless, more than half of the non-Compstat departments report that they are using mapping software for crime analysis. The differences are also large when we ask whether “crime trend identification and analysis” is used, though again more than seventy percent of non-Compstat departments utilize such analysis.

Table 28: The Availability of Crime Mapping and Other Crime Analysis Tools

	% Yes Compstat	% Yes Non-Compstat
Mapping software for crime analysis***	85.2%	52.9%
Pin mapping – of crime activity for all crimes by area***	77.1%	55.3%
Pin mapping – of specific crimes by type***	91.4%	75.5%
Pin mapping – of crimes by specific suspect or m.o.***	65.7%	39.9%
Hot spot mapping***	87.9%	65.3%
Crime trend identification and analysis***	93.4%	71.7%
Database or statistical analysis software for crime analysis**	88.7%	75.9%

**p<.01

***p<.001

We saw earlier that departments that claimed to have implemented a Compstat-like program were likely to use statistical analysis for problem solving. Here we can see that they are

significantly more likely to do so than are non-Compstat departments. Almost seventy percent of Compstat departments report that they use database or statistical analysis software for problem solving (see Table 29). This was true for only fifty four percent of non-Compstat departments. The gap is much greater when we examine the use of mapping software in problem solving. This was true for sixty seven percent of Compstat departments, but only about forty percent of non-Compstat departments.

Table 29: Is There a Difference Between the Types Of Departments and the Technology They Use for Problem Solving?

	% Yes Compstat	% Yes Non-Compstat
Database or statistical analysis software for problem solving**	69.0%	54.3%
Mapping software for problem solving***	66.9%	38.5%

**p<.01

*** p<.001

In terms of provision of data in a timely fashion directly to those responsible for problem solving, we do not find significant differences when the data are detailed information on individual cases either for criminal incidents, arrests, calls for service, or problem solving projects (see Table 30). However, when the data are statistical summaries or graphs or maps, larger and statistically significant differences are found. Compstat departments get this information to their problem solving managers at least weekly or daily at a higher rate than non-Compstat departments.

Table 30: Is There a Difference Between the Types of Departments and If the Data Gets to People Directly Responsible for Problem Solving?

Survey Item	% Daily or Weekly Compstat	% Daily or Weekly Non-Compstat	% Monthly Compstat	% Monthly Non-Compstat
Detailed information on individual cases of criminal incidents	85.0%	82.5%	9.3%	8.8%
Detailed information on individual cases of arrests	84.3%	77.3%	7.1%	10.8%
Detailed information on individual cases of calls for service	64.0%	55.7%	18.7%	22.0%
Detailed information on individual cases of problem solving projects	65.9%	61.1%	21.7%	21.8%
Statistical summaries or graphs of criminal incidents***	54.6%	21.6%	38.3%	53.0%
Statistical summaries or graphs of arrests***	38.6%	14.2%	42.9%	53.8%
Statistical summaries or graphs of calls for service***	32.9%	14.9%	46.4%	48.3%
Statistical summaries or graphs of problem solving projects***	36.2%	14.0%	38.4%	39.9%
Maps of criminal incidents***	49.3%	17.6%	32.6%	23.7%
Maps of arrests***	28.7%	7.9%	22.1%	19.4%
Maps of calls for service***	25.7%	7.3%	27.2%	17.8%
Maps of problem solving projects***	32.6%	6.5%	21.5%	14.1%

*** p<.001

We find overall that Compstat departments are similar in their response to how they chose a problem solving strategy to address “the one crime/disorder problem that used more of the department’s efforts than any other” in the last year (see Table 31). For both groups, previous success in their own departments was defined by about two thirds of the departments as very important in their decision. There were also small differences in whether they drew from other departments or outside experts. Compstat departments were significantly more likely to rely on research evidence but the gap here is also not large. Forty percent of Compstat departments defined this as very important in choosing their response, versus about twenty nine

percent of non-Compstat departments.

Table 31: Deciding Upon Problem Solving Strategies

Importance of the following in deciding which tactics or methods to use to solve a specified problem	% Very Important Compstat	% Very Important Non-Compstat
Previous success with the approach	66.2%	68.1%
Research evidence suggesting this was the best approach*	39.6%	28.7%
Other department's reported previous success with the approach	32.4%	28.9%
Outside experts recommending this approach	15.1%	11.5%

*p<.05

When we look at specific tactics used to address the priority crime/disorder problem identified by sample departments we find a good deal of congruence between Compstat and non-Compstat departments (see Table 32). In only five of the twenty-three tactics examined were differences found to be statistically significant. The first ranked strategy for both types of departments was saturation of an area with police. Compstat departments were significantly more likely to increase arrests for targeted offenders and to target repeat offenders. They were significantly more likely to use checkpoints, gun seizures, or improve victim services. Importantly, these differences are not large in absolute terms, and only in the case of gun seizures are the differences large in relative terms (to the base rate of the item examined).

Table 32: Tactics Used to Solve Priority Crime/Disorder Problem in Last 12 Months (In Order of Frequency)

Strategy	%Used Tactic Compstat	% Used Tactic Non-Compstat	Strategy	% Used Tactic Compstat	% Used Tactic Non- Compstat
Saturation of an Area with Police	78.7	75.5	Warrant Checks on Arrestees	41.4	39.9
Increasing Arrests for Targeted Offenders**	73.8	59.8	Altering the physical Environment	34.0	31.8
Educating the Public	72.3	70.3	Check Points*	31.2	20.6
Targeting Repeat Offenders**	56.0	42.0	Sting Operations	29.8	24.1
Mobilizing Community Groups	56.7	60.8	Enforcing Laws Not Enforced Earlier	27.7	27.3
Mobilizing Other Public/Private Agency	56.0	47.9	Gun Seizures**	27.0	15.0
Intensive Enforcement of Minor Offenses	50.4	42.3	Pressuring Other Agencies to Improve Service	27.0	24.1
Nuisance Abatement Law Enforcement	47.5	40.6	Seeking New Laws	24.1	22.4
Buy-Bust Operations	41.8	37.8	Improving Victim Services*	22.7	14.0
Mobilizing Other Law Enforcement	41.4	39.5	Improving Response Time	10.6	10.1
Increasing Traffic Enforcement	41.4	39.9	Mediating Between Conflicting Parties	10.6	15.7
			Vertical Patrols in Buildings	2.8	2.8

* p<.05

**p<.01

***p<.001

We do not think it appropriate to develop summary scales from the specific items we have used to contrast Compstat and non-Compstat departments. Such an exact statistical representation of these data is not warranted given the fact that our measures reflect many different dimensions and are not necessarily equivalent either in mathematical scale or in substantive importance. Nonetheless, we think it useful to summarize our overall findings in

regard to the differences we have found. In Table 33, we note in which cases our tables showed less than half of the related items to be significantly different between Compstat and non-Compstat departments and which more than half were found significantly different. Using this approach we find that Compstat and non-Compstat departments were consistently more likely to differ on mission clarification and internal accountability. In contrast, in the case of geographic organization of command and organizational flexibility most comparisons we examined were not statistically significant. In regard to data driven analysis and innovative problem solving our findings are mixed. Regarding the timeliness of availability of data, there were no significant differences between Compstat and non-Compstat departments. However, if we examine the availability of crime analysis and mapping tools, all of the comparisons examined were significant. Similarly in regard to technological aspects of problem solving, Compstat departments did differ significantly on most of the items we examine. However, there were relatively few significant differences when we focused on how departments chose strategies or the specific tactics used.

Table 33: Summary of Overall Findings: Contrasting Compstat and Non-Compstat Department

Compstat Feature	More Than Half of Comparisons Statistically Significant	Less than Half of Comparisons Statistically Significant
Mission Clarification	X	
Internal Accountability	X	
Geographic Organization of Command		X
Organizational Flexibility		X
Data Driven Analysis: Timely Data		X
Data Driven Analysis: Analysis and Mapping	X	
Innovative Problem Solving: Mapping and Analysis	X	
Innovative Problem Solving: Availability of Data to Problem Solvers	X	
Innovative Problem Solving: Deciding on a Strategy		X
Innovative Problem Solving: Tactics Used		X

VII. Discussion and Conclusions

Our report has covered a broad group of topics regarding Compstat and its development in American police agencies. In our conclusions we want to focus on our main findings in regard to three basic questions. (1) How widespread is the adoption of Compstat and who is doing it? (2) Which elements of the Compstat approach appear to have been adopted most successfully in Compstat departments, and which have presented the most difficulty for adoption? (3) Finally, do Compstat departments differ significantly from non-Compstat departments in regard to the core elements of Compstat as we have described them?

One of the clearest findings of our study is that Compstat has spread widely and quickly

across American police agencies. Among departments that have 100 or more sworn officers, six in ten tell us that they already had or intended to develop within a year a Compstat-like program.

While the rate of adoption was much less in our sample of departments with between 50 and 99 sworn officers still forty percent claim to have or to be planning a Compstat program. This degree of diffusion of innovation places Compstat among a very small group of innovations that have been adopted widely by American police agencies. However, we suspect that the speed of adoption of Compstat is unusual for innovations in American policing. Compstat as a cohesive program was only developed in 1994 and was not widely known about until two or three years later. It is fair to say that Compstat as a recognized programmatic model has literally burst on to the American police scene.

Why has Compstat diffused so quickly and widely across the landscape of American policing? One reason is that the agency that created this program was the most visible local police agency in the nation and did a great deal to publicize it and show other agencies how it operates. Moreover, the program was widely discussed in the popular and professional news outlets, even leading to William Bratton being featured on the cover of Time Magazine in January, 1996. Compstat was presented as a dramatically more effective management strategy that reduced crime in New York and other cities. As other big cities began to adopt their own Compstat programs, this too increased the “buzz” in the press and among police agencies, helping to make it the “hot” program for local law enforcement leaders to consider in bringing first their own organizations and then crime under control.

Our study also suggests another reason that Compstat has spread so quickly: a number of American police agencies had already adopted many of its features *before* the term Compstat was coined. A number of agencies participating in our sample claimed to have already implemented

features of Compstat before 1994, when New York City initially developed and named its program. Some even claimed to have been engaged in all of the elements of Compstat before 1994. So, New York City's contribution appears to be its leadership in bringing all of these elements together into a single program, giving it a clear, coherent role, and providing a highly publicized set of claims that link it to performance – the decline of crime and disorder in the nation's most visible city.

However, we do not think that the program's origins in a highly visible police agency, its high public visibility, and the fact that many of its components were being implemented in other departments, is enough to explain why the Compstat model has been adopted so widely and so quickly. The crime control promise of Compstat comes as part of a wider package of organizational reform. The originators of Compstat sought to reinvigorate and retool American police organization using the components of strategic problem solving we have defined. However, this package, as it has been developed in the context of Compstat, did not demand that American police agencies fundamentally change the traditional hierarchical organizational structure of American policing. Compstat does not demand a revolution in the organizational structure of American policing but rather seeks to harness that structure in an attempt to have traditional American police organization work better and more effectively. Compstat thus offers American police agencies the prospect of improving how they work, while reinforcing the traditional hierarchical structure of the military model of policing-- a structure that has been under attack by scholars for much of the last two decades.

Most scholars have described police agencies as "bureaucratic" or "para-military" organizations (e.g. see Bittner, 1980; Davis, 1981; Goldstein, 1977; Melnicoe and Menig, 1978; Norholt and Strauer, 1983; Punch, 1983; Weisburd, McElroy and Hardyman, 1988). Police

departments have traditionally relied on a highly articulated set of rules defining what officers should and should not do in various situations to ensure internal control. This supervisory system is strongly hierarchical and essentially negative, relying primarily on sanctions for non-compliance with police rules and regulations. Importantly, this bureaucratic, military model of organization increasingly came under attack as community policing and related approaches gained popularity in American policing. As Weisburd, McElroy and Hardyman note:

Whatever the historical achievements of the bureaucratic, military model of organization, its shortcomings are increasingly evident to scholars and police administrators who argue that the demands of contemporary urban society undermine the assumptions upon which traditional police structures were built. While the military model depends on predictability, many of the situations to which officers are asked to respond cannot be anticipated. Though the norms that define appropriate responses may reduce the vulnerability of officers to criticism, they often do not provide useful guides for developing effective solutions to the problems encountered. Finally deployment patterns which treat patrol officers as if they were interchangeable parts (as well as highly centralized structures of authority and decision-making) prevent police officers from learning and responding to distinctive problems, needs and resources of the neighborhoods they serve (1988:31-32).

The challenge to the military model of American police organization was most clearly articulated by advocates of Community policing. Community policing emerged on the scene in the 1980s largely as a response to the perceived failures of policing we discussed in our introduction. Community policing demanded not only a reformation of the relationship between the police and the public, it called for a radical reorientation of the command structure of policing. Some scholars have called this a movement toward “decentralization of command” or “debureaucratization” (Mastrofski, 1998; Skolnick and Bayley, 1987). Community policing promotes the true professionalization of the rank-and-file officers, who – equipped with the necessary training, education, and motivation to solve problems -- are supposed to use their best judgment to make important decisions about how best to serve the neighborhoods to which they are assigned (Mastrofski, 1998). However it is defined, community policing requires that those

closest to the public be given more authority and autonomy to develop contacts with and draw information from the community. Of course the emphasis on the autonomy and authority of street level police officers raised important challenges to the traditional hierarchical military structure of American policing (Weisburd and McElroy, 1988; Weisburd, Shalev and Amir, in press).

Compstat presents an alternative model for police organization. It replaces the bubble-up professionalism proposed by community policing advocates with a revitalized cadre of middle managers (especially district commanders), who are given general objectives by top management and also given the authority and resources to get things done. But they are at the same time held accountable for at least making the effort to achieve management's goals and are required to be well-informed about the consequences, even if the desired results are not always forthcoming. Compstat is all about harnessing the hierarchy to achieve top management's objectives. At least in its current form it has little to say about how to harness the potential of the rank and file to top management's priorities. Our survey of police agencies cannot demonstrate it, but our observations in Compstat departments suggest that the rank and file remain largely oblivious to Compstat and that it intrudes little, if at all, into their daily work (see Section 3 of this report).

Compstat refines and reinforces traditional structures of policing. The most important structural refinement offered by Compstat is the centralization of information about street-level performance (Mastrofski and Ritti, 2000:197-198). It provides top management a way to comprehend and track the welter of highly decentralized decisions (for example, stops, arrests, field interrogations) made by rank-and-file officers, and it also provides data analysis that indicates the presumed consequences (for example, crime rates). Whether this information really tells top and mid-level commanders what they need to know to improve police performance is a

matter that might be debated, but it is irrelevant to our point here. Under Compstat *top management* establishes the terms of accountability for district commanders. This accountability can switch from interrogating a district commander about the particulars of a given case to looking for causes in crime trends in his or her district. Before Compstat, top police executives did not know what questions to ask – except for the exceptional, high-visibility crime or event. Now the district commander must have a credible account to report to his or her superiors.

Thus, rather than “flattening” the organizational hierarchy, Compstat’s centralization of street-level performance information breathes new life into it, in theory making military style structures work better – or at least in closer conformance to what traditional “command and control” should look like. In defining a clear mission, and in enforcing internal accountability for middle managers, such as precinct commanders, Compstat attempts to strengthen the hierarchical features of American police agencies. In emphasizing geographic organization of command and organizational flexibility it attempts to allocate and control resources in a way that empowers that organizational hierarchy. At the same time it seeks to draw from the major technological innovations in policing of the last two decades. This is reflected in the centrality of crime mapping and the importance of crime analysis in the Compstat model. Compstat also emphasizes problem solving. Importantly, these technological features are not seen as demanding fundamental change in the organizational structure of policing, as was assumed in the case, for example, of the implementation of community policing. Moreover, Compstat suggests that problem solving can be invested in middle management, in a way that does not require a new type of organizational approach to control, and that it can be successful. Put simply, it is easier to change the behavior of a few district commanders (particularly if their assignments are not protected by civil service) than it is hundreds or thousands of rank-and-file police officers.

Compstat accordingly offers American police agencies an approach that in theory allows them to reinforce and make more effective the traditional organizational structure of American policing, while adopting the major technological and strategic innovations of the last two decades. This in our view provides an important explanation for why Compstat has been adopted so quickly and so widely across American police agencies. It may also explain why we find a direct linear relationship between the size of a department and its adoption of Compstat. Larger departments would be expected to benefit most from an approach that attempts to make a large quasi-military structure work more efficiently and with greater centralized control.

While Compstat offers a model of innovation that reinforces rather than challenges traditional police organization, many of its prescriptions demand nonetheless significant change in the ways that American police agencies carry out their work. Compstat draws upon innovative management principles in order to reinvigorate the traditional hierarchical model of police organization. It demands that police organizations rid themselves of the “bureaucratic dysfunctions” that prevent traditional police organizations from being successful. Our findings suggest, perhaps not surprisingly, that while police agencies are quick to adopt elements of Compstat that reinforce traditional structures and activities, they are resistant to others that demand significant change in the social organization of police activities.

When we examined the core elements of Compstat, we found that departments generally perceive themselves as following the basic elements of strategic problem solving that form the Compstat approach. However, when we looked more deeply we found that implementation of Compstat is not as complete. Many departments that claim to have implemented a Compstat-like program do not implement specific aspects of the core elements of Compstat as we have defined them. In some cases, for example in the availability of timely data and the use of crime mapping,

most Compstat departments do follow the Compstat model closely. However, in other areas, for example, providing middle managers the authority to determine beat boundaries or staffing levels so that they can address problems, or in developing innovative problem solving strategies, many department's that claim to have a Compstat-like program do not closely follow the Compstat model.

Compstat departments are less likely to implement specific elements of Compstat that demand significant change in the daily work and management of police agencies. For example, it is one thing for senior police management to give middle managers responsibility for defining problem solving strategies, it is another to invest in them the authority to define staffing levels or beat boundaries. Similarly, it does not demand major change in the culture of policing to develop new technologies of data collection and analysis. However, going beyond traditional police strategies to develop innovative problem solving tactics demands a radical reorientation of the way police approach their task. We also think it consistent with our argument that police agencies are much more likely to use negative supervision approaches than positive ones in reinforcing internal accountability in Compstat. A negative supervisory system is one of the hallmarks of the traditional bureaucratic or military approach to ensuring compliance with departmental rules and regulations (Weisburd, McElroy and Hardyman, 1988).

In comparing departments that claimed to have implemented a Compstat-like program with other departments we were struck by the extent to which the strategic problem solving model has spread to large American police organizations and not just those that claim to have implemented a Compstat-like program. On each of the six core elements of Compstat that we defined, many non-Compstat departments also report to be implementing that feature of Compstat in their organization. The differences between Compstat and non-Compstat

solving has also become an accepted feature of American policing. Compstat itself has indeed reinforced these features of strategic problem solving and provided a clearly articulated philosophy for their importance. But our study suggests that it would be a mistake to see Compstat as a radical departure from prevailing trends. Our study illustrates that Compstat represents an evolution of practices that had already begun to be common and accepted in American police agencies. It also provides an approach to reform that reinforces rather than challenges the traditional hierarchical military structure of American police organization.

VIII. REFERENCES

- Anselin, Luc, Jacqueline Cohen, David Cook, Wilpen Gorr and George Tita. 2000. "Spatial Analyses of Crime." In David Duffee, David McDowall, Brian Ostrom, Robert D. Crutchfield, Stephen D. Mastrofski, and Lorraine Green Mazerolle, eds., *Measurement and Analysis of Crime and Justice*, pp. 213-62. Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice.
- Beer, Michael. 1980. *Organization Change and Development: A Systems View*. Santa Monica, CA: Goodyear Publishing Company.
- Berman, Jesse. 1987. *Police Administration and Progressive Reform*. New York: Greenwood.
- Bittner, Egon. 1980. *The Functions of the Police in Modern Society*. Cambridge, MA: Oelgeschlager, Gunn and Hain.
- Bouza, Tony. 1997. "NYPD Blues – Good, Lucky, or Both?" *Law Enforcement News*. January 31:8, 10.
- Braga, Anthony. 2001. "The Effects of Hot Spots Policing on Crime." *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 578:104-125.
- Bratton, William J. 1996. "Cutting Crime and Restoring Order: What America Can Learn from New York's Finest." Heritage Foundation *Lectures and Educational Programs*, Heritage Lecture #573. Available from www.nationalsecurity.org/heritage/library/categories/crimelaw/lect573.html.
- Bratton, William. 1998. *Turnaround: How America's Top Cop Reversed the Crime Epidemic*. New York: Random House.
- Bratton, William J. 1999. "Great Expectations: How Higher Expectations for Police Departments Can Lead to a Decrease in Crime." In Robert H. Langworthy, ed., *Measuring What Matters: Proceedings from the Policing Research Institute Meetings*, pp. 11-26. Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice.
- Bureau of Justice Statistics. 1998. *Census of State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies, 1996*. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics.
- Davis, E.M. 1981. "Professional Police Principles." In H.W. More, Jr. (ed.), *Critical Issues in Policing*. Cincinnati, OH: Anderson Publishing Company.
- Eck, John E. and Edward R. Maguire. 2000. "Have Changes in Policing Reduced Violent Crime? An Assessment of the Evidence." In Alfred Blumstein and Joel Wallman, eds., *The Crime Drop in America*, pp. 207-65. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Finkelstein, Sydney and Donald C. Hambrick. 1996. *Strategic Leadership: Top Executives and*

- Their Effects on Organizations*. St. Paul, MN: West Publishing Co.
- Fogelson, Robert F. 1977. *Big City Police*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Giuliani, Rudolph W. and Howard Safir. 1998. "Compstat: Leadership in Action." New York City: New York City Police Department.
- Goldstein, Herman. 1977. "Toward a Community-Oriented Policing: Potential, Basic Requirements, and Threshold Questions." *Crime and Delinquency* 33 (1):6-30.
- Goldstein, Herman. 1990. *Problem-Oriented Policing*. New York: McGraw-Hill.
- Greene, Jack R. and Stephen D. Mastrofski. 1988. *Community Policing: Rhetoric or Reality*. New York: Praeger.
- Greenspan, Rosann, Stephen D. Mastrofski, and David Weisburd. Forth. *Compstat and Organizational Change: Short Site Visits Report*.
- Gurwitt, Rob. 1998. "The Comeback of the Cops." *Governing* January:14-19.
- Kelling, George L. and Catherine M. Coles. 1996. *Fixing Broken Windows: Restoring Order and Reducing Crime in Our Communities*. New York: Free Press.
- Kelling, George L. and Mark H. Moore. 1988. "From Political to Reform to Community: The Evolving Strategy of Police." In Jack R. Greene and Stephen D. Mastrofski, eds., *Community Policing: Rhetoric or Reality*, pp. 3-25. New York: Praeger.
- Law Enforcement News. 1997. "NYC's Compstat Continues to Win Admirers." October 13:5.
- Maas, Peter. 1998. "What We're Learning from New York City." *Parade* May 10:4-6.
- Maple, Jack. 1999. *The Crime Fighter: Putting the Bad Guys Out of Business*. New York, NY: Doubleday.
- Mastrofski, Stephen D. 1998. "Community Policing and Police Organization Structure." In Jean-Paul Brodeur, ed., *How to Recognize Good Policing: Problems and Issues*, pp. 161-189. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Mastrofski, Stephen D. and R. Richard Ritti. 2000. "Making Sense of Community Policing: A Theory-Based Analysis." *Police Practice and Research Journal* 12:183-210.
- Mastrofski, Stephen D. and Robert C. Wadman. 1991. "Personnel and Agency Performance Measurement." In William A. Geller, ed., *Local Government Police Management*, 3rd ed, pp. 363-97. Washington, DC: International City Management Association.
- McDonald, Phyllis Parshall. 1998. *The New York City Crime Control Model: A Guide to*

- Implementation*. Unpublished manuscript. Washington, DC.
- Melnicoe, W.B. and J. Menig. 1978. *Elements of Police Supervision*. Encino, CA: Glencoe Publishing Company.
- Merton Robert K. 1940. "Bureaucratic Structure and Personality." *Social Forces* 18:560-568.
- Micklethwait, John and Adrian Wooldridge. 1996. *The Witch Doctors: Making Sense of the Management Gurus*. New York: Random House.
- Moore, Mark H. 1995. *Creating Public Value: Strategic Management in Government*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Moore, Mark H. 1997. "The Legitimation of Criminal Justice Policies and Practices." In National Institute of Justice, *Perspectives on Crime and Justice: 1996-1997 Lecture Series*. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice
- Moore, Mark H. and Darrel W. Stephens. 1991. *Beyond Command and Control: The Strategic Management of Police Departments*. Washington, DC: Police Executive Research Forum.
- Nordholdt, E. and R. Straver. 1983. "The Changing Police." In M. Punch (ed.), *Control in the Police Organization*. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
- Office of Management Analysis and Planning. No Date. "The Compstat Process." New York City: New York City Police Department.
- Osborne, D. and T. Gaebler. 1992. *Reinventing Government*. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
- Punch, M. 1983. "Management, Supervision and Control." In M. Punch (ed.), *Control in the Police Organization*. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
- Remnick, David. 1997. "The Crime Buster." *The New Yorker* February 24 & March 3:94-109.
- Selznick, Philip. 1957. *Leadership and Administration*. New York: HarperCollins.
- Sherman, Lawrence W. 1990. "Police Crackdowns: Initial and Residual Deterrence." In Michael H. Tonry and Norval Morris, eds., *Crime and Justice: A Review of Research*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Sherman, L. W. D. Gottfredson, D. MacKenzie, J. Eck, P. Reuter and S. Bushway. 1997. *Preventing Crime: What Works, What Doesn't, What's Promising?* Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice.
- Sherman, Lawrence W. and David Weisburd. 1992. "Does Police Patrol Prevent Crime? The

- Minneapolis Hot Spots Experiment.” Paper presented to the International Society of Criminology, Conference on Urban Crime Prevention. Tokyo, April.
- Silverman, Eli B. 1996. “Mapping Change: How the New York City Police Department Re-engineered Itself to Drive Down Crime.” *Law Enforcement News* December.
- Silverman, Eli B. 1999. *NYPD Battles Crime: Innovative Strategies in Policing*. Boston, MA: Northeastern University Press.
- Sparrow, Malcolm K., Mark H. Moore and David B. Kennedy. 1990. *Beyond 911: A New Era for Policing*. New York: Basic Books.
- Weisburd, David, and Lorraine Green. 1995. “Policing Drug Hot Spots: The Jersey City Drug Analysis Program. *Justice Quarterly* 12 (4): 711-735.
- Weisburd, David, Jerome McElroy and Patricia Hardyman. 1988. “Challenges to Supervision In Community Policing: Observations on a Pilot Project.” *American Journal of Police* 7 (2): 29-50.
- Weisburd, David and Thomas J. McEwen (eds). 1997. *Crime Mapping and Crime Prevention*. Munsey: Criminal Justice Press.
- Weisburd, David, Orit Shalev, and Menachem Amir. “Community Policing in Israel: Resistance And Change. *Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategy & Management*.
- Willis, James, Stephen D. Mastrofski, David Weisburd, and Rosann Greenspan. Forth. *Compstat and Organizational Change: Intensive Site Visits Report*.
- Witkin, Gordon. 1998. “The Crime Bust.” *U.S. News and World Report* May 25:28-36.

Appendix I:

**Managing Problem Solving in Police Agencies:
A National Survey**

MANAGING PROBLEM SOLVING IN POLICE AGENCIES

A National Survey



1201 Connecticut Avenue, NW, Suite # 200
Washington, DC 20036
Telephone (202) 833-1460 • Fax (202) 659-9149

August 1999

Supported by: National Institute of Justice, Grant No. 98-IJ-CX-0070

Instructions

Section One (pages 1 - 13) of the questionnaire asks about the top executive's views. It is designed to be completed by the head of your agency or someone who can accurately represent the agency head's views. **Section Two** (pages 13 - 22) may be completed by someone familiar with characteristics of your agency and with technical aspects of your department.

Confidentiality of the responses to the entire survey is guaranteed. No reports or data given to the National Institute of Justice or other researchers will identify the agency or any individual associated with specific responses. All identifying information will remain only with the researchers at the Police Foundation.

**If you have questions regarding the survey, please contact
Dr. Rosann Greenspan at (202) 833-1460, or by fax (202) 659-9149
or email: rgreenspan@policefoundation.org.**

Please complete and return the survey using the enclosed envelope to the following address. Because we would like to include everyone's answers for our analysis, it is important that you return your survey as soon as possible.

Police Foundation
1201 Connecticut Ave., NW, Suite 200
Washington, DC 20036

Please provide the name of the person who completed
SECTION ONE (EXECUTIVE VIEWS) of the survey.

Agency Name: _____
City and State: _____
Respondent Name: _____
Assignment/Rank: _____
Telephone: _____ Fax: _____

Please provide the name of the person who completed
SECTION TWO (ORGANIZATIONAL FEATURES) of the survey.

Respondent Name: _____
Assignment/Rank: _____
Telephone: _____ Fax: _____

Section One

Executive Views

Section One should be completed by the head of the agency or someone who can accurately represent the agency head's views.

1. What year did you assume the position of chief of this department? _____

2. Considering the many goals police agencies are expected to pursue, what would you say best describes **your approach to establishing priorities** for the department in the past 12 months?
 - 1 I try to get the department to focus on just a few of my highest priorities
 - 2 I try to get the department to handle many different goals which I select
 - 3 Other (please describe) _____

3. In the last 12 months has your agency publicly announced a goal of reducing crime or some other problem by a specific number or percent?
 - 1 Yes (please indicate crime or problem) _____
 - 2 No

4. We are interested in how you get a sense of the day-to-day performance of the department. For each type of information, indicate how often it is reported to you and how useful it is in assessing the department's performance. Check N/A if you do not routinely receive this type of information.

Types of Information	How often reported?					How useful?		
	Daily	Weekly	Monthly	Less Often	N/A	Very Useful	Somewhat Useful	Not Useful
a. Crime statistics (offenses)	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	5 <input type="checkbox"/>	6 <input type="checkbox"/>	7 <input type="checkbox"/>	8 <input type="checkbox"/>
b. Department activity statistics (arrests, citations, calls for service, etc.)	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	5 <input type="checkbox"/>	6 <input type="checkbox"/>	7 <input type="checkbox"/>	8 <input type="checkbox"/>
c. Response time averages	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	5 <input type="checkbox"/>	6 <input type="checkbox"/>	7 <input type="checkbox"/>	8 <input type="checkbox"/>
d. Complaints against police officers	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	5 <input type="checkbox"/>	6 <input type="checkbox"/>	7 <input type="checkbox"/>	8 <input type="checkbox"/>
e. Summaries of problem-solving projects	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	5 <input type="checkbox"/>	6 <input type="checkbox"/>	7 <input type="checkbox"/>	8 <input type="checkbox"/>
f. Staff's descriptions of important events/accomplishments	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	5 <input type="checkbox"/>	6 <input type="checkbox"/>	7 <input type="checkbox"/>	8 <input type="checkbox"/>
g. Other: _____	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	5 <input type="checkbox"/>	6 <input type="checkbox"/>	7 <input type="checkbox"/>	8 <input type="checkbox"/>

5. Listed below are a number of goals that police executives sometimes pursue. Please review all of these goals and then **rank the top five goals in terms of how much attention you paid to them in the last 12 months**. Write a 1 by the goal to which you paid the most attention, a 2 by the goal to which you paid the next most attention, and so on. After you rank the top five goals, leave the remainder blank.

	<u>Rank</u>
a. Reduce serious crime	_____
b. Reduce quality of life offenses	_____
c. Reduce fear of crime	_____
d. Reduce calls for service	_____
e. Increase citizen satisfaction with the police	_____
f. Increase service to citizens living in high-crime areas	_____
g. Increase efficiency of service (reduce cost per unit of service)	_____
h. Reduce conflict among different segments of the community	_____
i. Increase citizen participation in police programs	_____
j. Increase citizens' ability to make their own neighborhoods better places to live	_____
k. Give citizen groups more influence over police policy and practice	_____
l. Improve coordination with other public and private organizations	_____
m. Reduce complaints about police misbehavior	_____
n. Increase police managers' control over actual field operations	_____
o. Improve officers' policing skills	_____
p. Improve employee morale	_____
q. Be more responsive to the priorities of individual neighborhoods	_____
r. Provide better service to crime victims	_____
s. Improve the physical appearance of neighborhoods	_____

Many police departments are divided into districts, precincts, or divisions which themselves are subdivided into smaller territorial units, such as sectors, which may in turn be further subdivided into beats. Department terminology varies. We use the term "district" to refer to a fixed geographic area that is subdivided for officers' patrol responsibility.

6. Does your police agency divide its territory into districts (as described above)?

1 Yes

2 No

7. Thinking about department practices while you have headed your organization, please indicate how likely the event in the second column would be if the situation in the first column occurred. If you do not divide your territory into districts (as described above), consider the following situations in terms of patrol areas and patrol supervisors.

If this situation occurs,	How likely is it that this event will occur?	Very Likely	Somewhat Likely	Somewhat Unlikely	Very Unlikely
a. If crime in a district stays at a high level or continues to rise over many months,	the district commander will be replaced.	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>
b. If crime in a district declines over many months,	the district commander will be promoted or get a desired job assignment.	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>
c. If a district commander does not know about crime patterns in the district,	the district commander will be replaced.	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>
d. If the commander of a specialized unit frequently fails to fulfill requests for cooperation from district commanders,	the specialized unit commander will be replaced.	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>
e. If the commander of a specialized unit routinely fulfills requests for assistance from district commanders,	the specialized unit commander will be promoted or get a desired job assignment.	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>

8. Listed below are a variety of decisions that are made in police organizations. Please indicate **who usually makes each type of decision with little or no review by superiors**. Check only one response for each item. The following shaded box provides a guide for the terms used.

Top Executive	Highest ranking executive in police agency (Chief)
Operational Commander	Administrator ranking between top executive and district commander in chain of command (such as Head of Patrol)
District Commander	Has 24-hour responsibility for district or precinct
Line Supervisor	Works shifts with subordinates
Specialized Commander	Commander of a specialized unit outside of district chain of command

Type of Decision	Top Executive	Operational Commander	District Commander	Line Supervisor	Specialized Commander
a. Determine beat boundaries	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	5 <input type="checkbox"/>
b. Determine routine staffing levels for patrol shifts	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	5 <input type="checkbox"/>
c. Approve flexible hour requests for sworn personnel	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	5 <input type="checkbox"/>
d. Give individual employees job assignments	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	5 <input type="checkbox"/>
e. Mobilize SWAT unit to support operations	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	5 <input type="checkbox"/>
f. Select problem-solving strategies for high-profile problems	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	5 <input type="checkbox"/>
g. Select problem-solving strategies for low-profile problems	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	5 <input type="checkbox"/>
h. Provide official recognition for exceptional performance by a police-rank officer	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	5 <input type="checkbox"/>

Police departments are asked to deal with a wide range of community problems. In the next series of questions we would like you to focus on **the one crime/disorder problem that used more of the department's effort than any other problem in the last 12 months**. Please do not select a problem that is strictly internal or administrative, but rather focus on a problem that pertains to crime or disorder in the community. Items 9 through 23 refer to this problem, so please consider your selection carefully.

9. Please describe the crime/disorder problem that consumed more of the department's efforts than any other problem in the last 12 months. Provide as much detail as possible about the nature of the problem.

10. Which category below **best** captures the nature of the problem you described in the previous item? **Check only one**.

- | | |
|--|---|
| 1 <input type="checkbox"/> Property crimes | 9 <input type="checkbox"/> Weapons |
| 2 <input type="checkbox"/> Violent crimes against persons | 10 <input type="checkbox"/> Hate crimes |
| 3 <input type="checkbox"/> Drug crime | 11 <input type="checkbox"/> Traffic violations |
| 4 <input type="checkbox"/> Domestic violence | 12 <input type="checkbox"/> Other traffic |
| 5 <input type="checkbox"/> Vandalism | 13 <input type="checkbox"/> Auto theft |
| 6 <input type="checkbox"/> Alcohol-related crime (including DWI) | 14 <input type="checkbox"/> Disorderly conduct and minor disturbances |
| 7 <input type="checkbox"/> Conflict between different groups of citizens | 15 <input type="checkbox"/> Physical deterioration of neighborhood |
| 8 <input type="checkbox"/> Gangs | 16 <input type="checkbox"/> Something else |

11. How did **this problem** first come to your attention? **Check only one.**

- 1 Department personnel
- 2 Department data analysis
- 3 Mayor or other elected officials
- 4 Complaints from other agency heads outside police department
- 5 Complaints from community leaders
- 6 Complaints from individual citizens
- 7 Advice from outside consultants/researchers
- 8 News media
- 9 You perceived it directly (without input from any of the above sources)
- 10 Other (please specify) _____

12. Please mark each of the tactics or methods that your department used in its effort to solve **this problem** in the last 12 months. **Please check all that apply.**

1 <input type="checkbox"/> Saturation of an area with police	13 <input type="checkbox"/> Educating the public
2 <input type="checkbox"/> Check points	14 <input type="checkbox"/> Mobilizing community groups
3 <input type="checkbox"/> Buy-bust operations	15 <input type="checkbox"/> Altering the physical environment
4 <input type="checkbox"/> Gun seizures	16 <input type="checkbox"/> Improving victim services
5 <input type="checkbox"/> Sting operations	17 <input type="checkbox"/> Increasing arrests for targeted offenses
6 <input type="checkbox"/> Vertical patrols in buildings	18 <input type="checkbox"/> Intensive enforcement of minor offenses
7 <input type="checkbox"/> Warrant checks on all arrestees	19 <input type="checkbox"/> Increasing traffic enforcement
8 <input type="checkbox"/> Nuisance abatement law enforcement	20 <input type="checkbox"/> Seeking new laws to assist enforcement
9 <input type="checkbox"/> Enforcing laws not enforced earlier	21 <input type="checkbox"/> Targeting repeat offenders
10 <input type="checkbox"/> Mobilizing other public/private agencies	22 <input type="checkbox"/> Improving response time to calls for service
11 <input type="checkbox"/> Mobilizing other law enforcement	23 <input type="checkbox"/> Pressuring other agencies to improve service
12 <input type="checkbox"/> Mediating between conflicting parties	24 <input type="checkbox"/> Other (please specify) _____

13. How important was each of the following considerations in deciding which tactics or methods to use?

	Very Important	Somewhat Important	Not at all Important
a. The department has previously had success with this approach.	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>
b. Other departments have reported success with this approach.	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>
c. Outside experts recommend this approach.	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>
d. Research evidence suggests that this was the best approach.	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>
e. This approach was consistent with a good theory about what works.	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>
f. This approach was most likely to have support outside the department.	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>
g. This approach was least likely to be opposed outside the department.	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>
h. Police employees were least likely to resist this approach.	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>
i. No alternatives were considered.	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>

14. Which consideration in item 13 was the **most important** in deciding which tactics or methods to use? In the space below, write the letter of the most important consideration from the table above. If none applies, please describe the most important consideration.
-

15. Did the department work with other government agencies in dealing with **this problem**?

1 Yes (please describe) _____
 2 No

16. In the last year, have the department's efforts to deal with **this problem** been assessed?

1 Yes
 2 No
 3 Don't Know

The next two items inquire about the use of statistics to measure your agency's performance.

17. Which one of the following sources most influenced your own assessment about the department's efforts to deal with **this problem**? **Check only one.**
- ₁ Opinions of department personnel
 - ₂ Results of data analysis
 - ₃ Mayor or other elected official
 - ₄ Input from appointed public officials outside police department
 - ₅ Input from community leaders or citizen advisory panels
 - ₆ Input from outside experts (consultants, researchers, professional groups)
 - ₇ Other (please specify) _____
18. How would you assess the department's progress in solving **this problem**, based on what you originally expected to accomplish by this point in time?
- ₅ Much better than expected
 - ₄ Somewhat better than expected
 - ₃ About as expected
 - ₂ Somewhat worse than expected
 - ₁ Much worse than expected
 - ₈ Don't know

19. On average, how frequently did the department assess its progress in dealing with **this problem** using **statistical measures** of performance? By statistics, we mean any counts or summaries that quantify police activities or their outcomes (for example, arrests and crime rates). **Check only one.**

₁ Never used statistical measures

₂ Annually

₃ Quarterly

₄ Monthly

₅ Weekly

₆ Daily

₇ Other _____
(Specify)

20. How would you assess your department's ability to produce and analyze data about **this problem** over the past 12 months?

Ability to produce/analyze data about this problem	Very Good	Good	Fair	Poor	Very Poor	N/A
a. Ability to identify trouble areas ("hotspots") on a timely basis	<input type="checkbox"/> ₆	<input type="checkbox"/> ₅	<input type="checkbox"/> ₄	<input type="checkbox"/> ₃	<input type="checkbox"/> ₂	<input type="checkbox"/> ₁
b. Adequacy of information and data analysis for field unit decision making	<input type="checkbox"/> ₆	<input type="checkbox"/> ₅	<input type="checkbox"/> ₄	<input type="checkbox"/> ₃	<input type="checkbox"/> ₂	<input type="checkbox"/> ₁
c. Adequacy of data analysis to determine how successful efforts were	<input type="checkbox"/> ₆	<input type="checkbox"/> ₅	<input type="checkbox"/> ₄	<input type="checkbox"/> ₃	<input type="checkbox"/> ₂	<input type="checkbox"/> ₁
d. Adequacy of data analysis to indicate ways to improve past efforts to deal with this problem	<input type="checkbox"/> ₆	<input type="checkbox"/> ₅	<input type="checkbox"/> ₄	<input type="checkbox"/> ₃	<input type="checkbox"/> ₂	<input type="checkbox"/> ₁
e. Adequacy of data analysis for management to make long-term plans	<input type="checkbox"/> ₆	<input type="checkbox"/> ₅	<input type="checkbox"/> ₄	<input type="checkbox"/> ₃	<input type="checkbox"/> ₂	<input type="checkbox"/> ₁
f. Adequacy of data analysis to provide results to the press and public	<input type="checkbox"/> ₆	<input type="checkbox"/> ₅	<input type="checkbox"/> ₄	<input type="checkbox"/> ₃	<input type="checkbox"/> ₂	<input type="checkbox"/> ₁

21. At any point during the last 12 months did the department alter the method of dealing with **this problem**?

- ₁ Yes, based on statistical analysis
- ₂ Yes, but NOT based on statistical analysis
- ₃ No, the method was never altered
- ₈ Don't know

22. For each type of structure or procedure below, please indicate the **type of change**, if any, that was undertaken to deal with **this problem**. Terms are defined in the box below.

Temporary	There was a planned end date for this structure/procedure.
Permanent	There was no planned end date for this structure/procedure.
No Change	This structure/procedure was not used to deal with this problem.

Type of Structure or Procedure	Temporary	Permanent	No Change
a. Reassigned patrol officers to new units, areas, or work shifts	<input type="checkbox"/> ₁	<input type="checkbox"/> ₂	<input type="checkbox"/> ₃
b. Reassigned criminal investigators to new units, areas, or work shifts	<input type="checkbox"/> ₁	<input type="checkbox"/> ₂	<input type="checkbox"/> ₃
c. Reassigned other sworn specialists to new units, areas, or work shifts	<input type="checkbox"/> ₁	<input type="checkbox"/> ₂	<input type="checkbox"/> ₃
d. Reassigned civilian employees to new units, areas, or work shifts	<input type="checkbox"/> ₁	<input type="checkbox"/> ₂	<input type="checkbox"/> ₃
e. Altered method of patrol	<input type="checkbox"/> ₁	<input type="checkbox"/> ₂	<input type="checkbox"/> ₃
f. Altered law enforcement method	<input type="checkbox"/> ₁	<input type="checkbox"/> ₂	<input type="checkbox"/> ₃
g. Altered method of collecting data on problem	<input type="checkbox"/> ₁	<input type="checkbox"/> ₂	<input type="checkbox"/> ₃
h. Used overtime to provide personnel to deal with the problem	<input type="checkbox"/> ₁	<input type="checkbox"/> ₂	<input type="checkbox"/> ₃

23.

We are interested in different ways the department may have communicated with the public about its efforts to deal with this problem. Please indicate how frequently in the last 12 months the department used each of the methods below to communicate with the public about this problem. If this did not occur on a routine schedule, select the option that represents the frequency on average.

Method of Communication	Not Done	Annually	Quarterly	Monthly	Weekly	Daily
a. Press conferences, press releases, press interviews, feature stories	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	5 <input type="checkbox"/>	6 <input type="checkbox"/>
b. Public service announcement on television or radio	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	5 <input type="checkbox"/>	6 <input type="checkbox"/>
c. Internet web site reports (updated how frequently?)	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	5 <input type="checkbox"/>	6 <input type="checkbox"/>
d. Met with neighborhood groups (residential, business, churches)	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	5 <input type="checkbox"/>	6 <input type="checkbox"/>
e. Newsletters	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	5 <input type="checkbox"/>	6 <input type="checkbox"/>
f. Met with victims' groups	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	5 <input type="checkbox"/>	6 <input type="checkbox"/>
g. Met with other civic associations	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	5 <input type="checkbox"/>	6 <input type="checkbox"/>
h. Released formal written report	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	5 <input type="checkbox"/>	6 <input type="checkbox"/>

This completes the questions on the problem you selected. We would now like to move to a new topic. Several years ago the New York City Police Department instituted a system to manage police operations called **Compstat**, which stands for "computer comparison statistics." We would like to get your views on this approach to policing.

24. How familiar are you with NYPD's approach to Compstat?

- 1 Very familiar
- 2 Somewhat familiar
- 3 A little familiar
- 4 Not at all familiar →SKIP TO Q26

25. Have you or members of your department attended a Compstat session in New York City, or something like Compstat in some other department?

- 1 Yes, please identify department(s): _____
- 2 No

26. Below is a list of features that have been associated with Compstat and similar programs instituted in other departments. Please indicate how long your department has been doing this, if at all. Also, indicate if your department plans to or will continue to do each of these in the future.

Feature	How long has your department been doing this?						Plans to do or will continue in future?	
	N/A	< 1 year	1 - 2 years	3 - 5 years	6 - 10 years	> 10 years	Yes	No
a. Set specific objectives in terms that can be precisely measured	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	5 <input type="checkbox"/>	6 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
b. Give middle managers independence in selecting strategies to accomplish these objectives	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	5 <input type="checkbox"/>	6 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
c. Give middle managers control over more resources to accomplish objectives	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	5 <input type="checkbox"/>	6 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
d. Hold regularly scheduled meetings with district commanders to review progress toward objectives	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	5 <input type="checkbox"/>	6 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
e. Use data to assess progress toward objectives	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	5 <input type="checkbox"/>	6 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
f. Use maps to display crime problems and department activities which address those problems	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	5 <input type="checkbox"/>	6 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
g. Develop, modify or discard problem-solving strategies based on what the data show	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	5 <input type="checkbox"/>	6 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
h. Use aggressive enforcement strategies to deal with minor disorders and threats to quality of life in the neighborhood	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	5 <input type="checkbox"/>	6 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
i. Hold middle managers responsible for understanding crime patterns and initiating plans to deal with them	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	5 <input type="checkbox"/>	6 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
j. Require specialized units to assist patrol to solve problems	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	5 <input type="checkbox"/>	6 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
k. Hold specialized units accountable at regularly held meetings	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	5 <input type="checkbox"/>	6 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>

27. Has your department implemented a Compstat-like program?

- 1 Yes
- 2 No, but planning to do so →SKIP TO END OF SECTION ONE
- 3 No →SKIP TO END OF SECTION ONE

28. When was this program implemented?

____/____
Month Year

29. What, if anything, do you call this program? _____

-----END OF SECTION ONE-----

We appreciate your taking the time to complete this section of the questionnaire. PLEASE BE SURE THAT YOU HAVE COMPLETED THE INFORMATION BOX FOR THIS SECTION INSIDE THE FRONT COVER. Please use the space on the back page for any other comments you wish to make about any of your responses to the questions or about the survey in general. The remainder of this survey may be completed by someone other than the head of the agency.

Section Two ***Organizational Features***

Many police departments are divided into districts, precincts, or divisions which themselves are subdivided into smaller territorial units, such as sectors, which may in turn be further subdivided into beats. Department terminology varies. We use the term "district" to refer to a fixed geographic area that is subdivided for officers' patrol responsibility.

30. Does your police agency divide its territory into districts (as described above?)

- 1 Yes
- 2 No →SKIP TO Q36

31. How many districts does your department have? _____
[If your answer is zero or one, please skip to Q36]

32. How are your district stations located geographically?

- 1 A separate location for each district station
- 2 A separate location for most district stations
- 3 A separate location for a few district stations
- 4 All districts are operated out of the same location

Police functions can be organized in various ways. Here are the most common options:

- District Only** Police function performed by units under the district command.
- Outside Unit** Police function performed by units not under the district command.
- Outside Unit in District** Police function performed by units not under the district command, but physically located at the district facility.
- Mixed** Police function performed by both district and outside units.
- Other Unit** Police function provided by other government or police agency.
- Other Mixed** Police function provided by district units and by other government or police agencies.

33. For each item listed below, please check the box that best describes how that function is organized in your department. If it varies by district, pick the option that characterizes the most districts. Please mark N/A (not applicable) if this function is not provided by your agency.

	District Only	Outside Unit	Outside Unit in District	Mixed	Other Unit	Other Mixed	N/A
a. Uniformed Patrol	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	5 <input type="checkbox"/>	6 <input type="checkbox"/>	7 <input type="checkbox"/>
b. Traffic	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	5 <input type="checkbox"/>	6 <input type="checkbox"/>	7 <input type="checkbox"/>
c. Juvenile Officers	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	5 <input type="checkbox"/>	6 <input type="checkbox"/>	7 <input type="checkbox"/>
d. Street Tactical Units	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	5 <input type="checkbox"/>	6 <input type="checkbox"/>	7 <input type="checkbox"/>
e. Criminal Investigations	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	5 <input type="checkbox"/>	6 <input type="checkbox"/>	7 <input type="checkbox"/>
f. Public Transportation	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	5 <input type="checkbox"/>	6 <input type="checkbox"/>	7 <input type="checkbox"/>
g. Telephone Complaint Operators	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	5 <input type="checkbox"/>	6 <input type="checkbox"/>	7 <input type="checkbox"/>
h. Crime/Data Analysis	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	5 <input type="checkbox"/>	6 <input type="checkbox"/>	7 <input type="checkbox"/>
i. Public Housing	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	5 <input type="checkbox"/>	6 <input type="checkbox"/>	7 <input type="checkbox"/>
j. Community Policing Specialists	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	5 <input type="checkbox"/>	6 <input type="checkbox"/>	7 <input type="checkbox"/>
k. Crime Prevention Specialists	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	5 <input type="checkbox"/>	6 <input type="checkbox"/>	7 <input type="checkbox"/>
l. Narcotics	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	5 <input type="checkbox"/>	6 <input type="checkbox"/>	7 <input type="checkbox"/>

34. How does your department organize command of personnel assigned to districts?

1 No person below the rank of chief has 24-hour responsibility for the district

2 A single district commander has 24-hour responsibility for the district

3 Other _____

35. Who performs the data analysis for the department's crime and problem-solving efforts?
Check only one.

1 Officers/civilians in a centralized unit in headquarters.

2 Officers/civilians in both headquarters and district units, but mostly by the headquarters units.

3 Officers/civilians in both headquarters and district units, but mostly by the district units.

4 All data analysis is performed by the district units.

5 Other (please describe) _____

36. Who operates the records management system for crime incidents used by your department?

1 An information systems unit outside of the police department

2 Internal police unit

3 Unit in another law enforcement agency

4 Private contractor

5 Other (please describe) _____

37. Who operates the computer-aided dispatch system?

1 Department does not use computer-aided dispatch

2 An information systems unit outside of the police department

3 Internal police unit

4 Unit in another law enforcement agency

5 Private contractor

6 Other (please describe) _____

38. What are the hardware platforms for your records management system and for your computer-aided dispatch system? By records management system we mean offense reports, arrest reports, warrants, and other case related information other than calls for service. Please mark N/A if the system is not used by your department.

	Records Management System	Computer-Aided Dispatch (CAD) System
Stand-alone desktop computer	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>
Network server	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
Mainframe computer	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>
Other (please describe) _____	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>
N/A	5 <input type="checkbox"/>	5 <input type="checkbox"/>

39. How are records entered into the records management system? If more than one system is used, select the one that applies to the largest number of sworn personnel.

- 1 Officers handwrite or type reports that are entered by data entry personnel
- 2 Officers dictate reports that are entered by data entry personnel
- 3 Officers directly enter computerized reports from station house
- 4 Officers directly enter reports from laptops or terminals in vehicles
- 5 Reports are written by officers from laptops or terminals in vehicles and then sent to the records management system
- 6 Not Applicable, data are not entered

40. How are records exported from the records management system to department computers in order to generate reports and conduct crime and data analysis? **Check only one.**

- 1 Records are transferred/downloaded through a network
- 2 Records are copied to a computer disk/tape and then copied to another computer
- 3 Records are printed and typed into another database
- 4 Analysis is performed within the records management system
- 5 Other (please describe) _____
- 6 Not Applicable, records are not exported

41. How are records exported from the computer-aided dispatch system to departmental computers in order to generate reports and conduct crime and data analysis? **Check only one.**

- 1 Department does not have a computer-aided dispatch system
- 2 Records are transferred/downloaded through a network
- 3 Records are copied to a computer disk/tape and then copied to another computer
- 4 Records are printed and typed into another database
- 5 Analysis is performed within the computer-aided dispatch system
- 6 Other (please describe) _____
- 7 Not Applicable, records are not exported

42. Here are several types of technology used by some departments. For each one please indicate whether your department uses it for crime analysis, problem solving, and/or for Compstat-like meetings. **Check all that apply.**

Technology	Crime Analysis	Problem Solving	Compstat Meetings	Not Used
a. Mapping software	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>
b. Presentation software	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>
c. Database or Statistical Analysis software	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>

43. Does your department use an automated system to track the location of patrol vehicles (such as Global Positioning System hardware or an Automated Vehicle Locator system)?

- 1 Yes
- 2 No

44. Please indicate whether your department uses each of the following crime mapping/crime analysis techniques.

	Yes	No
a. Pin mapping - of crime activity for all crimes by area (for example, maps of all crimes within patrol areas)	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
b. Pin mapping - of specific crimes by type (for example, maps of burglary locations)	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
c. Pin mapping - of crimes by specific suspect or modus operandi	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
d. Crime trend identification and analysis	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
e. Serial crime profiling	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
f. Hot spot mapping	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
g. Gang territory identification	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
h. Other uses (please specify) _____	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>

45. What access do patrol officers have to the computerized data files listed below? **Check all that apply.**

Direct Access	The officer obtains the information from the computer without assistance.
Indirect Access	Someone other than the officer obtains the information from the computer for the officer.
No Access	Computerized data not available to patrol officers directly or indirectly.

	Direct Access		Indirect Access		No Access
	At station or headquarters	From vehicle	At station or headquarters	From vehicle	
a. Crime case files	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	5 <input type="checkbox"/>
b. Crime statistics for assigned beat	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	5 <input type="checkbox"/>
c. Crime maps for assigned beat	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	5 <input type="checkbox"/>
d. Calls for service for assigned beat	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	5 <input type="checkbox"/>

46. What access, if any, does your department have to the files of each of the following agencies?

	Access Through Agency Personnel	Direct Computer Access	No Access
a. Public housing	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>
b. Corrections	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>
c. Social services	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>
d. Education (truancy)	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>
e. Health department	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>
f. Public works	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>
g. Buildings and inspections	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>
h. Alcohol licensing	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>

47. Which of the following information, either as a computer database or in paper form, does your department maintain? **Check all items that apply.**

Information	Computer database	Paper form	Data not maintained
a. Gang information - colors, symbols, membership, territory, etc.	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>
b. Individuals recently released on parole or similar legal disposition	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>
c. Local registered sex offenders	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>
d. Known prostitutes	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>
e. Known drug users/dealers	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>

48. How often are the following types of information reported to the police managers who are responsible for problem solving efforts?

Type of Information	Never	Annually or less	Quarterly	Monthly	Weekly	Daily
<u>Criminal Incidents</u>						
Detailed information on individual cases	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	5 <input type="checkbox"/>	6 <input type="checkbox"/>
Statistical summaries or graphs	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	5 <input type="checkbox"/>	6 <input type="checkbox"/>
Maps	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	5 <input type="checkbox"/>	6 <input type="checkbox"/>
<u>Arrests</u>						
Detailed information on individual cases	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	5 <input type="checkbox"/>	6 <input type="checkbox"/>
Statistical summaries or graphs	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	5 <input type="checkbox"/>	6 <input type="checkbox"/>
Maps	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	5 <input type="checkbox"/>	6 <input type="checkbox"/>
<u>Calls for Service</u>						
Detailed information on individual cases	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	5 <input type="checkbox"/>	6 <input type="checkbox"/>
Statistical summaries or graphs	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	5 <input type="checkbox"/>	6 <input type="checkbox"/>
Maps	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	5 <input type="checkbox"/>	6 <input type="checkbox"/>
<u>Complaints Against Police</u>						
Detailed information on individual cases	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	5 <input type="checkbox"/>	6 <input type="checkbox"/>
Statistical summaries or graphs	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	5 <input type="checkbox"/>	6 <input type="checkbox"/>
Maps	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	5 <input type="checkbox"/>	6 <input type="checkbox"/>
<u>Problem-Solving Projects</u>						
Detailed information on individual cases	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	5 <input type="checkbox"/>	6 <input type="checkbox"/>
Statistical summaries or graphs	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	5 <input type="checkbox"/>	6 <input type="checkbox"/>
Maps	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	5 <input type="checkbox"/>	6 <input type="checkbox"/>

49. How, if at all, are crime incident reports filed by police officers audited for accuracy? **Check all that apply.**

- 1 No auditing performed →SKIP TO Q51
- 2 Auditing performed by supervisor of officer filing the report
- 3 Auditing performed by a special unit in police department assigned only this task
- 4 Auditing performed by a general administrative unit within the department
- 5 Auditing performed by another government unit outside the police department
- 6 Auditing performed by an outside professional or private sector organization

50. How are crime incident reports selected for auditing?

- 1 All reports are routinely audited
- 2 A random sample of reports is routinely audited
- 3 Only reports suspected of inaccuracies are audited
- 4 Other (please describe) _____

51. What is the typical time lag between the time an officer files each of the following reports and their being available for computer reporting by your agency? Check N/A if your department does not maintain a computerized record of this event.

Event	Time lag between event and availability for computer analysis						
	Immediately Available	Same Day	Within 7 days	Within 8-14 days	Within 15-30 days	Longer than 30 days	N/A
a. Call for service report	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 6	<input type="checkbox"/> 7
b. Crime incident report	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 6	<input type="checkbox"/> 7
c. Arrest report	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 6	<input type="checkbox"/> 7
d. Citation report	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 6	<input type="checkbox"/> 7
e. Field interrogation	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 6	<input type="checkbox"/> 7

52.

In the table below, please provide the information for each of the organizational characteristics describing the sworn and civilian personnel currently employed in your agency. Please check the box marked none if your agency has no people in an indicated category or if that category does not apply to your agency.

Organizational Characteristic	Number of Sworn Personnel	Number of Civilian Personnel
a. Total number of full-time personnel	_____ None <input type="checkbox"/>	_____ None <input type="checkbox"/>
b. Number of full-time personnel assigned to patrol/uniform units	_____ None <input type="checkbox"/>	_____ None <input type="checkbox"/>
c. Number of full-time personnel whose primary job is crime analysis	_____ None <input type="checkbox"/>	_____ None <input type="checkbox"/>
d. Number of full-time personnel whose primary job is planning/research (Don't count individuals who do both planning/research and crime analysis here)	_____ None <input type="checkbox"/>	_____ None <input type="checkbox"/>
e. Number of full-time personnel whose primary job is first-line supervision	_____ None <input type="checkbox"/>	_____ None <input type="checkbox"/>
f. Number of full-time personnel whose primary job is first-line supervision	_____ None <input type="checkbox"/>	_____ None <input type="checkbox"/>
	_____ None <input type="checkbox"/>	_____ None <input type="checkbox"/>

PLEASE BE SURE THAT YOU HAVE COMPLETED THE INFORMATION BOX FOR THIS SECTION INSIDE THE FRONT COVER.

-----END OF SECTION TWO-----

Section Three

Concluding Comments

We appreciate your taking the time to complete this questionnaire. Please use the space below for any comments you wish to make about any of your responses to the questions or about the survey in general.

Section One: _____

Section Two: _____

Thank you for completing the survey!

Please return the survey in the enclosed envelope as soon as possible. If the envelope has been misplaced, please return the survey to the address on the front cover.

Appendix II:

Drawing the Sample for the Police Foundation's Compstat Survey

DRAWING THE SAMPLE FOR THE POLICE FOUNDATION'S COMPSTAT SURVEY

Ed Maguire
Department of Criminal Justice
University of Nebraska at Omaha

May 21, 1999

Introduction

I was asked to draw a sample and provide a database of agency names and contact information for the national Compstat survey. According to the proposal, the "sample would be stratified to include all agencies with 100+ full time sworn personnel, and a sample of 100 agencies with between 50 and 99 full time sworn officers." Furthermore, the survey would "include 515 local police departments with 100 or more full time sworn officers. There are 698 local police departments with between 50 and 99 full time sworn officers. We would survey a random sample of 100 departments in this stratum." Finally, the proposal defines general purpose local police departments "to include municipal, county, tribal, and regional agencies." This paper describes the sampling frame, the samples, and the database that I have provided to the Police Foundation.

The Sampling Frame

The most complete current listing of American police agencies is the 1996 Directory Survey of Law Enforcement Agencies conducted by the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) and the Census Bureau. I obtained this data file and its documentation directly from BJS. The sampling criteria written in the Compstat proposal were apparently drawn from this database as well, since the numbers match precisely. As stated in the proposal, there are 515 large agencies with 100 or more sworn officers, and 698 small agencies with 50-99 officers.

The Samples

Four separate samples are included in the database I provided to the Police Foundation. These four samples are presented in order, and match the codes listed in the "sample" variable in the database.

- (1) This is a random sample of 15 small agencies that will receive a pretest.
- (2) This is a random sample of 100 small agencies that will receive the main survey.
- (3) This is a random sample of 10 alternate small agencies that can be used to fill in the above sample as needed. I did this for two reasons: in case there was a problem with one of the randomly selected small agencies, and in case there was some (random) overlap in the above two samples. As it turns out, one agency was randomly selected for both the pretest and main sample (Hendersonville, TN). If you do not want this agency to participate in both the main survey and the pretest, then select one alternate agency from this list.

- (4) This is the population of 515 agencies with 100+ officers.

The Database

Six tables are included in the database: one for each of the above samples, one full list of agencies that contains a sample code corresponding to the above numbers (1-4), and one table containing contact information from the COPS Office on all agencies matching the sample agencies (by ORI code). Not all of these agencies have applied to or received funding from the COPS Office, so this table does not contain information on all sample agencies.

The addresses in all but the COPS table come from the Bureau of Justice Statistics. I believe these are the same addresses used to mail the LEMAS surveys. The phone and fax numbers come from the COPS Office and are probably not very reliable. They may take you to the Mayor's Office, the training academy, the grants division, or the chief's secretary. They are also missing for a number of agencies that were not represented in the COPS databases.

I included the COPS Office information only as a fallback. As you can see from looking at it, the Chief's information often contains lower ranking officers, Mayor's offices, etc . . . I recommend not using any of this information for the main survey. I specifically recommend that you not use this information to do personal mailings to the chief. Its quality is just too suspect for that, and your survey may never arrive at the agency. I don't know of any good, current source for chief's names.

Miscellaneous

- Since the BJS database is three years old, it is important to remember that police agencies in the U.S. have been growing rapidly during that period. Some of the larger agencies that were in the small agency sample have probably grown and may now have 100 or more officers.
- I linked the COPS and BJS data using ORI codes. Two of these were incorrect and I deleted them.

Appendix III:

Survey Cover Letter to Police Departments

August 17, 2001

«NAME»
«AGENCY»
«ADDRESS1»
«ADDRESS2»
«CITY», «STATE» «ZIP»

Dear «Field1» «LASTNAME»,

The Police Foundation is conducting a national survey of police executives to gather information about strategies for managing problem solving and crime analysis, and to ask their opinions about some recent innovations in police management. This survey is the first stage in a study funded by the National Institute of Justice. Our project will provide a profile of what local police departments across the country are doing and planning with regard to the management of problem solving and crime analysis.

As a national non-profit whose mission is to improve American policing, we believe the results of the survey will assist police practitioners and policy makers in planning for the future. Your agency was one of over 600 selected, and we encourage you to participate in order for the survey results to be meaningful. As explained in the Instructions page inside the front cover of the enclosed survey, the Police Foundation guarantees the full confidentiality of your responses.

As further explained in the Instructions page, Section One of the questionnaire is designed to be completed by you or someone who can accurately represent your views as head of the agency. Section Two may be filled out by someone familiar with characteristics and technical aspects of your department. We have enclosed a stamped envelope for returning the completed questionnaire to the Police Foundation.

If you have any questions, please contact me at (202) 833-1460, or by email at rgreenspan@policefoundation.org. Thank you in advance for your participation.

Sincerely,



Rosann Greenspan, Ph.D.
Research Director

Section 2

Compstat and Organizational Change: Short Site Visits Report

Rosann Greenspan, Ph.D.

Stephen Mastrofski, Ph.D.

David Weisburd, Ph.D.

With

Ann Marie McNally, M.A.

Erin Lane, M.P.A.

POLICE FOUNDATION

**Section 2:
Compstat and Organizational Change:
Short Site Visits Report**

Table of Contents

I.	Introduction	1
II.	Compstat and Strategic Problem Solving: Core Elements	3
III.	Site Selection	6
IV.	Field Methodology	16
V.	Elements of Strategic Problem Solving in Sixteen Sites	17
	Small Departments (50-99 sworn officers)	19
	Medium Departments (100-499 sworn officers)	43
	Large Departments (over 500 sworn officers)	74
VI.	Discussion and Conclusions	109
VII.	References	113

Appendices

- Appendix I: Sample Department Narrative of Survey Responses (Site Selection Process)
- Appendix II: Letters to Compstat and Non-Compstat Departments
- Appendix III: Interview Instruments - 3 Instruments
- Appendix IV: Selected Site Report (Redacted)

List of Tables

Table 1: Department Characteristics Used for Site Selection10

Table 2: Matrix of Eligible Sites by Characteristics for Site Selection12

Table 3: Distribution of Departments Selected within Matrix 13

Table 4: Department Selected for Possible Site Visits 14

Table 5: Distribution within Matrix of 16 Short Site Visits 15

I. Introduction

Within two years of its introduction in 1994 by then Commissioner William Bratton of the New York City Police Department and his deputy commissioner the late Jack Maple, Compstat had been recognized as a major innovation in American policing. By 1998, when the Police Foundation undertook this study, it had been reported that Police Departments around the country had begun to adopt Compstat or variations of it (Law Enforcement News, 1997; Maas, 1998; McDonald, 1998). Other cities had reported success with their versions of Compstat (Gurwitt, 1998; Remnick, 1997), and agencies from around the nation and the world sent representatives to New York City to learn more about the program (Maas, 1998). The New York Police Department had begun holding annual conferences to accommodate the great interest that Compstat had engendered.

As we have said elsewhere,¹ NYPD's Compstat did not emerge full-blown and unprecedented in New York City in the mid-1990s. Commissioner Bratton and his staff drew heavily on management principles that have received acclaim as state-of-the-art and forward-looking (Bratton 1998; Micklethwait and Wooldridge, 1996). These principles include developing in management a commitment and capacity to: (a) clarify the agency's mission by focusing on its basic values and embodying them in tangible objectives, (b) giving priority to operational objectives over administrative ones, (c) organizing to simplify managerial accountability for achieving those objectives, (d) becoming more adept at scanning the organization's environment to identify problems early and develop strategies to respond (e.g., being "data-driven"), (e) increasing organizational flexibility to implement the most promising

¹ In Weisburd, et al., 1991, we provide a broader introduction and historical analysis of Compstat that is summarized in this section. See also Weisburd, et al., forth., 2003.

strategies, and (f) learning about what works and what does not by following through with empirical assessment of what happened. Elements of this approach have been introduced in policing under the rubric of problem-oriented (Goldstein, 1990) and community policing (Moore and Stephens, 1991). Compstat brought many of these management prescriptions together in a single program customized for police organizations. We characterize Compstat and its related features generically as “strategic problem solving.” We find the descriptive “strategic” particularly apropos because it highlights the thrust of this reform to establish a “big-picture” approach to police management’s need to deal with an uncertain and unstable environment.²

This report provides the second phase of the first national description of Compstat programs, considered in the framework of strategic problem solving. To date there has been very little systematic analysis of Compstat programs in policing, or of the manner and extent of implementation of elements of strategic problem solving in American police departments within or without the context of a Compstat program.

Relying on a series of sixteen site visits to departments systematically selected (see below) from a representative survey of American police departments conducted by the Police Foundation (Weisburd, Mastrofski, McNally and Greenspan, 2001), we examine the varieties of Compstat and strategic problem solving in departments that report implementing a Compstat program and departments that report implementing elements of strategic problem solving without instituting a Compstat program. What elements of strategic problem solving are departments in all parts of the country implementing? Which elements are they not? How do

² McDonald (1998:34) offers a definition that resonates with treating Compstat as strategic problem solving: “...[I]t should be considered enhanced leadership focused on a restructuring and integration of police operations driven by a scientific analysis of data. It is a reconfiguration of the relationship between patrol, investigations and all other specialized units. It is a shift in Departmental priorities from administration to crime control, especially by the Chief of police and other high-ranking staff. In short, it is clearly an operations management program.”

departments of varying sizes adapt Compstat and strategic problem solving? What problems do departments report facing in implementing Compstat and strategic problem solving? Like our national survey analysis (Weisburd, Mastrofski, McNally and Greenspan, 2001), this report also examines whether the implementation of Compstat and strategic problem solving in police agencies represents a substantive change in American policing. Do police agencies that claim to have adopted the Compstat model actually implement core elements of Compstat programs? How deeply have such core elements penetrated into Compstat departments? Do Compstat departments differ significantly from non-Compstat departments in regard to the basic elements of strategic problem solving?

II. Compstat and Strategic Problem Solving: Core Elements

In the context of the NYPD, Compstat refers to a “strategic control system” developed to gather and disseminate information on NYPD’s crime problems and track efforts to deal with them. It is a structure intended to serve the implementation of NYPD’s Crime Control and Quality of Life Strategies (Office of Management Analysis and Planning n.d.). But it has become shorthand for the full range of strategic problem solving in the Department. At the core of the approach are four crime reduction principles: (1) accurate and timely intelligence about crime made available at all levels in the organization, (2) the selection of the most effective tactics for specific problems, (3) rapid deployment of people and resources to implement those tactics, and (4) “relentless” follow-up and assessment to learn what happened and make subsequent tactical adjustments as necessary (Bratton, 1998; Maple, 1999; McDonald, 1998, 2001; Office of Management Analysis and Planning n.d.; Silverman, 1999; Walsh, 2001). These

and other elements of NYPD's Compstat approach are most visibly displayed in the twice-weekly Compstat "Crime Control Strategy Meetings," during which precinct commanders appear before several of the Department's top brass to report on crime problems in their precincts and what they are doing about it.

Beyond this, we identify seven key elements of Compstat emerging in the broader framework of strategic problem solving: mission clarification; internal accountability; geographic organization of command; organizational flexibility; data driven problem identification and assessment; effective problem solving; and external accountability.³ These features are not only associated with the Compstat model but constitute the core of organization development prescriptions that emerged in the last two decades.

- *Mission clarification.* Top management is responsible for clarifying and exalting the core features of the department's mission that serve as the overarching reason for the organization's existence. Mission clarification includes a demonstration of management's commitment, such as stating those goals in specific terms for which the organization and its leaders can be held accountable -- such as reducing crime by 10 percent in a year (Bratton 1998:252).
- *Geographic organization of operational command.* Operational command is focused on the policing of territories, so central decision making authority about police operations is delegated to commanders with territorial responsibility (e.g., precincts). Functionally differentiated units and specialists (e.g., patrol, community police officers, detectives, narcotics, vice, juvenile, traffic, etc.) are either placed under the command of the precinct

³ External accountability (defined in text at page 5) is arguably not a key element of Compstat, which focuses on revamping management and control inside the department, and which has crime reduction as its primary mission. We have not included external accountability as an element either in our report on the survey of the nation-wide implementation of Compstat or in our report on three selected sites that have implemented Compstat. We include external accountability as an element in this report for several reasons. (1) A number of sites in this report have implemented strategic problem solving without implementing Compstat. Since external accountability may be an element of strategic problem solving more broadly although not of Compstat, including it allows us to examine this possibility; (2) Observations at several departments where we conducted short site visits stirred our interest in the role of external accountability, especially the relationship of the department to local officials; (3) Our analysis of the national survey data (Weisburd, et al., 1991; Weisburd, et al., forth.) led to the conclusion that Compstat reinforces a traditional model of policing. This led us to a consideration, unexplored in the questions in the national survey, of the relationship of policing to local politics in the emergent Compstat and strategic problem solving styles of policing, a relationship called into question in the transition from traditional to professional policing, and reinserted in apparently different form in community policing (Kelling and Moore, 1988).

commander, or arrangements are made to facilitate their responsiveness to the commander's needs.

- *Data-driven analysis of problems and assessment of the department's problem-solving efforts.* Data are made available to identify and analyze problems and to track and assess the department's response. Data are made available to all relevant personnel on a timely basis and in a readily usable format.
- *Effective problem-solving tactics.* Police responses are selected because they offer the best prospects of success, not because they are "what we have always done." Innovation and experimentation are encouraged; use of "best available knowledge" about practices is expected.
- *Organizational flexibility.* The organization develops the capacity and the habit of changing established routines as needed to mobilize resources when and where they are needed for strategic application.
- *Internal accountability.* Operational commanders are held accountable for knowing their commands, being well acquainted with the problems in the command, and accomplishing measurable results in reducing those problems -- or at least demonstrating a diligent effort to learn from the experience.
- *External accountability.* There are at least two facets to external accountability. On the one hand, there is the role of communication with the community, how the department makes its efforts visible to other key constituents (e.g., the courts, correctional agencies, other government services) and the general public. Publicity provides a way for "stakeholders" to know what the department is doing and accomplishing, and is essential for building support for these efforts. On the other hand, there is the role that local government may play in shaping and controlling the implementation of Compstat and strategic problem solving. As Silverman has suggested, "firm external backing" was critical to Compstat's success in New York. "The strong political support from Mayor Giuliani was a *sine qua non*. The mayor propelled many of the forces for change and he stood behind them" (Silverman, 1999:181).

Prior to our national survey (Weisburd, et al., 2001) little was known about whether and to what extent departments are implementing these elements of Compstat or whether new varieties of the program are evolving. There were indicators that police leaders around the nation are interested and willing to explore Compstat, but we did not know how widely Compstat models have diffused across the United States or what types of departments are most likely to

develop Compstat programs. For departments that have adopted Compstat models, it was not known whether they have implemented its key elements. And more generally, it was unclear whether the adoption of Compstat truly represents a radical departure from models of policing that are carried out in Departments that have not adopted the Compstat model. Some of these questions were answered in our national survey of police agencies (Weisburd, et al., 2001). We continue our analysis in this report based on data collected in sixteen field visits in selected Compstat departments. Before discussing our findings we detail the methods we used in selecting departments for site visits and collecting data in the field.

III. Site Selection

Our study was designed to explore the nature and varieties of Compstat through three research methods, undertaken sequentially: a national survey of local police agencies, sites visits at up to 20 Departments, and process evaluations at three sites. The national survey was designed to provide a broad based understanding of the diffusion of Compstat in American policing. Building on that knowledge, the shorter site visits would then lead to a richer sense of the varieties of Compstat programs and the extent of implementation. Finally, intensive site visits at three sites would provide in-depth knowledge of the most successfully implemented models and their ramifications at all levels of the organizations in which they operate.

In selecting sites for short site visits, we wanted to visit departments that were actively engaged in most or all of the elements we identified as central to Compstat and strategic problem solving. We also wanted to consider for further analysis only departments in which there had been a substantial operation under way for a considerable time period (given what a relatively

new program Compstat was). By limiting our selection to departments with a minimum time in operation, we would (a) select departments for site visits that have described not aspirations, but activities; (b) visit programs that may be expected to continue in operation, and thus would be potential choices for the third level of analysis; and (c) observe programs that may have moved beyond initial problems and benefits of heightened attention to an equilibrium at which more meaningful assessment is possible. Thus our initial cut combined these two criteria.

While some Departments were already well known for having implemented Compstat, or were revealed in our search of the literature, we decided not to pre-select any departments. This would, on one hand, eliminate a bias based on how well publicized certain departments were; on the other, if our selection process led to those known Compstat departments, it would be somewhat of a validation of our survey instrument and selection technique. As it turned out, every department that might have been pre-selected as a well known Compstat site “made it” into our initial selection. As reported in our national survey report (Weisburd, et al., 2001), our sample included *all* departments with 100 or more full time sworn officers (large) and a sample of 100 departments with 50 to 99 sworn (small). Our response rate of 86% was further assurance that we were unlikely to miss a known Compstat department (all of which were in the large department category).

We included all departments that responded to the survey whether or not they reported having implemented a Compstat-like program. We were interested in the *extent* of implementation of the seven elements of strategic problem solving, which we suggest capture not only the essence of Compstat but also the core of organization development prescriptions that emerged in the last two decades. If strategic problem solving is being implemented without

Compstat as its focal point, we would want to understand how things work in non-Compstat departments as well as in Compstat departments.

In order to discover which Departments were actively engaged in most or all of the elements we identified as central to Compstat and strategic problem solving, we isolated those questions in our survey instrument that bore directly on the seven features of strategic problem solving. Using the complete database, we recoded all questions related to strategic problem solving as binary variables, to represent presence or lack of certain components. We then added the recoded scores for all of these variables, creating a new Strategic Problem Solving (SPS) variable. The SPS score, ranging from a low of 10 to a high of 50, served as a measure of the level of strategic problem solving in each department in the national study.

We first selected departments with the highest SPS scores. With 445 responding departments in the large category and 85 in the small, we aimed to include about the top 40 departments in the first round. In this way, as we added additional criteria we would reach the goal of selecting 20 sites for short site visits. As it turned out, an SPS score greater than or equal to 39 proved to provide the best cutoff point.

The second element of the initial cut was the length of time the department had been using the features of Compstat. A core question in the survey asked the departments how long they had been doing each of 11 features associated with Compstat. For each department, we calculated the mean length of time they had been involved in these 11 activities. After examining the data at different time intervals, we decided to use "1-2 years" as the minimum mean time for inclusion in the study. This was consistent with the minimum time criterion we anticipated in our original proposal. Using these two criteria (SPS \geq 39 and time \geq 1-2 years), we generated a list of

39 departments. All 39 initial departments were in the large department category, as no small departments met these criteria.

We created a separate score for the departments' level of technology, again based on responses to relevant questions in the survey. We then collapsed the scores into three categories: high, medium and low technology levels. As suggested in an internal memo during the selection process, "One element of SPS might be characterized as having to do with the *structures and processes of management decision making* in the problem-solving process: how problems are identified, selected for intervention, how interventions are devised, how progress toward problem-solving is evaluated, and how important decision makers in the organization are held accountable for fulfilling their SPS responsibilities. The second element concerns the technology believed to facilitate SPS: timely analysis of data and dissemination of that information to members of the organization who can use it in their problem-identification and problem-solving efforts. The current expectation is that electronic data storage, manipulation, and communication are superior to traditional physical data storage. Further there is an assumption that advances in software for spatial analysis, statistical analysis, and displaying results (spatially) all make the information more useful to police managers" (Mastrofski, 2000).

We also examined the region of the country in which the 39 departments were situated, using the four regions - Northeast, North Central, South, and West - used by the FBI for the Uniform Crime Reports. And we looked at the crime rate per 10,000 for the city in which the department was located, which we classified as low (<500 crimes/10000), medium (500-749 crimes/10000), and high (750+ crimes/10000). We broke department size further into three

categories: small (50-100 sworn officers), medium (100-499 sworn officers), and large (500+ sworn officers).

The 39 departments were well distributed across region and crime rate, requiring no further adjustment. Also, both medium and large departments were well represented. However, no departments with fewer than 100 sworn officers had an SPS score of 39 or higher. We rejected the possibility of eliminating the entire category of small departments from further study, because small departments represent such a large proportion of departments nationwide and because we theorized that the implementation of strategic problem solving would vary considerably from small to large departments. Therefore, we decided to include for consideration the 4 small departments with SPS scores of 35 or higher. The resultant list of 43 departments (with SPS score, time, region, size, level of technology, and crime rate) from which we would choose our sites follows. As we ensured anonymity to the departments that cooperated in the short site visits, the table below, and all further discussion, eliminates not only the name of selected departments but generally the state in which they are located. Crime rates for the small communities were not available.

Table 1: Department Characteristics Used for Site Selection

SPS Score	Avg. Time (yrs)	Region	Dept. Size	Tech. Level	Crime Rate
50	1-2	South	Large	High	High
49	1-2	NE	Large	Medium	High
49	1-2	South	Large	High	High
47	1-2	West	Large	Low	High
47	3-5	NE	Medium	Medium	Low
47	3-5	South	Large	High	High
47	1-2	NC	Large	Low	High
47	3-5	South	Medium	Low	Medium
46	3-5	West	Medium	High	Medium
46	1-2	South	Large	Medium	Medium
45	10+	West	Medium	High	Low
44	1-2	NC	Large	Low	High

SPS Score	Avg. Time (yrs)	Region	Dept. Size	Tech. Level	Crime Rate
44	1-2	NE	Medium	Low	Low
44	3-5	NE	Large	High	Low
44	10+	South	Large	Medium	Low
43	6-10	West	Large	High	Medium
43	6-10	South	Large	Medium	High
43	3-5	NE	Medium	Medium	Low
43	1-2	South	Large	Low	High
42	3-5	NE	Medium	Medium	High
41	1-2	South	Medium	High	High
41	1-2	South	Medium	High	High
41	6-10	South	Large	Medium	High
41	3-5	NC	Large	Medium	Medium
41	3-5	West	Large	Medium	Medium
41	1-2	South	Medium	Low	Low
40	6-10	South	Medium	Low	High
40	1-2	South	Large	Medium	High
40	3-5	South	Medium	Low	High
40	10+	NC	Medium	Medium	Medium
40	1-2	NE	Medium	Low	Low
40	1-2	South	Medium	Medium	High
40	6-10	South	Medium	Low	Medium
40	3-5	South	Medium	High	Medium
39	3-5	NE	Medium	Low	Low
39	3-5	South	Large	High	Medium
39	10+	South	Medium	Low	High
39	3-5	South	Medium	Medium	High
39	10+	South	Medium	High	Low
38	3-5	NE	Small	Low	NA
36	6-10	West	Small	Medium	NA
35	3-5	NE	Small	Medium	NA
35	3-5	NC	Small	Medium	NA

We then created a matrix of these 43 departments by which to examine the distribution of eligible departments by department size, level of technology, and crime rate (crime rate was not available for the small departments). The matrix follows (with department names eliminated).

Table 2: Matrix of Eligible Sites by Characteristics for Site Selection

Technology Level	Small Departments	Crime Rate	Medium Departments	Large Departments
LOW	1	LOW	4	---
		MEDIUM	2	---
		HIGH	3	4
MEDIUM	3	LOW	2	1
		MEDIUM	1	3
		HIGH	3	4
HIGH	---	LOW	2	1
		MEDIUM	2	2
		HIGH	2	3

Before further selection, we decided to add a small number of departments that reported using Compstat but scored low on our SPS scale. This represented a check on our assumptions about strategic problem solving. Initially we selected one department with Compstat but low SPS that scored high on technology and one department with Compstat but low SPS that scored low on technology. We selected the department with the lowest SPS score that fit in with our time criterion (using features of Compstat for a mean length of at least 1-2 years) and the only Department with a low SPS score that scored in the high category for level of technology.

From this base, we selected 22 departments. This part of the process was subjective, included regional consideration and known Compstat departments, and was considered fluid and subject to revision. We noted that the distribution of the 22 departments selected reflected the distribution of the 43 departments in the sample. The distribution follows:

Table 3: Distribution of Departments Selected within Matrix

Technology Level	Small Departments	Crime Rate	Medium Departments	Large Departments
LOW	1	LOW	1	---
		MEDIUM	1	---
		HIGH	3	2
MEDIUM	1	LOW	1	---
		MEDIUM	---	2
		HIGH	1	2
HIGH	---	LOW	2	1
		MEDIUM	1	1
		HIGH	---	2

The next step was critical: we created narratives from the survey responses of each of the 22 remaining departments. These analyses included items not assessed in our SPS and technology scales. The narrative described the crime/disorder problem that consumed most of the Department's efforts over the last 12 months, the tactics employed to address that problem, how the tactics were selected, how the Chief became aware of the problem, other agencies the Department worked with to solve the problem, and what changes, temporary or permanent, were made to Department structures or procedures to deal with this problem. It described the Department's familiarity with Compstat, if they had observed Compstat at another Department and where, if they had implemented a Compstat-like program and if so, when and what it is called, and how long the Department had been using 11 features of Compstat. The narrative reported the number of districts the Department was divided into, where stations were located, and the organization of various police functions and the command of personnel assigned to districts. It described the operation and export of records from the RMS and CAD system, the crime mapping/crime analysis techniques used, patrol officer access to computerized data files, and access to files of other agencies. It included maintenance of computer and paper databases,

the timeliness of reporting information to police managers responsible for problem-solving efforts, and the time lag between an event and the availability of the report for computer analysis.

The narrative reported the punishment and reward system for middle managers, and examined who made an assortment of decisions within the department (see Appendix A for an example).

These reports added considerably to our sense of the departments, and to our confidence about the departments chosen. The narratives generally reinforced our selections; most were interesting departments with viable programs, programs that engaged with crime data, and that involved many of the elements of strategic problem solving. The narratives also served to help us determine that 3 of the departments might not be suitable for site visits, due to doubts that their programs were as active and fully implemented as the scores suggested. The remaining list of 19 Departments, absent Department name and state, follows.

Table 4: Departments Selected for Possible Site Visits

SPS Score	Avg. Time (yrs)	Region	Dept. Size	Tech. Level	Crime Rate
50	1-2	South	Large	High	High
49	1-2	South	Large	High	High
49	1-2	NE	Large	Medium	High
47	1-2	West	Large	Low	High
47	3-5	NE	Medium	Medium	Low
47	3-5	South	Medium	Low	Medium
46	3-5	West	Medium	High	Medium
46	1-2	South	Large	Medium	Medium
44	1-2	NC	Large	Low	High
43	6-10	West	Large	High	Medium
43	6-10	South	Large	Medium	High
41	3-5	NC	Large	Medium	Medium
40	3-5	South	Medium	Low	High
38	3-5	NE	Small	Low	Unknown
36	6-10	West	Small	Medium	Unknown
21	<1	South	Medium	High	Low

The next step was to contact the 19 departments selected to confirm our expectations about their programs, seek their cooperation, and make arrangements to visit them. A few adjustments were made at this stage. One large department with a high SPS score (47), high technology score and high crime rate was in transition and asked us to postpone our visit. Instead, we substituted another department with a slightly higher SPS score (49), high technology score and high crime rate that we had eliminated in our subjective cut from 43 to 22 departments mainly for reasons of geographic distribution. Two medium size departments declined to participate because they had abandoned their Compstat programs. (One of these was the Compstat department chose for its low SPS score and low technology score.) Finally, all the principal investigators and research associates on the project had made site visits to New York’s Compstat and spoken with various NYPD officials earlier in our research. We finally eliminated New York as one of the sites at this stage for several reasons. There was difficulty scheduling a visit during a period of uncertainty between commissioners; New York has been studied by other researchers; and we felt that a short site visit in a department the size of New York might not yield as representative a view as could visits in departments with fewer divisions. Thus, we conducted 16 short site visits, distributed as follows:

Table 5: Distribution within Matrix of 16 Short Site Visits Conducted

Technology Level	Small Departments	Crime Rate	Medium Departments	Large Departments
LOW	1	LOW	---	---
		MEDIUM	1	---
		HIGH	1	2
MEDIUM	1	LOW	1	---
		MEDIUM	---	2
		HIGH	---	2
HIGH	---	LOW	1	---
		MEDIUM	1	1
		HIGH	---	2

As stated earlier, we did not consider absence of a formal Compstat program a reason for eliminating a department from consideration, as this would give us the opportunity to examine departments where elements of strategic problem solving had been implemented without a Compstat structure. In the end, 4 of the 16 departments where we conducted short site visits had reported that they had not adopted a Compstat-like program. One of these was a medium size southern department with a high SPS score. One was a large Midwestern city that had at least temporarily abandoned its Compstat program. And both of the small departments selected for having the highest SPS scores among small Departments lacked formal Compstat programs. Consideration of the problem solving activities in departments without Compstat enhanced our understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of Compstat and the varieties of strategic problem solving.

IV. Field Methodology

We spent two to four days of intensive observation and interviews at each of the sixteen sites. Each site visit was conducted by either one or two researchers (principal investigators and research associates), with the exception of the initial visit which served as a training and coordinating visit, and which was carried out by four researchers – two principal investigators and two research associates.

Most site visits were scheduled by the Departments in consultation with our researchers, and were fairly highly structured. We created several instruments to guide our interviews: one for managerial level officers, one for rank and file, and one for crime analysts (See Appendix C.). We timed our visits to coincide with Compstat meetings, where relevant. We attended

Compstat meetings, pre-Compstat meetings, and other operational meetings. Where there were divisions, we spent time in more than one division. We interviewed Chiefs, commanders, middle managers, patrol officers, and crime analysts. While these semi-structured observations, interviews and ride alongs were provided most of the data for this analysis, at every site we also engaged in conversation with officers we encountered by chance, in order to get a sense of how theory permeated to practice, especially at the level of patrol. Often we were able to interview officers who happened to be in the building, or someone we met in passing. Not surprisingly, some of the freshest insights occurred in this way. We also gathered a wide range of documents at the sites, including crime data, Compstat materials, annual reports, organizational charts, et alia.

V. Elements of Strategic Problem Solving in Sixteen Sites

In our national survey report (Weisburd et al, 2001), we found that departments report implementing many of the elements of strategic problem solving whether or not they have implemented a Compstat-like program. In our short site visits, we selected departments that had and had not implemented Compstat, and thus could examine not only how Compstat was implemented but also how strategic problem solving is conducted in both Compstat and non-Compstat Departments. This more fluid sense of the adoption of strategic problem solving allowed us to discover what other analytical categories would serve an understanding of change in policing besides whether a department reported having adopted a Compstat-like program.

Thus, in the analysis that follows we group the sites by size of department, for several reasons. First, in our other two reports (Weisburd et al. 2001; Willis et al, 2003), the emphasis of

our analysis is on departments of over 100 sworn officers. In this report are we able to examine implementation of the elements of Compstat and strategic problem solving in smaller departments with 50-99 officers, and also to distinguish between medium sized departments (100-499) and large departments (500+). Second, as we will see in what follows, we found that the greatest variation among departments was associated with whether the department was classified as small, medium, or large. Size of department is directly implicated in whether, how, and how successfully strategic problem solving and Compstat programs have been adopted.

In our national survey report, we stated, “Compstat... seeks to harness [the organizational structure of American policing] ...in an attempt to have traditional American police organization work better and more effectively. Compstat thus offers American police agencies the prospect of improving how they work, while reinforcing the traditional hierarchical structure of the military model of policing” (Weisburd et al., 2001). With control of the traditional hierarchical structure arguably less at issue in smaller departments generally, it is perhaps not surprising that even the most cutting edge smaller departments would not feel the pull towards implementing Compstat. However, our findings from the short site visit segment of our study suggest that strategic problem solving can be and is implemented in departments that have not implemented Compstat. This finding reinforces our early tentative suggestion that Compstat adopted and expanded elements of strategic problem solving that represented advances in modern management generally (Weisburd et al., 1998).

As described in the next sections, the implementation of some of the elements of Strategic Problem Solving in small and mid-sized departments is more advanced than in large Departments. But it is when we turn to the large Departments that have high scores on our SPS

(Strategic Problem Solving) scale and have adopted Compstat programs (including one that ended it), that we find a far greater resemblance to the New York style Compstat that has been well described elsewhere (Silverman 1999; McDonald 1998, 2001; inter alia). Thus our discussions of the elements of Strategic Problem Solving in small and mid-sized departments shows how modern management ideas have penetrated policing both with and without Compstat-like programs, while our discussion of SPS and Compstat in the large departments provides insights into the implementation of Compstat programs that could not be derived from the small and medium sized departments.

Small Departments (50-99 sworn officers)

We visited two small departments (50-99 sworn) that scored high on the elements of strategic problem solving in our national survey – one on the east coast, one on the west coast. Neither of these departments had introduced a Compstat program, although both had some familiarity with Compstat. The crime analysis unit of the east coast department had observed a session of New York’s Compstat. The west coast department had not attended Compstat, but the Chief was sufficiently knowledgeable about it to express the clear opinion that introducing Compstat into “Chestnutville”⁴ would be “creating a cannon to swat a fly.” We begin our in depth discussions of the short site visits with a review and analysis of our findings from these two site visits. These Departments are more than 3,000 miles apart, one in the far north east of the country, one on the west coast. The demographic differences between the two cities are as

⁴To protect the anonymity of the departments that agreed to participate in our study, we substitute pseudonyms for the actual city names. While the participating departments will surely recognize themselves, we hope that we have sufficiently obfuscated their identities so that others are at least somewhat befuddled.

great as the geographic distance. Yet what is most remarkable is the similarities between the kind of policing that we found in these two exemplary small Departments.

“Clarkton,” with a population of 35,000 residents and five empty shoe factories abandoned as production moved overseas, is economically depressed with few prospects for recovery in the short term. The population does not have a high level of education, as college training was not necessary when factory jobs were plentiful. “Chestnutville’s” population of 64,000 affluent, well educated and largely white suburbanites commute to lucrative high tech jobs and lure shoppers from the surrounding area with their exclusively upscale shops and restaurants in a pleasant pedestrian mall where it seems the sun always shines. As one patrol officer told us, “There are no bad parts of town.”

Short site visits are well suited to discerning the structures and discourse of the departments under scrutiny; to describe practice we turn to the longer site visits in part three of our study (Willis et al., 2003.). In these two small departments we found in place the language and the framework for strategic problem solving based on geographic organization. Examples aplenty were provided to suggest that officers practice their profession in the way they describe it, as we report, but we cannot know how many do so and to what extent. We describe the ideas that are put forward, and the structures that the departments have created for carrying forth these ideas, as well as reported examples from practice. While we formed the impression that many members of these Departments are in fact practicing as they preach, only further study could confirm that impression.

Our discussion focuses on the *seven* key elements of Compstat emerging in the broader framework of strategic problem solving: 1. mission clarification; 2. geographic organization of

operational command; 3. effective problem solving tactics; 4. organizational flexibility; 5. internal accountability; 6. external accountability; and 7. data driven analysis. These features are not only associated with the Compstat model but constitute the core of organization development prescriptions that emerged in the last two decades. As we will see, most of the elements are present in these small departments; some of the elements may even be more developed in these small non-Compstat departments than in larger Compstat departments.

Mission Clarification

“Working together to benefit our community” is the slogan of the Chestnutville Police Department. In the Department’s “vision” statement, “partnerships” within the Department as well as “community partnerships” are encouraged: “We participate in problem solving with community members, organizations, and other government Departments.” While the slogan of working together and the vision of partnership are general enough to encompass a range of ideas, the one idea that dominated our discussions was the “philosophy of problem solving.” For the Chief, the focus was on working together with the City Manager and his Executive Committee of Department managers. He viewed his job primarily as providing information on a daily basis to the other city Departments. The Chief and others maintained a conscious view of the Department as one aspect of city government, visibly represented as well as facilitated by the location of the police Department along with most city Departments in the municipal services office building.

The Captain of the Operations Division, who was appointed Chief shortly after our site visit, and who had been with the Department for 25 years when we visited, stated that the Department “has always been problem-solving oriented.” In interview after interview we were

told that, although the Department had never developed a formal program, “the philosophy of problem solving is ingrained at all levels of the Department.” As the Captain put it, officers have long been trained that they have the power and authority to solve problems, and to ask, “Is there anything else I can do here.” A sector lieutenant (see Geographic Organization) suggested that while “good cops always did community oriented policing,” they now focus more on “long range problem solving and community involvement.” There is increased emphasis on being a “conduit” and “learning how to involve other services.” Below we discuss the organization that encourages this style of policing, but first we turn to Clarkton and a view of its sense of mission.

Clarkton boasts a slogan that is a more concise version of that of Chestnutville: “Serving Through Partnerships.” Even the longer mission statement contains this focus: “It is the mission of the [Clarkton] Police Department to create an atmosphere of partnership with the community toward the common goal of protecting life and property, and enhancing the overall quality of life.” As in Chestnutville, an emphasis on problem solving dominated interviews with personnel at all levels. Also like Chestnutville, problem solving is not a formal program but an explicit “philosophy” and set of activities that involves patrol officers, supervisors, and commanders. The problem solving philosophy was first introduced in the Bicycle Patrol Unit which was instituted in 1991. According to the Chief, the goals of the Department are to reduce crime, reduce calls for service, and improve the relationship with the community. “Improving the relationship [of the Department] to the community is necessary to achieve the other two goals.” And, as a patrol sergeant pointed out, reducing crime and thus calls for service would allow spending more time working with the community. That these interconnected goals had permeated the Department was evidenced throughout our interviews. As one sergeant reported,

the motivation for introducing problem solving was twofold: “to get the community involved in our operations” and to “reduce calls for service.”

Thus we find that not only do the two small departments share the feature of a mission that has been clarified and that has penetrated deep into the Department, but they also share a mission of surprisingly similar content, a mission centered on problem solving and partnership with the community. While partnership may be viewed as a means rather than an end, it was clear in these departments that the process was important in itself. The missions differ in that Clarkton also emphasizes reducing crime and calls for service in order to better serve the community. Chestnutville, on the other hand, has “no major crime problems” (this quote is from a watch commander/sector lieutenant, but was reinforced in many interviews) and does not lack resources to devote to problem solving. As one patrol officer told us, “We have more cops than we need, so we can take the time on a call to do something.” This officer offered the example that when he handles a domestic violence call, he will call the shelter to inform the woman when the man has been released. This example indicates an unusual level and duration of involvement that would be an aspiration for most Departments, including Clarkton. But that important situational difference aside, the missions of the two Departments and their significance among personnel are striking in their commonality.

Geographic Organization of Operational Command

In Chestnutville it is called “district policing;” in Clarkville they call it “geobeats.” Both are recent innovations that may or may not stand the test of time.⁵ But both structures are

⁵ We know that sector policing survived the appointment of a new Chief of police from within the ranks, who had been in office for well over a year at the time of this writing.

significant innovations that in theory are critical to the principles of Compstat and strategic problem solving, and that represent real organizational change.

In Chestnutville, there has always been one police district, operating out of one location. While this continues, under “district policing” or “sector policing,” the city has been divided into three geographic sectors with flexible boundaries depending on calls for service and crime. Each sector has a lieutenant with 24 hour responsibility. Sector lieutenants also serve as watch commanders. In each of the three sectors, there are three teams (day shift, swing shift and graveyard) each headed by a patrol sergeant. In addition there is the “overlap team,” also referred to as “cover officers.” During two 5-hour periods when two teams are working each sector – from noon to five, and from 9:30 pm to 2:30 am – one team has “sector responsibility” to patrol and respond to calls, while about half the cover officers are available for “projects” or “overlap activities.” Teams rotate weekly, so that all officers have the opportunity to work on the overlap team, to develop “projects,” and “are not stressed as much as before” as one officer said. While there is a geographic responsibility in the sector assignment, an older system of rotating officers in 3-month shifts has continued, so that officers have not become clearly identified with a particular sector. However, the Department’s website, which reportedly is well used by the city’s well educated population (“with 60% of the residents online”), encourages sector identification by citizens, and lists officers by sector and team (time), with email addresses.

Sergeants prepare monthly reports on “overlap activities” and sector commanders (lieutenants) provide monthly reports to officers and supervisors to share information about the sector. At the start of the 3-month shifts, sergeants write reports defining the problems that the

shift will focus on when they have time. Officers also develop their own projects during their weeks on the overlap team.

There is also a community policing team (CPT), introduced several years prior to district policing. Although the size of the team was recently reduced, as the Chief believed that community policing should be a “daily responsibility,” the team’s sergeant says CPT has “blossomed incredibly” since the Department went to sectors. Once viewed as a “dumping ground,” the CPT reportedly is now viewed by other officers as a valuable resource. As one patrol officer said, the CPT identifies and facilitates projects. “If you’re working patrol, you can use them or they can use you as needed.”

Although sector policing and the CPT are key components of strategic problem solving in Chestnutville, the introduction of the overlap team seems to have had the greatest impact by allowing officers the flexibility to develop problem solving tactics. This is discussed further below.

We turn now to Clarkton and its structure of “geobeats.” The traditional structure of patrol, which continues along with the introduction of geobeats, is as follows: There is one police district, with all operations based in one location. The Department has three eight-hour patrol shifts with a lieutenant in charge of each shift. The city is divided into seven patrol beats, each patrolled by one officer during each shift. (The bicycle unit and the power shift do not alter this basic structure.).

Recently, the Department has added another layer of geographic organization, by dividing the seven patrol beats into smaller sub-beats or geo-beats. This new layer divides the city into areas called “geobeats” which are assigned to lieutenants, sergeants and patrol officers

who are given 24 hour responsibility for addressing problems in their geo-beats. Every officer has sole responsibility for one geo-beat which covers a few square blocks within a patrol beat. Each patrol sergeant oversees the officers in one patrol beat. And every lieutenant is responsible for the geo-beats within 2-3 patrol beats. Officers are in charge of following up with all names and addresses of calls for service repeats located in their geo-beat. The deputy Chief explained that “officers are expected to come up with solutions to repeat CFS in their geo-beats and to take responsibility and a 'stake holder' position in problems there.” Supervisors are expected to follow up with officers to see that they are addressing the names and locations identified as problematic.

Some supervisors (usually sergeants) hold regular meetings with the officers in their geo-beats to discuss the current problems and the efforts being made to address them. One sergeant reported that he looks through the “repeats” in his geo-beats, makes assessments about the situations he believes the police can positively affect, then assigns those to his officers.

How strongly officers identified with their geo-beats in Clarkton was uncertain. Two bicycle officers knew exactly the boundaries of their respective areas. One patrol officer did not know where his was. It was unclear whether his geobeat simply does not generate any repeat calls, and thus he has not been tasked to look into any problems there, or whether officers in general are not pressed to focus on their geobeats. In Chestnutville, though one officer opined that district policing is “a joke among rank and file cops,” he also defined district policing as meaning that “everyone will be accountable for crime in their district.”

Thus both Chestnutville and Clarkton have revamped their organizational structure in a way that gives lieutenants both temporal responsibility as watch commanders and geographic

responsibilities as sector administrators or geo-beat commanders. Each also places geographic responsibility on sergeants and on patrol officers. In Chestnutville, the sector is not subdivided, so that patrol officers and sergeants are responsible for the entire sector to which they are assigned, but only the lieutenant has 24 hour responsibility. The Clarkton system divides the city into small geographic areas and each officer has 24 hour responsibility for a geo-beat. This is meant to allow “the officer to locate a particular problem area, name, or address; analyze it and develop a plan to solve the problem utilizing all resources possible, including other venues such as social service agencies, landlords, etc.” It also affects the “unity of command,” as each officer and sergeant reports to two different supervisors, the shift supervisor and the supervisor of the geobeat. The complication of temporal and geographic command responsibilities comes up again as we discuss geographic organization in some of the larger sites we visited.

Effective Problem Solving Tactics

Problem solving in Chestnutville occurs on several levels. The Chestnutville Police Department participates in “community problem solving” at the City level, consistent with the Chief’s view of the Department as one spoke in the wheel of city government. The city’s community problem solving group, “Community Connection, ” began at the same time that the Police Department introduced its community policing team. The “interdisciplinary” Community Connections team includes Departmental representatives such as the city attorney, a city planner, and a police representative, along with several community representatives. The philosophy of Community Connections, as with community policing, is to develop a collaborative relationship with the community, to help identify and work through problems, to help neighborhoods explore solutions and to facilitate them in working on their problems.

The problem solving example that the Community Connections representative (an assistant city manager) provided was oft cited by police interviewees as well as an example of successful problem solving in the Police Department. That is, the police did not distinguish their own problem solving projects from those in which they participated as police representatives on the Community Connections team. That example was one involving a flooding problem in a neighborhood. The city worked with the citizens and officers on their days off, uniting the neighborhood to undertake creek cleanup on private property that had been affected by flooding. The police lieutenant himself directly worked on the cleanup. The success of this operation one year prior to our visit has led to two subsequent neighborhood ditch cleanups.

Police participation in Community Connections has declined recently. This change corresponded with and may be related to the Department's new focus on sector policing and the related emphasis on problem solving activities throughout the patrol division by way of the rotating overlap team.

A problem solving and management program called "Beat Designing" was in effect for about 6 years prior to the current structure. In that program, at the start of every 3 month shift, officers surveyed the community about their concerns, and were required to design a plan for addressing problems over the next 3 months. At the end of the shift they would write a report on what they had accomplished. Although the program was criticized for becoming "paper-bound," its emphasis on problem solving and individual officer responsibility continues.

The operations captain of Chestnutville offered an example of problem solving that he felt was achieved because of the new structure of district policing. Over a period of six months, seven different officers had responded to calls complaining about a homeowner who was making

renovations to his home, making noise, working outside legal hours, etc. At each call, none of the officers was aware of previous concerns. After the introduction of district policing, the sector coordinator was able to “develop information and see the pattern. On the next call, the homeowner was given a citation, and the sector coordinator will now be able to monitor the situation.”

The operations captain expressed concern that, despite the increase in problem solving activities by the sector commanders, the Department is still not tracking problems well, taking too long to identify ongoing problems. He did not relate this concern to possible causes or avenues for improvement. In our estimation, it is at least possible that the intermediate level of geographic restructuring that has occurred, where sector commanders have 24 responsibility for a geographic area and thus the wherewithal to identify patterns, but 24 responsibility for a particular area has not been placed on sergeants and patrol officers, could be a factor in “taking too long to identify ongoing problems.” Moreover, as discussed below, the limited use of crime analysis and crime mapping, could also play a role in the captain’s (now Chief) frustration about the Department “still not tracking problems well.” Police Foundation work in the New England Consortium Project has shown that small Departments can benefit substantially from the use of crime mapping and crime analysis (e.g., see Police Foundation, 2000).

The “overlap team” is generally used for “projects” or problem solving activity. However, “If a sector gets hammered, they can assign the cover unit into the area. On normal nights, you take the extra people and put them on projects.” As explained above, while one team has sector responsibility, the others do projects or activities. The teams alternate weeks, so that everyone is expected to both. As one sergeant put it, there was a big increase in proactive

problem solving with the “luxury of overlapped shifts” 3 or 4 years ago. Having served in other Departments, this sergeant saw that elsewhere an officer is “putting out fires all day long,” busier with more violent crimes, whereas here they have the time to “take a case right through.” An officer will write a search warrant, follow the case from initial investigation to felony complaint.

A patrol sergeant commented that the “beauty of the system is its flexibility.” If your team was inundated last week, you can clean up projects this week. You can be “as inventive and flexible as you want.” He gave 7 different examples of problem solving in his team:

1. A “kid” was groping women on jogging trails. An officer in plain clothes was assigned and was able to witness the suspect in action.
2. Alcohol stings. A plain clothes officer would go to businesses with an underage child who would purchase liquor. They would both cite those who sold to the minor and commend those who did not.
3. They went to local hotels to identify residents with parole or probation search clauses or warrants. They found meth labs by this method.
4. Bar checks. In uniform they do walkthroughs, and cite for false IDs
5. Recently did a more proactive version of addressing the problem of underage drinking. An officer happened to learn that 7-11s were discarding their old ID card readers. They were able to pass them on to the bars.
6. They were less successful in surveillance of male solicitation in park bathrooms.
7. Warrants. Previously warrants would stack up. A couple years ago the warrant clerks began contacting the police in a timely manner. They pass the warrants to the sergeant, and the officers go out and serve them.

The team supervisor (sergeant) prepares monthly reports for the sector lieutenant summarizing overlap activities. In the sample report we examined, overlap activities ranged from some traditional police work, to warrant checks, to creating a list of local residents who provide dependent care and placing the list in the dispatch center. The range is indicative of the nature of

problem oriented policing in Chestnutville: serving fresh warrants, follow-up investigation of an in-custody fraud case, checking hotel registers for wanted subjects and attempting to serve warrants, completing detailed sector maps based on maps obtained from the fire district, locating a fax machine that was making false 911 calls, two officers teaming up as a DUI enforcement team, undercover surveillance, attending photography classes in order to do the team's photography. The report ends with a summary of "Overlap Activity Yield: 1 DUI arrest, 8 warrants served, 1 felony complaint obtained."

While most of these examples involved short range problem solving, a sector lieutenant gave the following example of effective (in his assessment) long range problem solving. The problem was that "highschool kids and offsite kids" were scaring people away from businesses, committing vandalism, with some drug involvement, and having fights. This activity was in a business complex, that is, on private property. He learned of the problem through the officers, from the school, and from business operators. A multi-faceted solution was developed, using a wide range of tactics, including: (1) posting, (2) writing "letters of authority" informing the students that the police had the authority to enforce the law on private property, (3) communication with the students, (4) education with the kids directly engaged in the problems, (5) making security recommendations to the businesses based on analysis of calls for service data to determine when the offenses were occurring - "hot hours," (6) involving the businesses and securing their support for consistent high level enforcement, (7) changing lighting, removing phones, (8) deploying the traffic team to carry out saturation enforcement, (9) bringing in the Community Policing Team (CPT) to work at the school. The lieutenant added that follow-up will occur in a month or two, with officers being asked to follow up with the business owners.

Chestnutville, with its relatively low crime problem and with its strong city manager system that also adopts the problem oriented approach, along with the recent restructuring into district policing with the overlap shift, has in place many elements to facilitate strategic problem solving. A patrol officer offered, "Command staff has always stressed that if there is something you want to do, let your sergeant know, and we will facilitate it, whether it is working a case or working on a problem.

Clarkton also encourages problem solving among its officers. Analyzing calls for service data for repeat names and addresses, officers are encouraged to focus on particular locations. And, like in Chestnutville, wide ranging problems have been identified and addressed. For example, a bike officer told us about a successful POP project he had executed which entailed obtaining donations with which to buy defibrators for patrol cars. Another officer had worked to have boulders put around vacant lots to prevent cars being abandoned on them.

Problem solving in Clarkton is tracked through monthly reports prepared by the watch commanders. These reports contain 1) progress reports on each currently running POP project, and 2) reports of what is being done in each of the problem areas identified through the repeat calls and repeat persons data from CFS. Officers are also asked to document the strategies they apply to different problems and to file the description in files sorted by type of problem, so that in the future, if another officer tackles a similar problem he can refer to the files to see if and how the problem was handled in the past. One sergeant told us he meets with his geobeat officers every month to review progress on problem solving. He also said that they follow-up later to see whether CFS have decreased and if conditions have improved. As we have said, a short site visit cannot assess the extent of problem solving activities among police personnel.

While some officers we interviewed at all levels seemed highly engaged in problem solving activities, others just as clearly did not. However, the structures and tools are in place for problem solving activities in the Clarkton PD.

Two detectives indicated they feel that, since the Department's emphasis on problem solving, they now have leeway to take initiative, try ideas, and be creative. As examples they mentioned running several prostitution stings, and that they are encouraged to dress down on certain days and go into the community in quasi undercover to check on suspects and pre-trial releasees. A sergeant who was excited by and committed to the program, provided numerous examples of the Department's problem solving initiatives. He reported that officers are encouraged to look for problem areas and take pro-active action even before the area has generated CFS.

The following are examples of specific problem solving efforts made by the Clarkton PD:

1. The Department keeps track of disturbances linked with specific bars, and will prohibit their license renewal if a bar is continually linked to disturbances that go unaddressed. The LPD will call bar owners who are in jeopardy to encourage them to take positive action.
2. The Chief gave an example of an officer who became concerned with public drinking in a park and outside nearby apartment buildings. A state law requires that before an arrest for public drunkenness is made the offender must receive a warning, making it rather easy to avoid arrest and penalty. To address the problem the officer worked with a city attorney to draft an ordinance whereby signs were posted stating that public drinking was not allowed – the sign served as the warning. Now, if officers come across someone drinking within 200 feet of one of these signs, they can arrest them on the spot. Apparently this has been quite effective at deterring public drinking.
3. The white-collar crime unit spoke at an AARP meeting to provide advice on how to avoid being victimized by phony telephone solicitors.
4. At their initiation, detectives now work with probation and parole to monitor pre-trial releasees. Probation and parole keep detectives informed about pre-trial releasees and detectives regularly keep an eye on them to see that they are not violating conditions of

their release. The detectives report that this has had a dramatic affect on compliance in terms of both new criminal activity and technical violations.

5. A sergeant gave an example about a house that was generating lots of noise complaints. The resident was a single teenage mother established in this housing through public assistance. Her friends found it an appealing place to hang out because there was no supervision, even though she didn't want them there. Working with the young woman, the sergeant drew up a list of rules, all of which she agreed to; he typed it up and posted it in the apartment. The list included "not more than one guest at one time allowed on premises," "no guests after 11:00pm," "no drinking on the premises." The implication was that the police had imposed these rules and that violators would be arrested. This proved to be an effective deterrent and the complaints ceased.
6. Officers schedule and facilitate meetings with apartment building residents to generate rules to which all residents agree. This has also reduced calls for service.
7. Officers try to deal with parking problems by, for example, working to build a new parking lot, rather than spending a lot of time giving parking tickets day after day.
8. An unmanned patrol car is parked at a busy intersection as a deterrent to speeders.
9. After an elderly woman's home was burglarized when she admitted someone who used a false name, an officer commented that it was too bad the woman didn't have a peephole. The Department purchased a quantity of peepholes and now installs them free of charge for residents.

We were told repeatedly that problems such as these would not have been handled in the same way before the Department adopted problem solving. In the past officers would have been chastised for taking the out-of-service time required to address these problems instead of being encouraged to address them, as they are now.

Organizational Flexibility

"The organization develops the capacity and the habit of changing established routines as needed to mobilize resources when and where they are needed for strategic application."(Weisburd, et al. 1998)

According to Chestnutville's operations captain, sector coordinators can move resources with his approval. In major cases, such as a series of courthouse arsons that took place a few

years ago, a task force is created. Although there are teams for major traffic investigations and other major investigations, as needed, one of the regular officers who has trained in crime scene analysis is also brought in. Officers are encouraged to have collateral responsibilities such as the officer who studied photography out of his own interest, and now is used for crime scene photography.

At another level, sector policing combined with the overlap shift and the emphasis on problem solving activities, has made organizational flexibility a central aspect of the daily routine. "If a sector gets hammered, they can assign the cover unit into the area. On normal nights, you take the extra people and put them on projects." This structure has led officers of various ranks to express enthusiasm about the amount of flexibility in terms of their authority to select projects and methods for addressing the selected problems, and in their ability to draw on other teams of officers as needed, including the traffic team, the community policing team and the overlap team. Moreover, the boundaries of the sectors are fluid and determined by calls for service. According to one sergeant, "The beauty of the system is its flexibility." If your team was inundated last week, you can clean up projects this week. You can be "as inventive and flexible as you want." As the operations captain said, "Problems can be defined at any level, from an officer to the Chief. Officers have the freedom to define problems, and are encouraged to do so, and formal approval is not required."

In Clarkton, supervisors are able to request extra manpower from other shifts for specific operations. According to one lieutenant, this was not a change from previous organizational capacity. District commanders can request extra assistance at weekly crime analysis meetings. A sergeant gave an example of his ability to have resources shifted, by justifying the need and

having a plan of action. Confronted with an area experiencing a lot of disorder, he wrote a proposal for extra manpower, and succeeded in getting people re-assigned from other shifts for a few weeks.

Perhaps it is easier in a smaller Department both to maintain the traditional lines of authority and to cross them and provide flexibility as needs arise.

Internal Accountability

“Operational commanders are held accountable for knowing their commands, being well acquainted with the problems in the command, and accomplishing measurable results in reducing those problems -- or at least demonstrating a diligent effort to learn from the experience.” (Weisburd, et al., 1998)

In a sense, district policing in Chestnutville is structured to create greater accountability. All reports were that this accountability exists as positive reinforcement, being rewarded for addressing problems in one’s sector, even if the problem is not successfully solved. On the other hand, the freedom that all agree exists to find and address problems, is explicitly seen as contrasting with a strict internal accountability structure such as provided by Compstat. The operations captain indicated, as others after him, that the philosophy of problem solving is ingrained at all levels of the Department, without a formal program. His assertion was supported by all interviews during the site visit. In explaining that problems can be defined at any level, from an officer to the Chief, that officers have the freedom to define problems and are encouraged to do so, and formal approval is not required, the operations captain explicitly contrasted this structure with his perception of the internal accountability structure of Compstat. In Compstat, he explained, there are “layers which make it hard to get things done.”

There is also a formal system in Chestnutville that rewards officers in the long range for problem solving activity. The “master officer program” for select officers in the Department for between 9 and 15 years (with another increase at 20 years) requires that the officer be involved in community projects to be admitted, and to continue that involvement. This program is also meant to overcome the “disconnection problem” resulting from the 3-month shift rotation.

Lieutenants compile monthly reports of problem solving activities which are presented to command staff. Reportedly the Captain will send notes saying he appreciates a project, and will commend the officers. As an officer said, Command staff has always stressed that if there is something you want to do, let your sergeant know, and we will facilitate it, whether it is working a case or working on a problem. This describes a very loosely structured system of accountability, based on what supervisory officers report to command staff, not on tests of knowing their commands, nor on how well acquainted they are with the problems in the command, and not even on accomplishing measurable results.

In Clarkton, as in Chestnutville, personnel report that they are encouraged, rather than pressured, to do problem solving. However, the rewards are clear, according to the Chief, who stated that the “few who don’t buy in – they get passed over for promotion and for special assignments. If you don’t excel in community problem solving, your chance for promotion is small.” Departmental performance evaluations include a specific section on community policing, as one of five areas for which officers are evaluated: "This factor defines the manner in which the officer identifies problems on his/her beat; the extent to which the officer analyzes problems and develops responses for dealing with situations, which whenever possible involves citizen input; the extent to which s/he promotes goodwill and understanding with the public;

displays courtesy; is involved with and promotes crime prevention activities and the extent to which s/he assesses the needs of his/her beat and addresses those needs." Evaluations weigh heavily in both promotion and assignment. Exceptional officers receive letters of commendation and awards which are presented in roll-call and at the annual awards dinner.

Command staff in Clarkton hold weekly meetings with the Crime Analyst to review serious crimes and crime patterns. Every Thursday the deputy Chief and other command staff meet with the crime analyst to discuss patterns and clusters of crime identified through computer crime mapping. The crime analyst regularly examines patterns of burglary, burglary from motor vehicle, looking for trends and clusters in time of day, and day of week, for example. The short, informal meeting we attended included the Deputy Chief, a sergeant of detectives, the lieutenant in charge of support services, the sergeant in command of the bike patrol unit, and the Crime Analyst. The crime analyst handed out a map of residential burglaries and car burglaries with a written rundown of the incidents, and discussed which incidents she thought were linked (19 of the 23 burglaries occurred in one night on a college campus.) The focus of the meeting was to provide information from the crime analyst to command staff. In addition to this weekly meeting, some of the geobeat commands hold periodic meetings to discuss problems on the beat.

While there is minimal formal framework of accountability in either of these smaller Departments, informal accountability structures play a role. A sergeant in Clarkton stated that supervisors are held accountable for problems being addressed. He said that the district commander checks to see that sergeants and lieutenants are handling the problems in their geobeats and that if problems aren't being solved "it will come back to them, and no one wants it to come back to them." He also said that he evaluates his staff on "how well they solve

problems, not how many tickets they write.” Although problem solving is presented as a voluntary activity, one patrol officer reported that he feels "pressured" into problem solving activity because he knows he won't "evaluate well" without it. And the Chief's words suggests he was correct.

Thus, there is some variation between the two small non-Compstat sites in terms of internal accountability, but again there is more similarity than difference. Nothing like the strict accounting by district commanders and of crime and disorders and police activity that we will see in the larger Compstat Departments occurs here. Accountability is informal, with the emphasis on reward for non-traditional problem solving activities.

External Accountability

External accountability is a pervasive aspect of policing in Chestnutville. For the Chief, his position on the Executive Team chaired by the City Manager seems as important as any other aspect of his job. A main focus of his job primarily was providing information on a daily basis to the other city Departments. As stated earlier, the Chief and others maintained a conscious view of the Department as one aspect of city government, visibly represented as well as facilitated by the location of the police Department along with most city Departments in the municipal services office building. Captains participate in various city committees, and a lieutenant serves on the Community Connections project. Providing information to the public through the web site where daily crime logs are available, through email, through the civilian crime prevention coordinator, as well as by regular interaction is a part of this cognizance of the importance of community relations. Citizens interested in crime prevention can ask to receive automatic emails about specific crime incidents. Officers at all levels describe their roles as

working with the community, which comes back to the mission statement and its focus on partnership with the community. The focus throughout the department is on responding to community generated concerns.

The Clarkton Police Department also exhibited a high level of concern about their relationship with the community, and this concern appears to have infused many aspects of the Department's operations. Officers are encouraged to talk and form working, problem-solving relationships with citizens. The bike patrol unit's main function is to interact with the community. Police personnel take part in many citywide citizen committees. Seven substations (one for each patrol beat) have been established, where citizens can walk in to talk with police. Community policing forms a significant part of officers' evaluation. As in Chestnutville, there is an awareness that crime may not be the most troubling problem in the community. During our visit, there were plans to survey residents to find out what they are most concerned with and adjust their focus accordingly.

Data-Driven Analysis

This is the least developed element of problem solving in Chestnutville. Most problem identification is done through citizen complaints or officer reporting. Since there is a clear sense that there is simply very little crime in Chestnutville, there is little inclination to discover crime problems through data analysis, even though the operations captain perceived a weakness in problem identification. Sergeants and lieutenants read daily crime reports and consider this sufficient to appreciate the nature of criminal activity. One problem solving solution that was given as an example did involve analysis of calls for service to determine when the problem was hottest. While a new CAD system and a new RMS system are being developed through a COPS-

MORE grant, there are no plans to begin crime mapping. Although the Department once had a crime analyst, there had not been one for some time at the time of our visit, and no plans existed to develop this capacity. The records Department creates a monthly report, which the command staff receives. To the Chief, more important than crime statistics is the quality of life in the city. The Chief provides a daily report to the City Manager's Executive Committee, and crime information is made available to citizens through the website where detailed information by sector is provided, through direct emails where regular updates on particular crime problems can be received, and through the crime prevention coordinator who responds to citizen requests for crime information. The purpose of data, then, is focused outwardly towards the public rather than inwardly towards crime analysis.

The Clarkton Police Department introduced a crime analyst position one year prior to our visit. The civilian crime analyst has a background in statistics and has worked for the military. She has access to calls for service data, field interview data, and arrest data. Analysis focuses on CFS data. She creates computerized maps using Rand McNally mapping software, the Keystone database, designed for law enforcement.

As discussed earlier, each month the crime analyst provides the deputy Chief a list of all addresses and names that have repeatedly appeared in CFS data. He distributes the list to the lieutenants. The list reaches patrol officers at the geobeat level, who follow-up with repeat locations and repeat callers. The deputy Chief compares CFS data for the current month with the same month of last year. He states that if CFS have increased, he wants to know why.⁶

⁶ It should be noted that police initiated contacts, including field interviews and traffic stops are included in the calls for service database, so CFS as an indication of crime and disorder is somewhat misleading.

Every Thursday the deputy Chief and other command staff meet with the crime analyst to discuss patterns and clusters of crime identified through computer crime mapping. The crime analyst regularly examines patterns of burglary, burglary from motor vehicle, looking for trends and clusters in time of day, day of the week, and so on. To increase visibility, the crime analyst attends roll call twice a day, where she distributes daily crime related reports, including BOLO notices to the officers, and sometimes gleans tidbits that she passes on to later shifts. Some officers and lieutenants request information directly from the crime analyst.

In addition to having the crime analyst as a resource, patrol officers have direct access to citywide and beat specific information on CFS, nuisance complaints, and crime by individual and location. Officers have access to computer terminals and manuals describing exactly how to generate various reports. One lieutenant advised that if he is asked for the same type of information twice, he writes a program, and adds instructions on running the requested report to the manual, so the next time someone wants that information she/he can obtain it themselves.

It is in the area of data driven analysis that we found more variation between the two small Departments than in any other area. It cannot be argued that this difference had to do with resource differential. Clarkton, with limited resources, has integrated crime analysis and CFS mapping into its strategic problem solving activity at the command level and at the street level. Chestnutville, with no funding shortage, and in fact having received federal funding for a new records management system and computer aided dispatch system, made a decision not to develop crime analysis and not to introduce mapping capabilities that was not financially driven. It may be understood in terms of the Department's self-image as a service organization whose role is quietly to ensure the maintenance of the extraordinarily high quality of life in Chestnutville

through responsiveness to community generated concerns, rather than a perception of a need to focus on crime. If this is so, it may be that other small Departments with well developed strategic problem solving have integrated data driven analysis in ways that more resembles Clarkton than the anomalously privileged Chestnutville.

Strategic Problem Solving in Small Departments

Our experiences in Chestnutville and Clarkton lead us to conclude that a high level of strategic problem solving, including all seven elements that comprise the concept, can be and is being achieved in small Departments without the introduction of a formal Compstat program.

Medium Departments (100-499 sworn officers)

We turn now to six⁷ disparate medium size Departments, ranging from a suburb of a large southern city to a western gambling town and a south Florida beach town, from an old northeastern working class town to two seemingly similar Texas cities. Our experiences in this size community were as varied as the places themselves, yet again there is enough commonality to draw some conclusions about the role of Compstat in medium sized Departments.

The Departments that we visited in this category range in size from 114 to 501 sworn officers. While five of the six Departments indicated in our national survey that they had “implemented a Compstat-like program,” the manifestations in some of the Departments bear a somewhat remote resemblance to Compstat New York-style. Some of the Compstat Departments have weekly meetings (Midcity, Ivory City, Eastmont), some biweekly (Auden)

⁷One Department, Beach City, that was originally classified as a large Department has been regrouped here into the medium-sized Departments because its number of sworn officers was 501, making it much more like Departments with 100-499 officers than like the large Departments, that ranged from 700 to thousands of officers. Also, the size of the population served by the Department was almost identical to another of the medium size Departments.

and some monthly (Beach City). Although Gulf City did not report having Compstat, it has daily meetings attended by the command staff – the Chief and the five division commanders.

Of the five Compstat sites, two – Auden and Eastmont – reported implementing their programs in 1996; Beach City implemented it experimentally in one district in November 1998 and Department-wide in March 1999; Midcity also implemented their program in March 1999, and Ivory City in July 1999. As reported in the methodology section, one of the mid-size cities was chosen because it had indicated it had a Compstat-like program, but it had a low SPS score. This Department was Midcity.

In selecting medium size sites for short site visits, as we reported above, “Two medium size Departments declined to participate because they had abandoned their Compstat programs.” These were Departments that had high SPS scores, meaning that the elements of strategic problem solving were in place, yet they had for one reason or another been unable or unwilling to maintain their Compstat program. Our experience in the medium size sites suggests that adapting Compstat for mid-size Departments has been difficult. It may be that many of these Departments would benefit more from implementing SPS without a formal Compstat program. It is surprisingly difficult to characterize whether or not a city has a Compstat-like program. Compstat is sometimes chiefly characterized by a weekly meeting where command staff report on crime in their areas; sometimes it is characterized as a data system; and sometimes it is characterized as a crime reduction strategy. (In a popular television series, it has become a verb: “Let’s Compstat,” cries the Chief whenever he wants to address his command staff in a darkened room with high tech crime maps.)

The size of the Departments does not in all cases reflect the size of the population served. Our “small” Departments served populations of 35,000 and 65,000. The “medium” size Departments are located in one suburban community of 35,000 people; three cities in the 80,000-100,000 range; and two cities with about 160,000 residents. The success of implementation of strategic problem solving is related to the size of the Department, but not to the size of the population served. Two of the sites had high crime rates (Eastmont, Beach City), two had medium crime rates (Ivory City, Gulf City) and two had low crime rates (Auden, Midcity).

As with the small sites, our discussion of the medium size sites focuses on the *seven* key elements of Compstat emerging in the broader framework of strategic problem solving: 1. mission clarification; 2. geographic organization of operational command; 3. effective problem solving tactics; 4. organizational flexibility; 5. internal accountability; 6. external accountability; and 7. data driven analysis. These features are not only associated with the Compstat model but constitute the core of organization development prescriptions that emerged in the last two decades. But are they combined in these medium size sites as they are in the Compstat model? Or do they more closely resemble the small departments we examined?

Mission Clarification

Compstat in larger cities, as we shall see, has a specific focus on crime reduction, often with specific percent reductions targeted, but the mission of the small Departments with developed strategic problem solving had a different focus. While both small Departments had clarified missions that had penetrated deep into the Departments, their mission centered on problem solving and partnership with the community. Is this a continuum with the medium cities somewhere in the middle?

Beginning with the Department with the most “Compstat-like” program, the Auden Police Department was focused on crime reduction, although they did not set specific crime reduction goals. Both the Chief and the local newspaper sometimes credited Compstat and other times credited community policing with crime reduction in the city, but that the Department was focused on reducing crime was well understood at all levels within the Department. Other personnel suggested that the crime reduction was in part due to Compstat – by recognizing crime patterns and targeting specific areas – but also to the increase in the number of officers in the city, and the increased sentences of convicted offenders. In Beach City, the Chief has said that reducing the crime rate has been the most important goal for the past few years. This general goal does not, however, seem to permeate the Department.

Another Compstat Department, Midcity, establishes annual Department goals and objectives in a yearly Department retreat. The goals, disseminated throughout the Department, are general principles, such as “identify community problems and devise community partnerships or police strategies to resolve these problems;” “promote traffic safety through education, enforcement, and training;” and, “promote professional service through teamwork, leadership, and training.” The objectives are the broad strategies for achieving the goals, adapted within each Bureau and shift (e.g., Daytime Patrol, Canine, etc.). Ivory City does not set crime reduction goals, or emphasize a Departmental mission statement. Nevertheless, throughout the Department we observed a focus on innovative problem solving efforts. The foundation for proactive problem solving was laid some years earlier and recently reactivated by the current Chief. In suburban, high crime Eastmont, when the Chief took over in 1997 he established a new and clear mission that is well known in the Department, to “establish a safe and secure

community by protecting and serving with honor.” Of equal importance seems to be a goal of efficient and effective personnel management, that manifests in several ways that will be discussed at greater length in other sections of this report. Gulf City, the one Department in this group that, despite a high SPS score, did not report having a Compstat-like program, did not exhibit a sense of mission either explicit or implicit. Some of our interviewees indicated the Department had a problem oriented policing focus but this focus was not expressed or demonstrated throughout our observations. Gulf City was in transition with an interim Chief during our short site visit, which may have affected the extent to which a clear mission was possible at this particular time.

Thus, some medium size cities focus on crime reduction, though not with specific crime reduction goals. While some emphasize problem solving, none have the same emphasis on community service that the small Departments exhibited.

Geographic Organization of Operational Command

Of the six mid-sized Departments, two had undertaken significant transformations to geographic organization of operational command; two had mixed systems, one of which had recently switched back to temporal supervision after experimenting with geographic supervision but retained elements of the geographic command structure; and two others continued to operate within the traditional temporal organization.

Auden’s Chief considered geographic organization a key feature of his Compstat program. All units, including most detectives, have been decentralized. All decentralized personnel are under the command of one of the three Sector Commanders, who have 24 hour responsibility for their sectors. Violent crime (excluding homicide), narcotics, and vice crimes

are handled by the Sector detectives. In most cases, the central detectives are also used to assist the Sector detectives. This organization was considered a work in progress during our short site visit; the Chief indicated that they were still “ironing out” who does what. Crime analysis for the Department remains centralized.

Although it is difficult to discern in a short site visit what impact geographic organization has had at the levels of patrol sergeant and patrol officer, our impression was that it had made a real difference in their jobs. According to one patrol sergeant, the Department “used to be set up that there was an early boss and a late boss. The officers had no responsibility in an area because the next day, a patrol officer could be sent somewhere else. Patrol officers didn’t really own anything.” Now officers feel responsible for problems in their “route” because they work there day in and day out, dealing with the people and their problems on a daily basis, and they will get credit for solving problems.

Auden has undertaken decentralization even though the Sectors do not have the space to operate active substations. Roll call is held jointly at Headquarters and officers spend little time at the Sector stations. Bicycle units use the substation to store their bikes so they do not have to return them to Headquarters each day; other officers stop by to use the restroom or telephone facilities. Sector Commanders have a work area at the sector stations, as does Weed and Seed, and sector detectives occasionally conduct interviews there.

Whereas Auden has been developing this new command structure over several years, Ivory City converted to an Area Command structure quite recently. Each of three Areas – North, Central, and South – is run by a Lieutenant who supervises a number of Sergeants who in turn supervise the patrol officers. Only Patrol has been decentralized in Ivory City. Other units,

including Robbery, Gangs, and Traffic, still operate citywide. While only Patrol has been restructured, the reorganization is designed to penetrate down to the patrol officers.

In order to accomplish geographic organization down to the patrol level, the Ivory City plan includes not only Area Command, but also "Beat Integrity." According to Beat Integrity, police officers work the same beat for six months until a bid is conducted, at which time the officers may change beats. During that time they not only respond to calls in their beats but also are encouraged to conduct activities dealing with community issues or solving problems within their beats. Officers frequently are dispatched to other beats and even other areas when the beat officer is already involved in another call. While responding to calls for service is necessary, officers with responsibility for their own beats now resent having to cover other beats. Our impression was that officers feel that having to cover other beats means that the beat integrity has not been fully implemented. In one Area, the Area Lieutenant encourages beat officers to take one hour per week to address community issues and problem solving. But one officer indicated that the pressures to be available to take calls and not require other officers to respond to calls in your beat work against such activities. As in other western communities, there is a relatively small number of officers for the number of residents. Ivory City has about 320 officers compared to 500 officers in Beach City, serving similar size permanent populations. (Both are cities whose primary industry is tourism and entertainment, with significant influxes of non-residents.)

As in Auden, the substations in Ivory City are small spaces. Officers use the substations for writing reports or to use the phone or restroom. Each Area Lieutenant has an office in their substation. The substation's primary function is as a place where local residents can come to file

a police report, taken by a civilian Community Service Officer (CSO). The CSO's take about 60% of the Department's reports. CSO's only man the substations but also drive marked vehicles to take other reports. Aside from this function, there is little activity in the substations.

Compstat was relatively new in Beach City at the time of our short site visit, and was still being "tinkered with." The operational command structure was mixed, combining aspects of both geographic and temporal organization. Patrol was divided into three geographic districts (District One, District Two, District Three), each headed by a District Major, also called the District Commander (DC). Under each DC were three Captains with temporal responsibility for the day shift, evening shift and night shift in their District. The captains supervised the patrol sergeants and patrol officers assigned to each shift. Roll call and deployment took place in Department Headquarters. All other units in the Beach City Police Department except the Community Policing Initiative (CPI) remained completely centralized. The CPI (since changed to the Community Support Division), also overseen by a Major, is located separately and more conveniently for public access. It has operated on a geographic basis since 1996, divided into three geographic Components that are smaller than the three patrol Districts, with officers assigned to Component One, Two or Three.

Midcity had experimented with geographic organization, with Lieutenants responsible for geographic Divisions. There was dissatisfaction with this structure – the Lieutenants were in charge of the Divisions, but "for two-thirds of the day they were not available." This meant that Sergeants were de facto in charge of the Division most of the time. Now Lieutenants operate as shift commanders, with one Lieutenant in charge of Day Shift, one overseeing Evening Shift, and a third the commander of Night Shift. This organization "facilitates more contact between

shift commanders and the officers in briefings.” Nevertheless, geographic organization has not been completely dismantled, in that the city is made up geographically of eight patrol beats. Each beat is further divided into smaller areas called reporting districts. Patrol officers are assigned to beats, although they are often sent to other beats to cover or assist. Calls for service were being analyzed with a view to redrawing beat lines at the time of our site visit. One deputy Chief expressed interested in mapping and geographic reorganization, both in terms of redrawing the beats, and in that the Department also divides the city into East and West and may further divide into North and South. It was not clear how these directional divisions have been or would be used operationally. All units except patrol are centralized in Midcity, and there are no substations in the city.

In Eastmont’s Field Operations Division, a Captain is in charge of each temporal shift. Under each shift Captain are two Lieutenants and three Sergeants. The city is divided into six patrol zones or beats, but the supervisory structure does not reflect the beat structure, remaining strictly temporal in nature. The perception is that the Department is too small to warrant geographic organization of command, but we have seen smaller Departments above that have implemented geographic supervision (above).

Finally, the non-Compstat medium Department, Gulf City, also has not implemented geographic organization of operational command. All police operations are based at headquarters where divisions are formed operationally rather than geographically. There are five operational divisions: Uniformed Services (patrol), Criminal Investigations, Support Services, Office of Community Services, and Office of Professional-Responsibility. Under patrol, there

are three lieutenants each of whom supervises a shift (day, evening, and night) that encompasses the entire city.

Effective Problem Solving Tactics

Many of the medium size Departments touted innovative and effective problem solving tactics. There may not have been as clear a system of encouraging and rewarding innovation as in the small Departments, but the emphasis was apparent. This emphasis may be more compatible with the way Compstat and/or strategic problem solving have been adapted in some small and mid-size Departments than in larger Departments.

In Auden, the Chief considered one of the major elements of Compstat to be that it “demands that the command staff analyze crime data, and develop plans to deal with the problems.” Although the Department’s adoption of problem oriented policing preceded its introduction of Compstat, the Chief expressed the view that problem oriented policing “even now ... is not quite institutionalized.” Problem solving is not the “automatic response” he would like it to be, and it is still “somewhat reactive.” One of the sector captains considered the major elements of Auden’s Compstat program to be “information sharing” and “the SARA model – ongoing analysis of criminal activity within an area of responsibility by identifying patterns and series of crimes and trying to find solutions for them, culminating in a presentation to show what is happening and how personnel are working to solve the identified problems.”

In the meeting we observed, although the Sector captains presented their reports in competitive fashion, there was a cooperative and lively interchange of problem solving suggestions and information sharing as each sector captain presented problems being faced in their districts. The Compstat meeting provided the sector captains an opportunity to share

information about similar cases. One Sector captain later said that although there was often a high level of interaction in the meetings, the one we attended was “a little more interactive than usual.” He thought our presence “created even more of a team approach.” For example, when one captain was presenting, he wondered if he was getting into too much detail. “I can go through them all but I don’t know if that’s our intent.” Another sector captain asked him to speak about a road rage incident in his sector. “It may be related to the one I have.” A patrolman who had attended some Compstat meetings expressed the view that the meetings provided an open forum in a relaxed atmosphere with participants brainstorming about the problems of different areas. The meeting allowed for “input from everybody, from patrolmen to the person in charge.” Nevertheless, with a two week turnaround time between meetings (at the time we observed Compstat in Auden each sector reported biweekly; this has since been changed to one sector reporting every two weeks), there was little chance for analysis before responding.

One sector captain reported on a creative problem solving effort hit upon in driving through a troubled neighborhood with his Weed and Seed coordinator and noticing that trash was all over the street. They recognized that the trash was overflowing its receptacles and spilling onto the street – that the problem was there were not enough trash receptacles. The solution was to ask neighborhood businesspeople to contribute funds to purchase additional trash receptacles for the neighborhood. The sector captain reported that “they want to focus on some of the little things along with targeted police work to make a difference.”

Interviewees reported on several successes based on patterned crime analysis across sectors that would not have been recognized without Compstat. One example was the recognition

that a “plague” of motor vehicle breaking and entering was occurring at specific types of sites – city parking garages. Targeting these sites led to a decrease in the number of occurrences.

The Chief of Ivory City expressed a commitment to proactive problem solving, a return to the foundation laid years earlier by a former Chief. The current Chief feels that although the Department’s reputation as a problem oriented Department had continued in the interim, it had been “surviving on its reputation” until he refocused the Department upon his appointment. A COPS report published in 2000 lists Ivory City as one of 62 international cities “prominently associated with problem oriented policing” (Scott 2000: 40-41). Our researcher found that indeed “the most striking thing about [Ivory City]’s Police Department is the amount of innovative problem-solving that is conducted.” She also found that much of this problem solving is initiated at the officer level. The Department’s Compstat-like meeting is sometimes referred to as the POP meeting, or the Command Staff Meeting, and is primarily a report on problem solving activities. At this weekly meeting one of the three area commanders makes a presentation that includes projecting maps showing specific crimes in the past 30 days. The focus of the presentation was a report on a range of problem solving activities in the community at both the supervisory and rank and file level. For example, the commander reported on his “Supervisory Level Ownership Program” which included contributing a bi-weekly newspaper article, participation in a business owners meeting, participation in a Code Compliance Task Force, the implementation of a Chaplains Program, and participation in a number of homeowners associations. He also discussed “Officer Initiated Programs” which included an officer who was conducting door to door quality of life contacts in drug and prostitution areas and an Elderly Get to Know You Program that was started by an officer.

Outside the meeting we learned of many other problem solving activities that used the problem oriented policing approach championed by Herman Goldstein (1990). We perceived a commitment of energy and resources to these activities. Whole units such as the traffic unit and the gang unit practiced problem oriented policing, as did individual officers. Two programs that used problem-solving and involved coordination with other agencies were HELP (Homeless Evaluation Liaison Program) and Kid's Korner.

The HELP Program began in 1994 as a Community Oriented Policing and Problem Solving Project. Homelessness was perceived as overwhelming the system with calls for service and time in jail (usually for food or a warm place to sleep). As a gaming town, the analysis was that the homeless were displaced from other cities and had fallen on hard times in Ivory City because of gambling and alcohol. The program is a joint effort of the police and sheriff's Departments, healthcare providers, several shelters, and other social service agencies, with the assistance of private individuals. The HELP Program attempts to assist the displaced homeless to return to their hometowns if a support structure of either family or friends can be found who will take responsibility. Interviews are conducted with homeless individuals to determine their eligibility for the program and locate family or friends willing to help. If successful, the person is provided a bus voucher and sent to the destination. The stated purpose is to assist displaced people and return them to an environment in which they have a chance of success. The HELP program does not intentionally send people to be homeless in another city or send them to other shelters.

Although the program has not been formally evaluated, officers point out that the two free local missions in town had not been filled to capacity even one night in the past year. The

food bank reports serving 1/3 less meals than a year ago. Officers reported that service providers credit the HELP Program for these reductions. They estimate that 96% of the individuals assisted by the HELP Program do not return to Ivory City.

Another innovative coordinated problem-solving program in Ivory City is Kid's Korner. The Kid's Korner program is "committed to working proactively toward a healthy future for our community's children at risk for child abuse and neglect." A police officer and a county health Department community health nurse go door-to-door to rooms in motels known to house poor families and other poor neighborhoods to assess the safety and well being of the children who are residing there. The program has incorporated the use of a mobile clinic van provided by a charitable foundation. The program is designed to bring access to nurses, social workers, and the police to the doors of residents who have experienced barriers to traditional services due to culture and language, finances, substance addictions, transportation, and other issues.

The program evolved from a beginning in which a single police officer identified an area of potential concern - the weekly and monthly rental hotels – and began paying visits to these sites. He was concerned with the abuse and neglect of the children left in these rooms, checking on whether they were at risk of harm and that their daily living needs were being met. Eventually a public health nurse heard about his actions and asked if she could come along and do physical assessments of the children. The coordinated effort meant that the officer in uniform was able to gain access and the nurse was able to more fully evaluate the children. From this informal beginning, the concept continued to develop with additional personnel and resources and is now a fully functioning program.

Problem-solving tactics in Beach City generally involve more standard police response including sweeps and directed patrols. Nevertheless, the Compstat meeting involved information sharing and problem solving processes, more than did Ivory City's meeting where the format was mainly reporting. However these were all short term responses rather than the more long term problem solving efforts presented in Ivory City. For example, a pattern of airbag thefts led to a discussion and a decision to send out a bulletin to all personnel and to collaborate with other jurisdictions in the county. A pattern of Camry thefts led to decisions to increase stops of Camrys "when appropriate" and to give out The Club to Camry owners.

The Department is also involved in some more innovative problem solving activity. As a recipient of a federal community policing initiative award, they have been active in offering classes to citizens and working to build relationships in the targeted communities. The Department, also in a location that attracts many tourists like Ivory City, in this case to its warm climate, also is involved with a coordinated effort to address homelessness called the Homeless Assistance Coalition (HAC). The HAC has an assistance center that provides shelter and food to people willing to try to work. The stay is limited and residents must be out of the center during the day, seeking or at work. Obviously the HAC program is not for everyone. Nevertheless, a police officer, teamed up with a former homeless man, tries to encourage homeless persons to go to HAC at least for one night after conducting a warrant check and a search for contraband. The Department and the Coalition also work with other social service organizations to get assistance with alcoholism, drug addiction, or mental health counseling.

When Midcity was deciding whether to implement Compstat, how best to develop POP projects (top down or bottom up) was an important part of their decision. That is, they preferred

to have officers develop their own POP projects, but observed a Compstat Department where sergeants set up the projects. Police officials were concerned that Compstat would negatively impact POP projects. The main impetus for the decision to institute their Compstat-like program (Team Meeting or Thursday Meeting) was as a response to criticism regarding communication with the District Attorney's Office, who are present at most meetings. Thus, this low SPS Department had a different motivation for introducing Compstat than other Departments. As in other smaller cities, innovative problem solving tactics are developed perhaps epiphenomenally, i.e., innovative Departments may develop effective problem solving tactics and may adopt Compstat, but there is not a causal link between Compstat and effective problem solving tactics.

Nevertheless, problem solving tactics were either individually initiated on the one hand, or were not explicitly tailored to local needs or involved traditional police tactics such as stings on the other. A detective in the Investigative Services Bureau developed two innovative programs, a juvenile first offenders program and a thumbprint program. The first offenders program is directed at juvenile offenders who meet certain criteria (no class C misdemeanors, only nonviolent offenses, not gang related, not sexually motivated crimes, and first contact with the police). The detective sends the parents a certified letter explaining the program and giving them 10 days to contact him. At the first meeting with the parents and the child, they tailor a program to the individual child. They may require the parent or the child or both together to attend counseling at a cost adjusted to parents' income. The juveniles are also required to attend a weekly class led by the detective, which addresses the consequences of one's actions, creating a mission statement regarding life goals and relationship with parents, and developing a social contract that is discussed with the parents. There has been no formal evaluation of the program,

but reportedly only 3 of the 40 juveniles who have entered the program have been re-arrested.

However, the program is not firmly established in the Department; if the detective is reassigned it may not have the personnel to continue.

This same detective started a thumbprint program. Local merchants who cash checks for people without identification now require that they put their thumbprint on the back of the check. The program has led to the arrest at a 7-Eleven of a person who was cashing forged checks.

Besides these officer initiated programs, the Department conducts several ongoing POP projects. They offer a Landlord Training Program to teach property managers to get undesirable tenants evicted from apartment complexes under a zero tolerance policy; they also use code enforcement to demolish crack houses, and use nuisance abatement laws to decrease illegal activities at a targeted bar. Directed bike patrol was used in a nature park that was having incidents of lewd behavior, and prostitution and narcotics stings have been used in targeted areas.

The Eastmont Police Department has adopted a range of problem solving tactics, some national programs and others developed locally. There is no system for developing such tactics; management in Eastmont is informal and emanating from its strong Chief. Problem solving efforts include an automated system that calls to check in on elderly, a DUI task force, Strap and Snap which is a safety program to check the proper use of child safety restraints, Cops in the Shop which puts plainclothes officers in liquor stores to ensure compliance with age restrictions, CAT (Combat Auto Theft) which uses a sticker on a vehicle identifying it as not being used between certain hours and gives officers probable cause to stop the vehicle if it is moving during this time period, Weed and Seed (in which the Department has already used money to refurbish a vacant lot into a colorful park), McGruff the Crime Dog and PC the Patrol Car aimed at children,

an Apartment Manager Program that teaches managers their rights and how to operate a crime-free building, and Citizens Police Academy.

High ranking personnel in Gulf City consider that the Department has had a problem solving orientation for years, and that these efforts became more explicit within the last five years when the ideas of community policing, problem oriented policing, and the SARA model were introduced into the police lexicon. Interestingly, Gulf City leadership actually visited Midcity as a problem-solving model. The patrol captain reports that while “there is no policy *per se* that directs us to problem-solving, it has become accepted and understood throughout the Department” that they do problem-solving. We found pockets of problem solving in the Department, but did not find that it was pervasive or systematic, or that there was general awareness of a philosophical or strategic shift towards strategic problem solving.

According to the Chief, the Department’s motivation for adopting this approach was to increase interaction between the police and the public, and to facilitate increased community involvement with problem identification. They hoped to stimulate citizens to proactively report problems in their communities in order to engender a collaborative relationship between police and citizens in approaching problems. The main challenge has been the traditional, “catch the bad guy” mentality held by some personnel. The Chief feels that newer officers generally have a different, more modern idea of law enforcement since they have been taught community policing from the beginning.

Personnel consider the daily morning command staff meeting to be one of the main problem-solving efforts in the Department. At the 20 minute meeting we attended, each division commander gave a very brief report to the Chief. No serious problems or concerns were raised

for discussion, the Chief did not ask any of the commanders questions about their presentations, and there was no discussion. The meetings are intended to keep the division commanders and the Chief abreast of issues in all of the divisions, and in some cases are a venue for discussing problems and generating solutions. They are informal and make no use of data or other technology.

While there is no systematized program through which problem solving is executed or encouraged, several interviewees provided specific examples of ways that innovative problem solving techniques had been undertaken. The patrol captain reported that he researches the internet and PERF materials for ideas of ways to address problems and to learn what tactics other Departments have found to be effective. Such information is also obtained at the Texas Law Enforcement Institute where personnel go to meet representatives from other agencies and to share ideas about approaches to problems.

Other specific problem solving activities in Gulf City included:

- The CO of investigations, realized (through a complaint submitted to the DA) that crime victims were sometimes falling through the cracks in the justice system and were not being apprized of all the sources of help available. To remedy this he created a resource list for his detectives to give to victims of violent crime such as domestic violence. Officers now go over this list with victims to ensure that they are informed on how and where to obtain assistance. He felt that in the past, before problem solving was emphasized, the solution developed would not have been as systematic.
- The CO of patrol talked about a problem that had been addressed two years ago of people approaching cars at intersections and soliciting money. This was given as an example of the Department identifying and addressing a problem while it was still relatively small after a patrol officer brought it to the attention of a commander. With the help of the internet, the Department researched how other Departments had addressed similar problems and then developed their own solution. They worked with a city attorney to draft and pass an ordinance requiring solicitors to have permits. The permit application included a background check and a small fee. Not surprisingly, most of the people who had engaged in this activity did not obtain permits, and once the police had leverage to engage solicitors and to check their permits the problem faded away. According to the

patrol captain, before the Department emphasized problem solving such a problem would have been left up to individual officers to handle on a case-by-case basis.

- The CO of patrol described an anti-gang initiative developed when the city experienced a proliferation of gang marking graffiti and an increase in drive by shootings. Officers began initiating and building positive trusting relationships with gang members and potential gang members. Through these relationships officers served as positive role models and as sources of support, and in some cases talked subjects out of being in gangs. The strategy was "get respect by showing respect" and when arrests need to be made treat the arrestees "like people." They also organized efforts to paint over gang-related graffiti by forming officer-supervised work crews of people sentenced to community service and obtaining donations of painting supplies from local businesses. The year prior to this effort the city had six gang-related drive-by shootings, and in the three years following they have had none. They also report less graffiti.
- The Department is also very involved with the local schools. They currently have an arrangement whereby several officers, whose salaries are paid by the education Department nine months of the year, are posted full-time in the middle schools. Every six weeks officers are assigned a new group of kids who have been identified as needing extra help with study skills for one reason or another. The School District set up a control group to allow the success of the program to be measured, and the evaluation found that the kids who worked with the officers showed a greater improvement in grades, attendance, and teacher reports than the control students. Even though this project originated from a grant, the program has been continued indefinitely.
- Another problem addressed by the Department involved a run-down downtown bar district which was the source of much disorder and many calls for service. First, the Department set up a substation in this area to promote a police presence. Then the Department worked with the city to institute stricter liquor license renewal requirements. Now the police Department keeps track of complaints relating to different bars, and when a given bar is up for license renewal, they can argue against or support the application. The possibility of losing their license has impelled bar owners to be more responsible for the impact of their establishments on the neighborhood and consequently the crime and disorder problems in the area have diminished. In one case the Department was influential in having a bar's application rejected and the bar subsequently closed.
- To be a presence in public housing, the HPD started a program where certain apartments are put aside for police officers, who volunteer to live there and pay no rent.

Organizational Flexibility

Here, we can explore the relationship between geographical organization and organizational flexibility in medium Departments, because of the range of implementation of geographic organization in these departments. While organizational flexibility is a hallmark of strategic problem solving, its relationship to geographic organization of operational command is complex.

Looking first at the Departments that have converted to geographic organizational of operational command, we find that geographic organization has strained against flexibility, has necessitated flexibility, and has obviated the need for it. Let us explain.

Geographic organization of patrol operations tends to lead to competitiveness and caution about sharing resources. As one sector commander in Auden put it, "It is difficult to 'borrow' officers. Since the geographic distribution, things have become territorial." In this important sense it has strained against flexibility. When we consider the beat level in Ivory City, where flexibility is regularly called for in order for officers to respond to calls for service if the assigned beat officer is otherwise engaged, officers report resenting being called away from their territory. That is, while the same feeling of territoriality occurs at the beat level for the rank and file as at the sector level for the commander, calls for service demands necessitate that officers respond to calls outside their beats. What was normal operating procedure before beat integrity, that is, that available officers respond to calls as needed, is now necessitated flexibility. On another level, when we looked at Ivory City, which has organized patrol geographically but where all specialized units have remained centralized, we found flexibility to be inherent in the structure. That is, when an area commander needs something specific accomplished, he calls on the

specialized units to come in and take the required action. On the other hand, in Auden where most specialized units have been decentralized, this kind of cooperative flexibility between specialized units and area commanders is not needed, since the specialized units already fall under the area command. That is, full decentralization obviates the need for flexibility between specialized units and area commanders.

In Beach City, which combines both geographic and temporal organization, interviewees reported the Compstat meeting served to facilitate information sharing and focusing of resources as needed. An example reported in the meeting we attended was an identified pattern of increasingly hostile armed robberies concentrated in one district that led to shifting tactical squads from the two other districts to assist the tactical squad in the affected district. Overtime was approved due to financial assistance from the business owners association. The centralized robbery squad provided additional manpower for surveillance and support as needed. Organizational flexibility is in evidence in yet another dimension in Beach City, in that CPI (Community Policing) officers, who normally are not tied to radio calls, cover calls for service during shift changes so that the new shift does not begin with a backlog of calls and the outgoing shift can get off work in time.

In Midcity, which was in a transitional state regarding geographic organization, there seemed to be a traditional wall of secrecy between field operations and detectives that suggested flexibility had not become a Departmental norm. On the other hand, the beat structure led to the necessity of flexibility among patrol officers in covering one another's territories.

Eastmont, the smallest of our mid sized Departments, had no geographic organization and no formal channels for flexibility or sharing resources. On the other hand, the strong Chief has the knowledge of operations and the ready power to shift resources as needed.

Gulf City, which had not adopted geographic organization, was understaffed during the period of our observations, and reportedly was less able to move around resources than would otherwise be the case. Still, there was regular movement from the traffic unit to patrol as needed. The captain of the patrol division had the authority to make semi-permanent changes between these assignments as deemed necessary, needing only perfunctory approval from the Chief before implementing the change. Patrol lieutenants could request officers to be moved from traffic to patrol for part or all of a shift simply by calling dispatch. Commanders also regularly moved officers reporting for shift at the last minute from uniform to plain clothes as operations required. No geographic territoriality interfered with these movements.

Internal Accountability

Auden's Chief considers internal accountability to be the first element of Compstat and in fact the easiest element to implement. He said that it is easy in a para-military structure to pull people in and ask questions because they have to do it. And in front of their peers, where it creates a personal pressure to do something about it [crime in their sector]. Compstat establishes accountability up and down the chain of command. We were told that meetings had become more relaxed since Compstat was first implemented, that they are no longer as "nerve-racking." Nevertheless awareness of internal accountability remains acute. As one sector commander stated jokingly during his presentation of crimes in his sector in the Compstat meeting, "When I first saw this map, I started to write my letter of resignation." A patrol

sergeant explained that this accountability extended to the officers, detectives and sergeants. When they develop a solution to a problem, now the officer “gets excited” because he or she “gets credit for it,” whereas previously they would write a report and never see or hear about it again.

There seemed to be relatively little focus on internal accountability in Ivory City, with its strong emphasis on innovative problem solving. Although the Chief mentioned it, the division commanders did not report it as a concern or even an aspect of their program. The meeting format was a presentation rather than an accounting or inquisitory process. This de-emphasis on internal accountability in an innovative problem solving Department is a corollary that reinforces our finding (see Willis et al. 2003) that an emphasis on internal accountability marshals against innovative problem solving.

Beach City was moving rapidly towards a higher level of internal accountability, frustrated somewhat by problems in their data delivery. Nevertheless, the new assistant Chief running the Compstat meeting asked very specific and pointed questions, and that tendency was expected to continue and increase.

Midcity also suffered data problems that may have interfered with an emphasis on internal accountability. But no other evidence of a focus on internal accountability was present. The Compstat meeting was unfocused and no one seemed to preside over the proceedings or take a lead in responding to command staff reports.

Eastmont, with a weekly management meeting that includes but does not emphasize crime control, has a high level of accountability without structural support, accomplished instead by a very hands on Chief. This is a rather small “medium” Department, with only 125 sworn

officers and is probably in this way more like some small Departments. One accountability technique the Chief employs is meeting with patrol officers individually to let them know about feedback he has received from citizens pertaining to the officer's performance. He proactively surveys one in five calls for service, and reports both negative and positive comments to the responding officers. He also has an open door policy, which officers utilize. Another more standard method for monitoring accountability is the daily, weekly and monthly reports that cross the Chief's desk. Nevertheless, accountability is not focused on crime reduction but on responsibly responding to the community. There is an emphasis on pride in physical appearance, supported by twice monthly uniform inspections.

Internal accountability is "modestly present" in Gulf City, though more so than in some of the Compstat Departments. Some commanders take initiative to monitor the work of their subordinates although this is not emphasized. The patrol captain reported that there are no positive or negative incentives for achieving particular results; however, if a commander did not know the crime problems in their area over a long period of time, he would be reassigned to a different position. A lieutenant in the patrol division said that he examines crime by district (beat), and that if one district was getting "hit" more than usual he would talk to the officer about it. He said that this approach makes him "more accountable to commanders." The idea of accountability is present but since it is not officially promulgated or enforced it is not a major element of the Department's problem solving efforts.

External Accountability

Attention to community concerns has increased overall in policing, as exemplified in community-oriented policing. While increased accountability to the community is an aspect of

strategic problem solving, it remains unclear whether increased external accountability is associated with the *adoption* of Compstat. Nevertheless, at least in small and medium cities, external accountability does affect the way Compstat is *implemented*.

In Auden, which has the most developed Compstat program of the medium cities, there has been a reported increase in accountability to the community. Only five or six years before our visit, neighborhood groups developed around the issues of public safety and fear in the neighborhoods. At first the Chief attended many of these meetings himself; then he hired a civilian community liaison answerable directly to him. But, as the Chief said, "With the concept of community policing, however, it is not enough to have the liaison present because the officers have to be visible too." It took a long time for officers to understand why they were attending neighborhood meetings. (One thought they were there to guard the meeting.) Now the Department attends four meetings per month. The interaction with Compstat arises in that the Chief reports that these neighborhood meetings have an effect on how the Sector Captains prioritize and delegate their resources. This is an aspect of external accountability that would not have been possible prior to geographic reorganization.

In Ivory City, external accountability penetrates day to day policing in the variety of problem solving activities discussed earlier. Community surveys have been conducted regularly since 1987 as a measure of satisfaction and service. The Department is also surveying 911 callers and non-emergency callers. The Chief considers interactions with community members and city agencies to be his "report card from the community." A weekly television show produced by the Department provides information to the public and frequently includes a

segment where the Chief responds directly to questions from the neighborhoods. Regular meetings with minority leaders include follow up reports on issues from previous meetings.

As in Auden, Beach City District Majors attend community meetings and respond to community groups' concerns in a way that would not be possible without the (partial) geographic organization of the Department. Also, the Community Policing Initiative (now Community Services Division) which has a substantial number of officers (about 60 or about 20% of the total number of the officers in the 3 operations districts) works closely with and is accountable to the local communities.

In Midcity and Eastmont, the police are involved with the community, but there is no emphasis on external accountability. In Midcity, outside of everyday policing, the police relate to the community in the role of friendly provider of service rather than being held accountable by or to the community. For example, there is a successful Citizens Police Academy, a DARE program, and a Landlord Training program. Similarly, in Eastmont there are Police Athletic League (PAL) activities. The Eastmont police have established external accountability on a broader basis by applying for and achieving state accreditation.

The high SPS score, non-Compstat Department of Gulf City had a strong emphasis on external accountability that pervaded the Department as in Ivory City. Many interviewees spoke of an increase in accountability to the community and that they "worked for citizens." Officers discussed their problem solving approach as entailing "more professionalism and more accountability," and emphasized that far more attention is paid citizens' complaints than in the past. This seems to have been in response to previous lawsuits against the Department. From the Department comes the view that community relations have improved, and this is also in evidence

in the school and community related programs described above, and in the citizens' police academy.

Data-Driven Analysis

In the two small Departments we visited, both with high levels of strategic problem solving, we found considerable difference in the use of crime analysis. Similarly, in the medium size Departments, the extent of the use of data-driven analysis varied considerably. In all Departments where crime analysis was used, it was very much a work in progress, sometimes still in its infancy. There were considerable technical problems with Records Management Systems (RMS), and Crime Analysis Units were understaffed and in some cases in need of additional training.

In Auden at the time of our site visit, maps produced by the Crime Analysis Unit based on police report data were projected and used to identify crime patterns at the Compstat meeting, and formed the basis of the presentations by the Sector captains. Data comparing crime for the previous year and the previous 2 week period were also available. Maps provided information on time as well as crime type. Crimes were reported where emergent geographic patterns might be expected; thus domestic assaults were no longer addressed in the Compstat meeting. One new sector captain suggested that it would be useful to have hot spot reports before the meeting to enable the commanders to develop plans and address them at the Compstat meeting in order to get ideas or resources needed to deal with these problem areas. The suggestion implied that the presentation and use of data at the meeting did not drive plans of action leading up to the meeting. Nevertheless, the discussion at the meeting was focused on crime analysis by the sector

captains, and strategies to respond to the problems as analyzed, whether or not the maps were available to them prior to the Compstat meeting.

Ivory City has a Crime Analysis Unit (CAU) and has begun to use crime data in several ways. Crime analysts prepare crime maps by Area Command and type of crime for the weekly Command Staff Meeting, where the Area Commanders use the maps in their presentations. The CAU also prepares weekly beat books for each beat with information on Part I crimes, which are distributed to the officer assigned to the beat in the Beat Integrity program.

Beach City's monthly Compstat meeting involves presentations using computer generated crime maps. Presentations are made not only by each District Major, but also by each shift captain for each area within the district. Analysis is both temporal and geographic.

In Midcity, the desire to expand the use of data for crime analysis was expressed, and laptops were being installed in police cars which would speed up data entry, but backlogs and other problems with the RMS rendered crime data relatively uninformative for crime analysis at the time of our site visit. Crime mapping software had been purchased but was not operational. Nevertheless, some traditional use of data was underway; for example, beat lines were being redrawn based on calls for service data.

Eastmont was in the process of converting its technical systems at the time of our visit, with the intention expressed of expanding the use of crime mapping and data analysis. Currently, there is some identification of problems and trends through the use of the raw numbers of crimes by type, but it cannot be said that data driven analysis is used to any considerable extent. The weekly "management information system" meeting combined both

operations and management. Some crime trends were identified and addressed in the meeting, but more managements issues were discussed.

Gulf City's police Department was in the process of establishing an integrated RMS/mapping system, and planned to hire a Crime Analyst. At the time of our visit, the main data used were calls for service. These data were obtained by patrol lieutenants calling the dispatch center at the end of each shift. There was also some offense report data compiled by the commanding office of the investigations unit. These data were distributed weekly to the three patrol lieutenants. The Chief expressed concern that technological advances do no good if the smaller Departments with which they work closely can't afford comparability. Therefore, the steps the Department is taking towards enhanced capability are "small and considered."

Conclusion

Some medium size cities focus on crime reduction, though not with specific crime reduction goals. While some emphasize problem solving, none have the same emphasis on community service that the small Departments exhibited.

Of the six mid-sized Departments, two had undertaken significant transformations to geographic organization of operational command; two had mixed systems, one of which had recently switched back to temporal supervision after experimenting with geographic supervision but retained elements of the geographic command structure; and two others continued to operate within the traditional temporal organization.

Many of the medium size Departments touted innovative and effective problem solving tactics. There may not have been as clear a system of encouraging and rewarding innovation as in the small Departments, but the emphasis was apparent. This emphasis may be more

compatible with the way Compstat and/or strategic problem solving have been adapted in some small and mid-size Departments than in larger Departments

In Medium departments that have converted to geographic organizational of operational command, we found that geographic organization has strained against flexibility, has necessitated flexibility, and has obviated the need for it.

Internal accountability varied greatly among medium sized departments.

Attention to community concerns has increased overall in policing, as exemplified in community-oriented policing. While increased accountability to the community is an aspect of strategic problem solving, it remains unclear whether increased external accountability is associated with the *adoption* of Compstat. Nevertheless, at least in small and medium cities, external accountability does affect the way Compstat is *implemented*.

In the two small Departments we visited, both with high levels of strategic problem solving, we found considerable difference in the use of crime analysis. Similarly, in the medium size Departments, the extent of the use of data-driven analysis varied considerably. In all Departments where crime analysis was used, it was very much a work in progress, sometimes still in its infancy. There were considerable technical problems with Records Management Systems (RMS), and Crime Analysis Units were understaffed and in some cases in need of additional training.

Leadership is critical to successful administration in cities of this size. A strong leader can innovate and create accountability within or without a Compstat program. Nevertheless, reorganizing operations geographically, where responsibility for an area is carried 24 hours a

day, does seem to be a very helpful structure, particularly suitable to problem solving as well as to internal accountability.

We found effective problem solving tactics in various Departments. While the Department that had no Compstat meeting and no data did not have a systematic problem solving approach, it had produced a number of effective and innovative strategies. The most Compstat like Department was less focused on innovative strategies.

Even in medium sized departments with very high “SPS scores” some elements of strategic problem solving are emphasized more than others.

Large Departments (over 500 sworn officers)

We visited eight Departments with more than 500 sworn officers. Seven of the sites ranged from a low of 700 to 2,000 sworn, while one was among the largest Departments in the country with over 9,000 sworn officers. All but one of the sites had an active Compstat-like program; the eighth had such a program that had been suspended. Despite the range of size, these Departments all “behaved” in ways that distinguished them from the small Departments that had highly developed strategic problem solving without a Compstat program, and the medium Departments that were grappling with how to implement strategic problem solving and Compstat. The problems they faced and the solutions they arrived at were sufficiently similar to lead us to conclude that large Departments – defined as from 500 to the largest Departments in the country – interested in adopting Compstat programs can learn from the experiences of other Departments in that size range.

We found in the large cities that have high scores on our SPS (Strategic Problem Solving) scale and have adopted Compstat programs (including one that ended it), a far greater resemblance to the New York style Compstat that has been well described elsewhere (Silverman 1999; McDonald 1998, 2001, inter alia). Thus our discussions of the elements of Strategic Problem Solving in these Departments provides insights into the implementation of Compstat programs that could not be derived from the small and medium sized Departments.

As with the small and medium Departments, we disguise the names of the cities but leave all other facts unchanged, save one: Several of these Departments have developed acronyms for their Compstat-like programs that represent their goals and importantly signify that the programs they were adopting were their own and they were not simply transplanting an idea from the NYPD. In some cases the acronym has become widely known in the communities served as well as in the Department and in policing generally. To name the program would be equivalent to naming the city. Thus, in all cases we refer to the local program as Compstat. Similarly, whatever the head of the Department may be called in the particular site, we use the generic “Chief” in all cases.

Mapleton is a west coast city with a diverse population of almost 400,000, a relatively small police force of 700 sworn officers for a city of its size, and a high crime rate. Surrey is a mid-Atlantic city with a diverse population of 200,000. With half the population of Mapleton, it has about the same number of sworn officers – 720 – and a high crime rate. Nortown in the north-central quadrant has a population of 370,000 in a metropolitan area of two million people who work in or frequent the city. The police force has about 915 sworn officers. Midwestern and with a medium crime rate, Crossroad has a population of about 850,000 and over 1,100

sworn officers. Waterville is a unique and vibrant southern city of about half a million population and about 1,600 sworn police officers. Northern Oldtown has a population of about 270,000 and over 1,400 sworn officers. Mission is a Texas city of over 1,000,000 and almost 1,900 sworn police officers. We will not report in detail on the very large city, which we call Big City, beyond saying it has one of largest police forces in the country.⁸

Mission Clarification

Beginning with Mapleton, we found a pervasive appreciation that the mission of Compstat is crime reduction, and a sense that this purpose was lacking under the previous Chief. As one district captain said, "Crime reduction is what I get graded on." The focus is on reduction of Part One crimes. The Chief developed what he has called a series of "crime reduction principles:"

"In order to reduce crime in the city, we have also developed a series of crime reduction principles, which will serve as the basis of our overall crime fighting strategy. The principles are as follows:

- Tracking and apprehending known, wanted offenders, including parolees and probationers at-large and warrant suspects.
- Crime analysis that is detailed and comprehensive and provides a clear picture of crime.
- Tactics that are strategic and well developed, drawing upon every available resource, including the community and those from other city and county agencies.
- Rapid response to problem areas and crime-causing conditions, such as public drunkenness, loitering, drug dealing and prostitution activity.
- Relentless follow-up: To continually improve and to ensure that we reduce crime and keep it down, we will continually access our planning processes and tactics. If something has worked well, we should consider its replication in another part of the city or the organization. If something has not worked well, let's find out why and fix it. If the idea or tactic is simply not feasible, let's discard it and try something else. The point is to be relentless in our quest to improve and to solve persistent neighborhood problems."

⁸ Because of the size of the city and Department, and because Compstat meetings in Big City are held within Divisions, our site visit focused on only one Division. As a result we have omitted Big City from the current analysis.

A concern that the focus on Part 1 crimes means that other crimes are being neglected was raised by some. Reportedly on the first day of our visit the police officers' association (the union) raised the concern that calls for service are being ignored in favor of focusing on special crime problems.

Crime reduction was a clear goal in Surrey as well, but here there was a second element of "service to the public." The Department achieved its first stated goal of reducing violent crime by 30%. Many respondents mentioned this. Some reported that a further goal of reducing crime in general by 30% over 3 years had been set. The Chief conveyed the second element of service to the public has in the materials he required officers to read, and especially in the renaming of "precincts" to "Customer Service Zones." While only a name change, this notion of the citizen as customer and the expectation of increasing customer satisfaction, was expressed by several respondents. Responsiveness to community leaders was also a pronounced feature, discussed supra (external accountability). One captain indicated, consistent with our observations of others, that there was a sense of mission in the Department that had never been clearer.

Despite this Departmental focus on crime reduction and customer service, the objectives of Compstat in Surrey were far more focused on organizational development and officers' presentation skills. As our reporter put it, the emphasis was on "process over results," with the expectation that good outcomes would come from a focus on process.

The sense of crime reduction as mission was at least as clear in Nortown as in Mapleton and Surrey. "Now we have a mission. Before we did not." This sentiment expressed by a sector lieutenant was echoed throughout our visit. The mission was, simply put, crime reduction. As

she said, “[Compstat] keeps us focused.” The impact on police practice was reportedly felt immediately when Compstat was introduced. According to the Chief, “The day we started the trap door dropped out.” The major focus has been on aggressive enforcement of misdemeanors, or, as one inspector put it, “paying attention to the small stuff.” For him, as reiterated by a sergeant and two patrol officers, this is essentially “doing police work the old fashioned way.” The sergeant suggested, “In the old days you’d get looked down at if you did misdemeanor enforcement. Now you’re rewarded for it.Before good cops did it, but now mediocre and bad cops are directed to do it too.” As the Chief said, “Aggressive policing is central to [Compstat].”

In Waterville also it was clear that crime reduction was a top priority. When Compstat was first introduced the focus was on homicides, then it moved to other violent crime, then auto theft, and at the time of our site visit it appeared to perhaps be shifting to domestics. Secondly, there was a focus on eradicating corruption. Third, was the theme of paying more attention to the public and what it wants from the police. This service orientation appeared to be secondary to crime reduction, but nonetheless was mentioned throughout our interviews. Indicators include the expectation that district commanders attend neighborhood meetings, and that the Department provide information about crime on its website.

Oldtown’s Compstat program has a definite focus on crime reduction, but the Chief does not support the idea of designating specific benchmarks. The Department’s formal mission statement is featured on the Department’s website and in the Chief’s office, and is signed by all police officers. The statement, however, is very general, and without the focus of some Departments on partnership and responsiveness to citizens; it emphasizes protecting life and property, preventing crime, enhancing quality of life, and safeguarding constitutional rights.

Like Oldtown, the police in Mission have a clear sense that the Department's mission is to decrease crime, but there has been an equally clear decision at the City administration level not to publicize specific reductions. As the Chief indicated, the purpose of Compstat is to make the Department "a proactive Department....every dot [on a crime map] is a victim, and it is our job to reduce victimization." Unlike in Waterville or Nortown, there has been no specific focus on certain types of crime. The Department's formal mission statement is visible in the Department and featured on the Department's website; some officers are familiar with it, others not. Unlike Oldtown's more or less singular focus on public safety, Mission's mission statement emphasizes both community service and safety – highlighting community-oriented services and building problem-solving partnerships with citizens to prevent crime, reduce fear, and enhance the quality of life throughout the community, always treating people with dignity, fairness, and respect.

Crossroad was unique among the large sites in that it had been an early adopter of Compstat that had suspended the program, primarily due to problems with the crime data. With regime changes in the mayor's office and the police Department, whether Compstat would be resumed was not yet known. Because one of our investigators had close knowledge of Crossroad's Compstat program, we visited the site in order to glean Department members' reflections on the impact of Compstat as well as to determine how having had Compstat affected current operations. While we can report on most aspects of strategic problem solving under Crossroad's Compstat program, the more ephemeral element of mission clarification will not be reported retrospectively.

Thus, throughout the large Departments the main emphasis was clearly on crime reduction, in some cases with specific goals, in others more generally. Service to the public was a secondary aspect of the mission in some large Departments, with one Department having a unique emphasis on eliminating corruption.

Geographic Organization of Operational Command

All of the large Departments had implemented geographic organization of operational command to some degree, and some quite radically either Department wide or on an experimental basis in selected districts. In some cases the move in this direction had begun before the introduction of Compstat. Nevertheless, geographic organization of operational command is a critical element of the accountability structure of Compstat.

Mapleton had implemented geographic organization of operational command to a considerable, if uneven, extent. The city is divided into geographic areas, each with a captain in the position of Area Commander. Each area is divided into two districts. Unusually for a large Department, the Areas operate out of headquarters.

One of the Areas had become an experimental Area, with a stronger orientation towards geographic organization. The Area command was temporarily housed in a small station in a shopping center. The Area's two Districts had each been divided into two PSAs, each under the command of a police lieutenant. We were asked not to interview officers in this Area because it was still very much a work in progress.

The Criminal Investigations Division had been decentralized so that each Area has a Lieutenant and a team of investigators with Area responsibility. The C.I.D. Lieutenant plays a

key role in the Compstat meeting. CID handles all crime except homicide, arson and weapons.

Special investigations units for homicide, narcotics and youth are not geographically based.

The Crime Prevention Units (CPUs), which previously operated as more or less independent street narcotics squads, are also decentralized, and now focus on whatever crime problems are identified in their Areas. The Units do not respond to calls for service, so have the flexibility to go where needed, and even change their hours of work to address specific problems in their geographic area. For example, after a large increase in auto theft in one beat was noted at the previous Compstat meeting, and it was established that the incidents were occurring between 9 a.m. and 3 p.m., the Area Captain requested that the CPU temporarily change its working hours from 1 p.m. - 11 p.m. to from 7 a.m. to 5 p.m.

Patrol officers are assigned to beats, but due to high calls for service and high citizen to officer ratio, they do not have much opportunity to become involved in problem solving in their beats. Nevertheless, a young rookie expressed a sense of ownership of his beat. He said that his sergeant provides him with a one-page summary report of activity on his beat, including statistics comparing this year to last. He finds this helpful, as "I don't work every day." The sergeant gives him the numbers, and if he wants to work with them more, he can. That is, he can ask the sergeant. for permission to do surveillance or take on a "project." In the 4 months since graduation, he has not yet spent time on a "project," but he is about to start one with a friend. "You want to be known in the Department for doing something good. It's kind of a competition."

In Surrey, all precinct commanders and investigative managers indicated that they were given considerable latitude to make decisions about operations for which they were responsible,

although the designation of official hot spots was not completely in the purview of the precinct commanders. There has been a gradual move towards decentralization. In the early 1990s, when property detectives were moved into the precincts to work more closely with precinct units, but remained under the command of the centralized Investigations Division. More recently the property detectives were moved to the command of the precinct commanders. Some other specialized units had been decentralized, such as street enforcement and bicycle units, but most remained centralized under the Investigations Division, including the detective division, youth and family crimes, forensics, and organized crime.

In Nortown, there was an ongoing and unrelenting process towards geographic organization of operational command that began even before Compstat. Starting at the top, even the duties of two of the Deputy Chiefs had been redefined geographically. Vice was decentralized and each precinct had a Community Response Team with responsibility for crack (drugs), vice and prostitution. These teams are not tied to the 9-1-1 system. Some organized crime, vice, and gang operations still remain with the centralized Special Investigations division.

Geographic accountability has moved down the ranks from the Precinct Commander in the first two years of Compstat to the Lieutenants at the time of our visit. Lieutenants were now viewed as "the key rank," and the union negotiated a significant pay raise for the rank. The precincts were divided into sectors, with a lieutenant having 24-hour responsibility for each sector. In addition, the same lieutenants are also city-wide watch commanders. The sector responsibility aspect of geographic reorganization remained somewhat controversial at the time of our visit, with the sense that no one was in command when the sector lieutenant was not there, and dissatisfaction with the solution of increasing sergeants' responsibilities.

Geographic responsibility devolved also to the patrol level. Officers indicated they had to “stay in their area more,” and that Compstat “says concentrate on an area and the individuals in that area where crime is occurring.” In fact, in explaining about “sector patrolling,” one patrol officer referred to patrolling outside your sector as “poaching.” While another other officer claimed, “I don’t care what happens when I’m not here,” it is interesting to note that this would have been the norm prior to sector policing, whereas he knew that there was an expectation of geographic ownership that he was defying.

Likewise in Waterville, geographic organization of operational command was an important part of its Compstat approach. With the introduction of Compstat, there was a major reorganization that included transferring most of the criminal investigative and tactical specialists from Headquarters out to the districts. Only cold homicides and sex crimes remained centralized. This gave each district commander control of nearly all field operations in his district, and greatly increased the number of officers under their command. It enabled the district commanders to take charge of problems, viewed as a necessity if they were to be held accountable for crimes in their areas. One captain said that “decentralizing the detective bureau was essential.”

In Oldtown, as in Mapleton, geographic reorganization was underway but was uneven, with one experimental district more fully geographically oriented, again like in Mapleton. There were four geographic districts managed by a captain and an executive officer lieutenant. The District was responsible for patrol operations as well as some investigative functions, overseen by Sergeants. In the pilot district, a geographic accountability program was being implemented, dividing the District geographically into three Sectors. Patrol responsibility in each Sector was

supervised by a Sergeant, making sergeants and patrol officers aware of the accountability and geographic organization of the Department. Many functions were still centralized in Nortown, including robbery/homicide, domestic violence, gang, special operations, and criminal investigations.

Geographic organization of operational command was also an important feature of Mission's Compstat program. The implementation plan was divided into two phases, with the main difference between phases being the extent of decentralization to the substations. They were still in phase one at the time of our visit, but considerable decentralization had already taken place. Property crimes detectives and sergeants had been reassigned to substations under command of the district commanders. Also crime analysts were assigned to substations, with increased training, and a larger role in precinct operations than their predecessor "case analysts." The data entry function had been temporarily handled at the precinct level, although not under the precinct commander's supervision, in an effort to increase the timeliness of the data. Lack of supervision undermined the effort and this function was re-located to headquarters. The phase two plan include placing personnel from the homicide, sex crimes, and possibly family violence units under the command of the geographic subdivisions.

Like the other large Departments, Crossroad's suspended Compstat program had involved a focus on geographic reorganization in order to give the district commanders more resources and more decision-making leeway. Interestingly, the decentralization efforts begun under the previous Chief were continuing despite the suspension of Compstat.

Effective Problem Solving Tactics

The large Compstat Departments did not prove to be particularly innovative in their problem solving tactics, nor especially focused on the use of scientific evidence in developing problem solving tactics. However, at least in some Departments, middle managers reported an increased focus on problem solving under Compstat.

With the focus on aggressive enforcement of Part One crimes, traditional policing using crime analysis and mapping to focus on places and times, has perhaps been the main activity emphasized in Mapleton's Compstat program thus far. However, examples of problem solving were also readily given. Most of these activities were carried out by the crime prevention units; regular patrol officers primarily respond to calls for service. For example, to address a problem of nighttime household burglaries and window smashes, young officers "flyered" the area and recommended CPTED (Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design) solutions. When it was determined that locked auto burglaries were mainly being perpetrated by homeless persons, the solution applied was arresting those under the influence and also enforcement of shopping cart theft. For a problem of daytime burglars they looked for truancy and used the truancy center. Earlier the example of re-arranging shifts to address auto thefts was mentioned. That strategy also involved saturating the area, focusing on a certain make and model, and serving juvenile arrest warrants. A problem solving unit primarily focused on code enforcement citywide has been in existence for over a decade. The Unit was somewhat diminished until its original sergeant was returned to the position by the new Chief who also implemented Compstat.

In Surrey, one captain provided examples of effective "problem-solving" that they associated with Compstat, finding that with Compstat, "You look for a long term solution.

There's not hiding." This captain described recognizing a persistent seasonal problem in a park area, saying, "Compstat focused us on the need to do something proactive and systematic... We documented our efforts much better." The captain and executive lieutenant involved officers from several different units in taking "ownership of the problem," and solicited support from the officers regularly working in the area. All the officers involved were encouraged to discuss the pros and cons of previous efforts to deal with the recurring problem, and the bike unit and selective enforcement unit changed their schedules to work weekends. A follow-up assessment was planned in the second year. Another captain felt that Compstat was "a reporting process for our successes, our known problems." He felt it was not then being used to identify problems and plan for their solution. He noted that Compstat was intended to be a problem-solving enterprise but had not really been used that way. He and his lieutenant planned to make problem-solving a reality in their precinct, which he felt was consistent with the Chief's effort to try to evolve Compstat toward problem-solving.

Several respondents in Surrey mentioned that problem solving ideas are communicated in the Compstat meeting process, and later applied in their own districts. They gave the example from the meeting we attended of an officer who had originated an idea of using people convicted of minor offenses for community service projects such as cleaning up trash in downtown areas wearing jailhouse garb. We noted that the Captains had presented a range of problem-solving activities during the Compstat meeting, but felt that the meeting was designed for us and was not typical of regular meetings. Others indicated that after years of Departmental isolation, there was an increasing emphasis on seeking information beyond the Department whether through site visits, through the internet, or through the encouragement of advanced education for command

staff. Nevertheless, according to several interviewees (but by no means all of them), Compstat has not yet been effectively used as a problem-solving method in Surrey.

Nortown had a strong emphasis on problem solving before introducing Compstat, but reportedly Compstat made “the biggest difference.” One senior official described a new emphasis on Department-wide solutions. For example, the Department is working with a local office of a national industry to create a recreational facility for children. Another citywide example was addressing a truancy problem by creating a program of in-school supervision for truants involving law enforcement. Lower level officers also reported this sense of the importance of problem solving. As one sergeant said, “Compstat has made the Department more problem solving oriented.” He went on to say that he thinks they do “more problem oriented policing than community oriented policing.”

It is no accident that the problem the Chief of Nortown chose to describe as the problem that had consumed more of the Department’s efforts than another other in the last 12 months (in responding to our national survey) was “downtown disorder at late night entertainment closing time.” This is representative of the clear emphasis on addressing quality of life offenses, and the complete integration of broken windows theory into policing in Nortown.

One much discussed but not fully implemented strategy in Nortown has been “debriefing,” with the idea that an arrested suspect may have knowledge of other offenses and offenders and be willing to divulge that information. A sergeant suggested that one problem with the debriefing idea is a practical one: there is no place at the jail to conduct debriefing, and bringing the suspect back to the precinct carries other problems of transporting the suspect, etc. Another weekly strategy is the “Top 10 List.” Each precinct creates a list not of its most serious

offenders, but of those who have repeatedly been involved with the police. This might include probationers and parolees. Officers are expected to focus attention on those individuals.

Directed patrol has been implemented. Each week officers are directed where to focus their efforts during down time when not responding to calls.

Captains in Waterville also described a range of problem solving activities including an effort to address auto theft and theft from autos that revealed that there were many false reports of stolen property. Ideas are developed in staff meetings, or in conversation, much as they had been before the introduction of Compstat, although with some increase in soliciting ideas from subordinates and from peers outside the Department. Occasional reference was made to reading about a solution, but no systematic use of scientific evidence was found in any of the sites.

Oldtown used traditional police tactics such as buy-bust operations to address complaints about drug activity and extra patrol in targeted areas. However, some more unusual problem-solving tactics were also described. In at least one District, an emphasis has been placed on debriefing arrestees to find out what they know about other crimes and other perpetrators. In this district, one detective cleared 51 cases in a month, for which he was commended at a Compstat meeting. Some Districts have created walking posts that put officers out on foot in a very small defined area, usually in a commercial district. The Department also seemed to be active in working in collaboration with other agencies (ATF, FBI, probation, health Department) as well as forging productive relationships with the community.

Problem solving strategies in Waterville seemed to be selected based primarily on what has previously been done in the Department, rather than through analysis and investigation of

what might work. There was little interest in innovation, and the Compstat meeting did not encourage innovative problem solving.

A number of approaches to problem solving developed during Crossroad's Compstat period and earlier had been institutionalized and continued during the hiatus we observed. One early innovation was the district criminologists introduced by an academic adviser some years earlier. There is also the continued involvement of a policy research institute, a "residue" of the Compstat program. In addition, neighborhood resident surveys also conducted by academics, have continued. "We thought the problems were gangs, but the surveys showed that it was quality-of-life problems."

Organizational Flexibility

Compstat and geographic organization of operational command has both increased the possibility of organizational flexibility and paradoxically increased competition between geographic units, which operates against that flexibility except with the direction of the Chief or other central command figures.

In Mapleton, we were told that moving criminal investigations and crime prevention units into the Areas has increased organizational flexibility. We noted that the crime prevention units were willing and able to change their schedules in order to better address problems based on crime data analysis. Decisions to move officers between Areas would be made by the Deputy Chief if at the Compstat meeting there appears to be a big problem in one Area. However, we observed in Mapleton, as elsewhere, that Compstat fostered competitiveness between district commanders, thus decreasing rather than increasing their inclination to share resources. As one district captain bluntly said, "Is it competitive - YES - very competitive. Don't ask me if I've

helped [another district]. How the restructuring going on in the experimental Area would affect organizational flexibility was not yet known at the time of our site visit.

In Surrey, hot spot analysis and Blitz to Bloom projects seem to be the principal processes through which Compstat worked to strategically concentrate resources on problems. Our sense was that crime analysts were used less for problem solving and more to dig out information once an operational decision maker had decided that a place or a person is a problem. This was consistent with the way hot spots were designated in part by community leaders. All of the precinct commanders mentioned that having an area designated a hot spot was a powerful way to get extra resources to handle problems. The captain of the small downtown precinct said that they increase flexibility by canceling days off and requesting volunteers. They will sometimes call on special operations, rarely borrow from other precincts, though they might sometimes cover each other on calls. The investigations group indicated that they try to be responsive to requests, but they can't always fulfill them because of the need to establish priorities.

In Nortown the centralized special investigations division and central investigations division are required to report at the Compstat meeting to give the message to the precincts of their "being available to the precincts." However, this availability was not apparent in the meeting we attended. Flexibility is being addressed more through decentralization. For example, robbery, formerly part of CID, was recently decentralized to the precincts.

The creation of the CRT teams in each precinct has had a distinct effect in terms of their flexibility within their precincts, or as one Inspector put it, "the fluidity of resources." The Chief indicated that precincts give up their CRTs to help one another, but only the deputy Chiefs

actually have the authority to move them between precincts. A lieutenant reported that sharing officers between precincts is much more infrequent than within a precinct, and is planned well in advance. An inspector gave an example of this kind of planned between-precinct sharing from the previous summer when the Downtown Command needed assistance from every precinct and the watch commander called designated response cars to assist as needed. But he pointed out that this flexibility actually developed several years before the introduction of Compstat, after an incident of a mini-riot. Prior to that incident, there were “giant walls between precincts” and “no cooperation.” Several sector lieutenants indicated that the creation of sectors made lieutenants competitive with each other, and thus reluctant to share resources between sectors even in the same precinct. There was also concern that a sector lieutenant with a city wide watch command may not take resources from his sector as readily when they were needed in another area.

In Waterville, the size of each District Commander’s sworn force was dramatically increased with the Compstat reform. DC’s are given great discretion in how they use their officers; this is the principal means available to them to use their forces strategically. They are also encouraged to have their first-line supervisors take greater initiative in guiding and directing patrol officers’ use of their free time. DC’s felt that asking the Chief for additional resources had little chance of success, since he had his own priorities.

The Captains were very involved with the crime data (infra) and shifted resources as needed. As one said, “We adjust to crime hourly, and they keep me posted, so we can shift resources immediately.” When asked for an example of how he was able to concentrate resources to deal with an emerging problem, he noted that there had been a recent surge in auto burglaries in his district. “Within 30 hours we took our task force (14 officers) and used them.

We also used uniform officers.” Patrol officers do much more directed patrol. And each district is allocated a large number of overtime hours. If officers on overtime don’t show activity, then the Captain doesn’t give them any more overtime. Priorities are set based on vocal citizens and “the obvious things that we see.” “I rob Peter to pay Paul.” By this he meant that he was constantly shifting resources from one worthy task to another, trying to keep the lid on things and show that he was on top of it, but that there was an obvious cost because he couldn’t maintain focused resources on a given problem. This increased flexibility may, in other words, be no more effective than when the reactivity was at the patrol officer level. The question is whether they stay focused long enough on a given problem to be of any real benefit in terms of long term problem reduction.

Organization flexibility in Nortown seemed mainly to be as directed by the Chief. No Captains expressed ease of securing additional resources or personnel if they felt it was needed, but in the Compstat meeting the Chief specified people from different units to accomplish certain tasks. For example, regarding a neighborhood that had been experiencing an increase in robberies, the Chief asked the Captain if there had been any community input, because it is likely that someone in the community knows something about the offenders. The Captain reported that the community group there was quite weak, so the Chief suggested that the district captain and the sergeant in community affairs get together and work to establish a strong tenants association group that meets on a monthly basis. Both the community affairs sergeant and the district captain indicated this cooperation could not have been accomplished without the direction of the Chief.

In Mission, many respondents reported that resources had always been shifted around quite easily, even before Compstat. Since Compstat there is more emphasis on communication

and collaboration and some felt it was somewhat easier to obtain assistance from special units based at headquarters, but that this has never been a problem in the Department. However, their examples were all regarding precinct commanders calling on centralized units such as the gang unit or special operations. One precinct Captain reported that since Compstat, assistance can usually be obtained by a phone call. In one case, a phone call led to a small staff of SOU assigned to the Substation target area for a period of three weeks. While it is unclear whether Compstat has enhanced this cooperation, one captain suggested that the information generated by Compstat makes it easier to identify problem areas and therefore it is easier for commanders to justify their need for extra manpower. If aid is not forthcoming, a call is placed to the Deputy Chief. One captain also reported having some leeway about switching officers to and from undercover positions.

In Crossroad the Chief indicated it had been and continues to be difficult to have enough resource flexibility to go after problems as they arose. . They do use overtime, especially in the summer to increase flexibility. However, the officers' work schedule (6 days on, 3 days off) makes it difficult to be flexible. They also assigns officers to shifts according to seniority. The middle shift is loaded with young officers, but they're too busy to do extra things. When a district commander he tried to deal with the intransigence of the Department's structure by giving the community a say in who got selected to do community policing jobs. He said that there was a competition for these jobs between two types of people: those who wanted the desirable work times (usually the more senior people) and those who actually wanted to do the job. By bringing the community in, he was able to circumvent the seniority bid system and the community interviewed the officers and selected those who seemed most motivated to do

community policing & problem solving. He also supported the Department's efforts to decentralize (begun under the previous Chief who introduced Compstat), giving district commanders more resources and more decision-making leeway.

Internal Accountability

Perhaps next to the crime reduction mission, internal accountability has been the key element of the Compstat strategy in large departments.

In Mapleton, the district captains take the Compstat process with utmost seriousness, and it is clear that they feel considerable pressure both to have reduced crime in their Area and to be knowledgeable about specific incidents that have occurred. As one overworked Captain said, "[Compstat] drives the job." It seemed also that the shakeup that accompanied the appointment of the new Chief and deputy Chiefs was still being felt among the command staff. This same pressure could not be said to have penetrated further into the organization in the form of pressure to perform, but there was a more focused sense of mission.

From the Chief down to the rank and file, police in Surrey viewed Compstat as an "accountability tool" For the Chief, it is a way of forcing commanders and their subordinates to learn more about what is going on in the parts of the Department and community that are their responsibility. Middle management also emphasized that Compstat heightened accountability within the organization. This was seen as both its purpose and its effect. One captain said that accountability is key to current operations. "You don't tell the Chief about a problem and then ask him what to do, or just provide some plans about what you're going to do.... you'd better be prepared to tell him what you're doing *now*." "Accountability here has increased almost 200% due to Compstat." As in Mapleton, some captains found the pressure of Compstat takes "a great

personal toll.” The Chief had apparently used Compstat to get some middle managers to take early retirement or change Departments. One remaining captain in Surrey was likely to join them.

Accountability for crime reductions seemed to have pervaded the culture of policing in Nortown. While initially the pressure was particularly placed on precinct commanders, there was now a sense of the pressure point being shared at the level of CRT and Sector lieutenants. As one Inspector said, accountability is a big part of Compstat. Precinct commanders were convinced that they are responsible; now the precinct commanders are getting better at “pushing the responsibility” downwards. The Chief pointed out that Nortown was small enough that every precinct commander is held accountable each week. He described the process as less adversarial than New York, as a “more cooperative learning environment.” He indicated that although there were some transfers at the beginning, “we had good commanders.” In fact, through attrition, he has replaced three of the five precinct commanders. In other words, he gently but definitely altered the command staff. Although the two deputy Chiefs remain, the Chief did not disagree with a suggestion by the Compstat commander that they are “not so important.”

As one sergeant put it, Compstat puts pressure on the inspectors to do something, but it also “trickles down to street supervisors and the patrol corps that it is important to be in the right place at the right time.” A day or two before the Compstat meeting, he notices that “the boss is getting nervous,” both the lieutenant and the inspector. She will start asking, “What problems have you solved this week?” and will email the sergeant again before the meeting.

In Waterville, more than any other element of strategic problem solving, internal accountability was volunteered most often and most intensively as the signature feature of

Waterville's Compstat, along with the sense that before Compstat there was no accountability. After Compstat, several district commanders were replaced by people the top command felt would be real "problem solvers." There seemed to be a general consensus that internal accountability had been established most strongly between the top brass and district commanders, although the emergence of District Compstat meetings meant that it was trickling down to 1st line supervisors and detectives. There was greater variation about the extent to which it had filtered down to the rank and file. For the most part, it appears that because the average patrol officer does not attend a Compstat meeting, he would probably not be able to see how his job had changed due to Compstat (e.g., greater direction from supervisor on how free time is spent). One interviewee felt that this would be the next step in institutionalizing Compstat – to make rank and file more aware of and responsive to the needs of fulfilling their role in internal accountability.

In Oldtown as elsewhere among the large Departments, accountability was one of the first elements of Compstat that was mentioned by all police personnel. It was clearly a main feature of the Compstat meeting we observed. As the Chief said, "Compstat may not really be responsible for bringing down the crime numbers, but it definitely is responsible for making people more accountable." The Captains know that they and their Executive Officers must stand up there and be able to answer all of the questions that are posed by the brass. In the District which has implemented the geographic accountability program, they planned to bring accountability down another level by having the Sector commanders responsible for delivering some of the information at the Compstat meeting.

After interviewing many Department personnel in Mission, it was clear that accountability was the first thing they thought of when asked about Compstat. Nevertheless, there was a conscience rejection of New York's "adversarial model," both due to the Chief's inclination and the police union. Further, the Chief has not set any specific goals or targets for the Department, and at no level in the hierarchy does there seem to be the possibility of incurring any punishment such as demotion. The threat of transfer to a less desirable or career building post was, however, a real possibility. The Captain from Research and Planning refers to undesirable posts as "Siberia" and a substation Captain refers to them as "dog houses." The Chief implied, however, that once the decentralization plan is complete, and Service Area commanders have the full compliment of resources he considers necessary for them to do their jobs, then he will hold them accountable. At present, as mentioned above, the decentralization is only partially complete so commanders do not yet have the full constellation of resources at their disposal. Meanwhile, commanders do express dread about the Compstat meetings and about the likelihood of "getting hammered" at them, although this does not seem to occur at the Mission meetings.

In Crossroad, Compstat was remembered for putting pressure on the district commanders to deal with problem areas. However, reportedly nobody felt that they'd lose their job over a poor Compstat performance, and crime was going down anyway. All district commanders were expected to stand up and be held accountable for whatever was on the Chief's mind. The Chief who introduced Compstat wanted the process to be adversarial, to hold the DC's feet to the flames. Many people said the Chief often selected one obscure case among some 1200, seeming to want to play "gotcha!" looking for something that a commander did not know or could not

account for. Eventually the lack of timely data interfered, the meetings were diluted and floundered.

Internal accountability was a prominent feature of Compstat in the large Departments, as understood throughout the Departments at all levels, and as felt often quite heavily by some of those held accountable for their areas. In most Departments the consequence of poor performance took the form of embarrassment, for some retirement was encouraged. We note that though the Compstat meetings themselves vary considerably -- some seem to emphasize performance and reporting of past successes rather than ongoing analysis of current crime and order problems -- nevertheless, the emphasis on performing well, especially on being knowledgeable about crime in your area, was palpably felt by all who are called on to report and those who support them.

External Accountability

Perhaps the most varied element among the large Departments was the emphasis on and role of external accountability.

The mayor played a large role in the development of Compstat in Mapleton and continued his involvement after it was fully introduced. His focus on reducing Part 1 crimes drove much of the focus of Compstat up to the time of our site visit. The expanded crime analysis unit (infra #7) provides daily reports to the mayor and city manager, as well as responding to phone request from city council, the mayor, vice mayor and city manger. However, Compstat had not been publicized in the community and, though there was been some talk of inviting the media, this had not yet occurred. City leadership took the decision that they were not yet ready for public comments on Compstat. The deputy Chief who runs the Compstat

meetings expressed a “sense that citizen complaints are increasing,”complaining mainly about rude conduct, which he attributed to the increased enforcement associated with Compstat.

In Surrey, Compstat is seen as an effective new channel to deliver mass communications to the public directly (unmediated by the press), through the increased emphasis on presentation technology and skills. Presentations developed for the Compstat meetings are repackaged for delivery at public meetings. Compstat is viewed by middle and top management as an effective way to communicate with the public, to keep them informed, to shape their view of the Department, and to help mobilize their support. There is a tradition of paying much attention to city council members’ requests and concerns on behalf of their constituents in Surrey, and Compstat has been a continuation of that concern.

Whereas citizens of Mapleton and Surrey are unlikely to have heard of Compstat in their cities, in Nortown they are quite likely to have heard of their local version. When Compstat was being developed in Nortown, over 70 meetings were held with stakeholders in the community and the criminal justice system, and 7 workgroups were established. Reportedly community outreach was an important and difficult part of the process, and several interviewees pointed to the 70 meetings as an indicator of how they worked to bring the community along. At a conference we attended in Nortown not directly related to this research, the Mayor spoke of the success of Compstat [by the local acronym] as if it were clearly widely known in the city. The Chief stated that “the political side [of Compstat] is important” and explained that the Department produces an annual Compstat “report card” for the public. The Chief also explained that precinct commanders work directly with council members, who are provided weekly bulletins). Nortown has put in place an audit and IAD Compstat.

Aggressive policing is central to Compstat in Nortown, and the Chief suggested accusations of “heavy-handedness” may have been warranted in the first year. Nevertheless, the Chief stated they are not lowering the bar of acceptable conduct; they have changed their ethics training, and the Chief now teaches the ethics class in the academy in order to emphasize its importance. Interviews indicate there has been some tension in the Department’s relations with the minority community that has to some extent focused on the adoption of Compstat. The lieutenant in charge of the program indicated that directed patrol has helped alleviate the problem, as now officers are addressing defined problems rather than “hanging out or picking on people.” Although we do not want to make more of this issue than warranted (of which we have no independent knowledge), we raise it because it was frequently raised by those interviewed. It is interesting to note the extent to which the Department involved the community from the planning stages. One could suggest that this strategy may have backfired. However, it is more likely that the reason for involving the community to this extent from the outset was related to the history of police/minority community relations in Nortown.

Two city attorneys, the county attorney, and the Chief probation officers attend Nortown’s Compstat meetings. Top managers spoke of the Department’s crime prevention “partnership” with the county attorney.

In Waterville, a local organization fashioned after New York City’s police foundation is a powerful source of external accountability. Its executive director (and perhaps to a lesser extent the volunteers) learns what is going on in the Department and communicates to its members, while at the same time communicating the membership’s preferences to the Department.

District Commanders are expected to undertake efforts to work with community groups, according to the Chief. One district commander indicated that Compstat had increased communication with the public. “We need to tell them what’s going on in the District (in terms of crimes and police activities). Now we have credibility, and they have access to figures about crime from the internet. They can also call us or city hall. We keep them advised of what is going on.” Another captain indicated that he talks to neighborhood people and knows that their attitude about crime and the police are now very positive, whereas before Compstat they were negative. He also indicated that he tries to keep the same officer on the beat, not only to hold the officer accountable for what goes on in that zone, but to help the community and the officer get to know each other better. He also said that an important source of information in establishing priorities are the major concerns of vocal citizens. The Chief stated that Compstat not only serves as an effective way to shape the public’s view of the Department, it also keeps the district commander better informed and more successful in communicating with the public.

External accountability was not a major focus of Compstat in Oldtown. However, in one District, the Captain decided to make working with other agencies and community groups a goal; he convinced some of the local community papers (in various languages) to allow him some space for a weekly police column. Another Captain specifically mentioned that one thing that is lacking from the Compstat process is the presence or contribution of councilpersons or community groups at the meeting. Apparently poor relations between the Department and the local newspaper of record mean that even good news like dramatically lower crime rates is not widely publicized.

Accountability to the community is an important feature of policing in Mission, although it is not an explicit component of their version of Compstat. According to the Chief, while the Department at all levels has a stronger relationship with the community than ever before, there reportedly has been a history of good relations with the community. A community policing unit that regularly attends neighborhood meetings exists independently of Compstat.

Space permitting, neighborhood groups are welcome to attend Compstat meetings in Mission, a relatively uncommon feature in our experience. Still it remained unclear what role Compstat plays in the Department's relationship with the community, or what role the community plays in Compstat.

Overall, the element of external accountability was a mixed bag in the large Departments. In some Departments, Compstat was a piece of a focus on communication with the community, a way of providing better information to the public than was previously available. In two Departments it led to some concern about heavy-handed police tactics. In several Departments the mayor or city council were integrally associated with the Compstat process. A few Departments invite other criminal justice agents (probation, prosecution) to attend, and some occasionally invite community groups.

Data-Driven Analysis

Whereas crime data was relatively low tech in the small and medium Departments, whether or not they had a Comsptat program, in the large Departments there has been a clear emphasis on improving the quality and timeliness of crime data. The one large Department that had not achieved what it wanted in this area is the Department that suspended its Compstat

program. Nevertheless, while data were presented in the Compstat meetings, it was not clear that this increase in data had led to an increase in the use of crime analysis in policing.

In Mapleton, for example, the importance of crime analysis in the Department has clearly grown, as symbolized in its relocation from the basement to the top floor of headquarters, with large windows and a commanding view of the city. Next door is the room in which the Compstat meetings are held. This too symbolizes the importance of crime analysis in the process, and also proves functional at times when quick data analyses are requested during the meeting. The Unit has received "great help" from another department in the state known for its strength in crime analysis.

The crime analysis unit is relatively large, consisting of a sergeant, 5 (sometimes 6) full time sworn officers who were in the process of becoming certified crime analysts, 5 civilian crime analysts, 3 police record specialists, and 1 management analyst. Four of the officers in the crime analysis unit are directly assigned to Compstat. One is assigned to each district, and one to the deputy chief responsible for Compstat.

According to some reports, data now "drives the work" in the districts, and is the focus of the Compstat meeting. Crime maps and crime reports are studied by the district commanders and the deputy chief who runs the meetings. The crime analysis unit produces clear reports. For some reason, much data that could more easily be read on maps is produced in tabular form. Maps that are produced are plotter size and while well produced, are cumbersome for the captains and lieutenants to work with. Also, if smaller maps were produced there would be more opportunity for others than the command staff to use them (as in some other sites).

A CPU sergeant noted that he likes the maps for seeing patterns. If there's a pattern, we'll work on it, because patrol is spread so thin. They can work on it for a few hours, but not on a constant basis." A patrol sergeant said that though he has never attended a meeting, after every meeting his lieutenant and captain tell them about the crime trends and where to focus resources. Also, at the beginning of each week, he examines a report of crime statistics for the beat, suspects, year to date stats. He makes himself a copy of the report both so that he can focus on those activities and times when he has free time, and for self-protection.

In Surrey, data did not seem to drive the work of the precincts. Hot spots were not chosen based on data analysis, and reporting in the Compstat meeting we observed was about individual cases rather than crime trends or data analysis. The emphasis technologically was on video (and some audio) power point presentations, not using crime mapping or other tools for analyzing trends and patterns.

In Nortown, there were some indications that the data produced by the Compstat unit and the data available at the precinct level are being used to do policing. As one sergeant said, with the computers, knowledge of times and locations of crimes, whether they are doing surveillance or saturation or whatever they are doing, I think we are "doing a better job." The inspector or his lieutenant use the data to select the problem, and "I do more of the problem solving." Compstat was built with Mapinfo which the crime analysts say takes a sophisticated user. Each precinct has one person, sworn or civilian who can use it. A proprietary software has also been developed for use throughout the department. It was installed in 50 -60 computers at the time of our visit, about a quarter of the workstations in the department, and takes only 5 minutes of instruction to use. One sector lieutenant reported "pulling up maps' regularly in order to gauge

whether crime is down in the area, but not necessarily to analyze and develop strategies. An otherwise skeptical patrol officer remarked that “there is better information available” now, and he is informed about what happened in the last shift, which was not previously done. Data were used thus at the operations level; at the Compstat meeting, crime maps and crime data are displayed, but mainly with the intention of reporting and comparing to other time periods, rather than analysis.

In Waterville, the district commanders and their lieutenants and sergeants seemed to be constantly swimming in data and concerns about data – generating reports and being able to identify and account for trends. However, much of their time was spent merely being updated on what was going on with individual cases and being able to brief the top command on this. There seemed to be a greater emphasis on this “case focus,” but it is undoubtedly the case that captains’ level of interest and concern about crime trends and patterns now is far greater than it was before Compstat was implemented. The nature of the data focus is on short term trends with most of the emphasis on traditional crime categories, looking for substantial changes over that short period.

An observation our researcher made in Waterville applied to most large sites – There is at least some sense in which the wealth of maps and charts creates a kind of guessing game in which the DC’s job is to try to figure out what the Chief will focus on in the Compstat meeting.

In Oldtown, they use a great deal of data in their Comstat process. In the meeting, they show many different charts, graphs, and maps. Examples include crime by day of week, crime by time of day, total crime, individual crimes [robberies, violent crimes (sexual assaults, aggravated assaults), burglaries, thefts, auto thefts and recoveries, and quality of life complaints (narcotics,

panhandling, traffic)] and general performance measures, such as response time and internal affairs complaints. Most of the data is incident based, although they also briefly look at some other data, including response time and calls for service. A striking aspect about the data in Oldtown compared to other departments visited was the confidence in the accuracy of the data. The Captains were completely aware of the incident reports and would immediately deal with the Lieutenant or Sergeants if there were any problems or inconsistencies. An example included an incident that occurred at a location in which the Captain knew he had a walking post which should have been manned at the time of the incident. The Captain checked with the Lieutenant who informed him that the officer was in court at the incident time. This information allows the Captain to shift things around so that the next time a walking post officer needs to be away from the post for something like court, the Captain can make sure that the post is covered. This information and the development of the Captain's future protocol may never have been developed if he didn't keep such great tabs on the information. Another check on the data involves Internal Affairs. The Internal Affairs officers must report what activities they perform in order to ensure accurate data. Some of these activities include checking officers' log sheets with the dispatch log, doing citizen satisfaction surveys, and pulling random reports to make sure that they are complete and accurate.

Data is a central feature of Mission's Compstat program; however, the use of data for actual strategy development seemed to be basic and infrequently led to changes in resource deployment. The Chief considered "timely and accurate intelligence and evaluation and analysis" a central element of Compstat. The Compstat process is geared toward synthesizing data by specific crime type and patrol area and requiring commanders to have a thorough

comprehension of specific crimes and crime patterns in their commands. Each week the unit in charge of Compstat meeting preparations produces a book containing city-wide and service area specific maps for each crime type that show locations of all crimes that have occurred in the previous 28 day period and for the previous seven day period as well as some summary statistics on each crime including share of each crime by service area and comparison to percent change from 1999 to YTD 2000. Research and Planning reports that they now have access to accurate, timely, and accessible crime data and that until Compstat "no one had every tried to use these data before." In preparing for the Compstat meeting, the captain sits with the crime analyst and "we look for relationships between cases, and where there aren't any, we move on." But the preparation is geared at becoming knowledgeable about and responding to questions about crime in the service area, rather than to developing strategies or problem-solve. At least one patrol officer felt favorably about the Crime Analyst being in the precinct and about having maps in the in the roll-call rooms, although he allowed that the utility of these resources depended on officers taking their own initiative to use them. He reported that overall there is more emphasis on sharing of information than there has been in the past. A sergeant said the increased data "really helps him to link crimes." And that "communication is much improved."

In Crossroad data problems contributed to the demise of the Compstat program. Nevertheless, our observations suggest that despite significant improvements in data technology and timely information in many departments, the result has been to some extent to focus on memorizing the data and comparing results over time or between areas rather than devising ways to make use of the data in deploying officers and solving problems, and analyzing the effectiveness of the strategies implemented.

Conclusion

Throughout the large Departments the main emphasis was clearly on crime reduction, in some cases with specific goals, in others more generally. Service to the public was a secondary aspect of the mission in some large Departments, with one Department having a unique emphasis on eliminating corruption.

All of the large Departments had implemented geographic organization of operational command to some degree, and some quite radically either Department wide or on an experimental basis in selected districts. In some cases the move in this direction had begun before the introduction of Compstat. Nevertheless, geographic organization of operational command is a critical element of the accountability structure of Compstat.

The large Compstat Departments did not prove to be particularly innovative in their problem solving tactics, nor especially focused on the use of scientific evidence in developing problem solving tactics. However, at least in some Departments, middle managers reported an increased focus on problem solving under Compstat.

Compstat and geographic organization of operational command has both increased the possibility of organizational flexibility and paradoxically increased competition between geographic units, which operates against that flexibility except with the direction of the Chief or other central command figures.

Perhaps next to the crime reduction mission, internal accountability has been the key element of the Compstat strategy in large departments.

Perhaps the most varied element among the large Departments was the emphasis on and role of external accountability.

Whereas crime data was relatively low tech in the small and medium Departments, whether or not they had a Comstat program, in the large Departments there has been a clear emphasis on improving the quality and timeliness of crime data. The one large Department that had not achieved what it wanted in this area is the Department that suspended its Compstat program. Nevertheless, while data were presented in the Compstat meetings, it was not clear that this increase in data had led to an increase in the use of crime analysis in policing.

VI. Discussion and Conclusions

This report focuses on fifteen departments in some considerable detail, and compares their implementation of Compstat and strategic problem solving. In addition to reinforcing findings and conclusions of our other reports, this method also leads to conclusions that have practical implications for other departments interested in whether and how to implement the elements of Compstat and strategic problem solving.

We find that the most important distinctions among Departments engaged in Compstat and strategic problem solving are not found in how they are organized geographically or the level of information technology available or other elements of Compstat, or even whether they have explicitly adopted a Compstat-like program. The most important distinction is that of size.

Those cities with over 500 sworn officers that have undertaken Compstat programs are arguably more surprising in the similarities of their programs than in the differences, despite interesting variations and ranges of implementation. Whether these cities have high or low crime rates, and whatever their technological level, there are striking similarities in (1) their focus on crime reduction; (2) the extent to which they have implemented geographic organization of

operational command; (3) the emphasis on holding middle managers accountable for knowledge about crime in their areas often without achieving real accountability for solving crime problems; (4) lack of emphasis on effective problem solving tactics and (5) similarly weak emphasis on organizational flexibility. These findings provide further support to our conclusions in our companion reports (Weisburd et al. 2001; Willis et al 2003), and in a related article (Weisburd et al, forthcoming 2003), that “Compstat refines and reinforces traditional structures of policing” (Weisburd et al. 2001).

Those small cities with 50-100 officers that are committed to strategic problem solving are almost interchangeable in important aspects of their approaches despite huge variation in the kind of communities served and the availability of crime data. While they have not implemented formal Compstat programs, they have been successful in adopting many of the elements of strategic problem solving. Small departments do not have the same concerns about accountability as large departments, as their operations are more transparent. Nevertheless, they have adopted geographic organization of operational command that has strengthened the external accountability structure as well as internal accountability. These departments have been innovative and focused in developing effective problem solving tactics. They perhaps demonstrate that while Compstat has served to reinforce traditional structures of policing in larger departments while not encouraging innovation, innovation is more easily adopted without challenging traditional control structures in small departments. In vastly different small departments, elements of strategic problem solving have been and can be implemented successfully without adopting Compstat. As the Chief of one of the small departments told us, introducing Compstat into Chestnutville would be “creating a cannon to swat a fly.” While his

comment was meant to address mainly the low rate of serious crime in his community, the same sense of the inappropriateness of Compstat could be deduced from the other small department, Clarktown, with its more serious crime problems.

In the medium range, we find some departments behaving more like the small Departments, others that are more like the large departments. Overall, implementation of Compstat was not as successful, in the sense of being not as complete, in the medium departments. Because one of the three departments we selected for intensive site visits was one of the medium size Compstat departments, we know that they were moving towards less frequent Compstat meetings. We also know that two other departments we originally selected for short site visits had similar experiences. One was meeting so infrequently that we were unable to find a time over several months to schedule a visit; another had at least temporarily suspended its program. This may mean that Compstat adapted for medium departments may entail less frequent than weekly meetings. Or it may suggest that Compstat is less suited for many medium departments as a means for adopting elements of strategic problem solving than it is for large departments, that medium departments may well look to the small departments that have focused on problem solving and geographic organization without adopting Compstat.

Medium size departments tended to share with the large departments a focus on crime reduction. They varied considerably in their implementation of geographic organization of operational command. Organizational flexibility interacted with geographic organization in complex ways. Medium departments ranged widely in their emphasis on internal accountability. They generally had greater emphasis on innovative and effective problem solving tactics than the large departments, though they did not show the same commitment in

this area as the small departments. Importantly, the most Compstat-like department was less focused on innovative strategies. Thus it would seem that the tension we find in general between the possibility for innovation and Compstat's tendency to reinforce traditional structures extends not only to large departments but also to medium departments.

The conclusions of this report should be somewhat encouraging to Departments that have not developed in these directions but would like to. For it means that a great deal can be learned from other cities in their size range that have developed to a greater extent the norms and structures of strategic problem solving. Programs can be adapted successfully to different places with differing profiles and problems. The more difficult question is whether departments interested in increasing implementation of the elements of strategic problem solving will achieve this best through adoption of Compstat. The answer may vary in part in relation to the size of the department concerned.

VII. References

- Bratton, William. 1998. *Turnaround: How America's Top Cop Reversed the Crime Epidemic*. New York: Random House.
- Goldstein, Herman. 1990. *Problem-Oriented Policing*. New York: McGraw-Hill.
- Gurwitt, Rob. 1998. "The Comeback of the Cops." *Governing* January:14-19.
- Kelling, George L. and Mark H. Moore. 1988. "From Political to Reform to Community: The Evolving Strategy of Police." In Jack R. Greene and Stephen D. Mastrofski, eds., *Community Policing: Rhetoric or Reality*, pp. 3-25. New York: Praeger.
- Law Enforcement News. 1997. "NYC's Compstat Continues to Win Admirers." October 13:5.
- Maas, Peter. 1998. "What We're Learning from New York City." *Parade* May 10:4-6.
- Maple, Jack. 1999. *The Crime Fighter: Putting the Bad Guys Out of Business*. New York, NY: Doubleday.
- Mastrofski, Stephen D. 2000. "Measuring Police Organization Implementation of Strategic Problem Solving." Memo on file at the Police Foundation. January 26.
- McDonald, Phyllis Parshall. 1998. *The New York City Crime Control Model: A Guide to Implementation*. Unpublished manuscript. Washington, DC.
- McDonald, Phyllis Parshall. 2001. *Managing Police Operations: Implementing the New York Crime Control Model – Compstat*.
- Micklethwait, John and Adrian Wooldridge. 1996. *The Witch Doctors: Making Sense of the Management Gurus*. New York: Random House.
- Moore, Mark H. and Darrel W. Stephens. 1991. *Beyond Command and Control: The Strategic Management of Police Departments*. Washington, DC: Police Executive Research Forum.
- Office of Management Analysis and Planning. No Date. "The Compstat Process." New York City: New York City Police Department.
- Police Foundation. 2000. *Problem-Solving Case Studies: A Selection of the Best Problem-solving Strategies Implemented by the New England Police Consortium Developed by the Police Foundation May 2000*
- Remnick, David. 1997. "The Crime Buster." *The New Yorker* February 24 & March 3:94-109.

- Scott, Michael S. 2000. *Problem-Oriented Policing: Reflections on the First 20 Years*. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services.
- Silverman, Eli B. 1999. *NYPD Battles Crime: Innovative Strategies in Policing*. Boston, MA: Northeastern University Press.
- Walsh, William F. 2001. "Compstat: An Analysis of an Emerging Police Management Paradigm." *Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies and Management* 24(3): 347-362.
- Weisburd, David, Rosann Greenspan and Stephen Mastrofski. 1998. *Compstat and Organizational Change: A National Assessment. A Proposal Submitted to the National Institute of Justice*. Washington, DC.: Police Foundation.
- Weisburd, David, Stephen D. Mastrofski, Ann Marie McNally, Rosann Greenspan, and James Willis. 2001. *Compstat and Organizational Change: Report of a National Survey*. Washington, DC: Police Foundation.
- Weisburd, David, Stephen D. Mastrofski, Ann Marie McNally, Rosann Greenspan, and James Willis. 2003. "Reforming to Preserve: Compstat and Strategic Problem Solving in American Policing." *Criminology and Public Policy*. Forthcoming.
- Willis, James, Stephen D. Mastrofski, and David Weisburd, with Ann Marie McNally and Orit Shalev. 2003. *Compstat and Organizational Change: Intensive Site Visits Report*. Washington, DC: Police Foundation.

Appendix I:

**Sample Department Narrative of Survey Responses
(Site Selection Process)**

Sample Department Narrative of Survey Responses (Site Selection Process)

144A	Location	SPS	43
	Contact Person	TECH	Medium
	Telephone and Fax	SIZE	High
	Second Contact Person	RATE	High (crime rate)
	Telephone and Fax		

The problem that consumed more of the PD's efforts than any other was "reducing Part I crimes through community policing/problem-solving and assessing statistics/tactics through a Compstat process." Department data analysis showed the problem and the department chose to solve the problem based on an approach with which they had previously had success. The problem solving tactics included check points, buy-bust operations, warrant checks, nuisance abatement law enforcement, educating the public, mobilizing community groups, altering the physical environment, increasing arrests for targeted offenses, intensive enforcement of minor offenses, increasing traffic enforcement, and seeking new laws to assist enforcement. The PD worked with the state legislature and task forces with various agencies. Temporary changes were made in almost every structure or procedure although there was no change made to the method of collecting data on the problem.

The PD is very familiar with Compstat and has seen NYPD's version. In November of 1998, they began their own Compstat program. About half of the features of Compstat have been used for more than 10 years and the other half are reported to have been being used for 3-5 years (set specific objectives in terms that can be precisely measured, hold regularly scheduled meetings with dc to review progress toward objectives, use data to assess progress toward objectives, hold middle managers responsible for understanding crime patterns and initiating plans to deal with them, and hold specialized units accountable at regularly held meetings).

There are 3 districts which are all operated out of the same location. Functions are organized in a variety of ways - uniformed patrol, traffic, and street tactical units by district only units, community policing specialists, crime prevention specialists, and narcotics by outside units, criminal investigations, telephone complaint operators, and crime/data analysis by outside units in the district, juvenile officers by a mixed unit, and public transportation and public housing by other units. A single dc has 24-hour responsibility for the district. An internal police

unit operates the RMS and CAD and records from both are transferred/downloaded through a network to generate reports and conduct crime and data analysis. All mapping techniques are used by the PD.

Patrol officers have direct access at the station or headquarters to crime case files, crime stats for assigned beat, crime maps for assigned beat, and calls for service for assigned beat. Access is gained through agency personnel to all agencies except for social services and health department in which the PD has no access. Computer databases are maintained for gang info and registered sex offenders and info on parolees, known prostitutes, and known drug users/dealers are kept in paper form. The reporting of information to police managers responsible for problem solving efforts varies greatly to the type of information and they form in which it is reported. Criminal incidents info are reported daily, while stats and maps are reported weekly. Arrest information is reported weekly, but the stats and maps are only reported quarterly. Calls for service info are reported daily, stats are quarterly, and maps are weekly. Complaints against police info are reported weekly but stats and maps are never reported. Problem-solving project info and maps are reported weekly and stats are reported monthly. Arrest reports and field interrogation is available for computer analysis the same day as filing, citation reports are within 7 days, and call for service reports and crime incident reports are available within 8-14 days.

It is somewhat likely that the dc will be replaced if crime in a district stays high or continues to rise over many months or if the dc does not know about crime patterns in the district. If crime in a district declines over many months, it is also somewhat likely that the dc will be promoted. If a specialized unit commander fails to fulfill requests for cooperation, it is somewhat unlikely that the commander will be replaced. But, if the specialized unit commander fulfills requests for assistance, it is somewhat likely that the commander will be promoted.

The dc and line supervisor make many of the decisions although the operational commander determines beat boundaries and the top executive approves flexible hour requests for sworn personnel.

Appendix II:

Letters to Compstat and Non-Compstat Departments

(1) Letter to Compstat Departments

April 13, 2000

Chief NAME
POLICE Department
ADDRESS
CITY, STATE ZIP

Dear Chief NAME,

As you may recall, a few months ago your department [if the chief filled it out, say you] completed a survey sent to you by the Police Foundation on the topics of managing problem-solving, organization and technology. This survey was the first stage in a national study of Compstat and organizational change funded by the National Institute of Justice. We have now completed the national survey of police executives and are beginning the second stage of the project. In this stage, we will visit a select number of departments across the country to examine a variety of Compstat programs that have been implemented.

Based on our analysis of 530 departments in the national survey, we have identified the NAME Police Department as one of 20 exemplary departments across the country that we would like to make the subjects of short site visits of two or three days. The selection is based on a variety of factors, including the level of strategic problem solving in your department.

We very much appreciate your cooperation in this two [or three] day site visit. During our visit, we would like to observe a Compstat meeting and talk to various members at all levels of the organization, including executive staff, district commanders, line supervisors, patrol officers and any other field specialists. Our aim is to learn about the specifics of your Compstat program, such as how your department came to adopt Compstat, what are the features of Compstat, and what experiences has your department and members of your department had with Compstat. Any written report based on our visit will be sent to you to check for accuracy, and we will not use names of individuals interviewed in our reports.

We anticipate sending one of our researchers, NAME, on DATE, 2000. Please let me know if this timing is convenient so we can make further arrangements. You can call me at (202) 833-1460 or email me at rgreenspan@policefoundation.org. Thank you for your assistance.

Sincerely,

Rosann Greenspan, Ph.D.
Research Director

(2) Letter to Non-Compstat Departments

April 13, 2000

Chief NAME
POLICE Department
ADDRESS
CITY, STATE ZIP

Dear Chief NAME,

As you may recall, a few months ago your department [if the chief filled it out, say you] completed a survey sent to you by the Police Foundation on the topics of managing problem-solving, organization and technology. This survey was the first stage in a national study funded by the National Institute of Justice. We have now completed the national survey of police executives and are beginning the second stage of the project. In this stage, we will visit a select number of departments across the country to examine different strategies, techniques and organizational structures police departments are using to conduct problem-solving.

Based on our analysis of 530 departments in the national survey, we have identified the NAME Police Department as one of 20 exemplary departments across the country that we would like to make the subjects of short site visits of two or three days. The selection is based on a variety of factors, including the level of strategic problem solving in your department

We very much appreciate your cooperation in this two [or three] day site visit. During our visit, we would like to observe problem-solving initiatives and talk to various members at all levels of the organization, including executive staff, district commanders, line supervisors, patrol officers and any other field specialists. Our aim in this visit is to learn about the specific ways in which your department deals with crime or quality of life problems including identifying, analyzing, and resolving issues. Any written report based on our visit will be sent to you to check for accuracy, and we will not use names of individuals interviewed in our reports.

We anticipate sending one of our researchers, NAME, on DATE, 2000. Please let me know if this timing is convenient so we can make further arrangements. You can call me at (202) 833-1460 or email at rgreenspan@policefoundation.org. Thank you for your assistance.

Sincerely,

Rosann Greenspan, Ph.D.
Research Director

Appendix III:

Interview Instruments - 3 Instruments

Standard Instrument

DEPARTMENT NAME: _____

SITE VISIT – COMPSTAT STUDY

Interviewee: _____ **Date:** _____
Contact Phone Number: _____ **Time:** _____
Rank/Assignment: _____ **Interviewer:** _____

ADOPTION OF COMPSTAT

1. How did your Police Department come to adopt its Compstat program?

.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....

2. When did your department first get interested in developing a Compstat program?

.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....

3. How long did it take for the program to become fully operational in the Police Department (implemented department wide)?

.....
.....
.....
.....

ADOPTION

4. What did your department hope to accomplish by adopting its Compstat program, what was its motivation?

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

5. What were the major challenges or obstacles your department faced in adopting the Compstat program?

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

6. Did your Police Department try to emulate another department? Did the agency study what other Police Departments were doing? Which ones? How did they study them?

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

Technical Instrument

DEPARTMENT NAME: _____

**SITE VISIT – COMPSTAT STUDY
TECHNICAL (MIS) PERSONNEL FORM**

Interviewee: _____ **Date:** _____
Contact Phone Number: _____ **Time:** _____
Rank/Assignment: _____ **Interviewer:** _____

1. Could you just give me a brief overview of the technical process used in the department such as data collection, storage, and retrieval of information.
2. How reliable is the information once it gets to the point that the Crime Analysis Unit is using it to generate reports and maps (specifically for Compstat)?
3. How quick is the turnaround from information being collected and then entered into the system?
4. Does your department have any measures of security in the system? Are there different levels of access for personnel?
5. In your opinion, does the department use its technological capabilities to their fullest potential?
6. Has Compstat made a difference in the way you do your work?

Rank and File Instrument

DEPARTMENT

NAME: _____

SITE VISIT – COMPSTAT STUDY RANK AND FILE FORM

Interviewee: _____ Date: _____

Contact Phone Number: _____ Time: _____

Police Department: _____ Interviewer: _____

Rank/Assignment: _____

- I. Do you know what Compstat is? How would you describe it?
- II. Have you ever been to a Compstat meeting? What was your experience there?
- III. Has Compstat changed the way you do your job? How?
Has it changed the way others do their job? In what ways?

Appendix IV:

Selected Site Report (Redacted)

Selected Site Report (Redacted)

City, State
Date
Researcher

Interviews:

- Lt. _____, Compstat Unit Commander
- Chief _____
- Lt. _____, CRT and Sector Commander, _____ Precinct
- Inspector _____, _____ Precinct
- Inspector _____, _____ Precinct
- Lt. _____, Commander, _____ Division
- Inspector _____, _____ Precinct
- Director _____, Commander _____
- Compstat Unit Crime Analyst _____
- Compstat Unit Police Support Technician _____
- Compstat Unit Officer _____
- Compstat Unit Officer _____
- Lt. _____, Sector Lieutenant, _____ Precinct & _____
- Lt. _____, Sector __ Lieutenant, _____ Precinct
- Sgt. _____, CRT, _____
- Officer _____, CRT, _____ Precinct
- Officer _____, _____ Precinct
- Sector Lt. _____, _____ Precinct (abbreviated interview)
- Lt. _____, Commander of the Compstat Unit, escorted me throughout my site visit. My visit was his priority, even as his Unit was preparing for the Compstat meeting. He was extremely accommodating, knowledgeable and open, and made every effort to ensure that I spoke to people throughout the organization. In general, the department was very receptive to the visit and would, I think, be similarly receptive to a longer, intensive site visit. It is possible that Lt. _____ will have received a transfer to become a Sector Lt. by the time of such visit.

Meetings Attended:

- Pre-Compstat Meeting, _____ Precinct
- Pre-Compstat Briefing of _____ by Lt. _____
- Compstat Meeting

Documents Acquired:

- _____ Police Department, 1998 Annual Report
- _____ Police Department, Compstat Strategy (recently completed, includes history of Compstat, four “basic principles,” describes some 15 “successful strategies” undertaken in 1999, as well as measures of success in part one crime reduction, etc)
- Compstat Unit Organizational Chart
- Week 124 Jun 6-12, 2000 Crime Rate Charts
- Several Sample Maps
- Sample Posting for Directed Patrol Area, Second Precinct, June 8th to June 14th
- Weekly Newsletter produced for her “team” by Lt. _____, Sector ___ Lt., _____ Precinct
- Compstat Meeting Notes, Week 124, June 15, 2000, produced by Lt. _____ for information of _____, the Chief, and the Deputy Chiefs; also provided to Precinct Inspectors who are unable to attend a Compstat meeting.

About the City:

_____ is a cosmopolitan midwestern city of 370,000 residents in a metropolitan area of 2 million people who work in or frequent the city. The racial composition of the population includes about 78.4% white, 13% African-American, 4.3% Asian/Pacific Islander, 3.3% Native American, and .9% “other.” There has recently been an in-migration of Somalians and Southeast Asians. Also, minority members have increasingly moved back downtown, as in other American cities. Currently half the children in _____ public schools are of color.

About the Police Department:

The _____ Police Department has 1200 employees: 914 sworn officers and 278 civilian employees.

Chief _____ was appointed in March 1995 (His previous position was as Chief of _____ which [is not far from New York City]). Chief Olson reports that he witnessed firsthand and benefitted from the crime reduction associated with New York’s Compstat.

The Police Department patrols the city in five precincts, including a smaller “Downtown Command” (DTC). Each precinct is commanded by an Inspector and is divided into two or three geographic sectors that are assigned to Lieutenants (more on this later). Each precinct also contains a Community Response Team (CRT) (more later). Centrally operated units include the Criminal Investigations Division (CID) and the Special Investigations Unit (SID). The CID includes Robbery (recently decentralized), Domestic Assault, Child Abuse, Sex Crimes, and Forgery/Fraud. The SID includes Homicide, Juvenile, Narcotics, Organized Crime, and Bomb/Arson.

Adoption of Compstat:

The first Compstat meeting was held in January 1998. Prior to that date, considerable groundwork had been laid, beginning in 1996. .

Chief _____, appointed in 1995, was previously Chief of _____. He was a “close friend” of William Bratton, and was amazed by his success at Transit and later with NYPD. Although he wanted to introduce Compstat in _____, he felt he needed additional resources, that there must be a “set group of officers off the 9-1-1 abyss.” With the addition of 81 officers through COPS Office funding, and by greatly decreasing the number of sworn officers in headquarters and “getting rid of brass,” reducing from 9 to 2 the number of officers at the highest rank of captain (the two remaining deputy chiefs), he began to decentralize the department, and established Community Response Teams in each precinct that were not tied to 9-1-1 calls. (Eventually, decentralization also involved empowering lieutenants, who have become the “key rank.” This was clearly indicated in a negotiated 31% pay increase for the rank of lieutenant.) Still, Chief _____ “didn’t push the concept of Compstat.”

Then Sgt (now Lt.) _____, who learned about Compstat from friends who were officers in New York, became interested in the program. He saw that his friends had “a different attitude due to Compstat,” an attitude that “they could do something about crime,” and they were happier in their jobs. For example, they would go after outstanding warrants.[He] discussed his interest in Compstat with _____.

Chief _____ sent a team to New York’s first Compstat conference, consisting of Sgt. _____, Deputy Chief _____ then of the _____ Bureau, and Sgt. _____ who had computer knowledge. After also talking with rank and file in New York, the team returned convinced, prepared a power point presentation, and presented it to the Chief. According to Sgt. _____, halfway through the presentation Chief _____ stopped them and said, “I know this works. We’ll do it.” Although _____ thought this was because he had convinced the Chief, the Chief explains that he was thrilled when the Sgt. wanted to pursue Compstat, as it was what he had wanted, but he wanted it to come from within.

Compstat stands for _____. Formally, Compstat has four “basic principles” or “pillars”:

- Accurate and timely intelligence
- Rapid Deployment of Personnel and Resources
- Effective Tactics
- Relentless Follow-up and Assessment

Operationally, the key element is clearly aggressive misdemeanor enforcement.

Extensive planning over a period of 7 months ensued, with a view to customizing the Compstat strategy to meet the needs of _____. Over 70 meetings were held with stakeholders in the community and the criminal justice system. Seven workgroups were established.

Reportedly community outreach was an important and difficult part of the process, and several interviewees pointed to the 70 meetings as an indicator of how hard they worked to bring the community along. Chief _____ described it as a “massive marketing” process. Getting the support of the mayor, who is an African-American woman, was an important step. Lt. _____ indicated that there was “lots of anger in the

African American community,” who were concerned that, “You will target our communities.” _____ also reported that among the public, there is “a cloud around Compstat.” As she explained, _____ was tired of loitering, prostitution, and other street level activity as well the crack trade and high murder rate, and were “ready to tolerate the enforcement of lower crimes.” However, the “cloud” consists of those in the community who oppose arresting for misdemeanors and who think that there is bias in enforcement, and that Compstat leads to the over-arrest of people of color. All these comments were offered with no prompting; community support has been an ongoing concern that the department has been dealing with throughout.

Rank and file were also skeptical at first. They were concerned that they were being told to be “proactive in enforcing misdemeanor crimes and livability offenses,” but that they would not be backed up by their superiors if harassment complaints were made. These fears were allayed once the program was put into effect. (I use the word ‘program’ advisedly; I was told repeatedly that Compstat is not a program, it’s a philosophy, or a management strategy.) Officers saw that because lieutenants and commanders were now accountable for the crime in their jurisdictions, they were supportive of the officers under their command.

A significant and perhaps unique component of _____’ development of Compstat was the culmination in a 4-day “super-training” in January 1998. Every officer and civilian attended Compstat training for one full day. Training was given by the Chief, Deputy Chief _____, and Sgt. _____, as well as a Precinct Commander and an Officer from NYPD. The NYPD Officer’s personal impact was reportedly quite significant in convincing rank and file to buy into the new strategy. In my view this department-wide training was a good way to get the message of change down to the rank of file.

As a sergeant in CRT in the Downtown Sector put it, Compstat puts pressure on the inspectors to do something, but it also “trickles down to street supervisors and the patrol corps that it is important to be in the right place at the right time.”

The Compstat Unit

Initially there was one Compstat Coordinator, with the rank of sergeant. Beginning in February 1999 a 9-person Compstat Unit headed by a lieutenant was created. The unit is housed in a building adjacent to police headquarters that housed the former Community Services Bureau. With decentralization of that bureau, the building is dedicated primarily to the Compstat Unit. The weekly Compstat meetings are also held in this building.

The Compstat Unit incorporates two functions: Compstat and RECAP. It is commanded by Lt. _____, with a Sgt. as Operational Supervisor (position vacant during my visit). The Compstat function includes civilian Crime Analyst _____, who holds a Masters degree and (check) has been with the Department since it first introduced crime analysis under an LEAA grant in 1976, and Officer _____ who has been with the Unit since it was created in January 1999, and has been developing software for use throughout the department. The RECAP function includes a civilian Police Support Technician, and two Officers. A Clerk Typist serves both Compstat and RECAP.

Compstat IAD

Every second week, _____ has a Compstat IAD. Chief ____ stated that he picked up the idea of a Compstat for the Internal Affairs Division from Police Director Joseph Santiago of Newark. I did not have the opportunity to attend a Compstat IAD.

Elements of Compstat

For everyone below the level of Chief and Director with whom I spoke, Compstat is equivalent to aggressive enforcement of misdemeanors, or what _____ referred to as “the sexy part.” With attention to the seven identified elements of Compstat, the emphasis, then, is on effective problem solving. All reports are that the results have been impressive, but there is some concern, as Lt. ____ worried, that “things have gone too far.” Because of this emphasis, it was anticipated that IAD complaints would increase with the introduction of Compstat, and plans were made to address the increase; instead complaints went down. Nevertheless, there has been investigation into racial profiling by the Civil Rights Division and a consent decree is expected.

Mission Clarification:

“Now we have a mission. Before we did not.” These words from CRT and Sector Lt. _____ were echoed in many interviews. As she said, “Compstat keeps us focused. Before, it was hit or miss.” Crime reduction became the focus of policing in _____, and the impact was reportedly felt immediately. According to Chief ____, “The day we started the trap door dropped out.” Or in the words of Lt. _____, they “saw the effects immediately.” As simply put by Inspector _____, the mission of Compstat is to “reduce crime.” Although there may be other elements to a crime reduction strategy, the major focus has been on aggressive enforcement of misdemeanors, or, as Inspector _____ put it, “paying attention to the small stuff.” For him, as reiterated by a sergeant and two patrol officers I spoke with, this is essentially “doing police work the old fashioned way.” The sergeant suggested, “In the old days you’d get looked down at if you did misdemeanor enforcement. Now you’re rewarded for it.Before good cops did it, but now mediocre and bad cops are directed to do it too.” As Chief ____ said, “Aggressive policing is central to Compstat.”

Geographic Organization of Operational Command

There has been an ongoing and unrelenting process towards geographic organization of operational command that began even before Compstat and continues.

Starting at the top, even the duties of the Deputy Chiefs have been redefined geographically, so that one Deputy Chief is responsible for the North Field Services Bureau and one for the South Field Services Bureau. The Central Services Bureau, including Compstat, the Special Investigations Division, and Traffic is under the command of _____ (...identifying comment.....).

Formerly, precincts had “crack teams” and the rest of Vice was centralized. Under Chief ____, Vice was decentralized and each precinct now has a Community Response Team with responsibility for crack (drugs), vice and prostitution. These teams are equipped with “good vehicles and equipment.” As explained by one CRT Commander, the day team does drug houses, and the night team focuses on prostitution and loitering. In the course of their work, the night team also does jumpouts or observes street drug transactions. These teams are not tied to the 9-1-1 system.

Accountability has moved down the ranks. As __ Precinct Inspector ____ put it, in the first and second years, accountability meant that the Precinct Commander was responsible for crime in the precinct. In the third year, as both he and __ Precinct Inspector _____ stated, “Lieutenants are accountable.” They are, in the Chief’s words, “the key rank.” And, as _____ continued, now the lieutenants are “tasking sergeants.” Although this has been encouraged, one lieutenant indicated that in lieutenants’ view, sergeants identify more with officers than with administration.

The precincts have been divided into sectors, with a lieutenant having 24-hour responsibility for each sector. This reorganization was fully implemented in February and March 2000. Lieutenants have become the “key rank” in the strategy, and the union has negotiated a 31% pay raise. In addition, the same lieutenants have been assigned as city-wide watch commanders. The sector responsibility aspect of the geographic reorganization remains somewhat controversial. Lt. _____ raised the concern that when a sector lieutenant is not on duty, there is a lack of supervision in that sector. He suggested that this is the situation that existed for the CRASH Unit in the Rampart Division of the Los Angeles Police Department. Or, as Inspector _____ put it, “They can’t be here 24 hours a day.” The Chief’s solution to this concern, placing more responsibility on sergeants, is questioned by some lieutenants. Other concerns are discussed below under “Organizational Flexibility.”

Inspector _____ gave an example of how geographic organization by sector combined with mapping of data had made possible a problem solving plan that he felt would not have developed otherwise. (See the Bar Walkthrough Program under Problem Solving Tactics.)

The CRT officer and patrol officer I spoke to, though generally de-emphasizing the impact of Compstat on their work (since they were already doing good policing), did notice a geographic impact. One said that “the squad has to stay in their area more,” and the other that “Compstat says concentrate on an area” and the individuals in that area where crime is occurring.” In fact, in explaining to me about “sector patrolling,” he referred to patrolling outside your sector as “poaching.” While the other officer claimed, “I don’t care what happens when I’m not here,” it is interesting to note that this would have been the norm prior to sector policing, whereas he knew that there was an expectation of geographic ownership that he was defying.

Data Driven Analysis

There were numerous indications that the data are being used to do policing. As Sgt. _____ of the _____ CRT said, with the computers, knowledge of times and locations of crimes, whether they are doing surveillance or saturation or whatever they are doing, I think we are “doing a better job.” The inspector or his lieutenant use the data to select the problem, and “I do more of the problem solving.”

Compstat was built with Mapinfo which the analysts say takes a sophisticated user. Each precinct has one person, sworn or civilian who can use it. A proprietary software called _____ has been developed for use throughout the department. It is currently installed in 50 -60 computers, about a quarter of the workstations in the department, and takes only 5 minutes of instruction to use. Lt. _____ pulls up maps regularly. She says they used to gauge the effect of their work through community response. Now they pay attention to the numbers, and can say, yes, crime is down. . For example, she will look at robbery numbers about twice a week. She also reviews Compstat maps: “Cops like visuals....Compstat keeps us focused.” Rather than ask crime analysis for maps, she asked that Geomaster be installed on her computer.

Even an otherwise skeptical officer remarked that “there is better information available” now, and he is informed about what happened in the last shift, which was not previously done.

Effective Problem Solving Tactics

There has been a strong emphasis on problem solving from the beginning. As _____ indicated, the department instituted crime prevention 20 years ago, and problem solving a number of years ago, but Compstat made the biggest difference. She described a new emphasis on department-wide solutions. For example, the department is working with General Mills to create a recreational facility for children. She gave a second example of addressing a truancy problem by creating a program of in-school supervision for truants involving law enforcement.

But this sense of the importance of problem solving does not stop at the brass. As Sgt. _____, a CRT sergeant said, “Compstat has made the department more problem solving oriented.” He went on to say that he thinks they do “more problem oriented policing than community oriented policing.”

It is no accident that the problem the Chief in responding to our survey chose to describe as the problem that had consumed more of the department’s efforts than another other in the last 12 months was “downtown disorder at late night entertainment closing time.”. This is representative of the clear emphasis on addressing quality of life offenses, and the complete integration of broken windows theory into policing in _____.

An example of problem solving given by Lt. _____ was with regard to robberies. They will do loitering arrests, street sweeps, and work undercover. They will look at narcotics arrests and overlay the maps to determine if there is a pattern.

One much discussed but apparently not fully implemented strategy has been “debriefing,” with the idea that an arrested suspect may have knowledge of other offenses

and offenders and be willing to divulge that information. A sergeant suggested that one problem with the debriefing idea is a practical one: there is no place at the jail to conduct debriefing, and bringing the suspect back to the precinct carries other problems of transporting the suspect, etc.

Another weekly strategy is the "Top 10 List." Each precinct creates a list not of its most serious offenders, but of those who have repeatedly been involved with the police. This might include probationers and parolees. Officers are expected to focus attention on those individuals.

Directed patrol is implemented. Each week officers are directed where to focus their efforts during down time when not responding to calls.

Organizational Flexibility

According to _____, having the still centralized Special Investigations Division and Central Investigations Division report at the Compstat meeting gives the message to the precincts of their "being available to the precincts." However, this availability was not apparent in the Compstat meeting I attended. Flexibility is being addressed more through decentralization. Robbery, former part of CID was recently decentralized to the precincts.

The creation of the CRT teams in each precinct has had a distinct effect in terms of their flexibility within their precincts, or as Inspector _____ put it, "the fluidity of resources." Chief _____ indicated that precincts give up their CRTs to help one another, but only the deputy chiefs actually have the authority to move them between precincts. Lt. _____ said that sharing officers between precincts is much more infrequent than within a precinct, and is planned well in advance. Inspector _____ gave an example of this kind of planned between-precinct sharing from the previous summer when the _____ (precinct) needed assistance from every precinct and the watch commander called designated response cars to assist as needed. But he pointed out that this flexibility actually developed 4 or 5 years ago, before Compstat (but during Chief _____'s leadership), after an incident of a mini-riot. Prior to that incident, there were "giant walls between precincts" and "no cooperation."

Several sector lieutenants indicated that the creation of sectors has made the lieutenants competitive with each other, and thus reluctant to share resources between sectors in the same precinct. There was also the concern that a sector lieutenant with a city wide watch command may not take resources from his sector as readily when they were needed in another area.

Internal Accountability

Accountability for crime reductions seems to have pervaded the culture of policing in _____. While initially the pressure was particularly placed on precinct commanders, there is now a sense of the pressure point being shared at the level of CRT and Sector lieutenants. As Inspector _____ said, accountability is a big part of

Compstat. Precinct commanders were convinced that they are responsible; now the precinct commanders are getting better at “pushing the responsibility” downwards. Chief _____ pointed out that _____ was small enough that every precinct commander is held accountable each week. He described the process as less adversarial than New York, as a “more cooperative learning environment.” He indicated that although there were some transfers at the beginning, “we had good commanders.” In fact, through attrition, _____ has replaced three of the five precinct commanders. In other words, he has gently but definitely altered the command staff. Although the two deputy chiefs remain, the Chief did not disagree with a suggestion by Compstat commander Lt. _____ that they are “not so important.”

_____ indicated that although the centralized Special Investigations Division and Central Investigations Divisions report at the Compstat meeting, the purpose is mainly to create information; they are not responsible for crime reductions. She seems to feel that there should be more accountability in those units, although she does not believe Compstat is the place for that. It will be interesting to see if a way to bring them into the accountability structure is developed.

As a sergeant in CRT in the Downtown Sector put it, Compstat puts pressure on the inspectors to do something, but it also “trickles down to street supervisors and the patrol corps that it is important to be in the right place at the right time.” A day or two before the Compstat meeting, he notices that “the boss is getting nervous,” both the lieutenant and the inspector. She will start asking, “What problems have you solved this week?” and will email him again before the meeting.

External Accountability

Chief _____ believes, “the political side is important” and stated that they produce an annual Compstat “reportcard” for the public. He also explained that precinct commanders work directly with council members, who are provided weekly bulletins (I didn’t see these bulletins.). Unlike New York, Chief _____ points out, they have put in place an audit and IAD Compstat. Although aggressive policing is central, they are not lowering the bar of acceptable conduct. They have changed their ethics training, and the Chief now teaches the ethics class in the academy. Inspector _____ described a “precinct advisory council,” an independent organization that meets to identify problems it wants the police to address. _____ pointed out that unlike in other departments, here the Chief is not the only department representative who speaks to the community. In fact, _____ spends a considerable amount of her efforts on community relations.

As has been suggested throughout this report, there has been some tension in the department’s relations with the minority community that has to some extent focused on the adoption of Compstat. Chief _____ suggested accusations of “heavyhandedness” may have been warranted in the first year. Lt. _____ indicated that directed patrol has helped alleviate the problem, as now officers are addressing defined problems rather than “hanging out or picking on people.” Since I would not want to make more of this issue than warranted, which I have no independent knowledge of; I raise it only because it was frequently raised by those I interviewed. It is interesting to note the extent to which the department involved the community from the planning stages of Compstat (above). It is

tempting to suggest that this strategy may have backfired. However, it is more likely that the reason for involving the community to this extent from the outset was related to the history of police/minority community relations in _____.

As mentioned earlier, two city attorneys, the county attorney and the chief probation officers attend Compstat meetings. _____ spoke of the department's "partnership" with the County Attorney, in which they discuss long-term efforts for particular areas of increased criminal activity.

Pre-CODEFOR Meeting

_____ District's pre-CODEFOR meeting was held the morning of the Compstat meeting. (I was scheduled to attend another pre-CODEFOR meeting which is held on the previous day, but that meeting was canceled.) The meeting was held in the roll-call room. Posted in the small conference room are (1) last week's Compstat maps for _____ District, (2) the Compstat Top 10 List for the District, replete with photographs, (3) graphs and charts from last week's Compstat meeting, and (4) stacks of previous months' maps going crime. The information is prominently displayed for the information and use of all officers in the district. The Captain and his Compstat officer reviewed the data for the week, and then went around the table, which included besides district supervisors, also university police.

After the Compstat meeting, Inspector _____ holds a staff meeting. Although he thinks the Compstat meeting is more for reporting, sometimes critical information is conveyed at the meeting.

Pre-CODEFOR Briefing

Each week Lt. _____ meets with _____ before the Compstat meeting. He has prepared a folder for each precinct, containing: (1) a summary of percentage of total crime increase or decrease, also comparisons to last year the last two weeks, with possible questions; (2) a map for each Part I offense category; (3) summary statistics for this period and the past 2 weeks. Officers in the Compstat unit highlight things that they notice are going on. Lt. Martin writes questions based on these observations. _____ will use those questions, but will also ask larger questions about how they are doing with the basic elements of Compstat such as the Top 10 List.

Compstat Meeting

Although not lavish, a large room dedicated to Compstat meetings. Equipment is brought in rather than being permanently

Three members of the Compstat Unit sit at the front and to one side operating the equipment which consists of 3 laptop computers and projectors and 3 screens. Lt. _____ sits at the side at a separate table, taking notes on another laptop. _____ sits opposite the Compstat staff, and behind her sit the Chief and the Deputy Chiefs. In the middle is the table where each presenter will sit. Several rows of chairs are behind these positions.

About 30 people are in attendance. Two city attorneys are assigned to Compstat, as well as the County Attorney and the Chief Probation Officer

After a brief introduction, including mention that crime was down 23% in 1999 and 21% in 1998, and that this year's goal is 10-12%, _____ called on the _____ District. First _____ questioned the Inspector about some domestics and robberies, then he began his presentation. [Lt. _____ provided me with the notes he took during the meeting, which I will not review here.] On the 3 screens were projected: (1) a bar graph of percent change over several weeks and year to date; (2) a map of auto thefts in the district for this period; (3) bar graphs for year to date overall property crimes. As he reviewed details of the offenses, a sector lieutenant from another sector asked whether a program Inspector _____ had used had made a difference in auto theft. Insp. _____ then asked to look at theft from motor vehicle. Passing the microphone back and forth with the Property Investigators Lt., Lt. _____, he continued. _____ asked about what is making a particular Warehouse location vulnerable. The Inspector described the location as remote and said that security people were suspected. Lt. _____ is working on prevention and education issues. At the end of the presentation and questions, _____ asked more general questions about how the District was doing on various "basics" of Compstat. I think she indicated that this kind of review was out of the ordinary and though useful was being done for my information. The "basics" she listed were: timely intelligence, prevention, top 10, canvassing, debriefing, and misdemeanors. Insp. _____ said they were doing best at timely intelligence and rapid response. They are not doing as well at debriefing.

Next up was _____ Precinct, with Inspector _____ (identifier) and one of his sector lieutenants, Lt. _____ presenting. The presentation proceeded similarly, with interspersed questions from _____. Next was SID (Special Investigation Division). This presentation is done without maps. As _____ said earlier, this is not where she thinks they should be held accountable, they are here more to share information and give a message of availability. After a 10 minute break, _____ Precinct presented. _____ called a "good Compstat effort," i.e. problem solving, the solution of a case where a cabdriver was robbed, and the officer called hospitals to get the name of a person with a cut hand, and so on. Next was Fifth Precinct, then the Criminal Investigations Division (CID), then another 10 minute break. The last two presenters were the Downtown Command and the License Unit. Inspectors for Housing, Traffic and Licensing rotate, so that each presents every third week.

At the end of the meeting, _____ turned to the full group with two announcements, one regarding using up grant money, and another comment about empty seats in the room. She urged precinct commanders to bring their command staffs, saying that not everyone has been here.

The Compstat meeting, in the view of two Inspectors, is just for reporting. And it did seem that the meeting was not the pressure cooker observed in New York or _____ nor at least at my visit the problem-solving meeting observed in _____. However, I do think the pressure of reporting and being knowledgeable about crime in one's area remains an important aspect of Compstat. The elements of the Compstat process that has pervaded the department, the attention to data and crime reduction, etc., could not be sustained, I think, without the Compstat meetings.