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National Evaluation of the Local Law Enforcement Block Grant Program

PHASE TWO FINAL REPORT

Prepared for the
National Institute of Justice
810 Seventh Street, NW, 7th Floor
Washington, DC 20531

March 2005

**National Evaluation of the
Local Law Enforcement Block Grant Program**

**Phase Two
Final Report**

March 2005

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March 3, 2005

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Re: Grant No. 97-LB-VX-0013, National Evaluation of the Local Law Enforcement Block Grant Program

Dear Ms. Reed:

Enclosed please find three (3) copies of the *National Evaluation of the Local Law Enforcement Block Grant Program: Phase Two Final Report*. You also will receive an electronic version of the report, in PDF, via e-mail.

Sincerely,

Robert K. Yin
President

RKY/cc

Enclosures

Preface

This document is the final report from the second phase of the National Evaluation of the Local Law Enforcement Block Grant (LLEBG) Program. The first phase of the evaluation was commissioned in 1997 as Grant #97-LB-VX-0013 from the National Institute of Justice (NIJ), under Phyllis McDonald, Ph.D., as program monitor. The second phase began in 2001, first under Dr. McDonald, then, when Dr. McDonald left NIJ, under Winifred Reed.

The research team would like to express its gratitude to the staff at the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA), for providing assistance in providing access to grantee e-mail lists and program files. Without their total collaboration, this project would not have been possible.

The team also declares its appreciation to the LLEBG grantees who took their valuable time to complete the survey that was a critical component of the second phase of this evaluation, and particularly to the staff of the 22 jurisdictions that hosted site visits to study their programs.

Most of all, we express our deepest thanks to Winifred Reed, who participated in all phases of this phase of the research, including designing the survey instrument, conducting the survey, and making site visits. Her patience, although tried more than once, never failed.

Executive Summary

COSMOS Corporation (COSMOS), in its Phase One evaluation of the initial implementation of the LLEBG program, discovered anecdotal information suggesting that several grantees were using their LLEBG funds to support “results-oriented” programs, programs that have stated goals and also have qualitative or quantitative performance measures that can be used to determine if those goals are being met. Further, some of those programs had already begun to produce desired results. These encouraging findings were not anticipated, partially because unlike some other law enforcement grants, such as the Byrne Formula Grants, the LLEBG program did not require grantees to demonstrate desired results. In addition, because the Phase One evaluation focused on the early stages of the LLEBG program, it was not considered likely that results could have been produced. These findings were sufficiently provocative to lead the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) to support COSMOS to conduct a Phase Two evaluation of the LLEBG program to address these research issues:

1. What does the extant literature indicate about the current status of, and motivations toward “results-oriented” government programs?
2. To what extent are LLEBG grantees using their funds to support “results-oriented” programs?
3. What is the nature and effectiveness of such “results-oriented” programs in a wide variety of sites?
4. What are the forces that led those sites to adopt such programs?

This Phase Two evaluation report provides answers to those questions.

Key Evaluation Findings

This report provides details concerning the findings with regard to the four basic research issues noted above. Most striking, from among these results, were the following:

- A review of the literature suggests that, in many nations around the world, there has been a “global public management revolution,” in which a focus on performance has replaced that on hierarchy, rules, and internal regulation. Reflecting this trend, what has been termed “a quiet revolution” has occurred in the United States in which the federal government has devolved administrative responsibilities and policy-shaping decision-making to local governments, which themselves have begun to stress the importance of solving problems, achieving specified results, and producing outcomes. This revolution has also reached law enforcement, where developments such as community policing, problem-solving policing, attention to “measuring what matters,” and COMPSTAT have led to a focus on producing measurable results.
- The research team distributed an e-mail survey to all 3,111 FY2001 LLEBG grantees, asking whether the recipient jurisdictions were using LLEBG funds to support one or more programs that were “results-oriented,” that is, that “have stated goals and also have qualitative or quantitative performance measures that can be used to determine if those goals are being met.” If the jurisdiction had one or more such program, they were then requested to provide the names of those programs.
- A total of 2,776 (89.2%) of the agencies on the list received the e-mails. The lowest successful delivery rate (80.7%) was found among agencies receiving grants of \$1 million or more. Among agencies allocated grants less than \$1 million, e-mails were received by percentages approaching or exceeding 90 percent. These results indicate that conducting an e-mail survey of law enforcement agencies is extremely efficient, but that contacting larger agencies may pose the greatest challenges.
- Altogether, 1,704 responses were received. This represents 62.1 percent of those agencies that were actually contacted,

54.8 percent of all jurisdictions on the list. The highest response rates were found among agencies receiving grants between \$250,000 and \$499,999 (67.1%), followed by agencies receiving grants between \$100,000 and \$249,999. The response rate for all other agencies (except for those who received grants of under \$10,000) ranged slightly over 50 percent to almost 60 percent. The response rate for agencies with awards smaller than \$10,000 was the lowest (39.6%).

- A total of 406 (23.8%) responding jurisdictions indicated that they used LLEBG funds for one or more “results-oriented” program. The percentage of grantees supporting “results-oriented” programs varied directly, and dramatically, by the size of the grant award. In particular, 11.9 percent of grantees with awards below \$10,000 indicated that they supported “results-oriented” programs. For grantees with awards between \$10,000 and \$99,999, however, approximately 20 percent indicated they supported “results-oriented” programs. For grantees with awards between \$100,000 and \$499,999, approximately 35 percent said they funded “results-oriented” programs. For grantees with awards between \$500,000 and \$999,999, slightly more than 45 percent indicated they supported “results-oriented” programs. Finally, for grantees with awards of \$1 million and above, slightly more than 74 percent said they used the LLEBG funds to support “results-oriented” programs.
- Interpreting these results is comparable to resolving the classic “glass half empty/glass half full” conundrum.” On the one hand, the results indicating that, overall, 23.8 percent of grantees used LLEBG funds to support “results-oriented” programs suggests that 76.2 percent of recipient agencies did *not* use grant funds to support such programs. This could be seen as indicating that less than one quarter of agencies receiving LLEBG grant funds used those funds to support “results-oriented” programming, and therefore that the prevalence of such programs was relatively unimpressive. On the other hand, put in the context that LLEBG, unlike many federal grant programs, such as Byrne Formula Grants, does not *require* that funds be used to achieve specific results, a finding that 24 percent decided to use their funds to support “results-oriented” programs could be seen as suggesting that forces other than federal requirements were encouraging local government to invest in such programs.

- Analyzing the results by size of grant award provides a more nuanced understanding of the prevalence of “results-oriented” programming. Those results indicate that, among agencies receiving grants of less than \$100,000, 12 to 24 percent claimed they were supporting “results-oriented” programs. Among agencies receiving grants between \$100,000 and \$999,999, however, between 34 to 45 percent indicated they were implementing “results-oriented” programming. Finally, and most impressively, 74 percent of agencies receiving grants of \$1 million or more indicated that they used LLEBG funds to support “results-oriented” programming. These results indicate that, at least among the agencies receiving the largest grant awards (that is, those in the largest agencies, with highest violent crime rates), there is evidence of a “quiet revolution” occurring among local American governments.
- The 406 jurisdictions that indicated that they had used LLEBG funds to support “results-oriented” programs, reported 1,681 such programs, funded at \$98.3 million.
- After developing a site visit protocol, research team members made visits to 22 sites with “results-oriented” programs, selected to be as broadly representative of such programs as possible.
- The site visits revealed that the processes by which the decision to fund “results-oriented” programs, and the means used to implement them, varied widely, as summarized below:
 - In Alexandria, Virginia, the recipient jurisdiction executive turned basic decision-making power concerning the use and implementation of LLEBG funds over to the chief law enforcement executive, who, in turn, after collaborating with his command staff, allocated the funds to a program that addressed an emergent problem using what could be considered traditional law enforcement techniques.
 - In Baltimore City, Maryland, responsibility for determining the allocation of LLEBG funds was essentially given to the Mayor’s Coordinating Council on Criminal Justice, although it cleared its preferences with the LLEBG Advisory Board. The Coordinating Council operated under the auspices of the Mayor’s Performance Measurement Project, designed to require all city agencies and city-funded programs to measure their performance vis-à-vis

annual objectives. This focus on performance measurement continued under the succeeding mayor.

- In Baltimore County, Maryland, the chief executive of the recipient jurisdiction turned decision-making authority for use of the LLEBG funds to the police chief, who in turn created a system for soliciting proposals from the department’s operational units for how those funds should be used. These proposals were required to include measurable goals and objectives, specified program activities, a timeline, and a budget. Proposals were screened by members of the department’s command staff.
- In Boston, Massachusetts, the mayor gave decision-making authority for allocation of LLEBG funds to the police commissioner. The commissioner, guided by the city’s strategic plan and the department’s strategic plan for neighborhood policing, decided to set aside a significant proportion of the funds for Community-Based Organizations (CBOs). These CBOs were invited to submit proposals for “violence prevention grants” that would address problems identified in their district’s neighborhood plan. Each proposal had to specify the problem to be addressed, the target audience, goals and objectives and how they would be measured, how the program would address the specified problem, the program’s timeline, how the police would be involved, a budget, and how the effort would be continued after LLEBG funding was terminated. Proposals were judged by an outside panel of five persons, including academics, city officials, and community representatives, using a rigid point system.
- In Brockton, Massachusetts, although the mayor gave administrative responsibility for implementing LLEBG-funded programs to the police department, he insisted that a multi-agency LLEBG Advisory Board be given authority to decide how those programs were to be selected and to maintain oversight authority over them. This Advisory Board, unlike many, which met annually to passively ratify decisions made by other authorities, this board met monthly and closely scrutinized the operations of the LLEBG programs. As a demonstration of its results-orientation, the board hired an outside evaluator to monitor those programs and used the findings of the evaluator,

who attended the board's meetings, to determine whether to continue funding contractors.

- In Cambridge, Massachusetts, the mayor gave the police commissioner the responsibility for deciding how to allocate LLEBG funds and to oversee the implementation of LLEBG-supported programs. The commissioner, following the Boston example, set aside a sizeable percentage of the funds to be allocated to CBOs, on a competitive basis. Applicants were to indicate how the program could be completed within one year, how it could be sustained without LLEBG funding, the reasonableness of the budget, and how the program would involve more than one partner. The commissioner and his staff reviewed the proposals to determine how they might improve the crime situation in Cambridge.
- In Jacksonville, Florida, although the mayor allowed the sheriff to decide how to spend the first year of LLEBG funds, in all subsequent years the decision has been made by the city's Department of Community Services. Funding is made in response to proposals submitted to the director of that department. These proposals, and all city agencies and contractors, are expected to conform to a Total Quality Government (TQG) program, which incorporates a city mission, vision, guiding principles, and a strategic plan. An integral part of the program is the focus on "process management," involving a systematic method of identifying program outcome indicators, monitoring program results, and revising the program based upon those results. In accordance with the TQG process, LLEBG proposals are evaluated on the basis of their relevance to the city's strategic plan and their ability to demonstrate the attainment of measurable goals. Refunding of programs is determined based on the achievement of program objectives.
- In Los Angeles City, California, when LLEBG funds became available, the mayor convened a multi-agency advisory board to determine how to allocate these monies. The board issued a Request for Proposals (RFP) for various public and private agencies to request funds. An independent proposal review team used a quantitative rating system to determine the most eligible applicants. The review team's recommendations were then submitted

to the city council and the mayor for their final approval. The Mayor's Office of Criminal Justice Planning (MOCJP) plays a major role in recommending funding, and providing fiscal and program oversight of grant funds, including those from LLEBG. This involves grant management, project monitoring, and serving as a liaison between the city and BJA. The Community Development Department (CDC) has direct oversight of the program implementation and provides operational support and technical assistance to the sub-grantee agencies. Both the MOCJP and CDC have a strong results-oriented approach and, in order to ensure that funds are allocated effectively, have hired evaluators to monitor the progress of funded programs. According to several city officials, programs are expected to be performance based, and those that do not demonstrate effectiveness are not refunded. Program-related data are collected through an internet-based Management Information System (MIS) that includes interagency access and centralized reporting features.

- In Los Angeles County, California, the decision concerning how to allocate LLEBG funds fell to the County Board of Supervisors. Those supervisors, and in particular the “justice deputies,” with responsibility for criminal justice issues, relying upon the county's strategic plan, which requires performance measures for contracts, determined that the funds should be allocated to address particular crime problems that had been identified within the county. All contract and grants are reviewed by the “justice deputies” and the Budget and Operations Management Branch of the County's Chief Administrative Office to ensure that the programs make progress toward the attainment of their goals.
- In Miami-Dade County, Florida, the chief executive of the recipient jurisdiction turned decision-making authority concerning the use and implementation of LLEBG funds over to the chief law enforcement executive. The police chief and his command staff decided to allocate the block grant funds more or less equally across all of the police departments' divisions, but further decided that exactly *how* those funds would be expended would be based upon proposals submitted, through the chain of command, by officers at each district.

- In North Miami Beach, Florida, the mayor turned decision-making authority concerning the LLEBG grants over to the police chief, who, in collaboration with his command staff, decided to allocate LLEBG funds to support programs to deal with emergent problems in a way that did not use traditional law enforcement techniques. The chief, a strong proponent of community-oriented and problem-solving policing, decided to apportion some of the LLEBG funds to dealing with this problem.
- In Palo Alto, California, the city manager left the decision concerning how to spend the funds to the police chief. The chief insisted that any programs funded be congruent with the city’s Comprehensive Plan and the police department’s strategic plan, and was a clear priority of the City Council and the City Manager. A multi-agency Task Force on Youth Violence had proposed a program to address the long-range implications and causes of the city’s rising youth violence problem, but had not been able to fund it. Recognizing that this program met all of his criteria, he used the LLEBG funds to implement and evaluate that program.
- In Pasadena, California, the chief of police was given responsibility for determining how to allocate LLEBG funds. In making his decision, he relied on the department’s strategic plan, which had a major emphasis on dealing with the problems of youth. He therefore allotted a portion of the funds to a diversion program for first time juvenile offenders. Both the chief and the LLEBG Advisory Board insisted that the program keep records of its results.
- In Portland City/Multnomah County, Oregon, because the city and county had established a long-term collaboration, when LLEBG funds first became available, the mayor and the County Board of Supervisors agreed to an informal sharing agreement. According to that agreement, the city, which received the overwhelming amount of funds, would establish an LLEBG advisory committee that comprised representatives from both the city and the county, and the funds were to be expended for projects favored by both jurisdictions, although the city’s police department was to serve as administrator of the grant. The city decided to allot most of its funds to the police department, although

the chief insisted that a significant proportion of the city's grant funds be provided, on a competitive basis, to local community-based organizations ("strategic partners") serving the needs of both the city and the county. All programs funded had to be in congruence with the department's Community Policing Transition Plan and, later, the Community Policing Strategic Plan. In addition, the mayor and the County Board of Supervisors insisted that all programs demonstrate their results.

- In Rancho Palos Verdes, California, the decision concerning how to allocate LLEBG funds was assigned to the Palos Verdes Peninsula Region Law Enforcement Committee, representing the cities of Rancho Palos Verdes, Rolling Hills Estates, and Rolling Hills. Although Rancho Palos Verdes was the only city eligible for LLEBG funding, the committee agreed that the funds should be used to address a juvenile crime problem that plagued all three communities. The mayors of all three cities agreed that because funding was becoming more scarce, it was important that the value of this effort be measured by outcome measures. They were supported in this position by the fact that BJA, at least initially, required an annual progress report that demonstrated the effects of the LLEBG-supported programs.
- In Riverside, California, a rising juvenile crime problem convinced many members of the local criminal justice system that a diversion program for lower-level, first-time offenders was needed. With COPS funds, the sheriff created a teen court in one of the county's cities. When LLEBG funds became available, the sheriff became chair of the advisory committee and convinced the other members that they should expand the teen court to other cities. The County Board of Supervisors agreed to this, with the stipulation that it would not fund any project for more than one year without evidence of results.
- In San Francisco City/County, California, the mayor assigned responsibility for deciding how to allocate LLEBG funds to the executive committee of the Mayor's Criminal Justice Council (MCJC), a body created in the early 1970's, composed of representatives of the police department, the sheriff's office, the district attorney's office, the public defender's office, the local judiciary, the

county board of supervisors, the probation department, as well as non-governmental organizations. This group allocated the funds according to the priorities expressed by the members of the MCJC, as long as they were congruent with the city/county strategic plan. In accordance with that plan, and the explicit requirement of the new mayor, all funded programs were expected to be able to demonstrate the results they had achieved.

- In Santa Clara County, California, when informed of the availability of LLEBG funds, the county administrator assembled a broadly representative LLEBG Advisory Board with a mandate to distribute the funds broadly across the various agencies of the criminal justice system. No clear requirement that the funds be used for results-oriented programs seems to have been established.
- In Seattle, Washington, the mayor, upon notification of the availability of LLEBG funds, assembled a multi-agency LLEBG committee to consider requests for funding from both the Seattle Police Department and local organizations that proposed to implement crime prevention programs. In each case, proposals were required to indicate how the requested funds would be used in pursuit of both the city's and the police department's strategic plans, and how the attainment of program goals would be measured. Each non-police agency receiving LLEBG funds were required to sign a "Project Services Agreement" that specified the goals and objectives to be achieved by the program. The police department monitored the progress of each funded program, by means of quarterly reports. The department was aided in this request by being able to refer to LLEBG's requirement that annual written progress reports be provided for programs funded under specific program areas. Preference for refunding was based largely on the demonstrated ability of the programs to achieve their goals, leverage other funds, and to build on interagency partnerships.
- In Stockton City/San Joaquin County, California, the city and county agreed to form a mutual LLEBG Advisory Board and to submit a joint city/county proposal. The proposal itself was focused primarily on attaining the goals of the county's Comprehensive Multi-Agency Juvenile

Justice Plan. The City Council and the County Board of Supervisors determined that all programs should provide evidence of their level of performance and, where possible, the results achieved.

- In Tacoma, Washington, the city manager originally assigned decision-making about the use of LLEBG funds to the police chief, who used the monies to support overtime pay for officers and remodeling. In all later years, however, the allocation was largely determined by the Human Rights and Human Services Department (HRHSD), a city agency responsible for providing human services to the city. This agency, like all city agencies and contractors, was expected to operate under the general auspices of the city's strategic plan and a comprehensive outcomes-based evaluation (OBE) system. Under this system, with a focus on logic models, all city agencies, employees, and contractors were required to link program strategies to outcomes and goals. Under the aegis of this system, the HRHSD developed a Human Services Strategic Plan, which governed its decisions regarding LLEBG expenditures. The department decided that a significant portion of the LLEBG funds should be provided to community-based organizations. In accordance with the OBE system, those organizations were to submit comprehensive proposals, complete with indicators of progress, appropriate sample size, demonstrated ability to compile and analyze outcome data, an indication that the proposed program can achieve measurable results, and a demonstration of the ability to use data analysis to make adjustments in the program, if necessary. The Tacoma Urban Network and the Pierce County Funders Group had standardized application forms and outcomes for all local programs and had provided technical assistance to CBOs in writing outcomes-based proposals. Refunding is based upon the extent to which the projects achieve their desired outcomes.
- In Taunton, Massachusetts, the mayor gave the police chief authority to decide how to spend the LLEBG funds. The chief in office at the time the first funds became available decided to spend them on various types of equipment. When a new chief took office in 2000, he brought with him an interest in juveniles and decided to invest a sizable amount of the LLEBG funds in programs

addressing the problems of juvenile crime and at-risk youth. Both the chief and the advisory board insisted that these programs demonstrate their effectiveness.

- Exhibit 7-2 of the main report provides a summary of the factors that lead jurisdictions to fund “results-oriented” programs.
- The nature of the “results-oriented” programs took a wide variety of forms, as described in the body of the text, including strictly law enforcement efforts, juvenile diversion programs, domestic violence reduction programs, community crime prevention efforts, drug reduction programs, truancy reduction programs, and various other approaches.
- As indicated in the main body of the report, many of these programs have begun to produce desired and measurable results. Exhibit 7-3 provides a summary of those results.

Summary, Conclusions, and Recommendations

Summary and Conclusions. This evaluation found that almost one-quarter of LLEBG grantees indicated that they are using their grant funds to support “results-oriented” programs, that is that “have stated goals and also have qualitative or quantitative performance measures that can be used to determine if those goals are being met.” The prevalence of such programs varied directly with the size of the grant awards. Almost three-quarters of grantees receiving \$1 million or more indicated that they used grant funds to support “results-oriented” programs. Because grantees were not required, as in some grant programs, to demonstrate specific results, this finding lends support, at least among the largest jurisdictions, to the finding of the literature review that there is a “quiet revolution” occurring in the United States, a revolution in which local governments have begun to stress the importance of solving problems, achieving specified results, and

producing outcomes. The forces behind this revolution in the 22 jurisdictions visited for this evaluation are extremely varied. In some jurisdictions, such as Jacksonville, Florida and Tacoma, Washington, the revolution was advanced by the adoption and implementation of a comprehensive system that requires specification of program goals and measurement of the attainment of those goals for all government programs and contracts. In Baltimore City, Maryland, mayors had established a preference that programs be able to demonstrate their results, although this preference was neither as institutionalized nor as pervasive as in Jacksonville and Tacoma.

In some jurisdictions, such as Boston, Massachusetts; San Francisco, California; and Seattle, Washington, programs were expected to contribute to the goals specified in a city strategic plan. Law enforcement strategic plans, on the other hand, were most influential in Pasadena, California; Baltimore County, Maryland; Seattle, Washington; and, to a lesser degree, Tacoma, Washington.

The mayors in Baltimore City, Maryland; Portland, Oregon; Rancho Palos Verdes, and San Francisco, California, were quite instrumental in insisting the LLEBG funds be invested in programs that could demonstrate the effects they had achieved.

In Los Angeles County, California; Multnomah County, Oregon; and Riverside County, California the County Board of Supervisors insisted that the LLEBG funds be invested in results-oriented programs. Likewise, in Stockton, California the City Council insisted that the programs given LLEBG support be able to demonstrate their effectiveness.

In other jurisdictions, such as Baltimore City, Maryland; Los Angeles City, Palo Alto, and San Francisco City/County, California, pre-existing groups shaped, to a large extent, the agenda for expenditure of LLEBG funds. In other places, such as Los Angeles City, and Riverside County, California; and Brockton, Massachusetts, the multi-agency LLEBG advisory board itself played a significant role in creating a results-oriented investment of LLEBG funds.

In some law enforcement agencies, such as Boston, and Cambridge, Massachusetts; and Portland, Oregon, a commitment to community-oriented policing led the law enforcement executive to insist that community-based organizations be supported by LLEBG funds, and that the results of their efforts be measured. In other agencies, such as Alexandria, Virginia; Baltimore County, Maryland; Miami-Dade County, Florida; North Miami Beach, Florida; and Taunton, Massachusetts, the chief law enforcement executive's commitment to problem-solving policing led the chief to insist that the results of LLEBG-funded programs be demonstrated.

Thus, all of the strands leading to the "quiet revolution" in American government, in which local governments have begun to stress the importance of solving problems, achieving specified results, and producing outcomes, can be found in one or more of the LLEBG sites highlighted by this report.

Recommendations. The results of this analysis of the LLEBG program indicate that many agencies, particularly the larger ones, utilized the block grant funds to support "results-oriented" programs, although the program guidelines did not require that they do so. As this report suggests, there are many factors that

could account for this development, most of which were completely out of the control of the LLEBG program. The program did, however, contribute to this development in two noticeable ways. First, the requirement that each jurisdiction create and be responsible to an LLEBG Advisory Board, at least in theory, held the program's expenditures directly accountable to community interests and, indirectly, to producing results contributive to those interests. In some cases, these boards played a largely symbolic, or even peripheral, role in determining how program funds be invested. In some notable cases, however, these boards played a pivotal role in ensuring that the LLEBG program adopt a "results-oriented" orientation. The members of these boards held the program particularly accountable for achieving the desired program. It is recommended, therefore, that the program continue to require that such boards play an important role in determining how the program funds be spent.

Second, in the early stages of the program, grantees were required to submit annual reports demonstrating the progress they had made in certain program areas. Many grantees indicated to program evaluators that these required reports, although sometimes a nuisance, proved useful in providing guidance as to what programs deserved continued support, and which did not. In the judgment of the evaluators, these reports focused the attention of the program directors toward the issue of program effectiveness. Although the requirement for such progress reports was eventually discontinued, it is recommended that some system of accountability for results achieved be reinstated, both because it would provide benchmarks against which the national program could be evaluated, and because it

would provide a “results-oriented” focus for the grantees, especially those smaller jurisdictions that did not adopt such an approach earlier.

To facilitate such a “results-oriented” approach, it is further recommended that BJA establish criteria by which various types of programs could be evaluated, as well as advice concerning the most efficient means of gathering and analyzing such data. This system would have to tread a delicate balance between being rigorous while at the same time not being onerous. The process by which such a system would be implemented would be of critical importance. In particular, having BJA work closely with representatives of grantees to develop this system would seem of paramount importance.

Finally, it is recommended that BJA establish, or at least facilitate, a system by which grantees could share their program experiences, both successful and unsuccessful. This system, preferably on-line, would make it possible for grantees to learn from each other’s successes, as well as failures, and to further refine the most efficient and effective ways to measure the results of the programs they have implemented. Such a system would spread the benefits of a largely-successful program to as many grant recipients as possible.

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1. INTRODUCTION

In FY1996, Congress appropriated funds to allow the BJA to implement the LLEBG program, an initiative designed to provide funding to local governments for projects to reduce crime and improve public safety. The NIJ, with funding from BJA, selected COSMOS Corporation (COSMOS), after competitive bidding, to conduct an evaluation of the early implementation of the LLEBG program. In that evaluation, COSMOS found that, although the program rules and regulations did not require it, many grantees were using LLEBG funds to support “results-oriented” programs, with specific goals, measurable objectives, careful monitoring or evaluation, and revision of programming depending upon the results achieved. These encouraging, but unanticipated, results raised several questions. What does research literature suggest about the emergence of “results-oriented” government? To what extent did LLEBG grantees use their funds to support “results-oriented” programs? What types of such “results-oriented” programs are being implemented in various jurisdictions around the nation, and with what effect? What accounts for the decision by these jurisdictions to use their grant funds to support such programs?

Intrigued by these findings, BJA agreed to fund a Phase Two evaluation designed to address these questions. This report presents the results of that investigation. The report is comprised of seven sections, including this introduction. Section 2 briefly summarizes the history of federal funding for state and local law enforcement, describes the LLEBG program itself, and presents the

highlights of the first phase of the evaluation. Section 3 provides a brief overview of the Phase Two evaluation. Section 4 describes the results of the literature review concerning the status of “results-oriented” government. Section 5 presents the results of a survey of LLEBG grantees concerning the prevalence of using LLEBG funds to support “results-oriented” programs. Section 6 provides a series of descriptions of “results-oriented” programs at selected jurisdictions across the country, including a discussion of the forces that led to the decision to fund such programs, the nature of those programs, and the results they have been able to achieve. Finally, Section 7 provides a summary of the evaluation and suggests conclusions that can be drawn from it.

2. BACKGROUND

2.1 Federal Funding for State and Local Law Enforcement

Federal funding for state and local law enforcement began with the Law Enforcement Assistance Act (LEAA) of 1965—legislation that called for \$7 million in appropriations for criminal justice purposes. Since that time, the amount of federal funding for local law enforcement has fluctuated dramatically, rising with the implementation of LEAA, declining when that program was discontinued, but rising again since the late 1980s. At no time, however, has federal funding exceeded two percent of all law enforcement expenditures combined.

Among these federally funded programs, the LLEBG is not the largest, but has comprised just under 20 percent of the federal grant funds available for local law enforcement in recent years. Following is a brief description of the major sources of federal law enforcement funds for local jurisdictions.

Edward Byrne Memorial State and Local Law Enforcement Assistance Formula Grant Program (Byrne Formula Grant Program). One of the largest federal grant programs providing funding for law enforcement purpose are the Byrne Formula Grants, a partnership among federal, state, and local governments to create safer communities. Under this program, created in 1988, BJA is authorized to award grants to states for use by states and units of local government to improve the functioning of the criminal justice system—with emphasis on violent crime and serious offenders—and enforce state and local laws that establish offenses similar to those in the Federal Controlled Substances Act. Grants may be used to provide personnel, equipment, training, technical

assistance, and information systems for more widespread apprehension, prosecution, adjudication, detention and rehabilitation of offenders who violate such state and local laws. Grants may also be used to provide assistance (other than compensation) to victims of these offenders. Twenty-six (later twenty-nine) legislatively authorized purpose areas were established to define the nature and scope of programs and projects funded under this program. Of the funds available, each state receives a base amount of 0.25 percent, or \$500,000, whichever is greater. The remainder is divided among the states based on population. Recipient jurisdictions are required to meet a 25 percent match requirement. In recent years, approximately \$500 million per year has been available under this program. Some local jurisdictions expressed dissatisfaction at the role played by the state in the planning and allocation of these funds, as well as the requirement that awards to localities were required to provide information about the extent to which their programs achieved certain evaluation goals.

Community-Oriented Policing Services (COPS) Program. The COPS program was created under the auspices of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, with a mandate to advance community policing throughout the United States. Community policing, as COPS defines it, represents a shift from more traditional law enforcement in that it focuses on prevention of crime and the fear of crime on a very local basis. Community policing puts law enforcement professionals on the streets and assigns them a designated beat, so they can build mutually beneficial relationships with the people that they serve. COPS provides grants to tribal, state, and local law enforcement agencies to hire

and train community policing professionals, acquire and deploy new technologies, and develop and test innovative policing strategies. Although COPS was funded with the general intention of putting 100,000 community policing officers on America's streets, the program has developed several special programs to achieve this goal: Accelerated Hiring, Education, and Deployment (AHEAD); Funding Accelerated for Smaller Towns (FAST); Making Officer Redeployment Effective (MORE); the Universal Hiring Program (UHP) which incorporated FAST and AHEAD; the Youth Firearms Violence Initiative; the Antic-Gang Initiative; the Community Policing to Combat Domestic Violence Program; the Problem-Solving Partnership Initiative; the Regional Community Policing Institutes; the COPS in Schools program; and many other programs. Most of these programs require a 25 percent local match. Annual funding has ranged from over \$1,200 million in the mid 1990s to slightly less than \$700 million per year since 2000.

Operation Weed & Seed. Operation Weed & Seed is a strategy that involves a two-pronged approach: law enforcement agencies and prosecutors cooperate in "weeding out" criminals who participate in violent crime and drug abuse, attempting to prevent their return to a targeted area; "seeding" brings human services to the area, encompassing prevention, intervention, treatment, and neighborhood revitalization.

Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) Grants. States also have been eligible to receive Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) grant funds, beginning in 1996. The funds are designated for use in training law enforcement officers or prosecutors; creating special domestic violence units; creating new policies,

protocols, and procedures; improving data collection and communications systems; funding victims services programs; addressing stalking complaints; and addressing the needs of Indian tribes. The program requires a 25 percent match from recipients.

The Local Law Enforcement Grant (LLEBG) Program. As mentioned above, the LLEBG program was created in 1996 to provide local government agencies funds to reduce crime and improve public safety. Between FY1996 and FY2002 (the last year for which data are available) the program allocated between \$331 million to \$485 million to over 3,100 jurisdictions, based on their average annual Part 1 violent crimes. An unwaivable 10 percent local cash match was required.

Unlike the Byrne Formula Grants, discussed above, in which BJA provides funds to states, LLEBG funds are allocated directly to local government units if the awards consist of at least \$10,000; the funds are awarded to states for jurisdictions whose awards were less than \$10,000. To be eligible, each local and state sub-recipient was required to establish an interest-bearing trust fund in which to deposit program funds. In addition, each local jurisdiction was required to convene an advisory panel before the jurisdiction could draw down on LLEBG funds. Each panel had to include local representatives of law enforcement; the prosecutor's office; the court system; the public school system; and a local nonprofit, educational, religious, or community group active in crime prevention or drug use prevention or treatment. The panel was to review the proposed allocation of funds and make recommendations to the CEO of the jurisdiction. Finally, localities

receiving the awards directly also were required to hold at least one public hearing on the use of the funds. Jurisdictions were given up to 27 (later changed to 24) months from receipt of the award to expend the funds or the money was to be returned to the federal government.

The LLEBG was distinctive for a number of reasons. First, the program was designed to place few restrictions on local jurisdictions, specifying only general categories in which funds could be expended (see the description of program purpose areas below). Without strict limitations on the use of funds, jurisdictions had an opportunity to explore locally oriented initiatives or programs that they perhaps did not have the means to fund prior to the LLEBG program, rather than to follow federally specified priorities. Second, unlike many grant programs, these funds were awarded directly to local jurisdictions. Third, although the funds were to support law enforcement and public safety measures, the eligible grantee was the local general-purpose government, not the law enforcement agency (hence the “local” in “local law enforcement block grants”). Many jurisdictions did turn the administration of the program over to their law enforcement agencies, but the overall impact was to encourage collaboration among and between these agencies and other service agencies and community groups.

Finally, recipients of LLEBG funds were required to contribute only a 10 percent match (as opposed to the 25 percent match often associated with federal grants). This low match requirement allowed a number of smaller jurisdictions to participate in the program. It also enabled some larger jurisdictions, whose law

enforcement budgets are often determined well in advance of notice of any available grants, to meet the match requirement.

LLEBG funds were to be used according to several program purpose areas, described in Exhibit 2-1.

Analyses of program expenditures indicate that the greatest percentage of LLEBG funds were used to purchase equipment, hire additional law enforcement personnel, pay for overtime pay, and support crime prevention activities.

2.2 Phase One Evaluation

COSMOS was selected by NIJ to conduct an initial evaluation of the LLEBG program. During the first phase of that evaluation, the COSMOS project team:

- Examined the decision-making models used by jurisdictions to allocate those funds;
- Assessed the new electronic application process implemented by BJA; and
- Scanned for and conducted case studies of innovative uses of the LLEBG funds.

The full evaluation report (COSMOS, 2001) provides the details of the results of all of these activities. What was most striking, from among all of these results, was that:

- 232 of 236 respondents to a telephone survey indicated that they believed they were doing something innovative with the LLEBG funds;

Exhibit 2-1

PROGRAM PURPOSE AREAS FOR LLEBG

Purpose Area	Definition
Hiring	Supporting the hiring, training, and employing of additional law enforcement officers and necessary support personnel on a continuing basis. The money was not to be used to continue funding of previously hired positions (must show a net gain in personnel).
Overtime	Paying overtime to presently employed law enforcement officers and necessary support personnel to increase the number of hours worked by such personnel.
Equipment	Procuring equipment, technology, and other material directly related to basic law enforcement functions.
Enhancing Security Measures	Enhancing security measures in and around schools and in any other facilities or locations that were considered to have special risk for incidence of crime (funds could not be used for new construction, but could be used for renovation with special approval by BJA).
Drug Courts	Establishing or supporting drug courts. Funds could be used only if a program included continuing judicial supervision of offenders and integrated administration of other sanctions and services including mandatory testing, substance abuse treatment, probation, and aftercare services.
Enhancing Adjudication	Enhancing the adjudication process of cases involving violent offenders, including cases involving violent juvenile offenders. This included a range of activities, including enhancing sanctions, increasing space available to house offenders awaiting trial, and hiring additional attorneys to prosecute violent cases.
Multi-jurisdictional task force	Establishing a multi-jurisdictional task force to prevent and control crime, particularly in rural areas, composed of law enforcement officials representing units of general-purpose local government and federal law enforcement officials.
Crime Prevention	Establishing crime prevention programs involving cooperation between community residents and law enforcement personnel to control, detect, or investigate crime or to prosecute criminals.
Indemnification Insurance	Paying for costs of indemnification insurance for law enforcement officers.

- During visits to several sites, grantees were able to associate the LLEBG expenditures with specific programs or practices;
- Many of those programs and practices had specific goals with particular intended outcomes;
- Many jurisdictions had “bundled” the LLEBG funds with those from other sources (e.g., Byrne, COPS) in order to create a synergistic effect;
- In many cases, LLEBG funds were used as a catalyst to leverage other available resources with more constraints on their use; and
- Several LLEBG-funded projects had already begun to produce desired outputs (e.g., enhanced crime information systems) or outcomes (e.g., reductions in recorded crime).

Thus, in Phase One of the evaluation, LLEBG funds often were found to have been used in innovative ways, to address clearly identified goals, and to produce specified outcomes, in an accountable fashion. In some cases, these efforts had already begun to achieve desired outcomes. To a large degree, then, it was the team’s conclusion that the funds were being used to support “results-oriented” programming, and that many of those efforts were already beginning to produce outcomes.

The project team did not expect to find such progress, for several reasons:

- The Phase One evaluation focused on FY1996 and FY1997 awards. Since sites had 27 months in which to *expend* these funds, significant implementation was not expected to occur until well into the evaluation period;
- LLEBG grants had not been made with any of the explicit “outcome-oriented” expectations that characterize contemporary discretionary grant programs. In fact, there are far fewer restrictions on jurisdictions using LLEBG funding than found in other formula grant programs; and

- For many jurisdictions, the LLEBG funds were relatively modest in size, reducing the likelihood that significant outcomes could be achieved.

By design, the Phase One evaluation did not specifically focus on documenting or assessing outcomes. Therefore, it is all the more remarkable that several instances of such outcomes-based programs were discovered.

Intrigued by these findings, BJA decided to fund COSMOS to look more closely at the literature concerning the current status of “results-oriented” government programs, the extent to which LLEBG recipients used grant funds to support “results-oriented” programs, the nature and effectiveness of those programs, and the forces that led grantees to use their funds in this way. A summary of the Phase Two evaluation is provided in the next section of this report.

3. BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE PHASE TWO EVALUATION

3.1 Research Questions

Phase Two of the national evaluation of the LLEBG program had the following research questions:

- What does the extant literature indicate about the current status of, and motivations toward “results-oriented” government programs?
- To what extent are LLEBG grantees using their funds to support “results-oriented” programs?
- What is the nature and effectiveness of such “results-oriented” programs in a wide variety of sites?
- What are the forces that led those sites to adopt such programs?

3.2 Data Collection Methods

To answer these evaluation questions, the evaluation plan called for the evaluation team to:

- Conduct a thorough review of literature concerning trends in government management policies, particularly those involving grants. This review included international trends; changes at the federal, state, and local government levels; and trends within law enforcement in particular;
- Conduct a fax survey of LLEBG grantees to determine if they are using those grant funds to support “results-oriented” programs;
- Conduct follow-up telephone interviews with representatives of jurisdictions that indicated they had supported “results-oriented” programs with LLEBG funds;
- Select a diverse, representative sample of jurisdictions with “results-oriented” programs, stratified by region and award size; and

- Conduct a series of site visits to representative jurisdictions that indicate they are using LLEBG funds to support “results-oriented” programs and determine the nature of the programs, the results they might have achieved, and the forces that led the jurisdictions to support such programs.

4. TRENDS IN GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY

4.1 The Global Public Management Revolution

In the late nineteenth century, a “public administration paradigm” evolved in response to the corruption that had permeated American government. This approach stressed public management that was structured by hierarchy, rules, and internal regulation (Behn, 2001). To a large extent, this paradigm did solve the corruption problem. Over the last few decades, however, American government has become concerned less by the problem of corruption than by the problem of performance. As summarized by Derek Bok (1997): “If one thing has become clear about the federal government, it is that Americans have little regard for its performance.”

As a result of the concern to improve government performance, a number of proposals to revise the former public management paradigm have been offered. Some have called for “deregulating government” (Dilulio, 1996); others have endorsed “reinventing government” (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992); yet others have urged the “banishment of bureaucracy” (Osborne and Plastrik, 1997). Regardless of the label, and regardless of the particular prescription, these various reforms have all emphasized better management that produces better results. Similar changes have occurred overseas, especially in New Zealand, Australia, Great Britain, and Scandinavia. Kettl (1997, 2000) has called this a “global public management revolution.” Borins (1995, 1998) has conceptualized “the new public management” as composed of several key ideas, all focused on improving the

performance of the public sector. The Public Management Service of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (1995: 7) has concluded: “A new paradigm for public management has emerged, aimed at fostering a performance-oriented culture that is characterized by a closer focus on results.

Although, as Light (1997) notes, there have been 11 “tides of reform” to sweep American government in the last century, the comprehensiveness and duration of the new focus on results suggests that this new reform effort may be different. Part of the difference derives from the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA), passed in 1993. GPRA required all federal agencies to set strategic plans for their activities and indicators for measuring their outcomes by March 2000. As summarized by the General Accounting Office (1997: 1), Congress designed the legislation “to fundamentally shift the focus of federal management accountability from a preoccupation with rigid adherence to prescribed processes to a focus on achieving desired outcomes and results.” As analyzed by Kettl (2000), GPRA differed from previous reform efforts in three significant ways. First, Congress invested itself directly in GPRA by passing it into law. Previous efforts had been executive mandates, subject to lose favor with the next administration. Second, both Congress and the Clinton administration quickly found political value in the legislation. On the one hand, House Majority Leader Dick Armey discovered that GPRA provided a device for bringing executive branch officials before congressional committees to answer for their programs. On the

other hand, the Office of Management and Budget began to rely on GPRA to shape agencies' activities. Third, some agencies, including the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the Internal Revenue Service, and the Department of Defense, began using the GPRA process to improve internal management. For all of these reasons, GPRA has provided considerable support to the implementation of the public management revolution within federally funded programs

4.2 Devolution

For the last several years, the federal government has devolved administrative responsibilities and policy-shaping decision-making to state and local governments. For example, the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) turned much of the responsibility for welfare over to the states; the EPA delegated more authority to the states in devising strategies for reaching pollution reduction goals. The states experimented with new managed care plans for Medicaid recipients and devised innovative performance management systems. Federal funding for local criminal justice programs, as mentioned above, began in 1965, with the Office of Law Enforcement Assistance, later to become the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration. More recently, a plethora of federally-funded programs has provided assistance (and much autonomy) to local authorities. COPS, for example, has supplied millions of dollars to support community policing efforts, improve responses to domestic violence, provide enhanced security at schools, and many other topics. Much discretion is left up to

local law enforcement authorities. BJA itself provides funding to state and local governments, not only through the LLEBG program, but also through Byrne Formula Grants, the Bulletproof Partnership program, and many others. Although the level of local discretion varies across programs, responsibility for carrying them out is left to the local level of government.

A number of state and local governments have implemented rigorous results-oriented management systems as well. The National Council of State Legislatures examination of this issue concluded that, by the end of 1999, 33 states had “broad governing-for-results” legislation, 17 did not (Snell and Grooters, 2000). No comparable survey is known to have been conducted of local governments, but, as this study shows, a significant number of local jurisdictions used LLEBG funds for “results-oriented” programs. As will be shown below, there has been a “quiet revolution” in American government akin to the “global public management revolution” described above. Leading in the direction is the field of law enforcement? in particular, developments such as problem-solving policing, COMPSTAT (an abbreviation, most people believe, for “Computerized Statistics”), and efforts to “measure what matters” have all been quite congruent with the revolution in public management summarized above.

4.3 The Quiet Revolution in American Government

One manifestation of the “global public management revolution,” described above, was that there was, as one observer has called it, “a quiet revolution” occurring in American government (Linden, 1994: 3-4). According to this analysis:

...a virtual transformation is occurring in some of our public institutions, a transformation no one could have predicted even ten years ago. This sea change is as sweeping and deep as it is quiet. It is overshadowed, for the moment, by the endless stream of stories documenting the failures of our government, but the change holds enormous promise for our public institutions and our very society.

The “quiet revolution,” according to Linden, is characterized by the emergence of governments that are organized around solving problems, achieving specified results, and producing outcomes. One of the earliest indications that such a revolution was underway was the creation of the Innovations in American Government Program, funded by the Ford Foundation and administered by the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. This program, initiated in 1986, was designed to identify and reward outstanding examples of creative problem-solving in the public sector. It was precisely such outcomes-oriented governments that Osborne and Gaebler (1992) called for when they urged that government be “reinvented.” Unlike traditional bureaucratic governments, which focus on inputs, “reinvented” or “entrepreneurial” governments focus on results. The recession of the early 1990s produced a rapidly growing number of governors, mayors, and city managers who began to adopt the reinvention approach, measuring outcomes and using that information to improve their management. In 1993, the Clinton administration joined the movement with Vice President Al Gore’s National Performance Review. Only five years after the first call for

reinvention, Osborne and Plastrik (1997: 9) could report that, “American progress [toward that goal] since 1990 has been remarkable.”

4.4 The Revolution in American Policing

Major changes have been occurring over the last three decades in American policing as well, reflecting the “quiet revolution” in government described above. The evaluation team believes that the products of this “revolution” are what were uncovered in Phase One of the evaluation—that many of the grantees are using the LLEBG funds in creative, outcome-oriented ways that have already begun to show results. This revolution can be attributed to several sources, briefly summarized below.

Attention to Research. Since the 1970s, American police agencies have opened themselves to collaboration with researchers in an effort to empirically assess the effectiveness of their traditional strategies and tactics. The Kansas City Preventive Patrol Experiment (Kelling, Pate, Dieckman, and Brown, 1974), conducted by the Police Foundation in collaboration with the Kansas City Police Department, raised questions about the utility of the most basic strategy of policing: random preventive patrol. A Rand Corporation study (Greenwood, Petersilia, and Chaiken, 1977) raised similar questions about the efficacy of detective work. After those initial path-breaking studies, police departments opened themselves to researchers who have studied the effectiveness of a broad array of topics, including response time, foot patrol, team policing, one vs. two officer vehicles, community policing, and many others.

Many of these studies were, and remain, controversial. What is most striking, however, is that even the opponents of these studies have agreed that the most effective way to rebut their findings is by questioning their research methods or, alternatively, providing contrary empirical evidence. Policing, a profession that had long depended upon tradition as the basis upon which to make policy decisions, has come a long way toward adopting an outcomes-oriented decision-making paradigm.

Community-Oriented Policing. One of the first uses of the term “community-oriented policing” was by Chief Raymond Hoobler in announcing the results of the San Diego Community Profile study (Boydston and Sherry, 1975), which suggested that having officers become more familiar with the areas they patrol could be effective. Since that time, despite varying definitions of the term, “community policing” as an orientation (or philosophy) has become prevalent throughout American policing (see, for example, Skolnick and Bayley, 1988; and Greene and Mastrofski, 1988). Although many of the attempts to implement community policing have not been rigorously evaluated, the explicit goal of each such effort has been to improve relations with the public. This movement, then, has led to a focus on the accountability of police to the community, a radical departure from the “professional model” adopted previously (Kelling, 1988; Kelling and Moore, 1988).

Problem-Oriented Policing. In a seminal article, Herman Goldstein (1979) argued that instead of simply responding to a series of individual calls for service,

many of which were similar, police should attempt to identify the cause of the problem and seek to reduce or eliminate that cause. That article, expanded into a widely disseminated book (Goldstein, 1990), became the basis for what has come to be known as “problem-oriented policing.” At the core of this approach is a problem-solving process, elaborated in various places (e.g., Eck and Spelman, 1987; Goldstein, 1990; Shelley and Grant, 1998), that generally involves four stages:

- Scanning, which involves looking for and identifying problems;
- Analysis, in which a thorough understanding of the problem is developed;
- Response, in which response options are developed that are consistent with the information analyzed, an appropriate response is selected, and that response is implemented; and
- Assessment, in which feedback on how well the response is working is collected and used to refine the response or redefine the nature of the problem.

The assessment stage of this model places particular emphasis on the measurement of outcomes produced by the response, or program intervention. The focus on measuring outcomes, and redirecting programs in light of the results, has been a valuable contribution of problem-oriented policing to the policing profession.

Measuring What Matters. As a result of the developments in community-oriented and problem-oriented policing, Kelling (1992) raised the question of whether, given this new foci, we were truly “measuring what matters.” Primarily addressing organizational performance measurement, Kelling contended that

traditional yardsticks were outdated and needed to be changed. His paper stimulated the NIJ and the COPS to collaborate on creating a Policing Research Institute that focused on “measuring what matters.” This effort examined the implications of contemporary policing for measuring organizational performance and sought to move toward new, more relevant criteria. A series of meetings, solicitations, and papers has ensued (Brady, 1996; NIJ, 1997; Langworthy, 1999). As a result, police practitioners and researchers have experienced a heightened awareness of the importance of measuring outcomes, specifically those produced by community policing efforts.

Data-Driven Policing: COMPSTAT. As part of the natural progression toward increased accountability and intensified focus on outcomes, the New York City Police Department, in 1994, introduced COMPSTAT, a periodic briefing by precinct commanders during which they report to the department’s command staff on recent crime trends in their areas and indicate how they were responding to them. To make these meetings possible, significant improvements in the department’s data management and analysis capabilities were necessary. Although there are varying interpretations of the history of this effort, by all accounts the COMPSTAT meetings have become a major focus of departmental activity (Bratton, 1998; Silverman, 1999; Maple, 1999). Advocates of the approach have claimed that COMPSTAT deserves much of the credit for the dramatic decreases in crime reported in New York in the last several years. As a result, several other police departments, ranging from Philadelphia to Los Angeles, have

adopted some or all of the basic features of the COMPSTAT model in their own jurisdictions.

4.5 Summary

During the course of the Phase One evaluation of the LLEBG program, the COSMOS evaluation team found that several jurisdictions were using grant funds to support “results-oriented” programs that stress accountability and results—and that many of those programs were already producing desired results. These findings were largely unexpected, both because such an approach was not required by the program, and because the evaluation focused on the first two years of funding, thus allowing little time for programs to achieve results. Upon examination of management literature, summarized above, it appears possible that these “results-oriented” programs are a manifestation of the impact of a “global public management revolution,” “a quiet revolution” in American government, and a multi-faceted “revolution” in American policing. If this is the case, these results could be significant for local crime prevention efforts in particular and federal policymaking in general.

Supporting this hypothesis, however, requires answering the following questions:

- To what extent is the results-oriented approach being utilized by LLEBG grant recipients?
- What forces led to the adoption of results-oriented programming?
- In what ways is this outcomes-oriented approach being used, and with what results?

It is these questions that the next section of this evaluation seeks to answer.

5. THE PREVALENCE OF RESULTS-ORIENTED PROGRAMMING

In order to determine the extent (prevalence) of results-oriented programming among LLEBG grantees, COSMOS conducted a survey of all FY2001 grantees. To facilitate this survey, BJA provided a list of 3,111 jurisdictions that received grants during that year. Since all of these jurisdictions were required to have e-mail addresses in order to participate in the electronic filing system, it was decided to conduct the survey using e-mail and a Web-based data entry format. In addition, because conducting such an e-mail survey was so inexpensive and quick, it also was decided to distribute the survey to all grant recipients, not just to a random sample. With the concurrence of BJA and NIJ, a brief survey instrument was created, asking each jurisdiction whether it was using LLEBG funds to support one or more programs that were “results-oriented,” that is, that “have stated goals and also have qualitative or quantitative performance measures that can be used to determine if those goals are being met.” (A copy of the survey instrument is included as Appendix A of this report.) If the jurisdiction had one or more such programs, they were then requested to provide the names of those programs. Before the survey was distributed, a letter from representatives of BJA and NIJ was sent by e-mail to the chief executive and point of contact notifying them that their agency would receive the survey and requesting their cooperation.

Because of the electronic nature of the survey, responses began to be received almost immediately after the initial request was sent. Fully 16 percent of

the responses were received on the same day the survey was sent; another 26.5 percent were received on the second day.

Exhibit 5-1, below, summarizes the results of the survey. As that table indicates, the survey was e-mailed to all 3,111 jurisdictions on the list of agencies receiving LLEBG grants (column 2). A total of 2,776 agencies (89.2%) of the agencies on the list actually received the e-mail (columns 2 and 3). A total of 335 (10.8%) of the e-mails did not get through to their intended recipient: 28 were blocked by the receiving e-mail server, 29 had invalid addresses, 3 were returned because the receiving mail box was full, 168 were returned because the address could not be found on the receiving e-mail server, and another 107 had unspecified errors. The percentages of agencies receiving the e-mail varied somewhat across their LLEBG award size, with the lowest percentage of agencies receiving the e-mail (80.7 percent) being those with LLEBG grants of \$1 million or more. Among agencies allocated grants of less than \$1 million, e-mails were received by percentages approaching or exceeding 90 percent. These results indicate that conducting an e-mail survey of law enforcement agencies is extremely efficient, but that contacting agencies with the largest number of Part 1 crimes poses the greatest obstacles, perhaps indicating the greater attention those agencies pay to erecting “firewalls” to defend themselves against electronic intrusions.

Altogether, 1,704 agencies responded to the survey, consisting of 54.8 percent of those on the original list, and 61.4 percent of those that received the e-mailed survey. Exhibit 5-2 compares a few basic demographic characteristics for

Exhibit 5-1

RESULTS OF SURVEY OF LLEBG GRANTEES: BY GRANT AWARD SIZE

(1) Grant Award	(2) List	(3) Contacts	(4) Contacts/ List	(5) Returns	(6) Returns/ List	(7) Returns/ Contacts	(8) Results- Oriented	(9) R-O/ List	(10) R-O/ Returns
\$1 million and over	57	46	80.7%	30	52.6%	65.2%	22	38.6%	73.3%
\$500,000-\$999,999	71	63	88.7%	42	59.2%	66.7%	19	26.8%	45.2%
\$250,000-\$499,999	146	139	95.2%	98	67.1%	70.5%	32	21.9%	32.7%
\$100,000-\$249,999	302	264	87.4%	190	62.9%	72.0%	67	22/2%	35.3%
\$75,000-\$99,999	153	138	90.2%	91	59.5%	65.9%	19	12.4%	20.9%
\$50,000-\$74,999	262	241	92.0%	152	58.0%	63.1%	36	13.7%	23.7%
\$25,000-\$49,999	674	597	88.6%	378	56.1%	63.3%	72	10.7%	19.0%
\$10,000-\$24,999	1277	1139	89.2%	656	51.4%	57.6%	131	10.3%	20.0%
Under \$10,000	169	149	88.2%	67	39.6%	45.0%	8	4.7%	11.9%
Total Awards	3111	2776	89.2%	1704	54.8%	61.4%	406	13.1%	23.8%

the jurisdictions that responded with those that did not respond. The exhibit shows that the responding counties tended to have larger populations than the non-responding counties, but that the responding cities tended to be smaller than the non-responding cities. The differences may suggest that the respondents were not entirely representative of the universe of LLEBG grantees.

A further analysis of the results presented in Exhibit 5-1 indicates some variation in response rates across award size. Specifically, based upon returns relative to the total list of grantees, the highest response rates were found among agencies receiving grants between \$250,000 and \$499,999 (67.1%), followed by agencies receiving grants between \$100,000 and \$249,999 (62.9%). The

Exhibit 5-2

COMPARISON BETWEEN RESPONDENTS AND NON-RESPONDENTS

Demographic Characteristics	Respondents		Non-Respondents	
	No.	Average	No.	Average
Counties:				
	396		394	
Avg. Sq. Miles		1284		1125
Average Population		235408		170614
Average Percent White		80%		79%
Average Percent Under 25 Years of Age		35%		35%
Cities Over 25,000:				
	545		327	
Avg. Sq. Miles		36		37
Average Population		97151		119914
Average Percent White		73%		72%
Average Percent Under 25 Years of Age		38%		37%
Smaller Cities and Towns:				
	569		562	
Avg. Sq. Miles		19		19
Average Population		21978		36507
Average Percent White		82%		69%
No Data				
	194		119	
TOTAL	1704		1402	

response rate for all other agencies (except those who received grants of under \$10,000) ranged from slightly over 50 percent to almost 60 percent. The response rate for agencies with awards smaller than \$10,000 was the lowest (39.6%); since these agencies, according to program policies, were to receive their funding indirectly, through the state, this could possibly be accounted for by confusion regarding reporting accountability.

Calculating the response rate relative to those agencies actually receiving the survey, the highest response rates were found among agencies receiving grants between \$100,000 and \$149,999 (72.0%), and those allocated grants between


\$250,000 and \$499,999 (70.5%). The response rate for all other agencies (except those receiving grants of under \$10,000) ranged from 58 to 67 percent. By far the lowest response rate was found among agencies receiving grants smaller than \$10,000; again, this low response rate could plausibly be attributed to a confusion regarding reporting accountability.

Column 8 shows the number of agencies in each category that indicated that they were using LLEBG funds to support one or more “result-oriented” program. Column 9 indicates the percentage of agencies on the original list that has such programs. Finally, column 10 indicates the percentage of agencies that responded to the survey that had one or more “results-oriented” program. As the exhibit indicates, 406 (23.8%) of responding jurisdictions indicated that they used LLEBG funds to support such programs.

Exhibit 5-3 provides a graphic presentation of the number of responding grantees, subdivided by the size of their award, which indicated that they had one or more “results-oriented” programs. As that exhibit indicates, the percentage of grantees supporting “results-oriented” programs varied directly, and dramatically, by the size of the grant award. In particular, 11.9 percent of grantees with awards below \$10,000 indicated that they supported “results-oriented” programs. For grantees with awards between \$10,000 and \$99,999, however, approximately 20 percent indicated they supported “results-oriented” programs. For grantees with awards between \$100,000 and \$499,999, approximately 35 percent said they

Exhibit 5-3

RESULTS-ORIENTED PROGRAMS BY AWARD SIZE



Below \$10,000	\$10,000 to \$24,999	\$25,000 to \$49,999
\$50,000 to \$74,999	\$75,000 to \$99,999	\$100,000 to \$249,999
\$250,000 to \$499,999	\$500,000 to \$999,999	\$1 million +

funded “results-oriented” programs. For grantees with awards between \$500,000 and \$999,999, slightly more than 45 percent indicated they supported “results-oriented” programs. Finally, grantees with awards of \$1 million and above, slightly more than 74 percent said they used the LLEBG funds to support “results-oriented” programs.

Interpreting these results is comparable to the classic “glass half empty/glass half full” conundrum. Among all responding grantees, 23.8 percent indicated they were using LLEBG funds to support “results-oriented” programs. From the “glass half empty” perspective, this finding could be seen as suggesting that 76.2 percent of grantees were *not* using grant funds to support such programs. However, from the “glass half full” perspective, it could be seen as surprising that as many as 24 percent of grantees would support such programs, although the grant provisions did not require that they do so.

Analyzing the results by size of grant award provides a more nuanced understanding of the prevalence of “results-oriented” programming. Among agencies receiving grants amounting to less than \$100,000, 12 to 24 percent of agencies claimed they were supporting “results-oriented” programs. Among agencies receiving grants between \$100,000 and \$999,999, however, between 34 to 45 percent indicated they were implementing “results-oriented” programming, an even more impressive finding, given that such programming was not required by LLEBG guidelines. Finally, and most impressively, the fact that 74 percent of agencies receiving grants of \$1 million or more used those funds to support

“results-oriented” programming suggests that, at least among the very largest agencies, there is evidence of a “quiet revolution” occurring among local American governments.

6. THE BASIS, NATURE, AND EFFECTIVENESS OF RESULTS-ORIENTED PROGRAMMING

6.1 Selecting Sites

In order to select jurisdictions with results-oriented programs that would be examined in detail, evaluation staff reviewed the programs mentioned by the 406 grantees indicating they had such programs. Programs were first screened to exclude common programs such as DARE, GREAT, PAL, and other generic efforts. This produced a list of 302 grantees that indicated that they funded other types of results-oriented programs with LLEBG funds. Members of the evaluation staff then made telephone calls to the point of contact in those jurisdictions to obtain more information about their programs. In particular, staff members asked about:

1. The goals of the program;
2. How the program works;
3. Which agency implements the program and what other agencies are involved;
4. What performance measures are used to determine if the program is achieving its goals;
5. Whether the jurisdiction was tracking the results and whether an evaluation was being conducted; and
6. What results the program had achieved so far.

Based on the results of the survey, the evaluation staff selected jurisdictions that had programs that appeared to merit further investigation during a site visit.

Programs were selected that met as many of these “results-oriented” criteria as possible:

1. They had clear goals;
2. They worked in a way designed to achieve those goals;
3. They had defined performance measures;
4. The jurisdiction was tracking the results of the program; and
5. They had begun to achieve desired results

In order to select broadly representative sites, the most promising programs were stratified according to the following criteria:

1. Geographic region;
2. Jurisdiction population; and
3. Program type.

A total of 44 jurisdictions were identified that appeared to be most representative of the results-oriented programs. (Appendix B provides a list of these programs, by region and program type.) Because of budget limitations, it was possible to make site visits to only 22 of these jurisdictions. To reduce travel costs, sites were visited by geographic cluster. As a result, jurisdictions in the Midwest and Southwest were not included in the site visits. Exhibit 6-1 lists the 22 jurisdictions and the dates they were visited, also showing the cluster pattern.

6.2 Site Visit Protocol

Prior to commencing site visits, evaluation staff developed a site visit protocol to guide data collection during the visits. A copy of that protocol is included as Appendix C of this report. Whenever possible, site visits were made by a team of two COSMOS evaluators. Before each visit, the team members obtained and

Exhibit 6-1

SCHEDULE OF SITE VISITS FOR THE NATIONAL EVALUATION OF THE LLEBG PROGRAM

Location of the LLEBG Grantee	Date of Site Visit (2001-02)
1. Los Angeles City, CA	October 13 – 20
2. Los Angeles County, CA	
3. Pasadena, CA	
4. Rancho Palos Verdes, CA	
5. Riverside, CA	
6. Baltimore County, MD	February 6
7. Alexandria, VA	February 11
8. Baltimore City, MD	February 20 – 21
9. Jacksonville, FL	February 26 – March 2
10. North Miami Beach, FL	March 18 – 19
11. Miami, FL	March 20 – 22
12. Boston, MA	March 31 – April 13
13. Brockton, MA	
14. Cambridge MA	
15. Taunton, MA	
16. Seattle WA	May 4 – 16
17. Portland, OR	
18. Tacoma, WA	
19. San Francisco, CA	June 2 – 14
20. Palo Alto, CA	
21. Santa Clara County, CA	
22. Stockton/San Joaquin County, CA	

reviewed all grant applications, annual written assessments, and other material obtained from the jurisdiction to be visited. Two weeks prior to the visit, the evaluation team contacted the grantee's designated Point of Contact (POC) to negotiate the timing of the site visit, brief the POC concerning the nature and purpose of the site visit, request that information concerning the local program(s) be assembled, and begin to develop an agenda for the visit. A copy of the site visit protocol was provided to the POC, who was encouraged to share it with all persons to be interviewed. Prior to the visit, the team notified the chief executive officer of the grantee of the nature and timing of the visit.

During the site visits, which lasted from one to four days per jurisdiction, the team members interviewed a wide range of persons involved in planning and implementing the results-oriented programs, including, but not necessarily limited to, the following:

- Representatives of the office of the chief executive officer of the jurisdiction;
- Personnel within the grant management office of the jurisdiction;
- Participants in the decision-making process that selected the results-oriented program(s);
- Key decision-makers in the agency/agencies implementing the program(s);
- Grant managers in those agencies;
- Managers who are implementing the program(s);
- Program staff members;
- Clients of the program(s);
- Leaders of community-based organizations; and, where relevant,
- Local evaluators.

In these interviews, site visit team members sought to determine how and why it was decided to use LLEBG funds to support results-oriented programs, how those programs are implemented, and what results, if any, those programs have achieved.

In addition to conducting interviews, team members also collected and reviewed copies of various archival documents, including:

- Minutes of planning meetings;
- Program proposals;
- Program assessments;
- Contracts and subcontracts;
- Inter-agency and intra-agency memoranda concerning program implementation;
- Program progress reports;
- Copies of media coverage of programs;
- Program output, and outcome data; and
- Evaluation reports.

6.3 Site Visit Summaries

This section presents summaries of the findings of site visits to the following jurisdictions:

- Alexandria, Virginia
- Baltimore City, Maryland
- Baltimore County, Maryland
- Boston, Massachusetts
- Brockton, Massachusetts
- Cambridge, Massachusetts
- Jacksonville, Florida
- Los Angeles City, California
- Los Angeles County, California
- Miami-Dade County, Florida
- North Miami Beach, Florida
- Palo Alto, California
- Pasadena, California
- Portland City/Multnomah County, Oregon
- Rancho Palos Verdes, California

- Riverside County, California
- San Francisco City and County, California
- Santa Clara County, California
- Seattle, Washington
- Stockton City/San Joaquin County, California
- Tacoma, Washington
- Taunton, Massachusetts

For each site, the “Background” portion provides a summary description of the jurisdiction and how it was decided to use LLEBG funds to pay for results-oriented programs. The “Results-Oriented Programs” portion describes the programs supported by block grant funds and the results those programs have achieved.

6.3.1 Alexandria, Virginia

Background. The City of Alexandria, with a population of approximately 130,000 in 2001, is a short drive across the Potomac River from Washington, DC. Although the personal crime rate has consistently remained low, the city experienced a dramatic (35.4 %) rise in Grand Larceny Auto (GLA, defined as the theft or attempted theft of all types of motor vehicles) between 1994 and 1995, rising from 874 to 1,183. Upon receipt of the LLEBG funds, the police chief, in collaboration with his command staff, decided that this rising GLA problem deserved the focus of attention in the expenditure of those funds.

Results-Oriented Program. The Alexandria Police Department decided to use its LLEBG funds to support a *Grand Larceny Auto (GLA) Task Force*. The task force, which began in 1994 with seven officers and one sergeant, had the goal of reducing the number of thefts or attempted thefts of motor vehicles throughout the city. The officers, in overtime mode, worked in plain clothes, using three

rented, unmarked cars. They sought to achieve this goal by using a computer to run license plate numbers through local, state, and federal databases to determine if the vehicle had been reported stolen. They operated while patrolling the city in the rental vehicles. In addition, in an effort to interrupt auto thefts in progress, the unit would occasionally conduct stakeouts in locations known to produce numerous stolen vehicle reports. At the beginning of the program, the units would work from 7:00 or 8:00 p.m. until 4:00 or 5:00 a.m., checking between 500 and 1,000 license plates per night. LLEBG funds are used to support approximately six months of the overtime expenses; departmental funds are used to support the program, to the extent possible, for the rest of the year. The GLA Task Force worked on 202 days in 2000, producing 39 GLA recoveries, 183 arrests, and recovered property worth over \$270,000. After March 2001, because of decreased LLEBG funding, and local financial difficulties, the unit was reduced from six to three police officers and one sergeant.

The principal measure of program success was the number of reported GLA incidents in the City of Alexandria. Data provided by the police department indicated that the number of GLAs fell from 1,183 in 1995 to 733 in 2000, a reduction of slightly over 38 percent. As a result of the perceived success of the program, the unit has expanded its focus to include robberies and burglaries, and the name of the unit has been changed to the Tactical Response Team.

6.3.2 Baltimore City, Maryland

Background. Baltimore, with a population of slightly more than 650,000 inhabitants, has faced significant crime and drug problems over the past few years. To address these problems, the city had supported the development of several community organizations, based on the premise that crime and disorder could be best addressed at the neighborhood level. A number of public and private organizations were developed to facilitate the communities' efforts. The Mayor of the city, for example, created the Mayor's Coordinating Council on Criminal Justice, which later became known as the Mayor's Office on Criminal Justice (MOCJ). This agency worked closely with the Community Law Center, the clinical law program at the University of Maryland at Baltimore, the Citizens Planning and Housing Association (CPHA), and the Neighborhood Design Center to provide assistance to the city's many neighborhood associations, largely with the goal of protecting them from crime and disorder. In 1994, the Community Law Center and the CPHA developed a proposal for the city to receive a Comprehensive Communities Program grant. This grant, managed by MOCJ, was used to develop crime prevention and reduction strategies in five of the city's neighborhoods. These programs were to be based upon collaboration among nonprofit civic groups, community associations, and public agencies. This grant lasted from 1995 to 1997. The mayor during that period, Kurt Schmoke, had initiated a Program Performance Measurement Project under which each of the city's agencies had to measure their performance and how the results indicated progress toward

achieving 1 of the city's 18 objectives. Grantees were also expected to conform to this performance measurement system. The police department, in keeping with the mayor's requirements, began its own Crimestat program, based on the COMPSTAT initiative begun by the New York City Police Department. The mayor then began a city-wide program, called Citystat, based on the police department's model, that called for all agency heads to periodically demonstrate their progress toward the attainment of their goals.

In 1997, the five Comprehensive Communities were expanded and merged with the Baltimore City HotSpots Initiative, designed to address crime in several communities throughout Maryland, with financial support from the Governor's Office on Crime Control and Crime Prevention (GOCCP). This agency had its own reporting requirements, which required that the outcomes of funded programs be measured, often by outside evaluators. When the availability of LLEBG funds was announced, the MOCJ played a major role in making recommendations about how those funds would be allocated. In making these recommendations, the MOCJ sought to continue the city's HotSpots/Comprehensive Communities effort, and operated under the assumption that any program supported by LLEBG should adhere to the mayor's performance management requirements as well as the measurement mandate from the GOCCP. The annual performance measurement report, initially required by LLEBG for programs of certain types, was another motivation to monitor the performance of programs closely. The new mayor,

Martin O'Malley, continued the previous mayor's emphasis on performance measurement, integrating it with Citystat.

Results-Oriented Programs. Although Baltimore nominated several programs, supported, at least in part, by LLEBG funds, two programs in particular seemed to best meet the definition specified in the survey. The most significant proportion of LLEBG funding was used to support the *Comprehensive Communities/HotSpots Program*, mentioned above. This program is a community-based crime prevention collaboration of 54 community organizations, 12 city agencies, the Baltimore Police Department, 8 state and federal agencies, and 45 nonprofit agencies, churches, foundations, and institutions, with the goal of creating a 6-part strategy to reduce crime and improve the quality of life in selected Baltimore neighborhoods. The underlying assumption of the program is that it is possible for any given community, working in partnership with appropriate resources, to make it more difficult for crime to be perpetrated. This approach stresses building comprehensive community infrastructures to affect the many factors that contribute to the occurrence of crime. The program operates in 5 Comprehensive Community (CC) target areas and 12 HotSpots (HS) target areas, with a combined population of approximately 150,000 residents. In each area, the strategy is implemented under the guidance of a team composed of community residents, a community organizer, a foot patrol officer, and a community lawyer. A Core Team works with the communities to: assess problems, needs, and resources; assists the communities in strategic planning; and provides training,

technical assistance, and policy advice to the community organizations. The program contains a wide variety of components, including community mobilization, resource organization, community policing, community supervision (by parole agents, probation agents, and Department of Justice caseworkers), community maintenance (using housing code enforcement, nuisance abatement, community lawyers, community service), youth organizers, youth tribunals, application of Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) principles, community prosecution, victim outreach and assistance, and various other tactics. The success of the program has been measured by examining recorded crime in the target areas, compared to that in the rest of the city. Data provided by program staff indicated that from 1996 to 1998, Part 1 crimes in the CC/HS areas fell by 32 percent, while in the city as a whole, crime fell by 17 percent.

The *Offender Reentry Partnership Project* seeks to provide a comprehensive, seamless system for the community integration of inmates who return to targeted Baltimore neighborhoods. Key services provided to program participants, through a network of city and state agencies, the Baltimore Police Department, and community-based and non-profit service providers, include life skills training, employment readiness training, job counseling and placement, job retention counseling, transitional housing; parenting skill training, childcare resources, substance abuse treatment; and both medical and mental health care. Program success was to be measured by the recidivism of program participants. Data

provided by program staff indicate that of the first 35 clients served by the program during its first year (1991), none had been re-arrested.

6.3.3 Baltimore County, Maryland

Background. Baltimore County, with a population slightly greater than 782,000 residents, has its own police department that serves the unincorporated areas of the county surrounding Baltimore. The county executive, when informed of the availability of LLEBG funds, gave responsibility for deciding how to use those funds to the police chief. The police chief, in turn, assigned the responsibility for apportioning the funds to a small group of his senior staff, with the admonition that the funds should be spent in pursuit of the goals of the department's strategic plan. This group then sent out Requests for Proposals (RFPs) from each of the department's operational commanders. Each proposal was to have measurable goals and objectives, tied to the department's strategic objectives, as well as have a description of how the goals were to be achieved and a budget. The proposals were evaluated on the basis of their focus on the department's strategic goals, the feasibility of the proposed approach, and the reasonableness of the proposed budget.

Results-Oriented Programs. Although several results-oriented programs were funded with LLEBG support, the *Warrant Apprehension Task Force* can serve as a good example of the type of effort supported with this grant. This task force was created to deal with a large number of open warrants on file for persons thought to reside within Baltimore County. The task force consists of one

lieutenant, two sergeants, two corporals, an office manager, 10 detectives, and nine police officers. These officers spend several hours per week searching for, and arresting, persons with open warrants, most often for domestic violence, assault, and burglary, as well as drug and alcohol violations. Program outcomes were to be the number of warrants served and the number of arrests made. Data provided by the task force indicates that during the first year of the program the number of warrants served by the Baltimore County Police Department increased by 31 percent; the number of arrests for open warrants increased 34 percent. These results were considered to be so positive, that a Regional Warrant Apprehension Task Force was created, under the supervision of the Baltimore Police Department, involving several police agencies in the Baltimore region as well as members of the Parole and Probation Department.

Other programs reduced offenses committed by juveniles, fatal and serious injury automobile crashes, violent crimes of various types, prostitution, speeding, and other outcomes.

6.3.4 Boston, Massachusetts

Background. Boston, a city with almost 600,000 residents, has a strategic plan that guides decision-making regarding the expenditure of funds, whether its their own budget or external grants. Furthermore, the police department has a strong community policing orientation, which stresses the importance of community-based planning. When the LLEBG funds were made available, the mayor essentially turned the decision-making process concerning how to allocate

the funds to the police commissioner. The commissioner, guided by the city's strategic plan and the department's own strategic plan for neighborhood policing, decided to spread the funds broadly, supporting new tactical operations, providing continued support to on-going programs, and providing "Violence Prevention Grants" to community-based organizations. The commissioner provides his recommendations to the LLEBG advisory board, which, after some deliberation, usually ratifies the commissioner's recommendations.

Results-Oriented Programs. Although Boston funds literally dozens of projects with its LLEBG funds, the department nominated the following as the best examples of results-oriented programs: the Violence Prevention Grants program, the Anti-Gang Initiative/Operation Cease Fire, the Youth Services Providers Network, and the School Impact Project.

The *Violence Prevention Grant program* was created by the police commissioner as a means of supporting his commitment to community policing. In particular, he allocated \$1 million of almost \$3 million in LLEBG funds originally allocated to the city to be provided to programs run by community-based organizations and designed to reduce violence in various forms. (From FY1996 through FY2001, the department allocated almost 38 percent of their LLEBG funds to this program.) The department issued a RFP for "Violence Prevention Grants," each funded with block grant funds. Initially, the grants could be for sums up to \$50,000, but the department found grants of that size too difficult to administer, so the top limit was reduced to \$20,000. The RFP was published in local newspapers

and distributed to over 800 private nonprofit organizations in the Boston area.

Each proposal had to: 1) specify the problem to be dealt with; 2) demonstrate that the project would address a neighborhood priority, as articulated in the district's strategic plan; 3) identify the target population; 4) specify the program's goals and objectives, and how they would be measured; 5) describe how the program would address the specified problem; 6) summarize past experience working with the identified problem; 7) provide a project timeline; 8) describe the police role in the project; 9) indicate how the project would be sustained after LLEBG funding was terminated; and 10) provide a budget for completing the project. In addition, each proposal had to be accompanied by a letter of support from the district commander of the area to be targeted. The proposals were judged by an outside panel of five persons, including academics, city officials, and community representatives, none of whom were associated with the police department. A rigid point system was used by the panel to judge the viability of each proposal. The most common issues addressed were youth gangs and violence and domestic violence. The police department, seeing itself as a "grant-providing foundation," required quarterly progress reports from each project, and determined whether to refund a project to a large extent on the results it had demonstrated.

The *Anti-Gang Initiative/Operation Ceasefire* is a multi-agency strategy with the goal of combating youth violence. It operates under the auspices of the Youth Violence Strike Force, comprising officers of various local, state, and federal police agencies along with the district attorney's office, the Department of Youth Services,

the probation department, the parole board, the U.S. Attorney's Office, the Ten Point Coalition (comprising members of the clergy), as well as community residents, merchants, and organizations. The program is based upon the premises that: 1) most serious youth violence is committed by a very small group of youth; 2) this violence is encouraged and amplified by gang affiliation; and 3) focused, intense, coordinated attention on violent gangs by law enforcement and the community can reduce violence. The strategy involves three components: intervention, prevention, and suppression. A monthly meeting is held with representatives of the police department, social service agencies, and community agencies to devise strategies to deal with specific gangs and "hot spots" of violent crime throughout the city. A coordinated "zero tolerance" intervention is then agreed upon and implemented. This frequently involves directly confronting gang members, informing them that they are under surveillance, and that any violation of the law or parole violation, however minor, would lead to arrest or parole revocation. Program success has been measured by the number of total homicides and the number of homicides involving persons aged 24 and under. Total homicides fell from 96 in 1995, the year before the program began, to 18 in 2001. Homicides involving persons 24 years of age and under fell from 46 in 1995 to 3 in 2001.

The *Youth Service Providers Network (YSPN)*, a partnership between the Boston Police Department and the Boys and Girls Club of Boston, is designed to provide adult care, services, and assistance to "at-risk" and "high-risk" adolescents

and their families. Youth who are at-risk for being arrested, getting involved with the juvenile justice system, or have already become involved in that system, are the typical YSPN client. The goal of the program is to provide prevention and intervention services to those clients, with the larger goal of reducing youth violence and increasing youth safety in Boston. One of the advantages of the partnership with the police department is that front line police officers have frequent access to youth who are at-risk and are in need of social services. YSPN has Licensed Clinical Social Workers (LICSWs) working in neighborhood-based police stations across the city as well as in several city-wide police units. Referrals come to the LICSWs either directly from police officers or through police reports filed by police officers. Youth and their families referred to YSPN receive assistance under a three-tiered system: 1) intake and assessment, during which an assessment of family and individual strengths and weaknesses help determine the nature and level of services required; 2) short-term clinical case management, during which youth and their families are seen in weekly or monthly meetings with a focus on parent guidance and supportive counseling; and 3) on-going clinical services, during which youth and their families are seen weekly regarding issues related to truancy, delinquency, school performance, and family functioning. Statistics produced by the program indicate that the clients of YSPN have shown that they have experienced improved parent/youth communication; increased time spent between parents and youth; improved parenting skills; improved knowledge about community and agency resources; decreased family trouble calls to the

police; fewer out of home placements, such as in foster care; increased school attendance; fewer curfew violations, running away incidents, and verbal arguments; fewer arrests; improved ability to talk about feelings and problems; decreased drug use, weapons carrying, and fighting; and improved communications with parents and other adults.

The *School Impact Project*, one of several “School Safety Initiatives,” was a program designed to reduce criminal incidents in Dorchester High School, considered to be the city’s most troubled school. The project began as a problem-solving initiative by the police department’s Schools Unit. After determining that the level of crime in the school had reached unacceptable levels, the officers in the unit convened staff from the office of the district attorney, juvenile corrections, probation, street workers, and social workers from the Youth Service Providers Network. In addition, they brought in social workers and representatives of faith-based organizations. Their analysis of crime incident reports yielded two main courses of action. First, in order to restore order, police officers were brought into the school. Second, the headmaster, staff, faculty, and students were provided support in their effort to restore the school’s code of conduct and maintain a safe and nurturing learning environment. To accomplish this, clergy and police made joint home visits to students on probation or were disruptive at school, metal detectors were installed at the school, and a dialogue between police and students was established. The measurement of the effectiveness of the project was measured by the police department’s Office of Research and Evaluation. That

office found that the total number of incidents of weapons recovered, false fire alarms, robbery, and assault/battery fell from 104 during the 4 months prior to implementation to 14 incidents after the project began—an 86.5 percent decrease.

Although not a results-oriented program in the typical sense, the use of LLEBG funds to develop software to analyze and graphically present crime data at the department's periodic *Crime Analysis Meetings* produced an analysis package that is available on the Internet to any law enforcement agency that wishes to access it.

6.3.5 Brockton, Massachusetts

Background. Brockton, a city of slightly over 90,000 inhabitants, is situated 20 miles from Boston, in southeastern Massachusetts. Founded in 1881, the city became the largest shoe-producing center in the United States. Gradually, however, Brockton lost most of its manufacturing base. As a result, the city suffered serious budget deficits, forcing the city to lay off 25 percent of the police force in the early 1990s. At the same time, because of the expensive housing market in Boston, many younger families moved to the Brockton area. As a consequence, the city has the fourth largest school system in the state, with a total of 20 public schools. When LLEBG funds first became available, the mayor assigned organizational responsibility to the police department, but instructed that a multi-agency advisory board be given responsibility for how grant funds were to be expended. The board was advised by the Plymouth County District Attorney's Office that Brockton had a rate of juvenile arraignments more than twice as high as the average for the state, and that the proportion of students on probation in the

city was three times higher than that for the state as a whole. Thus, the city was faced with a rising juvenile crime problem at the same time that the police department had lost one quarter of its officers. The board decided that dealing with the youth crime problem deserved highest priority in expenditure of LLEBG funds. In addition, the group decided that the funds should be used to hire a grant coordinator to organize and administer the block grant funds and programs.

Unlike any other site in this study, the LLEBG advisory board took its responsibilities so seriously that they met monthly to review the progress of the funded programs and to consider any corrective steps that needed to be taken. During deliberations about the FY2000 funds, the board decided that it was important to have objective evaluations of the effectiveness of the programs funded by the block grant. As a result, the board signed a contract with an external evaluator to provide evaluations of all funded programs. The evaluator then sought information from each funded program concerning their goals, program strategies, and measurable indicators of program success. In addition, the evaluator was added to the LLEBG advisory board and provided periodic feedback concerning the operations of and successes achieved by the various funded programs. By FY2002, the results of the evaluation were used by the advisory board to determine whether to refund existing programs.

Results-Oriented Programs. The most notable examples of results-oriented programs funded by Brockton were the Adult and Juvenile Probation Ride-Along Programs and the Department of Youth Services Ride-Along Program. The *Adult*

Ride-Along Program involves Brockton police officers “riding-along” with adult probation officers to visit high-risk probationers at their homes. These visits occur twice a week, usually on weeknights between the hours of 4:00 p.m. and 8:00 p.m., and occasionally on Saturdays between the hours of 9:00 a.m. and 1:00 p.m. The primary goal of the program was to provide surveillance as part of probation supervision to ensure that probationers comply with the requirements of their sentences and to provide increased community safety. A second goal was, by means of the presence of police officers, to provide protection for the probation officers while conducting these home visits. Finally, the program sought to increase and enhance the level of communication between the probation department and the police department. The external engaged in a number of efforts in order to assess the effectiveness of this program: 1) analyses of probation officer contact logs to determine the frequency, nature, and outcome of home visits; 2) interviews with probation officers involved in the program; and 3) review of case files of a sample of probationers contacted. The evaluation determined that many of the attempted home visits resulted in no contact being made with a probationer. As a result of this finding, the advisory board encouraged the police/probation teams to make more visits. The evaluation also found that probation officers did, indeed, believe that the presence of a police officer provided an additional margin of safety. The probation officers also said that the presence of a police officer on these visits lend an air of authority and seriousness to the visit that would not have existed had the police officer not been

there. On the other hand, probation officers indicated that there was considerable inconsistency among police officers concerning how they dealt with probationers and their families, and the extent to which the police officers shared information. Despite these limitations, the evaluator found the program to be successfully achieving its goals. The LLEBG advisory board, using this evaluation as a criterion of success, decided to refund the program, with some minor changes designed to address the problem areas the report cited.

The *Juvenile Probation Department Ride-Along Program* was similar to the Adult Probation Ride-Along Program, except that it involves Brockton police officers making home visits to the homes of juveniles. The program took two forms. The first form involved police/probationer teams visiting the home of truant students to discuss school attendance concerns. These visits were conducted Monday through Friday between the hours of 9:00 a.m. and 1:00 p.m. The primary goals of this part of the program were to reduce truancy in school, reduce the number of truants on the streets of Brockton, and educate parents and youth concerning the consequences of truancy. The second form of visit involved the Probation Outreach Partnerships (POPS) program and focused on conducting visits to the homes of juvenile probationers after normal probation business hours. These visits were conducted seven days a week and occurred in four-hour time blocks between 5:00 p.m. and 11:00 p.m. The primary goals of this aspect of the program were to more effectively enforce the orders of the juvenile court, improve communication between police officers and juvenile probation officers, reduce the

total number of warrants, and increase the safety of probation officers. The external evaluator analyzed contact logs and interviewed juvenile probation officers, but due to confidentiality concerns was not able to talk to probationers. Unfortunately, the evaluation did not contain data on truancy in schools or the number of warrants. Instead, the measures of program success relied exclusively on the results of the interviews with juvenile probation officers. In those interviews, the officers expressed the opinion that the program was, in fact, allowing them to educate parents and youth, to improve communication with the police, and increase the safety of probation officers. Based on these results, the advisory board decided to refund the effort.

The *Department of Youth Service (DYS) Ride-Along Program* sent teams of caseworkers from the Department of Youth Services and the Brockton Police Department to make home visits to youth under DYS supervision. This program differed from the other two ride-along programs in that DYS caseworkers routinely make home visits to youth paroled to the community. These routine visits, however, are made without police officers, and only during standard office hours. The DYS ride-along program, by providing a police escort, allowed DYS caseworkers to visit the homes of their clients after business hours. The stated goals of the program were to enhance the safety of the caseworkers and increase and enhance the communication between DYS caseworkers and police officers. LLEBG funds were used to fund at least one DYS ride-along per week. The external evaluator relied on interviews with caseworkers and a review of individual

case files. The evaluation report makes clear the limitations of relying on purely qualitative data to assess the success of the program. The caseworker interviews indicated that the presence of the police officer makes the home visit more formal than their usual visits, and that the youth frequently appeared more anxious and tense than normal. Nevertheless, the caseworkers indicated that the visits were desirable, largely because it allowed them to see the youth in their home environment in the evening hours. They also thought that the visits improved the sharing of information between caseworkers and police officers. Despite the purely qualitative nature of this evidence, the LLEBG advisory board decided it was sufficient to justify refunding the program.

6.3.6 Cambridge, Massachusetts

Background. Cambridge, with a population of slightly over 100,000, is perhaps most famous as the home of both Harvard University and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. When the availability of LLEBG funds was announced, the mayor gave responsibility for allocating those funds to the police commissioner. The commissioner, in turn, decided that the funds, rather than being used for overtime pay or other traditional purposes, should be allocated to programs, operated by service providers, which involve active partnership with the police department. Prospective providers were requested to submit proposals to be reviewed on a competitive basis. In addition to partnership with the police, the selection criteria included: 1) the program should be capable of being completed within one year; 2) the program should be sustainable beyond LLEBG funding,

from other sources; 3) the budget must be reasonable; and 4) the proposal should bring together more than one applicant. Quarterly narrative and financial reports were to be required. All proposals were reviewed by the Commissioner and his staff.

Results-Oriented Programs. The Cambridge Police Department nominated several programs that they considered results-oriented. Among them were the Girls Lifetime Empowerment Awareness Program (LEAP) Self Defense Program, the Community Dispute Resolution Center (CDRC), and the Life Skills Substance Abuse Awareness and Prevention Program. Another program, the CASPAR Alcohol and Drug Prevention Program, was not refunded because it could not document its implementation or demonstrate results.

The *Girls LEAP Self Defense Program* is a 16 to 20 hour self-defense curriculum designed specifically for girls. The keystone of the curriculum is the idea that the skills taught in the self-defense workshop should be applicable to any number of life situations, not just the prevention of violence. The program's model of violence prevention focuses on girls' self-esteem and self-awareness as well as on their physical skills. Thus, the program extends beyond the traditional martial arts-based self-defense programs. The program curriculum seeks to "address each girl" in her entirety, seeking to empower her physically, mentally, emotionally, and spiritually. The target group selected was girls aged 8 to 14, based on the expectation that many girls during the preteen years experience a drop in self-esteem, combined with the fact that there are few curricula aimed at this age

group. The program is offered at various sites throughout the city, with each session involving 16 to 24 girls. The multicultural training staff includes two professional trainers and four teaching assistants with expertise in self-defense. Each program ends with a “Community Day,” open to the public, to celebrate the achievements of the girls. This event also provides an opportunity for the police and other community groups to meet with neighborhood residents and to focus positive attention on issues of children’s safety. An analysis of the annual report submitted by Girls LEAP program reveals that the “results” mentioned have to do with how the program was implemented, how many girls attended, did they complete the program, and other such issues. No true outcome measures were collected.

The *Community Dispute Resolution Center (CDSC)*, founded in 1979, is one of the oldest mediation programs in Massachusetts. The mission of CDSC is to provide a community-based forum for dispute resolution through the use of mediation. The group is committed to providing mediation services to low and moderate-income individuals and families who could otherwise not afford the cost of private dispute resolution services. CDSC’s guiding philosophy is that mediation can be an effective intervention for people in conflict. Given the support of trained mediators, serving as neutral third parties, the program contends that most people can resolve their own disputes. Clients voluntarily participate in the program and are encouraged to openly communicate in a safe and confidential atmosphere. The mediators practice cooperative and creative problem-solving, affording clients

the opportunity to resolve disputes constructively. LLEBG funds are among many sources of funding for the program. CDSC served over 600 clients in FY2000, referred from sources as diverse as courts, schools, the housing authority, and others. A total of 158 cases were mediated, reflecting a 42 percent increase in mediation activity from the previous year. According to program staff, 68 percent of the cases were successfully resolved through mediation.

The *Life Skills Substance Abuse Awareness and Prevention Program* is designed to teach students in the 6th through the 8th grades the dangers inherent in substance abuse. Although a pre-post test evaluation of attitudes has been conducted, the results were not available at the time of the writing of this report.

6.3.7 Jacksonville, Florida

Background. Jacksonville has the largest population, over 735,000 inhabitants, of any city in Florida. Since the consolidation of the city and the county in 1968, it encompasses almost 760 square miles, making it the largest in the United States. In order to make municipal services more efficient and more responsive to citizens, the local government has developed a Total Quality Government (TQG) program. This program incorporates a city mission, vision, guiding principles, and strategic plan. All programs, employees, and contractors are expected to be focused on achieving the city's mission in general and one or more elements of the city's strategic plan in particular. An integral part of the program is the focus on "process management," involving a systematic method of

identifying program outcome indicators, monitoring program results, and revising the program based upon those results.

Although the decisions about disbursement of first year's LLEBG funds were left to the sheriff, in all subsequent years the decisions have been made based on proposals submitted to the director of the city's Department of Community Services. According to the director, these proposals are evaluated primarily on their relevance to the city's strategic plan and their ability to demonstrate the attainment of measurable goals. Refunding of programs is based on the demonstrated ability to achieve program objectives. The LLEBG advisory board routinely approves the decisions made by the Department of Community Services.

Results-Oriented Programs. Jacksonville uses its LLEBG funds to support a wide variety of results-oriented programs. The most significant ones are summarized below.

The *Drug Abatement Response Team (DART)* was established as an interagency, intergovernmental, community-based response to the problem of drug houses in Jacksonville. DART officers, deputies of the Jacksonville Sheriff's Office, notify property owners of drug and/or prostitution activity occurring on their property and explain that, under Florida's Public Nuisance Statute, their continued ownership and control of the property could be jeopardized if the illegal activity continues. In addition, the DART officers conduct an education program for landlords and property owners, instructing them of effective means to screen tenants and to maintain order on their premises. In cases in which the owner is

unwilling to abate the illegal activities, the property is required to undergo a safety inspection by DART officers to identify any and all municipal housing and fire code violations. These violations are reviewed as a potential means for immediate posting and vacating the property. As long as the property is posted and not re-certified, any entry onto the property is illegal and those found on the property are subject to arrest. This has led to a significant increase in evictions by cooperative property owners. In addition, the DART officers investigated and documented the status of more than 3,000 vacant structures throughout the city. Through these investigations, many properties were identified with an illegal homestead exemption; illegal activities, such as drug use and/or prostitution; and theft of electricity. Many of these abandoned structures were found to be the location of sexual assaults or attempted assaults and were fast-tracked through the city's demolition process. Through this program, the Property Appraiser's Office recouped thousands of dollars in back taxes and added penalties from those properties with fraudulent homestead exemptions. In addition, the Jacksonville Electric Authority realized a significant savings after cutting the illegal electric service at hundreds of locations.

The *Truancy Interdiction Program (TIP)* is a joint effort by the City of Jacksonville, the Jacksonville Sheriff's Office, the Duval County School Board, the State Attorney's Office, and the Youth Crisis Center for middle and high school students. The program was designed to reduce truancy, improve academic achievement, increase student and family commitment to school, improve

promotion and graduation rates, and reduce crime and violence during school hours. The officers involved in the program contact any juvenile seen off school premises between 9:00 a.m. and 2:00 p.m. on school days, assess whether the juvenile is truant, and assess the best response to the problem. In the first year of the program, 6,795 truants were contacted. Of those, 1,097 (16.1%) were suspected to have been involved in delinquent acts and were referred to the Department of Juvenile Justice; 3,910 (57.5%) of the truants were returned to their home school; another 717 (10.6%) of the truants were returned to their home or place of business; and an additional 1,055 (15.5%) were processed through the Truancy Center, which handles juveniles considered to be habitual truants. The truancy recidivism rate fell from 19 percent in 1999, before the program started, to 8.1 percent in 2001.

The *Juvenile Justice Comprehensive Strategy Unit* is a group of Jacksonville Sheriff's deputies who seek to identify "at-risk" youth and to collaborate with other public agencies, juvenile justice providers, families, schools, faith-based institutions, and grassroots organizations to direct resources in order to minimize risk factors, maximize protective factors, and promote public safety in a manner congruent with the city's Juvenile Justice Comprehensive Strategy. Under this program, contracts were negotiated and signed between the city and 18 non-profit agencies to enhance existing juvenile justice prevention and sanctions programs. These agencies were selected for their ability to address the five priority risk factors identified by the Comprehensive Strategy Task Force: economic

deprivation, lack of commitment to school, academic failure, family management problems, and the availability and use of drugs. The program so far has addressed 6,981 “at-risk” youth, using such approaches as after school tutoring; assistance with family management concerns; a scholarship/mentoring program; an after school arts program; provisions for a safe, supervised environment for abused and neglected children to visit with their biological family; a violence prevention program for children who have witnessed domestic violence; a sanctions program for juvenile offenders ordered to serve community service hours; as well as conflict resolution and life skills training. Results indicate that the targeted youth demonstrated an increase in school attendance, increased grade point average, increase in promotion to the next grade level, reduction in early and persistent antisocial behavior, and an increase in parental participation in school. In addition, juveniles targeted by the program showed a decrease in juvenile delinquency, an increase in volunteerism in the community of youth and their families, a decrease in self-reported drug use, and a decrease of abuse and neglect.

The *Developing Adults With Necessary Skills (DAWN)* program was created by the City of Jacksonville Community Services Department, in partnership with the Jacksonville Sheriff’s Office Pre-trial Detention Facility, Gateway Community Services, Inc., and the Florida Community College at Jacksonville. This program provides GED, Life Skills, and vocational preparation classes necessary for the adult male county sentenced population, aged 18-21, in an effort to assist them in

successfully re-integrating into society. Statistics gathered in July of 2002 indicated that, since the program began in 1997, 55.7 percent of participants received a GED, 55 percent were employed after release, and 62.5 percent of participants had not been re-arrested since release.

The *Juvenile Offender Reintegration Program (JORP)* is an educational and life skills counseling program provided to adjudicated juveniles in the Duval County jail, with the goal of reducing recidivism among juvenile offenders. The program offers a 16-week curriculum consisting of psycho-social assessment, life management training, communications skills training, group interaction skills, individual/group counseling, drug/alcohol education, mentorship, and sex education. No evaluation data were available at this time this report was written.

The *Juvenile Drug Court* provides a wide range of clinical services, including day treatment, intensive outpatient group and individual counseling, homework assistance, tutoring by volunteers, a computer lab, art activities, recreation programs, employment counseling, and transportation. Of the first 120 graduates of the program, only 12 have been re-arrested, a recidivism rate of 10 percent.

LLEBG funds are also used to support an *Adult Drug Court*, based on the model first implemented in Miami and now found in many cities throughout the country. The participants in this program demonstrated a 19 percent recidivism rate.

The *Probationers' Educational Growth (PEG)* program is designed to ensure that all offenders have access to the full range of educational services, life skills

programs, and workforce readiness opportunities available. The goal is to break the cycle of recidivism by engaging offenders and ex-offenders in existing or new education and self-betterment programs. PEG staff members have established close working relationships with the four community college campuses in the Jacksonville area, as well as with public schools advertising GED classes to establish an accessible process for enrolling PEG clientele. The success of the program will be measured by the recidivism rate of program participants, although those figures are not yet available.

The *Intimate Violence Enhanced Services Team (INVEST)* has the goal of providing a seamless, systematic community response to domestic violence through a multidisciplinary collaboration focusing on pro-arrest/pro-prosecution policies and procedures, case investigation and prosecution, and implementation of innovative forms of outreach, advocacy, and services to victims. The program provides enhanced response, intensive support, and strengthened follow-up investigation for high-risk-for-fatality domestic violence cases, as well as offering valuable resources for area law enforcement and human services agencies. Utilizing interagency links and expertise within a coordinated response system, this team (consisting of a law enforcement officer and a domestic violence victim advocate) receives specialized training in domestic violence lethality, identifies and responds to high-risk-for-fatality domestic violence cases using specialized protocols, which focus on collection and documentation of evidence, mandates that child witnesses be interviewed at the crime scene. Each designated victim is

assigned an advocate to maintain bi-weekly contact, document incidents of abuse, provide emotional support and court accompaniment, advocate on behalf of the victim with the criminal justice system and social service systems, and facilitate access to other services, such as injunctions for protection, counseling, support groups, legal advice and advocacy, etc. The success of the program is measured by the number of victims served and the reduction in intimate violence deaths and the number of victims served. Since its implementation in October of 1999, the program has served over 700 victims identified as at-risk for lethality, and the number of annual intimate violence deaths have dropped by 60 percent (15 deaths in 1999, compared to 6 deaths in 2002).

The *Center for Prevention of Domestic Violence* is a collaborative effort of the Community Services Department, Duval County Clerk of Court, Jacksonville Sheriff's Office, the State Attorney's Office, Hubbard House, the local domestic violence center, and the Fourth Judicial Circuit. The Center serves as a One Stop Shop for victims of domestic violence with the clerk of court personnel offering assistance with filing of injunctions for protection, advocates providing safety planning and resource information and referral, and the State Attorney's office providing assistance when criminal activity has been identified. The success of the program is measured in numbers of petitioners receiving safety plans and resource and referral information. Since it began in October of 2001, victims at the center have received 2,342 safety plans and 152,036 referrals to community resources.

6.3.8 Los Angeles City, California

Background. Los Angeles, the nation's second largest city, with a significant number of Part 1 crimes, was notified in 1996 that it was eligible for almost \$15 million in LLEBG funds. When those funds became available, the Mayor convened an LLEBG Advisory Board, comprising representatives of the Mayor, the City Attorney, the Chief of Police, the Los Angeles Unified School District, the city's chief legislative analyst, the City Council Public Safety Committee, and various community-based agencies, to determine how to allocate these funds. The board issued a RFP for various public and private agencies to request funds. An independent proposal review team used a proposal rating system to determine the most eligible applicants. The review team's recommendations were then submitted to the city council and the mayor for their final approval.

Soon after the LLEBG funds became available, a dispute about the disparity in funding between the City and the County of Los Angeles developed. After several months of negotiations, the two jurisdictions finally agreed to create a joint Advisory Board, representing the shared interests of the two jurisdictions. Eventually, this joint board reached agreements on their common problems and how to mutually address them. According to many persons interviewed, this joint board produced an unusual, if not unprecedented, shared effort between the two jurisdictions to address common problems. In both the city and the county, the issue of juvenile delinquency and gangs had been a major, and increasing, concern for the last several years.

Although the Advisory Board allotted a majority of the funds to the Los Angeles Police Department—for technological support, equipment, and staffing—the board also allocated a sizable percentage to the Los Angeles Bridges Program (L.A. Bridges), designed to ameliorate the rising gang problem in both the city and the county. The idea for this program originated in the mayor’s office, although several other agencies, including the City Council, the Community Development Department, and the Criminal Justice Planning Office became involved in program planning and implementation. As total LLEBG funding decreased, however, the allocation to L.A. Bridges decreased dramatically. In FY1999, for example, the city received \$10.6 million (including the local match), of which the L.A. Bridges received over \$4 million, almost 40 percent of the total. By FY2000, the city’s LLEBG funds declined to \$8.8 million, of which \$878,000 (10%) was allocated to L.A. Bridges. By FY2002, the program continued to receive 10 percent of the total allotment of LLEBG funds, but since that total had been reduced to \$6.6 million, L.A. Bridges only received \$657,000.

The Mayor’s Office of Criminal Justice Planning (MOCJP) plays a major role in recommending funding, and providing fiscal and program oversight of grant funds, including those from LLEBG. This involves grant management, project monitoring, and serving as a liaison between the city and BJA. The Community Development Department (CDC) has direct oversight of the program implementation and provides operational support and technical assistance to the sub-grantee agencies. Both the MOCJP and the CDC have a strong results-oriented approach and, in

order to ensure that funds are allocated effectively, have hired evaluators to monitor the progress of funded programs. According to several city officials, programs are expected to be performance based, and those that do not demonstrate effectiveness are not refunded. Program-related data are collected through an Internet-based MIS that includes interagency access and centralized reporting features.

Results-Oriented Program. The City of Los Angeles nominated its *Los Angeles Bridges* program as an example of a results-oriented effort supported with its LLEBG funds. This program, known locally as L.A. Bridges, was created to address the problem of serious and violent juvenile offenders, many of them gang members, who threaten many of the city's neighborhoods. The program is designed to reduce juvenile delinquency and gang-related activity among middle-school students in targeted school communities. L.A. Bridges contains two parallel components. The first component seeks to encourage at-risk youth to improve school attendance and academic performance, foster family unity, and work with local residents to develop strong grassroots structures incorporating the support and resources of key city departments and agencies and community-based organizations. The program staff, along with 27 local and over 100 collaborative partners offer a range of activities, specially designed and focused to produce performance-based results, including: mentoring and tutoring programs, theater, art, dance, and music activities; and sports programs in baseball, basketball, football, soccer, horseback riding, and tennis. After an initial pilot effort, that began

in July 1997 for the 97/98 school year, L.A. Bridges has expanded to 26 middle schools, selected on the basis of *youth risk factors*, such as poor school attendance and achievement, violent behavior at school or in the community, and associations with current or former gang members and/or have family members who have been affiliated with gangs; *family risk factors*, including family violence, gang activity, and substance abuse; and community risk factors, such as high levels of crime and delinquency.

This component seeks to develop a comprehensive array of services at the 26 school sites that are the focus of this program. A service delivery system has been developed at each site to increase communication and service integration among schools, law enforcement, and social service providers. Six Neighborhood Advocacy Councils (NACs) have been established to coordinate collaborative efforts among community residents, schools, community-based agencies, and law enforcement to enhance prevention, intervention, and suppression. A steering committee, made up of representatives from the City's Commission on Children, Youth, and Their Families; the Community Development Department; the Los Angeles Police Department; the Los Angeles Unified School District; and the Mayor's Office of Criminal Justice Planning oversee the process.

The NAC meetings are conducted to provide a forum for communication between the community and law enforcement. L.A. Bridges Coordinators work with local participants to develop area Safety Plans for youth and families. Conflict and dispute resolution strategies are employed to increase awareness of racial and

cultural differences and bridge communication gaps among participants. Periodic reports on program performance are provided at NAC meetings. Parent education classes, youth and family counseling, and after-school educational and recreational activities provide resources for families and an alternative to negative behaviors.

The second component of L.A. Bridges is the Hard Core Gang Intervention Program, consisting of Intervention teams whose mission is to prevent the escalation of violence among rival gangs. Team members develop and maintain gang truces, convene monthly community forums, and provide coordinated citywide rapid deployment of the teams in response to crisis calls from school officials, parents, and local residents.

The city has hired a program evaluator to track the following performance measures:

- School attendance;
- Truancy rates;
- Academic performance;
- Psycho-social skills performance;
- Drop out rates;
- Students' ability to manage anger and resolve conflicts without violence;
- Parent-child-sibling relationships and communication;
- Family stability;
- Community solidarity concerning various local initiatives;
- Juvenile crime and delinquency rates in the area;
- School crime and misconduct rates; and
- Recorded crime in the neighborhood surrounding the targeted schools.

Although the evaluation report is not yet available, evaluators indicate that preliminary results indicate that students at L.A. Bridges schools have reported an

improvement in grades, reduced absences and suspensions, and fewer incidences (as reported by parents) of gang affiliation. Further, evidence suggests that crimes reported in the target schools have decreased. Data supplied by the Los Angeles Unified School District Policed Department for the 1998/1999 school year indicate that many of the 26 middle school sites experienced decreases in crime over the 1997/1998 school year. Decreases were especially noticeable in the categories of robberies and property crimes, with 15 and 19 schools reporting decreases, respectively. Eight of the 19 reported declines of over 50 percent in property crimes. Decreases in loitering and trespassing were noted at 11 schools; battery and weapons possessions declined at 10 schools, and chemical substance abuse reports declined at 15 of the 26 schools. Decreases were indicated in several other categories, but not to such a noticeable extent.

6.3.9 Los Angeles County, California

Background. Los Angeles County is the nation's most populous county, with a population of over 9.5 million, spread over more than 4,000 square miles. After negotiations with the city concerning disparity in the funding allocations to the city and the county, the county's allocation rose significantly, from slightly less than \$3 million to over \$10 million in FY1999. During the course of these disparity negotiations, the city and county decided to create a joint LLEBG Advisory Board, as mentioned above. The county decided to fund approximately 40 programs, administered by several county agencies. In deciding how to expend the funds, the board relied upon the county's strategic plan, which requires performance

measures for contracts. In addition, the County Board of Supervisors, and particularly their “justice deputies” made recommendations to the Advisory Board concerning particular crime problems that needed to be addressed in the county.

All contracts and grants are reviewed at the end of each funding cycle by the “justice deputies” and the Budget and Operations Management Branch of the County’s Chief Administrative Office to ensure that the programs make significant progress toward the attainment of their goals.

Results-Oriented Programs. Although a significant portion of the county’s LLEBG funds were used to underwrite the costs of detention facilities, the majority of funds were used for results-oriented programs, including the following: Strategies Against Gang Environments (SAGE), Abolish Chronic Truancy (ACT), the Alternative Sentencing Program, the Community Law Enforcement and Recovery (CLEAR) program, the Special Enforcement Unit, and the Los Angeles Bridges Program.

Strategies Against Gang Environments (SAGE), functions under the auspices of the Community Prosecution Division. The program dedicates an experienced Deputy District Attorney (DDA) to a particular city or community for the purpose of working with law enforcement, residents, other city officials, and other established local agencies in developing and implementing strategies to combat crime and eliminate conditions that promote lawlessness. Each SAGE DDA focuses on the issues that are of greatest concern to the community to which they are assigned. There are six such programs throughout the county, three of which are primarily

funded by LLEBG funds; the other programs are funded by the local city where the programs operate. In the LLEBG-funded areas, the primary strategies used are case/probationer tracking, criminal nuisance abatement, a good neighbor program, partners with schools, a peer mentor program, an anti-truancy program, and a Community Alliance for Responsible Enforcement (CARE) program.

As part of the *case/probationer strategy*, the SAGE DDA tracks an average of approximately 20 cases of known adult and juvenile members of criminal street gangs (as well as cases bearing on the overall quality of life in the community) to ensure that the community is fully and fairly represented in criminal proceeding, especially in the case of “incorrigible minors.” The DDA may become involved with the minor and parents before any formal actions are taken by law enforcement or probation. The DDA receives case referrals from Parks and Recreation personnel, public school officials, as well as from law enforcement. The SAGE DDA reviews incident reports and analyzes the criminal history of potential tracking subjects. The DDA then suggests areas of further investigation to strengthen a case, advises the probation department of unreported concerns or issues or probation violations, and supports other DDAs in the adult and juvenile courts by providing background information or requesting appropriate conditions of probation before sentencing. Using these techniques, the SAGE DDAs help identify at-risk probationers who are then targeted for probation checks and searches to ensure compliance with court-imposed conditions of probation. In the first year of operation of the program in the City of Paramount, 11 multi-location probation

operations resulted in checks and searches of 95 probationers with 11 arrests for new crimes or probation violations.

Under the auspices of the *criminal nuisance abatement strategy*, the SAGE DDA monitors all gang, narcotics, prostitution, and other criminal nuisance activity within the target area. If any activity is found to be connected to a particular property, the DDA contacts the property owner. Sheriff's deputies are then brought in to describe to the property owner the nature of the criminal nuisance activity and the specific tenant(s) involved. The DDA advises the owner of his legal responsibility to abate the nuisance activity under the applicable provisions of the California Penal Code and Health and Safety Code. During these meetings, the DDA also provides information to the owner concerning possible house rules and tenant screening techniques that could help avoid future problems. Program officials indicate that 99 percent of the time these "informal abatements" lead to the removal of the criminal nuisance activity. If the owner is uncooperative and the nuisance activity persists, the SAGE DDA will proceed with a "formal abatement" action in federal or state court. In the first year of the implementation of the abatement strategy in the City of Paramount (1998-99), over 100 properties had been investigated for criminal nuisance abatement. Twenty-seven of the 28 abatement cases opened in 2000 were resolved.

The *good neighbor program* operates in conjunction with the criminal nuisance abatement program. Analysis of local crime statistics supported national studies showing that crime thrives in rental properties with ineffective property

management. Utilizing existing city and county resources to help properties achieve certification, the “good neighbor program” is a three-phase program offered to all owners/managers of rental property. In Phase I, property owners/managers attend a six-hour educational seminar on property management issues and techniques, including tenant screening, recognition of criminal nuisances, legal processes of landlord/tenant matters, crisis resolution and Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) concepts. Phase II of the program consists of property inspection and compliance with applicable building, safety and fire codes, and law enforcement CPTED requirements. Phase III requires that the owner/property manager implement a “Neighborhood/Apartment Watch” program. Although exact statistics were not available, program managers in the City of Paramount contend that, by achieving certification and employing the skills learned in Phase I, property owners/managers have realized increased profitability and tenants have experienced improved habitability conditions, lowered incidence of crime, reduced fear, and greater satisfaction with their living conditions.

Under the *Partners with Schools program*, the SAGE DDA is also the District Attorney’s representative on the Student Attendance Review Board (SARB) of the Paramount Unified School District. In this capacity, the DDA participates in the analysis of truancy cases, provides guidance to the SARB, and to students referred to it, and has developed relationships with teachers and School District personnel to abate conduct which disrupts both the learning environment and the

community. The ADA in this area has helped to launch a new program of drug awareness targeted at 5th and 6th grade students. Working with the Bureau of Narcotics Enforcement under the California Department of Justice, this “Drug Store” program is a four-hour presentation patterned after the “Every 15 Minutes” program that addresses the dangers of teenage drinking and driving. Although specific data were not available, program spokespersons indicate that the number of incidents of teenage drinking and driving have been notably decreased.

The *peer mentor program*, being implemented in the City of Whittier, matches at-risk fifth grade students with college-bound high school seniors in an effort to provide the children with a positive role model who resides in their neighborhood. The relationship focuses on enhancing the mentee’s social and academic development by providing access to cultural and vocational resources, such as museum field trips, hiking, sports events, local college tours, tours of the local courts and police departments as well as visits to local businesses. The goal of this program is to build self-confidence in the mentees and demonstrate, by way of example, that making positive choices leads to high school graduation and staying away from gangs and drugs. The program began with five mentor/mentee pairs in one area high school and one feeder elementary school in 1998. By 2000-2001, the program had expanded to 44 pairs in 3 high schools and 6 feeder elementary schools. Two program coordinators work with the assistance of high school student interns, school personnel, and the community to establish and maintain the program throughout the course of each school year. In addition to anecdotal

evidence from mentors and mentees commenting on the effectiveness of the effort, program coordinators report that parents and teachers report positive behavior changes and improved grades among mentees.

The *anti-truancy program*, also implemented in the City of Whittier, targets high school truants through the Whittier Union High School District Student Attendance Review Board (SARB) and involves prompt intervention by the SAGE DDA, probation, mediation, and the juvenile courts. Students are referred to SARD by the five feeder high schools, and each student, with their parent or guardian appears at a SARB meeting conducted at the Whittier Superior Court. The student's attendance is tracked throughout the school year and failure to comply with SARB results in officer home visits, truancy citations, mediation, or a truancy petition. The SAGE DDA continues to track the cases to ensure appropriate sentences and compliance with school attendance conditions of probation. The goal of the program is to act as a deterrent to would-be truants and ensure prompt consequences for those individuals that choose to be truant. Since its inception, approximately 84 students per year have appeared before the program. In the 1998-99 school year, 30 students were referred to Juvenile Court for a truancy petition and/or criminal proceedings. In 1999-2000, only 20 students were referred. In 2000-2001, 16 students were referred. Additionally, the school district reported that attendance for the SARB students improved by more than 70 percent and was so impressed with the results of the program that it created a SARB coordinator position to facilitate this program exclusively.

The *Community Alliance for Responsible Enforcement (CARE)* program focuses on the “Lower Uptown” area of Whittier, and is aimed at improving the neighborhood’s quality of life. The program is a collaborative effort between the city, the police department, the code enforcement department, the community development department, the building and zoning department, the district attorney’s office, and members of the community. This public-private partnership focuses on exterior building improvements, improved property management skills, and heightened law enforcement efforts. The two major components of the CARE program are a certification process for property owners and managers and a \$15,000 loan program to support restoration of deteriorated properties. Loan repayment is waived at the end of five years if the property is effectively maintained and certification requirements are complied with.

The *Abolish Chronic Truancy (ACT)* program is directed at the fact that on any given day 200 to 300 thousand of the 1.6 million students in Los Angeles County are absent from school, most without valid excuses. As a consequence, the county has the highest dropout rate among California’s 58 counties. These dropouts have been found to frequently be involved in criminal activity, welfare, unemployment, and other negative activities. Administered by the District Attorney, the goal of this program is to assist in returning elementary school chronic truants to the classroom through the modification of behavior, rather than seeking prosecutions. To achieve this goal, Deputy District Attorneys intervene at the early stages of the truancy cycle by holding parents accountable for their

children's excessive absenteeism. They accomplish this by systematically informing the parents of the Compulsory/Mandatory Education laws, the consequences for non-compliance with those laws, and why education is intrinsically important. The primary target of the program is children aged 5 through 11, although some are as old as 15. From 1993 through the middle of 2001, the parents of 79,219 children have been sent letters from the District Attorney inviting them to attend a group meeting by a DDA concerning the consequences for non-compliance with the Compulsory Education laws. In that same period, 14,387 parents have met individually with a DDA to discuss their child's continued non-compliance. A total of 1,128 parents were required to attend a Student Attendance Review Board (SARB) in order to make threatened formal prosecution if compliance is not demonstrated. Only 49 prosecutions have been necessary. In two elementary schools for which attendance data were available, actual in-seat attendance rose from 88 percent to 94 percent.

The *Alternative Sentencing Program (ASP)* is designed to provide public defenders and the court with accurate information about the client in capital cases and other violent felonies, thereby enabling the attorney to effectively advocate in sentencing hearings and the court to impose appropriate sentences. In addition, the program supports clients and facilitates their participation in their defense while detained pending a court hearing. Finally, the program assists attorneys during the preparation and conduct of a trial. In order to take advantage of the program, attorneys handling violent offender cases complete a request for assistance from

the 10 paralegals assigned to the ASP through the county's branch courts. The paralegal reviews police reports, witness' statements, court proceedings, records, and other documents and meets with the client, witnesses, experts, and others involved in the case. The paralegal assists the attorney in trial preparation by drafting jury questionnaires, producing exhibits, drafting motions, retrieving jury instructions, and providing full-time assistance during the trial. Weekly meetings are held involving paralegals, their supervisors, and a private consultant to discuss problem cases, project activities, and procedures. Although no formal evaluation of the program has been conducted, program managers indicate that public defenders have reported that they find the program to be quite helpful to them.

The *Community Law Enforcement and Recovery (CLEAR)* program, is designed to reduce gang-related crimes by improving collaboration among criminal justice agencies and the community. The long-range goal is to institutionalize systems that will support continual community recovery from gang violence. The program is administered by the mayor's office and is managed by an Executive Committee made up of representatives from eight core agencies: the Mayor's Office of the City of Los Angeles, the L.A. County Sheriff's Office, the Los Angeles Police Department, the Los Angeles County Probation Department, the L.A. County District Attorney's Office, the L.A. City Attorney, the Department of Parole and Community Services, and the California Department of Corrections. The first CLEAR program was launched in November 1996 as part of the President's Anti-Gang Initiative, funded by the COPS. The program has subsequently expanded to

include six sites. The one at Century station is the only one operating outside the city, and is the only one supported by LLEBG funds, supporting two Deputy District Attorneys (DDAs), out of the total of 12 in the program. Unfortunately, given the \$35 billion budget deficit currently faced by the state of California, the total number of CLEAR DDAs may have to be reduced significantly, leaving LLEBG as an even more important source of funding.

The CLEAR program at Century Station is a collaborative team comprising a sergeant, two investigators, six gang enforcement deputies, and a community liaison deputy. There also are two deputy probation officers and two deputy district attorneys on the team, which is supported by a station clerk and an office administrator. The overall program is managed by a lieutenant. The program functions by identifying and targeting the most active gang members and by referring at-risk youth to CBOs for counseling. All gang-related incidents that involve the Florencia street gang are investigated by CLEAR detectives and the cases are filed with the team's deputy district attorneys. Thus, in essence, the program implements vertical prosecution of targeted cases. A key element of the program is the ability to obtain gang probation conditions on the individuals who have been convicted of gang crimes, thus allowing the team to ensure the targeted youth are complying with the terms of their probation—particularly the prohibition against associating with gang members. Another useful tool is the conducting of random probation searches. The community liaison deputy interacts with community and facilitates monthly meetings to discuss their concerns about gang

incidents, and also works closely with the local schools and parks to ensure their concerns are being met. The program has hired a private evaluator to examine the effectiveness of the program. Preliminary analyses show a significant reduction in gang crime in the primary target area, as compared to no change in a comparable, comparison area. LLEBG funding has been “bundled” with other funds (such as from COPS, Byrne, private funds, and other local funds).

The *Special Enforcement Unit (SEU)*, under the auspices of the County of Los Angeles Probation Department, in collaboration with the Los Angeles Police Department, serves as a liaison between the LAPD’s South Bureau gang suppression units and the adult and juvenile probation supervision functions. The South Bureau contains some of the most heavily impacted gang areas in Los Angeles County. The SEU consists of four Deputy Probation Officers (DPOs) who provide supplemental and street level supervision for gang-involved adult and juvenile probationers. Specifically, the SEU DPOs provide a number of services designed to impact gang violence, including, but not limited to: 1) daily interaction with gang suppression police, including ride-alongs, arrests, and detention of adult and juvenile probationers who would otherwise not been held accountable; 2) preparation of violation and other court reports with special emphasis on issues surrounding gang involvement; 3) significant follow-up coordination with the district attorney and courts, including expert gang testimony; 4) coordination and participation in probation compliance searches and probation searches in response to certain crime investigations, including a significant number of murder

investigations; 5) instructions of probationers to cease gang-related activity, and encouraging probationers to enroll and participate in counseling, schooling, training, or employment; 6) follow-up coordination with caseload-carrying DPOs; and 7) conducting home visits with police to probationers' homes, reviewing conditions of probation, and interacting on a more positive basis with probationers and their families. Between February 2000 and March 2001, the only period for which data were available, the SEU DPOs conducted over 500 probation searches, confiscated 49 firearms and over 754 grams of illegal substances, sought 57 warrants and apprehended 55 persons, and arrested 260 juvenile probationers and 166 adult probationers. In addition, prosecutors and bench officers told evaluators that the quality of testimony and coordination by the SEU DPOs was of high quality and "an invaluable asset in the battle to detain and hold LA's gang predators accountable." Police officers commented upon the reduced tension and hostility during probation searches and arrests; the ability to quickly and accurately coordinate probation searches; the ability to gather gang intelligence; the ability to detail or additionally instruct probationers; and an enhanced ability to present cases in both adult and juvenile courts regarding case specifics and appropriate disposition and sentencing. As with CLEAR, LLEBG funds have been "bundled" with funds from numerous other sources.

The *Los Angeles Bridges* program was described in some detail in the section regarding the programs of Los Angeles City. As mentioned above, this program is designed to deter youth from gang involvement or criminal activity by providing

case-managed alternatives for at-risk youth. Community-based collaboratives provide an array of youth services according to an individualized service place created specifically for each participant. What is striking is that the county's program is funded by the City's LLEBG funds, along with funds from the City of Los Angeles' General Fund and the Los Angeles Police Department. Outside evaluators have been hired by the county to examine the performance of the program. These evaluations have found that the program has led to improvements in such key outcome indicators as improved grades and school attendance, increases in reading, math, and language standardized test scores; improved work habits, increased stability in the home; a reduction in gang identification and criminal or gang peer association; and a reduction in incidents of violence and vandalism at targeted schools.

Data supplied by the Los Angeles Unified School District Police Department for the 1998/1999 school year indicate that many of the 26 middle school sites experienced decreases in crime over the 1997/1998 school year. Decreases were especially noticeable in the categories of robberies and property crimes, with 15 and 19 schools reporting decreases, respectively. Eight of the 19 reported declines of over 50 percent in property crimes. Decreases in loitering and trespassing were noted at 11 schools; battery and weapons possessions declined at 10 schools, and chemical substance abuse reports declined at 15 of the 26 schools. Decreases were indicated in several other categories, but not to such a noticeable extent.

6.3.10 Miami-Dade, Florida

Background. Miami-Dade County encompasses slightly over 1,900 square miles, larger than the entire state of Rhode Island, with a population of approximately 2.3 million persons. Although there are 31 cities in the county, the population in the unincorporated areas is slightly greater than 1.2 million. In the late 1980s, due to some notorious robberies and assaults on tourists, and a high violent crime rate, the Miami area had acquired a reputation of being a dangerous place to live or visit. In 1995, the county changed its political structure, electing its first strong mayor, who quickly established the reduction of crime in the county to be his top priority. The new director of the Miami-Dade Police Department (MDPD), responsible for policing the unincorporated area of the county, took this responsibility seriously, establishing a number of efforts to deal with robberies, auto thefts, aggravated assaults, burglaries, drugs, and other crimes. Over the last few years the number of crimes of all types has declined dramatically. In 1996, however, when LLEBG funds became available, the level of crime was still at unacceptably high levels. Thus, the LLEBG Advisory Board, although it allocated some of the grant funds to support a drug court and a juvenile assessment center, most of the funds were given to the MDPD to conduct anti-crime operations.

Results-Oriented Programs. The leadership of the MDPD decided to distribute the department's portion of the LLEBG funds more or less equally among the eight police districts, as well as some of department's special operational units. In each district or unit, these funds were used to support on-duty or overtime pay

for officers working on *Enhanced Enforcement Initiatives (EEIs)*. These initiatives are designed to address the specific crime problems in each district, using the department's COMSTAT, an in-depth review of local crime patterns, to identify and address emerging crime trends. District officers and detectives, working closely with their crime analysts, submit formal proposals to the district commander, detailing the nature of the problem to be addressed, the techniques to be used to address the problem, how the success of the EEI will be evaluated, and how much the effort will cost. If the district commander approves the proposal, it is then referred to the director's office for final review and approval. If the proposal is approved for implementation, the originating officer in effect becomes a "program manager," allocating personnel, monitoring effectiveness, ensuring adherence to the proposed budget. At the end of the EEI, an After-Action Report is submitted to the district commander describing the nature of the tactics used, the resources utilized, and the results achieved. At the end of the fiscal year, the commanders submit a list of all of their EEIs as well as the results they have achieved.

The nature of the EEIs varied as much as does the nature of the crime problems they addressed. In general, the efforts consist of 1) enforcement activities, 2) Driving-Under-the-Influence (DUI)/Drug Recognition Expert (DRE) checkpoints, and 3) career criminal enforcement. Enforcement activities included commercial and residential surveillance operations, roadside and parking lot robbery deterrence, juvenile curfew enforcement, truancy sweeps, holding community meetings, vehicle burglary details, traffic and DUI enforcement, gang

sweeps, prostitution details, underage drinking details, narcotics enforcement, VIN etching projects, pawn shop investigations, and a myriad of other tactics.

DUI/DRE check points involved establishing inspection points throughout the county to identify drivers who might be under the influence of alcohol or drugs, in violation of traffic ordinances, or otherwise deserving of further interrogation or arrest. Career criminal enforcement efforts involve the identification of serious high rate offenders, monitoring the activities of those criminals through surveillance operations, and working with the State Attorney's Office to ensure the filing of appropriate charges.

A complete compilation of the dozens of EEIs conducted would not be possible. A few notable examples, however, provide an insight into the nature and effectiveness of these efforts. The Tropical Park Enhanced Enforcement Initiative was established by the Kendall District to address a troubling rise in reported crimes in Tropical Park. The initiative involved saturation patrol of marked vehicles to increase police visibility, increased enforcement action to cease criminal activity, heightened surveillance activities, and enhanced investigative efforts. The initiative involved placing marked police units in the park during two shifts per day. A comparison of the first four months of the initiative with the comparable time period of the previous year indicated a 9 percent reduction in auto thefts, 67 percent reduction in aggravated battery, and an 80 percent reduction in narcotics operations.

In the Miami Lakes District, a Robbery Reduction Enhanced Enforcement Initiative focused on an area identified by the District's Crime Analysis Unit to have a high, and increasing, number of reported robberies. District officers were assigned to this area, where they intensified patrol coverage, conducted Field Interview Reports, increased traffic enforcement, and conducted other activities. Comparing robbery in the first three months of the initiative to the comparable period the previous year indicated a 24 percent reduction in robberies. A burglary EEI in the same district resulted in a 25 percent reduction in burglaries during the first three months of the effort.

6.3.11 North Miami Beach, Florida

Background. Located midway between Miami and Fort Lauderdale, North Miami Beach is a city of only 5.2 square miles with slightly more than 40,000 inhabitants. Although relatively small, the city has six schools, including one high school, one middle school, and four elementary schools. At the time LLEBG funds were made available, the city was experiencing a high rate of truancy at these schools. These truants often loitered aimlessly at local businesses and often committed crimes during daylight hours. Surveys conducted by the police department showed that residents felt that controlling this problem was a top priority. The mayor turned decision-making authority over disposition of the LLEBG grants to the police chief. The chief, a strong proponent of community-oriented policing and problem-solving policing, decided to apportion some of the LLEBG funds to dealing with this problem.

Results-Oriented Program. Although the police department used LLEBG funds for other purposes as well, the chief and his staff decided to allot a portion to support a program to deal with the city's truancy problem. The department began by conducting research to determine what other cities were doing to deal with truancy. After identifying several different approaches, the department decided to incorporate the features of various models, creating the *Police Eliminating Truancy (PET)* program. This program had four primary goals: 1) remove truants from the streets; 2) identify the reasons for truancy and seek to address them; 3) reduce the number of crimes committed during school hours; and 4) track the chronic truants. The program used grant funds to pay for two officers, supervised by a lieutenant, to patrol the streets from 9:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m., stopping apparent truants when they encountered them. PET officers focused on areas of the city where crime analysis indicated were "hotspots" for the types of crimes most often committed by juveniles, particularly burglaries, auto thefts, criminal mischief, and shoplifting. One officer patrolled in a marked police car, the other in a PET van that advertises the program. The officers worked three days per week, on a more or less random basis. The officers conducted field interviews of juveniles they encountered to determine if they were truant. Truants were then brought to a Truancy Evaluation Center, where staff (a teacher and a social worker) assessed the juveniles and sought to determine why they were truant. Based on this assessment, the staff offered needed services, including anger management, drug- and gang-awareness instruction, or reinforcement of the importance of education. The assessments

determined that a significant portion of the truants said they had missed the bus; this led to meetings with the school board to seek to address this problem.

Another sizeable portion of the truants said they had been suspended from school but had no daytime supervision; this led to a revision of school policy to notify parents when students are suspended. The program encountered between 300 and 400 truants per school year. An analysis of recorded crime during the daylight hours before and during the first year of the program showed sizable decreases in residential burglaries, burglaries from vehicles, criminal mischief, stolen vehicles, and grand theft. In addition, surveys of residents indicated that the fear of juveniles had decreased notably.

6.3.12 Palo Alto, California

Background. Located 35 miles south of San Francisco and 14 miles north of San Jose, Palo Alto, with approximately 61,000 residents, is in the heart of Silicon Valley. Although located in a region of great affluence, and the home of Stanford University, the city began to experience a growing gang problem and an increase in youth violence in 1994. In response, as a short-term response, the City Council revised its curfew ordinance, but also asked that the police department to convene a Task Force on Youth Violence to address the long-range implications and causes of the problem. This Task Force, involving representatives from schools, police, recreation, counseling, the PTA Council, the Human Relations Commission, the Chamber of Commerce, and others directly involved with youth, met over the course of two years to develop a positive response to the needs of young people

who were at-risk of becoming involved in delinquent behavior. As a result of the deliberations of the Task Force, 45 agencies agreed to propose a program called Positive Alternatives for Youth (PAY). The announcement of the availability of LLEBG funds provided the opportunity to actually implement this program. The city manager left the decision concerning how to spend the funds to the police chief, who clearly recognized that the PAY program was congruent with the city's Comprehensive Plan, the police department's strategic plan, and was a clear priority of the City Council and the City Manager.

Results-Oriented Program. LLEBG funds were used to support the *Positive Alternatives for Youth (PAY)* program, proposed by the Task Force on Youth Violence. This program was designed as a multi-faceted effort that would comprehensively address the various issues that influence young people's decision about becoming involved with gang activity and/or criminal behavior. In particular, it sought to help at-risk middle and high school teenagers gain job experience and life skills, develop a connection with their community, and pursue positive alternative activities. The program consisted of six basic components: 1) life skills training and counseling, provided to at-risk youth and their families; 2) job placement; 3) mentoring; 4) recreations activities; 5) tutoring and homework assistance; and 6) community service opportunities.

To be eligible to participate in the program, a youth must meet at least three of the following criteria: 1) have demonstrated problems in schools (including poor attendance, low grades, discipline problems, or attends alternative school); 2) has

experience with the juvenile justice system (including a past drug or minor criminal involvement, on probation, or school discipline records for criminal acts such as vandalism); 3) comes from a household with family income below that of the community at-large; 4) has family problems (such as being involved with family counseling, self-reported problems, or parent-reported problems); or 5) demonstrates difficulty with social adjustment (such as problems observed by a counselor or others, isolation, fighting, or lack of social skills). Participants had to be willing to commit to attending school regularly, meet with an adult mentor weekly, and attend a six-week job coaching/life skill counseling group.

The program was thoroughly evaluated, using teacher/school counselor evaluations, employer evaluations, school records, and criminal records. The results concerning the first cohort of 17 participants showed that: 1) 80 percent of participants showed improvement in school attendance; 2) 80 percent of participants showed an improvement in academic grades; 3) 75 percent received counselor/teacher evaluations indicating improvement in school performance, self-confidence, and/or attitude toward school; 4) 85 percent of participants maintained employment for at least three months; 5) 88 percent received positive evaluations from their employers; 6) 88 percent received wage raises during their time of employment; and 7) contacts with police declined by 33 percent and were dramatically less frequent than a control group. Results from more recent cohorts showed similarly impressive positive results.

6.3.13 Pasadena, California

Background. Pasadena, with a population of approximately 136,000, is located 10 miles northeast of downtown Los Angeles. Although relatively affluent, the city also is an ethnically diverse community. When LLEBG funds were made available, the mayor allowed the chief of police to propose how to spend those funds. In his decision, he primarily relied on the department's strategic plan, which had a major emphasis on dealing with the problems of youth. He therefore allotted a portion of the funds to diversion program for first time juvenile offenders. Both the chief and the LLEBG advisory board insisted that the program keep records of its results.

Results-Oriented Program. Pasadena decided to spend a portion of their LLEBG funds to support the development and maintenance of the *Youth Accountability Board (YAB)*. This program, begun in January 1998, was created in an effort to help juveniles, who have committed their first criminal offense, to receive suitable intervention without having to receive a criminal record. To be eligible, a youth must: 1) be under the age of 17; 2) be a resident of Pasadena or attend a school within the Pasadena Unified School District; 3) have no prior arrest record; and 4) have committed a minor offense. The Youth and Family Services Unit of the police department review juvenile arrest reports and other material to determine program eligibility. Qualified juveniles are referred to the YAB and to Pasadena Mental Health (local private service provider) where an assessment of the juvenile and his/her family is conducted to determine what type of counseling

will be most appropriate. Eligible youth and his/her family then appear before a three-member board. Each member of the board must be a graduate of the Pasadena Police Department's Citizens Police Academy, must reside or work in Pasadena, must undergo a background investigation, must receive board training, and must have previously observed a YAB meeting. Also attending the meeting is a Pasadena Mental Health Counselor, the investigating detective, and the program staff assistant.

At the first board meeting, the board members inquire about the precipitating incident (from the point of view of both the juvenile and the detective), about the juvenile's behavior at home, school attendance and grades, and the counselor's assessment of any underlying problems that must be addressed. Having heard all of this information, the board members meet, in the absence of the juvenile and his/her parents to agree upon an "Accountability Contract" designed to address the juvenile's criminal behavior and any other underlying issues. To participate in the program, the juvenile and parents must commit to the contract for six months. Contract requirements normally include mandatory counseling, maintenance of acceptable school grades and attendance, community service, and an apology letter to family and victims. The YAB then holds tracking meetings every two months. The investigating detective oversees the terms of the contract and periodically contacts the juvenile and parents to follow up in between tracking meetings. An external evaluation has been contracted for, but the results of that evaluation are not yet available.

6.3.14 Portland City/Multnomah County, Oregon

Background. Portland, with a population of slightly more than 525,000, is the county seat of Multnomah County, with a population of approximately 665,000. The two jurisdictions have a long history of collaboration. Thus, when LLEBG funds first became available, the mayor and the County Board of Supervisors agreed to an informal sharing agreement under which the city's LLEBG Advisory Committee was to be made up of representatives from both the city and the county, and the funds were to be expended for projects favored by both jurisdictions, although the city's police department was to serve as administrator of the grant. (In the early years of the grant, the county got a small amount of LLEBG funds on its own.) The city decided to allot most of its funds to the police department, although the chief insisted that a significant proportion of the city's grant funds be provided, on a competitive basis, to local community-based organizations ("strategic partners") serving the needs of both the city and the county. This latter requirement was in accordance with the department's Community Policing Transition Plan and, later, the Community Policing Strategic Plan.

The mayor of Portland has a reputation for closely monitoring expenditures of all city agencies, including the police bureau, and for requiring measurable results from those expenditures. Thus achievements of the police and strategic partner programs were expected to be reported on a quarterly basis. Likewise, the County

Board of Supervisors has a performance-based appropriation process, demanding that projects demonstrate results if they are to be refunded.

In FY2001, because of financial problems, the county insisted on, and received, a “disparate distribution” of the city’s LLEBG funds. As a result, what had been an informal sharing of the grant became a formal division of responsibilities, with the city administering only the police department and “strategic partner” programs, and the county administering those affecting the district attorney’s office and the courts.

Results-Oriented Programs. Largely because of the expectations of the mayor and the County Board of Supervisors, most of the efforts were expected to provide evidence of the results they had achieved. Requests from police commanders for use of LLEBG funds to provide overtime pay for police officers to work on special projects, for example, were required to submit an operation plan, including a description of the efforts to be undertaken, along with expected outcome measures, both short-term and long-term, of the mission. Further, after action reports were required that provided evidence about short-term results. Finally, subsequent quarterly reports from the commanders were required to provide indicators of long-term results of the operations.

The city also provided funding for the *Encouraging Men by Teaching and Creating Excellence (EMBRACE) Program*, designed to provide re-entry services for ex-offenders between the ages of 18 to 24 who are transitioning back into the community. The program provides mentorship, job training and employment

placement assistance, housing referrals, individual and group counseling, recreational activities, and advocacy on the part of the client with parole/probation officials. Clients participate in weekly group sessions including topics such as conflict resolution; domestic violence/violence prevention skills; anger management; and the importance of education, ownership, employment, and money management. Data provided by the program indicate that 91 percent of the program's clients had remained free of parole/probation violations during their participation in the program. Furthermore, the vast majority of the clients had secured full- or part-time employment or were engaged in GED training or an educational program.

Additional evidence of the results-oriented approach was demonstrated in two programs supported by the county, the Sanctions Treatment Opportunity Progress (S.T.O.P.) Drug Diversion Court and the Neighborhood District Attorney Program. The *S.T.O.P Drug Diversion Court* was created in 1991 to provide a diversion program for minor drug violations. The program has the following core elements:

- 1) intensive drug treatment is provided three to five days following arrest;
- 2) treatment is based on individual assessments and case plans;
- 3) continued judicial supervision of the treatment and case management is provided to each participant;
- 4) all participants have at least one appearance per month before the S.T.O.P. judge, during which progress and problems are discussed;
- 5) program compliance is monitored by the judge and the treatment provider, with non-compliance resulting in adjustments to the treatment plan, work release, work

camp, brief periods of incarceration, or other sanctions; and 6) therapeutic, supportive, and aftercare services, such as physical health services (screening, education, and follow-up clinics), mental health (dual diagnosis groups, medication management, on-site practitioners), employment and housing assistance, anger management, relapse prevention, and family counseling.

An outcome evaluation, funded by the county in 1998, used a matched comparison group to determine the effectiveness of the program. That evaluation found that clients who participate in the program, and particularly clients who graduate from the program, had a significantly lower recidivism rate than did the comparison group. Further, the report found that every tax dollar spent on S.T.O.P. clients produced \$2.50 of avoided cost savings to the taxpayer.

The *Neighborhood District Attorney* program was created by the Multnomah County District Attorney to address the problems of local communities. The program operates by assigning an assistant district attorney to work in one of seven neighborhoods throughout the county to identify and attempt to resolve the problems (often quality of life issues) of the residents and businesses of the community. The nature of the strategies adopted by these district attorneys varies widely, depending upon the nature of the local problems and resources. In general, the district attorneys use a problem-solving approach, attempting to identify the problems to be addressed and mobilizing whatever forces might be necessary and appropriate to ameliorate those problems.

In one area, the district attorney used volunteers from the business community and intensified police coverage to reduce low-level disorder complaints (including prostitution, public drinking, vandalism, public urination, littering, and car thefts). As a result, the number of such complaints declined dramatically. In another area, plagued by persistent drug sales problem, the Neighborhood District Attorney, working with the city attorney, crafted an ordinance creating a drug-free zone, the first of its kind in the country. The result was the drug market was virtually eliminated in one area and significantly reduced in another. In yet another area, the district attorney concentrated on a strip of motels known to attract prostitution and drug activity. In this area, the district attorney got most of the motel owners to agree to require people registering for rooms to provide photo identification for themselves and all people coming to their rooms. When one particularly troublesome motel continued to draw complaints, the district attorney worked with the police to conduct a sting operation. A chronic nuisance ordinance was used to close down two other motels. As a result of these varied tactics, the number of complaints in the motel strip declined significantly.

6.3.15 Rancho Palos Verdes, California

Background. Rancho Palos Verdes, a town of slightly more than 40,000 persons, is one of three cities, along with Rolling Hills Estates (with a population of approximately 7,700) and Rolling Hills (with a population of about 1,900) on the Palos Verdes Peninsula, hugging the coast of Los Angeles County. Rancho Palos Verdes and the other two cities on the Peninsula do not have their own police

departments, but, instead, contract with the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department for policing services. Because the three cities share many of the same problems and services, and collaborate extensively, in 1974 the three mayors agreed to create the Palos Verdes Peninsula Regional Law Enforcement Committee. This committee approved a regional agreement with the L.A. County Sheriff's Department, one which pools police services for the three cities.

When LLEBG funds became available, Rancho Palos Verdes was the only one of the three Peninsula cities qualified to receive them. Nevertheless, the decision as to how to expend the funds was made by the Regional Law Enforcement Committee, considering the inter-related needs of all three jurisdictions. Since they contract for police services with the L.A. County Sheriff's Department, these agencies could not use the LLEBG funds to purchase police equipment. Instead, the committee agreed that they should focus on what they mutually agreed was their most significant crime problem; juvenile crime. In particular, they noted that, with the recent consolidation of high schools in 1993, attendance at the Peninsula High School had doubled, leading to a dramatic increase in on-campus incidents as well as an increase in crimes in the shopping center across the street from the school. In 1996, for example, burglaries from parked vehicles in the area numbered 27, while grand theft auto incidents had reached six, both unprecedented numbers. In addition, there were reports of gang infiltration and narcotics trafficking in the parking lots and around the campus. The committee agreed to recommend to the LLEBG Advisory Board that the grant

funds be combined with local city funds, as well as COPS funds from the state to Rancho Palos Verdes, Rolling Hills, and Rolling Hills Estates, to address this problem. The mayors of all three cities agreed that, because funding was becoming more scarce, it was important that the value of this effort be measured by outcome measures. They were supported in this position by the fact that BJA, at least initially, required an annual progress report that demonstrated the effects of the LLEBG-supported programs.

Results-Oriented Program. Rancho Palos Verdes agreed to devote its LLEBG funds (in addition to COPS funds from all of the Peninsula cities) to create a Community Resource (CORE) Policing Team, composed of three Los Angeles County sheriff's deputies, who would serve, under the regional contract, as Special Assignment Officers (SAOs), supervised by one sergeant. These SAOs would operate under the Community Oriented Policing model being implemented by the Los Angeles Sheriff's Department. This model stresses the importance of building a partnership between the community and its police department. The SAOs' mission was to focus on juvenile problems, with the goal of proactively intervening when juveniles need help, rather than reacting after the youth get into trouble. The responsibilities of the SAOs were not limited to the school campus; however, since virtually all of the juveniles of concern were expected to attend school, most of their problems involved the high school in some way.

The responsibilities of the SAOs involved: serving as a liaison with school administrators, attending school board meetings, participating in Student

Attendance Boards and the School Principal Information Network, attending school assemblies and sporting events, maintaining frequent presence on the school campus, gathering intelligence regarding criminal activity and other problem behavior on campus, assisting merchants with implementing measures to reduce juvenile crime, and attending City Council meetings.

Measures of success have relied on reported crime and incident data. During the first full year of the program, for example, the number of vehicle burglaries in the target area declined from 27 to 11; robberies fell from 9 to 5; grand theft property crimes were reduced from 23 to 8; and auto thefts were reduced from 6 to 2. In addition, reports of criminal incidents involving juveniles fell from 149 reports in 1997, before the program began, to 66 reports in 2000, in the program's third year.

6.3.16 Riverside County, California

Background. Riverside County, with a population of about 265,000 persons, stretches from Orange County to the Arizona border and is one of the fastest-growing counties in the nation. Because of the growing number of families with young children, minor crimes by youth and teens led to a clogged juvenile justice system. The sheriff, after consulting with the head of the Juvenile Division of the District Attorney's Office and others involved in the system, determined that a diversion program for lower-level, first-time juvenile offenders was necessary. Representatives from other local agencies agreed. The sheriff decided that a teen court would be a desirable approach. Since the sheriff was familiar with the grant

process, he recommended that COPS funds be used to support such a program. A teen court was established in one of the cities that contracted with the Sheriff's Office for law enforcement services.

When LLEBG funds became available, the County Board of Supervisors allowed the sheriff to shape the county's use of those funds, and made him the head of the LLEBG Advisory Board. Thus, he influenced the board to agree to use the grant funds to implement additional youth courts in other contract cities throughout the county. The Board of Supervisors applies zero-based budgeting, refusing to approve projects for more than one year without evidence of results.

Results-Oriented Program. Although other results-oriented programs have received some portion of Riverside County's LLEBG funds, one of the best examples of such programs is the *Temecula Valley Youth Court (TVYC)*. As mentioned above, this program was designed to provide first-time minor offenders with a means to be diverted out of the criminal justice system, while still holding them accountable for their offenses. The TVYC hears first-time, low-level criminal violations committed by minors in the City of Temecula and the surrounding area. Typically, the court hears and adjudicates cases involving vandalism, theft, minor assault, possession of marijuana, and low-level felony violations (on a case by case basis). The program involves personnel and services of the Riverside County Sheriff's Department, the Riverside County Juvenile Probation Department, the Juvenile Division of the Riverside County District Attorney's office, the Temecula Valley Unified School District, and the Youth Service Center of Riverside.

After criminal charges are sought against a juvenile in the Temecula area, the original police report and juvenile court petition are reviewed by Youth Court staff, prior to the case reaching the Probation Department. The reports are reviewed to determine if the incident and the juvenile meet the criteria of the program. Court personnel meet with the youth and his/her family one week before the juvenile's court date. At this orientation meeting, the staff members describe the program, provide information concerning the nature regarding potential consequences if the juvenile does not participate in the program, and allow the family and youth to ask questions.

In order for the juveniles to participate in the program, the juveniles must waive their rights to a criminal proceeding trial regarding their guilt and accept the charges without contest. The juveniles and their family then receive a subpoena from the Youth Court to appear for case hearings. At that hearing, a synopsis of the precipitating offense is read to the court by the "prosecuting attorney" (a juvenile volunteer with an interest in the judicial system). The "defense attorney" (also a juvenile volunteer) responds by citing mitigating circumstances, and rebutting aggravating circumstances. After both sides of the matter have been heard, the case is submitted to a jury of his or her own peers. After deliberation in private, the jury returns to the courtroom with a sentence recommendation. The judge (an adult volunteer leader or person actually employed in the actual criminal justice system) hears the recommendation and either agrees with the jury or modifies the sentence.

Most youth are assigned one or more of the following sentences:

1) performance of community service; 2) completion of an apology letter to the victim; 3) completion of a life plan essay; 4) jury duty participation in future sessions; 5) open-ended counseling; and 6) placement on a modified probation period. After the sentencing hearing, the juvenile is expected to complete his or her sentencing requirements during the modified probation period and will be subject to additional consequences or expulsion from the program at any time for inappropriate behavior and/or lack of participation or cooperation. Upon the juvenile's successful completion of the program sentencing requirements, the criminal complaint against the juvenile is closed and considered adjudicated without a conviction record.

Program success was measured by the number of youth who successfully completed the program. According to data provided by program staff, between August 1998 and August 2000, the TVYC heard and processed 355 cases. Of those cases, 291 juveniles (82%) successfully completed the program. The County Board of Supervisors, the Sheriff's Office, and the LLEBG Advisory Board considered this rate of success to be sufficient to continue to fund this and the original Youth Courts, and to open a fourth.

6.3.17 San Francisco City and County, California

Background. San Francisco, a city and county of almost 780,000 inhabitants, formed the Mayor's Criminal Justice Council (MCJC) in the early 1970s, when the federal government required local jurisdictions to form criminal justice planning

units in order to receive assistance. This council, composed of representatives of the police department, the sheriff's office, the district attorney's office, the public defender's office, the local judiciary, the county board of supervisors, the probation department, as well as non-government organizations were given responsibility for planning, coordinating, and overseeing local criminal justice policy and programs. An executive committee of this group assumed leadership for the larger body. The executive committee has met regularly over the course of almost three decades, allowing its members to share concerns and resolve differences, all under the larger umbrella of the city/county strategic plan. In 1994, voters approved Proposition Q, the Neighborhood Crime Prevention Initiative, which led to the development of the Mayor's Neighborhood Crime Prevention Program (MNCPC). Under the auspices of this program, community organizers and outreach workers meet with residents and other stakeholders in a neighborhood to identify and implement appropriate strategies to reduce crime and violence in that area.

When LLEBG funds became available, in 1996, the newly elected mayor made the executive committee of the MCJC the core of the Advisory Board. The board agreed that certain existing programs, such as the city's Drug Court and the MNCPC, should receive priority funding. The remaining grant funds were apportioned in accordance with the priorities of the various agencies and community organizations represented on the board, as long as they were congruent with the strategic plan. There was general agreement among the members of the Advisory Board that more diversion programs, particularly for

juveniles and youth, were a high priority. It also was agreed that, to the extent possible, all funded programs should be able to demonstrate the results they had achieved. This was in accordance with the general results-orientation of the strategic plan, an orientation stressed emphatically by the new mayor.

Results-Oriented Programs. Although San Francisco funded several results-oriented programs, a few of them, such as Project Impact, the Mentor Court, and the Youth Treatment and Education Court (Y-TEC) provide particularly good examples of this type of program.

Project Impact is designed to create a single process through which juvenile offenders or youth at-risk with emotional disabilities will be identified, assessed, and supported through a continuum of flexible, wrap-around services. It was designed as a four-year demonstration project, funded by a grant from the California Board of Corrections, with supplemental support from LLEBG funds. Implementation of the project is led by a collaboration of the Mayor's Criminal Justice Council, the Juvenile Probation Department, the Department of Public Health/Community Mental Health Service, the Department of Human Services, and several community-based agencies: the Bay View Hunters Point Foundation, the Community Youth Center, the Instituto Familiar de la Raza, the Family Mosaic Project, and the Family Service Agency.

Under the auspices of the program, youth are screened to meet program eligibility criteria. To be eligible, a youth must: 1) be a San Francisco resident; 2) be aged 11 to 17; 3) have a mental health history; 4) have a history of learning

or attendance problems; and 5) have previous referrals to juvenile probation.

Entities that can participate in the referral and screening process include Juvenile Probation Officers, School Resource Officer, in coordination with their assistant principals, deans, school counselors; and the Community Assessment and Referral Center (CARC).

Youth found eligible to receive treatment services are provided the following treatment options:

- Project Impact Outpatient Services

These include:

- Licensed clinical social workers/family therapists engaging youth and parents immediately upon contact;
- Providing youth a brief assessment of their mental health needs;
- Providing short-term family therapy and group therapy; and
- Referring youth to the appropriate network of community agencies that provide clinical and wrap-around services based on an individualized treatment plan.

- Community Alliance Networks (CANs)

The community providers in the network include the Bay View Hunters Point Foundation, the Community Youth Center, and the Instituto de la Raza. Each CAN:

- Is staffed by 2 to 3 case managers;
- Offers clinical therapy and support services;
- Develops an individualized treatment plan; and
- Provides flexible wrap-around services such as mentoring, tutoring, job training/development, support groups.

Youth on Probation and/or detained are eligible for these services:

- Family Integrated Treatment Services (FITS)

Under this service, youth are eligible for:

- A risk assessment and additional testing by a licensed psychologist to better understand the youth’s mental, psychological, and educational needs;
- Assistance from the Mobile Support Team of case managers who provide brief case management, one-on-one counseling with families to intervene in arguments, or defiant behavior by youth. The team also assists families, service providers, and probation officers with support to ensure that youth meet their terms of probation;
- Support from the Family Mosaic Project, which offers youth intensive case management, supervision, and wrap-around services;
- Access to the Impact Community High School, which provides eligible youth with an alternative high school environment, integrating academic coursework and clinical therapy into a setting which enable youth to learn and accomplish their goals. This full-day enhanced high school is also a County Community School, and includes individualized educational support, after school activities, mental health and substance abuse counseling, and other support services for both students and families; and
- Access to placement coordination which brokers placement services between youth, family, and placement providers, with the goal of providing youth with a safe and therapeutic environment, with individual and group activities, individualized education, tutoring services, substance abuse counseling, and medication management.

Mentor Court is an adult, pre-adjudication felony diversion program focused on non-violent offenders, aged 18 to 25, charged with drug sales. It is similar in many ways to the drug model, although it stresses the importance of education and training more than that model. Offenders are referred by their defense counsel to the district attorney for initial screening. To be eligible, the following conditions

must be met: 1) the defendant must be a resident of the city/county of San Francisco for at least one year; 2) the current offense does not involve gun possession or weapons use; 3) the defendant has no prior felony convictions for drug-related offenses or a history of violent criminal activity or have any outstanding warrants; 4) the defendant must have no prior arrests or convictions for firearm possession or weapons use; 5) the present case does not involve a significant quantity of drugs, unless extenuating circumstances prevail; and 6) the defendant is not an active or principal participant in a significant drug distribution organization; and the defendant does not presently have a substance abuse problem. Cases are judged based on the nature of the case, the defendant's level of motivation, education, and family support.

Preference is given to cases that are still pending in the preliminary hearing departments. If the district attorney accepts the applicant, the case will be referred to the Mentor Court, where the district attorney and the defendant agree to waive time. Newly admitted participants will then be subject to a 60-day evaluation during which the participant works collaboratively with the Pretrial Diversion Services unit to develop a Participation Plan setting for the individual's objectives for his/her Mentor Court participation. This plan must then be agreed to by the individual and Pretrial Diversion, and will be submitted to the court for approval. Participation Plans may include any of the following: 1) participation in educational, vocational, or other skill training programs, as deemed appropriate; 2) regular court appearances (at least two times per month); 3) regular contact with

the Pretrial Diversion Services unit; 4) attendance at a weekly class at the Pretrial Diversion Services unit; 5) participation in counseling/testing as deemed appropriate; and 6) follow all instructions as given by the Pretrial Diversion unit. A defendant who fails to meet program requirements may be terminated by the court, depending upon recommendations by both the prosecutor and defense counsel. At the conclusion of 12 months of successful participation in the program, and after completion of the pre-determined Participation Plan, the defendant's case, upon recommendation from the court, will be discharged upon motion of the district attorney. In the event that all program requirements and objectives have not been met, the court may extend the defendant's participation in Mentor Court.

Measures of program success include the percent of participants who complete the program, the rate at which participants fail to appear in court, and the percent of participants who re-offend within one year of completing the program. Information provided by the court's staff indicate that approximately one half of the participants complete the program. Program data also indicate that the failure to appear rate approximately 6 percent (compared to about 30 percent for non-participants). Approximately nine percent of the participants who successfully complete the program have been found to commit another offense within a one year of program completion.

The *Youth Treatment and Education Court (YTEC)* is an intensive case management and day-treatment program with an on-site high school (YTEC Academy). It is designed to help youth and their families:

- Address substance abuse issues;
- Remain clean and sober;
- Improve relationships within the family;
- Improve school performance; and
- Avoid further criminal activity.

To be eligible for the program, a youth must be 14 to 18 years of age and a San Francisco resident. In addition, they must have a history of drug or alcohol use, a pending or sustained non-violent offense, and have committed no sex offense.

The YTEC is a collaboration between the San Francisco Superior Court, the Probation Department, the Public Health Department, the District Attorney's Office, the Public Defender, local law enforcement agencies, and the San Francisco Unified School District. Potential participants are referred by a probation officer to the district attorney, who determines eligibility for the program. The public defender will meet with the youth to make certain they understand the legal implications of participation. After determination of legal eligibility, the YTEC Program Coordinator conducts a treatment assessment to determine program suitability. If the youth is determined to be eligible and suitable for services, a case manager is assigned and the participant begins the program.

An Individual Treatment Plan is the primary tool for each participant's treatment throughout the program. YTEC works with the participant and parent/guardian to identify the participant's goals, motivations, strengths, and obstacles. YTEC provides individual, family, and group therapy and counseling for

each participant as needed. In addition, YTEC hosts monthly Family Night Dinner/Workshops for participants and their families.

Intensive Day Treatment provides comprehensive judicial supervision, drug treatment, expressive arts, and high school academics for participants. Both treatment and school activities are provided in a gender specific environment. Case management connects participants in need of specialized off-site services with appropriate resources: residential, mental health, and treatment services for non-English speakers. The program works with the outside agency to establish and monitor a plan to best serve the participant, and to fulfill the requirements of the court. *YTEC Diversion* is a seven-week substance abuse education and prevention course for youth with first time drug and alcohol offenses.

The *YTEC Academy* provides an opportunity for participants to earn high school credits at an accelerated level. The program has a rigorous 8:30 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. daily schedule and supports students in reaching higher education goals. The academy curriculum includes academics (English, Social Studies, Science, and Math), expressive arts, character development, and vocational preparation. The school is held in a multicultural therapeutic community and is integrated with treatment activities.

An outside evaluator has been hired to track four indicators of program success: changes in alcohol and other drug use among participants, indicated through random urine analyses through all stages of the program; reduction in drug-related offenses, as indicated by re-arrest data, improved school attendance

and performance; and change in employment status. The evaluation report was not available at the time this document was prepared.

6.3.18 Santa Clara County, California

Background. Santa Clara County, whose county seat is the city of San Jose, had an estimated population of almost 1.7 million persons in 2001. When informed of the availability of LLEBG funds, the county administrator assembled a broadly representative LLEBG Advisory Board with a mandate to distribute the funds broadly across the various agencies of the criminal justice system. No clear requirement that the funds be used for results-oriented programs seems to have been established.

Results-Oriented Programs. Although the county invested a sizable proportion of its funding to fund sheriff's deputies involved in community policing efforts, no clear results of those additional officers, or their effects, seem to have been monitored, although the additional funds did allow for broader coverage on swing shift to provide better supervision and service to the public. Funds also were provided to support the Adult Drug Court, but no monitoring of the effect of these additional funds was maintained.

LLEBG funds were also allocated to the County's Probation Department to add an additional probation officer to the *Domestic Violence Specialized Supervision Unit* and to enhance the effectiveness of the department's Electronic Monitoring program. These funds, according to data provided by the Probation Department:

- Reduced average caseload per probation officer by 20 per officer;

- Allowed for the review of 100 additional child abuse cases per week;
- Provided for “supervision to standard” an additional 21 Domestic Violence cases;
- Processes an additional 30 “Threat Management” reports per week;
- Provided increased resources and referrals to victims through the Family Violence Center;
- Allowed the department to purchase state-of-the-art Electronic Monitoring equipment; and
- Provided for the monitoring of over 200 probationers and inmates in the community.

LLEBG funds also were used to add two District Attorney Investigators to the *Sexual Assault Felony Enforcement (SAFE) Task Force*, operated by the County’s District Attorney, increasing the number of Investigators from five to seven. This Task Force is designed to monitor the more than 4,000 registered sex offenders residing in Santa Clara County, which includes locating, verifying housing and employment of sex offenders; conducting surveillance and sweeps; and assisting local law enforcement agencies in sexual assault investigations. Although no specific breakdown of the added value of the two investigators was maintained, the task force indicated that between July 1, 2000 and May 3, 2001, it had arrested 99 registered sex offenders on a variety of charges ranging from parole violations to new criminal charges involving controlled substance violations and mandatory sex offender registration violations. Of those arrested, 66 percent had criminal backgrounds that included crimes against children. Several had combinations of adult and juvenile victims; all were crimes of violence. In early 2001, the Task Force conducted “Sweep2001” throughout the county, in which over 80 percent of all the registered sex offenders in the county were contacted, residency and

employment information was verified, random parole/probation searches were conducted, resulting in taking approximately ten percent of parolees into custody for a parole violation and/or new criminal charges.

6.3.19 Seattle, Washington

Background. Seattle, with a population of over 560,000 inhabitants, is the home of Boeing, and, until recently, Microsoft. Upon notification of the availability of LLEBG funds, the mayor assembled a multi-agency LLEBG committee to consider requests for funding from both the Seattle Police Department and local organizations that proposed to implement crime prevention programs. In each case, proposals were required to indicate how the requested funds would be used in pursuit of both the city's and the police department's strategic plans, and how the attainment of program goals would be measured. Each non-police agency receiving LLEBG funds were required to sign a "Project Services Agreement" that specified the goals and objectives to be achieved by the program. The police department monitored the progress of each funded program, by means of quarterly reports. The department was aided in this request by being able to refer to LLEBG's requirement that annual written progress reports be provided for programs funded under specific program areas. Preference for refunding was based largely on the demonstrated ability of the programs to achieve their goals, leverage other funds, and to build on interagency partnerships.

Results-Oriented Programs. Although the success of all LLEBG-funded was monitored, the Seattle Police Department nominated two results-oriented programs

of particular note: the Rapid Recycling Alternatives to Incarceration program, and the Asian/Pacific Islander Domestic Violence program.

The *Rapid Recycling Alternatives to Incarceration* program was designed to deal with female “rapid cyclers’ (those females who have been booked 10 times or more in a 12-month period). Most of these offenders were found to have been charged with misdemeanor offenses, often for substance abuse and mental health problems, and most of them appeared to be homeless. Although these offenders were not, for the most part, accused of committing serious crimes, they were proving to be a drain on the incarceration facilities of the county. The program sought to reduce the number of warrant bookings, and new criminal charges for women with 6 or more bookings in a 12-month period or who had spent more than 45 days in jail. The program sought to achieve this goal by intensive case management, involving linkages to services designed to reduce recidivism and prevent criminal behavior. Operated under the auspices of the YWCA, working in conjunction with the King County Department of Adult and Juvenile Detention. The program is being evaluated by the King County Adult Justice Operational Master Planning Group, although the results of that evaluation are not yet available.

The *Asian/Pacific Islander Coordinated Response to Domestic Violence* program was designed to address the particularly difficult problem of domestic violence among the Asian/Pacific Islander (API) communities in Seattle. In these communities, domestic violence is often seen as an internal family matter. Victims often fear and mistrust service providers and authority figures such as the police.

As a result, victims are often reluctant to seek out or accept help, and batterers may avoid treatment because of lack of cultural and language-appropriate services. The program is the product of a collaboration among four agencies (Asian Counseling and Referral Service (ACRS), Refugee Women's Alliance, Asian and Pacific Islander /Women and Family Safety Center, and International Community Health Services. The effort has three basic components. The first component, *batterers' treatment*, involves the transfer to the multi-lingual batterers treatment program (utilizing interpreters) from the Refugee Women's Alliance to ACRS. This involves creating two multi-lingual batterers treatment groups, one using trained, bilingual treatment therapists, and another utilizing interpreters to serve more clients in a timely manner. The second component, *victim services*, provides a wide range of services to victims of domestic violence from the API community. The third component, *community awareness*, expands educational efforts concerning domestic violence in the Filipino, Chinese, and Samoan communities. Performance measurement indicates that: 1) during the first year of operation, 44 API batterers completed an all state-mandated training, with indications that they were less prone to engage in battering behavior; 2) 81 API domestic violence victims had availed themselves of the program's services, with indications that their experiences of victimization had been reduced; and 3) a broad scale education effort concerning domestic violence had been implemented in the targeted communities.

6.3.20 Stockton City/San Joaquin County, California

Background. Stockton, a city of slightly more than 250,000, located approximately 90 miles east of San Francisco, is the county seat of San Joaquin County. Although the county's farmland has been largely replaced by housing developments, the poverty rate remains much higher than the state average, and crime, particularly among juveniles, and especially involving gangs, has become a major concern. They further agreed, that the programs funded should address the gaps in achieving the goals of the County's "Comprehensive Multi-agency Juvenile Justice Plan." The LLEBG Advisory Board decided upon a joint city/county proposal, which was then submitted for approval to both the City Council and the County Board of Supervisors. In keeping with the general philosophy of both of those bodies, it was determined that all programs should provide evidence of their level of performance and, where possible, the results achieved. Because most of the juvenile crime prevention programs selected were more properly the domain of probation and the police department, the city agreed to pass over \$500,000 of its funds to the county for the first four years of the program; more recently, with a reduction in LLEBG funds, the share going to the county has been reduced.

Results-Oriented Programs. Stockton and San Joaquin County agreed to fund several results-oriented programs, including the Gang Violence Intervention program, the Stockton Juvenile Co-Op program, the Youth Gun Violence Reduction program, Youth Accountability Boards, and the Kids Alcohol/Drug Alternative program.

The *Gang Violence Intervention* program, created in January 1997, was designed as a multifaceted approach to deal with the increasing gang problem in the Stockton area. The program staff comprises two Deputy Probation Officers, two Probation Assistants, and six Stockton police officers, supervised by one sergeant. Unfortunately, in June 2001, because of funding reductions, one of the probation officer positions was eliminated. These staff members maintain intensive supervision and surveillance of identified juvenile gang members and “wannabe” at home, at school, and in the community; this involves frequent unannounced home and school visits. The staff also promptly arrests or returns to court those wards that violate probation or commit new offenses; this involves joint police/probation violence suppression missions, involving central gang leaders.

During its first year of operation, the program staff jointly conducted a total of 108 searches, yielding 12 firearms. In addition, eight suppression missions were conducted in which individuals or groups of identified gang members were contacted and searched for contraband. Since that time, the number of searches has increased dramatically. As a result, the number of violations of probation identified rose from 16 in FY1996 to 284 in FY2001. At the same time, the number of gangs has been reduced from an estimated 157 in FY1996 to 95 in FY2001. Likewise, the number of estimated gang members decreased from almost 3,700 in FY1996 to approximately 2,100 in FY2001.

The *Youth Gun Violence Reduction* program (otherwise known as the Juvenile “Gangs & Guns” program) stemmed from the fact that between January 1995 and

September 1996, 35 of the 79 homicides in Stockton were committed by juveniles, and in all of those juvenile homicides, a firearm was the cause of death. Facing this stark reality, the Stockton Police Department and the San Joaquin County Probation Department funded a senior deputy district attorney who was assigned to the Juvenile Division solely to prosecute juvenile gang-related offenses and juvenile firearms offenses. The prosecutor was required to be experienced with gang prosecutions and knowledgeable about local juvenile gang structures. The program was designed so that the prosecutor followed these cases from beginning to end, i.e., working with the police gang unit and the assigned probation officers from the filing of a juvenile petition to the ultimate disposition or sentencing.

The prosecutor also was given the discretion to determine that some of the juvenile offenders were too incorrigible to be fit subjects for the juvenile system and that they would be prosecuted through the adult system. In addition, the program was designed to enhance enforcement of pre-existing conditions of probation imposed on many of the violent juvenile offenders in Stockton by targeting active juvenile gang members and vigorously enforcing probation terms, such as non-association clauses and search conditions. In 2001, the prosecutor prosecuted 136 petitions to conclusion, with another 12 petitions awaiting disposition, and 6 pending arraignment or jurisdictional hearing. Of the total 154 petitions, all but two of the minors were documented criminal street gang members or associates. Thirty of the minors admitted petitions or had petitions sustained for firearms offenses.

The *Stockton Juvenile Co-Op* program is at a central location, easily accessible to police, minors, families, school officials, and the public that serves multiple purposes: 1) it functions as an office for probations who handle minors' citations from initial filing to supervision; 2) it provides a venue for court-ordered and pre-dispositional programs (e.g., Parenting and Shoplifter Education programs); 3) it provides a location for counseling to be provided to chronic truants; 4) it serves as a location for police, probation, and the schools to determine who is on probation, who is searchable as a condition of probation, and who has outstanding warrants; 5) it serves as a resource for providing probation officers to the schools and the police, to assist on School Attendance Review Boards and in searches and arrests; 6) it provides a source of referral resources for counseling, community service, substance abuse, etc.; and 7) it offers the opportunity for informal probation to effect positive changes in youth instead of using affidavits and wardship. The office is staffed by four Deputy Probation Officers, one work-study student, and one Stockton police officer. Performance measures used by the program indicate that the average number of intakes processed per month rose from 72 in FY1997 to 107 in FY2000. In addition, the number of minors handled informally and diverted from the formal juvenile justice system rose from 201 in FY1997 to 1109 in FY2000. During the FY2001 fiscal year, 30 parents graduated from parenting classes at the Co-Op. In addition, 16 shoplifter education series were provided; 219 youth were referred to the program, of which 116 graduated. Only 13 percent of the graduates experienced new referrals to the Probation

Department, a reduction from the 19 percent noted prior to the program's implementation.

Two *Youth Accountability Boards* (YABs) were created with LLEBG funds in two unincorporated areas of East Stockton. The YAB program targets first-time or less serious misdemeanor juvenile offenders, diverting them from the formal juvenile justice system. The youth and their families are brought before a panel of community volunteers, where the nature of the offending behavior is discussed. The panel then determines appropriate consequences for the offense, including community service hours, anger management classes, shoplifter education, and arranges for restitution. The panel continues to monitor the offender to ensure that no new offenses occur, that all assigned consequences are completed, and that restitution occurs. If the offender successfully completes the assigned program, and does not re-offend, the original charges are dropped.

During the fiscal year 2000-2001, a total of 221 youth appeared before YABs. Of those, 111 successfully completed the program, 96 were still participating in the program, and 14 (6%) failed, either because of re-offending or failing to carry out all required aspects of the program. The county has been so impressed by these results that they have expanded the program to 15 YABs throughout the county.

The *Kids Alcohol/Drug Alternative Program (KADAP)* was designed to provide the county's Juvenile Drug Court with an outpatient treatment component and a viable and meaningful alternative to detention by: 1) intensive probation supervision of juvenile offenders with substance abuse issues; 2) intensive

substance abuse counseling in a controlled setting; and 3) reinforced remedial education. The program focuses on high-risk youth or first-time offenders, aged 14 to 18. Most of the youth identified as needing close surveillance/support and an intensive substance abuse treatment program had fallen far behind in school, indicating that they needed an academic environment. The program functions by providing alcohol and drug intervention care for up to 20 minors identified as wards with admitted alcohol and/or drug problems. Youth are referred by the Juvenile Drug Court to be screened to determine if they are fit candidates. Once accepted, the daily activities of the youth are monitored in the initial program stages by use of electronic monitoring. The youth are also subjected to random drug testing to ensure compliance with program rules. Further, participants are held accountable for educational progress by daily school attendance checks and monthly monitoring of school credit achievement. Teachers of the program youth are provided individualized school programs geared to the specific needs of those youth. Substance abuse counselors conduct individual counseling during the school day and group counseling after school at the KADAP school site. Probation officers assigned to KADAP prepare bi-weekly progress reports on each participant, including information about school attendance, substance abuse testing results, KADAP substance abuse counseling, and Alcoholics Anonymous or Narcotics Anonymous meeting attendance verification. KADAP team members appear in the Juvenile Drug Court on a bi-weekly basis to present the results of each participant's progress to the court. A voluntary acupuncture component is

also offered. Finally, the program offers organized school-related activities, such as athletic events and academic competitions for KADAP youth.

Of the 162 minors referred to KADAP between October 1, 2000 and September 30, 2001, 51 were accepted and ordered into the program by the Juvenile Drug Court. None of the students accepted into the program have been re-arrested for substance abuse during their time in the program. Of the approximately 1,900 urine tests conducted during this time, 140 (7%) produced positive results. During this period, none of the program youth have been involved in acts of violence.

6.3.21 Tacoma, Washington

Background. Tacoma, a port city of approximately 195,000 inhabitants, has been buffeted by forces, negative and positive, that led it to use many of the LLEBG funds for results-oriented programs. On the negative side, the city faces dire financial conditions. First, due to a citizen initiative, the state reduced the “car-tab” (automobile tax) from one based on the value of the car to a flat tax of \$30, resulting in a loss of between \$550 million and \$750 million. Second, another citizen initiative limited the growth of property taxes to one percent per year, significantly less than the inflation rate, leaving the city with fewer and fewer “real” dollars over the past few years. As a result of these changes in the tax structure, along with massive Boeing layoffs and the meltdown of the dot-com industry, the State of Washington faces a projected \$2.6 billion budget deficit, leaving it

incapable of coming to the aid of its distressed cities. As a result, Tacoma has had to carefully prioritize its spending.

On the positive side, a new city manager was hired, in 1990, with a commitment to Total Quality Management techniques and the reinventing government principles espoused by Osborne and Gaebler. One of his first endeavors was to develop, with the participation of community members, a strategic plan for the city that addressed the concerns of the citizens of the city. This plan established specific priorities for how the city should spend its efforts and funds. In order to implement this plan, the city manager instituted a comprehensive OBE system throughout the municipal government. All city employees received training in this evaluation system, with a focus on logic models, linking program strategies to outcomes and goals. In 1994, a Human Services Strategic Plan was adopted by the city, under the influence of the new city manager, to prioritize its delivery of services to the community.

In 1996, when the first LLEBG funds were made available, there was little awareness of the flexibility afforded to the use of those funds. As a result, much of the money was funneled to the police department for overtime pay and remodeling. In all later years, however, the allocation was largely determined by the Human Rights and Human Services Department. The department used the Human Services Strategic Plan, modified several times since its creation, to establish priorities to be used in deciding how to allocate LLEBG funds. The department determined that a significant portion of the funds should be provided to community-

based organizations (CBOs). In accordance with the city's OBE system, these organizations were expected to submit a comprehensive proposal, complete with clear and appropriate indicators of progress, appropriate sample sizes, demonstrated ability to compile and analyze outcome data, provide an indication that the proposed program can achieve measurable results, and demonstrates the ability to use data analysis to make adjustments in the program, if necessary. The department was assisted in this effort by the fact that the Tacoma Urban Network, one of 35 state-funded Community Health and Safety Networks in Washington, had been supportive of outcomes-oriented evaluations of the city's service programs. In support of this effort, the Pierce County Funders Group, a collaboration of seven funding organizations, had standardized application forms and outcomes for all local programs and had provided technical assistance to CBOs in writing outcomes-based proposals. (Government agencies, such as the police department, were not initially expected to have outcomes-based programs. In FY2001, however, municipal agencies were required to meet the same criteria applied to CBOs.)

The Human Rights and Human Services Department issues an annual Request for Proposals for LLEBG funds. CBOs are expected to fund at least 35 percent of any project with non-LLEBG funds. Each proposal is rated on criteria based upon the goals of the department's strategic plan. Funded agencies are required to submit quarterly outcome progress reports. Refunding is based upon the extent to which the projects achieve their desired outcomes.

Results-Oriented Programs. Although Tacoma funds several results-oriented programs with its LLEBG funds, the most notable of those programs is the *South Park Crime Reduction Project*. This project involves the Department of Public Works, the Department of Human Rights and Human Service, the Tacoma Police Department, and the Safe Streets Campaign. It focuses on the South Park neighborhood, with a population of approximately 3,500 inhabitants. About 66 percent of the housing consists of rental units, many with absentee landlords. In 2000, although crime declined in the city as a whole, it increased in South Park. A survey of residents indicated their biggest concerns were drug sales, prostitution, abandoned vehicles, and blighted housing. The project consists of the following elements:

- **Crime-Free Housing Program.** This element assists property owners and businesses to identify and eliminate illegal activity through education concerning tenant screening, drug activity awareness and documentation, and CPTED strategies. Project staff also organize community organizations.
- **Code Enforcement.** This element assists low-income residents in blight removal and minor repairs as well as coordinates community clean up campaigns. Landlords are informed of their legal obligations to maintain their property; if they do not comply, nuisance abatement ordinances are enforced to remedy the problem, either by forcing the owner to comply with the law or by closing the property altogether.
- **Law Enforcement.** The police department focuses on traffic violations and conducts covert and sting operations targeting prostitution and narcotics criminal activity.

The outcome measures for the project were calls for police service and recorded crime. In both cases, according to program staff, there were notable decreases after the project was implemented.

6.3.22 Taunton, Massachusetts

Background. Taunton, with a population of slightly over 50,000, is a major manufacturing center located in the Boston metropolitan area, which has had major financial problems in recent years. The city is currently \$4 million in debt. Thus, when LLEBG funds were announced, they were eagerly accepted. The mayor in office when the first funds became available gave the police chief the authority to determine how those funds should be spent. The chief, based on requests from his staff, proposed to use the initial grant funds on equipment of various types. The LLEBG Advisory Board approved this proposal based on the chief's recommendation. A new mayor was selected in 1999; a new police chief was installed in 2000. The new chief had been a training officer, a truant officer, and a juvenile officer. From those experiences he indicates that he had developed strong concerns about juveniles and the need for providing assistance to at-risk youth. He had allies on the LLEBG Advisory Board, particularly the head of probation, who agreed with this approach. The chief, with the concurrence of the board, decided to invest a sizable amount of the LLEBG funds in programs addressing the problems of juvenile crimes and at-risk youth. Both the chief and the Advisory Board insisted that these programs demonstrate their effectiveness.

Results-Oriented Programs. Taunton nominated two LLEBG-funded results-oriented programs: the Police/Probation Partnership, the Young Adult At-Risk GED program, and the Teen/Youth Community Service program, all of which were started after the new chief took office.

The *Police/Probation Partnership* was modeled on Boston's "Night Light" program in which police officers and juvenile probation officers made unexpected visits to the homes of juvenile probationers to determine if they were adhering to their terms of probation. The success of the program was to be judged by the number of juvenile probationers who successfully abided by the conditions of their probation, as well as the number whose probation was violated. In addition, the police department expected that the program would reduce the time necessary to book probationers who committed arrestable offenses. Unfortunately, the juvenile probation department, because of concerns about how the probation officers would be compensated, and use of probation's wagon, decided not to participate in the partnership.

The *Young Adult At-Risk GED* program was designed to provide GED training to at-risk youth who were on probation but had not graduated from high school. A teacher was hired with block grant funds to provide GED instruction. The success of the program was to be determined by the number of youth who successfully achieved their GED. Of the original class of 15, only one student succeeded in getting a GED. As a result, the chief decided to terminate the program as it was originally configured. Instead, the police department signed a contract with a local high school to provide GED training, at a lower cost than that charged by the original teacher. The results of the students sent to this new program were not yet available as this report was written.

The *Teen/Youth Community Service* program is a joint program of the police department and the Juvenile Probation Department of the Superior Court. Under the auspices of this program, juveniles, aged 15 to 17, placed on probation for minor offenses are sentenced to 20 to 40 hours of community service, under the joint supervision of a juvenile probation officer and a police officer. Community service assignments include cleaning up parks, schools and other public spaces; cleaning the police station; and assisting with programs of the Parks and Recreation Department. Success of the program was to be determined by the number of the youth involved in the program that failed to meet their conditions of probation or reappeared before the Juvenile Probation Department. As of the time of the evaluation site visit, all of the 25 youth who participated in the program had successfully met these criteria.

7. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

7.1 Summary

In Phase One of its evaluation of the initial implementation of the LLEBG program, COSMOS's evaluation team found that although the program rules and regulations did not require it, many grantees were using LLEBG funds to support "results-oriented" programs with specific goals, measurable objectives, careful monitoring or evaluation, and revision of programming dependent upon the results achieved. In addition, many of these LLEBG-supported, "results-oriented," programs had already produced desirable results. Intrigued by these encouraging but unanticipated findings, BJA funded COSMOS to conduct a Phase Two evaluation to address these questions:

1. What does the extant literature indicate about the current status of, and motivations toward, "results-oriented" government programs?
2. To what extent are LLEBG grantees using their funds to support "results-oriented" programs?
3. What is the nature and effectiveness of such "results-oriented" programs in a wide variety of sites
4. What are the forces that led those sites to adopt such programs?

Intrigued by these questions, this Phase Two evaluation report provides answers to those questions.

Before turning to the Phase Two findings, worth noting is that, in one respect, the Phase Two data collection corroborated and extended the Phase One findings. Exhibit 7-1 highlights the events for four LLEBG projects located in four different

Exhibit 7-1

**INTEGRATION OF PHASE I AND PHASE II EVALUATION FINDINGS:
FOUR RESULTS-ORIENTED LLEBG PROGRAMS
THAT WERE SITE VISITED IN BOTH PHASES**

Grantee	Results-Oriented Program	Pre-Existing Conditions	Inputs	Outputs	Outcomes
Baltimore City, MD	Comprehensive Communities/ HotSpots Prog. (CC/HS) (I, II)	<p>CC/HS program created in 1997 (II):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 54 community orgs - 12 city agencies - Baltimore PD - 8 state and fed. agencies - 45 non-profit and other orgs. <p>Tasked with creating 6-part strategy to reduce crime (I)</p>	<p>City of Baltimore receives LLEBG funds for CC/HS (I, II)</p> <p>F.I.V.E. Unit established with LLEBG funds (II):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 11 attorneys - 3 victim/witness agents <p>Strategies included (II):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - community mob. - resource org. - community policing - community supervision - community maintenance - youth organizers - youth tribunals - community prosecution – victim outreach and assistance 	<p>Core Teams work in communities to assess problems, assist in strategic planning, and provide training (II)</p> <p>Handgun offenses tried at circuit level instead of district level (I):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 86 defendants received sentences of 10 years or more - 99 defendants received mandatory minimum sentences of 5 years without parole 	<p>Anticipated Outcomes (I): – Greater community involvement in judicial system</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Mandatory sentences for repeat offenders - Longer sentences for crimes committed with handgun <p>From 1996-1998, Part I crimes fell (II):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 32% in CC/HS areas - 17% in city as a whole

* Phase One evaluation findings denoted by **(I)** and Phase Two findings denoted by **(II)**.

Grantee	Results-Oriented Program	Pre-Existing Conditions	Inputs	Outputs	Outcomes
Jacksonville, FL	Juvenile Justice Comprehensive Strategy Unit (I, II)	<p>Since 1992, violent/chronic juvenile offenders have been adjudicated as adults, resulting in new service needs (I)</p> <p>In 1996, the Juvenile Justice Comprehensive Strategy (JJCS) was developed under leadership of the Mayor, Sheriff, and State Attorney (I)</p>	<p>Agreement between sheriff's deputies, city, and 18 non-profit agencies to enhance juvenile justice prevention and sanctions programs (I, II)</p> <p>Address youth problems through (I, II):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - afterschool tutoring, - family management help, - scholarship/mentoring - afterschool arts program - safe environment for family visits for abused/neglected children - violence prevention prog. - sanctions prog. for youths providing community service - conflict resolution and life skills training 	<p>Program has reached 6,981 at risk youth (II)</p>	<p>From 1993 to 1998, the violent crime index for juveniles dropped 44 points (I)</p> <p>The number of juveniles in jail has decreased from 190 in 1994 to an average of 75 in 1999 (I)</p> <p>Targeted youth demonstrated increase in school attendance, GPA, promotion to next grade level, parental participation in school, and volunteerism in the community (II)</p> <p>Decrease in early and persistent antisocial behavior, juvenile delinquency, self-reported drug use, and abuse and neglect (II)</p>

Grantee	Results-Oriented Program	Pre-Existing Conditions	Inputs	Outputs	Outcomes
San Francisco City and County, CA	Youth Treatment and Education (YTEC) (I, II)	Mayor's Criminal Justice Council targets juvenile crime, establishes juvenile intervention and prevention programs as priorities for LLEBG funding used to leverage State "Juvenile Justice Challenge Grant" (I)	<p>Collaboration between the court, probation department, public health department, da's office, public defender, local law enforcement agencies and school district (I, II)</p> <p>Dept. of Education collaborates in curriculum for at-risk or delinquent juveniles (I)</p> <p>Comprehensive assessment services made available for delinquent juveniles (I)</p> <p>Child Crisis Services expands to provide direct, onsite linkage with probation officers (I)</p>	<p>Juvenile offenders are diverted to enhanced education and intensive probation rather than detention (I)</p> <p>Youth with pending or sustained nonviolent offenses are referred to the case manager to develop individual treatment plan to identify goals, motivations, strengths and obstacles. Participants have option of participating in Intensive Day Treatment, YTEC diversion substance abuse education and prevention course, and YTEC Academy to earn high school credits at an accelerated level (I, II)</p>	<p>Anticipated outcomes (I):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Juvenile court docket will be expedited as juvenile offenders are diverted to assessment and intervention services - Juvenile recidivism will decrease - Fewer juveniles will graduate to adult criminal justice system <p>Evaluation data not yet available (II)</p>

Grantee	Results-Oriented Program	Pre-Existing Conditions	Inputs	Outputs	Outcomes
Stockton/ San Joaquin County, CA	Stockton Juvenile Co-Op Program (I, II)	<p>In 1973, the county or local communities funded Co-op's in all municipalities, except the urban center, Stockton; the City of Stockton wanted a co-op because of its success in outlying towns (I)</p> <p>The youth population in Stockton is increasing (I)</p> <p>A joint city/county approach to addressing the criminal justice system began in 1993 when the Criminal Justice Task Force was formed and then developed the Juvenile Justice Local Action Plan from 1996-97 (I)</p>	<p>In November 1996, the city (\$800,000) and county (\$200,000) jointly approved a LLEBG juvenile justice funding plan, which included the South Stockton Co-Op (I)</p> <p>In November 1997, the North Stockton Co-Op was added from 1997 LLEBG funding (I)</p> <p>Co-Op provides space for (II):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - probation officers who handle minor citations - court-ordered programs - counseling to chronic truants - police probation and schools to determine probation status <p>Staffed by 4 deputy probation officers, 1 work-study student and 1 police officer (II)</p>	<p>Increased cooperation between police, schools, probation, and community (I)</p> <p>Police officers work daily with probation officers, who can search a youth who is on probation on the spot, without probable cause (I)</p> <p>Services for juvenile offenders are increased and immediate (I)</p> <p>Intakes rose from 72 in FY 1997 to 107 in FY 2000 (II)</p> <p>The number of youths carrying guns has decreased (I)</p> <p>16 shoplifter education series were provided, 219 youth referred and 116 graduated (II)</p> <p>In FY 2001, 30 parents graduated from the parenting class (II)</p>	<p>The number of juvenile fire arm - related arrests has decreased in the city by 51.2%, comparing the last six-month period in 1997 to 1998, a greater reduction than the national average (I)</p> <p>The number of minors handled informally and diverted from the normal system rose from 201 in FY 1997 to 1,109 in FY 2000 (II)</p> <p>Only 13 percent of graduates experience new referrals (reduction from 19 percent) (II)</p>

jurisdictions, where the projects were the subject of site visits under both the Phase One and Phase Two evaluations.

For all four projects, the Phase One findings cover an earlier period of time and Phase Two a later period. In all four cases, the integration of the two sets of findings are highly compatible. Importantly, for three of the four cases, the Phase Two findings enhance the array of outcomes reported earlier under the Phase One work (the fourth case was also consistent—but with neither phase able to identify numeric outcomes).

Key Evaluation Findings. This report provides details concerning the findings with regard to the four basic research issues noted above. Most striking, from among these results, were the following:

- A review of the literature suggests that in many nations around the world there has been a “global public management revolution,” in which a focus on performance has replaced that on hierarchy, rules, and internal regulation. Reflecting this trend, what has been termed “a quiet revolution” has occurred in the United States in which the national government has devolved administrative responsibilities and policy-shaping decision-making to local governments, which themselves have begun to stress the importance of solving problems, achieving specified results, and producing outcomes. This revolution has even reached the level of law enforcement, where developments such as community policing, problem-solving policing, attention to “measuring what matters,” and COMPSTAT have led to a focus on producing measurable results.
- The research team distributed an e-mail survey to all 3,111 FY2001 LLEBG grantees, asking whether the recipient jurisdictions were using LLEBG funds to support one or more programs that were “results-oriented,” that is, that “have stated goals and also have qualitative or quantitative performance

measures that can be used to determine if those goals are being met.” If the jurisdiction had one or more such programs, they were then requested to provide the names of those programs.

- A total of 2,776 (89.2%) of the agencies on the list received the e-mails. The lowest successful delivery rate (80.7%) was found among agencies receiving grants of \$1 million or more. Among agencies allocated grants less than \$1 million, e-mails were received by percentages approaching or exceeding 90 percent. These results indicate that conducting an e-mail survey of law enforcement agencies is extremely efficient, but that contacting larger agencies may pose the greatest challenge.
- Altogether, 1,704 responses were received. This represents 62.1 percent of those agencies that were actually contacted, 54.8 percent of all jurisdictions on the list. The highest response rates were found among agencies receiving grants between \$250,000 and \$499,999 (67.1%), followed by agencies receiving grants between \$100,000 and \$249,999. The response rate for all other agencies (except for those who received grants of under \$10,000) ranged slightly over 50 percent to almost 60 percent. The response rate for agencies with awards smaller than \$10,000 was the lowest (39.6%).
- A total of 406 (23.8%) responding jurisdictions indicated that they used LLEBG funds for one or more “results-oriented” program. The percentage of grantees supporting “results-oriented” programs varied directly, and dramatically, by the size of the grant award. In particular, 11.9 percent of grantees with awards below \$10,000 indicated that they supported “results-oriented” programs. For grantees with awards between \$10,000 and \$99,999, however, approximately 20 percent indicated they supported “results-oriented” programs. For grantees with awards between \$100,000 and \$499,999, approximately 35 percent said they funded “results-oriented” programs. For grantees with awards between \$500,000 and \$999,999, slightly more than 45 percent indicated they supported “results-oriented programs. Finally, for grantees with awards of \$1 million and above, slightly more than 74 percent said they used the LLEBG funds to support “results-oriented” programs.

- Interpreting these results is comparable to resolving the classic “glass half empty/glass half full” conundrum.” On the one hand, the results indicating that, overall, 23.8 percent of grantees used LLEBG funds to support “results-oriented” programs suggests that 76.2 percent of recipient agencies did *not* use grant funds to support such programs. This could be seen as indicating that less than one quarter of agencies receiving LLEBG grant funds used those funds to support “results-oriented” programming, and therefore that the prevalence of such programs was relatively unimpressive. On the other hand, put in the context that LLEBG, unlike many federal grant programs, such as Byrne Formula Grants, *require* that funds be used to achieve specific results, a finding that 24 percent decided to use their funds to support “results-oriented” programs could be seen as suggesting that forces other than federal requirements were encouraging local government to invest in such programs.
- Analyzing the results by size of grant award provides a more nuanced understanding of the prevalence of “results-oriented” programming. Those results indicate that among agencies receiving grants of less than \$100,000, 12 to 24 percent claimed they were supporting “results-oriented” programs. Among agencies receiving grants between \$100,000 and \$999,999, however, between 34 to 45 percent indicated they were implementing “results-oriented” programming. Finally, and most impressively, 74 percent of agencies receiving grants of \$ 1million or more indicated that they used LLEBG funds to support “results-oriented” programming. These results indicate that, at least among the agencies receiving the largest grant awards (that is, those in the largest agencies, with highest violent crime rates), there is evidence of a “quiet revolution” occurring among local American governments.
- The 406 jurisdictions that indicated that they had used LLEBG funds to support “results-oriented” programs, reported 1,681 such programs, funded at \$98.3 million.
- After developing a site visit protocol, research team members made visits to 22 sites with “results-oriented” programs, selected to be as broadly representative of such programs as possible. The site visits revealed that the processes by which the decision to fund “results-oriented” programs, and the means used to implement them, varied widely, as summarized below:

- In Alexandria, Virginia, the recipient jurisdiction executive turned basic decision-making power concerning the use and implementation of LLEBG funds over to the chief law enforcement executive, who, in turn, after collaborating with his command staff, allocated the funds to a program that addressed an emergent problem using what could be considered traditional law enforcement techniques.
- In Baltimore City, Maryland, responsibility for determining the allocation of LLEBG funds was essentially given to the Mayor’s Coordinating Council on Criminal Justice, although it cleared its preferences with the LLEBG Advisory Board. The Coordinating Council operated under the auspices of the Mayor’s Performance Measurement Project, designed to require all city agencies and city-funded programs to measure their performance vis-à-vis annual objectives. This focus on performance measurement continued under the succeeding mayor.
- In Baltimore County, Maryland, the chief executive of the recipient jurisdiction turned over decision-making authority for use of the LLEBG funds to the police chief, who in turn created a system for soliciting proposals from the department’s operational units for how those funds should be used. These proposals were required to include measurable goals and objectives, program activities, a timeline, and a budget. Proposals were screened by members of the department’s command staff.
- In Boston, Massachusetts, the mayor gave decision-making authority for allocation of LLEBG funds to the police commissioner. The commissioner, guided by the city’s strategic plan and the department’s strategic plan for neighborhood policing, decided to set aside a significant proportion of the funds for Community-Based Organizations (CBOs). These CBOs were invited to submit proposals for “violence prevention grants” that would address problems identified in their district’s neighborhood plan. Each proposal had to specify the problem to be addressed, the target audience, goals and objectives and how they would be measured, how the program would address the specified problem, the program’s timeline, how the police would be involved, a budget, and how the effort would be continued after LLEBG funding was terminated. Proposals were judged

by an outside panel of five persons, including academics, city officials, and community representatives, using a rigid point system.

- In Brockton, Massachusetts, although the mayor gave administrative responsibility for implementing LLEBG-funded programs to the police department, he insisted that a multi-agency LLEBG Advisory Board be given authority to decide how those programs were to be selected and to maintain oversight authority over them. This Advisory Board, unlike many, which met annually to passively ratify decisions made by other authorities, met monthly and closely scrutinized the operations of the LLEBG programs. As a demonstration of its results-orientation, the board hired an outside evaluator to monitor those programs and used the findings to determine whether to continue funding contractors.
- In Cambridge, Massachusetts, the mayor gave the police commissioner the responsibility for deciding how to allocate LLEBG funds and to oversee the implementation of LLEBG-supported programs. The commissioner, following the Boston example, set aside a sizeable percentage of the funds to be allocated to CBOs, on a competitive basis. Applicants were to indicate how the program could be completed within one year, how it could be sustained without LLEBG funding, the reasonableness of the budget, and how the program would involve more than one partner. The commissioner and his staff reviewed the proposals to determine how they might improve the crime situation in Cambridge.
- In Jacksonville, Florida, although the mayor allowed the sheriff to decide how to spend the first year of LLEBG funds, in all subsequent years the decision has been made by the city's Department of Community Services. Funding is made in response to proposals submitted to the director of that department. These proposals, and all city agencies and contractors, are expected to conform to a Total Quality Government (TQG) program, which incorporates a city mission, vision, guiding principles, and a strategic plan. An integral part of the program is the focus on "process management," involving a systematic method of identifying program outcome indicators, monitoring program results, and revising the program based upon those results. In accordance with the TQG process, LLEBG proposals are evaluated on the

basis of their relevance to the city's strategic plan and their ability to demonstrate the attainment of measurable goals. Refunding of programs is determined based on the achievement of program objectives.

- In Los Angeles City, California, when LLEBG funds became available, the mayor convened a multi-agency advisory board to determine how to allocate these monies. The board issued a Request for Proposals (RFP) for various public and private agencies to request funds. An independent proposal review team used a quantitative rating system to determine the most eligible applicants. The review team's recommendations were then submitted to the city council and the mayor for their final approval. The Mayor's Office of Criminal Justice Planning (MOCJP) plays a major role in recommending funding, and providing fiscal and program oversight of grant funds, including those from LLEBG. This involves grant management, project monitoring, and serving as a liaison between the city and BJA. The Community Development Department (CDC) has direct oversight of the program implementation and provides operational support and technical assistance to the sub-grantee agencies. Both MOCJP and CDC have a strong results-oriented approach and, in order to ensure that funds are allocated officials, programs are expected performance based, and those that do not demonstrate effectiveness are not refunded. According to several city officials, programs are expected performance based, and those that do not demonstrate effectiveness are not refunded. Program-related data are collected through an internet-based Management Information System (MIS) that includes interagency access and centralized reporting features.
- In Los Angeles County, California, the decision concerning how to allocate LLEBG funds fell to the County Board of Supervisors. Those supervisors, and in particular the "justice deputies," with responsibility for criminal justice issues, relying upon the county's strategic plan, which requires performance measures for contracts, determined that the funds should be allocated to address particular crime problems that had been identified within the county. All contract and grants are reviewed by the "justice deputies" and the Budget and Operations Management Branch of the County's Chief

Administrative Office to ensure that the programs make progress toward the attainment of their goals.

- In Miami-Dade County, Florida, the chief executive of the recipient jurisdiction turned decision-making authority concerning the use and implementation of LLEBG funds over to the chief law enforcement executive. The police chief and his command staff decided to allocate the block grant funds more or less equally across all of the police departments' divisions, but further decided that exactly HOW those funds would be expended would be based upon proposals submitted, through the chain of command, by officers at each district.
- In North Miami Beach, Florida; Pasadena, California; and Taunton, Massachusetts; the jurisdiction executive also turned decision-making authority over to the police chief, who, in collaboration with his command staff, decided to allocate LLEBG funds to support programs to deal with emergent problems in a way that did not use traditional law enforcement techniques.
- In Palo Alto, California, the city manager left the decision concerning how to spend the funds to the police chief. The chief insisted that any programs funded be congruent with the city's Comprehensive Plan and the police department's strategic plan, and was a clear priority of the City Council and the City Manager. A multi-agency Task Force on Youth Violence had proposed a program to address the long-range implications and causes of the city's rising youth violence problem, but had not been able to fund it. Recognizing that this program met all of his criteria, he used the LLEBG funds to implement and evaluate that program.
- In Pasadena, California, the chief of police was given responsibility for determining how to allocate LLEBG funds. In making his decision, he relied on the department's strategic plan, which had a major emphasis on dealing with the problems of youth. He therefore allotted a portion of the funds to a diversion program for first time juvenile offenders. Both the chief and the LLEBG Advisory Board insisted that the program keep records of its results.

- In Portland City/Multnomah County, Oregon, because the city and county had established a long-term collaboration, when LLEBG funds first became available, the mayor and the County Board of Supervisors agreed to an informal sharing agreement. According to that agreement, the city, which received the overwhelming amount of funds, would establish an LLEBG advisory committee that would be comprised of representatives from both the city and the county, and the funds were to be expended for projects favored by both jurisdictions, although the city’s police department was to serve as administrator of the grant. The city decided to allot most of its funds to the police department, although the chief insisted that a significant proportion of the city’s grant funds be provided, on a competitive basis, to local community-based organizations (“strategic partners”) serving the needs of both the city and the county. All programs funded had to be in congruence with the department’s Community Policing Transition Plan and, later, its Community Policing Strategic Plan. In addition, the mayor and the County Board of Supervisors insisted that all programs demonstrate their results.

- In Rancho Palos Verdes, California, the decision concerning how to allocate LLEBG funds was assigned to the Palos Verdes Peninsula Region Law Enforcement Committee, representing the cities of Rancho Palos Verdes, Rolling Hills Estates, and Rolling Hills. Although Rancho Palos Verdes was the only city eligible for LLEBG funding, the committee agreed that the funds should be used to address a juvenile crime problem that plagued all three communities. The mayors of all three cities agreed that because funding was becoming more scarce it was important that the value of this effort be measured by outcome measures. They were supported in this position by the fact that BJA, at least initially, required an annual progress report that demonstrated the effects of the LLEBG-supported programs.

- In Riverside, California, a rising juvenile crime problem convinced many members of the local criminal justice system that a diversion program for lower-level, first-time offenders was needed. With COPS funds, the sheriff created a teen court in one of the county’s cities. When LLEBG funds became available, the sheriff became chair of the advisory committee and convinced the other members that they should

expand the teen court to other cities. The County Board of Supervisors agreed to this, with the stipulation that it would not fund any project for more than one year without evidence of results.

- In San Francisco City/County, California, the mayor assigned responsibility for deciding how to allocate LLEBG funds to the executive committee of the Mayor’s Criminal Justice Council (MCJC), a body created in the early 1970’s, composed of representatives of the police department, the sheriff’s office, the district attorney’s office, the public defender’s office, the local judiciary, the county board of supervisors, the probation department, as well as non-governmental organizations. This group allocated the funds according to the priorities expressed by the members of the MCJC, as long as they were congruent with the city/county strategic plan. In accordance with that plan, and the explicit requirement of the new mayor, all funded programs were expected to be able to demonstrate the results they had achieved.
- In Santa Clara County, California, when informed of the availability of LLEBG funds, the county administrator assembled a broadly representative LLEBG Advisory Board with a mandate to distribute the funds broadly across the various agencies of the criminal justice system. No clear requirement that the funds be used for results-oriented programs seems to have been established.
- In Seattle, Washington, the mayor, upon notification of the availability of LLEBG funds, assembled a multi-agency LLEBG committee to consider requests for funding from both the Seattle Police Department and local organizations that proposed to implement crime prevention programs. In each case, proposals were required to indicate how the requested funds would be used in pursuit of both the city’s and the police department’s strategic plans and how the attainment of program goals would be measured. Each non-police agency receiving LLEBG funds was required to sign a “Project Services Agreement” that specified the goals and objectives to be achieved by the program. The police department monitored the progress of each funded program, by means of quarterly reports. The department was aided in this request by being able to refer to LLEBG’s requirement that annual written progress reports be provided for programs funded

under specific program areas. Preference for refunding was based largely on the demonstrated ability of the programs to achieve their goals, leverage other funds, and to build on interagency partnerships.

- In Stockton City/San Joaquin County, California, the city and county agreed to form a mutual LLEBG Advisory Board and to submit a joint city/county proposal. The proposal itself was focused primarily on attaining the goals of the county’s Comprehensive Multi-Agency Juvenile Justice Plan. The City Council and the County Board of Supervisors determined that all programs should provide evidence of their level of performance and, where possible, the results achieved.
- In Tacoma, Washington, the city manager originally assigned decision-making about the use of LLEBG funds to the police chief, who used the monies to support overtime pay for officers and remodeling. In all later years, however, the allocation was largely determined by the Human Rights and Human Services Department (HRHSD), a city agency responsible for providing human services to the city. This agency, like all city agencies and contractors, was expected to operate under the general auspices of the city’s strategic plan and a comprehensive outcomes-based evaluation (OBE) system. Under this system, with a focus on logic models, all city agencies, employees, and contractors were required to link program strategies to outcomes and goals. Under the aegis of this system, the HRHSD developed a Human Services Strategic Plan, which governed its decisions regarding LLEBG expenditures. The department decided that a significant portion of the LLEBG funds should be provided to community-based organizations. In accordance with the OBE system, those organizations were to submit comprehensive proposals, complete with indicators of progress, appropriate sample size, demonstrated ability to compile and analyze outcome data, an indication that the proposed program can achieve measurable results, and a demonstration of the ability to use data analysis to make adjustments in the program, if necessary. The Tacoma Urban Network and the Pierce County Funders Group had standardized application forms and outcomes for all local programs and had provided technical assistance to CBOs in writing outcomes-based proposals. Refunding is based upon the extent to which the projects achieve their desired outcomes.

- In Taunton, Massachusetts, the mayor gave the police chief authority to decide how to spend the LLEBG funds. The chief in office at the time the first funds became available decided spend them on various types of equipment. When a new chief took office in 2000, he brought with him an interest in juveniles and decided to invest a sizable amount of the LLEBG funds in programs addressing the problems of juvenile crime and at-risk youth. Both the chief and the Advisory Board insisted that these programs demonstrate their effectiveness.

A summary of the factors that led to results-oriented programming is provided in Exhibit 7-2.

- The nature of the “results-oriented” programs varied widely, as described in the body of the text, and summarized in Appendix B, including general crime prevention/reduction programs, general diversion programs, sexual violence/domestic violence programs, drug reduction programs, gang reduction programs, school crime prevention/reduction programs, and various other approaches.
- As indicated in the main body of the report, many of these programs have begun to produce desired and measurable results. A summary of these preliminary results is provided in Exhibit 7-3 on the following pages.

7.2 Conclusions

This evaluation found that almost one quarter of LLEBG grantees indicated that they are using their grant funds to support “results-oriented” programs, that is that “have stated goals and also have qualitative or quantitative performance measures that can be used to determine if those goals are being met.” The prevalence of such programs varied directly with the size of the grant awards. Almost three quarters of grantees receiving \$1 million or more indicated that they

Exhibit 7-2
FACTORS LEADING TO “RESULTS-ORIENTED” PROGRAMMING IN
STUDIED LLEBG SITES

Jurisdiction	Forces Motivating Results-Orientation					
	Police Chief/ Exec.	Mayor/ County Govt.	PD Strategic Plan	LLEBG Advisory Board	City/County Strategic Plan	Total Quality/ Outcomes System
Alexandria, VA	•					
Baltimore City, MD		•				
Baltimore County, MD	•					
Boston, MA			•		•	
Brocton, MA				•		
Cambridge, MA	•					
Jacksonville, FL						•
Los Angeles City, CA		•				
Los Angeles County, CA					•	
Miami-Dade County, FL	•					
North Miami Beach, FL	•					
Palo Alto, CA			•		•	
Pasadena, CA			•			
Portland City/Multnomah County, OR	•	•	•			
Rancho Palo Verdes, CA						
Riverside County, CA		•				
San Francisco City/County, CA					•	
Santa Clara County, CA						
Seattle, WA			•		•	
Stockton City/San Joaquin County, CA		•				
Tacoma, WA						•
Taunton, MA	•			•		

Exhibit 7-3 PRELIMINARY EFFECTS OF RESULTS-ORIENTED LLEBG PROGRAMS BY PROGRAM TYPE

Site/Program	Program Type						
	General Crime Prevention/Reduction	General Offenders/Diversion	Sexual Assault/Domestic Violence	Drugs	Gangs	Youth/School Crime Prevention/Reduction	Other
Alexandria, VA							
Grand Larceny Auto Task Force: Officers work in overtime mode to check license plates for stolen autos; LLEBG supports overtime.	In 2000, Task Force had 39 CLA recoveries, 183 arrests, and \$270k recovered property (GLAs also had declined from 1183 in 1995 to 733 in 2000). Unit, though reduced by LLEBG cutbacks, then expanded to cover robberies and burglaries						
Baltimore City, MD							
Comprehensive Community/Hot Spots: LLEBG helps to support large consortium collaborating to cover target area of 150,000 persons.	From 1996 to 1998, Part I crimes in the target area fell 32 percent, compared to 17 percent for the city as a whole.						
Offender Re-Entry Partnership Project		0% recidivism in first year					
Baltimore County, MD							
Warrant Apprehension Task Force is one project example, involving about 20 FTEs searching for and arresting persons with open warrants.	Warrants served by PD increased by 31 percent and number of arrests for open warrants by 34 percent. Positive experience leads to formation of a regional task force for warrants up 34%.						

COSMOS Corporation	Site/Program	Program Type					
		General Crime Prevention/Reduction	General Offenders/Diversion	Sexual Assault/Domestic Violence	Drugs	Gangs	Youth/School Crime Prevention/Reduction
	Boston, MA						
	Anti-Gang Initiative/Operation Ceasefire: LLEBG helps to support "zero tolerance" gang intervention strategy					Homicides for persons 24 years or younger fell from 46 in 1995 to 3 in 2001.	
	School Impact Project: PD participates in reducing crime in a local high school.					Total number of incidents, covering weapons recovered, false fire alarms, robbery, and assault/battery declined from 104 four months prior to implementation to 14 after project started.	
7-19	Youth Service Providers Network: PD and community organization collaborate to provide services to high-risk adolescents					Case claims positive youth-parent outcomes but provides no numeric data.	
	Violence Prevention Grants: About 38 percent of LLEBG funds used to solicit competitive community policing proposals, mostly addressing youth gangs and violence and domestic violence, also showing how activity would be sustained beyond LLEBG funding.	None reported					

Site/Program	Program Type						
	General Crime Prevention/Reduction	General Offenders/Diversion	Sexual Assault/Domestic Violence	Drugs	Gangs	Youth/School Crime Prevention/Reduction	Other
Brockton, MA							
Adult Ride-Along: PD officers ride with appropriate probation officers or youth caseworkers, helping them make home visits during late afternoon and evening hours							Probation officers safer; Local evaluator collects qualitative data, but too early to define any quantitative outcomes.
Juvenile Probation Ride-Along: PD officers ride with appropriate probation officers or youth caseworkers, helping them make home visits during late afternoon and evening hours							Probation officers favorable; Local evaluator collects qualitative data, but too early to define any quantitative outcomes.
DYS Ride-Along: PD officers ride with appropriate probation officers or youth caseworkers, helping them make home visits during late afternoon and evening hours							Caseworkers favorable; Local evaluator collects qualitative data, but too early to define any quantitative outcomes.
Cambridge, MA							
Girls Lifetime Empowerment Awareness: Teaches girls 16-20 hour self-defense curriculum, covering life situations and not just violent encounters						No outcome measures collected.	
Community Dispute Resolution Center had been founded in 1979. LLEBG was one of many sources of funds.	Program served over 600 clients in FY2000, mediating 158 cases (42 percent over the previous year), successfully resolving 68 percent.						

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Site/Program	Program Type						
	General Crime Prevention/Reduction	General Offenders/Diversion	Sexual Assault/Domestic Violence	Drugs	Gangs	Youth/School Crime Prevention/Reduction	Other
Life Skills Substance Abuse Awareness and Prevention: Teaches 6th-8th graders about drug prevention				Collected pre-post attitudinal data, but results not available at time of report.			
Jacksonville, FL							
Drug Abatement Response Team: Interagency effort to contact owners to stop houses from being used for illegal activities							Has led to evictions, recouping of back taxes on properties with fraudulent homestead exemptions, and savings in discontinued electrical service; 3000 structures investigated.
Truancy Interdiction: Interagency effort to reduce truancy as well as crime and violence during school hours.						Contacted 6,795 truants in first year; truancy recidivism rate dropped from 19 percent in 1999 to 8.1 percent in 2001.	
Juvenile Offender Reintegration Program						No data available.	
Developing Adults with Necessary Skills: Offers GED, life skills, and voc. prep. classes to adult male county sentenced population aged 18-21.							Since program started in 1997, 56 percent of participants received GEDs, 55 percent were employed after release, and 63 percent had not been re-arrested after release.
Juvenile Justice Comprehensive Strategy Unit: Contracts signed with 18 non-profit orgs. to strengthen juvenile justice prevention and sanction programs.				Decreased drug use		Has provided 6,981 at-risk youths with a variety of services. Youths show improved school behavior and reduced delinquency, but no data provided.	
Juvenile Drug Court				10% recidivism			
Adult Drug Court				19% recidivism			
Probationers		No data available.					

Site/Program	Program Type						
	General Crime Prevention/Reduction	General Offenders/Diversion	Sexual Assault/Domestic Violence	Drugs	Gangs	Youth/School Crime Prevention/Reduction	Other
Educational Growth Program							
Intimate Violence Enhanced Services Team: Provides interagency response and services to victims of high-risk-for-fatality domestic violence cases.	Since implementation in 1999, program has served over 700 victims, and intimate violence deaths dropped from 15 to 6 in 2002.						
Center for Prevention of Domestic Violence: Serves victims of domestic violence.			Since starting in 2001, victims have received 2,342 safety plans and 152,036 referrals to community resources.				
Los Angeles City, CA							
Los Angeles Bridges: Offers mentoring and tutoring services to high-risk youths in 26 middle schools, coordinating efforts by school, law enforcement, and social services agencies. Also operates a Hard Core Gang Intervention program to prevent violence among rival gangs						Program evaluator is tracking many outcomes. Middle schools report especially notable decreases in robberies and property crimes from 1997-98 to 1998-99 school years; absences down	
Los Angeles County, CA							
Abolish Chronic Truancy: Deals with 200-300,000 daily trancies (15 percent of enrollment)---e.g., by sending DA letters to parents to comply with						Attendance up from 88% to 94%; Record number of parents meeting with deputy district attorney, but is unable to track other outcomes.	

Site/Program	Program Type						
	General Crime Prevention/Reduction	General Offenders/Diversion	Sexual Assault/Domestic Violence	Drugs	Gangs	Youth/School Crime Prevention/Reduction	Other
compulsory/ mandatory education laws.							
Special Enforcement Unit: Provides supplemental and street-level supervision for gang-involved adult and juvenile probationers.							From 2000 to 2001, unit conducted over 500 probation searches, confiscated 49 firearms and over 754 grams of illegal substances, sought 57 warrants and apprehended 55 persons, and arrested 260 juvenile and 166 adult probationers.
Alternative Sentencing: Provides public defenders with paralegal support to assist clients' defense but also help court to impose appropriate sentences.		No data available.					
Community Law Enforcement and Recovery: agency-community effort to identify and target most active gang members, to reduce gang-related crimes; started prior to LLEBG, and only 1 of 6 sites is supported by LLEBG.					Gang crime reduced		
Strategies Against Gang Environments: Dedicates an experienced deputy district attorney for each of six communities (three funded by LLEBG), with activities varying according to communities' needs.					Crime reduced	In one community, tracked 95 at-risk probationers, with 11 arrests for new crimes or probation violations; and investigated properties for criminal nuisance abatement, resolving 27 of 28 cases opened in	

Site/Program	Program Type						
	General Crime Prevention/Reduction	General Offenders/Diversion	Sexual Assault/Domestic Violence	Drugs	Gangs	Youth/School Crime Prevention/Reduction	Other
						2000. Other communities report outcomes from mentoring, anti-truancy, and related services.	
Los Angeles Bridges Program: Offers mentoring and tutoring services to high-risk youths in 26 middle schools, coordinating efforts by school, law enforcement, and social services agencies. Also operates a Hard Core Gang Intervention program to prevent violence among rival gangs.						School crime reduced	
Miami-Dade, FL							
Enhanced Enforcement: Supports on-duty or overtime pay, to strengthen enforcement activities based on emerging crime trends identified under COMSTAT.	Many initiatives supported. In one, public park has reductions in auto thefts (9 percent), aggravated battery (67 percent), and narcotics operations (80 percent) after saturation patrol of marked cars. In another, high-robbery area has 24 percent reduction in robberies following intensified patrol.						
North Miami Beach, FL							
Police Eliminating Truancy: Pays for two officers to apprehend youths on streets during						Program encounters between 300-400 youths per year and notes decreases in residential burglaries, burglaries	

Site/Program	Program Type						
	General Crime Prevention/Reduction	General Offenders/Diversion	Sexual Assault/Domestic Violence	Drugs	Gangs	Youth/School Crime Prevention/Reduction	Other
school hours, bringing youths to service center.						from vehicles, and related crimes during daylight hours of school days.	
Palo Alto, CA							
Positive Alternatives for Youth: Provides comprehensive mentoring and other services to high-risk youths						Initial cohort of 17 youths show improved school attendance, academic grades, and related accomplishments. More recent cohorts show similar results, not documented.	
Pasadena, CA							
Youth Accountability Board: Helps youths with minor, first offenses to receive suitable intervention and not establish a criminal record; parents and youths must agree to a six-month "accountability contract."						No data available.	
Portland City/Multnomah County, OR							
Encouraging Men by Teaching and Creating Excellence: (EMBRACE) Provides re-entry services to ex-offenders aged 18-24.		Data show that 91 percent of participants remained free of parole/probation violations; majority had secured employment or were engaged in GED program.					
Portland City/Multnomah County, OR							
S.T.O.P. Drug Diversion Court: Started in 1991, includes drug treatment following arrest and other follow-up services.				Clients graduating from program have lower recidivism rate than matched comparison group.			\$1 spent on program saves \$2.50

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Site/Program	Program Type						
	General Crime Prevention/Reduction	General Offenders/Diversion	Sexual Assault/Domestic Violence	Drugs	Gangs	Youth/School Crime Prevention/Reduction	Other
Neighborhood District Attorney: Assigns assistant DAs to work in seven neighborhoods and their crime-related priorities.	Crime reduced in target areas{No data available}.						
Rancho Palos Verdes, CA							
Special Assignment Officers/Community Resource Policing Team: Three officers serve as liaison with schools, especially troubled high school.						In area around troubled high school, vehicle burglaries decline from 27 to 11; robberies from 9 to 5; grand theft property crimes from 23 to 8; auto thefts from 6 to 2; and criminal incidents involving juveniles from 149 in 1997 to 66 in 2000.	
Riverside County, CA							
Temecula Valley Youth Court: Provides minors with first-time, low-level offenses with ability to divert out of criminal justice system but still be accountable for their offenses by being sentenced by the youth court.						Between 1998 and 2000, the court processed 355 cases, with 291 (82 percent) successfully completing the program. Rate was considered high enough to continue funding this and three other youth courts.	
San Francisco City/County CA							
Project Impact: Juvenile offenders or at-risk youths with emotional disabilities receive outpatient, case management, and family treatment services.						No data available.	
Mentor Court: Pre-adjudication, felony diversion program offers education and counseling				About one-half of the participants completed the program, with a failure to appear in			

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Site/Program	Program Type						
	General Crime Prevention/Reduction	General Offenders/Diversion	Sexual Assault/Domestic Violence	Drugs	Gangs	Youth/School Crime Prevention/Reduction	Other
services to non-violent offenders (charged with drug sales), aged 18-25.				court rate of 6 percent, compared to 30 percent for non-participants.			
Youth Treatment and Education Court: Provides intensive case management, day-treatment, and on-site high school services to youths with history of drug use, a pending or sustained non-violent offense, and no sex offense.						External evaluator tracking four indicators of program success, but no data yet available.	
Santa Clara County, CA							
Domestic Violence Specialized Supervision Unit: Funds add an additional probation officer, reducing caseload per officer and increasing ability to review additional child abuse cases.			No data available other than dealing with strengthened review capability.				
Sexual Assault Felony Enforcement Task Force: Funds increase investigators from 5 to 7, under DA.			Data exist regarding the task force's accomplishments, but no breakdowns on added value of two investigators.				80% of sex offenders contacted; 10% taken custody
Seattle, WA							
Rapid Recycling Alternatives to Incarceration: Provides case management and other services to reduce		No data available.					

Site/Program	Program Type						
	General Crime Prevention/Reduction	General Offenders/Diversion	Sexual Assault/Domestic Violence	Drugs	Gangs	Youth/School Crime Prevention/Reduction	Other
recidivism among females who have been booked 10 times or more in a 12-month period, usually for misdemeanors, and usually appearing to be homeless.							
Asian/Pacific Islander Coordinated Response to Domestic Violence: Offers batterers' treatment, victim services, and community awareness efforts, coordinated by four service agencies.			State-mandated training completed by 44 API batterers, and 81 victims also served. No outcome data presented.] Reported victimization reduced				
Stockton City/San Joaquin County, CA							
Gang Violence Intervention: Team of officers and probation assistants maintain intensive supervision and surveillance of identified juvenile gang members and 'wannabes,' involving frequent and unannounced home and school visits.					Probation violations rose from 16 in 1996 to 284 in 2001; gangs declined from estimated 157 in 1996 to 95 in 2001, with estimated gang members also declining from 3,700 to 2,100.		
Youth Gun Violence Reduction: Senior deputy DA assigned to juvenile division, to work with police gang unit,						In 2001, the deputy DA prosecuted 136 petitions to conclusion, with another 18 awaiting disposition or pending arraignment. Of 154	

COSMOS Corporation	Site/Program	Program Type						
		General Crime Prevention/Reduction	General Offenders/Diversion	Sexual Assault/Domestic Violence	Drugs	Gangs	Youth/School Crime Prevention/Reduction	Other
	solely to prosecute juvenile gang-related and juvenile firearms offenses.						total, all but two minors were documented criminal street gang members of associates.	
	Stockton Juvenile Co-Op: Provides central facility for probation staff to handle minors' citations, for parenting and shoplifter education programs, for counseling services, and other coordinated police, school, probation, and family efforts.						Average number of monthly intakes rose from 72 in 1997 to 107 in 2000; youths diverted from juvenile justice system rose from 201 to 1109 in same period. Of 116 youths graduating education program, only 13 percent had new referrals to probation.	
7-29	Youth Accountability Boards: Two boards target first-time juvenile offenders with less serious misdemeanors, assigning penalties and dropping original charges if assigned consequences are completed.						During 2000-01, 221 youths appeared before boards, with 111 successfully completing program, 96 still participating, and 14 failing. Results lead to county expanding program to 15 boards throughout the county.	
	Kids Alcohol/Drug Alternative: Provides juvenile drug court with outpatient treatment component and intensive probation supervision, counseling, and remedial education as alternatives to detention, focusing on high-risk youth or first-time offenders aged 14-18.				Of 162 minors referred from 2000 to 2001, the drug court ordered 51 into the program. None have been re-arrested for substance abuse or involved in acts of violence. Of roughly 1900 urine tests during this time, 140 (7 percent) produced positive results.			

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Site/Program	Program Type						
	General Crime Prevention/Reduction	General Offenders/Diversion	Sexual Assault/Domestic Violence	Drugs	Gangs	Youth/School Crime Prevention/Reduction	Other
Tacoma, WA							
South Park Crime Reduction: Project consists of crime-free housing program, code enforcement, and sting operations.	Calls for police service increased and reported crime decreased after project was implemented, but no data were available.						
Taunton, MA							
Teen/Youth Community Service: Juveniles aged 15-17, placed on probation for minor offenses, are sentenced to 20-40 hours of community service.						First cohort of 25 youth participating in program all met their conditions of probation.	
Young Adult At-Risk GED: Provides GED training to at-risk youths on probation but not having graduated from high school.						Initial program only graduated 1 of 15 students; program reconfigured so that GED is offered at lower cost by local high school, instead of contracted teacher.	

used grant funds to support “results-oriented” programs. Because grantees were not required, as in some grant programs, to demonstrate specific results, this finding lends support, at least among the largest jurisdictions, to the finding of the literature review that there is a “quiet revolution” occurring in the United States, a revolution in which local governments have begun to stress the importance of solving problems, achieving specified results, and producing outcomes. The forces behind this revolution in the 22 jurisdictions visited for this evaluation are extremely varied. In some jurisdictions, such as Jacksonville, Florida; and Tacoma, Washington, the revolution was advanced by the adoption and implementation of a comprehensive system that requires specification of program goals and measurement of the attainment of those goals for all government programs and contracts. In Baltimore City, Maryland, mayors had established a preference that programs be able to demonstrate their results, although this preference was neither as institutionalized nor as pervasive as in Jacksonville and Tacoma.

In some jurisdictions, such as Boston, Massachusetts; San Francisco, California; and Seattle, Washington; programs were expected to contribute to the goals specified in a city strategic plan. Law enforcement strategic plans, on the other hand, were most influential in Pasadena, California; Baltimore County, Maryland; Seattle, Washington; and, to a lesser degree, Tacoma, Washington.

The mayors in Baltimore City, Maryland; Portland, Oregon; Rancho Palos Verdes, and San Francisco, California; were quite instrumental in insisting the

LLEBG funds be invested in programs that could demonstrate the effects they had achieved.

In Los Angeles County, Riverside County, California, and Multnomah County, Oregon, the County Board of Supervisors insisted that the LLEBG funds be invested in results-oriented programs. Likewise, in Stockton, California, the City Council insisted that the programs given LLEBG support be able to demonstrate their effectiveness.

In other jurisdictions, such as Baltimore City, Maryland; Los Angeles City, Palo Alto, and San Francisco City/County, California; pre-existing groups shaped, to a large extent, the agenda for expenditure of LLEBG funds. In other places, such as Los Angeles City, Riverside, California, and Brockton, Massachusetts, the multi-agency LLEBG advisory board itself played a significant role in creating a results-oriented investment of LLEBG funds.

In some law enforcement agencies, such as Boston, Cambridge, Massachusetts; and Portland, Oregon; a commitment to community-oriented policing led the law enforcement executive to insist that community-based organizations be supported by LLEBG funds and that the results of their efforts be measured. In other agencies, such as Alexandria, Virginia; Baltimore County, Maryland; Miami-Dade County, and North Miami Beach, Florida; and Taunton, Massachusetts; the chief law enforcement executive's commitment to problem-solving policing led the chief to insist that the results of LLEBG-funded programs be demonstrated.

Thus, all of the strands leading to the “quiet revolution” in American government, in which local governments have begun to stress the importance of solving problems, achieving specified results, and producing outcomes, can be found in one or more of the LLEBG sites highlighted by this report.

7.3 Recommendations

The results of this analysis of the LLEBG program indicate that many agencies, particularly the larger ones, utilized the block grant funds to support “results-oriented “ programs, although the program guidelines did not require that they do so. As this report suggests, there are many factors that could account for this development, most of which were completely out of the control of the LLEBG program. The program did, however, contribute to this development in two noticeable ways. First, the requirement that each jurisdiction create and be responsible to an LLEBG Advisory Board, at least in theory, held the program’s expenditures directly accountable to community interests and, indirectly, to producing results contributive to those interests. In some cases, these boards played a largely symbolic, or even peripheral, role in determining how program funds be invested. In some notable cases, however, these boards played a pivotal role in ensuring that the LLEBG program adopt a “results-oriented” orientation. The members of these boards held the program particularly accountable for achieving the desired program. It is recommended, therefore, that the program continue to require that such boards play an important role in determining how the program funds be spent.

Second, in the early stages of the program, grantees were required to submit annual reports demonstrating the progress they had made in certain program areas. Many grantees indicated to program evaluators that these required reports, although sometimes a nuisance, proved useful in providing guidance as to what programs deserved continued support, and which did not. In the judgment of the evaluators, these reports focused the attention of the program directors toward the issue of program effectiveness. Although the requirement for such progress reports was eventually discontinued, it is recommended that some system of accountability for results achieved be reinstated, both because it would provide benchmarks against which the national program could be evaluated and because it would provide a “results-oriented” focus for the grantees, especially those smaller jurisdictions that did not adopt such an approach earlier.

To facilitate such a “results-oriented” approach, it is further recommended that BJA establish criteria by which various types of programs could be evaluated, as well as advice concerning the most efficient means of gathering and analyzing such data. This system would have to tread a delicate balance between being rigorous while at the same time not being onerous. The process by which such a system would be implemented would be of critical importance. In particular, having BJA work closely with representatives of grantees to develop this system would seem of paramount importance.

Finally, it is recommended that BJA establish, or at least facilitate, a system by which grantees could share their program experiences, both successful and

unsuccessful. This system, preferably on-line, would make it possible for grantees to learn from each other's successes, as well as failures, and to further refine the most efficient and effective ways to measure the results of the programs they have implemented. Such a system would spread the benefits of a largely-successful program to as many grant recipients as possible.

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APPENDIX A

LLEBG E-Mail Questionnaire

Local Law Enforcement Block Grants Program and Project Questionnaire

First, so that we can be certain that our records are accurate and complete, please review the following information about your jurisdiction and agency.

Jurisdiction: (1)

Agency name: (2)

Agency program point of contact: (3)

Agency point of contact telephone number: (4) x(5)

Agency point of contact fax number: (6)

Agency point of contact email address: (7)

RESULTS-ORIENTED LLEBG-FUNDED PROJECTS/PROGRAMS

We are interested in learning more about projects and programs, funded at least in part by LLEBG funds for FY 1999 and/or FY 2000, that have clear goals and are "results-oriented" that is, that have qualitative or quantitative performance measures.

How many LLEBG projects do you have?

Do you have projects that have stated goals and also have qualitative or quantitative performance measures that can be used to determine if those goals are being met?

- No, we have no projects that have stated goals and performance measures. [SKIP to "Submit Responses"]
- Yes, we have at least one project that has stated goals and performance measures.

If you answered "yes" above, please list the names of your projects/programs that have stated goals and performance measures.

<input type="text"/>

Thank you for completing this survey. Please click on the Submit Responses button below to enter your responses.

[Submit Responses](#)

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APPENDIX B

Promising "Results-Oriented" Programs

Agencies With Promising “Results-Oriented” LLEBG-Funded Programs

Alexandria, VA

- **GLA Task Force**

Albuquerque, NM

- **Crime Free Multi-Housing Program**
- **Community Oriented Policing Youth Project**
- **DWI Drug Court**

Baltimore, MD

- **Hot Spots/Comprehensive Communities**
- **Firearms Investigation/Violence Enforcement**
- **Community Coordinators**
- **Youth Violence Initiative**
- **Offender Re-entry Project**
- **Community Service Program**
- **Operation Reachout SouthWest**
- **Project Garrison**
- **Edmondson Communities Organization**
- **Early Disposition Program**
- **Police Athletic League**

Baltimore County, MD

- **Warrant Apprehension Task Force**

Boston, MA

- **Anti-Gang Initiative/Operation Cease Fire**
- **ORE Research and Evaluation projects**
- **School Safety Initiatives**
- **PEACE Liaison program**
- **Youth Service Providers Network**
- **Violence Prevention Grants program**
- **Strategic Planning Implementation grants**

Brockton, MA

- **Project SOS (Students Opting for Success)**
- **Project Connect**
- **Camp Massasoit**

Cambridge, MA

- **Girl's LEAP self-defense program**
- **Community Dispute Resolution Center**
- **Life Skills Substance Abuse Awareness and Prevention**
- **CASPAR Alcohol and Drug Prevention Program**
- **Outward Bound**

Charleston County, SC

- **Career Advantages Through Responsibility and Education (CARE)**
- **Solicitor's Office Enhancement of Adjudication of Criminal Cases**
- **Safe Haven Project**

Chicago, IL

- Cook County Drug Court
- Project B.A.D.G.E

Contra Costa County, CA

- Enhancement of Domestic Violence Prosecution
- Gang Prosecution

Ft. Worth, TX

- Adult Drug Treatment Court
- Comin' Up
- Mentoring Initiative of the Teen Outreach Program
- New Beginnings

Galveston County, TX

- In-dash video cameras

Henderson, KY

- Mentoring Troubled Youth
- Mentoring School Youth
- Project MLK

Hidalgo County, TX

- Enhance adjudication process of violent offenders

Indianapolis, IN

- School Security
- Drug Court
- Community Prosecution
- Community Intervention/Prevention
- Street Level Advocacy Unit

Jacksonville, FL

- Truancy Interdiction Program
- Juvenile Offender Reintegration Program
- Developing Adults With Necessary Skills
- Juvenile Justice Comprehensive Strategy
- Juvenile and Adult Drug Courts
- Positive Educational Growth
- First Offender Prostitution Program
- Property Management Training (Safe Housing) Program
- Senior Fraud/Scam Awareness Program
- Transitional Housing for Former Offenders
- Corrections Urging Responsible Education
- Transition Housing for Former Juvenile Offenders

Kansas City, MO

- Family Violence Prevention and Education
- Dispute Resolution Community Mediators
- Neighborhood Assistance Center
- City Demolition, Weed Abatement, and Board Up
- Drug Abatement Response Team
- Sentenced to the Arts Program
- KC Futures Youth Arts and Employment Program
- Enhance Security

Los Angeles, CA

- Los Angeles Bridges Program

Los Angeles County, CA

- Drug Court Treatment Services Program
- Alternative Sentencing Program
- Sheriff Twin Towers
- Community Law Enforcement and Recovery (CLEAR) Program
- Strategies Against Gang Environments (SAGE)
- Los Angeles Bridges Program
- Abolish Chronic Truancy (ACT) Program

Lynn, MA

- Community-Based Crime Prevention Initiatives

Memphis, TN

- Truancy Assessment Center
- Parenting for Beginners
- CrimeStoppers
- Juvenile Education Academy
- Family Resource Center
- Alternative to Suspension
- Alliance for the Mentally Ill
- Shelby County Detoxification Center
- Shelby County Drug Court

Miami-Dade County, FL

- Gang Enforcement
- Juvenile Assessment Center
- Tactical Narcotics Team
- Warrants Sweeps

Minneapolis, MN

- Steven's Square Restorative Justice Project
- CJCC Family Violence Project
- Black Unity and Futurism BASICS Program
- Phillips Crime Prevention Program
- Somali Community Outreach Program
- DEAF Safe Community Crime Prevention Program

Nashville/Davidson County, TN

- Metro School Security
- Drug Court
- Juvenile Court

Newark, NJ

- Violent Repeat Offender Prosecution Program

New York City, NY

- Safe Corridors
- Manhattan Treatment Court
- Prevention and Education

New Orleans, LA

- **Curfew Center**
- **Juvenile Court**

North Miami Beach, FL

- **PET Program (juvenile truancy)**
- **Marine Patrol**
- **Bike Patrol**

Palo Alto, CA

- **Positive Alternatives for Youth**

Pasadena, CA

- **Youth Accountability Board**

Phoenix, AZ

- **Bringing Reality About Violence Education (BRAVE) Program**
- **Attendance is Mandatory (AIM) Program**
- **Young First Offender Program**

Pinole, CA

- **Project CARE (Children at Risk Excelling)**

Portland, OR

- **EMBRACE Crime Prevention Program**
- **STOP Drug Diversion Program**
- **Youth Gang Outreach Program**

Rancho Palos Verdes, CA

- **Special Assignment Officers**
- **Youth Intervention and Mentoring**

Richmond, CA

- **Five Year Strategic Plan**
- **Project Freedom**
- **Furtherance of APRIDE**

Riverside County, CA

- **Youth Accountability Teams**

San Francisco, CA

- **School Resource Officers**
- **Adult Drug Court**
- **Enhanced Prosecution of Serious Juvenile Offenders**
- **Mayor's Neighborhood Crime Prevention**
- **Clean Slate**
- **Own Recognizance Project**
- **Mentor Court**
- **Juvenile Justice Child Crisis Team**
- **Project Impact**
- **Juvenile Justice Reform Initiative**
- **Safe Haven Project**

Santa Clara County, CA

- **Drug Treatment Court**

- Specialized Domestic Violence Project
- Sexual Assault Felony Enforcement (SAFE) Task Force

Stockton, CA

- Juvenile Drug Court/Kid's Alcohol Drug Alternative Program (KADAP)
- Youth Accountability Boards
- Youth Gun Violence Reduction Program
- Stockton Juvenile Co-Op Program
- Gang Violence Interdiction Program

Seattle, WA

- Domestic Violence Victim Support Team
- Asian/Pacific Islander Domestic Violence Program
- Seattle Team for Youth
- Rites-of-Passage Experiences (ROPE) program
- School Security program
- King County alternatives to incarceration program

Tacoma, WA

- Domestic Violence Advocate Program

Tallahassee, FL

- Juvenile Assessment and Receiving Center
- Neighborhood Justice Center
- Adult Drug Court
- Juvenile Drug Court

Taunton, MA

- Young Adult At Risk GED Program
- Teen/Youth Community Service Program
- Police and Probation Officer Program

Tulsa, OK

- Child Abuse Network
- Metropolitan Tulsa Urban League
- Positive Behavior Strategies
- Resonance
- Family and Children Service
- Helping Hands
- Operation Nite Lite
- Parkside
- In-Line Skating
- PRIMEEXAMPLE
- DVIS Court Advocacy
- Literacy Project
- Children in Meth Labs
- North Peoria Crime Patrol
- Public Defender Drug Court for Children
- Twelve and Twelve Drug Court
- Juvenile Drug Court
- DVIS Advocate
- Demolition
- Tulsa Public Schools ASSETS Program

- **CAPTC After School Program**
- **Family and Children STAGES Program**
- **Resonance After School Program**
- **Tulsa Parks TASK Program**
- **Tulsa Parks PARTners Program**
- **CSC Family Literacy Program**

**Promising Results-Oriented LLEBG Programs by Program Type:
Northeast Region**

Site/Program	Equipment	General Crime Prevention/Reduction	General Offenders/Diversion	Sexual Assault/Domestic Violence	Drugs	Gangs	Youth/School Crime Prevention/Reduction	Other
Baltimore, MD								
Hot Spots/Comprehensive Communities		√						
Firearms Investigation/Violence Enforcement		√						
Community Coordinators		√					√	
Youth Violence Initiative								
Offender Re-Entry Program			√					
Community Service Program			√					
Operation Reachout SouthWest		√						
Project Garrison					√			
Edmondson Communities		√						
Early Disposition Program			√					
Police Athletic League							√	
Baltimore County, MD								
Warrant Apprehension Task Force			√					

Site/Program	Equipment	General Crime Prevention/Reduction	General Offenders/Diversion	Sexual Assault/Domestic Violence	Drugs	Gangs	Youth/School Crime Prevention/Reduction	Other
CASPAR Alcohol and Drug Prevention Program					√			
Outward Bound							√	
Lynn, MA								
Community-Based Crime Prevention Initiatives		√						
Newark, NJ								
Violent Repeat Offender Prosecution Program			√					
New York City, NY								
Safe Corridors							√	
Manhattan Treatment Court					√			
Enhanced Adjudication			√					
Taunton, MA								
Young Adult At Risk GED Program							√	
Teen/Youth Community Service Program							√	
Police and Probation Officer Program			√					

**Promising Results-Oriented LLEBG Programs by Program Type:
Midwest Region**

Site/Program	Equipment	General Crime Prevention/Reduction	General Offenders/Diversion	Sexual Assault/Domestic Violence	Drugs	Gangs	Youth/School Crime Prevention/Reduction	Other
Chicago, IL								
Cook County Drug Court					✓			
Project BADGE					✓	✓	✓	
Indianapolis, IN								
School Security							✓	
Drug Court					✓			
Community Prosecution			✓					
Community Intervention/Prevention		✓						
Street Level Advocacy Unit			✓					
Kansas City, MO								
Family Violence Prevention and Education				✓				
Dispute Resolution Mediators		✓						

Site/Program	Equipment	General Crime Prevention/Reduction	General Offenders/Diversion	Sexual Assault/Domestic Violence	Drugs	Gangs	Youth/School Crime Prevention/Reduction	Other
Juvenile Drug Court					√			
Adult Drug Court					√			
Probationers Educational Growth Program			√					
First Offender Prostitution Program			√					
Property Management Training Program		√						
Senior Fraud/Scam Awareness Program		√						
Corrections Urging Responsible Education			√					
Inside/Outside Transition Housing							√	
Memphis, TN								
Truancy Assessment Center							√	
Parenting for Beginners							√	
Juvenile Education Academy							√	
Family Resource Center								√
Alternative to Suspension							√	
Alliance for the Mentally Ill								√
Shelby County Detoxification Center					√			

Site/Program	Equipment	General Crime Prevention/Reduction	General Offenders/Diversion	Sexual Assault/Domestic Violence	Drugs	Gangs	Youth/School Crime Prevention/Reduction	Other
Shelby County Drug Court					√			
Miami-Dade, FL								
Gang Enforcement						√		
Juvenile Assessment Center							√	
Tactical Narcotics Team					√			
Warrants Sweeps			√					
Nashville/Davidson County, TN								
Metro School Security							√	
Drug Court					√			
Juvenile Court							√	
New Orleans, LA								
Curfew Center							√	
Juvenile Court							√	
Enhanced Adjudication		√						
North Miami Beach, FL								
Police Eliminating Truancy Program							√	
Tallahassee, FL								
Juvenile Assessment/Receiving Center							√	
Neighborhood Justice Center		√						
Adult Drug Court					√			
Juvenile Drug Court					√			

Site/Program	Equipment	General Crime Prevention/Reduction	General Offenders/Diversion	Sexual Assault/Domestic Violence	Drugs	Gangs	Youth/School Crime Prevention/Reduction	Other
Palo Alto, CA								
Positive Alternatives for Youth							✓	
Pasadena, CA								
Youth Accountability Board							✓	
Pinole, CA								
Project CARE (Children at Risk Succeeding)							✓	
Portland, OR								
EMBRACE Crime Prevention Program		✓						
STOP Drug Diversion Program					✓			
Youth Gang Outreach Program						✓		
Rancho Palos Verdes, CA								
Community Resource Policing Team							✓	
Special Assignment Officers							✓	
Youth Intervention and Mentoring							✓	
Richmond, CA								
Five Year Strategic Plan		✓						
Project Freedom								✓
APRIDE Program		✓						

Site/Program	Equipment	General Crime Prevention/Reduction	General Offenders/Diversion	Sexual Assault/Domestic Violence	Drugs	Gangs	Youth/School Crime Prevention/Reduction	Other
Sexual Assault Felony Enforcement Task Force				√				
Seattle, WA								
Domestic Violence Victim Support Team				√				
Asian/Pacific Islander Domestic Violence Program				√				
Seattle Team for Youth							√	
Rites-of-Passage Experiences Program							√	
School Security Program							√	
King County Alternatives to Incarceration Program		√						
Stockton, CA								
Juvenile Drug Court/Kid's Alcohol Drug Alternative Program					√			
Youth Accountability Boards							√	
Youth Gun Violence Reduction Program							√	
Stockton Juvenile Co-Op Program							√	
Gang Violence Interdiction						√		

Site/Program	Equipment	General Crime Prevention/Reduction	General Offenders/Diversion	Sexual Assault/Domestic Violence	Drugs	Gangs	Youth/School Crime Prevention/Reduction	Other
Tacoma, WA								
Domestic Violence Advocate Program				✓				
South Park Crime Reduction		✓						

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APPENDIX C

LLEBG Phase II Site Visit Protocol

LLEBG PHASE II EVALUATION SITE VISIT PROTOCOL AND PROCEDURES

Site Visit Objectives

The objectives of the site visits are to conduct case studies that:

1. Determine how results-oriented LLEBG-funded programs came to be developed and implemented;
2. Ascertain whether the results-oriented approach is characteristic of local government in general, of the particular implementing agency, or was derived from other causes.
3. Assess whether and how LLEBG funds facilitated the results-oriented approach;
4. Document how those results-oriented programs operate, and to what effect; and
5. Document how the results of these programs are used.

Site Selection Criteria

Sites will be selected according to several criteria. First, sites will be selected from among those that 1) responded to the national survey indicating that they have results-oriented programs, and nominated projects that meet that standard, and 2) indicated, in follow-up telephone calls, that they had results-oriented programs, even though they had not responded to the survey.

Second, sites will be selected from among those that indicated in follow-up telephone interviews that they had projects that met several of these stipulated criteria:

Second, sites will be selected from among those that indicated in the follow-up telephone interviews that they had results-oriented programs, funded at least in part by LLEBG, that met as many of the following criteria as possible:

1. They had clear goals;
2. They worked in a way designed to achieve those goals;
3. They had defined performance measures;
4. The jurisdiction was tracking the results of the program; and
5. They had begun to achieve desired results.

In order to select broadly representative sites, the most promising programs will be stratified according the following criteria:

1. Geographic region;
2. Jurisdiction population; and
3. Program type.

Third, sites will be selected in accordance to the extent that they satisfy the following criteria:

- They are geographically diverse (representing the West, Southwest, Midwest, Southern, and Northeast regions);
- They represent jurisdictions of diverse population sizes;
- Their results-oriented programs target a diverse mixture of issues (including equipment, crime prevention/reduction, offenders/diversion, domestic violence/sexual assault, gangs, drugs, youth crime, and other topics);
- Their jurisdictions reflect a diverse set of approaches to handling the LLEBG grants, ranging from, treating the grants as interrelated parts of an overall crime prevention strategy to treating the grants as isolated efforts.
- Their jurisdictions represent a range of inter-governmental and inter-agency cooperation. Some sites, for example, will be selected that fund programs that involve inter-jurisdictional collaboration, such as between city governments, or between city and county governments. Some sites, although not demonstrating inter-governmental collaboration, will be selected that fund programs that involve inter-agency collaboration. Some sites will be selected that fund programs that are implemented by only one agency. Finally, some sites will be selected that fund community-based programs.

Pre-Visit Activities

Comprising the Site Visit Team. Site visits will, when possible, be made by teams consisting of two members of the COSMOS staff. The senior COSMOS staff member will be designated as the lead person in the team.

Preparing for Site Visit. Prior to conducting a site visit, site visit team members will review all relevant materials specific to the site, including all grant applications, annual written assessments, Requests for Drawdowns, other BJA reports, survey responses, telephone interview responses, evaluation reports, and any other available materials.

Conferring with BJA Program Managers. Before visiting a jurisdiction, site visit teams will meet with or have a telephone conversation with the BJA program manager responsible for that jurisdiction. The purpose of this conversation will be to obtain any relevant information about the site that is not otherwise available, to be alerted to any potential problems experienced at the site, and to

obtain any information about specific issues that might be particularly helpful in conducting a successful site visit.

Conferring with Jurisdiction Point of Contact. Two weeks prior to the site visit, the site visit team will call the jurisdiction's Point of Contact (POC). The purposes of this call will be to:

- negotiate the timing of the site visit;
- brief the POC concerning the nature and purposes of the site visit;
- request that the POC begin gathering information concerning the nature of the program(s) to be examined during the site visit; and
- begin to develop the agenda for the visit. Team members will request to hold meetings with those persons listed under "Conduct Interviews" in the "Conducting the Site Visits" section below.

Confirming the Agenda. Three days prior to commencing the site visit, the lead person in the team will confirm the agenda with the POC.

Pre-Visit Notification. Prior to the visit, the site visit team will notify the chief executive officer and the chief law enforcement officer of the jurisdiction of the nature and timing of the visit. In addition, the team will notify NIJ and BJA of the upcoming visit.

Conducting the Site Visits

Initial site visits are expected to last from three to five work days, depending upon the number of results-oriented programs being implemented, the number of interviews to be conducted, and the complexity of the local situation. In each site visit, the following tasks will be performed.

Conduct Interviews. In order to accomplish the objectives of the site visits, members of the site visit team will interview a wide range of persons involved in planning and implementing the results-oriented programs. In all sites, persons interviewed would include, but not necessarily be limited to, the following:

- representatives of the office of the chief executive officer of the jurisdiction;
- personnel within the grant management office of the jurisdiction;
- participants in the decision-making process that selected the results-oriented program(s);
- key decision makers in the agency/agencies implementing the programs;
- grant managers in those agencies;
- managers who are actually implementing the programs;
- program staff members;
- clients of the results-oriented programs, where feasible;
- leaders of community-based organizations, and where possible,

- local evaluators.

During each interview, team members will inquire concerning any other relevant persons who should be interviewed.

Collect Archival Data. In addition, members of the site visit team will examine archival documents, including:

- minutes of planning meetings;
- program proposals;
- program assessments;
- contracts and subcontracts;
- inter-agency and intra-agency memoranda concerning program implementation;
- program progress reports;
- copies of media coverage of programs;
- program output and outcome data; and
- evaluation reports.

Observe Programs. Where feasible, members of the site visit team will conduct observations of the grantee's programs in action.

Focus of Activities on Site

Local Political Culture. The site visit team will address the following issues:

- What is the form of the local government—mayor, city manager, etc.
- Who in local government was involved in determining how LLEBG funds were to be used?
- Is there a results-orientation prevalent within the jurisdiction's government agencies or the implementing agency? If so, how long has that orientation existed? From what did it derive? Who provides its primary impetus?
- Does the local government (or implementing agency) have results-oriented strategic planning, including: effective communication of the strategic vision to all employees; responses to input from citizens and other stakeholders; and coordination of agency plans with central government plans? Are program-based budgeting or performance-based budgeting standard practice?
- Does the local government (or implementing agency) routinely collect and analyze indicators and evaluative data that can measure progress toward results and accomplishments, with a focus on the following elements of a measurement system: linkage to strategic planning, establishment of baseline data, use of outcome measures, target setting and monitoring, a drive toward

- continuous improvement, benchmarking, and training and validation?
- Do leaders and managers of the local government (or implementing agency) use results data for policy making, management, and evaluation of progress?
- Are the results of these activities clearly communicated by the local government (or implementing agency) to stakeholders?
- If there is no prevailing result-orientation the local government (or implementing agency), what was the origin of the idea for the program?
- If there is an overall strategic plan for the jurisdiction (or implementing agency), were the results-oriented LLEBG programs required to demonstrate how they conformed to that plan?

Local Decision-Making Process. The team will address these issues:

- How was it decided to allocate the LLEBG funds?
- Who participated in that process?
- What role did the Advisory Board play? How many times did it meet? Did it exist before LLEBG funding? How often does it meet? Who is on that board?
- Is there an application process at the local level?
- What criteria were used in selecting programs to be funded?
- Were needs assessments conducted?
- Who decided to fund the results-oriented programs?
- What was the decision-making process?
- Where did the matching funds come from?

Results-Oriented Programs. The team will address the following issues:

- Where did the idea for the programs come from? An application? An idea suggested by the community? Another source?
- Were there particular problems that needed to be addressed or constituencies to be satisfied that prompted the creation of the programs?
- What planning process was used in developing the program? Who was involved?
- Did the program exist prior to LLEBG funding? For how long? With what success?
- How much LLEBG funding has been allocated to these programs, by year? What other funds are being used?
- Are funds subcontracted to implement the programs? If so, to what organization(s)?

- How have the LLEBG (and other) funds been used to support these programs? Number of FTEs? Materials? Space? Services? Other?
- What is the target population for the programs? Is that population characterized by specific geographic, age, ethnic, or gender characteristics?
- What are the goals and objectives of the programs? How does the program operate to achieve those?
- What have been some of the major obstacles to the program's success?
- What have been the program's greatest successes?
- What agencies are involved in the programs? Law enforcement? Prosecutors? Judges? Schools? Community groups? Faith organizations? Substance abuse treatment facilities? Recreation facilities? Business groups? Other?
- What is the nature of the collaboration among participating agencies?
- How critical was LLEBG funding to the success of this program? Would it exist without such funding?
- What efforts have been taken to publicize the program?
- Is the community informed about the program's activities?
- Are the results of the programs used to make decisions about future funding?

Evaluation

- Is the program being evaluated? By whom?
- How are program activities, outputs, and outcomes being measured?
- Are evaluation reports available?
- What are the results of the evaluation to date?
- Are evaluation results used to modify the program?