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Author(s): George L. Kelling

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COLUMBIA'S COMPREHENSIVE COMMUNITIES PROGRAM: A CASE STUDY

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BOTEC Analysis
C O R P O R A T I O N

By:
George L. Kelling

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Overview

Columbia, South Carolina's Comprehensive Communities Program is based upon the city's philosophy of "people helping people" through close collaboration among governmental organizations, representative neighborhood groups, private agencies, and churches. Although governmental agencies are closely linked and the administrative agency for CCP is the city's Planning Department, the lead operative agency in CCP is the Columbia Police Department. At the heart of Columbia's program are three "community mobilizers." These police officers operate out of community-based offices and link police, other city government agencies, social service agencies, and citizen volunteers with citizens who are either experiencing serious neighborhood problems or creating them—problems associated with disorder, fear, serious crime, and the quality of life in Columbia's neighborhoods.

This case study of Columbia's CCP program was written as a result of site visits made to various CCP programs and interviews with CCP participants between January, 1996 and March, 1997. It also incorporates data from BOTEC's CCP Coalition Survey and Community Policing Survey, as well as information contained in federal and local documents and reports. Follow-up phone calls were made during December, 1997 and January, 1998, to key participants in order to write the epilogue.

Background Context

City Profile

Columbia, South Carolina is one of the smaller of the Comprehensive Communities Program sites. Columbia has a population of approximately 100,000 within a four county area with a population of 500,000. It is located in the geographical center of South Carolina and is both the largest city and the capital, having been created in 1786 as an alternative to the then-capital Charleston—a compromise to interior South Carolinians who were opposed to the capital being on the Atlantic coast. In 1805, Columbia was incorporated as a town and in 1854 as a city. The city was destroyed near the end of the Civil War, but recovered as a cotton manufacturing, agricultural, and industrial center by the late nineteenth century. Today, it is a multi-ethnic community comprised of 54 percent whites and 44 percent African-Americans, with the remaining two percent primarily Asian and Pacific Islanders.

Cities in South Carolina operate under one of three possible forms of city government: strong mayor, weak mayor, or city manager. Columbia operates under a city manager form of government, although the mayor has actively supported CCP efforts. Columbia is a center of higher education—the University of South Carolina (USC), Allan College, Benedict College, and Southern Lutheran Theological Seminary are all located there. The percentage of citizens who own their homes in Columbia is declining and is now only 45 percent, compared to a national average of 65 percent. The average home in Columbia is valued at approximately \$83,000, and citizens have a median income of \$23,200. Approximately 20 percent of all families live below the poverty line, with 30 percent of African Americans below it.

Although, as noted below, active involvement with neighborhoods developed greatly during the mid-1980s, Columbia has emphasized comprehensive neighborhood development since the 1970s. Five community-based corporations—Eau Claire Development Corporation, South Columbia Development Corporation, Columbia Development Corporation, Columbia Housing Corporation, and TN Development Corporation—are involved in redevelopment activities throughout Columbia. The activities include the clean-up of public spaces, park improvement, and business associations. The original target neighborhoods for the Comprehensive Community Program (CCP) hold 26 percent of the city's population: 73 percent of the residents in this subset are African-American and 26 percent are white.

Crime Problem

According to Columbia's CCP proposal, the crime problem was serious and escalating when the first draft was submitted. In 1993, using 1984 as a baseline, Part I index crimes were up by 20 percent, index violent crimes by 60 percent, murder by 35 percent, rape by 62 percent, robberies by 49 percent, aggravated assault by 60 percent, property crime rates by 14 percent, larceny by twelve percent, and motor vehicle theft by 59 percent. Burglary rates dropped during the same period by five percent. Between 1989 and 1993, arrest of juveniles per year increased from 475 to 1,091, or 130 percent. Violence within the family was also a serious problem. Two thousand and eight acts of inter-family violence were reported in 1993—58 percent were spouse against spouse, ten percent were parent/guardian against children, and eleven percent were among siblings.

Table I presents reported crime data during the period 1985-1995. Violent crimes peaked during the early 1990s: aggravated assault in 1990 and murder, rape and robberies in 1991. Burglary rates have fluctuated with no clear pattern. Larceny-theft peaked in 1988 and motor vehicle theft in 1990.

Unified Crime Report Data

Columbia		1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995
Crime	Population	100,024	100,959	94,320	97,609	95,982	98,052	99,990	99,990	99,929	100,504	104,457
Murder*	Raw	12	11	15	8	12	22	25	15	22	19	9
	per 100,000	12.00	10.90	15.90	8.20	12.50	22.44	25.00	15.00	22.02	18.90	8.62
Forcible Rape	Raw	67	101	77	85	84	103	119	105	94	116	89
	per 100,000	66.98	100.04	81.64	87.08	87.52	105.05	119.01	105.01	94.07	115.42	85.20
Robbery	Raw	389	446	396	448	444	518	687	596	666	571	677
	per 100,000	388.91	441.76	419.85	458.97	462.59	528.29	687.07	596.06	666.47	568.14	648.11
Aggravated Assault	Raw	931	956	990	1197	1357	1318	1202	1170	1422	1360	1401
	per 100,000	930.78	946.92	1049.62	1226.32	1413.81	1344.18	1202.12	1170.12	1423.01	1353.18	1341.22
Burglary	Raw	2226	2668	2684	2793	2025	1967	2145	1610	2090	1849	2256
	per 100,000	2225.47	2642.66	2845.63	2861.42	2109.77	2006.08	2145.21	1610.16	2091.48	1839.73	2159.74
Larceny-Theft	Raw	6016	7418	6988	7887	7110	7563	7912	6829	7316	7581	7559
	per 100,000	6014.56	7347.54	7408.82	8080.20	7407.64	7713.25	7912.79	6829.68	7321.20	7542.98	7236.47
Motor Vehicle Theft	Raw	519	568	669	990	1093	1154	1073	816	753	660	841
	per 100,000	518.88	562.60	709.29	1014.25	1138.76	1176.93	1073.11	816.08	753.54	656.69	805.12

*Murder includes non-negligent manslaughter

Columbia Police Department

The Columbia Police Department, which currently has a total of some 375 staff members, has been nationally recognized as an innovative police agency. In fact, one of its innovations—the Police Homeowner's Loan Program—was awarded the prestigious Harvard/Ford Foundation State and Local Government Award in 1993. Started in 1990, the city offered police officers a four percent, 20-year loan that covers both the cost of the house and refurbishing it. This program met several needs. First, it encourages police officers to live in cities and share community life. Second, it provides an opportunity to reclaim and refurbish basically solid urban housing stock.

Third, it gives police officers an “edge” in home-buying, despite their relatively low salaries.

Officers were initially cautious of the program. They were concerned about the impact on their families, especially their children, of being identified (stigmatized) as the families of officers and of living in transitional areas. They were assured, however, by supervisors and colleagues throughout the department, that the available homes would be in neighborhoods characterized by strong family life, not high-crime areas. Virtually all caution was allayed after the first purchase and move. Officer James Brown, his wife and two children bought and moved into a newly refurbished house and sang both its virtues and those of the neighborhood. Currently, 16 officers have purchased homes that had been substantially rehabilitated, nine purchased homes not in need of rehabilitation (two of which were new). Nine of the 16 officers who bought rehabilitated homes were white officers who chose to move into integrated neighborhoods. There have been no program casualties—no officers or families have regretted their home purchases and moved. Since the State and Local Innovations Award, local, private loan institutions have underwritten 50 percent of the loans and the program has expanded to include other city employees (although the funding arrangements are somewhat different). By 1995, 75 other cities either had or were developing comparable programs.

Other efforts signifying the CPD's commitment to communities and neighborhoods were evident during the early administration of Chief Austin. Police substations were initiated in August, 1990, the first being in Henley Homes, a troubled public housing project of some 800 residents. Under the leadership of Sergeant E. T. Young and Chief Austin, the experience in Henley Homes became a virtual pretest of what later was to become community policing throughout the city. While many elements of community policing were present, at least two principles were established that continue to influence how policing is conducted today in Columbia. First, the police role was expanded beyond law enforcement. This growth did not mean that police were not to be law enforcers, but that their role was to expand significantly. Second, police were to participate in community activities. This, of course, was the basic principle behind the Homeowners program discussed above. In Henley Homes this principle played itself out in police participation in nearly every aspect of life there, including sports, camping trips, community talent shows, dances, Scout activities, after-school tutoring programs, and learning centers for suspended students. Police officers also sponsored teaching activities themselves. The department evaluated the program and claimed five positive results: a 38 percent crime reduction in and around Henley Homes; a 20 percent drop in calls for service; a reduction in response time (because

police were stationed in the area); increased and improved sources of information; and, improved attitudes of police and citizens toward each other.¹

Over time a total of eight substations were created, most with a concern for public housing, but not exclusively so. Moreover, with funds from the Eisenhower Foundation, a police *Koban* was established in a public housing development in 1994. A *Koban* is a Japanese term for a local police substation that is highly visible and accessible to citizens. Although the *Koban* as it operates in Japan is solely a police facility, Columbia's *Koban* is staffed by two police officers and an Urban League program director. It also provides a part-time base for the Community Block Club, the Columbia Housing Authority, a social worker, and Officer John Sloan, a community mobilizer (see below).

These moves were part of a larger effort to decentralize the CPD and devolve power to lower levels of the organization. Prior to 1993, top command consisted of a chief and five captains (one a lead captain). In 1993, one captain was promoted to major and one captain position was dropped after the incumbent retired, leaving three captains—the current level. In September 1994, the chief made further organizational changes. Previously, the CPD was divided into two geographical areas (north and south), an administrative bureau, and an investigative bureau. The new organization divided the city into three areas (north, south, and metro) and each area was divided into two districts, with substation headquarters. Since the administrative and investigative bureaus were eliminated, personnel were transferred. School crossing guards were transferred from the administrative bureau to districts, ten investigators were transferred to districts, crime analysis was broadened to include local analysis in districts, and ten police officers were transferred from administration to the districts.

Community Context

Columbia is a “well organized” city, with virtually every neighborhood being organized. Another notable characteristic of this city's organization is that even many middle class neighborhoods are organized. Organizing middle-class areas has been a special priority for the Community Development Department. Not only have government officials wanted representation from all neighborhoods, but officials also believe that middle-class citizens bring backgrounds and skills to neighborhood and community processes that can both help and be learned by residents of poorer neighborhoods. Although they are in transition, the three CCP neighborhoods—Eau Claire, Rosewood, and Waverly—are particularly well organized.

¹ E. T. Young, “Columbia's Community Policing Program in Public Housing,” Unpublished, undated manuscript.

Resident and neighborhood participation in governmental processes, including activities such as applying for HUD or DOJ funds, is primarily provided through Columbia's Council of Neighborhoods (CCN)—a council made up of presidents of neighborhood groups and associations. Significantly, the leaders of three CCP target neighborhoods have been instrumental in the development and maintenance of CCN. For example, the president of CCN is a resident of the Eau Claire neighborhood.

The origins of CCN are to be found in the 1960s and 1970s, resulting from what neighborhood representatives perceived of as the city's preoccupation with revitalizing the downtown area while ignoring problems of residential neighborhoods. According to one of the presidents of a neighborhood association, "When you look at city government and departments in the '60s and '70s you would pick up on the fact that city government really didn't care much about neighborhoods. The mayor was concerned about downtown—trying to make Columbia a 'capital city.' They didn't worry about neighborhoods. About the mid-1980s, that began to change." The Eau Claire neighborhood is an example. Both city officials and neighborhood representatives agree that by the mid to late 1980s, whether by design or benign neglect, Eau Claire had been largely "written off" as a viable neighborhood. First, middle class whites had fled the area during the 1960s and 1970s. By the mid-1980s, middle class blacks were fleeing the area as well. According to city officials, these population shifts were a "jolt" alerting city officials that unless they paid more attention to neighborhoods, the whole city would suffer—let alone the downtown. Concurrently, according to a neighborhood president, "Neighborhood residents just didn't feel that they had a part in government." Representatives had been trying for some time to form the equivalent of CCN as a counter measure, but unhappily without much success.

Finally, the president of the Elmwood Park area managed to create the CCN as a permanent, regularly convening association of neighborhood groups. At first, in the early 1980s, the CCN was a modest organization; as the current president notes, "Only six neighborhoods were at the table." Yet for citizens, its creation provided an urgently needed voice in local governance. Its aim was to prevent conflict among neighborhoods and provide a united front in dealing with government and problems. By 1985, the CCN had grown to represent 20 neighborhoods and was meeting in City Hall. In the words of a neighborhood president, "By this time, city government and its involvement with people, and money, and programs, and outreach, and staff-support, and everything else, began to develop not so much to run *downtown* Columbia, but to run the *city* of Columbia and to look at neighborhoods. Since then, the dollars and the efforts have gone toward answering the question, "What can we do for neighborhoods and how can we involve neighborhoods in government?" That is the trend that began in the 1980s and influenced how CCP was developed." In his words again, "[Government] now listens and responds. In the same way, citizens listen and respond."

CCN is now an association of 64 neighborhood groups and, at any specific meeting, attracts presidents of approximately two thirds of its constituent organizations. Moreover, the relationship between neighborhood groups and city government has matured. At first, many of the meetings between community groups (whether individual groups, clusters of groups, or later CCN) and city government was largely confrontational—"Why aren't you doing this?" "Why are we left out?"—with the city responding defensively. Later, as city government and the neighborhood groups gained experience with each other, the relationship became less confrontational and more collaborative. Additionally, as CCN grew and city government worked hard to develop priorities in an equitable fashion across neighborhoods, the nature of the relationship among neighborhoods themselves changed, shifting from a somewhat defensive, zero-sum relationship (if you get it, we don't) to one of collaboration in defining priorities. By the 1990s, CCN began to develop and push for its own positive program. It was incorporated in 1993. The city now provides it with a small annual stipend, \$3000, for incidental expenses. Of the constituent groups, one-third are incorporated and all have by-laws. Traditionally, leadership of the CCN alternates between white and black representatives. As will be noted below, the CCN was a pivotal force in the development of the CCP plan.

Strong Additional Partners: Inner City Churches

While they are not CCP players in a technical sense, inner city churches (many predominately African-American, but not exclusively so) play a significant role in developing a truly comprehensive approach to dealing with crime and the quality of life in Columbia. One is struck when going through inner city neighborhoods, especially Eau Claire, not just that there are many churches, but that churches are thriving.

The House of Prayer, for example, is in a magnificent new building in the middle of 16 newly constructed, single family brick homes and 27 brick, single story one and two bedrooms apartments for the elderly. The new church building, which did not require financing, is owned by the Christian religious community known as the House of Prayer. The housing for the elderly was built by the House of Prayer for its members, so that "they can live out their golden years in their community and near their church and friends." The new houses were built by the city, through its redevelopment program. All—the church, the housing for the elderly, and the single family homes (called Church Place)—were built on reclaimed land and represent a collaboration between the city and church to rebuild a community. The city condemned the land for the church and the elderly housing and made it available to the church to purchase. Collaboration is more than political, it is in the details as well: when the church planned its housing for the elderly, they were to have wood siding. The city development agency indicated that the city was

deliberately building all its housing with brick siding to increase its attractiveness and longevity and to keep maintenance low. The church then agreed to use similar brick. The result is a lovely inner city neighborhood with a vibrant, warm, and open church at its core.

Three other churches are rebuilding in Eau Claire. One of these is rebuilding not only the large main church building but a free-standing new gymnasium as well. The pastor of this church, the Progressive Church, was quite explicit: "If you want to deal with the spiritual problems of youths, you have to attract them to the church. A gym is simply a necessity to do so." The same pastor said: "We could have moved out to I-77 (the expressway). We wouldn't have had to worry about crime. But staying in the city is a way of fulfilling our ministry. Our ministry is not just to the well; it is to those who need it the most." Another minister makes a similar point by saying, "The church is not just a social club that we dress up for every Sunday," and, "Let's not talk about those people 'out there', unless we're willing to go out and minister to them." His church has acquired two apartment buildings adjacent to the church. One is being used to house elderly parishioners, and the other, church offices.

One elderly minister related the difficulties his church was having in purchasing property in Eau Claire to build housing for elderly parishioners—they had the money, but some of the owners of dilapidated properties were unwilling to sell. When the pastor contacted city officials about the problem, they acted decisively and condemned the problem property. The church now has control over the lots they desired, including a former liquor store, and plans for the elderly housing continue.

Churches have decided to address, as their clergy put it, the "soul" of Eau Claire. The theology behind this mission is best captured by the name of an interdenominational group called "Shalom"—a term which, according to the clergy with whom I spoke, does not merely signify peace, but also harmony and wholeness—the goals of the greater church (defined here as a people not as a place) in Eau Claire. Its mission statement reads:

The Eau Claire Community of Shalom will work collaboratively with all groups (including neighborhood associations, clubs, schools, businesses, corporations, non-profits, and governments) who desire to serve the needs of the community and seek a special partnership with the other community churches, synagogues, mosques and temples to arrest and reverse the further physical and emotional deterioration of our community.

Shalom was created during the 1960s and from its inception had a social agenda consistent with its title. This coalition of clergy, white and black, exposed early redlining, discrimination, and other housing and development practices that had begun to tear Eau Claire apart, threatening its existence

as a viable and diverse neighborhood. Strong links developed among political leaders, colleges, and churches. From the beginning, the views of the clergy included a strong community orientation. They said, for example that, "to attack crime, the spirit of youths must be empowered," "the church must make moral statements about what is happening in the community," and "the church must be in the community and a force in it." Currently the Eau Claire Community of Shalom is involved in housing rehabilitation, a parish nurse program, girl scouts, prenatal and family missions, and publishing a resource directory for community residents.

The House of Prayer and the city of Columbia have transformed Read Street (old photographs show a neighborhood in a terribly dilapidated state). Other streets are being transformed by other churches and the city. It is an unusual but powerful partnership. Short visits cannot fully capture it, but it is a movement worth studying and understanding, especially with respect to the Comprehensive Communities approach.

CCP Planning and Organization


Columbia, South Carolina, was one of sixteen sites invited by the Bureau of Justice Assistance to apply for both planning and implementation funding to develop and implement a comprehensive strategy to combat crime. As stated in BJA's *Fact Sheet on the Comprehensive Communities Program*, "(t)he two defining principles of the CCP are (1) that communities must take a leadership role in developing partnerships to combat crime and violence, and (2) that State and local jurisdictions must establish truly coordinated and multi-disciplinary approaches to address crime and violence-related problems, as well as the conditions which foster them."² Each site was mandated to include jurisdiction-wide community policing and community mobilization prevention initiatives in their strategy. In addition, sites were asked to create programming, based on the area's needs, in the areas of youth and gangs, community prosecution and diversion, drug courts with diversion to treatment, and community-based alternatives to incarceration.

The Comprehensive Communities Program was implemented in two phases. Under Phase I, the invited jurisdictions submitted an application for approximately \$50,000 of planning funds to support the design and development of a comprehensive strategy. All proposals for Phase I funding were due April 29, 1994. Most of the sites were notified within a month that they were awarded funding for Phase I. During this planning phase, technical assistance in the form of workshops and meetings were offered to the sites. During July, 1994, representatives from each site were mandated to attend a two-day Phase II (Implementation Phase) Application Development Workshop. All Phase II applications were due to BJA on August 15, 1994.

Although Columbia's official start date was October, 1994, it did not receive the Great Adjustment Notice that allowed the city to begin expending its funds until a year later in October, 1995. Its end date has been extended to September, 1997, and city officials are currently preparing a proposal for second year funding.

² Bureau of Justice Assistance, *Fact Sheet Comprehensive Communities Program*, U.S. Department of Justice, 1994.

Columbia Timeline



Planning Process

The specific and immediate origins of the CCP planning and application process are to be found in Columbia's application to the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) to become an Enterprise Community (February 24, 1994). Similar to CCP's application process, application to become an Enterprise Community requires that a broad base of neighborhood, community, governmental, and private agencies and sectors be involved in determining needs and problems, potential solutions for those problems, and the respective roles of citizens, agencies, and other institutions in carrying out problem-solving activities. Initiated in early 1993, participation in this planning process involved governmental agencies, social service providers, and community residents (especially youth, non-profit groups, lenders and housing providers, educators, and elected officials). This planning process itself included community forums, ratification by neighborhood associations, and presentations to diverse civic and service organizations.

Columbia did not receive Enterprise community funding, yet despite this setback, city officials and neighborhood representatives viewed the planning process for it as a positive experience. Clearly, by the 1990s, most neighborhoods were relatively well organized and CCN was a viable overarching organization. Moreover, Columbia's city officials were relating to neighborhoods in a new way. The positive aspect of the Enterprise community planning process was that it brought many new groups to the table that should have been dealing with each other, but were not. For example, as a result of participating in this planning process, representatives of the school district and the University of South Carolina both recognized the potential for an educational laboratory. Consequently, they have formed a partnership that continues to explore the possibilities of collaboration between USC and the school district. Likewise, because all social services are delivered at a county or state level, city service providers had no more than occasional contact with state welfare officials. Each could have benefited enormously from systematic contact, especially since the majority of welfare clients were from the city and many lived in public housing, a city function.

When CCP became a possibility, a planning process was again mobilized that refined and re-targeted the Enterprise community process by expanding representation, geography and the agenda (the new program areas were community policing and youth services). The CCP steering committee included many of the same players as the Enterprise community steering committee (especially CCN), but also drew in a broader police and criminal justice base of participation, which complemented the new agenda. Moreover, neighborhood groups met regularly in the three target areas (sometimes with Chief Austin as the featured guest), to provide local input to the steering committee.

CCP Administrative Structure

The CCP project is directly managed through the City of Columbia's Planning Department. The "chain of command" goes up from Marshall Johnson (Grants Coordinator, Community Services Department), to Chip Land (Planning Director, City of Columbia), to Leona Plaugh (Assistant City Manager), to Hadley Miles (City Manager), to Mayor Bob Coble. This lineup functioned well in Columbia, with Johnson, Land, and Plaugh being the central day-to-day players. Other key players include Sergeant E. T. Young (Coordinator of Community Policing for the Columbia Police Department), Richard Semon (Director, Community Development), Roland Smallwood (Community Liaison, Community Development), and Eric Cassell (Community Development).

Several observable community strengths bode well for Columbia's plans. First, the chief of the Columbia Police Department (CPD), Charles Austin, is highly regarded throughout the community, enjoying considerable local political, social, and media support for his vision for the direction of the CPD. To say that he is profoundly respected in Columbia would not be too strong a term. Second, Columbia's neighborhoods are well-organized both internally and among themselves, through the Columbia Council of Neighborhoods (CCN), which is itself a potent coordinating vehicle for advocating neighborhood interests. Third, churches have maintained, indeed expanded, their presence in Columbia's inner city areas and are playing an active role in its reconstruction. Fourth, the level of coordination and cooperation among city agencies—especially among police, housing, planning, and school departments—is impressive. Not only do these agencies seem to be bound by a common purpose, but the key players in each agency also appear to like and respect each other. Finally, the city's size seems to make many of its problems manageable, especially in light of the above.

Although administered by the Planning Department, the Columbia Police Department is the cornerstone agency of the CCP effort. Implementing community policing is the single largest "chunk" of the program, and the community mobilization effort is being spearheaded by three sworn police officers.

CCP Strategy

Guided by three overarching values—building partnerships, people helping people, and community organizing—Columbia's original CCP proposal emphasized building on existing programs rather than implementing new ones. It included:

- Community Policing
- Alternatives to Incarceration

- Drug Court
- Conflict Resolution
- Community Mobilization
- Diversion
- Boys and Girls Clubs

The CCP effort was divided into two categories: \$990,000 was to go toward implementing community policing, and \$825,751 was to go toward a community mobilization component and other CCP components. The community policing budget included funds for eight neighborhood police officers, a job task analysis, training, the leasing and maintenance of a Koban, youth employment, and automation. The community mobilization funds included diversion (\$225,000), youth employment (\$100,000), job assistance (\$10,000), drug court (\$200,000), parenting program funding (\$10,000), neighborhood program funding (\$45,000), anti-violence programs (\$50,000), and administrative costs.

CCP Program

Community Policing

CCP efforts must be viewed within the context of a city police department which is already creating substations, devolving authority, and trying to collaborate with neighborhoods and other agencies. The core of Columbia's CCP proposal is to build administrative mechanisms and community infrastructure which facilitate community policing. Thus one goal includes reorganizing police operational systems (completed); conducting job task analysis and revising job descriptions, performance evaluations, and promotional policies (contract about to be let, after competitive bid); and, automating central records and operations (completed). This goal is linked to another, which equips officers with laptops and districts with personal computers, distribution of which have both been completed. Another goal, hiring eight additional officers and reassigning personnel, has also been completed (noted above). Providing officers with training in community policing has been ongoing; however, it is to be restructured, pending the approval of plans by the Bureau of Justice Assistance. The remaining goals are programmatic—as against organizational or administrative—and include continued partnerships, creating shared responsibility with police and youth through prevention programs, and continuance of Police Homeowners Loan Program. (discussed above).

It is in the achievement of the programmatic goals that neat demarcations among programmatic elements break down. Although community mobilizers are put forward in a separate budget category and are organized around a different set of goals, they are at the heart of virtually every community mobilization effort. Yet they are police officers jointly supervised by Columbia's community services department and police department. They are to “mobilize and empower residents to become more actively involved in planning and implementation of activities to reduce crime and related problems.”

The three target neighborhoods—Rosewood, Eau Claire, and Waverly—have officers assigned to the task of mobilizing communities. The officers work in collaboration with, or under the supervision of (depending how one sees it), Sgt. E. T. Young and Community Development Director Richard Semon. Each has a separate office in his assigned neighborhood, and although clearly and widely known as a police officer, usually works in plain clothes.

The community mobilizers are the “crown jewel” of the Columbia program in the sense that their positions are the most innovative aspect of the program and must be able to energize CCP efforts *now*. Much of Columbia's police efforts either focus on strengthening administrative processes or changing organizational structures or workings. While essential, more training or

specialized training is not very “sexy” or something about which one can become especially excited. Likewise, while absolutely essential, revising personnel systems (including evaluation and promotional procedures) hardly captures public or professional imagination. Finally, the full impact of changing personnel evaluation and promotion systems, even once they are in place, will be years down the path.

By contrast, the story of these three community mobilizers—officers Angel Cruz, Milton Frederick, and John Sloan—is immediate and inherently interesting. Moreover, the city, the CPD, and the officers/mobilizers are proud of what they are doing and their accomplishments. Their activities range from running rap sessions in the schools, to addressing street problems (e.g. abandoned cars and illegal car repairs) and traditional “hazards” (e.g. abandoned buildings), speaking at schools and community meetings, training other police departments, training and certifying young girls as baby sitters, working on other youth employment issues, managing traffic problems, sponsoring and/or coaching athletic activities (including cheerleading), developing legal clinics, organizing community clean-ups, and dealing with loitering, break-ins, and neighborhood drug problems. Despite its length, even this list is incomplete.

Several aspects of the community mobilizers’ activities and function particularly stand out. First, their standing in the community, especially with youth, is extraordinarily high. They have made a conscious effort to concentrate on younger children, feeling that the possibilities of success would be enhanced over the long haul. This strategy seems to be working because they have a “following” among youth, their offices are crowded with youths after school, and anecdotes of children bringing report cards to the officers to show them their passing grades (told not only by mobilizers but by housing and school officials as well) abound.

Second, it is not too strong to say that affection characterizes the relationship between mobilizers and community leaders. In each case, the obvious ease and intimacy of the relationship between mobilizers and adult citizens is impressive.

Third, the community mobilizers seem to enjoy regular and sustained contacts with school, housing, church, and recreational officials. Indeed, the “ad hoc” contacts, and the apparent quality of those contacts around specific problems appears to grow out of long-standing collaborative relationships. It is not clear at this time, however, whether the same relationship has or will develop among mobilizers and social service providers brought into the loop with CCP funding. Finally, while each community mobilizer has developed a different “style,” each collaborates effectively. Examples of these distinct styles are given in detail below.

Officer Milton Frederick's style is characterized by a strong commitment to education and to the effective integration of tradition with other community services. For instance, Officer Frederick, modeling his activities on earlier activities of Chief Austin, pioneered the rap sessions in Columbia schools. These sessions give youths, especially minority youths, an opportunity to "talk out" in a group their perceptions of problems they have in school and why they are having them. Although school officials were not polled on their impressions of the program, at least one principal stated his belief that the talks significantly reduce teacher-student conflict. Moreover, Officer Frederick is now expanding his activities to three other schools at the insistence of school administrators (Both Cruz and Sloan do school rap sessions but they are more of a signature effort for Frederick). Yvonne Manley, a local public housing manager, commented on the second characteristic quality of Officer Frederick's work. She pointed out that he provided better law enforcement services (including follow-up after the crime is committed), along with better access to social and other services. Manley reported that these goals, particularly as they were carried out from a substation in public housing, vitally supports her own goal of making the residents of public housing both good citizens and an integral part of the community. Officer Frederick is also involved in a wide range of other activities which exemplify his commitments: organizing boys and girls groups, dealing with community problems such as abandoned housing, obtaining school bus service for young children who were exposed to traffic hazards, counseling elementary students with school problems, and, creating a summer intern program for youths.

Officer John Sloan describes the "John Sloan" technique as using informal community service and mediation to deal with youth and youth problems. From his point of view, a mobilizer's job is not to transfer problems from one housing area to another, but rather to solve problems. Yet he can be tough. As he put it, "At first, I had to establish who's the sheriff in town." Officer Sloan, athletic himself, is involved in developing a myriad of sports activities for youths in his area. Additionally, Officer Sloan has been approved as a substitute teacher in Richland, sent reference letters to schools and potential employees for community volunteers, helped citizens influence police response to calls for service, oversaw two football teams and their cheerleaders, worked with graduate students to develop a community resource book, counseled students, and developed an address book for the Waverly Neighborhood Organization.

Angel Cruz's special focus and competence is community organization, and through these organizing activities, has developed a broad range of community resources—including a neighborhood legal clinic. It is propitious that community organizing is his special skill: Officer Cruz's area is, by far, the largest geographical area targeted for the CCP implementation, and by all accounts, he has been spread too thin. He is now addressing this issue by developing a cadre of volunteers who will help him deal with problems in vari-

ous neighborhoods, at least until he has the time and opportunity to get to them. The many other activities on which Cruz concentrates include solving neighborhood trash problems, overseeing summer interns, conducting workshops, dealing with other quality-of-life issues such as drainage; and lecturing at local colleges and universities. Several signs of Officer Cruz's success are evident. For instance Cruz's office is in a public housing development that, until he was assigned there, always required two cars to service calls—officers in the second car were sent to protect the first car from being trashed. Now Officer Cruz regularly parks either his personal or police car in front of his office without worry, even when he is not at his office. Moreover, in what is perhaps a minor but significant outcome, pizza delivery has been restored to the housing development since his assignment to the neighborhoods—a sign of commerce and services returning to the neighborhood.

Besides their network of social and city service providers, the three community mobilization officers are supported by residential police officers. Residential officers, now numbering fifteen (five in each of the three areas), work primarily as law enforcers, but in the community policing mode, so that they are able to work in very close collaboration with the officer mobilizers.

The self-described work of one of these residential officers, a community foot patrol officer, proved instructive. In it one sees the strong foundation that community policing provides to CCP-style efforts. This officer's beat spans two juxtaposed neighborhoods whose contrast is highlighted by the fact that these neighborhoods are divided, literally, by one street. On one side stand aging houses, some nearly dilapidated; on the other side stands comfortable, upper-middle class homes. In talking about these neighborhoods, not only was the African-American officer well-versed in the ideas that inhere in community policing, he was a friendly and affable young man who showed great concern for his neighborhoods. He understood that in one neighborhood, its residents, the city, the police department, and he himself had to arrest urban decline and restore the community. In the next neighborhood, he had to ensure that it maintained its viability. The observed professional relationship between the officer and a resident of this neighborhood (an upper middle class lawyer and community activist) was immediately obvious—with the citizen going out of his way to warmly receive and praise the officer and police department. The citizens' desires were explicit: to maintain the viability of the neighborhood by keeping crime low, fast traffic under control, and property values up—all essential if his neighbors were going to stay in Columbia rather than move to the suburbs. And for him, the foot patrol officer was the answer to all three problems.

This incident is instructive of the remarkable possibilities for effective police-citizen collaboration. Here is a white middle-class neighborhood being patrolled by an African-American in a police department headed by an African-American, a situation that many, if not most whites dreaded, not only in the

South but in other regions of the country as well only 30 years ago. Yet the officer was popular and worked with community residents to deal with their problems. The working collegiality and mutual respect of these two men is a heartening sign of the potential of community policing for extending visions and possibilities within communities.

It appears the greatest problem with the community mobilizers at the present time is their limited number. According to project officials, more and more communities are demanding current mobilizers' services or the assignment of new mobilizers. Angel Cruz, for example, is spread thin because of the sheer geographical size of his area. It remains to be seen whether his recruitment and use of volunteers can spread CCP activities through his territory more adequately. More broadly, will it be possible for volunteers alone to answer the communities' demands for service?

An interesting question, although not yet a problem, is that of community mobilizers' role and status. Are they primarily police officers who have been sequestered to special neighborhood assignments? Or are they primarily community organizers who by happenstance are police officers? Either way, how can it be assured that they truly are in the communities to serve the communities' needs, rather than in neighborhoods to organize parochial support for police department goals? The issue of how the community mobilizer positions should be staffed was recognized early as an important one by Columbia's CCP staff. Originally, based on the experiences in Hartford, the staff leaned towards getting professional social workers into the mobilizer positions. Chief Austin, however, believed strongly that the community mobilizers should be police, and urged that CCP staff share his point of view. This idea ultimately triumphed. This issue will be raised again in the concluding comments.

Organization for Community Input and Service Delivery

In Columbia it is particularly difficult to demarcate which program components are community policing, which are community mobilization, and which affect social service delivery. Indeed, the community mobilizers, as we have seen, are police officers involved in a community policing initiative and yet are obviously involved in mobilizing the community. The lines become more blurred when CCP service delivery is added.

Columbia's approach to service delivery appears to be driven by several needs. First, like most cities, expansion of governmental agencies to provide social services is no longer a fiscal option. Second, social service needs exist in the target neighborhoods that are outside the range of traditional services provided by existing agencies. The question that Columbia CCP officials faced was whether existing agencies, given increased funding, could be "refitted" to deal with specific problems in new ways. In other words, could tradi-

tional agencies, if provided with seed money to develop new capacities, expand or change their basic strategy in such a way that these activities could be sustained into the future? Essentially, their question extended the planning strategies of both the Enterprise community and CCP processes: their idea was to bring to the table both neighborhood representatives and representatives of traditional (and non-city governmental) agencies, as well as representatives of city agencies to see if new and innovative partnerships could be developed for neighborhood level problem-solving. This was to be accomplished in two ways, through the community mobilizers (discussed further below) and by funding existing agencies to provide new services.

In service of the later, on May 20, 1996, the City of Columbia published seven Requests for Proposals (RFPs), requesting work on: 1) a comprehensive study of the CPD, 2) job assistance, 3) domestic violence programming, 4) a parenting program, 5) alternatives to incarceration, 6) youth activities, and, 7) treatment services for the drug court. All were to be funded from the CCP grant. In effect, these RFPs represented the consensus that developed out of the city-wide CCP planning process (that also reflected views provided by CCP consultants) about what professional services were required to support the overall goal of the CCP effort. As mentioned previously, the lead citizen organization in the planning process had been the Columbia Council of Neighborhoods.

In September, contracts were awarded in five of the seven categories; in December, a contract was awarded to provide treatment in support of the drug court; a contract will soon be awarded to conduct the study of the CPD (discussed above). These awards were in the following categories, which again reflect the overall planning:

- Mobilize and empower residents to become more actively involved in the planning and implementation of activities to reduce crime and related problems. Contracts were awarded to Family Service Center, Sistercare, and Planned Parenthood of South Carolina;
- Implement community-based diversionary programs for at-risk youth in order to reduce crime. Funds were provided to the Boys and Girls Club of the Midlands and a contract awarded to Lexington/Richland Alcohol & Drug Abuse;
- Develop and implement an alternative to incarceration program for at-risk youthful offenders grades six through eight who are suspended or expelled and who are processed through the juvenile justice system in order to increase self esteem, responsibility, respect for self and others, and law enforcement. A contract was awarded to Passport for Success;

- Train middle and high school youth to constructively manage anger to reduce youth violence by promoting non-violent alternatives for resolving conflict within schools and to increase youth leadership skills through participation in school and violence prevention activities. A contract was awarded to Dr. Ronald D. Miles, Richland County School District One;
- Create a drug court diversionary program which provides treatment in lieu of incarceration for drug-addicted offenders. A contract was awarded to Lexington/Richland Alcohol & Drug Abuse.

At this point, it is important to return to a discussion of the community mobilizers and what they represent in this effort. Perhaps it would be wisest to think of them schematically as the hub of a wheel. City agencies, service agencies, volunteer efforts, and CCP funded programs are at the rim, to be brought to bear as the need requires. Mobilizers operate out of broad goals first conceptualized and made operational in Henley Homes in 1990. As community mobilizers, their duties include working with citizens, organizations, and governmental agencies to identify problems and to identify either solutions or ways to manage them. Many problems can be managed or solved by citizens themselves (at times with some prodding by mobilizers or residential police): reminding teens of their responsibilities, being volunteers in training efforts, cleaning up vacant lots, planting gardens, maintaining property, cleaning graffiti—the list is endless. Such community efforts to manage problems are also facilitated by the availability of small CCP-funded problem-solving grants that can range from several hundred to several thousand dollars. Other problems can be managed by existing programs or agencies (again, at times with some prodding by mobilizers or police): police, by warning, educating, or even removing troublemakers from the community if the problem is serious enough; schools, by educating; housing authorities, by holding people accountable; hospitals, through routine care and counseling; probation, by holding offenders accountable and finding services for them; and so on. Other persons (especially at risk youth) need specialized care. For some, mere referral is enough—they need help, know it, are eager to receive it, and get it. For others, they need and want help but find it difficult to manage their lives—they have young children or transportation is a problem. Yet others are ambivalent about needing or wanting help and avoid getting it by using excuses, arguing for example, “I’m just too busy,” or “I can’t get a baby sitter.” Finally, others are bound and determined *not* to get help and will only do so if coerced. Columbia’s CCP efforts are designed to give mobilizers the tools they need to provide the broadest base of services—whether highly motivated, ambivalent about receiving services, or hostile to the idea of some form of external help.

A hypothetical example clarifies how this diverse set of players and problems come together in practice. Suppose a family in public housing is both disruptive to its neighbors and is showing signs of child abuse. Police are called often and, again hypothetically, mobilizer Angel Cruz becomes aware of the problem through conversations with other residents, through his own familiarity with the neighborhood, and from other police who are involved in many repeat calls to the family in question. The disruption has also been noted by the Columbia Housing Authority. Officer Cruz meets with the family and refers them to the Family Service Center. The family begs out with the excuse that they simply cannot afford a baby sitter. Officer Cruz has a resource to deal with this problem. He has already contacted the job training program in the Boys and Girls Club and arranged for a teenage girl who has been trained as a baby sitter and who can be made available to the family. The family again balks and offers other objections if transportation isn't available and the times are inconvenient. Officer Cruz has the answer for these stumbling blocks as well. Volunteers from local churches are on-call, prepared to drive anyone who needs transportation to receive services at any time. When the family then refuses transportation, it becomes clear they simply are using excuses to avoid receiving help. In this hypothetical situation, given the problems that the family has brought to the neighborhood, the Columbia Housing Authority is now prepared to insist the family either make itself available for help and desist the behavior that is disturbing the community, or be evicted from the housing development.

A listing and description of CCP funded programs is attached as Appendix A. Marshall Johnson monitors these program elements. Monthly meetings of service providers are held under her direction. Verbal reports at these meetings are given by representatives of the agencies, and written reports include basic client statistics and information regarding overall program development.

As indicated above, the community mobilizers are a primary channel for the services of the agencies that comprise the CCP-based network (the spokes out of the hub of the wheel). What is much less clear at this time is how close a partnership exists among the agencies themselves (the rim of the wheel). Virtually all of the agencies have their own client and community networks independent of CCP (this was part of the reason they were selected). Clearly, Columbia CCP officials plan on expanding those networks—taking into account the lessons learned in their Enterprise community and CCP grant writing and planning exercises.

Network Analysis

Theory and Application

Network analysis has emerged as a popular analytic strategy for understanding social relations, and is an appropriate tool for shedding light on CCP partnerships. Network analysis has a long history of use in the fields of anthropology, sociology, and psychology (see Scott, 1991), and has now been used in other fields such as political science and education. The network approach assumes that (1) individuals are not isolated but rather function as part of a social system whereby their behavior is influenced by others, and (2) these social systems are structured and organized, and therefore, can be analyzed as predictable patterns of interaction. Thus, network analysis allows us to examine the structural properties of social relations by examining the interactions between individuals actors in a social network. Knoke & Kuklinski, (1982, p. 10) describe the two essential qualities of network analysis as “its capacity to illuminate entire social structures and to comprehend particular elements within the structure.”

Recent advances in the theory and techniques of network analysis have been substantial (see Wasserman & Galaskiewicz, 1993; 1994 for reviews). Despite these advances, the utilization of these techniques and models for the study of community action and public elites has been limited (see Knoke, 1993).

The Comprehensive Communities Program was designed primarily as a vehicle to facilitate the development of citywide networks and partnerships—collective entities that were hypothesized to improve the odds of preventing urban violence and disorder above and beyond what could be expected from individuals and agencies working independently. In the context of the present study, network analysis is an important strategy for identifying patterns of interaction among those who play key roles in each CCP coalition. These wave one network data provide an empirical look at the relationships and social networks that were taking shape early on in five CCP cities.

Boundary Specification

Specifying the boundaries of the network in advance of data collection is an important part of network analysis. Unlike typical random sampling approaches, limits on the population or the sample must be carefully imposed. Essentially, we adopted a “realist” (Laumann et al., 1982) approach to boundary specification by allowing each CCP site to define their own net-

work.³ The CCP proposals (prepared by the sites) were used by the research team to identify a preliminary list of potential actors and organizations within the CCP network. These lists were mailed to the CCP project director for review, who then recommended deletions and additions. The realist approach uses the criterion of “mutual relevance” to decide who belongs in a network. Here, the assumption is that individuals and groups are included in the network if they have a mutual interest in the CCP project and some capacity to influence the outcome. Indeed, there is reason to believe that individuals were included in the proposal (or later included in the network) because of their position in particular organizations or projects associated with CCP.

Sampling was not necessary in this study because the network populations were relatively small. Hence, all identified members of each network were included in the data collection effort.


Data Collection Methods and Procedures

The network data in this case study were collected as part of our Coalition Survey. The Coalition Survey was sent to sites from September, 1995 to June, 1996, depending on the site. This network analysis then is a snapshot of the relationships and social networks during the first half of the CCP implementation phase.

To measure CCP-related networks, respondents were given a list of individuals who were believed to be affiliated with the CCP coalition in their respective cities, and then asked how often they have contact with each individual on the list. Possible response options were “daily, weekly, monthly, every few months, never.”

To enhance the network analysis, individual cases were dropped when they did not have sufficient contact with other members of the network. Including persons with rare or occasional contacts in the network would have distorted the results by causing more dense (and therefore less interpretable) clustering of the remaining actors. Hence, after examining the frequency distributions, a decision was made to include only respondents who reported having contact with at least 10% of the total network “at least every few months.” The effects of applying this inclusion criterion are described separately for each site. The analysis strategy can be found in Appendix B.

³The realist approach can be contrasted with the nominalist view. With the latter, network boundaries are determined by the researcher's theoretical framework.



Codes:

AD=Alcohol/Drug Abuse Council	CM=City Manager's Office	DV=Domestic Violence	PLD=Planning Division	UL=Urban League
AW=Alston Wilkes Society	CN=Council of Neighborhoods	HA=Housing Authority	PR=Parks and Recreation	US=U.S. Attorney
BG=Boys and Girl's Clubs	CY=City Youth Initiatives	MO=Mayor's Office	RJ=Richland Dept. of Juvenile Justice	
CD=Community Development Dept.	DC=Drug Court	OS=Operation Success	SD=School District	
CR=Columbia Com. Relations	DJ=Dept. of Juvenile Justice	PD=Police Dept.		

Columbia Network Analysis

The original network sample in Columbia contained 39 target individuals. The level of contact between these individuals was relatively high compared to other sites⁴. Individual respondents reported having contact with anywhere from 28% to 64% of the total network (with a median of 46%). Thus, all 39 targets met the minimum criterion for inclusion in the network analysis, i.e., having contact with at least 10% of the total network “at least every few months.” Two of the five most frequently contacted persons were from the Planning Division of the City’s Community Services Department— the Planning Director (64%), and the Grants Coordinator (59%). Of the other three, two were from the Boys and Girls Clubs (64%) and the Urban League (59%) and the third was the Chief of Police (59%).

A two-dimensional smallest-space analysis was used as the best way to depict the observed relationships. Kruskal’s stress statistic was very satisfactory. The stress value is .20 and the R^2 value is .81. The two dimensions are not easily interpretable, perhaps because the data tended to cluster around one major network. The horizontal axis seems to be partially definable by municipally-driven, neighborhood-focused programs on the right side (e.g. youth-oriented prevention and community policing activities organized primarily by city departments and other agencies), in contrast to judicially-driven diversion and juvenile justice interventions on the left side. The vertical axis may reflect a distinction between politicians/senior executives on the top and operational managers below the horizontal axis.

Less ambiguous is the interpretation of key clusters in the network. The analysis in Columbia yielded one large high-density cluster and two small, low-density clusters. The major cluster, labeled “Key Agency Partners,” covers both the upper right and lower right quadrants, spreading across the horizontal (x) axis. This group of individuals illustrates a true multi-agency partnership at the management level, as the key actors in the primary agencies report having regular contact and communication with one another for both planning and implementation functions. The City of Columbia’s Police Department Planning Division is at the hub of the planning and implementation process. City agencies represented in this primary cluster include the Police, the Community Development and Planning Divisions of the Community Services Department, Parks and Recreation, the City Manager’s Office,

⁴Sites with smaller networks (or at least fewer survey respondents) generally have network members who interact more frequently. Thus, as might be expected, these differences between sites in the amount of contact are partially attributable to the size of the network.

and the Mayor's Office. The police chief, mayor, city manager, and Assistant City Manager are all involved in the CCP network, as well as the directors of community development, police planning, and community policing. Equally noteworthy is the involvement of non-municipal agencies, including the School District, Boys and Girls Clubs, the Urban League, Alcohol and Drug Abuse Council, the Housing Authority, and the Council of Neighborhoods. The latter is a mature and influential organization that interacts with top city officials on a regular basis. Also, the Columbia Housing Authority is centrally located in the primary cluster and plays a key role in this initiative. The community mobilizers from the Police Department, who are the centerpiece of CCP in Columbia, are based in public housing sites. Field interviews inform us that inter-agency partnerships were functioning at the street level as community mobilizers crossed numerous bureaucratic boundaries to solve family and neighborhood problems. What this network analysis confirms is that similar partnerships were occurring at the upper levels of management.

The remaining two groups are almost too small to be called clusters. In the lower left quadrant, there is a small cluster that is labeled "Alternatives to Incarceration." The group is defined by personnel from the Department of Juvenile Justice who divert young offenders from the juvenile justice system to programs such as Operation Success (also in the cluster). The other small group is in the upper left quadrant and is labeled "Drug Court/Diversion." This cluster appears to be built around the drug court and includes staff from the drug court, the Alcohol and Drug Abuse Council, and the U. S. Attorney's office. (Nearby is the judge who started this program). These two small mini-clusters are distant from the primary cluster of key partners in multi-dimensional space.

This network analysis is limited by the data it contains. As with other sites, some networks in Columbia are known to exist at the level of field operations, but are not captured here because their members are not sufficiently represented in the present database. For example, this survey cannot be used to characterize or map the extensive contacts made by the Police Department's community mobilizers or contacts between diverse members of Columbia's Council of Neighborhoods. They were simply not listed on the questionnaire.

Sustainability

Columbia has produced a draft “Sustainment Action Plan” under the direction of Marshall Johnson, with a steering committee that includes most of the major players (governmental officials, neighborhood leaders, heads of important service agencies, schools, the religious community, and others). The plan reads like a realistic and straightforward attempt to ensure continuation of CCP philosophy and program coordination. The document is available and there is little reason to replicate it here, other than to note that the Sustainment Action Plan specifies a three-pronged approach in the immediate future: continued progress in community policing, a commitment to keep the three current mobilizers in place to further mobilization efforts, and stepped up efforts to increase social service programs in the BJA- mandated areas.

Columbia's commitment to community policing appears to be complete. Implementation was initiated prior to CCP funding, it seems doubtless that it will continue, and sustainability is not really a question. However, the role of the community mobilizers, or how their functions will be carried out beyond the immediate future, is not entirely clear. The Sustainment Plan suggests that police and city officials will be studying ways of transferring mobilizer functions to community police officers. How well this will work remains a basic question. Given the enormous impression mobilizers have made in their communities, even if they are simply replaced or move on, they will be a hard act to follow. It will also be interesting to see if their roles can be solidified on a broader basis. And, if the role is indeed a transitional one, in which their work tested the outer limits of community policing, there are more pressing questions: Which of the current functions of the mobilizers are properly police functions? Are there functions of the mobilizers that can be handled either by volunteers or by community organizations? To what extent can some of the current functions of mobilizers, that cannot be handled through volunteers or community organizations, be incorporated into the community policing function? Certainly, there are additional issues, such as training, but, the above seem to be the most fundamental.

The city's strategy of bringing traditional social service agencies to the table with neighborhoods with an idea of those agencies “refitting” themselves to neighborhood needs is an interesting approach but, potentially unsustainable. Preliminarily, at least, the drug court seems to have a future as a permanent court function. Other agencies seem to be on the verge of “refitting” to incorporate new functions and service, but for them the jury is still out.

Finally, a corollary of the sustainability issue is the question of what benefits CCP funding brought to Columbia, if any. Would Columbia look much different right now, or would Columbia look much different in the future, if CCP

funding had not happened? Columbia's officials, recalling their Enterprise experience, indicated that they intended to attempt to pursue its goals, whether it was funded or not. That is, they already viewed themselves as involved in the pursuit of neighborhood goals—goals which were already part of Columbia's strategic vision for the future. Nevertheless, especially because it came on the heels of Enterprise funding planning, some Columbians suggested that, "CCP let us move to another level," one where there were more neighborhoods involved, a broader agenda, and more agency players. In sum, the Columbia CCP effort was narrowly tailored to fit Columbia's agenda for neighborhoods. CCP funds were used to further an extant agenda and to leverage traditional social agencies. The leveraging was dual: it brought agencies to the "community table" (and involved them in neighborhood and community processes in new ways) and "purchased" new programs with the hope that agencies would incorporate these new efforts into their core function.

Interim Summary

During the first visit to Columbia, the evaluator met with newly appointed mobilizers in their areas and rode in a bus with city officials and mobilizers to three target neighborhoods. At these target areas, local neighborhood leaders got on the bus and explained neighborhood problems and what was either being done or planned to be done about them. During the course of that day's varied activities, and particularly at a mobilizer's office, the interactions among city officials, mobilizers, residents of neighborhoods, and kids were observed. It was obvious these varied groups had a history: they knew each other, interacted casually yet purposefully, referred to previous experiences—all those “signs” that these people had been “dealing” with each other over time.

Many of the same people attended a meeting of the Columbia Council of Neighborhoods (CCN) and the interactions there were also similarly strong. Council representatives knew one another and had the “patter” that goes with familiarity. This familiarity was shared by city officials and police. These solid interactions between the varied groups impressed the importance of a successful formula. If a city combines: 1) effective city leadership (mayor, city manager, police chief, director of housing, etc.); 2) governmental organizations, and functionaries in them, that have a common purpose under this leadership; 3) mature citizen organizations that have gone beyond both infighting and confrontation (as their sole tactic); and, 4) manageable city size, then the CCP will develop the ability to overcome obstacles and collaborate. One assumes and hopes, of course, that this network of relationships also leads to problem-solving, which ultimately improves quality of life, reduces crime, and makes for safer, happier residents.

Columbia conveyed the impression that a common vision of a plan for action had developed among community leaders, bureaucrats, and citizens. A consensus had been established which, given the size of the city and its problems, included a conviction that problems were manageable. This agreement and outlook proved infectious. In other words, early in the research phase, it appeared obvious that Columbia could make significant progress to control crime and improve the quality of life in the neighborhoods.

Over time, this view has persisted—if anything, it has been strengthened. One almost got the feel of a “community action team” when dealing with Columbia's officials, but with important and impressive distinction that they were operating on a city-wide level. Meetings attended by the city manager, the deputy city manager, a police sergeant, patrol officers (mobilizers), staff of community development and other city agencies were characterized by the non-authoritarian and open nature of the “team.” Discussions over questions about the future role of the mobilizer were thoughtful, responsible, and in-

formed—by any standard. Moreover, conversations with school, housing, church, political, and other leaders, and observed interactions among them in various forums, convincingly portrayed a high level of coordination and collaboration. Size certainly facilitates such communication, but it does not come close to explaining it. It is not uncommon for organizational and bureaucratic “wars” in other small cities to rival those of some large cities. City and CCP staff explained their ability to work together by their longevity—most of the players had been around for a long time and had learned how to work together. Certainly, familiarity between individuals over time is important, but cannot explain the level of collaboration either. “Old line bureaucrats” can be notorious in their ability to stifle creativity and protect fiefdoms. Regardless of the explanation, Columbia officials achieved a rare level of unity in their pursuit of a strategic vision for neighborhoods.

The achievements of the Columbia Police Department were observable and impressive: since 1990, they moved to implement community policing, not as a program, but as a strategy of policing a city. The department has a clear philosophy about its functions—the groundwork was laid in Henley Homes—and it is now attempting to bring its tactics, infrastructure, and administrative processes into line with this philosophy. The forthcoming organizational study and task analysis are intended to help the department line up its infrastructure and administrative processes with its new function. This reorganization is, of course, a daunting task—one that virtually every police department serious about shifting its strategy is confronted with—and it is yet to be seen how fruitful this exercise will be.

My own guess is it will get the department off to a start, but continued experimentation, learning, and feedback will be required to get it right. But it is fair to ask whether such elements ever get it “right.” Since the early decades of the twentieth century, police departments have struggled with issues of selection, promotion, personnel evaluation, etc., and these issues remain only marginally satisfactory at best. These comments do not demean attempts to improve such systems: “measuring what matters” is important to virtually every aspect of policing, from selection and maintenance of personnel, to the establishment of problem priorities, to measuring the productivity of officers, bureaus, and departments.

Leadership has been an important factor in Columbia's efforts. Chief Austin's vision of policing has become a core ingredient in virtually every attempt to restore the quality of life in Columbia. Other city officials, especially housing officials, who are strong leaders in their own right, view their efforts as severely constrained without close collaboration with the CPD. Hence the emergence of the mobilizers/officers as the bedrock of the CCP program. One cannot overemphasize the impact they, and their residential officer colleagues, appear to have had in target neighborhoods—even up to late 1996, without the support of CCP-funded service providers (this does not suggest

that they were not supported by other existent agencies or programs; they were). How much greater their impact will be with the availability of CCP-funded service providers remains to be seen.

However, I have no doubt social service, housing, employment, and other services still serve clients independently of the police department, residential officers, and mobilizers—even in target areas. The CPD, mobilizers and other officers, however, served at least two purposes: first, they made access to troubled areas possible to both service organizations and commerce and, second, they served, and brokered services to, some of the most troubled and troublesome clients. Of course, the CPD does this work within the context of their commitment to controlling their “turf” and to working preventively with children and youths.

This, of course, returns us to a question raised earlier. Is this police work? Could mobilizers do the same work if they were not police? Are mobilizers doing for citizens what other agencies should be doing? These questions, of course, have been the subject of much debate over the past decade. Their obvious significance in Columbia's neighborhoods adds more to the controversy.

Finally, what was the importance of CCP funds? Preliminarily, CCP funds appeared to be used, first, to further or complete Chief Austin's implementation of community policing. As such, the funds were used to pursue an active agenda. Second, CCP funds were used, whether intentionally or not, to test the capabilities of police as community mobilizers in a community context of a broad political, organizational, and social consensus about what needs to be done in communities. This test was interesting and promising. Moreover, funds provided resources, while not exclusively, nonetheless especially for mobilizers. The level of their activities and their worth is yet largely to be determined.

An Epilogue to Columbia's CCP Case Study

Introduction

The Comprehensive Communities Program in Columbia, SC, although funded through the city's Planning Department, focused on implementing community policing and, through a unique program of police "community mobilizers," linking troubled and troublesome citizens to social and other forms of services. Citizen and community participation in efforts is channeled through the Columbia Council of Neighborhoods (CCN) – an association made up of 64 neighborhood organizations. Other characteristics of Columbia's CCP included close linkages among city agencies, the involvement of the faith community, close working relationships among city officials, especially police, planning, housing, and school officials.

Community Policing

Community policing continues to expand in Columbia: community mobilizers continue to operate in the three original communities and have been added to one new neighborhood; the department continues to shift to community policing; and a second Koban has been opened.

The core of Columbia's CCP effort is its community mobilization program staffed by three police officers who were located in three Comprehensive Community Program target neighborhoods: Rosewood, Eau Claire, and Waverly. Although staffed by different officers now, the community mobilization effort continues in these three neighborhoods. Three new officers have been appointed "mobilizers" – consolidating their role in Columbia's anti-crime strategy. A special focus of the new mobilizers has been to link senior citizens with special skills to promising youths. Youths will not only receive mentoring and have access to job opportunities, they will be paid for their apprenticeship activities.

Two of the former mobilizers are now working citywide in crime prevention activities with neighborhood groups. The third, Officer Angel Cruz, has been assigned to a new neighborhood – basically two large apartment buildings, one private and one public. Crime and disorder problems in these buildings, and the neighborhood as a result, had been worsening. Officer Cruz was sent in to stabilize the neighborhood by dealing with its problems in a manner similar to his activities in the Eau Claire neighborhood.

This, of course, is an interesting extension of the idea of community mobilizers. It not only expands the number of community mobilizers, it stands in opposition to the traditional idea of "sweeps" and special units to deal with either neighborhood "flare-ups" or prolonged worsening of neighborhood problems.

The CPD continues to orient itself towards community policing department-wide. Sgt. Estelle Young, along with Chief Charles Austin, the primary advocate and a mainstay of community policing in Columbia, has been promoted to the position of inspector and is now responsible directly to Chief Austin. In that position she will oversee the implementation of community policing citywide. Moreover, the department has been reorganized with the patrol division being moved into the community policing bureau. To facilitate this shift in strategy, the CPD is now planning extensive in-service training of all patrol officers in problem-solving and community policing. Moreover, plans are to more closely integrate the investigative function into community policing with a focus on investigators working with patrol officers in preventing crime and solving neighborhood problems.

Finally, based on the success of the first Koban (neighborhood police station) in Gonzales Gardens Homes, a second Koban has been opened in Henley Homes. Funds for this second Koban have been provided by the Eisenhower Foundation. Some of the achievements in Gonzales Gardens include an after-school tutorial program that has grown from 14 to over 100 students (37 of whom are now on their schools' honor roles); standing room only attendance at community meetings; the involvement of 44 neighborhood volunteers; the availability of computers for students; and a recreation program for youths.

Community Mobilization

Columbia is not just a city of neighborhoods, it is a city in which neighborhoods are well organized and a city in which neighborhoods have organized into a viable citywide organization. The Columbia Council of Neighborhoods (CNN) continues to meet on a regular basis. In April, Columbia officials are planning another neighborhood summit, the purpose of which is to consolidate neighborhood participation in anti-crime activities. These neighborhood summits are considered important by community leaders: they bring together and keep informed a broad base of neighborhood residents and leaders.

Service Delivery

As noted previously, contracts for service were let in 5 general areas: citizen mobilization, diversionary programs, alternatives to incarceration; school and violence prevention; and to create a drug court. The CCP coordinator has required regular reporting and self-evaluation by each of the agencies. All reported regularly and appeared to be operating in accord with their plans. The following have been so successful that they have been funded by local sources.

The first is the adult drug court. During the last quarter of 1997 the adult drug court screened and rejected 60 defendants, had 40 defendants involved in the application process, had 40 active defendants (10 of whom were admitted during this quarter), removed 7 persons from the program (6 failed and one failed to attend), and graduated one defendant. Although the program had to deal with judicial turnover, it was generally viewed as a success. Recent judicial appointees appear to be as committed to the idea of drug courts as the original judges.

But perhaps the surest sign of the popularity of the idea of drug courts is that Columbia has developed a juvenile drug court. This program was developed as a consequence of the perceived success of the adult drug court and will be funded by the Department of Alcohol and Other Drug Abuse. The juvenile drug court was convened on January 5, 1998, and two youths were admitted to the program.

The second notable success was the alternatives to incarceration program, Passports to Success. In December of 1997 it graduated its first five juveniles. The Department of Juvenile Justice & Richland School District have agreed to fund the effort in the future.

The "Survival Training for Parents" described in the original case suffered primarily from its popularity – apparently publicity from participants themselves to peers. Forty parents were expected to participate during the grant year. Seventy-seven participated, putting a strain not only on the direct service staff, but on staff required for child care and on the ability of the program to provide meals for participants and their children. These strains were managed by the participation of additional agencies, not part of the original program of recipients of grant funds: Family Connection of S.C., Family Literacy Program/Richland School District One, Parish Nurses Organization, and the community mobilizers.

Finally, the peer mediation program, after completing their training in twenty schools, was identified as an exemplary peer mediation program “model” by the South Carolina State Department of Education and was highlighted on “The Neilsen Report” on SC ETV. Facilitators have been asked to make presentations at seven statewide educational meetings.

Synergistic Effects of CCP

As indicated in the case, Columbia is one of the smallest cities among the CCP sites. Moreover, it is a well organized city: neighborhood associations have joined in a mature city-wide council of neighborhoods and have a standing relationship with governmental agencies. Thus, the tradition of joint efforts between city government and community organizers was well established when CCP was initiated. The synergetic impact of CCP was probably most notably felt in the community mobilizer program where city agencies such as housing, schools, and planning were able to concentrate their joint efforts on troubled and troublesome families in public housing and, more recently, in private housing as well. We suspect that the joint activities of police, school, and housing officials, concentrated through the office of the mobilizer, had considerably more impact than each of the organizations individually.

Moreover, inner city churches—primarily, but not exclusively African-American—have become major partners with city government in neighborhood reclamation, especially in housing and youth work. Although the work with churches was not funded by CCP, the capacity to coordinate perfected during CCP by the city planning department allowed for closer integration of city activities with church efforts in neighborhoods. Again, we believe that these joint efforts had more of an impact than uncoordinated enterprises would have.

In sum, even in a city that was well organized with a tradition of collaboration among city agencies, churches, and citizen groups, CCP seemed to offer additional opportunities to experiment with new approaches to joint activities, especially in the community mobilizer program. It should be noted that this was collaboration on the line—that is in the provision of direct services to youths and troubled families.

Sustainment of CCP in Columbia

- Community policing continues to be developed in a systematic fashion and the CPD appears to be organizing itself in accord with such a strategy;

- “Mobilizers” continue to play central, innovative, and important roles in the CPD – their use in troublesome areas offers an interesting alternative to “sweeps” and other forms of “stranger” police interventions;
- In addition to mobilizers, Kobans are being added with Eisenhower Foundation funds to make police more accessible to citizens;
- The drug court has been maintained and a youth drug court has been established, funded by the state;
- The alternatives to incarceration program has been funded by public monies;
- A popular program, “Survival,” received help from agencies not involved in their original conception or funding; and,
- The peer mediation program has achieved state-wide recognition.

In sum, the CCP agenda in Columbia continues to play an important role in the city's attempt to control crime and provide services to youth. As discussed in the case, the combination of experience, commitment to purpose, involvement of citizens, and skill of the players seems to have moved the program forward systematically. Concluding telephone interviews with staff and review of documents and news accounts gives no impression that Columbia is retreating from its original agenda or that they are not achieving their goals. While not all of the program elements might survive the end of CCP funding, the shift to community policing, the drug court, the community mobilization, and the alternatives to incarceration elements of the program seem well established.

Appendix A: Program Descriptions

Parenting Program

The program of the Family Service Center was announced on October 18, 1996. Its theme was "Survival Training for Parents," an attempt to mentor parents in family skills. Collaborating with the Family Service Center is the Columbia Housing Authority (CHA), Boys/Girls Club, Baptist Medical Center, and the Volunteer Action Center of the Midlands. Each organization had specific responsibilities: the Family Service Center was to develop and deliver the training, screen parents and children for group services, evaluate their efforts, and maintain records; the CHA was to provide sites, distribute publicity, identify and refer clients, recruit volunteers (especially senior citizens), and develop transportation through church volunteers; the Boys/Girls Club was to identify a pool of 48 teenagers to attend child care training and to coordinate a "pot luck" dinner every night the group met through voluntary associations and churches; the Baptist Medical Center was to provide teenagers with training in child care; and, the Volunteer Action Center was to recruit eight volunteers to serve as leaders for children's activity.

The first site was Henley Homes and the plan was to involve 16-18 parents. Latimer Manor, another housing site, fielded a similar program in January, 1997. Baby sitting was provided, if required. Since most of the parents were residents of the housing development in which the program was held, transportation was not required. During the first session 100 percent of the clients were in the 18 to 34 year old age range; all were at or below the poverty level, and all were women.

Adolescent Pregnancy Prevention

Planned Parenthood of South Carolina initiated its "Rising Stars: Teens Together for a Healthier Future," a pregnancy prevention program for adolescents, in September, 1996. The first group is meeting at Latimer Homes and is serving eleven teenagers, four females and seven males, ages twelve to fifteen years old. Activities include group discussions about self respect, life decisions, refusal skills, abstinence, human sexuality, and pregnancy and HIV/AIDS. Moreover, trips and other activities have included a youth day at a USC football game, skating, a visit to a museum, and attendance at a play. Associated groups include the mobilizers and residential police officers, local colleges for mentors and role models, and a dinner sponsored by a female residential dorm at USC. Attendance at activities through the first two months was reported at 100 percent.

Domestic Violence Programming

Sistercare's program to reduce domestic violence, in collaboration with Richland Memorial Hospital, was announced on November 12, 1996. Its goals are fourfold: to create a family violence task force; train police; train judiciary; and increase public awareness. Sistercare staff and volunteers will provide assessment and intervention services 16 hours a day at Richland Memorial Hospital. Medical personnel and volunteers have been trained.

Youth Activities

Youth Diversion Program

The Columbia Urban League expanded a youth diversion program in Columbia that is widely viewed as highly successful. Their contract was let on September 1, 1996. The program stresses aggressive mentoring: volunteers, under the supervision of professional Urban League staff, have responsibility for young persons who have some history of trouble. They intervene wherever is necessary: school, home, court, and intervene as often as daily if need requires.

The Boys and Girls Clubs

The Boys and Girls Clubs received two \$50,000 grants. Both were recreational programs in city parks. In Drew Park a new program was initiated; in Lorick Park an established recreational program was extended with CCP funds.

"Fighting Back" Program

The Lexington/Richmond Alcohol & Drug Abuse Council initiated its "Fighting Back" program in October, 1996. The purpose of the program is to organize youth and provide them with activities that help them reject drugs and find support.

Peer Mediation

Conflict resolution efforts were initiated by Dr. Richard Miles in Richland County School District One in October, 1996. The goal of the program is to develop a peer mediation program in each of the district's seven high schools and nine middle schools. Training materials have been selected, a two-day training workshop scheduled (January 28-29, 1997), and a selection process for individual school program facilitators initiated.

Youth Employment

Attempts have been made to provide youth with employment through CCP. The City of Columbia's Youth Employment Program has provided a matching \$50,376 to provide both summer and after-school work experiences for youth.

Alternatives to Incarceration

The Department of Juvenile Justice's (DJJ) program, "Passport for Success: An Alternative to Juvenile Incarceration," was approved in December, 1996. The program goal is to provide a highly-structured, community-based program for juvenile offenders. Program activities will include: peer groups and family training; training and experiences that promote positive behaviors; sanctions that include restitution; rewards for those who exhibit positive behavior; substance abuse prevention through testing, assessments, and education; educational experiences and discipline skills; and environmental awareness and appreciation of community service. Collaborating staff and institutions include: three program counselors from DJJ; Richland County School District; a service provider, to be subcontracted; and an evaluator, to be subcontracted.

Drug Court

The drug court was initiated in mid-October under Judge Joseph Wilson. By November 25, they had received 71 active referrals and another twelve to fifteen referrals who were not yet fully processed. Rehabilitative services were provided by Lexington/Richland Alcohol & Drug Abuse Council. The purpose of the program is to provide mandatory treatment for minor drug offenders who voluntarily enter the program. Those involved in the program must attend two meetings a week of either Narcotics or Alcoholics Anonymous and three group-therapy sessions provided by Lexington/Richland Alcohol & Drug Abuse Council or the Lancaster Recovery Center. Both treatment organizations have received specialized drug court training. Every week, participants must submit to drug tests. It is expected that they will either keep or find employment. Every two weeks they must appear before Judge Wilson to discuss their progress. If participants are truant or fail drug tests, they will be subject to either intermediate punishments by Judge Wilson or traditional court procedures.

Appendix B: Network Analysis Strategy

Distances among the targets were measured using a structural equivalence approach (cf. Lorrain & White, 1971), which overcomes some of the shortcomings of the conventional graph theory. Following the lead of Heinz and Manikas (1992), distances among the targets were measured by determining the overlap of acquaintances for any two actors, defined here as “the degree to which the persons who are in contact with each of them are the same people (p. 840).” The main benefit of this structural equivalence approach is that it circumvents the problem of missing data and allows us to compare patterns of contact for individuals who are not interviewed. This is only possible because our sample includes a sufficient number of respondents who know both individual targets. The alternative approach (i.e. the graphic theoretic approach, which measures similarity by counting the number of links in the communication network to get from person A to X) would require the collection of data from all people in the chain.

Multidimensional scaling was used to analyze our network data. As Scott (1991, p. 151) observes, “The mathematical approach termed ‘multidimensional scaling’ embodies all the advantages of the conventional sociogram and its extensions (such as circle diagrams), but results in something much closer to a ‘map’ of the space in which the network is embedded. This is a very important advance.” For the present analysis, we have used the non-metric multi-dimensional scaling technique called “smallest space analysis,” which uses asymmetrical adjacency matrix of similarities and dissimilarities among the targets. (See Kruskal & Wish, 1978; Scott, 1991 for a discussion of advantages over metric MDS). The data have been recoded to binary form, so that 0 indicates person X has had no prior contact with person Y and 1 indicates that X and Y have had some contact, i.e. at least “every few months.” The non-metric MDS program is able to produce a matrix of Euclidean distances (based on rank orders) which is used to create a metric scatter plot. These plots are displayed as the two-dimensional figures below.

The output of MDS is a spatial display of points, where each point represents a target person in the network. The configuration of points should inform us about the pattern of affiliations and contacts in the network. The smaller the distance between two points, the greater the similarity between these two individuals with respect to their social contacts. The location of person X in multidimensional space is determined both by X’s own social connections and by the connections of those who have chosen X as an affiliate. The MDS analyses were performed using SPSS Windows 6.1.

Technically, the data could be analyzed at either the individual or organizational level and each approach has some advantages. At this time, we have

decided to analyze the results at the individual level, primarily because of some highly visible individuals who played central roles in the conceptualization and implementation of CCP programs. Still, we are able to connect individuals to organizations, and tend to view them as representatives of the organizations with which they are affiliated. We are likely to use organizations as the unit of analysis for a planned longitudinal analysis because of the attrition problem in network and panel data.

To determine the appropriate number of dimensions for the data, a series of analyses were performed and a “stress” statistic was calculated for each solution. In MDS, stress is the most widely used goodness-of-fit measure for dimensionality, with smaller values indicating that the solution is a better fit to the data (Kruskal & Wish, 1978).⁵ By plotting the stress values for solutions with up to four dimensions, it became apparent that the “elbow” point (i.e. where any additional increase in the number of dimensions fails to yield sizeable reductions in stress) occurs at two dimensions. This pattern was evident at all five sites, and hence, we elected to use a two-dimensional solution across the board. Beyond relative stress levels there is the issue of absolute stress values. Stress values ranged from 18 to 20 percent, with one exception (25%). These values are considered acceptable in the literature, although figures above 20 percent suggest a weak fit (see Kruskal, 1964; Scott, 1991).

The data were analyzed, presented, and interpreted separately for each CCP site. Statistics reported include stress values calculated from Kruskal's Stress Formula 1 and the squared correlation (R^2). The R^2 value indicates the proportion of variance of the disparity matrix data that is accounted for by their corresponding distances.

After calculating the solution and mapping a multidimensional configuration, the final step is interpretation. This involves assigning meaning to the dimensions and providing some explanation for the observed arrangement of points in space. In other words, what do the clusters of points mean and how should they be interpreted? As Scott notes (1991, p. 166), “...this process of interpretation is a creative and imaginative act on the part of the researcher. It is not something that can be produced by a computer alone.”

⁵Technically, stress is defined as “the square root of a normalized ‘residual sum of squares.’” Dimensionality is defined as “the number of coordinate axes, that is, the number of coordinate values used to locate a point in the space.” (Kruskal & Wish, 1978, p. 48-49).

Limitations and Cautions

We should be cautious not to over-interpret or draw causal inferences about the observed networks for several reasons. First, these analyses and graphic presentations provide a one-time snapshot of interactions between individuals early in the CCP project. Consequently, these data will not allow us to tease out any pre-existing relationships and networks that may be operating. Thus, whether these networks are CCP-induced or reflect pre-existing relationships is unknown. A longitudinal look at these networks is currently in progress to see how these linkages change during the course of the CCP funding. Combined with careful fieldwork, this should give us a stronger assessment of CCP's contribution. Second, these analyses are limited to interactions between individuals, which may or may not reflect the nature and extent of partnerships between agencies. To capture interagency contacts, our unit of analysis for the longitudinal analysis will be the organization/agency rather than the individual (This analysis strategy also avoids the individual-level attrition problem that is always present in longitudinal data). Finally, the present analysis is limited by the nature of the original sample. Who ends up in the sample can have a large influence on the outcome of network analysis. While we are satisfied that this problem has been minimized by allowing sites to self-define a comprehensive list of CCP participants, nevertheless, we suspect that some individuals and groups have been overlooked at each site. Generally speaking, one might characterize this network analysis as a study of "elites" — in this case, community, city and agency leaders. Networks that may exist among street-level employees and community volunteers are under-represented (although not completely absent) from this analysis.

Despite these limitations, network analysis provides an important empirical tool for examining the nature and extent of community-based partnerships and coalitions. While it is easy to talk about "interagency cooperation" in grant proposals or in personal interviews, it is not so easy to create the illusion of a network (for the benefit of researchers and others) when members of that network are asked, individually, about their frequency of interaction with one another. The results here suggest that the number and density of networks varies by site and that resultant patterns of contact are generally consistent with our field observations.

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